Kissinger

Book report on “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of the History to the Military Profession” edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich

Recent military events have raised questions not only within the military profession but in the general public at large questioning military actions and subsequent outcomes. For example, the recent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan has sparked debate on every aspect of the U.S. presence and activities in Afghanistan. In hindsight, a closer examination of military history could have provided a glimpse of the possible future. For example, prior to the U.S. committing trillions of dollars and thousands of troops into Afghanistan, a look at Afghanistan’s history from the times of Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union, would have demonstrated the futility in trying to occupy that nation. There has been no nation that has successfully controlled Afghanistan, ever. While “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of the History to the Military Profession” does not specifically identify U.S. occupation and withdrawal form Afghanistan, it does clearly articulate the necessity of military professionals to study military history and in so doing, would allow military professionals the ability to limit, if not, avoid the major mistakes from the past and have the right tools to make strategic decisions.

An analysis of this book requires an analysis of its authors, or in this case, its editors Dr. Williamson Murray and COL (retired) Richard Hart Sinnreich. Professor Murray graduated from Yale University in 1963 with honors in history.  He then served five years as an officer in the United States Air Force.  He returned to Yale University where he received his Ph.D. in military-diplomatic history. He taught two years in the Yale history department before moving on to Ohio State in 1977 as a military and diplomatic historian. Professor Murray has taught at a number of academic and military institutions, including the Air War College, the United States Military Academy, and the Naval War College.  He has also served as a Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Navy War College, the Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, the Matthew C. Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, the Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum, and the Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. He is also a renowned author and recognized expert in military history. ( www.history.osu.edu/people) Richard Hart Sinnreich retired from the U.S. Army in 1990. A 1965 West Point graduate, he earned a master’s degree in foreign affairs from Ohio State University and is a graduate of the Army’s Command and General Staff College, the National War College and the Advanced Military Studies Program. He helped found the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and published widely in military and foreign affairs while on active duty. In 1977, he drafted NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study and wrote the final draft of FM 100-5 Operations in 1986. Since retiring from military service, Sinnreich has worked as an independent consultant, columnist and historian. ( www.ausa.org/people) The significance is both Murray and Sinnreich have insider insight on the lack of emphasis in the military profession on the study of military history, from personal experience, and this insight must have influenced the selection of works in this book.

“The Past as Prologue” as the title infers, this is not a traditional book analyzing military history from a single author. It is a collection of individual works from various contributors that are both military and civilian that demonstrate the importance of military history to the military professional. In an era where modernization, decisions made on computer modeling, smart weapon technology, objectives-based operations, and politically fueled decision making, the idea of going back to the roots of military study appear more applicable than ever. In this modern battlefield, where decisions are made hastily and communicated at the speed of electrons, the concept of being equipped with a broad range of experiences or knowledge should increase the probability of developing an achievable objective, but help dimmish risk of failure.

The format of the book lends to exemplify the message on the importance of military history to the military profession. There are two major parts of the book titled appropriately part 1 and part 2. Part 1 collection provides a balance of example and insights from practitioners to provide a broader perspective on the dangers and necessity of studying military history. This examination how the military has necessity and lesson on the use of military history by military professionals begins with essays from British and American General Officers that speaks to their personal experience and reflections as professional military officers. The most significant take away from part was from John Kriszely highlights that the study of military history “as part of the much wider context of war studies alongside more contemporary strategic and social studies” (p. 26) is necessary to avoid dangers of “drawing false lessons”. (p.26). But even Kriszely understood the inadequacy of military history programs within the military and as such concluded the necessity for the professional military to self-study. “…we must accept that the necessary education in military history is largely a matter for individual self-education”.

Part 2 continues to demonstrate through examples and insights on the dangers of limited focus on the study of military history by military professionals. Classical insights from Thucydides and Clausewitz on the necessity of studying military history. Clausewitz taught that war in unpredictable, chaotic, and dangerous. As such, understanding a s much about the art of war would be prudent to those in the profession of executing war. Part 2 continues to emphasize through analysis the gross outcomes that occurred from previous militaries. For example, Andrew Gordon provides insight on Royal Navy officers in the 19th century, Jonathan Bailey examination of technology and its implications during the Russo-Japanese war, and J. Paul Harris how not studying the lessons that could have been learned from World War I were the reasons for the British not being prepared for World War II.

The importance of military history to the military profession is self-evident, but this book goes beyond that. The specific essays, the sequencing, and the credibility of the editors and authors give this work valuable contribution to historical scholarship. In some sense, the application of personal lessons learned and perspective could be considered a primary source though the book would not categorize as a primary source. This mixture of firsthand account, story-telling, and analysis provide a compelling justification for the necessity of include this book to the collections of scholastic military history works. In many ways, reading the various essays, while it may defray from projecting itself as a literary marvel of historical value, on the contrary makes this almost 300-page book very easy to read. As such, one could argue it is better than some very difficult to digest deep in thought books like the multi-volume books written by Clausewitz.

This book is more relevant for the masses than for deep thinking strategic minded military historians. For the average professional military officer, this would be a fantastic first read as it could act as the catalyst motivating professional military officers to self-study military history as noted by John Kriszely. The weakness of the book is that it is relatively one sided. As such, there is not counter examination nor an ability for the non-believer to have an opportunity to examine the theme of this book from a counter perspective, which would have provided the book a broader effect. In addition, the book could have added more recent military history event essays like lessons learned from the Vietnam war, or first Gulf War. That being said, the readability, style, and organization made this book a pleasant reading experience. The consistency, evidence, and arguments were compelling. Any reader would have walked away from this book not only convinced on the importance of military history to the military professional, but able to argue for it.

In conclusion, I recommend this book. This should be an initial book provided to all the military officers upon commissioning and then again when they reach mid and upper ranks to remind them on the necessity to study military history and the dangers that exist when they don’t. This may help them to avoid the pitfalls of the fast and simple solutions, but rely on history to help them make military decisions.

Book report on “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of the History to the Military Profession” edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich

Recent military events have raised questions not only within the military profession but in the general public at large questioning military actions and subsequent outcomes. For example, the recent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan has sparked debate on every aspect of the U.S. presence and activities in Afghanistan. In hindsight, a closer examination of military history could have provided a glimpse of the possible future. For example, prior to the U.S. committing trillions of dollars and thousands of troops into Afghanistan, a look at Afghanistan’s history from the times of Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union, would have demonstrated the futility in trying to occupy that nation. There has been no nation that has successfully controlled Afghanistan, ever. While “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of the History to the Military Profession” does not specifically identify U.S. occupation and withdrawal form Afghanistan, it does clearly articulate the necessity of military professionals to study military history and in so doing, would allow military professionals the ability to limit, if not, avoid the major mistakes from the past and have the right tools to make strategic decisions.

An analysis of this book requires an analysis of its authors, or in this case, its editors Dr. Williamson Murray and COL (retired) Richard Hart Sinnreich. Professor Murray graduated from Yale University in 1963 with honors in history.  He then served five years as an officer in the United States Air Force.  He returned to Yale University where he received his Ph.D. in military-diplomatic history. He taught two years in the Yale history department before moving on to Ohio State in 1977 as a military and diplomatic historian. Professor Murray has taught at a number of academic and military institutions, including the Air War College, the United States Military Academy, and the Naval War College.  He has also served as a Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Navy War College, the Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, the Matthew C. Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, the Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum, and the Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. He is also a renowned author and recognized expert in military history. ( www.history.osu.edu/people) Richard Hart Sinnreich retired from the U.S. Army in 1990. A 1965 West Point graduate, he earned a master’s degree in foreign affairs from Ohio State University and is a graduate of the Army’s Command and General Staff College, the National War College and the Advanced Military Studies Program. He helped found the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and published widely in military and foreign affairs while on active duty. In 1977, he drafted NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Improvement Study and wrote the final draft of FM 100-5 Operations in 1986. Since retiring from military service, Sinnreich has worked as an independent consultant, columnist and historian. ( www.ausa.org/people) The significance is both Murray and Sinnreich have insider insight on the lack of emphasis in the military profession on the study of military history, from personal experience, and this insight must have influenced the selection of works in this book.

“The Past as Prologue” as the title infers, this is not a traditional book analyzing military history from a single author. It is a collection of individual works from various contributors that are both military and civilian that demonstrate the importance of military history to the military professional. In an era where modernization, decisions made on computer modeling, smart weapon technology, objectives-based operations, and politically fueled decision making, the idea of going back to the roots of military study appear more applicable than ever. In this modern battlefield, where decisions are made hastily and communicated at the speed of electrons, the concept of being equipped with a broad range of experiences or knowledge should increase the probability of developing an achievable objective, but help dimmish risk of failure.

The format of the book lends to exemplify the message on the importance of military history to the military profession. There are two major parts of the book titled appropriately part 1 and part 2. Part 1 collection provides a balance of example and insights from practitioners to provide a broader perspective on the dangers and necessity of studying military history. This examination how the military has necessity and lesson on the use of military history by military professionals begins with essays from British and American General Officers that speaks to their personal experience and reflections as professional military officers. The most significant take away from part was from John Kriszely highlights that the study of military history “as part of the much wider context of war studies alongside more contemporary strategic and social studies” (p. 26) is necessary to avoid dangers of “drawing false lessons”. (p.26). But even Kriszely understood the inadequacy of military history programs within the military and as such concluded the necessity for the professional military to self-study. “…we must accept that the necessary education in military history is largely a matter for individual self-education”.

Part 2 continues to demonstrate through examples and insights on the dangers of limited focus on the study of military history by military professionals. Classical insights from Thucydides and Clausewitz on the necessity of studying military history. Clausewitz taught that war in unpredictable, chaotic, and dangerous. As such, understanding a s much about the art of war would be prudent to those in the profession of executing war. Part 2 continues to emphasize through analysis the gross outcomes that occurred from previous militaries. For example, Andrew Gordon provides insight on Royal Navy officers in the 19th century, Jonathan Bailey examination of technology and its implications during the Russo-Japanese war, and J. Paul Harris how not studying the lessons that could have been learned from World War I were the reasons for the British not being prepared for World War II.

The importance of military history to the military profession is self-evident, but this book goes beyond that. The specific essays, the sequencing, and the credibility of the editors and authors give this work valuable contribution to historical scholarship. In some sense, the application of personal lessons learned and perspective could be considered a primary source though the book would not categorize as a primary source. This mixture of firsthand account, story-telling, and analysis provide a compelling justification for the necessity of include this book to the collections of scholastic military history works. In many ways, reading the various essays, while it may defray from projecting itself as a literary marvel of historical value, on the contrary makes this almost 300-page book very easy to read. As such, one could argue it is better than some very difficult to digest deep in thought books like the multi-volume books written by Clausewitz.

This book is more relevant for the masses than for deep thinking strategic minded military historians. For the average professional military officer, this would be a fantastic first read as it could act as the catalyst motivating professional military officers to self-study military history as noted by John Kriszely. The weakness of the book is that it is relatively one sided. As such, there is not counter examination nor an ability for the non-believer to have an opportunity to examine the theme of this book from a counter perspective, which would have provided the book a broader effect. In addition, the book could have added more recent military history event essays like lessons learned from the Vietnam war, or first Gulf War. That being said, the readability, style, and organization made this book a pleasant reading experience. The consistency, evidence, and arguments were compelling. Any reader would have walked away from this book not only convinced on the importance of military history to the military professional, but able to argue for it.

In conclusion, I recommend this book. This should be an initial book provided to all the military officers upon commissioning and then again when they reach mid and upper ranks to remind them on the necessity to study military history and the dangers that exist when they don’t. This may help them to avoid the pitfalls of the fast and simple solutions, but rely on history to help them make military decisions.