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RUNNING HEAD: CURVEBALL
Curveball and the Need for Accurate, Timely Intelligence
October 1, 2019
Abstract
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Is it more important to have timely intelligence, or accurate intelligence? This question lies at the
heart of the post-9/11 investigations into Iraq and their alleged weapons of mass destruction.
Infuriated by the attacks on 9/11, the American people and the Bush administration wanted
answers and excuses to go to war, and while they got their war, the intelligence that got them
there was flawed and unreliable. Instead of seeking after truth, the intelligence community
decided to find witnesses and reports that said what they wanted to hear: that Iraq had weapons
of mass destruction that could be launched at any time. Their rushed intelligence products led to
the United States fighting a war in Iraq and the loss of American lives over false information.
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Curveball and the Need for Accurate, Timely Intelligence
After 9/11, the Bush administration wanted to find the responsible party and the
American people were itching to go to war, and that created a lot of pressure on analysts to
produce quality results in a fraction of the normal time. Because the US lacked the Arabic-
speaking agents required to gather intelligence, they turned to foreign intelligence to fill in the
gaps. German intelligence officers initially interviewed Rafid Ahmed Alwan, or “Curveball,”
who claimed that Iraq had been making bioweapons for several years (Drogin, 2007), and
“because of the barriers that the United States faced in collecting intelligence on Iraq, it was very
difficult to ignore a source of information provided by another country” (Walsh, 2011, p. 2).
Motivated by anger and revenge, the US government eagerly looked for intelligence which
would allow them to go to war, but this led to a rushed investigation that ended up being based
on faulty information provided by Curveball. This situation highlights both failures and
successes of American intelligence—they failed because they put their desire for war and speedy
answers over the quest for truth, but they succeeded in their cooperation with foreign intelligence
programs.
The Search for Truth
The first failure of American intelligence gathering came from looking for a problem,
instead of looking for the truth. Truth lays the foundation for the American justice system,
Christianity, and intelligence gathering. When witnesses give testimony in court, they swear to
tell “the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” Similarly, in Proverbs 12:22 it says that “Lying
lips are an abomination to the Lord, but those who act faithfully are his delight.” When looking
at the post-9/11 world, analysts and decision makers should have focused on the truth, not
necessarily on taking speedy and decisive action. Because they were looking for evidence of
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Iraqi weaponry, when Curveball came along speaking false information, they were quick to listen
and slow to evaluate. “The case of Curve Ball, the single person who was the source for over one
hundred reports about Iraq biological-weapons programs that did not in fact exist, is a good
example of seeing what you expect to find, even when it isn’t there” (Duelfer, 2010, p. 470).
Sometimes decision-making must happen quickly and sparing time for lengthy investigations
could prove detrimental to national security. However, the goal of intelligence should always be
to uncover the truth, instead of finding evidence that supports a claim.
The Need for Speed
The second intelligence failure in this situation came from the focus on speed over
accuracy. After a crisis event like 9/11, everyone wants answers, and they wanted them
yesterday, which meant “a production process that normally stretched for six to ten months had
to be truncated to less than three weeks” (Tenet & Harlow, p. 323). Pushed for intelligence,
analysts turned to ready sources like Curveball, but the time constraints prevented them from
fully investigating their sources and looking for the possible inconsistencies. According to
George Tenet (who was the DCI), “the lack of time, however, did not relieve us of the
responsibility to get the information right. The flawed analysis that was compiled in the NIE
provided some of the material for Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003, UN speech, which helped
galvanize public support for the war” (Tenet & Harlow, p. 323). Even when pressed for time, the
truth should take precedence over what decision makers want or expect to hear.
Teamwork makes the Dream Work
While Curveball as an informant and the US invasion of Iraq over weapons of mass
destruction failed, the cooperation between US intelligence officers and German intelligence was
successful. James 1:5 says “If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask God, who gives generously
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to all without reproach, and it will be given him.” This verse shows that it is better to admit
ignorance and receive knowledge than to continue stubbornly alone. To work successfully with
German intelligence, the US had to admit that they had gaps in their own intelligence, which as a
world power is never an easy thing to do. Walsh (2011) says that “Receiving intelligence from
another country may be the most efficient or, in some cases, the only source of information” (p.
3). The only way a country can receive intelligence from another country, however, is by asking
for it, which the United States did in this situation.
Conclusion
Overall, the invasion of Iraq over the faulty reports of weapons of mass destruction led to
years of avoidable conflict, had the analysts and decision makers allowed the time and effort
necessary to find the truth of the matter. When the foundation of intelligence lies in truth, then
everything that stems from that intelligence has a greater chance of being useful and dependable.
However, in this situation, “the manufactured ‘realities’ of the Bush administration sprang from
certain fundamental assumptions, and as journalist Thomas Ricks has noted, ‘when assumptions
are wrong, everything built on them is undermined’” (Caldwell, p. 111). The United States
intelligence community failed in their post-9/11 investigations of Iraq because they searched for
proof of WMD’s in order to go to war and did not slow down and take the time to ensure the
accuracy of their sources and information. However, their cooperation with German intelligence
set an example for how to admit intelligence gaps, learn from the mistake, and amicably work
with other countries.
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References
Caldwell, D. (2012). Vortex of conflict: U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies.
Drogin, B. (2007). (1st ed.). New Curveball: Spies, lies, and the con man who caused a war
York: Random House.
Duelfer, C. (2010). Hide and seek: The search for truth in Iraq (First edition.). New York: Public
Affairs.
Tenet, G., & Harlow, B. (2008). (First edition.). At the center of the storm: My years at the CIA
New York: HarperCollins.
Walsh, J. (2011). . New York: Columbia The international politics of intelligence sharing
University Press.
