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Threats and Resiliency

Our ports need to be resilient to these threat vectors as a nation. Dr. Flynn (mentioned above) was the keynote speaker at the 2020 Maritime Risk

Symposium, discussing maritime security and resilience. Watch the keynote speech here:

MRS 2020: Keynote - FlynnMRS 2020: Keynote - Flynn

When dealing with any aspect of transportation, in this day and age, terrorism is a real threat. Maritime transit and ports handle vast amounts of goods

traveling throughout the world. As we have seen in the past few years, terrorists will utilize any means possible to in�ict terror on the transportation

system. The reality of a nuclear threat to an American port can be answered by posing the question. Terrorists have the global funds to purchase either

the actual bomb or the means to make the bomb. The ability for it to enter a port is also very real. Jonathan Medalia wrote the Congressional Research

Service report entitled “Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. According to CBP, the latest statistics indicate that 11 million

containers entered the United States.

The other attack vector that has received tremendous press is a small boat or land-based attack on a Liquid Natural Gas carrier or LNG. But is this a

plausible threat? Again, there are two sides to this discussion. In 2004, Sandia National Laboratory, a Department of Energy facility, conducted a

signi�cant and academically rigorous study. The lab considered an LNG tanker as “vulnerable” and the possibility of an attack “credible.” In 2016,

numerous news organizations, including Reuters, reported that the NG Tanker GALICIA SPIRIT came under attack…yet no one boarded the ship. In

2017, the LNG tanker La Macncha Knutsen came under from pirates yet was not stopped or boarded. This 173,656-cbm used a speed advantage to

minimize the attack.

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Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular

There is another threat vector that you may not have considered before…this is a non-indigenous species in ballast water discharged from merchant

ships. Within the NVIC, the following was provided:

The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention) was adopted in

February 2004 and entered into force in September 2017. Although the United States has not rati�ed the BWM Convention, we acknowledge

this important milestone for controlling the spread of invasive species by ballast water as one of the greater challenges for reducing the

environmental footprint of global shipping (NVIC 01-2018).

The Great Lakes have been one connected body of water that has faced SIGNIFICANT invasive species issues. Detroit Public Television, under the

“Great Lakes Now” e�ort, noted in 2021, “Of the many possible new invasive threats to the Great Lakes, 144 stand out in particular, according to a

study released in 2021” (PBS Detroit). The study was reported in the article by Davidson1, Tucker, Chadderton, and Weibert entitled, “Development of

a surveillance species list to inform aquatic invasive species management in the Laurentian Great Lake,” published in Management of Biological

Invasions 2021.

Continued PBS (2021), “The study lists 144 �sh, plants, and invertebrates that could invade the Great Lakes or expand their range. The species were

listed by the risk of damage they pose to the Great Lakes environment or culture and the likelihood they’d be introduced by one of six pathways” (PBS

Detroit). Continued the Davidson, Tucker, Chadderton and Weibert article, “Using the Great Lakes Aquatic Nonindigenous Species Risk Assessment

for consistent assessment across taxa, the surveillance species list consisted of 144 species: 64 plants, 4 algae, 40 �sh, 5 mollusks, 28 crustaceans, 1

platyhelminthes and 2 bryozoans.”

Did you know this was such an issue in the United States?

When you consider all of these threat vectors, there continues to be a danger….even today. How do you address it? Using a quantitative risk

assessment capability to analyze the threat, vulnerability, and consequence.

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Dirty Bomb Threats

While threat assessments need to be revamped in combat operations, Dirty Bomb threats regarding port security must be taken seriously. According

to an article on Dirty Bombs by the Council on Foreign Relations, “A “dirty bomb,” also known as a radiological weapon or a radiological dispersal

device (RDD), is a conventional explosive packaged with radioactive materials. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional

explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination (hence the term “dirty”).” These bombs are a real threat and could a�ect port operations for an

extended period if detonated in or around a port. The impact would be signi�cant as critical supply nodes would be a�ected…and the skilled labor

within the port could potentially be contaminated.

The scenario is twofold….a truck detonates a radioactive dispersion device or RDD into a port. The second scenario is that a radioactive device is

brought into a port within a shipping container, which is 40� or longer, that may have started its journey half a world away. Along with the port itself, a

dirty bomb would seriously a�ect the economy that the port supports due to canceled operations and signi�cant disruption of the Maritime

Transportation System or MTS. The blast and radiation would suspend all access and movement into and around the a�ected area and delay

operations until the area was reconstructed, cleaned, and deemed safe by the appropriate agency. Therefore, dirty bombs should be deterred if at all

possible.

How plausible is a dirty bomb in the Maritime environment? It depends on who you ask. A�er 9/11 Dr. Stephen Flynn, now with Northeastern

University, became a national expert based on the idea of a “bomb in a box” attack. This attack vector should be considered serious. Additionally,

Veronique de Rugy noted in a piece entitled, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?” American Enterprise Institute. Working Paper #115.

September 7, 2005. p. 8”.

The probability of a terrorist attack with an actual nuclear weapon cannot be reliably estimated, and it is undoubtedly lower than the probability of

virtually any other type of terrorist attack. But the devastation from such an attack would be so overwhelming that, based on expected damages — the

probability multiplied by the consequences — this threat must be considered one of the greatest dangers America faces...

But now you must ask yourself if a terrorist can develop such a weapon. Remember, to create an e�ect RDD, you need a radioactive substance and an

exploding capacity using a conventional explosive.

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Introduction: Maritime Security Threat Vectors

The American mindset is that we have the most powerful economy, military, well, everything. It is great to have pride and to believe in your country.

But when other countries decide they do not have the same view or mindset and want to let us know about it, they �nd our weaknesses and exploit

them. As the most powerful military in the world, America has become complacent in its ability to express its will on other countries that we are

�ghting. But when those countries utilize non-conventional tactics, it becomes more challenging to combat, and the statement "where the tactics of

the weak confound the tactics of the strong" could not be more accurate. As stated by Wilson, Sullivan, and Kempfer, “US military strategy at the

beginning of the 21st Century is not matched to the threat it is �ghting:

Our strategy — i.e., the pre-emptive application of hi-tech "precision" �repower on a "central front" against an adversary who is making a "last stand"

— in �ghting an amalgam of fourth-generation threats sounds and acts as if it were engaging the more traditional military threats in a 2GW or 3GW

nation-versus-nation con�ict”. The 4GW being staged as we speak does not require hi-tech military weapons but the ability to shape the hearts and

minds of citizens in the areas we are �ghting. As Carl Von Clausewitz stated over and over again, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other

means” (Grose, 2001). Therefore, we must change our tactics according to our enemy to achieve our desired objectives, especially in this 4GW.

Baneejee (2020) noted:

For four centuries, the law of the sea has rested on the principle of mare liberum or the freedom of the high seas. The oceans have traditionally

been regarded as areas over which no state could claim dominion or sovereignty. Nations desirous of countering security threats have found

that their e�orts are curtailed by the traditional paradigm, partly because of the resistance from other states to permit further derogation. Several

extant laws aim to contain the spread of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) material through a variety of measures. Certain

bilateral agreements between nations exist, but the foreign vessel still tends to remain sacrosanct primarily because of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea. Normally, merchant vessels in the open seas may only be stopped and searched without �ag state consent in

rare circumstances. In light of the scourge of a terrorist CBRN attack hanging like a Damocles’ sword upon the world today, this article seeks to

discern whether a state possesses the right to interdict and search vessels of another state suspected of ferrying CBRN material in international

waters. Countering the kind of faceless non-state actor threats of the 21st Century would require curtailing some of these freedoms earlier

enjoyed in the open seas. Better integration of maritime laws, such as the relevant sections of the UNSCR 1540, the PSI, and the SUA 2005 with

the UNCLOS, is of the essence.

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Feb 16, 2022

MTS-ISAC 2021 Annual Report Release Helps Mark Second Anniversary MTS Intelligence Shares Increase a Staggering Fifty Percent

The Maritime Transportation System Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MTS-ISAC) just released their 2021

Annual Report. Founded in 2020, the ISAC’s second annual report highlights the continued progress the maritime

community has made through active public-private peer engagement of critical infrastructure stakeholders.

Building upon a foundation of leadership and trust, the number of inbound MTS intelligence shares soared by fifty

percent. In addition, several Information Exchanges, a key pillar of the MTS-ISAC community-based approach,

were operationalized to enable stakeholders to work more closely together and create a common baseline

understanding of the cyber threats they are facing. Altogether, the report highlights key milestones and results

achieved during the second year to improve resiliency across the sector.

Based upon the reporting the MTS-ISAC received in 2021, maritime critical infrastructure stakeholders saw a

marked increase in cyber-attacks from the previous year. They regularly fended off a variety of threats, including

zero-day attacks, ransomware, and credential harvesting phishing campaigns from advanced persistent threat

(APT) actors. Simultaneously, they were challenged by aggressive scanning activity that targeted their networks

and systems looking for a wide range of software vulnerabilities. The nearly 1,500 MTS stakeholder shares related

to this range of activity allowed the MTS-ISAC to publish 89 cybersecurity advisories and 753 indicator bulletins

that provided early situational awareness to peer stakeholders.

“Our second year was exceptional. Any doubt as to whether successful cybersecurity information sharing could be

achieved in the maritime sector has long evaporated,” stated Scott Dickerson, the MTS-ISAC’s Executive Director.

“In addition to the launch of our Information Exchange program, which substantially contributed to the growth of

our stakeholder base and provided critical insights to the threat activity targeting our sector, we added critical

infrastructure partners and adopted Cyware as our information sharing platform. While we are excited about our

2021 accomplishments, we know that more challenges are ahead of us than behind us. But we are firm in our

belief that we’ll be best prepared as a community working together to address the challenges, and we‘ll

accomplish more as a result.”

The MTS-ISAC encourages all port and marine stakeholders to download a free copy of the report to better

understand the challenges faced and gains made by this important critical infrastructure sector. Also, the MTS-

ISAC would like to extend a special thanks to their board of directors, stakeholders, partners, collaborators,

interns, and everyone who has taken an interest in supporting its mission. “We are most effective when supported

by an engaged group of stakeholders,” added Christy Coffey, VP of Operations. “Our stakeholders make all the

difference. We are so grateful that our industry and state and local stakeholders showed up as cyber leaders

willing to share threat information across the maritime sector on a daily basis.”

2021 MTS-ISAC Annual Report.pdf Download PDF • 4.26MB

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

National Strategy for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Standards In pursuit of the President’s goal of national preparedness, it is essential that the nation has reliable chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) countermeasures equipment that can be used with confidence for the protection of life, health, property and commerce.

The Departments of Homeland Security and Commerce, working through the White House O�ice of Science & Technology Policy, released the National Strategy for CBRNE Standards, which describes the federal vision and goals for the coordination, prioritization, establishment, and implementation of CBRNE equipment standards by 2020.

This Strategy—created by the Cabinet-level National Science and Technology Council, which is the principal means within the executive branch for coordinating interagency science and technology policies—represents the federal consensus regarding the development of standards for CBRNE equipment used by federal, state, local, and tribal responders for CBRNE detection, protection, and decontamination. The Strategy is the result of a process that included the identification of current research e�orts and practices with respect to performance specifications and test methods, as well as standards- development needs of all relevant federal entities.

The Strategy concludes that achievement of the following goals will be key to ensuring technical performance and interoperability of CBRNE technology, appropriate equipment deployment, and e�ective user training:

Establish an interagency group for CBRNE standards to promote the coordination of such standards among federal, state, local, and tribal communities Coordinate and facilitate the development and adoption of CBRNE equipment performance standards Coordinate and facilitate the development and adoption of CBRNE equipment interoperability standards Promote enduring CBRNE standard operating procedures Establish voluntary CBRNE training and certification standards and promote policies that foster their adoption Establish a comprehensive CBRNE equipment testing and evaluation (T&E) infrastructure and capability to support conformity assessment standards

The first of these goals was achieved on April 15, 2011, with the establishment of the Subcommittee on CBRNE Standards under the National Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland and National Security. The Subcommittee has already begun to create a plan for achieving the Strategy’s remaining goals.

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Scope and Application

This Strategy explains the need for CBRNE standards. In addition to specifying high-level goals, this Strategy identifies lead activities to accomplish these goals, and provides the foundation to bridge current gaps. As such, it establishes a structure to facilitate the coordination of CBRNE investments and activities among agency leaders, program managers, the research and testing community, and the private sector.

The Strategy covers equipment used by federal, state, local, and tribal responders for CBRNE detection, protection, and decontamination. Medical monitoring and diagnostic equipment, as well as equipment in the health and safety arena, are governed by specific regulatory and statutory authority.

Last Updated: 01/18/2022

About the Subcommittee on Standards

The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Homeland & National Security chartered the Subcommittee on Standards (SOS) to serve as an interagency forum to gather CBRNE Federal stakeholders. The interagency group is co-chaired by the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate (/science-and-technology/) and the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (http://www.nist.gov/index.html) . Participants include from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The goal of the SOS is to develop a National Strategy for CBRNE Standards.

Asymmetric Threats

As wars of the past have incorporated more conventional tactics and strategies, American war theory has labeled armed con�ict as “asymmetric.” But

as time goes on changing the view of asymmetric threats will be an emphasis item for government o�cials to better educate combatant commanders.

In Stephen Blank’s article, Rethinking Asymmetric Threats, he states that “The use of terms relating to asymmetry is especially prominent in o�cial and

uno�cial threat assessments published by the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, independent analysis here and abroad, and/or major independent

commissions.” As American government agencies progress throughout our existence, it will be vital to clearly de�ne what an asymmetric threat is.

While the U.S. military is still engaged with terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, asymmetric threats will surely be assessed on how they will a�ect our

combat operations. Hopefully, they will be evaluated correctly to provide our troops with the best information.

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