Worldview of Evolutionary Psychology
Rachel Ulmer
Liberty University
Psychology 101
Professor Samantha Lynn Moroz
February 24, 2022
Introduction
Evolutionary psychology is conceived by its proponents as a revolutionary scientific paradigm or
meta-theoretical framework in the field of psychology (Buss 1995, 2005; Duntley and Buss
2008). It is therefore both holistic and imperialistic in scope and nature. It penetrates and
conceptually unifies every existing branch of psychology, be it developmental psychology,
biological psychology, cognitive psychology, personality psychology, social psychology,
organizational psychology, or abnormal psychology— on the foundation of evolutionary biology
(Buss 2005, p. xxiii; cf. Fitzgerald and Whitaker 2010, pp. 285– 289). Evolutionary
psychologists are also active in areas such as business ethics, the law, and criminology (Buss
2012; Cosmides and Tooby 2004; Jones 2005).
Its advocates claim the scientific project of evolutionary psychologists involves the mapping of
our universal human nature.
Foundational assumptions
To achieve their scientific project, evolutionary psychologists must at least hold the following set
of assumptions; otherwise no evolutionary psychological story of origins and human nature
could exist. I will introduce them under the themes of origins, human condition and solution.
1. On origins. Evolutionary psychologists identify three accounts for the origin of life on earth.
The first is the non-intelligent cause thesis, known as the blind, unconscious, and mindless
“watchmaker” (Dawkins 2006, p. 5). David Buss says, “evolution is responsible for who we are
today” (Buss 1995, p. 2); natural selection is “the only known physical process capable of
generating” complex physiological and psychological mechanisms (Pinker 2005, p. xiv).
<By linking relatedness and social structure.5 However, sociobiology desired to go directly from
genes to society, ignoring the individual and the way the individual thinks. This led to a mistaken
implication that individuals acted to maximize fitness. Evolutionary psychology avoids this
misinterpretation by emphasizing the product of adaptations-the individual's mind/brain.
Evolutionary psychology claims that natural selection in the "environment of evolutionary
adaptation" led to inherited psychological mechanisms which are modular, specific, and
numerous. One objective of evolutionary psychology is to identify psychological mechanisms.
They are as varied as our ability to pick a face out of a crowd, our romantic desires, our ability to
hear spoken words over background noise, and our joy of speaking to each other. These
mechanisms are best described in terms of cognitive psychology rather than behavior or
neurological structure. They "unfold" and develop in response to the social and natural
environment. According to John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, editors of The Adapted Mind,
humans are executors of adaptive psychological mechanisms, rather than fitness maximizers.6
Another objective of evolutionary psychology is to propose hypotheses on the adaptive functions
underlying each universal psychological phenomenon. These adaptations were generated in the
"environment of evolutionary adaptation," consisting of the social and natural environment of the
Pleistocene, rather than of the present day. Data used to evaluate hypotheses in evolutionary
psychology are potentially limitless-from physiological stimulus-response to character portrayal
in literature to anecdotal observations of human activities in the unplanned experiments of
modern society. Currently, the most compelling tests of evolutionary psychology hypotheses are
cross-cultural surveys designed to elucidate psychological universals.7
<Not surprisingly, recent books have publicized the racy application of evolutionary psychology
to human perceptions of sexual attractiveness.8 For example, men prefer nubile women with a
waist-to-hip ratio of 0.7 (whether fat or thin). Men have different "mate" criteria for marriage and
flings. Women seek men with status who are willing to commit resources. According to cross-
cultural surveys, these sexual preferences are universal. They indicate psychological adaptations
addressing mate choice, a specific dilemma experienced in the environment of evolutionary
adaptation. Consistent environmental clues allowed individuals to recognize and prefer certain
features in a mate. Over generations, individuals with certain preferences experienced greater
reproductive success. Therefore, through natural selection, such preferences became
psychological adaptations among all individuals of the species.
<Evolutionary psychology does not claim that individuals must seek certain features in a mate or
that seeking certain features maximizes a particular individual's fitness. This is the erroneous
implication of sociobiology. Donald Symons claims that a science of human behavior cannot be
directly based on analysis of the reproductive consequences of human action.9 Fitness
maximization is a general result of striving for specific goals, such as finding food or a suitable
mate. Symons warns that it is a logical error to say that specific goals are consequent upon a
general goal. Unfortunately, books popularizing the Darwinian approach to understanding human
action may confound the evolutionary psychology and sociobiological perspectives. For
example, Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, properly relates how an individual's behavior may
be seen as exemplifying specific psychological mechanisms proposed by evolutionary
psychology (with the general consequence of reproductive success).10 Other popularizers
erroneously link individual or group behavior directly to fitness maximization.11
<In sum, evolutionary psychology postulates that the mind/brain mechanisms that collectively
constitute human nature were designed by natural selection in the environment of evolutionary
adaptation and must be described as solutions to specific cognitive problems in that environment.
Evolutionary psychology conceptually integrates psychology and evolutionary biology by tying
together psychological phenomena and theories of adaptive function. Conceptual integration
between disciplines has been one distinguishing feature of the natural sciences. Consequently,
evolutionary psychology is on the "natural science" side of the fence in human studies. The
Standard Social Science Model consciously rejects integration with the natural sciences and is
vulnerable to criticism on that basis.12
A Christian View of Evolutionary Psychology versus the Standard Social Science Model
The Standard Social Science Model is founded on a moral rejection of biological views of
human nature. It claims that (1) humankind shares a psychic unity, (2) all human infants have
similar potential, and (3) the only thing that separates us is culture, not biology.17 Since culture is
relative and constructs perceived reality, cultures cannot judge one another. The Standard Social
Science Model promises that humans may be ideologically trained. Since there is no human
nature, we are programmable. Such a view appeals to moral elitists who intend to help the
(culturally) deprived through government action. Social scientists present their values as
"scientific" judgments and support an impersonal agenda of cultural reform (i.e., by changing
social structures).18
<While the moral claims of the Standard Social Science Model sound familiar to Christians, we
differ in justifying these values. The ideas of the psychic unity of humankind, the importance of
developing human potential, and the imprudence of judging one another flow from a
contemplation of divine revelation, rather than human knowledge, and support an agenda of
cultural reform through personal conversion. Because the Standard Social Science Model has
founding moral values that appear to agree with Christian morals, but actually support a
relativistic and totalitarian agenda, an assault on its scientific validity by evolutionary
psychology provides relief from this stagnant and dangerous worldview.
<In the short run, social scientists will respond to evolutionary psychology in the same manner as
they responded to sociobiology, with moral outrage. Those who question the scientific validity of
the Standard Social Science Model will be labeled as contradicting its moral claims. Questioners
will be classified as the moral equivalents of the past demagogues who relied on biological
claims of human nature to justify inhuman action. The tactics of this defense applies to other
fields of modern thought, such as law.19
But will evolutionary psychology be any better? Because it derives from Darwinism,
evolutionary psychology harbors naturalistic assumptions potentially dangerous to the Christian
perspective.20 However, we must remember that Darwinism is the best natural explanation of
human origins yet proposed, and, in modified form, is likely to remain so.21 In the long run, the
benefits and risks of evolutionary psychology will be tied to its scientific progress. Evolutionary
psychology will eventually construct a description of human nature within the Darwinian
paradigm. And here is where the challenge for the Christian may be seen. Christianity already
has a description of human nature. It comes from a long tradition of debating the nature of God
and humans while contemplating the experience of divine revelation. It is intimately tied to
Genesis. The opportunity for Christian apologetics comes with the question: Will descriptions of
human nature by evolutionary psychology and by Christianity be complementary?
This question sounds straightforward, but one must keep in mind that both evolutionary
psychology and Christianity seek a deeper understanding of the truth. They are both "moving
targets." The relationship between Christianity and science has been a peculiar one. Since the
Christian culture successfully gave birth to science, science appears to have undermined the
Christian worldview.22 The Copernican, Newtonian, and Darwinian revolutions forced
Christianity to make choices and self-discoveries that have tended to demythologize and
naturalize its revelation. Here, the term "demythologize" means "to connect a story with actual or
historical events" and "naturalize" means "to rationalize reports of miracles in terms of natural
processes."
<As Dick Fischer pointed out in The Origins Solution, demythologization reinforces the sense
that biblical events (especially miraculous ones) were real.23 Today, compared with other world
religions, Christianity is the most historically-oriented and free from myth. Naturalization, on the
other hand, rejects the reality of biblical events. Attempts to completely naturalize Judeo-
Christian revelation are necessarily speculative and may be challenged on epistemological
grounds.24 However, a weak form of naturalism prefers to isolate sections of the Bible and label
them as myth.25 In doing so, reality is denied on one plane (the physical) and not on another (the
moral). This attempt has been successful, particularly regarding the early chapters of Genesis.26
The mirror process, the mythification of (or the finding of ultimate purpose or beauty in) the
natural and evolutionary sciences, has been the focus of Christian resistance.27 We all know the
price paid when "what is" has been elevated to "what ought to be." Since nearly everyone today
agrees that the mythification of science violates the founding assumptions of naturalism,
expressions of purpose in nature border on nihilism.28 Richard Dawkins states that life has no
higher purpose than to perpetuate the survival of DNA29 Steven J. Gould emphasizes
contingency"pure luck"in the evolution of humans.30 As in the past, Christians will demand that
these views be either rejected or reinterpreted critically from the perspective of revelation.
It should be evident that evolutionary psychologists unite human beings with animals (cf. also
Duntley and Buss 2008, p. 31). Evolutionary psychologists must therefore maintain continuity
between animals and humans as discontinuity counts against the plausibility of the evolutionary
story.
The second account for the origin of life is the “seed theory” of geneticist Francis Crick—the
idea that extraterrestrial entities visited earth millions of years ago and planted the seeds of life.
Evolutionary psychologists are in absolute silence about this “theory.”
The third account, creationism, is “largely incapable of being verified or disproved by
observation or experiment and is not a scientific theory” (Buss 1995, p. 2). If it is true that the
findings of creation science cannot be verified, then it must be true of evolutionary psychology,
because when life originated on earth (from either an evolutionary or a creationist perspective),
there was no one present to observe it. By implication, evolutionary psychology is as much a
historical science as creation science, but with one major difference: creationists have the most
reliable eyewitness of how life appeared on earth, the Creator himself (Genesis 1; cf. Psalm
33:6-9; John 1:1–3; Colossians 1:15–17).3
Evolutionary psychologists are also guilty of two fallacies. The first is the genetic fallacy—that
is, to fault a view or belief purely on grounds of where it originates (in this case the Bible). What
is crucially important in determining the truth of a belief is the evidence and arguments in
support of it. Moreover, to assert that creationism is not scientific is not a scientific statement of
science, but a metaphysical statement of evolutionary psychologists about science. To say what
something is, is a metaphysical (philosophical) statement. The second fallacy is the fallacy of
centrality. The fallacy maintains that natural selection is the only cause of physiological and
psychological mechanisms known to scientists (that is, evolutionary biologists). They claim in
effect that since evolutionary biologists do not know of another source or cause of life and our
psychological make-up, there is none! All evidence to the contrary is simply ignored. The fact is
that evolutionists have already ruled that “natural selection” is the only cause of living
organisms, and there is therefore no need for an “an intelligent designer or supernatural forces”
(Tooby and Cosmides 2005, p. 20).
2. On the human condition: survival of the fittest. When evolutionary psychologists talk about
“environment,” they do not have a specific place or time in mind, but rather a period—from 2–3
million years to 10,000 years ago (Heylighen 2011, p. 2). It is referred to as the Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptedness. The environment was that of the life of hunter-gatherers who
encountered various problems to which they had to adapt in order to survive. These are mainly
problems solving activities related to feeding (gathering foods), reproduction (detecting and
attracting fertile mates, raising offspring), cooperative relations (detecting cheaters, free-riders
and those that could be trusted, the exchange of useful information through gossip and story-
telling) and avoiding dangers (enemies, predators, poisonous plants, and snakes) (Tooby and
Cosmides 2005, p. 16).
The most important thing about this period from an evolutionist perspective is that it had to
remain the same, in the sense that the same problems had to be recurrent. Because natural
selection is a very, very slow process (Cosmides and Tooby 1997); without the same problems
being recurrent over “deep time,” natural selection would not have been able to work out a
solution for the inability of our ancestors to deal with their environmental problems.
3. On the solution: the problem-solver. Evolutionary psychologists believe that over millions of
years the brain evolved a massive number of specialized neural circuits—also referred to as
“psychological mechanisms,” “modules,” “adaptations,” “programs,” and “information-
processing devices”—which enable our ancestors to tackle the problems posed by their
environment. The brain is “construed as a computational device (like computer hardware), and
the “mechanisms” are programs (like computer software) that process information.
The method and approach of evolutionary psychologists
Assuming that their foundational assumptions are true allows the evolutionary psychologist to
approach the study of the “mind” (brain mechanisms or modules) like an engineer. Steven Pinker
explains what it means:
psychology is engineering in reverse. In forward-engineering, one designs a machine to do
something; in reverse-engineering, one figures out what a machine was designed to do (Pinker
1997, p. 21).
Evolutionary psychologists tell us that they follow a four-step process to determine the function
of a particular mechanism or adaptation:
You start by carefully specifying an adaptive information processing problem; then you do a task
analysis of that problem. A task analysis of that problem consists of identifying what properties a
program would have to have to solve that problem well. This approach allows you to generate
hypotheses about the structure of the programs that comprise the mind, which can then be tested
(Tooby and Cosmides 2005, p. 16).
The method is so construed, together with the assumptions on which it rests, that evolutionary
psychology appears as a coherent framework for thinking about human nature. However, fellow
evolutionists have raised some substantial criticisms against the assumptions and working
method of evolutionary psychologists.
What the critics say
Evolutionary psychological accounts of evolved brain mechanisms to solve so-called adaptive
problems are often accused of being “just-so-stories,” meaning that their explanations are
nothing but reconstructions of a hypothetical evolutionary past that may seem plausible, but
which cannot be verified empirically (Heylighen 2011; Mitchell 1999). Evolutionary
psychologists have two major defenses against this charge.
The first is that there exists a fundamental mismatch between our current environment and those
of our hunter-gatherer ancestors. Behaviors that were adaptive then do not fit in well with the
demands of ours today. For example, our ancestors were afraid of tigers which pose no threat to
people in a modern city. They are more likely to be hit by a car, but a fear of cars is practically
nonexistent. This is purely because natural selection has not had time to inscribe this fear into
our genes (over the last 10,000 years). Consequently, they believe, the mismatch of
environments
is at the origin of our many “diseases of civilization,” which include obesity, cardiovascular
disease, diabetes, allergies, depression, dementia [i.e., schizophrenia] and ADHD [attention
deficiency and hyperactive disorder]. These disorders, which severely reduce our quality of life,
are virtually unknown among hunter-gatherers” (Heylighen 2011, p. 4).
The second defense is that their methods do not differ from those used by other scientists.
Hypothesis, predictions, and experiments have shown, for example, that children under the age
of five or six years of age are more likely to be abused by stepfathers than biological fathers.
Thus, stepfathers care less about their stepchildren than about their biological children. For the
evolutionary psychologist this makes perfect sense: “stepchildren do not pass on their
stepparent’s genes” (Geher 2006, p. 189; cf. Heylighen 2011, p. 3). Could it be that the
stepfathers simply do not love their stepchildren as much as their own? What about the
possibility of the stepfathers having a distorted belief about and/or concept of care? What does
this explanation say about stepfathers that do not abuse their stepchildren? Furthermore, is their
“explanation” in terms of reproduction (gene replication!) an explanation, an excuse, or simply a
misguided description of interpretations based on evolutionary presuppositions? We shall shortly
see that evolutionary presuppositions are the keys to making sense of their “explanations.”
For evolutionary biology professor, Richard Lewontin, the “explanations” of evolutionary
psychologists are no explanations at all. For example, why do babies cry? Those of us who had
children would offer reasons such as being uncomfortable (“baby needs a fresh nappy!”), being
hungry, or being ill. The evolutionary psychologist would say, “they are helpless, and unless they
can distract their parents from other concerns they will not be sure they will be fed or rescued
from pain,” from which follows that “natural selection will favor howling babies, since quite
ones may be malnourished or suffer injuries and so are less likely to survive” (Lewontin 2005, p.
7). Lewontin concludes that evolutionary psychology “is not a theory applicable to historical
change and cultural variation.”
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