Theoretical Application in Criminology
Merton’s Anomie Theory
The first criminologist to develop an explicit theory of crime based on the concept
of Anomie was Robert K. Merton. Merton (1938) adopted and shared DurkheimÕs ideas
on social organization and Anomie, and incorporated them into his criminological theory
on structural strain. This theory, known as MertonÕs Anomie Theory, sought to promote
sociological explanations across larger macro-level units. Merton believed that societies
endure various stressors that can lead them into Anomic states, thus differentially
impacting crime rates at the macro-level. While he did diverge in some key ways
from Durkheim, Merton (1938; 1957) also maintained continuity with some of
DurkheimÕs central notions.
In maintaining some continuity with Durkheim, Merton shared his common
assumptions of human nature. Both scholars assumed that human beings are Òbasically
social and compliantÉ under normal conditionsÓ (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001: 141,
emphasis in original), thus implying a collective strive for conformity. When societies
experience Anomie, a weakness in the normative order of a society causing a breakdown in
conformity, its members are more likely to react with crime. Merton also built upon the
Durkheimian notion Òthat ÔnormalÕ levels and forms of criminal activity in any society
reflect the fundamental features of social organizationÓ (Messner, Thome and Rosenfeld,
2008). These basic features of social organization are the prevailing social structures and
culture orientations that are encapsulated in major social institutions.
Using these commonalities as the basis for his theory, MertonÕs Anomie Theory
then diverged quite considerably from DurkheimÕs theoretical conceptions (Agnew,
1997). Much of the divergence from Durkheim centered on the role of Anomie in the
social system, but also in the individual-level implications for deviance (Passas, 1997).
In terms of the role of the social system, recall DurkheimÕs Anomie Theory
presented in Figure 1 above. It took a temporary or chronic form of societal crisis to
produce Anomie that led to deviant acts. In other words, Anomie (for Durkheim) is the
failure to regulate the goals that societal members aspire to achieve in society (Agnew,
1997; Kornhauser, 1978). For Merton, however, society generates universal and
collective goals, but fails to regulate the means individuals use to achieve these goals.
This failure of society to regulate the means introduces MertonÕs additional interest in
individual-level factors and how people cope with institutional pressures, as it is the
macro-social environment that contributes to individual strain. Anomie, then, is the
resulting contradiction between a societyÕs culturally ascribed goals and the social
structureÕs ability to regulate the means.10 Cultural pressures at the societal level coerce
or strain members of that society to break rules in order to secure those goals, sometimes
resulting in deviance. This relationship is reflected in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. MertonÕs Anomie Theory11
If a society were ÒhealthyÓ or in equilibrium, one would see an Òequal emphasis
placed on both the attainment of collectively held goals as well as the use of culturally
defined appropriate means to attain those goalsÓ (Patternoster and Bachman, 2001: 143).
These healthy and balanced societies experience less strain and more individual satisfaction
because, even without successful achievement of the collective goals, they have culturally
accepted means to try to achieve the goals. However, Merton did not
develop his theory to explain balanced societies. Rather, he was more interested in
explaining how societies vary in their balance between culturally accepted goals and
the means by which to attain the goals.
Like Durkheim, MertonÕs macro-level focus begins with social organization as
the starting point for understanding the socio-cultural aspects of deviant behavior. In
maintaining sociological continuity, the elements of culture and social institutions are at
the forefront. Merton acknowledges that these two elements are Òanalytically separable
although they merge imperceptibly in concrete situationsÓ (Merton, 1938: 672). From
his perspective, culture consists of goals, purposes, and interests. It comprises a Òframe
of aspirational reference. These goals are more or less integrated and involve varying
degrees of prestige and sentimentÉ. Some of these cultural aspirations are related to the
original drives of man, but they are not determined by themÓ (Merton, 1938: 672). The
cultural structure, then, is the organized set of normative values governing behavior
common to society. In this sense, MertonÕs theory points to deviance caused in part by
a Òcultural overemphasis on success combined with structurally limited opportunitiesÓ
(Passas, 1997).
Social institutions comprise the social structure of society that define, regulate,
and control the acceptable modes of achieving culturally defined goals (Merton, 1968).
ÒEvery social group invariably couples its scale of desired ends with moral or
institutional regulation of permissible and required procedures for attaining these endsÉ.
The choice of expedients is limited by the institutional normsÓ (Merton, 1938: 672-673).
Social institutions are part of the larger social organization, which ultimately describes
the components of a social system and the distribution of deviant behavior within that
social collectivity. These elements are what determine societies to be balanced or
imbalanced. Imbalanced societies, which Merton refers to as Òmalintegrated,Ó mean
that the subcomponents of culture (e.g., societal goals, norms) are out of equilibrium
and the messages emanating from the larger culture are at odds with the realities of the
social structure (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2009).
In malintegrated societies, such as the United States, the cultural system
encourages all members of society to place a high relative emphasis on monetary
success, and a low relative emphasis on the legitimate norms to achieve this success
(Agnew, 1997). Consequentially, these Anomic societies will experience a higher crime
rate than others because its members will employ the most expedient means, including
crime, to achieve their goals. Furthermore, in these societies even more strain and
pressure is placed on lower-class individuals. Cultural goals Òtranscend class linesÓ and
are not bound by them, Òyet the actual social organization is such that there exist class
differentials in the accessibility of these common success-symbolsÓ (Merton, 1938:
680). Class stratification differentially prevents members of society from achieving the
collective goal of monetary success through legitimate means, and as a result some may
turn to criminal activities. It is here that Merton again breaks with Durkheim. Merton
does not extend his idea of social structure beyond the class system, and for him the
structure of society functions mainly to distribute opportunities to achieve cultural goals
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012). However, Durkheim recognized there were more
dimensions to the concept of social structure Ð society also functions to place limits on
cultural aspirations. In general, Merton devoted less attention to social institutions
beyond class-stratification and instead focused his attention on defining the
cultural aspects of social organization.
MertonÕs Anomie Theory also includes a more micro-level focus, shifting
the level of analysis from macro-social forces to individual-level reasons for strained
members of society to engage or desist from illegal behavior.12 While this particular
aspect of MertonÕs theory remains outside of the scope of this research, it is interesting
to note that prior tests of MertonÕs Anomie Theory have largely investigated these
individual factors and methods of adaptation to strain and Anomie, while organizational
level empirical examinations of the theory are rare (Messner, 1988).
This has led some scholars to push for further inquiry into social organizational
aspects of MertonÕs theory (Messner, 1988; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994; Passas, 2000).
Other criminologists have critiqued existing studies claiming current tests of MertonÕs
theory have been incomplete and misspecified (Passas and Agnew, 1997). As the debate
continues, contemporary researchers remain guided by Durkheim and MertonÕs
interpretations of society and social organization. It should be noted that although theories of
Durkheim and Merton differ in their fundamental emphases, these theories are best viewed as
complementary rather than contradictory (Agnew, 1997). This point becomes evident as
theorists have employed aspects of both perspectives in the formation
of related criminological theories.13
12 This resulted from the realization that most individuals in society who are unable to achieve monetary
success do not turn to deviance (Agnew, 1997). Merton (1968) explains that conformity is in fact the most
common adaptation to strain. Deviance is simply a different adaptation in which there is no satisfaction to be
gained from pursuing non-monetary goals or from the adherence to legitimate norms (Agnew, 1997).
13 One such noteworthy theory is Global Anomie, developed by Nikos Passas, a student of Merton who
believed there to be room for further development of MertonÕs Anomie Theory (1990; 1995; 1997). Global
Anomie Theory expands on Merton (1938) by integrating MertonÕs Strain, relative deprivation, and reference-
group analysis with Globalization Theory (Passas, 1999; 2000). Drawing from Globalization TheoryÕs
inherently comparative nature and focus on macro-level flows of capital (Aas, 2007), Passas
Institutional Anomie Theory
Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld (1994; 1997; 2001a; 2006; 2012)
synthesized the theoretical concepts of social organization and Anomie that had been
developed through Durkheim, Merton, and other noted scholars14 in their macro-level
criminological theory, Institutional Anomie. This theory is in some ways an important
extension of macro-level MertonÕs Anomie Theory, largely because Messner and
Rosenfeld feared existing perspectives on crime overemphasize culture or social
institutions, rather than place equal weight on their importance. In developing their
theory, they equally emphasize the importance of culture and social institutions in
relation to crime at the comparative national and international levels. Messner and
Rosenfeld draw their assumptions of human nature and underlying concepts of culture,
social institutions and social organization from the extensive swath of key theoretical
and historical developments by Durkheim, Merton, Parsons, and other comparative
scholars in order to build the foundation for Institutional Anomie Theory.
Messner and Rosenfeld begin to build their foundations in some of DurkheimÕs
most important constructs of Anomie and the nature of crime. They accept and utilize
DurkheimÕs concept of Anomie, conceptualized by Durkheim to represent a weak,
normative environment (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012: 88). Moreover, Messner and
Rosenfeld accept DurkheimÕs notion that crime is a normal and regular element of
(1999) expanded on the idea of crime as a result of strain related to relative deprivation rooted in
comparison reference groups, and applied it on a global scale to nation-states. Passas (1999) believed it
necessary to apply Global Anomie Theory to serious forms of transnational crimes (e.g., political
corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering) in order to uncover its underlying causes, the impact of
globalization, and the effects of globalization on crime control efforts. In line with Globalization Theory,
Passas (1999) observed how the nature of transnational crimes reduces the authority of the nation-states
on an uneven scale. This, in turn, causes Òpower asymmetriesÓ to rise between nations, resulting in
societal relative deprivation on a very large scale.
14 For instance, Talcott Parsons and Karl Polyani (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2009).
society; Òcrime is normal, in a word, because it is social, and it is no less social than
conformityÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 51). Members of societies have insatiable
levels of needs and desires that require the structure of society to act as an external
regulatory function (Durkheim, 1962/1895). Thus, a society without crime is not
possible, because societies will always have needs and desires that require regulation.
Crime and deviance are necessary elements of societies, and may even prove useful to
the society by generating social change. That is, crime is functional to a healthy society.
In this sense, collective morality and resulting laws must be dynamic and constantly
evolving; otherwise, society becomes stagnant and ceases to progress (Durkheim,
1962/1895). This represents a structural functionalist perspective, from which Messner
and Rosenfeld draw from Durkheim, but also Talcott Parsons (1951).
For Parsons (1937; 1951; 1970; 1990), structural functionalism describes the need of
social systems to regulate society. That is, functionalism asserts, Òall recurrent social
activities have the function of maintaining a social systemÓ (Whitaker, 1965: 127). This
perspective begins with the concept of functions, defined as Òa complex [set] of activities
directed towards meeting a need or needs of the systemÓ (Rocher, 1975: 40). Parsons
(1951) believed that there are four functional imperatives present in all systems,15 and
these functional imperatives are used in all levels of his Action System. His Action
System was composed of four elements: the behavioral organism (responsible for
adaptation to and transformation of the external world), the personality system (defines
15 The four functional imperatives: Adaptation refers to the system coping with external situational
exigencies. It must adapt to its environment and adapt the environment to its needs. Goal attainment
describes how a system must define and achieve its primary goals. Integration describes how a system
must regulate the interrelationship of its component parts. It must also manage the relationship among the
other three functional imperatives. Latency describes how a system must furnish, maintain and renew both
the motivation of individuals and the cultural patterns that create and sustain that motivation (Ritzer,
the system goals and mobilizes resources to attain them), the social system (controls the
other elements), and the cultural system (provides the norms and values that motivate
societal members) (Parsons, 1951; 1970; Ritzer, 2008b). These four elements defined the
functions of social structures necessary and present in each society for it to function
properly.
Each element is composed of multiple systems and subsystems, but Messner and
Rosenfeld (1994) largely drew from two: the social system and the cultural system. For
Parsons, the social system represented Òsociety,Ó16 and was composed of four
subsystems: the economy, the polity, the fiduciary system (e.g., education, family), and
the societal community (e.g., law) (Parsons and Platt, 1973). The cultural system for
Parsons (1951) was Òthe major force binding the various elements of the social world,
or, in his terms, the action systemÓ (Ritzer, 2008b: 108). However, Messner and
Rosenfeld (1994) did not agree with ParsonÕs (1951) envision that culture existed
separately and preeminently above the other elements in the Action System. This view
gave too much weight to the role of culture, overshadowing other aspects of society (i.e.,
social institutions).
Further, Parsons (1951) believed, as do Messner and Rosenfeld, that the two
dimensions of social organization (i.e., culture and social institutions) should be distinctive
of each other, yet both present, in order to prevent Òsemantic confusionÓ (Kroeber and
Parsons, 1958). Social structure, the regulatory function of society, should be limited in
scope to the Òinteractional component of social systems. Culture should be limited to the
dimension of value, belief, and knowledgeÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012:
16 ÒSocietyÓ for Parsons is defined as Òa relatively self sufficient collectivity, the members of which
are able to satisfy all their individual and collective needs and to live entirely within its framework
(Rocher, 1975: 60).
58; Kroeber and Parsons, 1958). Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) argued that each concept
of culture and social structure contain elements of the truth; yet, the field needs a
criminological perspective that comprehensively, and equally, emphasizes both culture
and social structure. These two dimensions of social organization cannot be combined or
singularly emphasized. Much in the tradition of Parsons (1951):
The meanings of culture and social structure must be kept unambiguously
distinct precisely because they are empirically inseparable. Culture and social
structure are not ÒthingsÓ that can be neatly separated. They are analytical
constructs that call attention to different aspects of the same underlying social
phenomena. They are different ways of perceiving and understanding the nature
of social reality and the causes of social behavior. They are, in brief, points of
view for analyzing the social world. (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 55)
Messner and Rosenfeld found that while the field of criminology needs a theory
that equally emphasizes culture and social institutions, existing criminological theories
did not suffice. For instance, what they labeled Òcultural-learningÓ explanations of
crime17 served to more fully develop the concept of culture, but the perspective
understated the importance of social structure. This perspective begins with assumptions
of human nature congruent with Messner and RosenfeldÕs, rooted in DurkheimÕs notion
of normative crime. Individuals conform to the norms and standards of groups to which
they belong, therefore violating the normative standards of groups to which they do not
belong. Crime becomes the product of cultural or subcultural values and norms; but this
reasoning creates the problem of why some individuals violate the norms of their own
group. To respond to this problem, culture conflict theories suggest that members in
17 Messner and Rosenfeld (1994; 2012) felt it beneficial to present perspectives of criminology in this
fashion to represent the composite nature of micro- and macro-level theories. In this sense, many macro-
level explanations of crime commonly contain references to individual behavior. Thus, Messner and
Rosenfeld (2012) suggest presenting dominant criminological approaches as hybrids; for example,
Òcultural-learningÓ combines notions of the individual-level theory of Social Learning with notions of
society belong to multiple normative groups. Thus, the natural complexity of culture
lends itself to contradictions and violations of some groupÕs normative system because
to conform to one group is to violate another. Therefore, the cultural-learning perspective
maintains Òdeviance remains but the residual consequence of conformity. Without
conformity, there is no (cultural) devianceÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 51). Crime
is conformity (Sutherland, 1947). Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) note that while this
perspective is useful in Òshowing how the extraordinary results from the ordinary, how
the very conspiracy of the normalÉ produces the abnormalÓ (47), it is not without
serious theoretical concerns. Namely, they point out the problem of tautology they see
within the cultural-learning paradigm. For instance, if one assumes that all behavior is
consistent with underlying values, then delinquent acts themselves must be regarded as
evidence of delinquent values. This circular reasoning becomes nonfalsifiable, in part due
to an overly broad conception of culture (Kornhauser, 1978). To avoid trivializing
cultural differences between criminals and non-criminals, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994)
emphasize that what is needed is an incorporation of the second dimension of social
organization Ð social structure.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) next consider Òdisorganization-controlÓ
explanations of crime. This perspective omits culture from the equation completely,
focusing sole attention on the social structural dimension of social organization. This
perspective adopts some elements from the structural functionalist approach, in the sense
that it is up to the regulatory function of society to control the behavior of its individuals
(Durkheim, 1962/1895; Parsons, 1951). From the micro-level position, disorganization-
control explanations view individuals as hedonistic and predisposed to crime. Everyone
would commit crimes if they could, so why do most people refrain from engaging in
delinquency? From this perspective, the answer lies in the ability of various social
controls to restrain behavior; thus, there is no need to account for any cultural
motivations to violate the rules. Criminals simply lack the controls necessary to avoid
committing crimes. In some cases, social controls can be internal or external to the
individual. HirschiÕs (1969) version of Control Theory focuses on external controls
formed through bonds that individuals develop that attaches them to society. These
bonds connect individuals to conventional lines of action and activities, and to beliefs in
Òobey[ing] the rules of societyÓ (Hirschi, 1969: 26). The ÒbeliefÓ element is the most
controversial because beliefs or ÒdefinitionsÓ are central to cultural-learning
explanations of crime. However, Hirschi (1969) noted that control theorists focus on
beliefs that prohibit crime; Òdelinquency is not caused by beliefs that require
delinquency, but rather made possible by the absence of (effective) beliefs that forbid
delinquencyÓ (198). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) present another version of Control
theories that focuses on internal controls, deemphasizing the importance of societal
controls. They focus on a single trait of individual behavior Ð self-control Ð and argue
that individuals with low self-control are unable to form meaningful attachments to
others or other conventional groups and activities (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012). These
theories have been cited for failing to explain how or why bonds with society weaken or
fail to originally develop Ð most likely a result of their aversion to cultural aspects of
social organization (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994).
The theory of Social Disorganization partially responds to this critique by placing
social controls at the meso-level, and presents an ecologically based neighborhood
perspective of crime. A socially disorganized neighborhood is one in which the
neighborhood is unable to Òcontrol itselfÓ by managing its boundaries and prevent
delinquency and crime (Bursik, 1988; Bursik and Grasmik, 1993; Shaw and McKay,
1942). This idea has been expanded into concepts of Òcollective efficacy,Ó in which
neighborhoods are able to exercise control through a combination of social cohesion and
shared expectations for collective action (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). While
conceptual integration of Control theories and Disorganization theories has not been seen
in the literature, the perspectives unite in their separate efforts to focus on social
structural aspects of social organization absent culture (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012).
This perspective is successful in addressing why some people violate rules and
regulations of society. However, disorganization-control explanations of crime fall prey
to the opposite end of the spectrum from cultural-learning theories (Messner and
Rosenfeld, 1994). That is, instead of defining ÒcultureÓ too broadly and excluding
social structure as the cultural-learning perspective has done, the disorganization-control
perspective of crime has defined Òsocial structureÓ in equally broad terms, omitting
culture. The pendulum has swung too far in the other direction.
Finally, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) turn to a theoretical perspective Ð
anomie-strain explanations of crime Ð that has incorporated both culture and institutions.
By doing so, anomie-strain explanations of crime address deficiencies highlighted by
cultural-learning theories and disorganization-control explanations. Anomie-strain
theories are rooted in Durkheim and Merton, and to a lesser extent Passas, all of which
have been introduced and previously discussed. Merton has been the most notable
contributor to contemporary Anomie theory, and Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) (similar
to Passas, 1990; 1999) identify their theory of Institutional Anomie as a Òvariant of
Anomie theory associated with the work ofÉ Robert K. MertonÓ (11). However,
Messner and Rosenfeld point out several deficiencies in MertonÕs Anomie Theory that
they find lacking in conceptual stability, in line with previous critiques (e.g., Passas,
1990; 1997; Thio, 1975; Tittle, 1995). For instance, Merton does articulate the elements
of culture (the institutionalized means to attain culturally defined goals based on the
societyÕs central value orientations) and social structure (the legitimate means for
attaining the goals). However, for Merton, social structure equates only to social
stratification when determining access to legitimate means (Messner and Rosenfeld,
2009). Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) felt that basing social structure on the single
dimension of class stratification was too narrow of a conceptualization, and that
amendments must be made to account for social institutions and their interrelationships.
Additionally, Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) felt that the causes of crime for
Merton were too a narrow range of social factors (i.e., the role of norms acting as
inhibitors of misbehavior), failing to account for other social controls recognized by the
disorganization-control perspective. Incorporating other social controls (e.g., collective
efficacy, bonds and attachments to society) would underscore how ties to conventional
order, as established through performance of institutional roles, encourage socially
approved behavior (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2009).
Lastly, Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) noted that MertonÕs theory was not grounded
in any historical or comparative context. Instead, Merton focused solely on the United States
and the American Dream at stagnant points in time, and failed to more fully develop notions
of social structure. Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) believed MertonÕs
theory could be improved on by expanding the historical context to include the
development of various social institutions over time (drawing from the institutions
outlined by Parsons (1951)), and place the study of macro-level crime in a
comparative context.
The comparative context was one of significance for Messner and Rosenfeld.
They found value in not only understanding crime rates at the national and international
levels, but they also believed criminological theories should be able to explain why some
countries experience higher rates of crime than others. Noticing that the United States had
a higher rate of homicide than any other developed nation in the world, Messner and
Rosenfeld turned to the comparative sociological perspectives of the modernization
process (Heiland and Shelley, 1992) and the civilizing process (Elias, 2000; Gurr, 1989)
for guidance.18 Messner and Rosenfeld felt that both perspectives presented valid arguments,
but they ultimately lacked empirical support. As such, Messner and Rosenfeld next examined
comparative studies that considered elements of the modernization thesis
and the civilizing process, which include culture and social organization.19 They felt
the greatest value was added by comparative studies that focused on the role of culture
and values in explaining variations in both long-term and short-term crime rates, such
as studies conducted by Eisner (2008), Murdock (1957), and Etzioni (1961). This is
because, similar to the disorganization-control perspectives on crime, social institutions
had received the most attention in comparative sociology (e.g., Almond and Coleman,
18 Briefly recall: the modernization thesis noticed that as societies develop, or modernize, long-term
violent crime trends decrease significantly in comparison to less developed nations (Heiland and Shelley,
1992). The civilization perspective suggests that these long-term declines in violence among more
advanced nations are the result of a strengthening in institutional controls (both internal and external) and
in certain cultural values that condemn such behavior (Gurr, 1989).
19 Interestingly, Messner and Rosenfeld did not turn to Globalization Theory for guidance as Passas
(1999, 2000) did.
1960; Collver, 1963; Cutright, 1963; Scott, 2008), resulting in cultural elements
becoming lost in the minutiae. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) conceded that empirical
separation and measurement of these elements is difficult enough for researchers at the
national level, and the problem only compounds itself at the international comparative
level. Yet, the comparative context is necessary to derive meaning from crime-related
findings (Marshall and Summers, 2012). Thus, Messner and Rosenfeld felt strongly
that macro-level explanations of crime should consider both culture and social
institutions, placing them in the ever-important comparative context.
After fusing these historical influences and developments of key foundational
concepts (i.e., culture, Anomie, comparative sociology, social institutions, functionalism)
drawn from Parsons (1937; 1951; 1970), Merton (1938; 1968), and Durkheim
(962/1895), Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) introduced their new etiological theoretical
perspective known as Institutional Anomie Theory. This theory was designed to explain
macro-level crime rates by integrating aspects of society and social organization,
synthesizing historical assumptions and concepts from past noted scholars, while also
considering the related hybrid explanations of crime (e.g., cultural-learning).
The United States serves as the setting for Institutional Anomie Theory, due to the
high rates of serious crimes experienced in the country compared with other advanced,
developed nations.20 Therefore, Institutional Anomie largely discusses conditions in the
United States, but the theory in general is designed to explain conditions cross-nationally.
20 Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) emphasize that their theory operates best in developed nations due to the
combination of an economically oriented institutional balance and a culture that pressures society to succeed in
terms of pecuniary materialism, universalism, individualism, and achievement. Because of this, the authors
argue that transitioning nations, or countries in transition, are more likely to have different configurations and
therefore lower rates of serious crime. Thus, it is not necessary to consider these countries in comparative
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) first defined the elements of culture and social institutions
separately as they pertain to Institutional Anomie Theory. The relationship of these
elements in Institutional Anomie Theory is presented in Figure 3 below. Here, Messner
and Rosenfeld (2012) maintain continuity with MertonÕs Anomie Theory by implying
that Anomie is embedded within culture,21 and as Orru (1987) points out, may even be a
product of culture. Also in line with Merton (1938; 1968), Figure 3 illustrates that crime
and deviance occur when societyÕs central values and goal orientations (i.e., culture) are
malintegrated with institutionalized means for attaining these goals, and the prevailing
cultural structure deemphasizes legitimate means for attaining these highly valued goals.
Figure 3. Schematic Representation of Institutional Anomie Theory22
21 See also Passas (1997).
Institutional Anomie Theory considers the element of culture to be much
embedded in MertonÕs concept of the American Dream. ÒThe American Dream itself
exerts pressures toward crime by encouraging an anomic cultural environment, an
environment in which people are encouraged to adopt an Ôanything goesÕ mentality in
the pursuit of personal goalsÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 68). For Messner and
Rosenfeld (1994), the American Dream embodies Òa commitment to the goal of material
success, to be pursued by everyone in society, under conditions of open, individual
competitionÓ (69), and is composed of four values that serve to anchor this cultural
concept: achievement, individualism, universalism, and a fetishism of money.
ÒAchievementÓ is one concept the authors argue is most central to the American
culture. Each member of society is encouraged to succeed Òby any means necessary,Ó to
Òpull themselves up by their bootstrapsÓ and make something of themselves. This
success is, to a large extent, the defining measure of a personÕs value. ÒGiven such a
value orientation, the failure to achieve is readily equated with a failure to make any
meaningful contribution to society at largeÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 70).
Closely related to the idea of ÒachievementÓ is Òindividualism.Ó Rooted in
American history and culture is the drive for individual autonomy. The decentralized
nature of our governing bodies (e.g., state and local governments) reinforces the notion
of individualism and individual achievement. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) claimed that
this combination of ÒindividualismÓ and ÒachievementÓ ultimately Òexacerbates the
tendency towards anomieÓ (70). Survival of the fittest becomes the name of the game,
pitting members of society against each other in attempts to gain status and succeed.
Cultural values, such as ÒindividualismÓ and Òachievement,Ó are universally
emphasized and become the basis of individual social reform. This ÒuniversalismÓ of
success may be equally emphasized among community members, but Messner and
Rosenfeld (1994) pointed out that concepts of ÒfailureÓ are also universally inherent
in American society. Because cultural values are essentially universal, Òthe Anomic
pressures associated with an individualistic achievement orientation permeate the entire
social structureÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 71; Passas, 2000).
The fourth value that anchors the American Dream is the Òfetishism of money,Ó
later renamed Òpecuniary materialismÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012). This concept fits
in well with the other cultural values of Òindividualism,Ó Òachievement,Ó and
Òuniversalism,Ó as it is the tangible ÒthingÓ that binds the cultural values together.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) are quick to point out, however, that in emphasizing the
importance Americans place on monetary wealth is not to say Òthat Americans are uniquely
materialistic, for a strong interest in material well-being can be found in most societiesÓ
(71). Instead, monetary gain is simply held as the ÒmetricÓ or Òmeasuring rodÓ
of success in American society.23 This maintains continuity with Merton (1938), as
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) explain that Merton did not intend for his theory to
be about Òsimple economic deprivation, or povertyÓ (59), but rather it was designed
to illustrate how cultural elements can condition the impact of social structure on
crime. Monetary success is simply one of the principal cultural goals as prescribed
by the American Dream, and Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) agree.
23 This is related to Merton (1938) and PassasÕs (1997) concept of a comparative reference group, in
which the cultural values of this comparative reference group are used as a measuring-rod for others.
These four values of (American) culture (illustrated in Figure 3 above) combine
together to form the founding principles and Òdistinctive cultural ethosÓ of the American
Dream (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 71). In turn, the cultural environment that is created
based on these values and ethos becomes more conducive to criminal behavior as the
pressure to succeed in society increases. These elements of culture are particularly important
to Institutional Anomie Theory because, like Merton, the notion of Anomie itself is
embedded within the culture. When the pressure to succeed (as defined by high levels
achievement, individualism, universalism, and a fetishism of money) occurs with a
corresponding lack of legitimate (institutional) means to attain the culturally prescribed
goals, Messner and Rosenfeld (2012) conclude that the society is Anomic (88).24 In
line with Parsons (1951; Kroeber and Parsons, 1958) and other noted
sociologists (e.g., Marsh, 1967; Merton, 1938; Passas, 2000) culture composes only half
of the equation. For Messner and Rosenfeld (1994), the elements of the American
Dream embodied American culture, but social structure is as equally important to the
explanation of crime. As illustrated in Figure 3 above, Messner and Rosenfeld (2012)
expanded on MertonÕs concept of social structure, equating MertonÕs lack of legitimate
means to succeed with the institutional balance of power. ÒSocial institutions are the
building blocks of whole societiesÉ Institutions can be defined as Ôrelatively stable sets
24 This presents a potential fallacy in logic. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994; 1997; 2001; 2006; 2009; 2012) are
not clear on an explicit definition of ÒAnomie,Ó but do reference DurkheimÕs notion of Anomie as a state of
Òweakened norms,Ó and commonly reference the point that American society as defined by the American
Dream is Anomic. However, their model (see Figure 3) illustrates that a culture is considered highly anomic
when there is a strong desire to achieve, be individualistic, hold universal goals, and seek monetary rewards.
This would represent a set of cultural norms that are clearly defined and represent cultural imperatives that
members of society are driven towards, thus conflicting with DurkheimÕs conceptualization of
Ònormlessness.Ó It might be more useful to differentiate between comparative reference groups and normative
reference groups, as Passas (1997) suggested, but apply them to the national level to better understand cultural
Anomie. Thus, American (anomic) culture becomes the comparative group for other nations, but within its own
reference group the cultural aspects are normative.
of norms and values, statuses and roles, and groups and organizationsÕ that regulate
human conduct to meet the basic needs of a societyÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 72;
see also Kroeber and Parsons, 1958; Parsons, 1951). Moreover, Messner and Rosenfeld
(2012) explain that institutions are what allow a society to endure over time, and these
institutions are necessary for the individual and collective survival of the society. It is
the levels or configurations of institutional dependence that have Òprofound
implications for the motivation and control of human social behavior, including criminal
behaviorÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012: 75).
Based on ParsonsÕs (1951) development of the four functional imperatives present
in all societies (i.e., adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency), Institutional
Anomie Theory outlines three basic social needs around which societal institutions develop:
adaptation to the environment, mobilization and deployment of resources necessary for the
achievement of collective goals, and socialization of members to accept
societyÕs fundamental normative patterns (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994).25 The level of
each social need in a particular society will determine the strength of development in
certain institutions. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) identified four key institutions that
develop differentially based on these social needs (again, drawing from Parsonian
elements of the Action System): the economy, the polity, family, and education. Take, for
instance, the economic institution. In the United States, the economic institution strongly
supports the cultural values of the American Dream. Thus, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994)
claimed that adaptation to the environment is primarily responsible for the strong
development of this institution in the United States. The economic institution is
25 Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) diverge from Parsons here by restricting the social needs to three,
placing the legal realm (i.e., latency) composed of the criminal justice system within the political system
(i.e., integration).
reinforced by the emphasis on cultural goals of money and wealth (Merton, 1938; 1968;
Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012), therefore responding to the other basic social needs by
mobilizing and deploying economic resources necessary for the achievement of these
cultural goals and socializing members of society to accept the normative patterns of
capitalism. These economic resources include the basic human necessities of food,
clothing, shelter, but also include material possessions and other nonessential goods and
services/commodities. For Messner and Rosenfeld (1994), dominance of the economic
institution in societies is a key indicator of potential Òwidespread Anomie, weak social
controls, and ultimately, high levels of crimeÓ (68), and can be identified through the
devaluation of non-economic institutional functions and roles, the accommodation to
economic requirements by other institutions, and the penetration of economic norms into
other institutional domains. That is, societies characterized by economic institutional
dominance may find its members working late, consequentially missing their childÕs
soccer practice, regarding educational achievement as a means to attain a better job or
salary instead of valuing the acquisition of knowledge or learning for its own sake, or
their politicians may believe that government works best if it were run more like a
business (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994).
In countries with a different configuration of social needs and cultural goals than
highly developed nations like the United States, non-economic institutions become more
developed than the economic institution (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2006). For instance, in
societies with cultural goals other than economic prosperity, the political institution may
more strongly develop in order to meet the second basic social need of mobilizing and
deploying resources. Political institutions are designed to maintain public safety, and
therefore include all elements of the civil system and criminal justice system, such as the
police, court system, and correctional system (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). The polity
is often closely related to the economy, as illustrated by democratic politics and capitalist
economics, or socialist political agendas and communist economic principles (Passas,
1997). But, for Messner and Rosenfeld (2009), it depends on one institution driving the
other(s). In the United States, the cultural ethos of the American Dream coupled with the
superior strength of the economic institution result in the dominance of the economic
institution over the polity (i.e., capitalism is driving democratic politics).
In some cases, societies may place priority on socialization of its members to accept
societyÕs fundamental normative patterns. Here, the familial and educational institutions
become most developed. The familial institution acts on socializing societal members by
Òregulating sexual activityÓ and maintaining the society through reproduction (Messner
and Rosenfeld, 1994: 73). Other familial duties include physical care and nurturing of
children, Òsocializing children into the values, goals and beliefs of the dominant culture,Ó
and to Òserve as a refuge from the tensions and stresses generated in other institutional
domainsÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012: 75). The educational institution socializes its
members of society by transmitting basic cultural standards to new generations through
schooling, which develops individual human potential, but also advances Òthe general
Ôknowledge baseÕ of the cultureÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 73). This advancement
in the general knowledge base of societies has been shown to improve individual income
levels and serve as a Òprecondition for long-term economic growthÓ in transitioning
countries (IIASA, 2008: 1). In modern industrial societies, the
educational institution is also responsible for Òpreparing youth for the demands of
adult [occupational] rolesÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997: 66).
These four institutions create an institutional balance of power within each
existing society.26 Depending on the societyÕs basic social needs will in turn reflect the
differential development of the economy, polity, familial, and educational institutions.
Therefore, each society may vary in their distinctive configuration of their institutional
balance of power, but Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) explain it is when the economic
institution dominates over non-economic institutions the society is more likely to
experience high rates of crime. Moreover, while the primary activities of each institution
are fundamentally different, Òthe functioning of each institution has consequences for
the functioning of the othersÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 66). In other words, the
institutions should be considered interdependent, not independent of each other. This is
not to say that each institution will seamlessly coordinate and cooperate with the others;
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) acknowledge that conflict is created between institutions
based on the disparity in their fundamental cultural values. It is this interaction between
core cultural values leading to levels of Anomie and the unique institutional balance of
power that results in varying levels and types of crime between nations (Messner and
Rosenfeld, 2009).
Additionally, Messner and Rosenfeld (2006; 2009) theorized that if non-economic
institutions were valued equally or more so than the economy in a given society, serious
26 Messner and Rosenfeld (2012) are careful to note that the four institutions central to Institutional
Anomie Theory do not Òexhaust the institutional structure of modern societies, nor are they the only
institutions with relevance to crimeÓ (75). In fact, the authors offer religion and mass communications as
examples of other societal institutions that have been the focus for some criminologists. However, for
Institutional Anomie Theory, the economy, the polity, the family, and education are the only four
institutions relevant to having an ÒÔinstitutional understandingÕ of crimeÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld,
2012: 76).
crime rates would potentially decrease because the cultural values of the society would
produce more cohesion and social control. For instance, some developing countries may
place greater emphasis on family and educational institutions. In this situation, a strong
educational institution has been linked to improvements in economic conditions by past
research (Brinton, 2005; IIASA, 2008; Klasen, 2002). However, even with improvements in
economic conditions, the cultural values are still placed on the importance of education and
other non-economic institutions, using improved economic conditions as a means of survival
rather than tipping the institutional balance towards economic dominance.
Messner and Rosenfeld also focused their attention to the issue of types of crimes
that can be explained by Institutional Anomie Theory. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994)
proposed that their theory is best suited to explain what they consider to be Òserious
crimes,Ó and felt that criminologists had largely ignored this category of crime. They
sought to avoid presenting serious crimes as a false dichotomy with non-serious crimes
by defining them as Òviolations of criminal law involving significant bodily injury, the
threat of bodily injury, or, in the case of nonviolent offenses, significant economic harm
to victims, both individual and collectiveÓ (46) that fall along the Òserious endÓ of the
crime continuum. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) proposed looking at homicide and
robbery as two examples of serious crime.27 What perplexed Messner and Rosenfeld (1994)
about these particular crime-types was the fact that homicide and robbery rates in the United
States have been comparatively higher than any other developed nation. From a more
practical perspective, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) were also aware of problems inherent
with cross-national comparisons of crime rates. These problems include
27 This particular suggestion by Messner and Rosenfeld has resulted in criminologists only considering
these two crime-types in the vast majority of investigations of Institutional Anomie Theory.
recording practices and definitional differences between countries, as well as the
reliability of comparing cross-national data for a single year (Smit et al., 2012;
Spierenburg, 2012). In line with past research (e.g., LaFree and Drass, 2002), Messner
and Rosenfeld (1994) argued that homicide and to a lesser extent, robbery, enjoy a more
harmonious cross-national interpretation, thus making these data more reliable. While the
features of culture in developed capitalist nations are not uniquely experienced by any
particular society alone, the United States distinctly experiences an Òexaggerated
emphasisÓ on monetary success and an Òunrestrained receptivity to innovationÓ
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994: 76). This particular balance of culture and social
institutions, Messner and Rosenfeld argue, is what will ultimately lead to high rates of
homicide and robbery.
In sum, Messner and Rosenfeld synthesized major sociological concepts of
Anomie and social organization, largely drawn from sociological foundations in
Durkheim, Merton, and Parsons, into a new macro-level explanation for serious crime.
Institutional Anomie extends MertonÕs Strain with similar foundations in Merton (1938)
as Global Anomie (Passas, 1995; 1999; 2000), and draws from Durkheimian notions of
Anomie representing normlessness caused by unheeded cultural desires, requiring the
social structure to externally regulate society (Durkheim, 1962/1895). Equally
emphasizing both aspects of social organization, Institutional Anomie also adopts
Parsonian elements of Social Action that integrate functional imperatives with cultural
values and institutions comprising the social structure (Parsons, 1937; 1951; 1970;
1990). Finally, Messner and Rosenfeld frame Institutional Anomie and all its synthesized
elements in an international comparative context to explain variation in crime rates
between nations. This comparative perspective further allows Institutional Anomie to
address historical contexts to account for changes in levels of Anomie, culture, and
social institutions over time.
