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LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
HELMS SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
The U.S. Constitution, Enumerated Government Powers, and the Tenth Amendment
Submitted to Dr. Michael Robinson,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of
PLCY 702 – B03
Founding Era and the Constitution
by
Robert H. Carey, Jr.
June 16, 2022
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Thesis
While the Constitutional Conventioneers argued both in the Convention and afterwards
through The Federalist Papers and in the State Ratifying Convention that all the proposed
federal government’s powers were specifically enumerated and limited, and that all such powers
not specifically enumerated remained with the States and the People, the actual text of the
Articles II and III, concerning the Executive and Judicial Branches respectively, provided no
such specific limitations, and therefore provided these other Branches the means to
constitutionally expand their powers over the States and the People, with little legal recourse
available for either of those constitution-drafting groups. Further, the Necessary and Proper
Clause in Article I provided Congress the means to sidestep any of the other limitations placed
upon it in Article I. And, the Supremacy Clause in Article VI provided the Judicial Branch them
means to expand its own powers by its own decisions, as well as to “buy-off” the other branches
by expanding their individual powers by the same judicial logic.
The Constitutional Conventioneers Arguments on Limited Federal Powers
In Federalist No. 45, Madison attempts to assuage Americans’ fears the proposed federal
government will encroach on the rights of individual States – and by extension of the People,
both collectively and individually – by assuring his readers
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. (Madison Federalist 45)
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In Federalist No. 44, he similarly counters the argument that the “Necessary and Proper Clause”
was too expansive and prone to abuse by that federal government to expand its own powers
unjustifiably. Madison rejects any alternative paths the Constitutional Convention could have
taken in specifically enumerating these powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
specifically any action that would have required:
- pursuing and “prohibit[ing] the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated”,
- detailing the specific enumerated powers that define “necessary and proper”, or
- even defining what “necessary and proper” was not.
Madison rejects all those specific limitations on the Necessary and Proper Clause, especially the
alternative of expressly defining what is necessary and proper, because that would then put
Congress in the position of “violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably
necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted” (Madison Federalist No.
44). While not part of the proposed Constitutional text itself, and therefore not part of any legal
framework of the United States government, the fact the courts often reference the Federalist
Papers to interpret the meaning of the Constitution makes comments such as these extremely
relevant, for it implies the Constitutional Conventioneers specifically considered such
specifications on that clause and rejected them.
The fact is, many of the other conventioneers shared Madison’s assuredness the entirety
of the proposed Constitution represented a strictly enumerated and limited expression of the
proposed federal government’s powers, and that if it were not so specifically granted to the
proposed federal government, it remained with the States and the People. James Wilson, in his
famous “State House Yard Speech” told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that while in the
State constitutions everything that is not reserved specifically to the People was delegated to the
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State; the presumption was the State has all powers not specifically reserved to the People or
prohibited to the State by the State constitution. But, as Wilson specifically argued, for the
proposed federal Constitution, there was no need for an additional bill of rights, because “it
would have been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a foederal [sic] body of our own
creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by the
intention or the act, that has brought that body into existence” (Wilson [1787] 2007). Madison,
at the New York Ratifying Convention, mirrors Wilson’s arguments, but takes it one step further
in declaring the proposed Federal Constitution more a confederation of member governments,
and not an agreement of amongst the individual members of the People, as the States are. That is
because
In the first formation of government by the association of individuals, every
power of the community is delegated, because the government is to extend to
every possible object; Nothing is reserved, but the unalienable rights of mankind:
But when a number of these societies unite for certain purposes, the rule is
different, and from the plainest reason: They have already delegated their
sovereignty, and their powers to their several governments; and these cannot be
recalled, and given to another, without an express act. (Hamilton 1788, New York
Ratifying Convention)
And at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention, the editors of the notes write “it is
admitted, on all hands, that the general government has no powers but what are expressly
granted by the Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several states”
(South Carolina House of Representatives [1788] 1827). As detailed in Bolten’s video and notes,
many other State leaders, and Constitutional Conventioneers, including Roger Sherman (“The
powers vested in the federal government are only such as respect the common interests of the
Union and are particularly defined, so that each State retains its sovereignty in what respects its
own internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign State not delegated
to the United states” (Sherman 1788)), Edmund Randolph (“Every power not given it by this
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system is left with the states” (Randolph 1788), Alexander Hamilton (“Whatever is not expressly
given to the federal head, is reserved to the members” (Hamilton [1788] 1962)), and many
others, all said the same thing; the Federal Constitution limited the entire federal government’s
powers only to those specifically enumerated to the federal government, or prohibited to the
States (Boldin 2022).
The Limits of the Proposed Constitution’s Limitations on Federal Government Powers
But as many of these same leaders admit, it is only Article 1’s provisions regarding the
powers of the federal Congress that are specifically enumerated and limited. Noah Webster at
his State’s ratifying convention admits, “The Constitution defines the powers of Congress; and
every power not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several state-legislatures”
(Webster [1787] 1888), while Roger Sherman followed up his wide-ranging declarative
statement above with the counter-argumentative admission, “tho’ the general government in
matters within its jurisdiction is paramount to the constitutions and laws of the particular States,
yet all acts of the Congress not warranted by the constitution would be void” (Sherman 1787).
Meanwhile, at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Archibald MacLaine gave the most
precise admission of the narrow limitations of the Federal Government’s powers to only those
powers of Congress: “The powers of Congress are expressly defined…the Powers of Congress
are limited and enumerated. We say we have given them those powers, but we do not say we
have given them more.” But then Archibald appears to believe Congress is the only part of the
proposed government that matters, because he extends those limitations of powers to the other
two branches of the proposed Federal Government as well, stating declaratively, “We retain all
those rights which we have not given away to the general government” (MacLaine [1788] 1827).
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Upon a careful examination of the texts of the proposed Federal Constitution, the
admissions of the members of the Ratifying Conventions bear out, as only the powers of
Congress are specifically and explicitly enumerated and limited; the Constitutional
Conventioneers did not similarly enumerate limited and specific powers to the Executive Branch
nor the Judiciary in Articles II and III. Because of that, these other branches of the proposed
federal government, while having some of their powers enumerated in the Constitution, still do
not have the limits on their powers that Article I place on the federal Congress, limitations that
would not be provided until the enactment of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments three and a half
years after later. Article I, Section 1 specifically starts the operative text of the Constitution to
say, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States…”
(US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1), and then Section 8 proceeds to detail each of the powers “The
Congress shall have Power to…” do. Next, Section 9 details each of the things Congress “shall
not” do, such as suspend Habeas Corpus (US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 2), impose a “Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law” (Ibid., cl. 3). Finally, Section 10 details each of the things the
States are prohibited from doing. Words matter, and Article I of the Constitution provides, in
significant detail, each of the things Congress can and cannot do, as well as those things the
States are prohibited to do. And to repeat, all of these specifically enumerated and limited
powers follow the general overall enumeration that all the vested legislative powers are first
specifically granted by the People through the Constitution.
For the other two branches of government, the powers are not nearly as enumerated, nor
as limited or proscribed. Most importantly, they do not start with the same text as Article I’s
definition of Congress’ powers, namely the phrase, “All [Executive/Judicial] Powers herein
granted shall be vested…”. The Constitutional Conventioneers could have used that exact same
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limiting language for Executive and Judicial branches, but they did not. Instead, Section 1 of
Article II simply says, “The executive power shall be vested in a President…”. There is no
statement such executive power is granted by the Constitution. Rather, the implication is that the
executive power is preexistent and presumed, and that any executive agency can wield them;
they do not need to be granted by the participating States or the People. While Sections 2 and 3
of Article II do grant some powers to the President and the executive branch, they are more
general in phraseology than the strict delineations contained in the corollary sections of Article I.
Similarly, Article III also, presumes that broad judicial power already exists, and simply vests
such preexistent authority with the specific agency of the “one supreme Court and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may…ordain and establish” (Ibid., art. 3, sec. 1).
Making Constitutional Limits of Governmental Power Moot by
Not Specifying Those Limits
Lay on top of those clear differences in Constitutional text drafting between Article I and
Articles II and III the combined powers of the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I Section 8
and the Supremacy Clause in Article VI Clause 2, and that both are written so broadly and with
so few defined limitations, and Federal Government officials seeking to advance their own
political objectives or grow their political power are given the very tools to do so, even when
they may be exercised over the objections of the States and the People. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the Supreme Court’s 1941 United States v. Darby decision where the Justices
exercised their supreme authority to interpret the Constitution (United States v. Darby 1941, 312
US 119), and in doing so throw the very concept of State sovereignty “into the dust heap of
history”, apparently to the same crowd approval as Jefferson receives after dismissing
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Tallyrand’s rejection of the U.S. Constitution as a “dirty rag [that is no] symbol of Liberty”
(Hamlin and Arliss 1919, 13).1 Specifically, the Supreme Court took advantage of that generic
vesting of “The judicial power of the United States,” judicial power which is preexistent to the
Constitution and therefore not needing specific granting of specific authority by the States or the
People as is specifically done with the powers granted Congress in Article I. This assumption of
authority by judicial fiat was made available by the “subsequent review” authorities the Marshall
Supreme Court adopted for itself in the Marbury v. Madison (1803) decision, wherein it declared
that, “The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals” (Marbury v.
Madison 1803, 5 USC 173), as well as that, “The judicial power of the United States is extended
to all cases arising under the constitution” (Ibid., 5 USC 178) and the People who framed that
Constitution apparently have no role in the oversight or definition of either.
Conclusion
The result? Neither the Executive Branch nor the Judicial Branch suffer under the same
limitations of powers as must Congress. And federal courts if sympathetic to the desires of
either of the other branches to expand and solidify their authorities can provide such authorities
by judicial fiat, protected by their self-proclaimed final judgement status, with no further appeal
possible other than rebellion by the States or the People. The Founding Fathers built the very
system for the dismantling of the States’ sovereignty and the People’s liberties in their apparent
haste to get out of the hot and humid clime of Philadelphia.
1 In respecting the apparent sensitivities of the academic world, but oblivious to the toll it will take on the
grade for this already late paper, this author used the 1919 version of the play Hamilton, because the antiquity and
the hard-bound printing by a publisher with an ampersand in the name apparently denotes academic rigor and
reliability. Of course, most readers will agree the 2016 Hamilton play’s exchange between Alexander Hamilton and
Eliza Schuyler in the song “Helpless” of how only the “sky is the limit” would be a far more appropriate description
of the Supreme Court’s usurpation of States’ rights with the Darby decision. For which this citation is provided:
Miranda, Lin-Manuel, and Jeremy McCarter. 2016. Hamilton: The Revolution. New York: Grand Central
Publishing.
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