How does Aquinas’ idea of Christian kingship build on previous Natural Law concepts? Be sure
to include a discussion of justice, covenantal statesmanship, and Christian kingship, especially as
seen in the relationship between medieval religious and civil offices.
Introduction
As in almost every Christian examination of Man’s relationship to God and Man’s
responsibilities to God in his behavior in the State, Thomas Aquinas draws too upon Paul’s
discussion of how the Gentiles abide by the Law but have not been revealed the Law as were
the Jews (Rom. 2:14 [NASB]). From that passage, Aquinas continues with an additional
comment that “Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each
one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil” (Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Q.
91, A. 2, SC). Besides the fact Aquinas’ interpretation of Paul’s passage makes declarative
statements as to the Gentile’s behavior, and therefore knowledge of the Law, being universal, a
declaration which Paul does not make in a strict reading of Paul’s text, it still shows Aquinas’
deep reliance on the natural law principles of both Aristotle and Augustine, especially when it
comes to a drive to goodness that human reason compels, the innate goodness of
government’s rulers because of the goodness of that reason, and the necessity of the Christian
Church’s supremacy over the governments of Man.
Aquinas on Natural Law
While Augustine is far more Platonic than Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas only appears to even
consider Plato when it is in the secondary reference to Aristotle’s critiques of Plato’s Republic.
In De Regno, not a single reference to Plato or Socrates can be found, while Aristotle is cited
nine times to the King of Cyprus. Throughout both De Regno and Commentary, Aquinas’ chief
aim is to reconcile the philosophy of Aristotle to Christian theology. He does that by taking the
precepts of Aristotle’s view on natural law and the nature of Man, and then either finding
biblical text that supports such a philosophy or showing that Aristotle’s philosophy is predated
by God’s divine and natural laws.
First, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that “the light of reason is placed by nature in every man,
to guide him in his acts towards his end” (Aquinas De Regno, 4) and that drives him to live in a
group which is hopefully a just society, just as Aristotle believes “it is the special property of
man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and
right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a
household and a city-state” (Aristotle Politics, 1.1253a). Second, Aquinas argues that the divine
origins of human reason leads Man to pursue good things for the betterment of Man: “It is
implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the reward of virtue is happiness.
The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its possessor good and
renders his deed good” and it is this motivation by which, “everyone strives by working well to
attain that which is most deeply implanted in desire, namely, to be happy. This, no one is able
not to wish. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy”
(Aquinas De Regno, 63) where happiness is defined as pursuing the good goals taught by the
special revelation of God’s Bible and the Church.
Natural Law, Reason, and Community Government
That supremacy of Man’s reason over his baser instincts and desires then becomes the
model for Aquinas’ view of the nature, purpose, and structure of Man’s government: to temper
the baser tendencies of the relationships between men, to provide unity of community and
peace, and to lead men to pursue the happiness to be found in virtuous lives (especially those
that pursue the glorification of God). In those beliefs, Aquinas’ could have just as easily quoted
Augustine from City of God. As Augustine takes the reader from family to the village, and then
to the city and the cosmos, as progressively more perfect levels of government (Augustine The
City of God, Ch. 5), Aquinas takes the reader through an almost identical progression in his
Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, but also describes how the control of Man’s instincts by
reason is the same as the community’s control of the individual and the family where, “the
political community has priority over the household and every individual, since the whole as
such necessarily has priority over the parts” (Aquinas Commentary, 22).
Since Man’s reason will naturally pursue good ends because of its divine origins, and the
relationship between ruler and the ruled in Man’s government is a larger representation of the
relationship between the individual’s reason and emotional desires, Aquinas argues that pursuit
of the good extends to the city as well:
“If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in himself,
then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would likewise be for the
multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its possession…a thing which
the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life.
Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together.” (Aquinas De
Regno, 106)
Therefore, Aquinas argues for the most efficacious governmental structure to achieve that good,
and in this case, it is a monarchy, but one dedicated to the betterment of society
The aim of any ruler should be directed towards securing the welfare of that
which he undertakes to rule…Now the welfare and safety of a multitude formed
into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace…The chief
concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to procure the unity of peace…
Thus, the more efficacious a. government is in keeping the unity of peace, the
more useful it will be…Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more
efficaciously bring about unity than several—just as the most efficacious cause of
heat is that which is by its nature hot. Therefore the rule of one man is more
useful than the rule of many. (Ibid., 17)
God and Government
Aquinas extends that relationship between the reason of the individual and the reason of the
ruler where, “the analogy with the divine government is found in him not only in this way that
one man governs himself by reason, but also in that the multitude of men is governed by the
reason of one man” (Ibid., 94). That reason must be used to achieve justice, which Aquinas
defines as where the ruler, “must provide for each one what is necessary for his particular
condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or city could never endure” (Ibid., 100).
Here, Aquinas again practically quotes Augustine, who earlier warned, “Justice is only present ...
when the person is obedient to God's rule, when the mind rules the body, and when reason
rules the vices” (Augustine, XIX, Ch. 26). For Aquinas, just rule can only be achieved where the
ruler relies upon God, in part to avoid the lure of human glory because which can drive the ruler
to become a slave to popular opinion and the fear of war and the loss of individual rights
(Aquinas De Regno, 56, 58).
For Aquinas, it is a reliance on God which can protect the ruler from these pitfalls, and to
keep that rule in line with justice, because, “to govern is to lead the thing governed in a suitable
way towards its proper end…if a thing be directed to an end outside itself…it is the governor’s
duty, not only to preserve the thing unharmed, but further to guide it towards this end” (Ibid.,
103). And that end is Jesus Christ Himself, where, “all the kings of the Christian People are to be
subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For those to whom pertains the care of intermediate
ends should be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end, and be directed
by his rule” (Ibid., 110), and to ensure this, in the ultimate example of covenantal kingship,
because, “in the new law [of the New Testament] there is a higher priesthood by which men are
guided to heavenly goods. Consequently, in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests”
(Ibid., 111).
Aquinas, Thomas. 1949. De Regno ad Regem Cypri: On Kingship to The King of Cyprus.
Translated by Gerald B. Phelan. Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
https://isidore.co/aquinas/DeRegno.htm#1.
_____. 2007. Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. Translated by Richard J. Regan. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing.
_____. 2012. Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, 71-114. Translated by Fr. Laurence
Shapcote, editors John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcon. Lander, Wyoming: The Aquinas
Institute. https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.
Aristotle, Aristotle. -320. The Politics vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Augustine, Saint. 1954. The City of God, Books XVII-XXII. Baltimore: Catholic University of
America Press.
Aquinas to prior concepts
- Aristotle
o
- Plato
oBelieves in the innate goodness of the rulers to rule for good without additional
recompense.
it is more tolerable for him to seek glory than to desire money or pursue
pleasure. For this vice is akin to virtue inasmuch as the glory which men
desire, as Augustine says [ De civ. Dei V, 12], is nothing else than the
judgment of men who think well of men. So the desire for glory has some
trace of virtue in it, at least so long as it seeks the approval of good men
and is reluctant to displease them. Therefore, since few men reach true
virtue, it seems more tolerable if one be set up to rule who, fearing the
judgment of men, is restrained from manifest evils. For the man” who
desires glory either endeavours to win the approval of men in the true
way, by deeds of virtue, or at least strives for this by fraud and deceit. (60)
- Cicero
oFinally, he must provide for each one what is necessary for his particular
condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or city could never endure.
(100)
- Augustine
oTherefore there is no earthly thing which could make man happy, nor is any
earthly thing a sufficient reward for a king. For, as Augustine” says, “we do not
call Christian princes happy merely because they have reigned a long time, or
because after a peaceful death they have left their sons to rule, or because they
subdued the enemies of the state, or because they were able to guard against or
to suppress citizens who rose up against them. Rather do we call them happy if
they rule justly, if they prefer to rule their passions rather than nations, and if
they do all things not for the love of vainglory but for the love of eternal
happiness. Such Christian emperors we say are happy, now in hope, afterwards in
very fact when that which we await shall come to pass. But neither is there any
other created thing which would make a man happy and which could be set up
as the reward for a king. For the desire of each thing tends towards its source,
whence is the cause of its being. But the cause of the human soul is none other
than God Who made it to His own image. Therefore it is God alone Who can still
the desires of man and make him happy and be the fitting reward for a king. (65)
o
- Concepts
oNature of man
- Man is a social animal: “one man alone is not able to procure them all for
himself, for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is
therefore natural that man should live in the society of many.” (5)
- So, too in the individual man, the soul rules the body; and among the parts of
the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason.
Likewise, among the members of a body, one, such as the heart or the head,
is the principal and moves all the others. Therefore in every multitude there
must be some governing power. (9)
oMan’s reason
Thomas agrees with Aristotle, “the light of reason is placed by nature in
every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end” (Aquinas On
Kingship, 4) and that drives him to live in a group which is hopefully a just
society, just as Aristotle believes “it is the special property of man in
distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good
and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is
partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state”
(Aristotle Politics, 1.1253a)
It is implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the
reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of anything whatsoever is
explained to be that which makes its possessor good and renders his
deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by working well to attain that
which is most deeply implanted in desire, namely, to be happy. This, no
one is able not to wish. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for
virtue that which makes man happy.
So, too in the individual man, the soul rules the body; and among the
parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by
reason. Likewise, among the members of a body, one, such as the heart
or the head, is the principal and moves all the others. Therefore in every
multitude there must be some governing power. (9)
To be sure, the light of reason is placed by nature in every man, to guide
him in his acts towards his end…Yet it is natural for man, more than for
any other animal, to be a social and political animal, to live in a group.
This is clearly a necessity of man’s nature.” (4-5, citing Aristotle, Hist.
Anim. I, 1: 488a 7; Eth. Nic. I, 5; 1097b 11; ibid. IX, 9: 1169b 18; Pol. I, 2:
1253a 3.; and Aristotelian doctrine of Pol. I, 2: 1252b 30-125 a 1)
Thus, in a proportionate manner, reason is to man what God is to the
world. (94)
o
oPurpose of government
For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his
own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless
there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the
commonweal. In like manner, the body of a man or any other animal
would disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force within the
body which watches over the common good of all members. (8)
The aim of any ruler should be directed towards securing the welfare of
that which he undertakes to rule… Now the welfare and safety of a
multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which
is called peace… The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore,
is to procure the unity of peace… Thus, the more efficacious a.
government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be.
(17)
If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in
himself, then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would
likewise be for the multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its
possession. (106)
For men form a group for the purpose of living well Footnote together, a
thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life
is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather
together. (106)
oType of government
Thus, the more efficacious a. government is in keeping the unity of peace,
the more useful it will be. … Now it is manifest that what is itself one can
more efficaciously bring about unity than several—just as the most
efficacious cause of heat is that which is by its nature hot. Therefore the
rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many. (17)
the analogy with the divine government is found in him not only in this
way that one man governs himself by reason, but also in that the
multitude of men is governed by the reason of one man. (94)
oNature of natural law
oMan’s knowledge or natural law
- Specific topics
oJustice
Finally, he [the king] must provide for each one what is necessary for his
particular condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or city could
never endure. (100)
If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in
himself, then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would
likewise be for the multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its
possession. (106)
oCovenental Statesmanship
If he reflect seriously upon this, a zeal for justice will be enkindled in him
when he contemplates that he has been appointed to this position in
place of God, to exercise judgment in his kingdom; further, he will acquire
the gentleness of clemency and mildness when he considers as his own
members those individuals who are subject to his rule. (95)
Let us then examine what God does in the world, for in this way we shall
be able to see what it is incumbent upon a king to do. (96)
oChristian Kingship
Therefore the founder of a city and kingdom must first choose a suitable
place which will preserve the inhabitants by its healthfulness, provide the
necessities of life by its fruitfulness, please them with its beauty, and
render them safe from their enemies by its natural protection. (100)
to govern is to lead the thing governed in a suitable way towards its
proper end. Thus a ship is said to be governed when, through the skill of
the pilot, it is brought unharmed and by a direct route to harbour.
Consequently, if a thing be directed to an end outside itself (as a ship to
the harbour), it is the governor’s duty, not only to preserve the thing
unharmed, but further to guide it towards this end. (103)
For men form a group for the purpose of living well Footnote together, a
thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life
is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather
together. (106)
oReligious to civil offices
Thus, in order that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly
things, the ministry of this kingdom has been entrusted not to earthly
kings but to priests, and most of all to the chief priest, the successor of St.
Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the
Christian People Footnote are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ
Himself. For those to whom pertains the care of intermediate ends should
be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end, and be
directed by his rule. (110)
Similarly, since in the old law earthly goods were promised to the
religious people (not indeed by demons but by the true God), the priests
of the old law, we read, were also subject to the kings. But in the new law
there is a higher priesthood by which men are guided to heavenly goods.
Consequently, in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests. (111)
If, then, as we have said, the person who is charged with the care of our
ultimate end ought to be over those who have charge of things ordained
to that end, and to direct them by his rule, it clearly follows that, just as
the king ought to be subject to the divine government administered by
the office of priesthood, so he ought to preside over all human offices,
and regulate them by the rule of his government. (114)
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