Case Brief 1
Citation: Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (2012).
Parties: Oluf Johnson as the plaintiff. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company as the defendant.
Facts: The Cooperative sprayed pesticides on a day that had 9-21 mile per hour winds towards the Johnsons’
field. The Johnson’s had their fields tested by the MDA. The MDA found that there was no tolerance for
diflufenzopyr in soybeans and that, pending chemical testing, the MDA would determine if there would
be any harvest prohibitions on the Johnsons' soybeans. Afte the result of the chemical testing, the MDA
informed the parties that test results revealed that the chemical dicamba was present, but below
detection levels. The MDA also reported that the chemicals diflufenzopyr and glyphosate were not
present. Because only one of the three chemicals was present based on its testing, the MDA concluded
that it cannot be proven if the detections were from drift.
Procedural History: Cooperative won at District Court. The Johnsons’ appealed. However, in Appeals Court, the
Johnson’s won and the Cooperative appealed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issue(s): 1. Did the Johnsons' trespass claim fail as a matter of law? 2. Was the Johnson’s claim that the
pesticide drift from the Cooperative's spraying constitute nuisance and negligence? 3. Was the
Cooperative’s pesticide drift covered in the regulating practices of producers? 4. Was the
Johnsons’ request for a permanent injunction under the nuisance statute permissible?
Holding: 1. Yes. Pesticide did not constitute trespass. 2. No. The Department of Agriculture regulation
governing organic production applied only to producer’s actions. 3. Pesticide drift did not
require removal of field from organic production pursuant to regulation. 4. Injunctive relief was
permissible in a nuisance action.
Reasoning: The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s trespass claim failed as a matter of law. They began with the
discussion about the tort of trespass. In Minnesota, a trespass is committed where a plaintiff has the
“right of possession” to the land at issue and there is a “wrongful and unlawful entry upon such
possession by defendant.” Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 701
(Minn. 2012). Based on the tort of liability, the Plaintiff’s claim that the pesticide drift from the spraying
of the Cooperative, did not constitute nuisance and negligence. Minnesota does not recognize a claim
for trespass by particulate matter and the Johnsons could not prove any negligence or nuisance
damages based on 7 C.F.R. §. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 714
(Minn. 2012). The court concluded that the regulating of practices of producers does not cover the
Cooperative’s pesticide drift. When the regulation is read in the context of the NOP and the OFPA as a
whole and the statutory scheme’s focus on regulating the practices of producers. Johnson v. Paynesville
Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 711 (Minn. 2012). The Johnsons' request for injunctive
relief was not permissible under the nuisance statute because it concluded that they did not have a
viable nuisance claim under 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b), and therefore had no basis on which to seek an
injunction.
Case Brief 2
Citation: State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745 (1984)
Parties: State of Minnesota as the Respondent. John Brecon and Scott Carpenter as the Appellants.
Facts: Brechon and Carpenter were arrested at Honeywell corporate headquarters and charged with
trespassing. Prior to the trial the state moved to prevent the Defendants from presenting
evidence pertaining to necessity or justification defenses unless certain conditions were met.
The state sought to preclude the defendants from asserting a “claim of right” defense.
Procedural History: The State of Minnesota appealed, and the defendants sought review of the order limiting their
testimony to general beliefs. A three-judge panel in a 2–1 vote reversed the trial court and held
that “without claim of right” is an affirmative defense, that defendant's testimony as to beliefs is
irrelevant, that a necessity defense may not be raised at trial, and that a pretrial offer of proof
must be made as to the claim of right or justification defense. Court reversed.
Issues: 1. Does the state have the burden to prove the defendants did not have a claim of right to be on
Honeywell property? 2. Does jury or the court decide if defendants have a valid claim of right? 3.
Could the defendants be precluded from testifying about their intent?
Holding: 1. Yes. We hold that “without claim of right” is an element the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, in a criminal trespass case the state must present evidence from which
it is reasonable to infer that the defendant has no legal claim of right to be on the premises
where the trespass is alleged to have occurred. 2. Yes. We hold that the jury, not the court,
decides the sufficiency of the evidence presented to establish a claim of right. The court may not
require a pretrial offer of proof in order to decide as a matter of law that defendants have no
claim of right. This is so because claim of right evidence is evidence tending to disprove an
essential element of the state's case: that the actor trespassed without claim of right. 3. No. We
deem it fundamental that criminal defendants have a due process right to explain their conduct
to a jury.
Reasoning: In this case the courts looked at the rule of claim of right. The state had to prove that the
defendants did not have “claim of right” in adhering to the rule that criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed, the “claim of right” is an element the state must prove. M.S.A. § 609.605(5).
The jury would decide in this case if the defendants had a valid claim of right by looking at the
rule of criminal law. “The court may not require a pretrial offer of proof in order to decide as a
matter of law that defendants have no claim of right. In the rule of criminal law, the jury decides
the sufficiency of evidence. M.S.A. § 609.605(5). ”This is so because claim of right evidence is
evidence tending to disprove an essential element of the state's case: that the actor trespassed
without claim of right.” State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 1984). The defendant’s
could not be excluded from giving testimony in accordance the constitution and their right to
testify. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Case Brief 3
Citation: State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W. 2d 884 (1981)
Parties: State of Minnesota as respondent. Jane Douglass Hoyt as appellant.
Facts: Hoyt who is not related to Sharon Siebert, a brain-damaged resident of St. Mary’s Skilled
Nursing Home, began visiting her in a vegetative state. Hoyt continued to visit Sharon Siebert for
22 months until her arrest for trespass. Hoyt visited Sharon almost daily working with her to
improve her care and condition, or at least in Hoyt’s mind she was. Hoyt petitioned to be
appointed guardian of Sharon which at the same time Sharon’s parents also petitioned for the
appointment of themselves as co-guardian of the person and estate of Sharon. The petition was
granted to Sharon’s parents. Hoyt’s visitation rights to St. Mary’s were revoked. She refused to
leave voluntarily when entering the facility weeks after receiving the letter that her visitation
rights were revoked.
Procedural History: The State of Minnesota won at trial court and Hoyt appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the
district court’s judgement of conviction.
Issues: Did the defendant, in her offer of proof, present a sufficient prima facie case of claim of right
that she had a license to enter St. Mary's?
Holding: Yes. There was no showing that defendant was at any time informed, until subsequent to her
arrest, that the guardians had consented to, or acquiesced in, the decision of Mr. Brenny to bar
her from the facility.
Reasoning: Under Minnesota’s health care bill of rights, a facility may not require a waiver of the rights to
admission of facilities. Minn.Stat. s 144.651 (1980). The administrator of St. Mary’s
Rehabilitation Center did not have a right under this statue to revoke Hoyt’s visitation rights to
the facility. “Among the rights enunciated by the statute is: (17) Every resident may associate
and communicate privately with persons of his choice unless medically contraindicated and
documented by his physician in the medical record” State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Minn.
1981). This reinforced Hoyt’s claim of right because there was no evidence that the visitation
was medically contraindicated in Siebert’s medical record. The court then looked at a claim of
right. A claim of right is not limited to a claim of title or ownership. Express or implied consent a
license to a person from one who has the authority to give such consent is a defense to a charge
of criminal trespass. section 609.605(5). “A person visiting a nursing home resident with express
or implied consent of the resident or of the guardian of the resident is no less a licensee entitled
to use the means of ingress and egress to make such visitation possible than is a person visiting
an apartment building tenant.” State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Minn. 1981). Hoyt had a
claim of right defense to the trespass charge because implied consent of the guardian’s did not
exist on the date of the alleged trespass. State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Minn. 1981). The
court held that the defendant through her offer of proof made out a sufficient prima facie
defense of bona fide claim of right. Hoyt could not be convicted of trespass because it was not in
the rights of the nursing home to ban her from visiting as she was not being disruptive.
Minn.Stat. 609.72 (1980).
Case Brief 4
Citation: State v. Kremmin 889 N.W.2d 318 (2017)
Parties: State of Minnesota as the Respondent. Ronald Gene Kremmin as the Appellant.
Facts: Appellant and his wife were separated at time of charged offense. The Appellant’s wife and son
were living at the house of S.S. Appellant and his wife co-owned a horse that was boarded by
S.S. Appellant went to S.S.’s property and took the horse back to his farm. On that same day,
when S.S. and appellant’s wife saw that the horse was gone, they went to appellant’s farm to
retrieve the horse. Appellant shouted profanities at S.S. on the roadway next to the appellant’s
farm and S.S. told appellant to never return to her property. On a separate day, the appellant
drove into S.S.’s driveway, paused briefly and drove away. S.S. called the police and from S.S.’s
statement, the deputy was able to confirm that the description of the truck matched the
appellant’s truck. A citation for trespassing was then mailed to the appellant.
Procedural History: Kremmin was convicted in the District Court, Rice County, of misdemeanor trespassing. Kremmin
appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction.
Issue: Did sufficient evidence support appellant's conviction despite a lack of proof that S.S. told
appellant to leave her property?
Holding: No. Statute prohibiting trespass required alleged victim to both command defendant to leave
victim's property and to command defendant not to return, and thus evidence was insufficient
to support defendant's conviction for trespassing, where neither party presented evidence
supporting conclusion that victim told defendant to leave victim's property or that defendant
was even on victim's property at same time as victim. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.605(1)(b)(8).
Reasoning: In this case, the Court of Appeals analyzed the statute of trespassing. Trespass is defined as (b)
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person intentionally: (8) returns to the property of
another within one year after being told to leave the property and not to return, if the actor is
without claim of right to the property or consent of one with authority to consent. Minn. Stat. §
609.605, subd. 1(b)(8). Kremmin could only be found guilty of trespassing if there was evidence
to prove that he was told to leave and not return. ”There is no evidence and respondent does
not allege that appellant was on S.S.’s property when she told him never to return to the
property.” State v. Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). The statute would
have required Kremmin to depart the property. The court concluded that the plain meaning of
Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8), “is not so absurd as to utterly confound the above
legislative purpose, and as a result, respondent must show appellant was commanded both to
leave the property and not to return to properly obtain a conviction.” State v. Kremmin, 889
N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). Appellant could not be convicted of trespass because
there was no evidence to prove that the appellant was told to leave the property. State v.
Kremmin, 889 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
Statutes on Trespass
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.605 (West 2017)
This states the conditions that must be met to constitute trespass under Minnesota State Law. Trespassing is
covered in this statute and is broken down into 5 subdivisions which are Subd. 1. Misdemeanor, Subd. 2. Gross
misdemeanor, Subd. 3. This subdivision was Repealed, Subd. 4. Trespasses on school property, and Subd. 5.
Certain trespass on agricultural land. The requirements set forth in this statute pertain to the posting of signs,
prohibiting trespassing on premises, dwellings, construction sites, and owners or occupants of land. These laws
make it illegal to go on another person’s property without consent. The defendant would have to demonstrate.
that they illegally entered another person’s property without claim of right.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.605 (West 2017)
This statute concerns the trespassing for owners of animals. If someone allows their pet or farm animal to roam
freely or enter someone else’s property in a city, and this causes harm or damage, the person affected can sue
the animals owner for compensation. However, if the owner of the property doesn’t take action to control or
detain the animals causing damage, they may not be entitled to seek damages from the animal owner. For a
defendant to demonstrate trespass according to this statute they would have to allow their pet to roam freely and
enter someone else’s property and cause harm or damage if not detained.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
