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Intergovernmental Management 677

Intergovernmental management is more than just inter-

governmental relationships involving the federal govern-

ment. Th ough Professor McGuire agrees that the federal

government has become more intrusive and opportunistic

since the mid-20th century — resulting in less cooperative

intergovernmental relations — he argues that collaborative

management is much more prevalent than it is depicted

in Dr. Conlan’s analysis. A bottom-up view suggests that

local and regional activity can be both opportunistic and

collaborative, and such a perspective must be considered

in any discussion of managing federalism.

T he 50th anniversary of the Kestnbaum Com-

mission provides an opportunity to refl ect on

the changes in federalism and intergovern-

mental management that have occurred over the past

half century. In his foregoing essay, Tim Conlan thor-

oughly documents the intent of the commission’s

work, the recommendations that emerged from its

report to President Eisenhower, and the subsequent

remaking of American federalism since that time.

Th ere is little doubt that the intergovernmental man-

agement of the 1950s is diff erent from the intergov-

ernmental management of the early 21st century; one

should not expect otherwise. Th ese changes have been

captured through countless metaphors that describe

contemporary federalism, such as the “marble cake”

( Grodzins 1960 ), the “picket fence” ( Sanford 1967 ),

and the “matrix” ( Agranoff 2001 ; Agranoff and

McGuire 2003a). Some have referred to the existence

of “coercive federalism” ( Kincaid 1990 ) and “nation-

centered federalism” ( Beer 1993 ).

Conlan off ers another descriptive term, opportunistic

federalism , which he contrasts with the prevailing

paradigm of the past, cooperative federalism. His

central point in calling current intergovernmental

management opportunistic is that, in some cases, juris-

dictions — namely, the federal government — take ad-

vantage of other jurisdictions, exploiting opportunities

to control or co-opt relationships across governments

rather than pursue shared administrative strategies.

Th e implication is that managing federalism is less

cooperative now than it was when the Kestnbaum

Commission issued its report in June 1955.

Conlan’s empirical analysis is a fi tting contribution to the

research on federalism, off ering evidence of change

rather than a purely philosophical treatise on where

power lies and where it should rest — but not entirely.

Th ough he is optimistic in the end, Conlan remains a

skeptic throughout and is concerned that the state of

intergovernmental management is dominated by federal

government activity, which threatens to “propel opportu-

nistic federalism into the future.” From the top looking

down, it is not diffi cult to come to that conclusion. Th is

predominantly negative view of opportunism from the

top is, however, the primary shortcoming of his analysis.

Not all intergovernmental management involves the

federal government. As Agranoff argues, “[T]he recent

tradition in intergovernmental research must move

away from an obsession with action in Washington

and how much or how little power has accrued where”

(2001, 54). Investigating the extent of cooperation in

intergovernmental relations requires a focus on

national – state – local, interstate ( Zimmerman 1996 ),

and interlocal ( Th urmaier and Wood 2002 ) activities

across multiple functional areas ( Krueger and McGuire

2005 ). Th is would involve “a continuing ‘view from

the states’ and local governments” ( Agranoff 2001, 54 ).

Within the context of studying American federalism,

Martha Derthick writes, “Everywhere one looks, the

answer remains murky and many-sided” (2000, 27).

As a result, attempts to categorize American federal-

ism are largely futile because the scope of activities

across governments and organizations is so ephemeral.

New policies emerge, reforms are undertaken, elec-

tions usher in new approaches to federalism, and

sometimes events dictate entirely new prescriptions

( Stever 2005 ). Like federalism, the character of inter-

governmental management changes over time. Even

the concept itself is ambiguous, as it is of “recent

vintage, specialized usage, limited visibility, and un-

certain maturity” ( Wright and Krane 1998, 1162 ). In

Michael McGuire Indiana University – Bloomington

Intergovernmental Management: A View from the Bottom

Michael McGuire is an associate

professor of public and environmental

affairs at Indiana University – Bloomington,

where he teaches courses in public

management and intergovernmental

management. He is the coauthor of

Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments (with

Robert Agranoff, Georgetown University

Press), which received the 2003 Louis

Brownlow Book Award of the National

Academy of Public Administration.

E-mail: [email protected] .

Rethinking the Foundations of Public Administration: A Senior–Junior Exchange

678 Public Administration Review • September | October 2006

some cases, opportunism is an accurate descriptor for

intergovernmental management. In other cases, how-

ever, it is not. And this is the point that unsettles any

meaningful endeavor to label federalism: It depends.

It depends on the policy area, the policy instruments

employed, and even the skills of the administrator.

Th e central question may not be the degree to which

intergovernmental relationships are cooperative but

rather how collaborative they are. Th is distinction is

not a minor one. Collaboration is “a concept that

describes the process of facilitat-

ing and operating in multiorga-

nizational arrangements for

solving problems that cannot be

achieved, or achieved easily, by

single organizations” (Agranoff

and McGuire 2003b, 4). Col-

laboration should not be con-

fused with cooperation.

Although a great deal of collabo-

ration is cooperative — meaning working jointly with

others — collaborative management sometimes entails

the engagement of one or more organizations in a

purposive and offi cial partnership or contractual ar-

rangement, and it sometimes amounts merely to

assisting others in a particular eff ort (4). Collaborative

intergovernmental management is a “routine, regular,

and, in many cases, requisite activity” in jurisdictions

of all sizes (153). Collaboration assumes that govern-

ments are interdependent and that they need each

other to successfully carry out particular policy mak-

ing and administrative functions. It also allows for the

fact that relations may be uneven and that varying

levels of power may exist within the collaboration.

Opportunism and collaboration are not mutually

exclusive, and even in the face of local and state op-

portunism, elements of cooperative federalism still

exist. Indeed, evidence suggests they coexist in many

programs, especially when viewing federalism from

the bottom, which provides the best vantage point for

assessing the extent to which both opportunism and

collaboration are important features of intergovern-

mental management.

Th ere are diff erent models of managing federalism. A

top-down model exists in the area of regulatory pro-

grams, and it “is predicated on the growth of national

programming and tipping the balance within the

federal system toward executive control,” such that the

federal government manages its programs through

state and local governments ( Agranoff and McGuire

2001, 672 ). Th is type of intergovernmental manage-

ment clearly fi ts Conlan’s concern with opportunism

and co-optation. Th e top-down model is collaborative

only to the extent that the federal government (and

state governments) require compliant actors at the

lower levels of government.

A model of intergovernmental management that is

consistent with Conlan’s opportunism and his concern

with state and local governments adapting programs “to

serve strictly parochial ends” is a jurisdiction-based

model (Agranoff and McGuire 2003b). Jurisdiction-

based activity is strategic. It involves local and state

managers interacting with representatives from other

levels of government to design and manage policies that

benefi t the jurisdiction and meet the jurisdiction’s goals.

But such activity is also collaborative. Local and state

managers seek adjustments and policy-making resources

from all directions — vertical and

horizontal — including organiza-

tions from the nongovernmental

sector. Th ese actions are not based

in a sorting out of power across

governments. Jurisdiction-based

management emphasizes “calcula-

tion and negotiation rather than

accommodation and acclimation”

(Agranoff and McGuire 2003b,

49). It is not altogether clear how this type of manage-

ment within federalism leads to parochialism. As Wil-

davsky reminds us, “Uniformity is antithetical to

federalism. Th e existence of states free to disagree with

one another and with the central government inevitably

leads to diff erentiation” (1984, 57).

Bargaining and negotiation over grant programs is a

prevalent component of intergovernmental management

that can be considered both opportunistic and collabora-

tive. Grant programs have always provided the opportu-

nity to bargain, as many have pointed out ( Ingram

1977; Pressman 1975 ), and this continues to be the case

today. To be successful, donors need grant recipients,

and grant recipients need donors; interdependence (thus

collaboration) is the hallmark of many grant programs.

Seeking program adjustments and discretion in grant

and even in regulatory programs (Agranoff and McGuire

2003b) in order to accommodate local, regional, and

state needs is consistent with the ideal of federalism.

Th ere is evidence that the federal government encour-

ages collaborative structures for implementing policies

in multiple policy areas. Hall and O’Toole found that

in the 1960s and the 1990s, the majority of new,

signifi cant federal legislation authorized multiple agen-

cies for implementation (2000), and the trend held for

postlegislation rulemaking as well (2004). Other re-

search has demonstrated that the federal National

Estuary Program encourages implementation networks

that are “more extensive, span more levels of govern-

ment, integrate more experts into policy discussions,

nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakehold-

ers … thus laying the foundation for a new form of

cooperative governance” ( Schneider et al. 2003, 155 ).

Examples of shared governance that is both opportu-

nistic and collaborative across levels of government are

Local and state managers seek adjustments and policy-making resources from all directions —

vertical and horizontal — includ- ing organizations from the nongovernmental sector.

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Intergovernmental Management 679

numerous (Agranoff 2003; Moynihan 2005 ). For

instance, consider the way that local opportunism is

blended with collaboration in the Shared Strategy for

Puget Sound, an initiative to restore and protect

salmon runs across Puget Sound. Under the Endan-

gered Species Act of 1973, the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries and

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are the federal

agencies responsible for implementation. Th e act

requires a recovery plan for listed species that typically

is written by the federal agencies prescribing local

actions. Realizing the opportunity to act on behalf

of the region — not just the wishes of the federal

government exclusively — a collaborative initiative was

undertaken to coordinate with existing recovery eff orts

in the area. Parties to the eff ort include tribal govern-

ments, state government, local governments, business

and conservation groups, and, perhaps most impor-

tant for this collaborative eff ort, NOAA Fisheries and

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Th e Shared Strategy is

the fi rst regional eff ort to develop a recovery plan not

written by federal agencies. From the bottom up, this

example of intergovernmental management appears to

be both opportunistic and collaborative.

Th ere can be no argument that national actions have

become more dominant since the time of the

Kestnbaum Commission, particularly in recent years.

As Conlan states, legislation such as the No Child Left

Behind Act is “intrusive and dismissive of state and

local concerns,” but it is important that any discussion

of managing within federalism include a view from

the bottom. As collaborative intergovernmental and

interorganizational networks develop in many policy

areas, the opportunities for assertive local and regional

action are both prominent and encouraging.

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