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IT-659-Q1436 Cyberlaw and Ethics
SNHU
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IT business model of Maersk:
Digital transformation is considered as the most notable aspect for every business
in the recent years and in the year 2017, the shipping industry experienced many drastic
transformations. First of all, the world witnessed the first autonomous ships traversing
the sea and furthermore, the industry was also plagued by the threats of digitalization
such as hacks, malware attacks and cyber attacks. The primary highlight in the case of
new IT business model introduced by Maersk is the consideration for transforming the
customer experience and operational processes implemented in the organization.
The new model clearly cascades each of the functional aspects in the business
model and the ways in which the functions work and network with each other alongside
addressing the expansion of the organization’s margin. The IT business model of Maersk
could be identified as prominently focused on transport and logistics department. A clear
evaluation of the way in which the business model has been changed with reference to
digital transformation could provide clear insights into the definition and evaluation of
the IT business model of Maersk.
The present maritime industry in which Maersk operates is considerably
associated with digital transformation strategy which is focused on operational processes
and safety oriented activities. Another noticeable factor that can be identified in the case
of IT business model of Maersk is its emphasis on human resources as crucial
components of the transformation process (Cyber Security: A Legal Requirement, 2018).
The following assessment would provide a risk analysis report with references to the
specific cyber security laws, state statutes, criminal and civil laws and ethical guidelines
in context of Maersk and the existing regulations followed by the organization (Nkuna,
2017, p 25). The assessment would also include cyber-law crimes and the existing
information system security approaches that have been implemented by Maersk as well
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as the existing cyber laws that safeguard the data of an organization from external
intrusion (Nkuna, 2017,p e 26).
Existing regulations and precedents:
The cybercrime laws which have been outlined in the US and can be considered
as valid in the case of Maersk could be explicitly identified in two categories which
include substantive cybercrime laws and procedural cybercrime laws. In the case of
Maersk, the procedural cybercrime laws can be taken into focus as they are profoundly
associated with preventing unauthorized access to electronic data by third parties that
also include internet service providers, authority for searching electronic evidence and
authority for interception of electronic communication.
The procedural cybercrime laws are identified in 18 USC §§ 2510-2522, 2701-
2712 and 3121-3127 (Rees, 2018). The substantive cybercrime laws could also be
considered as relevant regulations that could be applicable to the case of the NoPetya
attack on Maersk that crumpled its operations across many terminals. The substantive
cybercrime laws are profoundly associated with laws pertaining to prohibition of online
identity theft, hacking and intrusion into intellectual property and computer systems of
an individual or organization.
The specific substantive cybercrime laws that can be mentioned in context of
Maersk include 18 USC § 1028 which focuses on prevention of any fraud or similar
activity implemented in relation to authentication features, information and identification
documents. The similar implications could be found in 18 USC § 1029, 1030 and 1037
which deal with fraud and other related activity with respect to access devices,
electronic mail or computers (Rees, 2018). The substantive law of 47 USC 605 could
also be accounted in this case as it deals with unauthorized publication and use of
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Current cyber laws, regulations and policies in Maersk:
The policy statement issued by Maersk in 2018 depicts the organization’s
formidable commitment to ensure security and implementation of necessary policies for
preventing security breaches. The security considerations are emphasized on equal terms
with operational and commercial factors in business management. The particular example
of Maersk’s recovery from the attack with its contingency plans could be assumed as a
validation for the same (Seacurus Bulletin, 2018, p 5).
The evaluation of the information systems security framework of Maersk also
suggests that the lack of frequent security updates was a notable cause for leading to the
detrimental impacts of the hacking attack. The attack was realized with an employee
clicking on an attachment with a virus which could have been prevented by resolving
the SMB vulnerability through the application of Microsoft security updates and patches
(Seacurus Bulletin, 2018,p 4). This setback in the company’s information system security
approach could have been resolved by observing and implementing the patch which was
issued after the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack on the National Health Service in UK.
Cyber law crimes:
The most common approach to follow in the identification and investigation of
cybercrimes within an organization is the conventional one in which the business impact
of the crime is evaluated first and check for severity of the incident such as compromise
of confidential information. The security personnel should be able to identify the
systems or servers which have been affected alongside recognizing the possibilities of
data loss upon abruptly shutting down system or a computer. The use of forensic
imaging is the next course of action to investigate cybercrime in which the recording of
affected system and related components could be observed (Fcw.com, 2018). The
investigation of different information sources such as external devices, log files and
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virtual machines as well as cryptographic security of evidence are also significant
security investigation measures.
The formidable impact of cybercrimes like the NoPetya attack on Maersk is
observed in the form of downtime that is far worse than any other loss to the
organization. The information system structure of an organization could be substantially
compromised with notable concerns being vested in duplication and redundancy of
information as well as loss of vital information regarding the organization’s business
operations.
The appropriate information security measures that should be followed to deal
with cybercrime are to emphasize prominently on translation of information security
policies into action. The specific human resources in responsibility of information
security should frequently update with the changing laws and regulations in the domain
of cybercrimes.
Cybercrime and ecommerce:
According to claims made by Maersk, it has been able to recover from the attack
within ten days by the reinstallation of almost 4000 servers, 2500 applications and
45000 PCs. This clearly reflects on the installation of a new infrastructure to deal with
the consequences of the NoPetya attack. In order to improve its cyber resilience the
organization also implemented many long term and immediate initiatives with the aim
for strengthening the IT infrastructure platforms as well improve the IT service
continuity and reinforcement of business continuity plans (Safety4sea, 2018). The
company has also opted for cyber insurance in order to refrain from negative fiscal
impacts of any future cyber-attacks.
As discussed in the earlier sections, the substantive and procedural cybercrime
laws are at the disposal of Maersk to deal with unauthorized intrusion into its
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information systems by hackers (Cimpanu, 2018). Furthermore, the USCG has issued a
cybersecurity strategy which outlines the best practices and voluntary measures which
can be employed by organizations like Maersk in the shipping industry. The introduction
of HR 3101 Strengthening Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Coordination in Our
Ports Act 2017 could also be considered as a promising respite for Maersk in terms of
regulations.
References
Cyber Security: A Legal Requirement. (2018). Retrieved from
https://knect365.com/shipping/article/8a7a100b-542c-45c2-8b0f-b22bb579fca8/cyber-
security-a-legal-requirement
Cimpanu, C. (2018). Maersk Reinstalled 45,000 PCs and 4,000 Servers to Recover From
NotPetya Attack. Retrieved from
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/maersk-reinstalled-45-000-pcs-and-
4-000-servers-to-recover-from-notpetya-attack/
Fcw.com (2018). Managing a cyber crime scene -- FCW. Retrieved from
https://fcw.com/articles/2014/12/18/managing-a-cyber-crime-scene.aspx
Nkuna, N. (2017). Understanding the motives for digital transformation in the container
shipping sector.
Rees, A. (2018). CYBERCRIME LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. Retrieved from
https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/us_cyb_laws.pdf
Seacurus Bulletin. (2018). Retrieved from
http://www.seacurus.com/newsletter/Seacurus_Issue_73.pdf
Safety4sea. (2018). Maersk Line: Surviving from a cyber-attack. Retrieved from
https://safety4sea.com/cm-maersk-line-surviving-from-a-cyber-attack/
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