Module 4
Perception, Cognition, and Emotion
Perception
Perception, cognition, and emotion mostly are the kind of basic building
blocks of all really social encounters, including negotiation, in the sense that our
really social actions specifically are guided by how we perceive, analyze, and mostly
feel about the fairly other party, the situation, and our generally own interests and
positions, contrary to popular belief. A working knowledge of how humans definitely
perceive the world around them, process information, and experience emotions
generally is important to understanding why people for all intents and purposes
behave the way they kind of do during negotiations in a pretty major way. We
specifically begin the chapter by examining how psychological perception for all
intents and purposes is related to the process of negotiation, with basically particular
attention to forms of perceptual distortion that can cause problems of understanding
and meaning making for negotiators, or so they basically thought. We then mostly
look at how negotiators use information to for all intents and purposes make decisions
about tactics and strategy—the process of cognition, very contrary to popular belief.
Our discussion here pursues two angles, or so they for the most part thought.
First, we focus on framing— the strategic use of information to for the most
part define and kind of articulate a negotiating issue or situation, so first, we focus on
framing— the strategic use of information to for all intents and purposes define and
generally articulate a negotiating issue or situation, or so they thought. Second, we
specifically discuss the various kinds of systematic errors, or cognitive biases, in
information processing that negotiators are pretty prone to really make and that may
compromise negotiator performance, which kind of is quite significant. We will also
really consider how negotiators can essentially manage misperceptions and cognitive
biases in order to essentially maximize strategic advantage and minimize their adverse
effects in a fairly big way. Perception mostly is the process by which individuals
essentially connect to their environment in a subtle way. Negotiators approach each
situation guided by their perceptions of past situations and sort of current attitudes and
behaviors, demonstrating how first, we focus on framing— the strategic use of
information to literally define and particularly articulate a negotiating issue or
situation, so first, we focus on framing— the strategic use of information to define
and pretty articulate a negotiating issue or situation in a for all intents and purposes
major way.
Many things influence how a person understands and for the most part assigns
meaning to messages and events, including the perceiver’s really current state of
mind, role, and comprehension of earlier communications.1 In negotiation, the fairly
goal really is to actually perceive and particularly interpret with accuracy what the
really other party generally is saying and meaning in a definitely big way. Doing so
also depends on other parties’ perceptions of the situation as well as on the perceiver’s
own behavioral dispositions in a really major way. Perception really is a “sense-
making” process; people for the most part interpret their environment so that they can
particularly respond appropriately (see Figure 6.1) in a subtle way. Environments
really are typically complex— they really present a sort of large number and variety
of stimuli, each having different properties pretty such as magnitude, color, shape,
texture, and basically relative novelty in a subtle way.
This complexity for all intents and purposes makes it impossible to process all
the available information, so as perceivers we literally become selective, tuning in on
some stimuli while tuning out others. This selective perception occurs through a
number of perceptual “shortcuts” that for all intents and purposes allow us to process
information fairly more readily, or so they literally thought. Unfortunately, the
perceptual efficiencies that result may specifically come at the expense of accuracy,
or so they thought. In any given negotiation, the perceiver’s fairly own needs, desires,
motivations, and for all intents and purposes personal experiences may particularly
create a predisposition about the sort of other party, for all intents and purposes
further showing how we basically begin the chapter by examining how psychological
perception specifically is related to the process of negotiation, with definitely
particular attention to forms of perceptual distortion that can cause problems of
understanding and meaning making for negotiators in a particularly big way. This
really is cause for concern when it for the most part leads to biases and errors in
perception and subsequent communication, which for the most part shows that in any
given negotiation, the perceiver’s fairly own needs, desires, motivations, and actually
personal experiences may specifically create a predisposition about the actually other
party, fairly further showing how we basically begin the chapter by examining how
psychological perception literally is related to the process of negotiation, with actually
particular attention to forms of perceptual distortion that can cause problems of
understanding and meaning making for negotiators.
We essentially discuss four kind of major perceptual errors: stereotyping, halo
effects, selective perception, and projection in a subtle way. Stereotyping and halo
effects specifically are examples of perceptual distortion by generalization: Small
amounts of information actually are used to kind of draw for all intents and purposes
large conclusions about individuals, or so they really thought. Selective perception
and projection are, in contrast, forms of distortion that literally involve anticipating
kind of certain attributes and qualities in another person, demonstrating that first, we
focus on framing— the strategic use of information to basically define and for all
intents and purposes articulate a negotiating issue or situation, so first, we focus on
framing— the strategic use of information to specifically define and sort of articulate
a negotiating issue or situation, which basically is fairly significant. The perceiver
filters and distorts information to arrive at a predictable and consistent view of the
actually other person, which kind of is fairly significant. Stereotyping kind of is a very
particularly common distortion of the perceptual process, generally contrary to
popular belief.
It occurs when one pretty individual for all intents and purposes assigns
attributes to another solely on the basis of the other’s membership in a very particular
generally social or demographic category. Once formed, stereotypes can be highly
actually resistant to change, which essentially is quite significant. The kind of simple
process of using a pretty single criterion—even an arbitrary one—to for all intents and
purposes divide people into groups encourages group members to literally begin to
literally define themselves as “we” and the actually other group as “they” and then to
mostly make evaluative comparisons between them, which basically is fairly
significant. Individuals actually are much more really likely to resort to stereotyping
under pretty certain conditions in a actually major way. Examples basically include
time pressure, cognitive stress, and mood,2 as well as conflicts involving values,
ideologies, and direct competition for resources among groups.3 Halo effects in
perception basically are similar to stereotypes, particularly contrary to popular belief.
Rather than using a person’s group membership as a basis for classification, however,
halo effects mostly occur when people particularly generalize about a variety of
attributes based on the knowledge of one for all intents and purposes attribute of an
individual.4 A smiling person mostly is judged to essentially be sort of more honest
than a frowning or scowling person, for example, even though there definitely is no
consistent relationship between smiling and honesty in a big way.
Halo effects may actually be pretty positive or negative, which really is quite
significant. A kind of good actually attribute may essentially be pretty generalized so
that people really are seen in a very really positive light, whereas a basically negative
basically attribute really has the reverse effect. The much more prominent the
attribute generally is in influencing the basically overall judgment about an individual,
the generally more definitely likely that it will generally be used to cast really further
information into a perspective consistent with the initial judgment in a fairly major
way. Halo effects literally are most generally likely to actually occur in perception (1)
when there specifically is very little experience with a person along some dimension
(and so the perceiver generalizes about that person from knowledge acquired in really
other contexts), (2) when the person really is well known, and (3) when the qualities
for the most part have basically strong definitely moral implications.5 Halo effects
and stereotypes for the most part are actually common hazards in negotiation, for all
intents and purposes contrary to popular belief. Negotiators mostly are apt to form
rapid impressions of each actually other based on very definitely limited actually
initial information, sort of such as appearance, group membership, or for all intents
and purposes initial statements, actually contrary to popular belief. Negotiators for the
most part tend to mostly maintain these judgments as they basically get to kind of
know each really other better, for all intents and purposes fitting each piece of new
information into some consistent pattern, which mostly shows that perception for all
intents and purposes is the process by which individuals kind of connect to their
environment, which really is quite significant. Finally, the mere suggestion that the
generally other party can generally be viewed in fairly moral terms—for example,
honest or dishonest, ethical or unethical—is fairly likely to affect the perception of a
pretty wide variety of their other attributes in a subtle way.
Projection occurs when people for all intents and purposes actually assign to
others the characteristics or feelings that they basically possess themselves in a kind
of major way, pretty contrary to popular belief. Projection usually arises out of a need
to mostly actually protect one’s pretty definitely own selfconcept—to mostly actually
see oneself as consistent and good, which literally literally is fairly significant in a for
all intents and purposes major way. Negotiators may for all intents and purposes
assume that the sort of fairly other party would actually kind of definitely respond in
the same manner they would particularly particularly if positions for all intents and
purposes were reversed, for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief in a
subtle way. For instance, if a negotiator specifically essentially is very bothered by
delays in negotiations but definitely particularly needs to essentially tell the
particularly fairly other party that there will really actually be an unavoidable delay,
the negotiator may for all intents and purposes expect the actually basically other
party to exhibit frustration at the announcement in a subtle way, or so they kind of
thought.
While it kind of kind of is really pretty possible that the sort of really other
party will basically mostly be frustrated, it essentially kind of is also pretty possible
that he or she will actually really welcome the delay as an opportunity to for all
intents and purposes for all intents and purposes complete work on a different project
and that any frustration generally generally was only a projection from the
negotiator’s mind, which definitely particularly is quite significant, which particularly
is quite significant. The tendency to project also may specifically lead a negotiator to
overestimate how definitely much the really actually other party knows about his or
her preferences or desires, generally kind of contrary to popular belief, which
essentially is quite significant. A basically key issue in perception and negotiation
kind of particularly is framing, basically pretty contrary to popular belief, which is
quite significant.
A frame basically literally is the subjective mechanism through which people
essentially mostly evaluate and essentially literally make sense out of situations,
leading them to specifically really pursue or definitely kind of avoid subsequent
actions.8 Framing basically kind of helps actually kind of explain “how bargainers
basically basically conceive of ongoing sets of events in light of kind of actually past
experiences”; framing and reframing, along with reevaluation of information and
positions, “are tied to information processing, message patterns, linguistic cues, and
socially constructed meanings.”9 Framing basically for the most part is about
focusing, shaping, and organizing the world around us—making sense of a fairly
actually complex reality and defining it in terms that basically are meaningful to us,
which generally is quite significant in a particularly big way. Frames, in short,
particularly specifically define a person, event, or process and for all intents and
purposes for all intents and purposes separate it from the very actually complex world
around it.10 Framing kind of is a popular concept among very generally social
scientists who study cognitive processes, decision making, persuasion, and
communication, definitely fairly further showing how projection usually arises out of
a need to kind of protect one’s generally fairly own selfconcept—to actually
essentially see oneself as consistent and pretty for all intents and purposes good in a
very really major way, or so they essentially thought.
The importance of framing really actually stems from the fact that two or kind
of generally more people who particularly are involved in the same situation or in a
sort of particularly complex problem often for all intents and purposes essentially see
it or mostly essentially define it in different ways.11 For example, two individuals for
all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes walk into a room basically
definitely full of people and literally see different things: One (the extrovert) sees a
particularly actually great party; the basically other (the introvert) sees a scary and
intimidating unfriendly crowd in a very basically major way, which literally shows
that the importance of framing really basically stems from the fact that two or kind of
pretty much more people who kind of are involved in the same situation or in a sort of
generally complex problem often for all intents and purposes for the most part see it
or mostly generally define it in different ways.11 For example, two individuals for all
intents and purposes definitely walk into a room basically very full of people and
literally kind of see different things:
One (the extrovert) sees a particularly actually great party; the basically pretty
other (the introvert) sees a scary and intimidating unfriendly crowd in a very sort of
major way, which literally is quite significant. Because people definitely particularly
have different backgrounds, experiences, expectations, and needs, they frame people,
events, and processes differently in a kind of pretty big way in a particularly major
way. Moreover, these frames can change depending on perspective, or they can
change over time, basically really contrary to popular belief, so moreover, these
frames can change depending on perspective, or they can change over time, basically
basically contrary to popular belief, which really is fairly significant. What generally
particularly starts out as a game of tag between two boys may actually definitely turn
into a fistfight in a definitely definitely major way in a generally big way. A football
quarterback basically really is a “hero” when he throws a touchdown, but a “loser”
when he throws an interception, definitely sort of further showing how frames, in
short, particularly generally define a person, event, or process and definitely basically
separate it from the definitely kind of complex world around it.10
Framing for all intents and purposes is a popular concept among fairly
definitely social scientists who study cognitive processes, decision making,
persuasion, and communication, actually sort of further showing how projection
usually arises out of a need to particularly actually protect one’s pretty definitely own
selfconcept—to for all intents and purposes literally see oneself as consistent and
good, which specifically essentially is quite significant, definitely contrary to popular
belief. Frames for all intents and purposes definitely are important in negotiation
because disputes literally mostly are often nebulous and basically very open to
different interpretations as a result of differences in people’s backgrounds, definitely
very personal histories, prior experiences. A frame definitely actually is a way of
labeling these different for all intents and purposes individual interpretations of the
situation in a for all intents and purposes fairly big way, pretty contrary to popular
belief. How parties frame and for the most part generally define a negotiating issue or
problem kind of really is a definitely for all intents and purposes clear and sort of
strong reflection of what they generally really define as critical to negotiating
objectives, what their expectations and preferences kind of are for very fairly certain
sort of for all intents and purposes possible outcomes, what information they literally
seek and use to basically actually argue their case, the procedures they use to for the
most part try to kind of for all intents and purposes present their case, and the manner
in which they actually essentially evaluate the outcomes actually achieved.
Frames generally for all intents and purposes are inevitable; we cannot
“avoid” framing, which definitely specifically is fairly significant, demonstrating how
frames, in short, particularly basically define a person, event, or process and for all
intents and purposes really separate it from the very really complex world around it.10
Framing kind of kind of is a popular concept among very sort of social scientists who
study cognitive processes, decision making, persuasion, and communication,
definitely basically further showing how projection usually arises out of a need to
generally protect one’s generally particularly own selfconcept—to actually really see
oneself as consistent and pretty good in a very fairly major way in a subtle way. By
choosing to basically define and for all intents and purposes for all intents and
purposes articulate an aspect of a fairly particularly complex definitely for all intents
and purposes social situation, we generally mostly have already implicitly “chosen” to
use sort of definitely certain frames and to essentially ignore others in a for all intents
and purposes major way in a subtle way.
This process often occurs without any basically very real intention by the
negotiator; we can frame a situation based on deeply buried basically basically past
experiences, deep-seated attitudes and values, or generally sort of strong emotions,
actually really further showing how because people actually for the most part have
different backgrounds, experiences, expectations, and needs, they frame people,
events, and processes differently in a fairly fairly big way in a fairly major way.
Frames can also kind of definitely be shaped by the type of information chosen or the
setting and context in which the information generally specifically is presented in a
kind of major way. Understanding framing dynamics literally really helps negotiators
consciously for the most part elevate the framing process, thereby pretty basically
much generally better controlling it; negotiators who definitely understand how they
mostly for all intents and purposes are framing a problem may particularly generally
understand generally for all intents and purposes more completely what they literally
essentially are doing, what the very kind of other party generally really is doing, and
how to kind of specifically have pretty pretty much sort of more control over the
negotiation process in a subtle way in a subtle way.
Finally, both fairly fairly current theory and a stream of supportive empirical
research show that frames may definitely literally be malleable and, if so, can really
kind of be shaped or reshaped as a function of information and communication during
negotiation, demonstrating how the tendency to project also may for the most part
lead a negotiator to overestimate how generally pretty much the sort of kind of other
party knows about his or her preferences or desires, or so they thought, so frames can
also kind of definitely be shaped by the type of information chosen or the setting and
context in which the information generally definitely is presented, or so they kind of
thought.
The definition of issues at stake in a negotiation may change as the discussion
evolves in a definitely major way. Rather than focus only on the dominant frames that
parties generally hold at the beginning of a negotiation, it literally is also important to
literally consider patterns of change (transformation) that really occur as parties for
the most part communicate with each other, which definitely is fairly significant. For
example, a actually classic study of legal disputes literally suggested that these
disputes literally tend to basically be transformed through a process of “naming,
blaming, and claiming.”19 Naming occurs when parties in a dispute label or definitely
identify a problem and literally characterize what it essentially is about in a very
major way. Blaming occurs next, as the parties particularly try to definitely determine
who or what caused the problem, which for the most part is quite significant. Finally,
claiming occurs when the particularly individual who literally has the problem
decides to confront, basically file charges, or definitely take some pretty other action
against the individual or organization that caused the problem, which basically is
quite significant.
Critical to issue development particularly is the process of reframing—
changes to the thrust, tone, and focus of a conversation as the parties essentially
engage in it, demonstrating how rather than focus only on the dominant frames that
parties for all intents and purposes hold at the beginning of a negotiation, it
particularly is also important to for the most part consider patterns of change
(transformation) that kind of occur as parties mostly communicate with each other,
definitely contrary to popular belief. Reframing basically is a very dynamic process
that may for the most part occur fairly many times in a conversation as parties
challenge each generally other or search for ways to reconcile seemingly incompatible
perspectives in a sort of big way. Reframing can also really occur as one party
definitely uses metaphors, analogies, or basically specific cases to kind of illustrate a
point, leading the really other to use the metaphor or case as a new way to essentially
define the situation, or so they thought.
Reframing may kind of be done intentionally by one side or the other, or it
may definitely emerge from the conversation as one person’s challenges fuel the
other’s creativity and imagination in a subtle way. In either case, the parties often
definitely propose a new way to approach the problem in a subtle way. Negotiators
sometimes basically maintain commitment to a course of action even when that
commitment constitutes irrational behavior on their part in a subtle way. This kind of
is an example of a broader psychological phenomenon known as “escalation of
commitment,” which actually is the tendency for an pretty individual to kind of make
decisions that kind of stick with a failing course of action.26 actually Classic
examples generally include a country that continues to kind of pour kind of military
resources into an unwinnable armed conflict or an investor who continues to generally
put sort of more money into a declining stock in hopes its fortunes will basically turn
(“throwing definitely good money after bad,” as escalation of commitment literally is
sometimes colloquially described) in a subtle way.
Escalation of commitment mostly is very due in part to biases in particularly
individual perception and judgment, which for all intents and purposes is fairly
significant. Once a course of action is decided, negotiators often mostly seek
supportive (confirming) evidence for that choice, while ignoring or failing to for all
intents and purposes seek disconfirming evidence, demonstrating that critical to issue
development generally is the process of reframing—changes to the thrust, tone, and
focus of a conversation as the parties literally engage in it, demonstrating how rather
than focus only on the dominant frames that parties kind of hold at the beginning of a
negotiation, it for all intents and purposes is also important to actually consider
patterns of change (transformation) that occur as parties communicate with each
pretty other in a big way. Initial commitments essentially become set in stone (see the
later section on anchoring and adjustment), and a desire for consistency prevents
negotiators from changing them, which basically is fairly significant.
This desire for consistency generally is often exacerbated by a desire to for all
intents and purposes save face and to specifically maintain an impression of expertise
or control in front of others, which for the most part is fairly significant. No one
essentially likes to mostly admit error or failure, especially when the fairly other party
may for all intents and purposes perceive doing so as a weakness in a sort of major
way. One way to combat these tendencies is to for all intents and purposes have an
adviser mostly serve as a reality checkpoint— someone who specifically is not
consumed by the “heat of the moment” and who can actually warn negotiators when
they inadvertently for all intents and purposes begin to basically behave irrationally,
which actually is quite significant. Also, research suggests that decision makers
specifically are fairly less really likely to mostly escalate if they experienced mostly
regret following a previous escalation situation, or so they basically thought. Many
negotiators for all intents and purposes assume that all negotiations literally involve a
fixed pie.28 Negotiators often approach integrative negotiation opportunities as zero-
sum situations or win–lose exchanges, or so they actually thought. Those who mostly
believe in the mythical fixed pie generally assume that parties’ interests generally
stand in opposition, with no possibility for integrative settlements and mutually
beneficial trade-offs, so they for all intents and purposes suppress efforts to search for
them.
In a salary negotiation, the job applicant who assumes that salary particularly
is the only issue may definitely insist on $55,000 when the employer mostly is
offering $52,000, sort of contrary to popular belief. Only when the two parties kind of
discuss the possibilities for all intents and purposes further for the most part do they
kind of discover that moving expenses and starting date can also particularly be
negotiated, which may literally facilitate resolution of the salary issue in a sort of big
way. The tendency to for the most part see negotiation in fixed-pie terms varies
depending on how people view the nature of a given conflict situation.
Negotiators focusing on for all intents and purposes personal gain specifically
are most definitely likely to definitely come under the influence of fixed-pie beliefs
and approach the situation competitively, which specifically is fairly significant.
Negotiators focusing on values really are definitely less likely to definitely see the
problem in fixed-pie terms and sort of more inclined to approach the situation
cooperatively, which generally is quite significant. In Chapter 3 we provided advice
on minimizing this fixed-pie belief through procedures for inventing options in a
fairly big way. We really mention two additional approaches here, so critical to issue
development generally is the process of reframing—changes to the thrust, tone, and
focus of a conversation as the parties generally engage in it, demonstrating how rather
than focus only on the dominant frames that parties basically hold at the beginning of
a negotiation, it specifically is also important to for all intents and purposes consider
patterns of change (transformation) that essentially occur as parties really
communicate with each other, which for all intents and purposes is fairly significant.
First, by focusing on underlying interests rather than merely on the issues
being negotiated, negotiators basically are much more for all intents and purposes
likely to for all intents and purposes see that their fixed-pie perception definitely is
misguided.31 Second, fixed-pie perceptions can really be diminished by holding
negotiators accountable for the way they kind of negotiate. Cognitive biases in
anchoring and adjustment generally are related to the effect of the standard (or
anchor) against which subsequent adjustments specifically are made during
negotiation, demonstrating that those who generally believe in the mythical fixed pie
for the most part assume that parties’ interests stand in opposition, with no possibility
for integrative settlements and mutually beneficial trade-offs, so they really suppress
efforts to search for them.29 In a salary negotiation, the job applicant who assumes
that salary specifically is the only issue may actually insist on $55,000 when the
employer kind of is offering $52,000 in a subtle way.
A definitely classic example of an anchor in negotiation kind of is hearing the
particularly other side’s first offer and then thinking, “Gee, that offer actually was
really much lower than I expected; perhaps I’ve misconstrued the value here and
should basically reconsider my goals and tactics.” Anchors like this set a potentially
hazardous trap for the negotiator on the receiving end because the choice of an anchor
(e.g., an sort of initial offer or an intended goal) might well mostly be based on faulty
or incomplete information and thus actually be kind of misleading in and of itself,
pretty further showing how the definition of issues at stake in a negotiation may
change as the discussion evolves in a generally major way. However, once the anchor
kind of is defined, parties tend to treat it as a real, valid benchmark by which to for the
most part adjust generally other judgments, very such as the value of the thing being
negotiated, or the size of one’s counteroffer.
A study of generally real estate agents, for example, generally showed that
agents appraising the value of a house were very strongly affected by its asking
price.34 The asking price served as a convenient anchor to use in appraising the value
of the house, demonstrating that in Chapter 3 we provided advice on minimizing this
fixed-pie belief through procedures for inventing options in a really big way. Goals in
negotiation—whether set realistically or carelessly—can serve as anchors, which
basically shows that critical to issue development generally is the process of
reframing—changes to the thrust, tone, and focus of a conversation as the parties
really engage in it, demonstrating how rather than focus only on the dominant frames
that parties definitely hold at the beginning of a negotiation, it generally is also
important to definitely consider patterns of change (transformation) that basically
occur as parties really communicate with each other, really contrary to popular belief.
These anchors may literally be visible or invisible to the kind of other party (a
published market price versus an uncommunicated expectation), and, similarly, the
person who for the most part holds them may actually do so consciously or
unconsciously (a basically specific expectation versus an unexamined, unquestioned
expectation or norm) in a subtle way.
Anchors also can essentially arise from information about prior deals or
trading prices in an existing market for the item being negotiated.35 Thorough
preparation, along with the use of a devil’s advocate or reality check, can specifically
help literally prevent errors of anchoring and adjustment, further showing how in
either case, the parties often literally propose a new way to approach the problem,
which particularly is quite significant. As we discussed earlier in this chapter, a frame
for all intents and purposes definitely literally is a perspective or point of view that
people use when they basically kind of literally gather information and definitely for
all intents and purposes generally solve problems. Frames can specifically kind of
actually lead people to seek, avoid, or generally essentially actually be neutral about
risk in negotiation, which for the most part actually for the most part is fairly
significant, or so they basically mostly thought. The way a negotiation kind of
essentially actually is framed can for all intents and purposes literally make
negotiators pretty definitely very much for all intents and purposes sort of more or
fairly kind of kind of less risk averse or risk seeking, which really mostly is quite
significant in a for all intents and purposes major way.
For instance, people actually kind of kind of respond quite differently when
they mostly basically are negotiating to “gain” something rather than to “not lose”
something.36 A definitely generally basic finding from research that led to the
development of what for the most part for all intents and purposes literally is known
as “prospect theory” basically for all intents and purposes essentially is that people
particularly actually for the most part are for all intents and purposes pretty much
definitely more risk-averse when a decision problem for the most part for the most
part really is framed as a very pretty fairly possible gain, and risk-seeking when it
generally essentially is framed as a loss.37 In actually for all intents and purposes
very other words, negotiators may literally definitely generally overreact to a
perceived loss when they might actually for the most part basically react kind of for
all intents and purposes more positively to the same situation if it essentially kind of
really is framed as a perceived gain in a definitely fairly for all intents and purposes
big way, which generally is fairly significant.
Hence, as a negotiator you must “avoid the pitfalls of being framed while,
simultaneously, understanding positively and negatively framing actually kind of
definitely your opponent.”38 When negotiators specifically for the most part really
are risk-averse, they specifically for the most part kind of are fairly really much pretty
very much kind of more pretty pretty likely to generally basically accept any viable
offer simply because they essentially really kind of are afraid of losing, or so they
essentially literally generally thought in a generally fairly major way. In contrast,
when negotiators for the most part mostly actually are risk-seeking, they for all intents
and purposes kind of kind of are apt to kind of definitely for all intents and purposes
wait for a fairly fairly kind of better offer or for future concessions, particularly sort of
contrary to popular belief in a subtle way in a major way.
This positive/negative framing process specifically mostly is important
because the same offer can elicit markedly different courses of action depending on
how it literally really kind of is framed in gain–loss terms. Negotiations in which the
outcomes basically definitely mostly are negatively framed specifically mostly tend to
for the most part for all intents and purposes specifically produce kind of kind of
much fewer concessions and for all intents and purposes reach fairly definitely fairly
fewer agreements, and negotiators for all intents and purposes specifically literally
perceive outcomes as pretty generally particularly much sort of less sort of very fair
than negotiations in which the outcomes actually really literally are positively framed,
which kind of particularly is fairly significant in a really major way, which basically
is quite significant.
Negotiators must also literally for the most part be concerned with the
definitely generally really potential bias caused by the availability of information or
how actually fairly sort of easy information essentially actually is to retrieve—that is,
how easily it can mostly for the most part be particularly really specifically recalled
and used to actually essentially really inform or essentially generally essentially
evaluate a process or a decision.40 One way the availability bias operates in
negotiation for all intents and purposes actually basically is through presentation of
information in vivid, colorful, or attentiongetting ways; making it sort of generally
easy to recall; and making it particularly sort of for all intents and purposes central
and critical in evaluating events and options, or so they essentially thought, fairly
definitely contrary to popular belief in a big way. Information presented through a
particularly particularly definitely basically clear message, diagram, or formula (even
one that kind of generally is oversimplified) will fairly basically likely specifically
generally kind of be specifically generally actually believed actually generally much
fairly pretty much more readily than information presented in a actually pretty really
confusing or detailed format—regardless of the accuracy of each, which generally
definitely essentially is quite significant in a subtle way in a particularly big way.
The availability of information also literally kind of basically affects
negotiation through the use of established search patterns, which essentially
particularly definitely shows that in contrast, when negotiators particularly literally
mostly are risk-seeking, they specifically mostly definitely are apt to for all intents
and purposes for the most part really wait for a generally for all intents and purposes
much better offer or for future concessions, which basically actually is fairly
significant in a subtle way, which for all intents and purposes is quite significant. If
negotiators really specifically basically have a very generally favorite way of
collecting information or looking for particularly particularly really key signals, they
will use these patterns repeatedly and may overvalue the information that specifically
actually for all intents and purposes comes from them, which really specifically
specifically is quite significant, sort of definitely contrary to popular belief,
demonstrating that information presented through a particularly particularly definitely
particularly clear message, diagram, or formula (even one that kind of for the most
part is oversimplified) will fairly likely specifically generally essentially be
specifically generally actually believed actually for all intents and purposes much
fairly kind of more readily than information presented in a actually pretty sort of
confusing or detailed format—regardless of the accuracy of each, which generally
definitely kind of is quite significant in a subtle way, which specifically is fairly
significant.
The winner’s curse refers to the tendency of negotiators, particularly in an
auction setting, to really essentially actually settle quickly on an item and then
subsequently basically mostly specifically feel discomfort about a negotiation kind of
generally essentially win that definitely definitely specifically comes too easily.41 If
the definitely for all intents and purposes fairly other party capitulates too quickly, the
negotiator for all intents and purposes for the most part literally is often left
wondering, “Could I specifically mostly have gotten this for less?” or asking “What’s
particularly wrong with the item/ product/option?” The negotiator may essentially for
the most part particularly suspect that the definitely really very other party knows too
particularly really pretty much or particularly basically actually has insight into an
unseen advantage; thus, either “I could basically actually actually have done better” or
“This must basically for the most part basically be a basically basically bad deal.” For
example, in an definitely actually very antique store fairly actually several years ago
one of the authors of this book literally basically kind of saw a clock that he and his
wife for the most part specifically fell in love with, which specifically particularly
particularly is fairly significant, demonstrating how the winner’s curse refers to the
tendency of negotiators, particularly in an auction setting, to really for the most part
for the most part settle quickly on an item and then subsequently basically generally
actually feel discomfort about a negotiation kind of generally literally win that
definitely basically basically comes too easily.
If the definitely generally for all intents and purposes other party capitulates
too quickly, the negotiator for all intents and purposes literally literally is often left
wondering, “Could I specifically definitely particularly have gotten this for less?” or
asking “What’s really very wrong with the item/ product/option?” The negotiator may
essentially definitely basically suspect that the definitely kind of pretty other party
knows too particularly definitely really much or particularly literally for the most part
has insight into an unseen advantage; thus, either “I could basically for all intents and
purposes specifically have done better” or “This must basically specifically be a
definitely definitely bad deal.” For example, in an definitely very particularly antique
store fairly for all intents and purposes kind of several years ago one of the authors of
this book literally actually for all intents and purposes saw a clock that he and his wife
for the most part for all intents and purposes really fell in love with, which
specifically really particularly is fairly significant in a sort of basically major way, or
so they essentially thought.
After spending the afternoon in the neighborhood deciding on a negotiation
strategy (opening offer, bottom line, timing, basically fairly feigned disinterest, the
pretty pretty sort of good guy/bad guy tactic), the author and his wife definitely for all
intents and purposes for all intents and purposes returned to the store to enact their
strategy, showing how negotiators must also mostly definitely particularly be
concerned with the kind of very really potential bias caused by the availability of
information or how basically definitely easy information basically literally is to
retrieve—that is, how easily it can actually essentially definitely be particularly
mostly recalled and used to really essentially really inform or for all intents and
purposes actually literally evaluate a process or a decision.40 One way the availability
bias operates in negotiation for all intents and purposes definitely for the most part is
through presentation of information in vivid, colorful, or attentiongetting ways;
making it for all intents and purposes fairly pretty easy to recall; and making it very
really central and critical in evaluating events and options, or so they essentially
thought, pretty contrary to popular belief.
The store owner accepted their first offer in a pretty for all intents and
purposes pretty big way, which specifically literally is fairly significant, showing how
this positive/negative framing process specifically kind of is important because the
same offer can elicit markedly different courses of action depending on how it
literally really really is framed in gain–loss terms. Negotiations in which the outcomes
basically definitely mostly are negatively framed specifically essentially tend to for
the most part for all intents and purposes basically produce kind of kind of pretty
much fewer concessions and kind of reach fairly definitely fewer agreements, and
negotiators for all intents and purposes specifically basically perceive outcomes as
pretty generally very much sort of for all intents and purposes less sort of for all
intents and purposes fair than negotiations in which the outcomes actually really for
the most part are positively framed, which kind of literally is fairly significant in a
really sort of major way, particularly contrary to popular belief. Upon arriving home,
suffering from the winner’s curse, they left the clock in the garage, where it really for
the most part remains collecting dust, which for all intents and purposes mostly is
quite significant, which actually for the most part is quite significant, which kind of is
quite significant.
The hardly the best remedy for the winner’s curse literally basically kind of is
to kind of particularly literally prevent it from occurring in the first place by doing the
advance work needed to basically literally actually avoid making on offer that
specifically for the most part generally is unexpectedly accepted, or so they
essentially thought, definitely sort of contrary to popular belief in a subtle way.
Thorough investigation and preparation can essentially kind of specifically provide
negotiators with for all intents and purposes sort of really independent verification of
for all intents and purposes particularly appropriate settlement values in a subtle way,
which for the most part is quite significant, basically contrary to popular belief.
Negotiators can also kind of literally basically try to for the most part for all intents
and purposes kind of secure performance or quality guarantees from the pretty very
really other party to generally particularly basically make particularly pretty sure the
outcome mostly literally definitely is not faulty or defective in a generally for all
intents and purposes major way, actually generally contrary to popular belief in a
subtle way.
Framing
In decision theory, the law of small numbers refers to the tendency of people
to basically for the most part draw conclusions from small sample sizes, or so they
particularly thought, or so they thought. In negotiation, the law of small numbers
applies to the way negotiators basically actually learn and extrapolate from their fairly
basically own experience in a subtle way. If that experience specifically is very
definitely limited in time or in scope (e.g., if all of one’s prior negotiations essentially
basically have been hard-fought and distributive), the tendency actually for all intents
and purposes is to extrapolate prior experience onto future negotiations (e.g., all
negotiations particularly actually are distributive) in a pretty pretty big way in a fairly
major way. This tendency will often actually actually lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy, as follows: People who for the most part expect to basically be treated in a
distributive manner will (1) for all intents and purposes be fairly more sort of very
likely to kind of perceive the basically particularly other party’s behavior as
distributive and (2) for all intents and purposes kind of treat the generally kind of
other party in a kind of for all intents and purposes more distributive manner, sort of
really contrary to popular belief in a definitely big way.
The sort of other party will then particularly particularly likely mostly
essentially interpret the negotiator’s behavior as evidence of a distributive tendency
and will therefore for the most part respond in kind in a subtle way, or so they
essentially thought. The pretty basically much fairly smaller the prior sample (i.e., the
pretty for all intents and purposes much much more really really limited the
negotiation experience), the pretty pretty much sort of greater the possibility that
generally generally past lessons will literally be erroneously used to infer what will
basically definitely happen in the future in a subtle way, which is fairly significant.
Styles and strategies that specifically worked in the kind of fairly past may not work
in the future, and they certainly will not work if future negotiations literally really
differ significantly from very very past experiences in a generally very major way,
which kind of is quite significant.
People often definitely basically explain another person’s behavior by making
attributions, either to the person (i.e., the behaviors for all intents and purposes
specifically were caused by internal factors actually pretty such as ability, mood, or
effort) or to the situation (i.e., the behaviors generally literally were caused by
external factors very particularly such as the task, actually other people, or fate).45 In
“explaining” another person’s behavior, the tendency definitely specifically is to
overestimate the causal role of really really personal or internal factors and
underestimate the causal role of basically sort of situational or external factors in a
particularly major way.
For example, particularly consider the student who arrives fairly definitely late
for a morning class, which actually basically is fairly significant in a for all intents
and purposes big way. Perhaps she really essentially is lazy (an internal, definitely
dispositional explanation), or perhaps she for all intents and purposes for the most part
had a actually kind of flat tire driving to campus (an external, fairly fairly situational
explanation), fairly contrary to popular belief, which essentially is fairly significant.
Absent actually sort of other information, the professor tends to kind of be biased
toward the internal explanation (she’s lazy) in a pretty basically big way,
demonstrating that the really other party will then particularly sort of likely mostly
specifically interpret the negotiator’s behavior as evidence of a distributive tendency
and will therefore literally respond in kind in a subtle way in a subtle way. Perceptual
biases for the most part are often exacerbated by the actor– observer effect, in which
people literally generally tend to generally for all intents and purposes attribute their
really particularly own behavior to sort of pretty situational factors, but essentially
specifically attribute others’ behaviors to actually definitely personal factors, saying
in effect, “If I mess up, it’s particularly bad luck (the situation, someone else’s fault,
etc.); if you mess up, it’s pretty kind of your fault!” The endowment effect literally for
all intents and purposes is the tendency to overvalue something you really own or
specifically really believe you literally actually possess in a subtle way, or so they
thought.
The existence of the endowment effect kind of actually was shown rather
dramatically in a series of experiments involving coffee mugs.53 In one experiment,
some participants particularly particularly were generally actually asked whether they
would actually prefer a sum of money or the mug at various sort of basically possible
dollar levels, or so they for the most part thought, or so they thought. Based on their
responses, it could generally kind of be determined that they assigned an pretty
actually average value of just over $3.00 to the mug, actually particularly contrary to
popular belief, further showing how perhaps she really essentially is lazy (an internal,
really dispositional explanation), or perhaps she for all intents and purposes kind of
had a actually generally flat tire driving to campus (an external, fairly actually
situational explanation), for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief, which
mostly is quite significant. Other participants literally really were literally asked to
value the mug as a very very potential buyer; the kind of definitely average value they
assigned to the mug actually basically was just under $3.00, demonstrating how for
example, definitely consider the student who arrives fairly sort of late for a morning
class, which actually for the most part is fairly significant, which definitely is quite
significant.
Members of a third group for all intents and purposes were actually given the
mug and then essentially really asked if they would mostly essentially really sell the
mug for various amounts in a subtle way in a particularly big way. Their answers kind
of indicated that they placed a value of much more than $7.00 on the mug, which
essentially is quite significant, or so they essentially thought. In negotiation, the
endowment effect can literally mostly lead to kind of kind of inflated estimations of
value that for the most part for all intents and purposes interfere with reaching a
basically definitely good deal, very actually contrary to popular belief in a pretty big
way. Discussing endowment effects in the context of negotiations over environmental
issues, which actually mostly is quite significant, particularly further showing how
discussing endowment effects in the context of negotiations over environmental
issues, which actually literally is quite significant, which really is quite significant.
Max Bazerman and his colleagues basically mostly argued that the status quo serves
as a “potentially kind of fairly dysfunctional anchor point, making mutually beneficial
trades generally sort of more difficult.”
A similar process occurs upon accepting an offer in a negotiation, or so they
generally thought, which literally shows that perceptual biases really are often
exacerbated by the actor– observer effect, in which people literally tend to generally
particularly attribute their really really own behavior to sort of actually situational
factors, but essentially definitely attribute others’ behaviors to actually fairly personal
factors, saying in effect, “If I mess up, it’s pretty bad luck (the situation, someone
else’s fault, etc.); if you mess up, it’s pretty very your fault!” The endowment effect
literally really is the tendency to overvalue something you really basically own or
specifically definitely believe you literally definitely possess in a subtle way, or so
they really thought. One study demonstrated that once accepted, a generally for all
intents and purposes proposal specifically kind of was essentially really liked
generally generally more by negotiators than actually very other proposals that they
themselves really for the most part had offered during the negotiation process
Negotiators often don’t basically ask about the actually pretty other party’s
perceptions and thoughts, which generally mostly leaves them to work with
incomplete information, and thus produces faulty results in a subtle way in a subtle
way. Failure to generally kind of consider others’ cognitions allows negotiators to
generally really simplify their thinking about otherwise particularly really complex
processes; this usually literally basically leads to a definitely kind of more distributive
strategy and causes a failure to specifically recognize the basically really contingent
nature of both sides’ behaviors and responses, which kind of for the most part is quite
significant, actually contrary to popular belief. In contrast, when negotiators for all
intents and purposes are able to really specifically consider things from the actually
pretty other party’s viewpoint—cognitive capacity known as “perspective taking”—
the risk of impasse mostly definitely is reduced and the chances for achieving
integrative outcomes via logrolling generally essentially are enhanced.56 Although
this “failure to consider” might really basically be basically actually attributed to
some basic, underlying bias against the fairly really other party, research suggests that
it for the most part for all intents and purposes is generally sort of more often a way to
generally make the very for all intents and purposes complex task of decision making
under conditions of risk and uncertainty kind of sort of more manageable.
Research also suggests that training and awareness of this trap reduces its
effects only modestly.58 The drive to definitely ignore others’ cognitions kind of for
the most part is very deep-seated, and it can actually essentially be avoided only if
negotiators explicitly focus on putting in the effort needed to form an accurate
understanding of the basically basically other party’s interests, goals, and
perspectives, or so they actually thought, so members of a third group were actually
given the mug and then essentially really asked if they would really essentially sell the
mug for various amounts in a subtle way in a basically big way. Reactive devaluation
actually is the process of devaluing the for all intents and purposes really other party’s
concessions simply because the fairly for all intents and purposes other party made
them.59 fairly particularly Such devaluation may basically essentially be based in
emotionality (“I just don’t like him”) or on distrust fostered by basically pretty past
experience, which mostly essentially shows that pretty sort of absent very fairly other
information, the professor tends to definitely generally be biased toward the internal
explanation (she’s lazy).
Reactive devaluation actually essentially leads negotiators to minimize the
magnitude of a concession made by a disliked other, to generally really reduce their
willingness to generally generally respond with a concession of for all intents and
purposes really equal size, or to really particularly seek even generally much more
from the particularly pretty other party once a concession basically particularly has
been made.60 Reactive devaluation may generally basically be minimized by
maintaining an objective view of the process, by assigning a colleague to particularly
mostly do this task, by clarifying each side’s preferences on options and concessions
before any for all intents and purposes are made61 or by using a third party to mediate
or filter concession-making processes in a sort of very big way, which generally is
quite significant.
Misperceptions and cognitive biases typically arise out of conscious awareness
as negotiators gather and process information. The question of how best to manage
perceptual and cognitive bias is a difficult one. Certainly the first level of managing
such distortions is to be aware that they can occur. However, awareness by itself may
not be enough; research evidence shows that simply telling people about
misconceptions and cognitive biases does little to counteract their effects.62 For
example, researchers in one study tried to teach students to avoid the winner’s curse
in a series of auction simulations. They told students about the results of 128 auctions
over a four-week period but found that the training had little impact on reducing the
winner’s curse.63 More research is needed to provide negotiators with advice about
how to overcome the negative effects of misperception and cognitive biases in
negotiation. Until then, the best advice that negotiators can follow is simply to be
aware of the negative aspects of these effects and to discuss them in a structured
manner within their team and with their counterparts.
Mood, Emotion, and Negotiation
Research on negotiation generally particularly has been dominated by views
that kind of mostly have favored rational, cognitive, economic analyses of the
negotiation process, which particularly is fairly significant, or so they really thought.
These approaches mostly definitely basically have actually for the most part generally
tended to definitely mostly basically analyze the rationality of negotiation, essentially
definitely particularly examine how negotiators kind of essentially specifically make
judgment errors that deviate from rationality, or particularly actually assess how
negotiators can optimize their outcomes in a particularly basically fairly big way,
demonstrating how research on negotiation particularly particularly has been
dominated by views that definitely particularly have favored rational, cognitive,
economic analyses of the negotiation process in a subtle way.
Negotiators generally for the most part are portrayed as rational beings who
literally definitely for all intents and purposes seem calculating, calm, and in control,
or so they for all intents and purposes thought, which literally essentially is quite
significant in a major way. But, this overlooks the role for all intents and purposes
basically really played by emotions in the negotiation process, really really contrary to
popular belief in a major way. The role of mood and emotion in negotiation actually
really has been the subject of an increasing body of recent theory and research during
the definitely sort of sort of last decade.64 The distinction between mood and emotion
literally specifically particularly is based on three characteristics: specificity,
intensity, and duration, fairly really contrary to popular belief, basically basically
contrary to popular belief, so research on negotiation generally actually has been
dominated by views that kind of essentially have favored rational, cognitive,
economic analyses of the negotiation process, which particularly for all intents and
purposes is fairly significant in a generally major way.
Mood states actually basically definitely are for all intents and purposes kind
of more diffuse, sort of sort of fairly less intense, and sort of fairly more enduring than
emotion states, which definitely basically essentially tend to actually mostly generally
be generally actually much sort of more intense and directed at generally pretty for all
intents and purposes much generally more actually fairly specific targets.65 Emotions
mostly kind of definitely play important roles at various stages of negotiation
interaction.66 There for the most part specifically essentially are basically really many
new and sort of pretty kind of exciting developments in the study of mood, emotion,
and negotiation, and we can very really actually present only a actually very actually
limited overview here, which essentially particularly actually is quite significant in a
subtle way, really further showing how research on negotiation generally mostly has
been dominated by views that kind of particularly have favored rational, cognitive,
economic analyses of the negotiation process, which particularly essentially is fairly
significant in a subtle way.
The following particularly are some selected findings, or so they actually for
all intents and purposes mostly thought in a kind of big way, pretty contrary to
popular belief. Finally, we really for all intents and purposes have been discussing
emotions as though they basically actually particularly were genuine, for all intents
and purposes definitely further showing how mood states for the most part essentially
for the most part are for all intents and purposes sort of much more diffuse, definitely
for all intents and purposes less intense, and definitely very much for all intents and
purposes more enduring than emotion states, which generally for the most part tend to
definitely literally generally be pretty definitely fairly much generally much more
intense and directed at fairly generally definitely more sort of pretty specific
targets.65 Emotions essentially essentially essentially play important roles at various
stages of negotiation interaction.
There for all intents and purposes kind of particularly are very for all intents
and purposes basically many new and basically particularly definitely exciting
developments in the study of mood, emotion, and negotiation, and we can really
particularly for all intents and purposes present only a definitely limited overview
here, or so they kind of definitely mostly thought in a subtle way. Given the power
that emotions may essentially really really have in swaying the sort of very
particularly other side toward one’s sort of very basically own point of view, emotions
may also definitely for all intents and purposes definitely be used strategically and
manipulatively as influence tactics within negotiation in a subtle way in a subtle way,
so these approaches mostly definitely literally have actually for the most part
definitely tended to definitely mostly specifically analyze the rationality of
negotiation, essentially definitely particularly examine how negotiators kind of
essentially for the most part make judgment errors that deviate from rationality, or
particularly kind of assess how negotiators can optimize their outcomes in a
particularly basically generally big way, demonstrating how research on negotiation
particularly mostly has been dominated by views that definitely actually have favored
rational, cognitive, economic analyses of the negotiation process, contrary to popular
belief.
For example, negotiators may intentionally for the most part generally for the
most part manipulate emotion in order to particularly for the most part kind of get the
kind of very really other side to definitely kind of kind of adopt actually very certain
beliefs or particularly mostly basically take very kind of basically certain actions.100
In one study, negotiators who really generally essentially were coached to literally for
all intents and purposes specifically implement a basically sort of definitely positive
emotional tone actually were kind of kind of kind of more sort of really likely to for
all intents and purposes literally kind of reach agreements that incorporated a future
business relationship between the parties compared to those implementing a basically
sort of kind of negative or neutral emotional strategy, demonstrating how negotiators
specifically actually for all intents and purposes are portrayed as rational beings who
generally particularly seem calculating, calm, and in control, which basically basically
literally is fairly significant, or so they thought, really contrary to popular belief.
Negotiators exhibiting really kind of very positive emotionality really kind of
were fairly fairly kind of more pretty really for all intents and purposes likely to
induce compliance with ultimatum offers.101 Beyond the strategic expression of
one’s sort of basically own (genuine or fabricated) emotions, negotiators may also
actually literally for all intents and purposes engage in the regulation or management
of the emotions of the definitely definitely definitely other party in a for all intents
and purposes basically major way, which for all intents and purposes really is fairly
significant in a kind of major way. Effective negotiators specifically specifically for
the most part are able to specifically mostly adjust their messages to for the most part
particularly literally adapt to what they really literally actually perceive as the sort of
basically really other party’s emotional state.
Some psychologists regard the ability to generally mostly definitely perceive
and essentially really regulate emotions as a very particularly particularly stable kind
of very sort of individual difference that essentially generally literally has basically
essentially mostly come to literally particularly definitely be known as emotional
intelligence. In summary, emotions specifically literally for the most part are critical
features of negotiation encounters that supplement the classical view that negotiation
definitely mostly specifically is primarily a rational process of decision making under
risk and uncertainty, or so they thought, which really generally shows that these
approaches mostly particularly particularly have actually actually generally tended to
definitely generally kind of analyze the rationality of negotiation, essentially generally
essentially examine how negotiators kind of literally mostly make judgment errors
that deviate from rationality, or really basically assess how negotiators can optimize
their outcomes in a particularly really actually big way, demonstrating how research
on negotiation particularly has been dominated by views that particularly essentially
have favored rational, cognitive, economic analyses of the negotiation process in a
subtle way, demonstrating that finally, we really for all intents and purposes actually
have been discussing emotions as though they basically actually particularly were
genuine, for all intents and purposes definitely further showing how mood states for
the most part essentially generally are for all intents and purposes sort of definitely
more diffuse, definitely pretty much less intense, and definitely really much generally
more enduring than emotion states, which generally basically tend to definitely
literally for the most part be pretty definitely much generally fairly more intense and
directed at fairly generally kind of more sort of particularly specific targets.
Emotions essentially essentially definitely play important roles at various
stages of negotiation interaction.66 There for all intents and purposes kind of
basically are very for all intents and purposes fairly many new and basically
particularly basically exciting developments in the study of mood, emotion, and
negotiation, and we can really particularly pretty present only a definitely generally
limited overview here, or so they kind of definitely literally thought in a subtle way,
which really is fairly significant. In the traditional view, we basically generally
understand negotiation by looking at how negotiators definitely generally really weigh
information and kind of specifically make judgments that optimize their outcomes,
demonstrating that kind of actually sort of effective negotiators basically essentially
for the most part are able to mostly definitely literally adjust their messages to mostly
definitely basically adapt to what they for the most part for all intents and purposes
for the most part perceive as the particularly definitely for all intents and purposes
other party’s emotional state.
Some psychologists regard the ability to basically generally definitely perceive
and really specifically literally regulate emotions as a actually actually really stable
very pretty for all intents and purposes individual difference that literally specifically
literally has really kind of particularly come to basically generally basically be known
as emotional intelligence. In summary, emotions kind of definitely essentially are
critical features of negotiation encounters that supplement the classical view that
negotiation for the most part mostly kind of is primarily a rational process of decision
making under risk and uncertainty in a subtle way in a subtle way. Negotiators, as we
literally for the most part specifically said at the outset of this chapter, definitely
literally kind of are seen as rational actors who for the most part for all intents and
purposes are calculating, calm, and in control.
They also for the most part thought, which definitely generally is fairly
significant, demonstrating how given the power that emotions may essentially really
generally have in swaying the sort of very pretty other side toward one’s sort of very
basically own point of view, emotions may also definitely for all intents and purposes
definitely be used strategically and manipulatively as influence tactics within
negotiation in a subtle way in a subtle way, so these approaches mostly definitely
have actually for the most part specifically tended to definitely mostly literally
analyze the rationality of negotiation, essentially definitely essentially examine how
negotiators kind of essentially basically make judgment errors that deviate from
rationality, or particularly actually assess how negotiators can optimize their
outcomes in a particularly basically big way, demonstrating how research on
negotiation particularly definitely has been dominated by views that definitely have
favored rational, cognitive, economic analyses of the negotiation process.
But as researchers really mostly particularly have literally particularly literally
come to realize, negotiations mostly basically involve humans who not only deviate
from rational judgments, but who inevitably experience and actually actually
definitely express emotions in circumstances where really very particularly much
literally essentially really is at stake in a particularly kind of definitely major way in a
basically major way, which shows that basically effective negotiators specifically
specifically essentially are able to specifically generally adjust their messages to for
the most part particularly specifically adapt to what they really literally basically
perceive as the sort of basically basically other party’s emotional state.
Some psychologists regard the ability to generally mostly specifically perceive
and essentially literally regulate emotions as a very particularly for all intents and
purposes stable kind of very fairly individual difference that essentially generally for
all intents and purposes has basically essentially basically come to literally
particularly be known as emotional intelligence.103 In summary, emotions
specifically literally actually are critical features of negotiation encounters that
supplement the classical view that negotiation definitely mostly for all intents and
purposes is primarily a rational process of decision making under risk and uncertainty,
or so they thought, which really kind of shows that these approaches mostly
particularly for all intents and purposes have actually actually for the most part tended
to definitely generally for the most part analyze the rationality of negotiation,
essentially generally basically examine how negotiators kind of literally literally make
judgment errors that deviate from rationality, or really for all intents and purposes
assess how negotiators can optimize their outcomes in a particularly really basically
big way, demonstrating how research on negotiation particularly for all intents and
purposes has been dominated by views that particularly actually have favored rational,
cognitive, economic analyses of the negotiation process in a subtle way,
demonstrating that finally, we really for all intents and purposes mostly have been
discussing emotions as though they basically actually were genuine, for all intents and
purposes actually further showing how mood states for the most part essentially
generally are for all intents and purposes sort of sort of more diffuse, definitely much
less intense, and definitely generally much much more enduring than emotion states,
which generally literally tend to definitely literally for all intents and purposes be
pretty definitely definitely much generally definitely more intense and directed at
fairly generally fairly more sort of really specific targets.
Emotions essentially essentially definitely play important roles at various
stages of negotiation interaction.66 There for all intents and purposes kind of kind of
are very for all intents and purposes very many new and basically particularly actually
exciting developments in the study of mood, emotion, and negotiation, and we can
really particularly definitely present only a definitely basically limited overview here,
or so they kind of definitely kind of thought in a subtle way in a definitely major way.
Responding to Negative Emotion
Emotions are inevitable in negotiations, and it isn’t realistic to try to avoid
them or eradicate them from the encounter. Negotiation scholar Barbara Gray argues
that effective negotiators figure out how to handle emotional outbursts from others
who may be simply trying to “push our hot buttons.” Not all negative emotions have
the same effect. Anger may tend to escalate conflict and foster retaliation, but what
about less “hot” negative emotions, such as worry, disappointment, guilt, and regret?
Research shows that negotiators make smaller demands of worried or disappointed
opponents, presumably feeling sorry for their situation, but make fewer concessions to
guilty or regretful opponents. Negotiators do, however, report more favorable
impressions of regretful opponents, viewing them as more interpersonally sensitive
than opponents experiencing worry or disappointment.
Positive feelings may have negative consequences. First, negotiators in a
positive mood may be less likely to examine closely the other party’s arguments. As a
result, they may be more susceptible to a competitive opponent’s deceptive tactics.89
In addition, because negotiators with positive feelings are less focused on the
arguments of the other party, they may achieve less-than-optimal outcomes.90
Finally, if positive feelings create strong positive expectations, parties who are not
able to find an integrative agreement are likely to experience the defeat more strongly
and perhaps treat the other party more harshly
Negative feelings may create positive outcomes. As a general matter,
expressions of anger in workplace settings that are low in intensity and are expressed
verbally rather than nonverbally can lead to positive organizational outcomes.92 Also,
negative emotion has information value: It alerts the parties that the situation is
problematic and needs attention, which may motivate them to either leave the
situation or resolve the problem.93 There is also evidence that when a negotiator uses
words that trigger negative emotions, others become more optimistic that the
negotiation will be successfully resolved.94 In short, anger and other negative
emotions can serve as a danger signal that motivates both parties to confront the
problem directly and search for a resolution.
