Discussion 2
The Paradigm of Security
A. Genesis of DHS
To say the world changed on September 11, 2001, is an extraordinary
understatement. As the air assault on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon unfolded, both
government agencies and the general populace watched in stunned silence. Even today, it
is difficult to fathom the full and sweeping implications of such an attack. Dual plane
attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center are almost impossible to fathom.
Yet, this is exactly what occurred. Radical Islamic extremists perpetrated the deadliest
attack carried out on U.S. soil. The damage to New York’s financial district was
catastrophic. Not only was the loss of life at staggering proportions, but the economic
impact on the New York metropolitan area and the country was significant.
Notions of security would be forever challenged and altered. Ideas of safety
within America’s borders would now be doubted. Indeed, the last 5 years have been
witness to an intense debate on what borders really mean and even, to the complete
consternation of experienced law enforcement sectors responsible for the border, whether
borders should be closed or opened. The more progressive politicos are claiming ICE
enforcement mimics Nazi-like tactics and that the agency hould be completely abolished.
U.S. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has described the entire border
processing and barriers to free and unbridled entry as “systematic cruelty.”2
Congresswoman Ilhan Omar equates border detention centers with “concentration
camps” and at the same time calls for the complete elimination of ICE and “other rogue
agencies.”3 At present, the country suffers under a split, divisive vision on the question
of border control— some urging a forceful and protective attitude toward our
sovereignty,4 while others see border restriction as some xenophobic reaction to cultural
differences. Ultimately how a country can sustain itself, protect itself, and preserve its
fundamental identity and human and physical assets without any border remains nothing
more than a well-intentioned but implausible dream.5 How this nation moved to fairly
consistent unanimity on border matters to such widely varying opinions on policy can
only be described as an extraordinary shift in selected public sentiments.
Confidence in our ability to withstand or detect attacks was severely undermined
by the events of 9/11. The attacks on American soil were sweeping in scope and left the
public safety and law enforcement communities stunned. How could planes be hijacked
and crashed into the financial district of one of the largest American cities? How could
the walls of the Pentagon be breached? How could a plane crash in rural Pennsylvania
represent a thwarted bid to attack the White House. The complexity of the undertaking
manifests a well-prepared and very determined enemy. The timeline of the attacks says
much about the complexity of these events. It is impossible to measure the complete
impact that these events had upon the American psyche, the former invincibility of our
home soil, and the pronounced re-examination of our entire approach to law enforcement
and the overall security of a nation.
Aside from a lack of coordination and interagency cooperation, the events of 9/11
make plain that an actual wall did exist between the varied agencies of government. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not share with the FBI, state and local police did
not communicate readily, and jurisdictional and turf issues often influenced policy
making in the pre-9/11 world. “The absence of coordination and collaboration in the area
of information and intelligence sharing contributed to the surprise of the attack.”9 After
9/11, it was blatantly obvious that walls had to be torn down and new infrastructures and
agencies created based on a cooperative mentality. But this tendency not to collaborate
and share appears a problem that continues even 20 years after the tragic events of 9/11.
Case after case, especially when it comes to domestic terrorism, active shooters and
crazed criminals illustrate how agencies keep information to itself instead of sharing. So
often, after the fact, one hears that a suspect was under FBI surveillance, or on the radar
screen due to a past criminal history or connected to foreign support groups advancing
terrorism—this sort of knowledge commonly known by intelligence agencies.
Too often, the FBI still does not know what the CIA should be disclosing, and
vice versa, or local law enforcement has no knowledge about a particular individual with
propensities for violence and terroristic acts. The cases of failed collaboration are far too
common, highlighting systemic challenges in information sharing and coordination
among various law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The divide between domestic
and international intelligence gathering has long been a barrier to effective collaboration
between agencies like the FBI and the CIA. While the FBI focuses on domestic threats
and criminal activities within the United States, the CIA primarily operates overseas,
collecting intelligence on foreign adversaries and potential threats to national security.
This compartmentalization of intelligence has led to instances where critical information
falls through the cracks, hindering efforts to identify and mitigate emerging threats.
Additionally, communication breakdowns between federal agencies and local law
enforcement agencies pose significant challenges to effective information sharing. Local
police departments often lack access to the same intelligence resources and databases as
their federal counterparts, limiting their ability to identify and respond to potential threats
in their communities. Conversely, federal agencies may not always prioritize sharing
intelligence with local law enforcement agencies, leading to gaps in situational awareness
and response capabilities.
One notable example of this failure of collaboration is the case of the Boston
Marathon bombing in 2013. The FBI had received intelligence from Russian authorities
about one of the suspects, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, indicating his radicalization and potential
ties to extremist groups. However, this information was not effectively shared with local
law enforcement agencies in Boston, allowing Tsarnaev and his brother to carry out the
deadly attack. The incident underscored the importance of seamless communication and
collaboration between federal and local agencies in preventing acts of terrorism.
Similarly, the shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando in 2016 raised questions about
the FBI's handling of intelligence related to the shooter, Omar Mateen. Despite multiple
warnings from coworkers and acquaintances about Mateen's extremist views and violent
tendencies, the FBI closed its investigation into him without taking further action. This
failure to connect the dots and act on credible threats highlights the need for improved
coordination and information sharing among law enforcement agencies at all levels.
In response to these shortcomings, efforts have been made to enhance
collaboration and information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The creation of fusion centers, which serve as hubs for sharing intelligence and
coordinating responses to threats, has been one such initiative. These centers bring
together federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to analyze and disseminate
information in a timely manner, improving situational awareness and facilitating joint
operations. Moreover, legislative measures such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Homeland Security Act have sought to break down barriers to information sharing by
enabling greater exchange of intelligence and data among agencies. These measures have
provided legal frameworks for sharing classified information, facilitating joint
investigations, and promoting interoperability between different law enforcement and
intelligence systems.
Despite these efforts, challenges persist, and further reforms are needed to address
the systemic issues that hinder effective collaboration among law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. This includes investing in technology and infrastructure to improve
information sharing capabilities, enhancing training and resources for intelligence
analysts and law enforcement officers, and fostering a culture of cooperation and
transparency across agencies. In conclusion, the cases of failed collaboration between the
FBI, CIA, and local law enforcement agencies underscore the need for systemic reforms
to improve information sharing and coordination in the fight against terrorism and violent
extremism. Addressing these challenges requires a multi-faceted approach that prioritizes
communication, interoperability, and cooperation among all stakeholders involved in
safeguarding national security. Only through concerted efforts to break down silos and
enhance collaboration can we effectively identify and disrupt threats before they
materialize, ensuring the safety and security of our communities.
The Parkland High School shooting case, where 17 students were slaughtered by
Nikolas Cruz, signifies a catastrophic error on the part of the FBI when it failed to advise
the school or local law enforcement of a real and impending threat. This tragic incident,
which occurred on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in
Parkland, Florida, highlighted critical flaws in the processes and protocols meant to
prevent such tragedies. In the months leading up to the shooting, the FBI received
multiple warnings about Cruz's behavior and potential for violence. These warnings
included detailed information about his social media posts, erratic behavior, and explicit
threats to commit a school shooting. Despite the gravity of these tips, the FBI failed to act
appropriately. One of the most glaring errors was the mishandling of a tip received in
January 2018, which explicitly warned of Cruz's desire to kill and his potential to carry
out a school shooting. This tip was not forwarded to the FBI’s Miami field office, nor
was it communicated to local authorities who might have taken preventive measures.
The failure to act on these warnings resulted in devastating consequences. On the
day of the shooting, Cruz entered the school with a legally purchased AR-15 rifle and
opened fire, killing 17 people and wounding 17 others. The massacre not only shattered
the lives of victims and their families but also sent shockwaves through the entire
community and the nation at large. The Parkland shooting exposed significant
deficiencies in the FBI's threat assessment and response protocols. It underscored the
need for more effective systems to ensure that credible threats are taken seriously and
communicated promptly to the appropriate authorities. This failure was a sobering
reminder of the importance of interagency cooperation and the need for robust
mechanisms to prevent such tragedies.
In response to the Parkland shooting, there has been a renewed focus on
improving the ways in which potential threats are reported and handled. The FBI and
other law enforcement agencies have undertaken reforms aimed at ensuring that tips and
warnings are evaluated more thoroughly and acted upon more decisively. This includes
enhancing training for personnel to recognize and escalate credible threats, improving
communication channels between federal and local law enforcement, and investing in
better technology for threat assessment. Moreover, the tragedy spurred a national debate
about gun control, mental health, and school safety. Lawmakers, educators, and
community leaders have called for a comprehensive approach to prevent school
shootings, which includes stricter gun laws, improved mental health services, and
enhanced security measures in schools. Many states have enacted "red flag" laws, which
allow authorities to confiscate firearms from individuals deemed to be a threat to
themselves or others, based on tips from family members, friends, or law enforcement.
The Parkland community has also become a powerful voice for change. Survivors
and families of the victims have advocated tirelessly for stricter gun control measures and
better safety protocols in schools. Their activism has led to the creation of organizations
such as March For Our Lives, which campaigns for comprehensive gun reform and aims
to prevent future school shootings. In conclusion, the Parkland High School shooting was
a devastating event that revealed critical failures in the FBI's threat assessment and
response systems. The inability to act on credible warnings resulted in a tragic loss of life
and highlighted the need for systemic changes in how potential threats are handled. The
aftermath of the shooting has prompted significant reforms and a broader conversation
about gun control, mental health, and school safety, with the aim of preventing such
tragedies in the future. The lessons learned from Parkland are a stark reminder of the
importance of vigilance, communication, and proactive measures in protecting our
communities from senseless violence.
The historic resistance to shared, collaborative information remains a constant
challenge of governmental agencies so large and so byzantine that it is difficult to change
the culture of ownership these entities have long preserved. While there continue to be
mistakes, especially in failing to warn and give advice to state and local officials, there
has been improvement. And the sharing mentality goes further than inter-government
agency relations and now includes private business entities. In the 2015 San Bernardino
shooting by the husband and wife terrorist team of Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik,
who were killed in the ensuing chase and gunbattle, the FBI could not gain access to the
terrorist’s cell phones—both of which were Apple encrypted—and which Apple refused
to unlock.
In general, law enforcement and emergency management authorities must see the
world in a post-9/11 prism, fully recognizing that what once was effective in cases of
mass terror, is no longer viable. “There are significant changes not only in the daily lives
of the American people but also in the function of the country’s emergency management
system.”13 In matters of command, communication, deployment, planning, and dispatch,
traditional agencies were challenged in ways never before envisioned. Nothing in the
status quo could have operationally prepared these professionals for a post-9/11 world.
And in a sense, that is exactly what the emergency, military, and law enforcement
community has been doing since 9/11—searching out the best approach and adapting to
the new reality.
As law enforcement and fire personnel perished in the rubble of the Twin Towers
and civilians in the airplanes plummeted to their deaths, the knowledge base of traditional
safety was turned on its head. The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001,
fundamentally altered the landscape of national security and emergency response,
revealing vulnerabilities and prompting a re-evaluation of existing protocols and
strategies. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon exposed significant
gaps in the nation's preparedness for coordinated terrorist assaults. First responders,
including firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel, demonstrated
extraordinary bravery and sacrifice as they rushed to save lives, often at the cost of their
own. Their heroism highlighted both the strengths and critical weaknesses of traditional
safety and emergency response systems.
Prior to 9/11, emergency response protocols primarily focused on natural disasters
and isolated incidents. The scale and complexity of the 9/11 attacks required a rapid and
coordinated response that surpassed traditional expectations. The overwhelming demands
on communication systems, resource allocation, and interagency coordination revealed
significant deficiencies. First responders often struggled with incompatible
communication equipment, a lack of real-time information, and insufficient resources to
manage the unfolding crisis effectively. In the aftermath of the attacks, it became clear
that a new approach to emergency preparedness and response was necessary. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to address these deficiencies
and to create a more integrated and comprehensive national security framework. The
DHS aimed to unify various federal, state, and local agencies under a single umbrella,
promoting better coordination and resource sharing. The need for improved
communication and interoperability among emergency responders was one of the most
immediate lessons learned. The inability of different agencies to communicate effectively
during the 9/11 attacks hampered rescue efforts and put lives at risk. This realization led
to significant investments in technology and infrastructure to enhance communication
capabilities and ensure that all responders could operate on the same channels during a
crisis.
Another critical lesson was the importance of intelligence sharing and threat
assessment. The attacks revealed that existing intelligence mechanisms were fragmented
and often failed to connect the dots. In response, the DHS established the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis to centralize and analyze information from various sources,
improving the ability to detect and respond to potential threats before they materialize.
The tragic events also underscored the need for specialized training and preparedness for
unconventional threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
incidents. The DHS developed programs to equip first responders with the skills and
knowledge required to handle these types of emergencies, ensuring a more effective and
informed response.
Moreover, the 9/11 attacks highlighted the necessity of robust public education
and awareness campaigns. Civilians play a crucial role in the overall security framework,
and their ability to recognize and report suspicious activities can be pivotal in preventing
future attacks. The DHS initiated various outreach programs to educate the public about
potential threats and encourage a culture of vigilance and preparedness. In summary, the
devastation of September 11, 2001, was a turning point that transformed the knowledge
base of traditional safety and emergency response. The sacrifices of the first responders
and civilians exposed critical vulnerabilities and propelled significant changes in national
security strategy. The establishment of the DHS, improvements in communication and
interoperability, enhanced intelligence sharing, specialized training, and public education
efforts are all part of the legacy of lessons learned from that fateful day. These changes
aim to ensure that the nation is better prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from
future threats, safeguarding the lives and safety of its citizens.
Soon after 9/11, law enforcement and intelligence agencies developed and learned
new strategies and tactics for prevention and mitigation. The safety community began to
reevaluate longestablished practices in light of this tragedy. From September 11, 2001, an
extraordinary series of new approaches was implemented, many of which were
implemented by a new DHS. Right from the start, state, local, and federal services rattled
the cages of ordinary bureaucratic practices. Getting to the implementation of DHS did
not happen overnight but evolved from a series of policy steps. From that tragic day until
the following year, government moved at lightning speed.
As DHS enters its 20th year of operation, the agency clearly has challenges both
present and future in scope. DHS has accomplished much over the last two decades, but
when reviewing the chronology presented on the pages that follow, try to envision a DHS
that might work a bit better or constructed alternatively and with different emphases. Put
another way, assume that growth in scope and size is not necessarily a good thing but
instead, might be a hindrance to better performance. If anything is obvious over the last
two decades, it is that DHS has grown in staggering proportions. Growth, in and of itself,
is not inevitably a good thing, for critics of DHS often label the agency a “lumbering
giant” or a “bureaucratic nightmare” or simply too large to manage in a critically
responsive way. DHS must be nimble and quick when dealing with disaster and terror,
both the natural and man-made variety. Even the protectors of DHS fully comprehend
this fact and that awareness has led to increasing partnerships between DHS and private
partners. No better example exists of this cooperative partnership between DHS and the
private sector, its industry, security, and emergency services and its intellectual expertise,
than is currently playing out in the COVID-19 pandemic. Government alone, nor DHS by
itself, could ever solve the pandemic but coupled with private industry, pharmaceutical
companies, medical labs, and research facilities, and the pandemic has met its match.
As we review the basic historic record of the life of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), several pressing questions arise regarding how this agency can retain its
strengths and effectively discard functions or practices that have proven ineffective.
Understanding the evolution of DHS, its successes, and its challenges can provide
valuable insights into its future direction. The DHS was created in 2002 in response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, bringing together 22 different federal departments
and agencies into a unified entity focused on safeguarding the United States from a
variety of threats. Over the years, the DHS has been involved in numerous initiatives,
ranging from counterterrorism and border security to disaster response and cybersecurity.
While the department has achieved significant milestones, it has also faced criticism and
operational challenges.
The DHS has played a vital role in protecting the United States since its inception,
but it must continuously evaluate and adapt to meet new challenges. By asking and
addressing these pressing questions, the DHS can retain its core strengths while
discarding or revamping less effective practices. This approach will enable the
department to remain a robust and dynamic force in safeguarding the nation, ensuring
that it is well-equipped to handle the complexities of modern national security.
B. Evolution and Change of DHS in 2001-2003
Any conception of a government agency dedicated to the protection of the
homeland takes time to develop and implement. The evolution of a governmental
structure, responsible for maintaining homeland safety and security, is both complex and
ever changing. Since 2001, the face and internal bureaucratic attributes of DHS have
undergone birth and rebirth, change, and reincarnation. The DHS of 2001 was a very
different animal from the DHS of today. There have been growing pains in the
development of the agency, its mission, and its structure. Despite these challenges, DHS
has maintained a unique and surprising adaptability in its changing programs, mission,
and structure in its short existence.
While safety and security issues are permanent national concerns, the examination
of how to predict and prevent threats to the national homeland took on added importance
after 9/11. On the front burner was how to take existing governmental agencies and
deploy them in the fight against terrorism. On the side burner was the nagging question of
whether or not the front burner was competent enough to generate the necessary heat and
intensity to be successful in this new undertaking. In choosing to erect a new government
agency in DHS, both President George W. Bush and Congress agreed that the “changing
nature of the threats facing America requires a new government structure against the
invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons.”
The drive toward a new agency was rooted in a host of compelling rationales.
Unity of purpose and mission was surely at the forefront. The “one” agency mindset
represented a significant change of ethos for the intelligence community. No longer
would the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency (NSA), and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) see themselves as individual players in the fight against
terrorism but instead as part of the collective and simultaneously unified effort to detect
and prevent harm to the homeland. DHS refers to these shifts in operational mentality as
an “evolution of the paradigm”18—a movement away from the decentralized toward a
totally centralized approach in the management of threat. DHS would be the centerpiece
of these efforts.
The act further compartmentalizes the agency into four main areas of
responsibility, namely, border and transportation; emergency preparedness and response;
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; and information analysis
and infrastructure protection. The organization chart of DHS in 2008,21 shown in Figure
2.11, portrays those with crucial responsibility for DHS. The significance of these
categories cannot be overemphasized. In border and transportation, DHS assumed control
over security services relating to our borders, territorial waters, and transportation
systems. Immigration and naturalization, customs, the coast guard, and animal protection
issues are now DHS functions. In emergency preparedness and response, there was a
complete merger of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operations into
DHS. FEMA, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, became an organization dedicated not
only to natural disaster but also to man-made events.
Federal interagency emergency programs were subsumed into the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), as were critical response units relating to nuclear and
pharmaceutical events. This consolidation was part of a broader effort to create a more
unified and coordinated approach to national security and emergency response. The
inclusion of federal interagency emergency programs under the DHS umbrella was a
strategic move aimed at enhancing the nation's ability to respond to a wide range of
emergencies and disasters. Prior to the establishment of the DHS, various federal
agencies operated their emergency response programs independently, often leading to
fragmented efforts and inefficiencies. By centralizing these programs within the DHS, the
government sought to improve coordination, streamline operations, and ensure a more
cohesive response to emergencies.
One of the key components integrated into the DHS was the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which plays a pivotal role in coordinating disaster
response and recovery efforts. FEMA's incorporation into the DHS enabled it to leverage
the department's broader resources and capabilities, enhancing its ability to manage large-
scale emergencies, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. This
integration also facilitated better collaboration with other DHS components, such as the
U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, during disaster response
operations. In addition to FEMA, the DHS absorbed critical response units specifically
designed to address nuclear and pharmaceutical events. These units are tasked with
preparing for and responding to incidents involving nuclear materials and pharmaceutical
threats, which require specialized knowledge and capabilities. The integration of these
units into the DHS was driven by the need for a more centralized and coordinated
approach to handling such high-risk events.
Nuclear response units within the DHS are responsible for a range of activities,
including the detection and interdiction of nuclear materials, response to radiological
incidents, and the management of nuclear forensics. These units work closely with other
federal agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to ensure a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. The DHS's Office
of Health Affairs, which oversees the department's medical and health-related activities,
also plays a crucial role in coordinating the response to radiological and nuclear
incidents. Similarly, pharmaceutical response units within the DHS are tasked with
addressing threats related to biological and chemical agents. This includes the
development and deployment of medical countermeasures, coordination of public health
responses, and management of the Strategic National Stockpile, which contains essential
medical supplies and pharmaceuticals for use during emergencies. The DHS works in
collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and other relevant agencies to ensure an effective
response to pharmaceutical threats.
The consolidation of these critical response units into the DHS has several
benefits. It enhances the department's ability to conduct comprehensive risk assessments,
develop integrated response plans, and deploy resources more effectively during
emergencies. Moreover, it facilitates better communication and coordination among
various federal, state, and local agencies, as well as with private sector partners and
international organizations. In conclusion, the subsumption of federal interagency
emergency programs and critical response units related to nuclear and pharmaceutical
events into the DHS was a strategic effort to create a more unified and efficient approach
to national security and emergency response. By centralizing these functions within the
DHS, the government aims to improve coordination, streamline operations, and ensure a
more cohesive and effective response to a wide range of threats and emergencies. This
integration enhances the nation's preparedness and resilience, ultimately contributing to a
safer and more secure homeland.
In the area of intelligence and threat analysis, DHS acts as a central repository for
information pertaining to threats to the homeland. Data from traditional intelligence
organizations such as the CIA, FBI, NSA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are catalogued and disseminated
as needed. DHS now works closely with the FBI’s Office of Intelligence.
As for infrastructure, DHS is responsible for the evaluation and protection of the
country’s primary infrastructure, including food and water systems; health and
emergency services; telecommunications; energy; chemical and defense industries; and
common carrier transportation. Issues of infrastructure continue to be pressed by both the
executive and legislative branch. Finally, DHS as of 2003 extended its program reach to
state, local, and private sector justice agencies. One of the hallmarks of DHS is the
cultivation of governmental inter- and intra-agency cooperation. DHS saw the essential
need for mutual trust and respect between competing agencies so that the mission of DHS
might be implemented. DHS erected an “intergovernmental affairs office” to coordinate
the numerous initiatives emanating from the agency.
Structurally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will have to adapt and
evolve to serve these varied interests, ensuring that it remains responsive and effective in
addressing the complex and multifaceted challenges that arise in the realm of national
security. This necessity for adaptation is driven by several key factors, including the
changing nature of threats, technological advancements, and the need for enhanced
collaboration among diverse stakeholders. The DHS was established in 2002 with the
primary objective of protecting the United States from terrorism and responding to
natural disasters. Over the years, its mandate has expanded to encompass a broad range of
responsibilities, from cybersecurity and immigration enforcement to infrastructure
protection and emergency management. This expansion requires a flexible and dynamic
organizational structure capable of responding to new and emerging threats.
One significant area where the DHS must adapt is in its approach to
cybersecurity. As cyber threats continue to evolve in sophistication and scale, the
department must develop more robust strategies to protect critical infrastructure,
safeguard sensitive information, and respond to cyber incidents. This includes not only
enhancing its own capabilities but also fostering stronger partnerships with private sector
entities and other government agencies. The integration of cybersecurity functions into
the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, for example, underscores the importance of a
coordinated and collaborative approach to cyber defense. In addition to cybersecurity, the
DHS must also address the growing complexity of immigration and border security. The
challenges posed by irregular migration, transnational crime, and human trafficking
require a comprehensive and nuanced response. This necessitates the development of new
technologies for border surveillance, improved processes for immigration enforcement,
and strengthened international cooperation. Structurally, the DHS may need to realign its
resources and personnel to better address these issues, ensuring that its various
components work seamlessly together to achieve common goals.
Another critical area for adaptation is disaster response and emergency
management. The increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, driven in part by
climate change, demand a more proactive and resilient approach. The DHS, through
agencies like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), must enhance its
preparedness and response capabilities, leveraging new technologies and data analytics to
predict and mitigate the impacts of disasters. This might involve restructuring certain
departments to prioritize rapid deployment of resources and improved coordination with
state and local authorities. Furthermore, the DHS must evolve to address the challenges
posed by domestic extremism and terrorism. Recent years have seen a rise in threats from
within the United States, necessitating a reevaluation of existing strategies and the
development of new initiatives to prevent and respond to such threats. This could involve
closer collaboration with law enforcement agencies, community outreach programs, and
the establishment of specialized units focused on domestic threats.
To effectively serve these varied interests, the DHS will also need to foster a
culture of innovation and continuous improvement. This means investing in research and
development, encouraging the adoption of cutting-edge technologies, and promoting a
forward-thinking mindset among its workforce. Training and professional development
programs will be essential to equip DHS personnel with the skills and knowledge needed
to navigate an increasingly complex security landscape. In conclusion, the structural
adaptation and evolution of the DHS are imperative to address the diverse and dynamic
challenges it faces. By realigning its resources, enhancing collaboration, and embracing
innovation, the department can better serve the varied interests of national security. The
ability to remain agile and responsive will ensure that the DHS continues to fulfill its
critical mission of protecting the United States and its citizens from a wide array of
threats, both present and future.
C. Reorganization and Evolution of DHS
In accordance with the act, DHS looks internally and externally for structural
changes within the agency and the merger of agencies from outside. The task of DHS is
to foster the unified culture of prevention and information sharing so needed in the fight
against terrorism. DHS is many things to many entities, and, in the final analysis, it is a
clearinghouse as well as an operational center for policy on homeland safety and security.
Over its short life span, DHS has evolved vigorously, at least in a programmatic sense,
but it has taken to a slow mode of structural change. From 2008 to the present, the
structure of DHS displays only minor internal and administrative differences. For
example, the National Cyber Security Center no longer stands side by side with the
Federal Law Enforcement Center and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office but has been
merged into the DHS Directorate on Science and Technology.
In recent structural changes within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the National Cyber Security Center, which once operated as a stand-alone office, has
been replaced by the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. This shift reflects an evolving
focus within the DHS on fostering collaborative relationships across various levels of
government, enhancing the department's ability to coordinate efforts more effectively in
response to emerging threats. The National Cyber Security Center, established to bolster
the nation's defenses against cyber threats, played a crucial role in developing strategies
to protect critical infrastructure and manage cyber incidents. Its integration into a broader
intergovernmental framework signifies a strategic pivot towards greater cooperation and
shared responsibility among federal, state, and local governments. This move aims to
create a more unified and comprehensive approach to national security, recognizing that
cyber threats often transcend jurisdictions and require coordinated responses.
The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs now assumes a central role in this
revised structure. By focusing on building and maintaining robust partnerships with state
and local governments, as well as with tribal and territorial authorities, this office seeks to
ensure that the DHS's efforts are harmonized across all levels of government. This
collaborative approach is designed to enhance information sharing, streamline
communication, and improve the overall effectiveness of the DHS in addressing a wide
range of security challenges. Despite this notable change, the remainder of the DHS's
structure remains largely consistent with the framework established in 2001, when the
department was first created in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The 2008
version of the DHS continues to uphold the original objectives set forth in its founding,
maintaining its core mission areas such as border security, immigration enforcement,
disaster response, and counterterrorism.
The continuity of these foundational elements underscores the enduring priorities
of the DHS. Key agencies and divisions within the department, such as the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Coast Guard,
continue to operate with the same mandates and objectives as they did in the early 2000s.
This consistency ensures that the DHS remains steadfast in its commitment to protecting
the nation from a broad spectrum of threats, both domestic and international. However,
the integration of the National Cyber Security Center's functions into the Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs also highlights the department's adaptability and
responsiveness to changing security landscapes. As cyber threats have grown in
sophistication and frequency, the need for a more interconnected and collaborative
approach has become evident. This structural adjustment aims to leverage the strengths
and resources of various governmental entities, fostering a more resilient and
comprehensive defense mechanism against cyber adversaries.
In summary, while the DHS has seen some strategic realignments, such as the
replacement of the National Cyber Security Center with the Office of Intergovernmental
Affairs, the core structure and mission of the department remain rooted in the principles
established in 2001. This balance of continuity and adaptation reflects the DHS's ongoing
effort to enhance national security through both steadfast commitment to its foundational
goals and the incorporation of new strategies to address evolving threats. The integration
of cyber security within a broader intergovernmental context exemplifies this dynamic
approach, aiming to ensure a more secure and resilient nation.
Given the previous "sweeps" of agencies and personnel within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), it is likely that a prudent course of action would be to ensure
stability through careful and strategic planning. These "sweeps," referring to past efforts
at restructuring and realigning various components of the DHS, have often been
undertaken with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness. However, they have
also highlighted the challenges and potential disruptions that can accompany such
significant organizational changes.
In the past, efforts to streamline the DHS have involved the consolidation of
agencies, the reassignment of personnel, and the merging of overlapping functions. While
these initiatives have yielded some positive outcomes, such as reduced redundancy and
enhanced coordination, they have also underscored the importance of maintaining
continuity and stability within the department. Abrupt or poorly managed changes can
lead to confusion, decreased morale among staff, and temporary lapses in critical
operations. Stability is particularly crucial in an organization like the DHS, which is
tasked with safeguarding the nation against a diverse array of threats. The department's
responsibilities range from counterterrorism and border security to disaster response and
cybersecurity. Any disruptions in these vital areas could have serious consequences for
national security and public safety. Therefore, ensuring a smooth and stable transition
during periods of restructuring is paramount.
One approach to achieving stability is through phased implementation of changes.
Rather than executing sweeping reforms all at once, a gradual and incremental process
allows for continuous assessment and adjustment. This method enables the identification
of potential issues early on and provides opportunities to address them before they
escalate. It also allows employees to acclimate to new roles and responsibilities in a
manageable way, reducing the risk of operational gaps. Moreover, clear communication
is essential during any restructuring effort. Keeping all stakeholders, including
employees, informed about the goals, timeline, and expected outcomes of the changes
can help mitigate uncertainty and build trust. Transparent communication fosters a sense
of inclusion and ensures that everyone understands their role in the new organizational
structure.
Additionally, providing adequate support and training for personnel affected by
the changes is critical. Investing in professional development and offering resources to
help employees adapt to new systems and processes can enhance their ability to perform
effectively. This support not only aids in maintaining stability but also contributes to a
more skilled and resilient workforce. In conclusion, while previous "sweeps" of agencies
and personnel within the DHS have demonstrated the potential benefits of restructuring,
they have also highlighted the need for a prudent approach that prioritizes stability. By
implementing changes gradually, maintaining clear communication, and providing robust
support to employees, the DHS can navigate the complexities of organizational reform
while continuing to fulfill its vital mission. The ultimate goal is to create a more efficient
and effective department that is well-equipped to protect the nation, without
compromising the stability and continuity of its operations.
In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has faced increasing
scrutiny and pressure from both legislators and policymakers who have been vocal about
the need for significant consolidation and merger of various tasks and functions within
the department. This push for restructuring is driven by a combination of factors,
including the desire for improved efficiency, enhanced coordination among different
branches, and the elimination of redundant operations that can drain valuable resources.
The DHS, established in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, was designed to unify several disparate agencies under a single umbrella to better
protect the United States from a wide array of threats, ranging from terrorism to natural
disasters. Over time, however, the department has grown considerably, and with this
expansion have come complexities and bureaucratic challenges that some argue hinder its
overall effectiveness. Lawmakers advocating for consolidation believe that streamlining
the department's structure could lead to more effective use of taxpayer dollars, reduce
administrative overhead, and foster a more agile response to emerging threats. For
example, they propose merging certain functions such as intelligence gathering,
cybersecurity operations, and emergency management to create a more cohesive and
responsive organizational framework. This would not only enhance inter-agency
communication but also ensure that resources are allocated where they are most needed.
Furthermore, the current budgetary realities cannot be ignored. The federal
government faces significant fiscal constraints, and all agencies, including DHS, are
under pressure to justify their expenditures and demonstrate value for money. In light of
these economic pressures, it is increasingly likely that financial considerations will
necessitate a re-evaluation of how the DHS operates. Cost-saving measures, which could
include the consolidation of departments, reduction of overlapping roles, and even
potential layoffs, may become unavoidable. The prospect of such sweeping changes has
elicited mixed reactions. Proponents argue that a leaner, more efficient DHS will be
better equipped to address contemporary security challenges, from cyber threats to the
complex logistics of disaster response. Critics, however, caution that hasty or poorly
planned consolidations could disrupt essential services and diminish the department's
capacity to fulfill its mission. They emphasize the importance of maintaining a careful
balance between efficiency and operational readiness.
As debates continue on Capitol Hill, the future structure of the DHS remains
uncertain. What is clear, however, is that any significant organizational changes will
require meticulous planning and execution to ensure that the primary goal of
safeguarding the nation is not compromised. Policymakers must weigh the potential
benefits of consolidation against the risks and work collaboratively to chart a path
forward that strengthens the department while addressing fiscal realities. In conclusion,
the ongoing discussions about the consolidation and merger of tasks and functions within
the DHS highlight a critical intersection of operational efficiency and budgetary
constraints. As legislators and policymakers navigate this complex landscape, the
decisions made in the near future will have lasting implications for the department's
ability to protect and serve the American people.
D. DHS in the Age of President Donald J. Trump: 2016–2021
Since the election and installation of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the
United States, DHS could be accurately described as operating in a whirlwind. There are
various reasons for this. First, was the operational and managerial style of Trump who
insisted on high levels of loyalty without fail and the advancement of his DHS agenda. In
each of these cases, the agency had never encountered the likes of President Trump for
his managerial style can be termed frenetic. Couple this with his firm demand that his
team players be on his team resolutely and unequivocally, and you have a cultural
dynamic the agency never previously encountered. Mostly, however, President Trump
saw the basis of election rooted in many aspects of what DHS does, such border security,
immigration, border wall construction, and putting American companies and workers
first. To say there was a systematic shake-up at DHS is an understatement.
Within DHS, the organizational structure of the Office of the Secretary was
altered under the provisions of the act. The secretary of homeland security oversees and
provides leadership in all facets of homeland defense and protection. Secretary Ridge is
largely lauded for his skill and demeanor during the turbulent initial days of DHS. His
reputation for integrity, consensus building, and political skill is well deserved. After
Secretary Ridge, the leadership of DHS was provided by former prosecutor and judge
Michael Chertof. Secretary Chertoff was a tireless advocate for his department. His six-
point agenda for DHS, developed and announced in July 2005, ensures that the
department’s policies, operations, and structures are aligned in the best way to address
the potential threats—both present and future—that face the United States.
With the election and swearing in of Barack Obama, the 44th president of the
United States, a new homeland security secretary was confirmed and appointed. Janet
Napolitano (Figure 2.16) was sworn in on January 21, 2009, as the third secretary of
DHS. Napolitano’s homeland security background was extensive. As U.S. attorney, she
helped lead the domestic terrorism investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing. As
Arizona attorney general, she helped write the law to break up human smuggling rings.
As Governor of Arizona, she implemented one of the first state homeland security
strategies in the country, opened the first state counterterrorism center, and spearheaded
efforts to transform immigration enforcement. She has also been a pioneer in
coordinating federal, state, local, and binational homeland security efforts, and presided
over large-scale disaster relief efforts and readiness exercises to ensure well-crafted and
functional emergency plans.
These are in addition to numerous domestic terrorist plots in various stages that
had been thwarted by U.S. intelligence agencies within DHS. These events and
phenomena, as well as the various plots, obviously influenced the focus of the agency.
The secretary’s platform emphasized an increased need for utilities security, including
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that control utilities, and the
need for increased vigilance and expertise in the area of cybersecurity across both the
public and private sectors. Napolitano’s tenure as DHS chief was not without
controversy. This included various reports of wasteful spending by DHS, certainly
something that many government agencies are not immune to. In addition, civil liberties
groups decried the continued use of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) pat
downs and imaging technologies—which some argue are too invasive—in airport
security screening.
In the wake of the Christmas Day bombing in 2009, the secretary had to backtrack
on statements that “the system worked” to concede that the system, in fact, did not work.
This is because Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was allowed to board a plane with
explosives and make it all the way to Detroit before his underwear bombing device failed
to detonate properly. Reports also indicate that the United States had received
intelligence, prior to the attack attempt, in reference to a Nigerian national based in
Yemen planning a possible attack. Another notable event, no fault of Secretary
Napolitano’s, was the disclosure of the failed “Fast and Furious” operation, conducted
from 2006 to 2011, in which over 1,600 firearms that were sold to dealers ultimately
made their way into the hands of Mexican traffickers. The intent was to track the
weapons and reveal key figures in the Mexican cartel hierarchy. The operation, however,
was a failure in that not only did authorities not track the movement of guns, according to
reports, but those guns have been directly linked to over 200 deaths in Mexico. While this
originated under the watch of Attorney General Eric Holder—out of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and not DHS—it was perceived as a black-eye
moment for the Obama administration, one that tested the public’s trust of government
operations in the name of security, not to mention an increasingly tense relationship with
Mexico. If anything, the operation emphasized the importance of border security in the
south and the need to stem the increasing threat of violence spilling over the border from
Mexico, albeit not in a wholly positive way. Despite these controversies and the
increasing range of threats and challenges, Secretary Napolitano ably led the department
on a range of new initiatives.
While political appointments frequently reflect political realities more than
experiential resumes, Jeh Johnson has been at times a polarizing and complex figurehead
for DHS. For example, Secretary Johnson has shown general reticence to label terrorist
acts as terrorist acts or to use nomenclature such as “jihad” or “Islamic Terrorism.” This
has led to a debate on political correctness and whether the avoidance of using such valid
terminology ignores the issues and undercuts the operational integrity of what DHS must
encounter every day. On the other hand, Secretary Johnson gets high marks for his
integrity, his willingness to delegate and rely on talented people, and an overall
leadership style that keeps the rank and file in DHS in a contented state. Since his tenure
ended, his public contributions and insights have highlighted his honest approach and
how DHS came to rely on his professional manner. For example, Secretary Johnson has
been keenly critical of the politics so evident in the Coronavirus situation and has
vociferously asked for a national response rather than a party-based reaction.27 Johnson
was equally fair in his assessment of border detention facilities where children and
families were cared for but not necessarily at a perfect level. Johnson noted that the sheer
volume and the fact these policies were attributable to the Obama administration.
After this priority, the DHS mandate becomes far more lenient in matters of
enforcement. And when families and children are involved, Johnson increasingly
liberalized processes to ensure the least amount of detention possible. In fact, he
concluded that “In short, once a family has established eligibility for asylum or other
relief under our laws, long-term detention is an inefficient use of our resources and
should be discontinued.”30 Finally, Johnson has drawn criticism for advancing a theory
of racial profiling at border enforcement relative to drug enforcement, especially at the
Mexican border. Despite some controversies, which go with the territory, Secretary
Johnson successfully oversaw the establishment of policy, procedure, and protocols in the
summer and fall of 2014, to identify travelers for screening in response to the Ebola crisis
in West Africa. Overall, the department has undergone some significant changes in the
several years under his watch.
Other offices include Public Affairs, Military Advisor’s Office, Counter Narcotics
Enforcement, and the Executive Secretariat. Of recent interest is September 28, 2015,
announcement of a new Office of Community Partnerships. The office targets the
increasing caseload of domestically generated violent extremism, hoping to build bridges
between DHS and community groups aware of domestic terror plots but fully in
opposition to those approaches. This office will be dedicated to the mission of countering
violent extremism and developing community partnerships that will combat and ferret out
these threats. In the span of 3 years, since 2016, the Trump Administration had four DHS
Secretaries. Former Marine General John Kelly was President Trump’s first choice to
lead the DHS. Kelly brought systematic order to an agency being pulled in diverse
directions and his military leadership style was very beneficial to the department
especially when one considers the political pressures applied to it on so many levels.
Next, President Trump appointed Kirstjen Nielsen (Figure 2.21) as Secretary from
2017 to 2019. Secretary Nielsen worked her way up and through the ranks of DHS and
worked very effectively with General John Kelly. A tireless leader and a strong advocate
of stricter border policies, Secretary Nielsen labored in very difficult times for DHS.
Essentially, her performance was largely shaped by enforcement of the “Zero-Tolerance
Policy” whereby illegal immigrants caught at the border were immediately referred for
criminal prosecution. And while that policy might have been legal and justified, the
image problems of the policy are now legendary—the most illustrative example being
how children could be separated from their illegally crossing parents, or from caretakers
incorrectly or improperly claiming “asylum.” Efforts to enforce the policy ignited a
firestorm of protest over its inhumanity rather than legality, although various federal
courts intervened in questionable ways to make that policy difficult to enforce.
While McAleenan’s tenure was only a year, his contributions to the vision and
outlook of DHS were quite significant. His most important leadership approach forced
DHS to look within our borders rather than gazing to other countries or overseas. While
terror often comes or generates from foreign countries, the preparation and training may
be home-grown or domestic. This operational approach is fully described in the DHS
Factsheet. Secretary McAleenan’s very short tenure as DHS Secretary was not caused
due to major policy differences with the Trump administration but the difficulties of
traversing the fluid political realities of the position. After a long and distinguished
career, McAleenan indicated it was time to be closer to family and to spend some time in
the private sector. President Trump was very commendatory of his service but rumors
swirl about whether the President thought he was aggressive enough in implementing his
border policies.
To say there has been tumult at DHS is an understatement. In an agency so
fractured and disjointed by its inherent complexity, the transiency of its appointed or
Congressionally approved Secretaries provides little stability to the department. And
while all the Secretaries under the Trump administration have made valuable
contributions to the role and functions of the department, it was hoped the appointment of
Chad Wolf might calm the turbulenceLaLbit. Secretary Wolf was Chief of Staff to former
Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen; Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Strategy, Plans,
Analysis & Risk as well as Under Secretary for this same, crucial office. Wolf was not
without controversy including a rejection of New York State’s right to participate in the
“Global Entry” program because the state will not allow access the DMV records to
check backgrounds of the applicants.
Secretary Wolf expanded DHS efforts to reconnect all separated families,
continued efforts to assure election processes and voting integrity, finished the DHS
Strategic Mission and Plans, as well as gave some increased priority to assuring
humanitarian treatment of those seeking entry at the borders.38 In September through
November 2020, several court rulings determined that Acting Secretary Wolf is likely
unlawfully serving as acting secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, due to
the fact that appointment was invalid under the agency’s applicable order of succession.
As such, it may be determined by various court that some policies implemented during
his tenure will be invalidated or overturned at some point. It should be noted that two
other individuals served as acting DHS heads at the tail end of Trump’s presidency,
including Pete Gaynor for nine days and David Pekoske for thirteen days. Under the
Biden Administration, Alejandro Nicholas Mayorkas took over on February 2, 2021 as
the seventh DHS Secretary. He served in DHS under the Obama administration both as
the director of United Citizenship and Immigration service for four years and as Deputy
Secretary for here years under then Secretary Jeh Johnson.
In the reorganization phase, DHS clearly articulated its internal structure by
establishing a myriad of internal departments. At various stages from 2005 until the
present, directorates were implemented and, in some cases, were later abolished. To say
that DHS is a dynamic bureaucracy is an understatement. At face value, the directorates
reflect the stress of the agency—what it wishes to primarily focus on. By 2007, each of
these directorates was abolished and the respective obligations and duties transferred to
other departments within DHS. Currently, there are only two remaining directorates at
DHS, although the National Protection and Program Directorate has evolved to an
Agency level, and titled Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
CISA analyzes these critical forms of infrastructure to determine potential threats
and vulnerability, management, and mitigation of identified risks to same and be just as
adept in the coordination of agency response in the event of threat. Covered later in this
chapter will be the protocol and methodology of infrastructure analysis. Much of what
state, local, and federal authorities do in response to infrastructure threat is derived from
the directorate’s research results and recommended best practices. A myriad of other
functions assumed by CISA and will be encountered throughout the remainder of this
chapter. Increasingly, the department has been given oversight over biometric identity
program by and through its office of The Office of Biometric Identity Management
(OBIM) which oversees the US-VISIT program and other identity programs. Other
offices, such as the National Risk Management Center (NRMC), deal with matters of risk
analysis, assessment, and management as well as the emerging statistical and quantitative
discipline of risk analytics. The NRMC brings the private sector, government agencies,
and other key stakeholders together to identify, analyze, prioritize, and manage the most
significant risks to our critical infrastructure.
The role of science and technology in the world of homeland security is patently
obvious. As government agencies and localities deal with shrinking budgets, the
efficiency and efficacy of their practices take on added importance. The Science and
Technology Directorate plays a key role in the development of all forms of technology
and scientific applications useful to homeland defense. It serves a variety of broader
functions, such as being a clearinghouse for technology practices and equipment,
especially as to design and engineering; it tests and evaluates the compatibility and
interoperability of diverse technologies used across the various states and weighs and
assesses the primary needs of the nation’s first-responder requirements for technology.
The Directorate has played an aligned role in the pandemic Coronavirus by evaluating the
surface life of the virus, the impact of ultraviolet light, and other forces which might
work toward eradicating this pandemic.
The Directorate for Management is the administrative arm of DHS where
traditional functions of personnel, finance, and capital and procurement requirements are
dealt with as well as the acquisition and maintenance of DHS properties. The Directorate
is responsible for budget development and oversight. With more than 200,000 employees
in DHS, the management directorate takes on a major undertaking in the matter of human
and physical capital. See Figure 2.3247 for the organizational chart of the directorate. Just
moved within the supervision of the Management Directorate is the Federal Protective
Service which protects federal assets and installations. The Directorate oversees the
activities of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which is a law enforcement entity
dedicated to safety and risk reduction at federal installations.
The FPS also takes a lead role in the assurance that federal buildings and
installations are rid of security problems and that the design, operation, and layout of
facilities are as conducive as possible to safe security practices. In each facility, the FPS
sets up a Building Security Committee, which conducts a vulnerability assessment of
each facility. As a complex bureaucracy, DHS never remains organizationally stagnant
but appears endlessly capable of growth and transformation. One of the challenges
reporting on DHS offices and structure regards their lack of permanency.48 DHS
subsumes agencies, directorates, divisions, and in carrying out its overall mission,
establishes a host of offices- and of recent description what it terms “Support and
Operational Components.” Just as the idea of the “Directorate” seems to be shrinking,
with only two remaining, the concept of an “Office” seems subject to redesignation and
definitional change.
Throughout its history, aside from internal machinations that redesign and
redesignate the offices, directorates, and sub-entities of DHS, the Department has often
witnessed additions and even subtractions from its overall structure. Often termed
“reorganization” the Department has displayed some dynamic changes over its short
existence. The intent was to combine, blend, and synthesize appropriate agency functions
with the appropriate office. For the most part, DHS has remained largely intact since
these radical days of reorganization in 2003–2004. It was not only an administrative
sweep that took place when these agencies moved from familiar locale to the DHS
setting. For both DHS and the incoming agency, a change of outlook and culture was
required. By change, one means that a new prioritization of agency function had to occur;
the former agency had to inculcate, acclimate, and become part of a new mission and
mindset. In a governmental life span, this is a difficult order to fulfill. Even so, it appears
that DHS has done a fairly good job integrating so much in such an expeditious fashion.
To truly appreciate these cultural and administrative shifts, one need only look to the
moves from one agency to another (Table 2.1). In DHS, these moves are simply
unrivaled in the history of the government—the movement can only be termed radical in
scope. Sweeping moves, from so many governmental agencies, are not the stuff of
government personality, whether it is local, state, or federal. In the final analysis, such
shifts and mergers were essential to any notion of a “single roof” for homeland security.
While many of these former agencies and offices will be covered in other sections of this
chapter, this section will significant structural shifts into DHS.
The placement of the USCG within DHS was considered a radical shift by many,
and by some an uncomfortable fit for a military entity, but on closer inspection, it a
defensible move. While the Coast Guard has never been part of the Department of
Defense, there are increased calls for its proper placement in that environment.50 On the
other hand, the mission of the Coast Guard, its historical dedication to safety and security
in our waterways and coastline makes the agency the perfect complement to DHS. With
its extraordinary infrastructure of maritime resources, its skill in the detection and
prevention of crime on the seas and waterways, and its technical superiority in a host of
operations, the USCG has been called on to be a major player in the fight against
terrorism (see Figure 2.37). The Coast Guard also issues regular, monthly briefings on
activity that be deemed suspicious on the maritime front. Each month the Coast Guard
posts places and locales that give rise to homeland defense concerns. The transition, of
course, has not been without its share of challenges. The USCG has a variety of masters
to answer to. The sheer volume of coverage, in both task and geography, is daunting.
“With 95,000 miles of coastline and close to 360 ports of entry, the United States is
challenged daily with monitoring maritime safety, securing national borders and the
global supply chain, and protecting natural resources,”55 the USCG labors under heavy
demands. It has undergone a “fundamental reordering,”56 which requires it to be an
“instrument of national security.”
For most of its history, the Secret Service has done an admirable job of protecting
Presidents. Of recent history has been breaches in the White House fencing perimeter—
no party more audacious than former Iraq military veteran, Omar Gonzalez.59 See Figure
2.41 for a graphic of the new five-foot taller fence. After scaling the fence, he actually
made into the White House compound.60 This was not Gonzalez’s first encounter with
security breaches along the perimeter at the White House.61 In addition, the events of
January 6, 2021 and the storming of the capitol by Trump supporters has dramatically
increased the focus and considerations for security measures in Washington DC.
The Secret Service also deals with counterfeiting and select federal crimes not
aligned to homeland security issues. Its investigations unit deals with identity crimes such
as access device fraud, identity theft, false identification fraud, bank and check fraud,
telemarketing fraud, telecommunications fraud (cellular and hard wire), computer fraud,
fraud targeting automated payment systems and teller machines, direct deposit fraud, and
investigations of forgery. For homeland purposes, the protection unit assumes a central
role. Two areas where the Secret Service orchestrates protective services are in major
events and threat assessment. In the first instance, major events, the Secret Service
coordinates agencies and their respective resources when a significant public event,
involving protected persons, takes place. In this case, the secretary of DHS designates the
event as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). The Secret Service assumes its
mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational
security plan. The NSSE is coordinated in cooperation with its established partnerships
with law enforcement and public safety officials at the local, state, and federal levels.
These reports serve as a critique of DHS using the combined wisdom of the
committee as outside, objective observers. The aim is for the council to turn a critical and
pragmatic eye on DHS programs and offer recommendations for improvement and to
curtail initiatives that may be redundant or not properly vetted, to avoid unnecessary
bureaucracy within the department. The council wisely calls for the aggressive
integration and melding of state and local governmental authorities, working side by side
with federal entities in law enforcement and the intelligence community; the agency also
seeks input and professional participation by other suitable means. One avenue erects and
establishes a body of government leaders, scholars, and practitioners that give advice to
DHS. DHS labels these groups as subcommittees, task forces, and panels. DHS also
relies on specialized committees that deal with topics of significant interest to the agency.
Presently, these committees are designated as senior advisory committees, an example
referenced later in this chapter. Other areas of expertise are solicited in private sector
justice, secure borders, state and local officials, and the academe. These committees issue
reports and recommendations to the secretary as needed.
