THE TRAFFIC REGULATIONS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK PROMULGATED
BY THE POLICE COMMISSIONER PROVIDES
Introduction
‘No person shall operate, or cause to be operated, in or upon any street an advertising vehicle;
provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent the putting of business notices upon
business delivery vehicles, so long as such vehicles are engaged in the usual business or
regular work of the owner and not used merely or mainly for advertising.’
Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates about 1,900 trucks in New
York City and sells the space on the exterior sides of these trucks for advertising. That
advertising is for the most part unconnected with its own business. It was convicted in the
magistrates court and fined. The judgment of conviction was sustained in the Court of Special
Sessions. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion by a divided vote. The case is here
on appeal.
{On the due process challenge, the Court stated:} We do not sit to weigh evidence
on the due process issue in order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate;
nor is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom. We would be trespassing on one of the
most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation
had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local
authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that
to be palpably false.
The question of equal protection of the laws is pressed more strenuously on us. It is pointed
out that the regulation draws the line between advertisements of products sold by the owner
of the truck and general advertisements. It is argued that unequal treatment on the basis of
such a distinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the regulation. It is said, for
example, that one of appellant’s trucks carrying the advertisement of a commercial house
would not cause any greater distraction of pedestrians and vehicle drivers than if the
commercial house carried the same advertisement on its own truck. Yet the regulation allows
the latter to do what the former is forbidden from doing. It is therefore contended that the
classification which the regulation makes has no relation to the traffic problem since a
violation turns not on what kind of advertisements are carried on trucks but on whose trucks
they are carried.
That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the problem, even if we assume that it is
premised on the correct construction of the regulation. The local authorities may well have
concluded that those who advertised their own wares on their trucks do not present the same
traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take
a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judgment is
correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidence on traffic than those of
appellants.
We cannot say that that judgment is not an allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has
relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination
against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical
considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question
of equal protection is to be answered. And the fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate
from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a
different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring.
There are two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which this Court may invoke to
invalidate ordinances by which municipal governments seek to solve their local problems.
One says that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law’. The other declares that no state shall ‘deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’
My philosophy as to the relative readiness with which we should resort to these two clauses is
almost diametrically opposed to the philosophy which prevails on this Court. While claims of
denial of equal protection are frequently asserted, they are rarely sustained. But the Court
frequently uses the due process clause to strike down measures taken by municipalities to
deal with activities in their streets and public places which the local authorities consider to
create hazards, annoyances or discomforts to their inhabitants. And I have frequently
dissented when I thought local power was improperly denied.
The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to use the due process
clause to strike down a substantive law or ordinance. Even its provident use against
municipal regulations frequently disables all government—state, municipal and federal from
dealing with the conduct in question because the requirement of due process is also
applicable to State and Federal Governments. Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due
process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find
objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not disable any
governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the
prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine that
cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of
law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely,
nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take
no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation.
This case affords an illustration. Even casual observations from the sidewalks of New York
will show that an ordinance which would forbid all advertising on vehicles would run into
conflict with many interests, including some, if not all, of the great metropolitan newspapers,
which use that advertising extensively. Their blandishment of the latest sensations is not less
a cause of diverted attention and traffic hazard than the commonplace cigarette advertisement
which this truck-owner is forbidden to display. But any regulation applicable to all such
advertising would require much clearer justification in local conditions to enable its
enactment than does some regulation applicable to a few. I do not mention this to criticize the
motives of those who enacted this ordinance, but it dramatizes the point that we are much
more likely to find arbitrariness in the regulation of the few than of the many. Hence, for my
part, I am more receptive to attack on local ordinances for denial of equal protection than for
denial of due process, while the Court has more often used the latter clause.
In this case, if the City of New York should assume that display of any advertising on
vehicles tends and intends to distract the attention of persons using the highways and to
increase the dangers of its traffic, I should think it fully within its constitutional powers to
forbid it all. The same would be true if the City should undertake to eliminate or minimize the
hazard by any generally applicable restraint, such as limiting the size, color, shape or perhaps
to some extent the contents of vehicular advertising. Instead of such general regulation of
advertising, however, the City seeks to reduce the hazard only by saying that while some
may, others may not exhibit such appeals. The same display, for example, advertising
cigarettes, which this appellant is forbidden to carry on its trucks, may be carried on the
trucks of a cigarette dealer and might on the trucks of this appellant if it dealt in cigarettes.
And almost an identical advertisement, certainly one of equal size, shape, color and
appearance, may be carried by this appellant if it proclaims its own offer to transport
cigarettes. But it may not be carried so long as the message is not its own but a cigarette
dealer’s offer to sell the same cigarettes.
The City urges that this applies equally to all persons of a permissible classification, because
all that it does is (1) forbid all inhabitants of New York City from engaging in the business of
selling advertising space on trucks which move as part of the city traffic; (2) forbid all truck
owners from incidentally employing their vehicles for such purpose, with the exception that
all truck owners can advertise their own business on their own trucks. It is argued that, while
this does not eliminate vehicular advertising, it does eliminate such advertising for hire and to
this extent cuts down the hazard sought to be controlled.
That the difference between carrying on any business for hire and engaging in the same
activity on one’s own is a sufficient one to sustain some types of regulations of the one that is
not applied to the other, is almost elementary. But it is usual to find such
regulations applied to the very incidents wherein the two classes present different problems,
such as in charges, liability and quality of service.
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a discrimination in a problem in which
the two classes present identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the sole
nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce traffic hazards. There is not even a
pretense here that the traffic hazard created by the advertising which is forbidden is in any
manner or degree more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with considerable
force that this local regulation does not comply with the equal protection clause because it
applies unequally upon classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects of
the regulation.
As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude toward the equal protection clause, I do
not think differences of treatment under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to assure
either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed
out between those bound and those left free. This Court has often announced the principle
that the differentiation must have an appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or
ordinance.
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute to an evil or danger in
the same way and to the same degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while
those who do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I
think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt
with differently than those who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That might be done by many
classifications, which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is a real
difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate
action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be
promoted for a price.
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet
Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or display everybody’s
advertising, and its rental of space on the sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main
business which brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see that, in a day of
extravagant advertising more or less subsidized by tax deduction, the rental of truck space
could become an obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of regulation,
that is not my business, and in view of the control I would concede to cities to protect citizens
in quiet and orderly use for their proper purposes of the highways and public places, I think
the judgment below must be affirmed.
Dandridge v William
Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, C.J., and Black, Harlan,
and White, JJ joined. Black., J. issued a concurring opinion in which Burger, C.J., joined.
Harlan, J., issued a concurring opinion. Douglas., J., issued a dissenting opinion, in which
Brennan, J., joined. Marshall, J., issued a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined.
Conclusion
This case involves the validity of a method used by Maryland, in the administration of an
aspect of its public welfare program, to reconcile the demands of its needy citizens with the
finite resources available to meet those demands. Like every other State in the Union,
Maryland participates in the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), which originated with the Social
Security Act of 1935.
Under this jointly financed program, a State computes the so-called “standard of need” of
each eligible family unit within its borders. Some States provide that every family shall
receive grants sufficient to meet fully the determined standard of need. Other States provide
that each family unit shall receive a percentage of the determined need. Still others provide
grants to most families in full accord with the ascertained standard of need, but impose an
upper limit on the total amount of money any one family unit may receive. Maryland,
through administrative adoption of a “maximum grant regulation,” has followed this last
course. This suit was brought by several AFDC recipients to enjoin the application of the
Maryland maximum grant regulation on the ground that it is in conflict with the Social
Security Act of 1935 and with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reference
1. New York City Department of Transportation. (n.d.). Traffic rules and regulations.
Retrieved from https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/motorist/traffic-regulations.shtml
2. City of New York. (n.d.). New York City Administrative Code - Traffic rules.
Retrieved from https://www.nyc.gov/site/law/code/administrative-code.page
3. New York City Police Department. (n.d.). Traffic enforcement. Retrieved from
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/transportation/traffic-enforcement.page
4. City of New York. (n.d.). NYC rules. Retrieved from http://rules.cityofnewyork.us
5. LexisNexis. (n.d.). New York City traffic regulations. Retrieved from
https://www.lexisnexis.com
6. Westlaw. (n.d.). New York City traffic regulations. Retrieved from
https://www.westlaw.com
