HLSS523Wk5

References

An�-Defama�on League (2005). Tax Protest Movement. h�p://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/tpm.html

Carter, D.,Chermak, S., Carter, J. and Drew, J. (2014, July). Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes. University of Maryland Na�onal Consor�um for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). h�ps://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf

Federal Bureau of Inves�ga�on (2011). Sovereign Ci�zens: A Growing Domes�c Threat to Law Enforcement. h�ps://leb.�i.gov/2011/september/soverign-ci�zens-a-growing-domes�c-threat-to-law-enforcement

Leadership and Recrui�ng

Because the Sovereign Ci�zen is built on the ideology of having the choice whether or not to abide by certain laws there is very li�le leadership presence within the extremist movement. Most individuals are self-radicalized and are not typically part of a certain group. There is no central leadership and no organized group that members can join — instead, there are a variety of local leaders with individualized takes on sovereign ci�zen ideology and techniques. Further, many of the individuals who have willing ear to the belief system that makes up the ideology and grassroots of the Sovereign Ci�zen movement read and find most of the extreme rhetoric from online discussions, websites and blogs. In recent years many individuals who start their membership and recruitment into the Sovereign Ci�zen movement do so because they are fallen on hard �mes financially. Believing and blaming government ins�tu�ons for their current life situa�on.

Sovereign Ci�zens Movement and Belief System

The Sovereign Ci�zen Movement is built on the belief system that supports the philosophies that they do not need to believe in the judicial system and most rules of laws. Sovereign Ci�zens believe they can righ�ully choose which laws the will adhere to. Because of this lack of not adhering to local, state and federal laws Sovereign Ci�zens are created a large backlog in court cases. The "Sovereign Ci�zens" movement has swelled rapidly in the last two years, affec�ng most major law enforcement agencies.

The Sovereign Ci�zen extremist movement is rooted in racism and bigotry which began its grassroots in the 1950's and 1960's. However, many Sovereign Ci�zens are of African American background. The grassroot ideology is also steeped in religious prejudice as one of the main parts of the radical ideology is that Jews are to blame for the financial ins�tu�ons and downfall the American Federal Government. Sovereign Ci�zen Movement further the 16th Amendment was never adequately ra�fied therefore income taxes are voluntary.

Are Sovereign Ci�zens Terrorists?

So, with any extremist group we must start to ask the ques�on of whether the Sovereign Ci�zen has roots in domes�c terrorism ideology. One of the most aspects of the defini�on of terrorism is to terrorize innocent individuals. According to the Federal Bureau of Inves�ga�on (2011) Sovereign Ci�zens could be dismissed as a nuisance, a loose network of individuals living in the United States who call themselves “sovereign ci�zens” and believe that federal, state, and local governments operate illegally can also operate and ins�ll violent behaviors and ac�ons that could be defined as domes�c terrorism ac�vity. However, a 2014 survey of 175 state, local and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies were asked about their percep�ons of terrorists threats showed that the Sovereign Ci�zen movement was the most highly ranked, with 86 percent of agreeing or strongly agreeing that it was a serious terrorist threat (Carter et al, 2014). As we have learned over the past decade radicaliza�on to terrorism can happen within the online pla�orm which is o�en quite appealing to many if not all extremist groups and individuals. As with all domes�c terrorism techniques and approaches local law enforcement is and will con�nue to be at the forefront of countering extremist ac�vity that could manifest into domes�c terrorism.

Tac�cs and Ac�ons

Each par�cular extremist group has hallmark tac�cs they use to show and support their ideology and belief. The tac�cs for the most part Sovereign Ci�zens are also unique to their extremist movement and organiza�on. Some of their ac�ons and tac�cs include but is not limited to: license plates that are not government issues with unique names, an�-government car s�ckers, belief language bent on conspiracy to include an�-Semi�c comments, off punctua�on of names and lack of zip codes. Sovereign ci�zens are an�-government extremists, who may believe that even though they physically reside in this country, they are separate or “sovereign” from the United States. As a result, they may believe they do not have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing en��es, motor vehicle departments, or law enforcement. This causes all kinds of poten�al problems—and possible violent criminal ac�vity.

Not every ac�on taken in the name of the sovereign ci�zen ideology is a crime, but the list of illegal ac�ons commi�ed by these groups, cells, and individuals is extensive (and puts them squarely on the homeland security and law enforcement radar). In addi�on to the above, sovereign ci�zens may:

1. Threaten judges, law enforcement professionals, and government personnel; 2. Impersonate police officers and diplomats; 3. Use fake currency, passports, license plates, and driver’s licenses; and 4. Engineer various white-collar scams, including mortgage fraud and so-called “redemp�on” schemes.

However, violence and even murder occurs within the Sovereign Movement. A few violent criminal events that have taken place in recent history include: the shoo�ng of two Arkansas police officers where shot and killed by Joseph Kane in 2010. Kane shot West Memphis officers Bill Evans and Brandon Paudert a combined 25 �mes with an AK-47 a�er he and his father, Jerry Ralph Kane Jr., were pulled over in a traffic stop.

Introduc�on: Sovereign Ci�zen Movements Trying to answer the ques�on, “what is extreme or extremism?” is what makes this course so interes�ng. It leaves you to wonder how we are defining extremism and extremist behavior. The defini�on of extremism, like the defini�on of terrorism, is constantly changing due to the issues facing the country at the �me. I want to reaffirm for you at this point of the course that you are having a “normal” experience and that your feelings and thoughts are intended to be mixed on the examina�on of this subject material. Remember the poli�cal spectrum is broad and moves along a con�nuum of perspec�ve and thought. Society itself through poli�cal context sets the outlying boundaries of the le� and right of that con�nuum.

Going forward we will further examine some major movements in extremism. So far, we have covered the American White Supremacist movement coupled with the extremist group known as Neo-Nazis; the Chris�an Iden�ty extremist movement as well as the Chris�an Reconstruc�onism, and other Right-Wing Religious Movements; and An�-American Government Extremists. Assuming you have read all the course material to this juncture it easily presents how diversified and how many fac�ons there are to each of these movements. There are groups, subgroups, and subgroups of the subgroups.

We could spend several courses delving into the backgrounds and philosophies of each of these en��es. Please do not feel overwhelmed in that regard, as what I have tried to do is keep the categories broad for you and at the same �me give you glimpses at the various philosophies that drive planks of extremist belief and behavior. For the second half of the course, I want to hit a few more highlights of extremists and extremist groups along the poli�cal spectrum that are “up and comers,” who seem to be raising their profiles on the extremism scene. Again, remember that poli�cal context and general philosophical orienta�on of the na�on plays a great part in how these groups are being defined and viewed.

RAND > The RAND Blog >

When Is a Terrorist Really a Terrorist? COMMENTARY (The Hill)

Privacy - Terms

OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

Travelers are evacuated out of the terminal and onto the tarmac after a shooting at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport in Florida, January 6, 2017 Photo by Andrew Innerarity/Reuters

by Brian Michael Jenkins

January 27, 2017

S ecurity footage shows what looks like an all-too-typical episode of lone-wolf terrorism: A single young man

pulls a handgun from his waistband and begins firing at helpless victims in an airport baggage claim area.

The results were certainly terrifying — five dead, six wounded, countless others traumatized as witnesses to

the carnage.

But while this month's attack at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport in Florida outwardly bore the hallmarks of a

terrorist event, it should not be automatically lumped in with the many deadly acts of ideologically inspired violence

that plague the globe — at least not based on what is now known about the attacker, 26-year-old Iraq War veteran

Esteban Santiago.

More than 15 years after fear of international terrorism seized the world's consciousness on 9/11, Americans seem

almost eager to explain away senseless acts of mass violence as being driven by ideology, preferably jihadi ideology.

This is a mistake that only stokes the fear of terrorism and exaggerates the influence and reach of America's Islamist

extremist foes.

As word of the Fort Lauderdale attack spread across the media landscape, journalists, online commentators and

many Americans immediately sought to identify the terror nexus that would conveniently attribute the killings to

jihadi motivations.

And there it was: Santiago had complained to the FBI that U.S. authorities were forcing him to watch Islamic State in

Iraq and Syria (ISIS) videos in his home state of Alaska and heard voices urging him to join the terrorist group. He

later told investigators that he had participated in jihadi online chat rooms, though this has not yet been

corroborated.

But does this make Santiago a terrorist? Not necessarily. It could point to a delusional mental state with only a thin

connection to terrorism. Such mental conditions are commonly at play in these kinds of attacks, even when the

connection to terrorism is less tenuous.

Who's to say if mental health interventions could have helped prevent some of the attacks that are commonly attributed to terrorist motives?

To be sure, those who commit mass murder are seldom society's happy campers, but that should not necessarily

expand America's terrorist list to include individuals with histories of aggression, substance abuse or mental illness

who put on an ISIS or al Qaeda jersey on their way to the attack.

Who's to say if mental health interventions could have helped prevent some of

the attacks that are commonly attributed to terrorist motives, but were

committed by individuals with deep personal or emotional problems, some with

twisted needs to self-explain their rage, even when their deadly missions are

planned to end in their own deaths?

Was Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez, the shooter who killed five people in

Chattanooga, Tennessee in 2015, a lone-wolf terrorist dedicated to jihad or a

disturbed individual with alcohol, drug and money problems whose family had

sought and failed to get him therapy?

Was the 2016 killing of 49 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida an act of

terror committed on behalf of ISIS as the killer, Omar Mateen, told police before he was killed, or was it an act of rage

by an angry homophobe on steroids?

It is probably not lost on America's jihadist enemies that their ideology has become a conveyor for individual

discontents. Whether planned or not, the jihadists have attracted a self-selecting audience of troubled souls through

social media outreach, publicizing their atrocities and urging extreme violence.

All of this is reinforced by intense global media coverage of attacks with terrorist links.

Countering mass violence demands a distinction between those truly radicalized and inspired by jihadist ideology

and those with lesser links, including those whose mental states and violent tendencies preexist their exposure to

jihadist ideology.

But this is not a simple task in the face of a public that prefers easy answers.

To some audiences, ascribing murderous rampages to political motives may make more sense than a more nuanced

explanation that includes mental illness. Terrorism gives Americans a clear culprit and a distant enemy to fear and

loathe, whereas mental illness could arouse sympathy, inappropriately mitigating the violence.

And in a curious way, death at the hands of terrorists ennobles the dead and wounded. They are not merely random

victims of mindless murder, but casualties of war.

Terrorism is also something that can seem easier to address: Security can be increased, jihadist organizations can be

destroyed, violent extremism can be countered. A terrorist can be shot or shut up in prison.

Sorting out how to deal with mental disorders that sometimes don't show themselves until they erupt in bloodshed

is a much more difficult task.

Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an

author of numerous books, reports and articles on terrorism-related topics.

This commentary originally appeared on The Hill on January 26, 2017. Commentary gives RAND researchers a

platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and

analysis.

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Sovereign Ci�zen Numbers

As with any extremist group knowing the exact number of individuals who claim to be a Sovereign Ci�zen is nearly impossible to account for as there are many individuals who may not verbal claim ci�zenship into this group or who may not provide ac�ons that would be considered part of the Sovereign Ci�zen agenda. In the mid-1990's, the IRS es�mated that there were approximately 250,000 such tax protesters in the U.S., not all of whom were full-blown sovereign ideologues. It is es�mated there are roughly over 300,000 members overall who claim allegiance to the Sovereign Ci�zen movement and group with 100,000 considered hardcore adherents.