INTL613Wk8

HLS Challenges

On the terrorism threats to the na�on, it has shi�ed from al Qaeda to a much more complex and mul�faceted threat with the emergence of the so called Islamic State (ISIS) and increased homegrown terrorism. As the Intelligence Community’s Worldwide Threat Assessment states,

US-based homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will remain the most frequent and unpredictable Sunni violent extremist threat to the US homeland. They will be spurred on by terrorist groups’ public calls to carry out a�acks in the West. The threat of HVE a�acks will persist, and some a�acks will probably occur with li�le or no warning (Coats, 2017, p. 5).

How to collect and share intelligence on domes�c threats by individuals who may not even be formal members of a terrorist group -- but capable of self-equipping and self-targe�ng innocent civilians -- is a very significant domes�c intelligence challenge. Countering ISIS and other inspired low-level individuals already within the homeland is a task that requires interagency collabora�on across all levels of government; well beyond what it would have taken to stop the 9/11 a�acks (Gardner, 2016). This is further complicated by yet another challenge – the prolifera�on of cheap encryp�on technologies that terrorists have employed to plan and coordinate a�acks. These encrypted communica�ons are not accessible to law enforcement or intelligence agencies, even when they have authority to collect on or monitor the targeted individuals using them.

Finally, an important note to end this course on relates to the lack of a single lead federal agency for intelligence support to homeland security. In fact, there is not even a government wide accepted term for this func�on, and ‘HSINT’ itself is not even defined within DHS. As the reading by Nelson (2013) stated,

Department will first need to define what cons�tutes ‘homeland security intelligence.’ Given the variety of en��es from across the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector involved in the collec�on and analysis of homeland security intelligence, a common defini�on is of immense value. DHS should provide a common defini�on for all those involved in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. The Department must also be�er establish its posi�on within this enterprise. While a variety of agencies and organiza�ons are capable of collec�ng and analyzing this intelligence, the mul�tude of en��es involved demands that there be a single, coordinated point of control for the movement and distribu�on of this intelligence. In order to increase its effec�veness, DHS should firmly establish itself as this focal point, serving

as the primary lead organiza�on for the movement of informa�on and intelligence between the federal government, state and local governments, and private industry.

Nelson offered the view that DHS should be the focal point for HSINT, but other experts in this field think the FBI should be the lead domes�c intelligence agency. Further, there are some prac��oners who assess that neither DHS nor the FBI (with their law enforcement focus) should lead, but an en�rely new domes�c intelligence agency should be created along the lines of the Bri�sh MI-5 or the Canadian Intelligence and Security Service. So this leaves us at the end of our course asking the ques�on: what is the future of HSINT?

Matthew Alcoke Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington Institute for Near East Policy Counterterrorism Lecture Series Washington, D.C. November 19, 2019

The Evolving and Persistent Terrorism Threat to the Homeland Remarks prepared for delivery.

First and foremost, I would like to thank you for the invitation to be part of the Washington Institute’s Counterterrorism Lecture Series. It is an honor to represent the FBI and to speak to you at this esteemed event. Today, I will discuss the ever-evolving terrorism landscape, with an eye to the homeland. My intent is to provide an overview of the threat as we see it at the FBI today, including the investigative challenges and opportunities presented by this shifting paradigm.

To level set before we begin, I’d like to explain how the FBI works counterterrorism. The FBI categorizes terrorism investigations into two programs: international terrorism and domestic terrorism. International terrorism includes investigations into members of designated foreign terrorist organizations, state sponsors of terrorism, and homegrown violent extremists. The latter are individuals inside the United States, who have been radicalized primarily in the United States, and who are inspired by, but not receiving individual direction from, foreign terrorist organizations.

Domestic terrorists are individuals who commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of ideological goals stemming from domestic issues. A majority of our domestic terrorism cases fall into one of four categories: racially motivated violent extremism, anti-government/anti-authority extremism, animal rights/environmental extremism, and abortion extremism.

Because of the interests of the audience here today, my comments will focus largely on the international terrorism threat to the U.S. But to be clear, preventing acts of terrorism, regardless of ideology, is the FBI’s number one priority.

I’d like to set the stage by discussing the FBI’s evolution in the 18 years since 9/11, and why we are stronger, more agile, and better able to confront the threat of terrorism—both international and domestic. After the 9/11 attacks, we asked ourselves, “What could we have done better?” And every day since, we have asked ourselves, “What do we need to do to keep the American people safe from terrorism today, tomorrow, and the day after that?”

We’ve torn down walls separating agencies and preventing collaboration. We’ve significantly improved the way we share information, not just among law enforcement and the intelligence community, but also with the private sector and foreign partners. Sharing is now the rule, rather than the exception.

Because of this increased collaboration, we’ve developed a whole-of-government approach to combating terrorism over the past 18 years. During the course of our investigations, we bring the full force of the U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial system to bear against these actors.

Underpinning all of our successes is our commitment to partnerships. In fact, one of the most critical elements of the FBI’s counterterrorism strategy is the Joint Terrorism Task Force, a partnership between law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels committed to preventing acts of terrorism.

The FBI has JTTFs in all 56 of our field offices around the country, with over 4,000 investigators, bringing a holistic capability to the fight. It’s an integrated investigative approach to terrorist detection and prevention.

What hasn’t changed is the FBI’s commitment to preventing all acts of terrorism in the United States and against U.S. interests overseas. The whole-of-government approach we now bring to the counterterrorism mission positions us to best address the dynamic threat that we face today.

Eighteen years after 9/11, what does this terrorism threat look like? I’ll begin with what we might consider “longstanding” terrorism threats emanating from overseas groups.

We are certainly still laser-focused on foreign terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS. As you know, these organizations wish to cause us harm and pose the biggest Sunni terrorist threat to U.S. interests overseas. Simply put, the lethal threat from these groups persists despite significant setbacks and defeats.

Al Qaeda in particular has proven resilient, despite the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. Al Qaeda’s desire to carry out large-scale, spectacular attacks in the United States is clear. And we’re also paying attention to al Qaeda’s affiliates, like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Qaeda in Syria.

As we continue to monitor the situation in Syria, we know the threat from ISIS remains, despite its loss of territory, resources, and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Even after suffering significant defeats, ISIS can now rely on global support from its branches.

Of particular concern within our own borders, ISIS’s model of online recruitment and propaganda encourages supporters to take action against soft targets from wherever they are located.

We’ve seen this call to action through online channels play out across America. In March, a man arrested not too far from here in Maryland admitted to planning a vehicle ramming attack in the name of ISIS. And in August, authorities disrupted a plot to conduct a stabbing in Queens on behalf of the terrorist organization. Neither of these individuals received specific direction from ISIS in their attack plan but sought out and found propaganda online, which inspired them to plot an attack.

In addition to countering the threat from Sunni terrorist groups, we also have worked to mitigate the threat from Iranian supported groups who are plotting and conducting attacks. We know the government of Iran aims to preserve the regime and export its Islamic revolution worldwide, through the use of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, its strategic partner Hizballah, and its proxy groups positioned to harm U.S. interests in the Middle East.

The threat has also reached our shores. Recently, two men pleaded guilty to conducting surveillance against Jewish and Israeli facilities and against Iranian dissidents in the U.S. at the direction of the government of Iran.

Although these foreign terrorist groups and state actors have suffered significant defeats through military and intelligence efforts by the U.S. and others, we can’t take our eye off the ball. Their violent determination persists.

I’ll end here with discussing these organizations and nation states, because I’d like to also discuss how the threat has evolved within our borders. A decade ago, these organizations posed the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. Today, as evidenced by recent attacks, the greatest threat we face in the homeland emanates from self-radicalized lone actors, of any ideology, who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons.

These lone actors span our international and domestic terrorism cases, and include homegrown violent extremists, inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, and domestic violent extremists, inspired to commit violence in furtherance of domestic ideologies.

Homeland plotting shifted from in-person networks motivated by local radicalizers to self-starting violent extremists inspired by online ideologues and propaganda. We are seeing the Internet and social media enable individuals to engage and encourage other like-minded individuals without face-to-face meetings. As FBI Director Christopher Wray often says, “Terrorism moves at the speed of social media.” We find that to be true every day in our investigations.

An individual sitting in front of a computer in one country can communicate with, encourage, and inspire multiple extremist actors thousands of miles away. Social media provides an avenue for the rapid movement of information in a realm where radicalization is often a personal and anonymous process.

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N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y

The US Faces Cyber Threats on Multiple Fronts of Infrastructure JULY 12, 2019  • B I S H O P G A R R I S O N

ishop Garrison is a scholar at the 2019 Aspen Security Forum.

As the technology that supports our society continuously evolves, so have the

threats we face from bad actors poised to exploit it. It’s not simply the “grid”, although that is at risk. In fact, Russia is said to have spent years inserting

malicious malware into American oil and gas systems that have left many

portions of infrastructure vulnerable. As this takes place, there is an ongoing debate over the cyber security threat Huawei may pose to the world’s future 5G

network and privacy, and a potential escalation of cyber offensive operations

between the United States and Russia, as recent reports indicate the former

Soviet nation’s power grid has been infiltrated by U.S. forces. But it goes beyond our hard infrastructure; it’s also our democracy infrastructure, where in recent

weeks we’ve seen the rise of deepfakes and cheapfakes, election hacking and

engineering, and the risk of foreign entities unduly influencing democratic elections around the world. All of these issues and occurrences highlight that

America has yet to properly deal with the vulnerabilities within its electoral

process. The country has not created a comprehensive cyber plan across the

multiple organizations affected by these problems. And the issues persist while

our electoral process remains susceptible to attack. 

The Mueller investigation disclosed intrusions into the county election systems of two Floridian municipalities. Further, the FBI believes the operation allowed

foreign operatives to go further and breach the government system of at least

one of the counties. Florida has begun to take corrective measures to address this situation that, against the backdrop of the aforementioned challenges we

face, seems almost Kafkaesque. Governor DeSantis announced that an

investment of an additional $2 million in unspent federal grant fund will be used

to address the cyber shortcomings, but in an age of cheap software and unaffiliated hackers what will that money truly amount to? Also, what type of

comprehensive response will we see across state and party lines during arguably

the most partisan point in our history? As the Senate Majority Leader has

blocked election security legislation and the President has stated, and later retracted, his thoughts that he would accept information on political opponents

from a foreign source, what can states do to close the gap on the challenges they

face? Compounding these ongoing problems, America has yet to understand or tackle the threat that minority communities face from ongoing schemes that

target them through social media engineering and information warfare.

The security of all parts of our infrastructure, with particular attention to our

election systems, should be a non-partisan issue. Moreover, it’s a problem for all liberal democracies and should be of great concern to NATO, the UN, and other

like-minded coalitions. The United States and its allies are faced with a

multifaceted, highly complex threat that we are currently not capable to handle

or, arguably, fully aware of the scope and depth. Ultimately, we must determine

how to bridge political divides in order to ensure all aspects of our infrastructure —and democracy—remain secure and free from foreign influence of any kind.

The views and opinions of the author are his own and do not necessarily reflect

those of the Aspen Institute.

R E L A T E D

D E F E N S E P O L I C Y

A Maritime Challenge to North Korea Sanctions

J U LY 1 , 2 0 1 9 • B R Y C E B A R R O S

The Future of HSINT

As we conclude this course, our final week focuses on the future of HSINT as well as challenges for intelligence support to the homeland security enterprise. There are a great many challenges that have already been addressed such as the difficulty of sharing intelligence and collabora�ng and synchronizing ac�ons among the dozens of federal organiza�ons and hundreds of state and local agencies across the na�on. There is also a very real and con�nuing threat from terrorists overseas and here at home that are a significant challenge for HSINT. As the required reading by Nelson (2013) stated,

While the pressing need to prevent further terrorist a�acks a�er 9/11 naturally led DHS to devote much of its energy and resources to protec�ng against this threat, the Department can no longer afford to focus on al Qaeda as the preeminent threat to the na�on…new challenges are emerging. DHS must find ways to increase the na�on’s defenses against cybera�acks, establish enhanced systems for secure screening and creden�aling, and improve intelligence and informa�on sharing, all while opera�ng in a constrained fiscal environment (para. 2).

This quote touches on a just a few of the significant challenges for intelligence support to homeland security enterprise. For example, there are many cyber threat actors that span from countries to non-state terrorists and even unaligned hackers who can do grave damage by way of a keyboard and an internet connec�on. Collec�ng on these threats and collabora�ng across the many government agencies with a role to play is cybersecurity is a highly complex task. Sharing informa�on on terrorists was addressed in the intelligence reforms a�er 9/11 by crea�ng the interagency Na�onal Counter Terrorism Center that was discussed in week 2. However, there is no comparable hub for sharing intelligence on cyber threats -- while at the same �me there are even more agencies with a key role in cyber security than counter-terrorism. This homeland intelligence task is made significantly more complex by the fact that cyber security -- and therefore intelligence support to cyber security -- must include the private sector where 85% of our cri�cal infrastructure is owned and operated.