Literature Assessment
Nicholas Merritt
PLCY 700
August 15, 2021
Introduction
The purpose of this literature review will be to examine the impact of Civil-Military
Relations in policy making. It is clear that certain legislation started a shift of the balance of
power in this relationship. Traditionally, what has made the military power of the United States
has been the aggregate control over the military by elected officials. The balance of this power is
critical for the continued success of the nation. Up until 1980, the civilian control over the
military remained unquestioned. It was the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in which Special
Operation Forces failed to rescue 52 hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. This failed
mission exposed gaping problems in inter-agency communication, mission command, defense
acquisition, and personnel management. As a result, Senator Barry Goldwater and Congressman
William Nichols introduced the Goldwater-Nichols Act to address these deficiencies in national
defense. It was this piece of legislation that began to tip the scales of balance in Civil-Military
Relations.
Research Question and Dependent Variable
The research question this review will attempt to answer is has the civilian population
lost control over the military? The re-organization from the Goldwater-Nichols Act led to a shift
in power away from elected officials and toward Joint Chiefs and Theater Commanders. The idea
was to give more control to the senior military officers in an effort to give them the ability to
successfully accomplish their missions. To this point, the majority of the power remained with
the civilian population. When President Trump was elected, the civilian population essentially
lost control over the military. A number of top policy positions were filled by the President with
active duty and retired officers. Positions like the National Security Advisor, The Secretary of
Defense, and The White House Chief of Staff were all filled with senior military officers. The
dependent variable of this review is the military chain of command starting with the President
and ending with the Theater Commander.
Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment in Civil-Military Relations
The first peer-reviewed source this literature review will examine discusses the number
of current and former generals President Trump appointed to top national security positions in
20161. To properly understand why this decision is controversial, we must first understand the
importance that the civilian population maintain control over the military. Societal control over
military forces is one of the cornerstones of democracy. Some of the earliest forms of
government were incredibly vulnerable to a military coup because those militaries wielded too
much power. Even as recent as World War II, the Nazi’s used military force to subvert civilian
control, and the failed Valkyrie attempt to assassinate Hitler included a provision for the reserve
Army to gain control of the government2.
When President Trump was elected, he began his cabinet nomination process, which
including several former generals in key national security positions. The majority of them were
what was considered a true civilian, or out of the military for a prolonged period of time,
however his nomination for the Secretary of Defense, James Mattis required a congressional
waiver since he had served within the past seven years, which he received. The waiver process
requires a service member to be separated from the military for at least seven years and is one of
the many checks and balances put in place to maintain civilian control over the military.
After the President finished the nomination process, there were some concerns that the
balance between civil-military control was headed in the wrong direction. A small group of
1 James Joyner, “Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment Incivil-M Ilitary Relations,” Strategic Studies Quarterly
15, no. 2 (Summer 2021),
https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNF7FD7F8CEB3F942ec42b9c1e26834ba24f082776c613fef
ac372a3598907d845295f1c0f598a.
2 Jay Hemmings, “Operation Valkyrie: The Plot to Get Rid of Adolf,” accessed August 13, 2021,
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/operation-valkyrie.html.
legislators saw it as a possible way to reel in the President from some of his antics. The balance
of power was threatened, nonetheless. One of the primary concerns for the appointees was that
the nation’s foreign policy issues would become militarized. Many scholars asserted that while
having these former generals in these positions would benefit military strategy, the lack of
foreign policy expertise would hinder long term goals. With the Goldwater-Nichols Act in place,
the re-organization of command within theaters of combat made concerns reach a boiling point.
In Afghanistan, the President frequently deferred to the theater commanders, which led to
a no holds bar type of military action where diplomacy was thrown out the window for the more
violent approach3. Half way through the Trump administration, most of the former generals were
either fired or resigned from their positions. This brought a somewhat return to normalcy in the
balance of civilization-military control. The entire situation put the system into doubt, however
in the end during the transition of power to the Biden Administration, when the peaceful
transition of power was threatened those in the necessary position stood firm by their defense of
the Constitution and ensured a peaceful transition. It would seem as though control over the
military remained in civilian hands, until the Biden Administration appoint General Lloyd Austin
the Secretary of Defense, using the same waiver that Secretary Mattis was given, further
muddling civil-military relations.
Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations: Room for Improvement
The next article in this literature review discusses the poor decision making structure and
the gap between policy aims and war strategy during each of the Presidential Administrations
3 Robin Wright, “Trump Drops the Mother of All Bombs on Afghanistan,” New Yorker, 14 April
2017, https://www.newyorker.com/.
after the attacks on September 11th4. Regardless of the past experiences Cabinet Members have,
one of the keys to a successful civil-military relationship is the ability to work in harmony. The
civilian leadership must have a sound foundational knowledge of military operations and the
military leadership must present their civilian counterparts with unbiased opinions on decisions.
When there is a gap in this relationship, both national security and foreign policy are hindered.
When there is not a gap, the country has the ability to move forward by leaps and bounds.
It would seem as though the solution to bridging this gap is inserting former military
officials into positions such as the Secretary of Defense. Which would in theory correct the
problem, however this would bring into question the balance of the civilian military relationship.
The author discusses both the Bush and the Obama Presidencies. President Obama not having
any military experience, and President Bush was a former officer an pilot in the Air Force5. This
would seem like the prefect comparison to determine the benefit or hinderance of military
experience in the highest office of the country. As the author points out both President’s
struggled with this military relationship but for different reasons.
The author cites three major issues with the civilian military relationship since the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan started twenty years ago. With too much micro-management on the civilian
side, and avoidance or borderline neglect from the military side, trust has deteriorated and
effectiveness diminished6. Second, wartime strategy on the military side has been ineffective,
4 Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves, “Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations: Room for Improvement,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly (Fall 2015), https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271519.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
5 Andrew Glass, “George w. Bush Suspended from Texas Air National Guard, aug. 1, 1972,” accessed August 14,
2021, https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/this-day-in-politics-aug-1-1972-095023.
6 Thomas Sheppard and Bryan Groves, “Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations: Room for Improvement,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly (Fall 2015), https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271519.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
partially due to the lack of proper communication between military leaders and civilian. Third,
the lack of proper decision making strained this relationship, also due to the lack of effective
communication. After noting these serious flaws, several solutions to the problems are brought
forward.
Sheppard and Groves recommend the next president which would turn out to be President
Trump, refresh this strained civilian military relationship by communicating with them his vision
on the issue and insist the top military officials give clear, unfiltered advice. The issue here, is
that not only did the President surround himself with former generals on all sides, but the
President ultimately did not find the fine line of communicating. The gap between policy aims
and war strategy can be closed with Congress reviewing the current and proposed strategies of
the President, which makes sense since they are the ultimate authority in declaring war in the
first place. This would also mitigate any communication gap, since all parties would be involved
in the process. The President also needs to be informed on the reasons why the people who do
not agree with the chosen policy think the way they do. This would allow them to see the issue
from all vantage points in order to make the best decision possible. We can see that even at the
highest levels of government, communication can be a major issue. This article does a great job
analyzing the why aspect of the failure of the civilian military relationship.
Military Officers: Political without Partisanship
One of the main reasons why there tends to be this communication gap between the
military and the civilian population is the fact that the civilians the military work with are
politicians. This is an issue because it is ingrained in the military to avoid political and partisan
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
ideals, which does create an environment of distrust or poor communication. If military officer
and theater commanders remove themselves from this politics, they would have to remove
themselves from policy and strategy7. In order for there to be effective policy and military
strategy, military officers must not only be a part of this process, but they must have the ability to
speak candidly on the issue.
One of the reasons the civilian military relationship remains successful is that the military
officers remain a political, simply offering advice based on military strategy. After all, the
civilian control over the military is one of the foundations of our democracy, and this factor helps
to keep that balance. But at what cost? When do you remain apolitical enough to maintain the
balance, but at the same time not negatively effecting military strategy. This is the dilemma
military officers find themselves in. This issue becomes even more complicated when a former
military officer is thrust into a political position. They are then forced to maintain that balance on
an individual basis.
When attempting to achieve this balance, you must examine what it means to be political.
This way, you can avoid pitfalls and target successes. When it comes to this civilian military
relationship, being political serves three meanings. First, taking power away from other
governmental agencies for your benefit. Second, is actual authentic participation in the policy
making process. The third is perhaps the worst part of the process, and that is the involvement in
partisan politics8. Politics creates a difficult situation between military officers and their jobs. As
7 Mackubin Owens, “Military Officers: Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall
2015), https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271520.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
8 Mackubin Owens, “Military Officers: Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall
2015), https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271520.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
earlier stated, they must refrain from seeking any sort of political power and partisanship, but at
the same time, when they are thrust into these positions, they are forced too. This puts them in a
unfamiliar situation and they are expected to mold policy to protect the nation.
This further emphasizes the importance of civilian control over the military. A civilian put
into this position would not go through the same struggle. At the same time, part of being a
successful military officer is being put in those uncomfortable situations and adapting and
overcoming. What should be a clear line between this relationship continues to remain gray. The
article brings up an approach to solve this dilemma, created by Samuel Huntington in his study
The Soldier and the State. Huntington recommends a two pronged approach to this problem.
Achieving military control from the civilian population must be subjective and objective9. The
subjective approach maximizes the power of the civilian side, giving them complete control over
the military, but also sacrificing military effectiveness. Huntington preferred the objective
approach which offers the military officers the autonomy to make strategic decisions, but does
not threaten the civilian military relationship.
Conclusion
One of the reoccurring themes of the civilian military relationship is trust and
communication. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey spoke in great length to
this truth. He says “I talk about the importance of trust at every opportunity, one way we earn
this trust is by avoiding partisan politics, we are not elected to serve, rather we elect to serve10.
For General Dempsey in this position, it is easy to hold this ideal, since he still serves his civilian
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
9 Huntington, Samuel., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1957), 80–85.
chain of command. Where this attitude gets muddled is when you thrust on of these former
generals into a civilian position, forcing them to adapt.
As it stands today, although the scale has been close to tipping, I do not believe the
civilian population has lost control over the military. General officers have stood firm on the oath
they took on the Constitution which can clearly be seen after the January 6th riots. What does
become an issue is that if a civilian put into the Secretary of Defense for example has no military
experience, how can they effectively advise policy based on military strategy. They must defer to
their military counterparts for the strategy, but in the end the decision is up to them. Appointing a
former military officer into these positions of power is the prudent thing to do. They have the
knowledge to advise on effective military strategy, but in the end the decision remains in civilian
hands.
References
Dempsey, Martin. “The Importance of Maintaining Trust: Civil-Military Relations and the
Profession of Arms.” Accessed August 14, 2021. https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-
View/Article/575759/the-importance-of-maintaining-trust-civil-military-relations-and-the-
profession/.
Glass, Andrew.. “George w. Bush Suspended from Texas Air National Guard, aug. 1, 1972.”
Accessed August 14, 2021. https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/this-day-in-politics-aug-1-
1972-095023.
10 Martin Dempsey, “The Importance of Maintaining Trust: Civil-Military Relations and the Profession of Arms,”
accessed August 14, 2021, https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/575759/the-importance-of-
maintaining-trust-civil-military-relations-and-the-profession/.
Hemmings, Jay. “Operation Valkyrie: The Plot to Get Rid of Adolf.” Accessed August 13, 2021.
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/operation-valkyrie.html.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1957), 80–85.
Joyner, James. “Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment Incivil-M Ilitary Relations.” Strategic
Studies Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Summer 2021).
https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNF7FD7F8CEB3F942ec42b9c1e26834b
a24f082776c613fefac372a3598907d845295f1c0f598a.
Owens, Mackubin. “Military Officers: Political without Partisanship.” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015). https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271520.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
Sheppard, Thomas, and Bryan Groves. “Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relations: Room for
Improvement.” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2015). https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/stable/pdf/26271519.pdf?
ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default
%3A180240a3baeae69043da35053d1b60de.
Wright, Robin. “Trump Drops the Mother of All Bombs on Afghanistan,” New Yorker, 14 April
2017, https://www.newyorker.com/.