Right of the Accused to Defence under the Malaysian Criminal Justice System
In Malaysia, the accused’s right to defence is protected and explained in several legal provisions.
The starting point of this discussion is by referring to Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, which
guarantees the right of a person to not be deprived of his life or liberty save in accordance with the
law. That is to say, even if a person has been accused of committing the crime of murder, he cannot
be punished straightaway without being subjected to legal process. The accused must go through the
criminal trial process which has been prescribed in the CPC. One of the rights availed to the accused
during the criminal trial process is the right to raise a relevant defence against the offence charged.
The right of the accused to raise the defence in a criminal trial is of great importance, and should be
safeguarded to ensure a fair trial. This was echoed by the Federal Court in Goi Ching Ang v. Public
Prosecutor [1999] 1 CLJ 829, p.855, where it was held that “Fairness requires fair trial which, in
turn, needs fair procedure. Fair process requires that the interests of both the prosecution and the
defence are adequately provided for.” This right is also consistent with Article 5(3) of the Federal
Constitution, which provides that an arrested person has the right to consult and be defended by a
legal practitioner of his choice. Although it is not expressly stated that the accused has the right to
raise a defence in court, this right infers that an accused can be defended by his lawyer through the
plea of any relevant defence or to make an application for plea bargaining or representation.
Also, such right is consistent with Article 8 of the Federal Constitution, which states
that: “… all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law
respectively.” This means that not only does the law provide the power to the Public Prosecutor
to conduct prosecutions and submit relevant evidence to prove the case against the accused, but
at the same time legal protection should also be given to the accused, allowing him to defend
himself effectively from the charge directed towards him. Therefore, the accused should be
treated equally before the law and accorded with legal protection in a criminal trial process. This
can be seen in Krishnan v. Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 292 where the Supreme Court
affirmed:
It is one of the most basic rules of justice that however heinous a crime a person is
accused of, whatever the rank of the person who testifies against him, he can only be
convicted on evidence produced according to the stringent requirements of the law….
But it does not mean that a person accused of one of the most serious crimes known to
our law is not entitled to equal protection before the law (p. 295).
This right is also further detailed in the CPC. The gist of Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution is
reaffirmed by section 255 of the CPC, which states: “Subject to any express provision of law to the
contrary, every person accused before any criminal Court may of right be defended by an
advocate.” Moreover, the CPC stresses the right of the accused to defend himself once the Public
Prosecutor has proven a prima facie case against him. Section 173(h)(i) of the CPC says that: “If the
Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence
charged, the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.”
4.3 Criminal Trial Process
It is important to briefly go over the criminal trial process in Malaysia to better understand how
criminal defence works. The Malaysian judiciary is based on the common law tradition and
adversarial system (Ibrahim & Nambiar, 2011). Malaysia adopts the adversarial system, which
was inherited as part of the legacy of British colonization. In the adversarial system, the
criminal trial involves the competing parties submitting their case and presenting their
arguments in the manner prescribed by the law. The parties to a criminal case are the Public
Prosecutor and the accused person. The criminal trial involves a process by which the Public
Prosecutor has to present evidence through its witnesses and documents to prove the guilt of the
accused person, and the accused will be allowed to defend the allegation against him. The
criminal trial is a contest between the state, which is represented by the Public Prosecutor and
the accused. This implies that there are two levels of a criminal trial, which are the prosecution
and the defence stages. At the prosecution stage, the burden of proof is placed on the
prosecution to prove its case against the accused. This is embedded in section 101 of the
Evidence Act 1950. This principle was applied in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 MLJ 263,
where the Court emphasised that the burden of proof of the accused lies with the Public
Prosecutor. The power to prosecute is exclusively vested in the Public Prosecutor as provided
for in Article 145 (3) of the Federal Constitution, and reiterated in section 376 (1) of the CPC,
where it reads: “The Attorney General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control
and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code.”
At the beginning of a trial, which is also known as the prosecution stage, the accused is
not required to prove his innocence. This principle is consistent with the presumption of
innocence, whereby the accused is presumed innocent unless proven otherwise. Only when the
Public Prosecutor succeeds in proving its case against the accused will the accused will be
called to enter upon his defence. At this stage, the Public Prosecutor has to prove a prima facie
case against the accused. This is stated in section 173(h)(i), where it connotes that: “If the Court
finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged, the
Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.”
The meaning of For the purpose of subparagraphs (i) and (ii), a prima facie case is made out against the
accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence, which if
unrebutted or unexplained, would warrant a conviction.
Prima facie means that all the elements or ingredients of the offence have been proven from the
credible evidence given by the prosecution witnesses and relevant documents tendered by the
prosecution. When all the elements of the offence have been proven, then the offence against the
accused has been established. The words “… unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a
conviction” indicate that after prima facie case has been established, the defence will then be called
to give an opportunity for the accused to rebut or to provide explanation. In light of section 173(ha)
(i) to (iii) of the CPC, when an accused person is called to enter upon his defence, he will be given
three options: to remain silent, to give sworn or unsworn evidence. Should he opt for the second and
third options, he may deny committing the offence or raise a defence to defend himself. But, if he
decides to remain silent, then the accused can be convicted. This principle was applied in the
Federal Court’s case of Ahmad Najib Aris v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 CLJ 800where in this case,
after considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the High Court found that the
prosecution had made out a prima facie case of rape and murder against the appellant, and called
upon him to enter upon his defence. However, the appellant chose to remain silent. Upon the
appellant choosing to remain silent, the trial judge convicted the appellant on the two charges made
against him and passed sentence accordingly. On this point, the Federal Court affirmed the High
Court’s decision and elaborated as follows:
… when the appellant chooses to remain silent, the court is put in a situation where it has
no other choice but to convict the appellant on both charges as the appellant had failed to
rebut the evidence adduced by prosecution’s witnesses (p. 836).
It means that the appellant’s failure to give evidence to raise defence or rebut the prosecution’s
case leaves the court with no choice but to convict him.
At the defence stage, the burden of proof lies on the accused to prove his defence. The
accused may call defence witnesses to substantiate his defence. This is consistent with the
wording of section 105 of the Evidence Act 1950 and illustrations (a) and (b). This principle
was confirmed in the case of Juraimi Husin v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 383, where the
court stated that: “… the burden of establishing the defence of insanity lay upon the first
accused” (p. 422). The standard of proof to prove the defence can be seen from the case of Goh
Yoke v. Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 MLJ 63, where the Federal Court held that the standard of
proof required from the accused person is similar to the burden which rests upon parties in civil
proceedings, which is on a balance of probabilities. The same principle was also applied the
Court of Appeal’s case of Syahmie Hassan v. Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 LNS 1074. There is
no mathematical formula given in the CPC to measure the standard of on a balance of
probabilities. Reference to the case of Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER, is
important, where Lord Denning explained the meaning of a balance of probabilities as the
following:
It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a
criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: ‘we think it more probable
than not’, the burden of proof is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not (p.
372).
It means that if a judge does not believe in the defence or unsure about the defence because the
probabilities of the defence are equal, then the accused will lose.
It is important to note that although during the defence stage the burden is on the
accused to prove his defence, it does not relieve the prosecution of its duty from cross-
examining the accused with a view to challenging the truth of his defence. Hence, throughout a
criminal trial (prosecution + defence), the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests on the
prosecution, and the standard of proof required is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This is
because the failure of the prosecution to cross-examine evidence given by the defence witness
including the accused will amount to acceptance, thus leaving doubt in the prosecution case.
This principle was applied in the High Court’s case of Public Prosecutor v. Ee Boon Keat
[2006] 2 MLJ 633, where Augustine Paul J ruled that: “As a matter of fact, the failure by the
prosecution to have effectively cross-examined DW2 would amount to an acceptance of her
testimony” (p. 635).
According to section 173 (m)(i) of the CPC, the court shall then consider all the evidence
adduced before it by both the prosecution and defence, and shall decide whether or not the
prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 173 (m)(ii) to (iii) of the
CPC, if the court finds that the prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, the court
shall find the accused guilty, and upon conviction the court shall pass sentence according to law. If
the court finds otherwise, the court shall record an order of acquittal.
REFERENCES
Allen, M. (2013). Textbook on criminal law (12th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Arslan,M. (2018). The right to examination of prosecution witnesses. Zeitschrift für
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 6(1), 218-228.
Bernard, T. J., Paoline III, E. A., & Pare, P. P. (2005). General systems theory and criminal
justice. Journal of Criminal Justice, 33(3), 203-211.
Bowden, P., Henning, T., & Plater, D. (2014). Balancing fairness to victims, society and
defendants in the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses: An impossible
triangulation? Melbourne University Law Review, 37(2), 539-584.
Cross, N. (2010). Criminal law and criminal justice. Sage.
Cruft, R. (2011). Crime, punishment, and responsibility: The jurisprudence of Antony Duff.
Oxford University Press.
Dignan, J., & Cavadino, M. (2007). The penal system: An introduction (3rd ed.). Sage
Publications.
Duff, R. A. (2007). Answering for crime: Responsibility and liability in the criminal law.
Hart Publishing.
Ferguson, G. (2015). Criminal liability and criminal defenses. In J. D. Wright (Ed.),
International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (2nd ed.) (pp. 219-
226). Springer.
Hall, J. (2008). General principles of criminal law (2nd ed.). The Lawbook Exchange Ltd.
Husak, D. N. (1989). Justifications and the criminal liability of accessories. The Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology, 80(2), 491-520.
Husak, D. N. (1992). The serial view of criminal law defenses. Criminal Law Forum, 3(3),
369-400.
Ibrahim, N., & Nambiar, R. M. K. (2011). There are many ways of skinning a cat, my lord:
Humor in the Malaysian adversarial courtroom. 3L: The Southeast Asian Journal of
English Language Studies, 17(2), 73-89.
Lanham, D., Wood, D., Bartal, B., & Evans, R. (2006). Criminal laws in Australia. The
Federation Press.
Leverick, F. (2006). Killing in self-defence. Oxford University Press.
Monaghan, N. (2016). Criminal law (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Pakes, F. (2010). Comparative criminal justice (2nd ed.). Willian Publishing.
Pham, T. T. N. (2016). Juvenile offenders in Vietnam and the right to defence. Youth
Justice, 16(1), 49-70.
Robinson, P. H. (1982). Criminal law defenses: A systematic analysis. Columbia Law
Review, 82(2), 199-291.
Sistare, C. T. (1989). Responsibility and criminal liability. Kluwer Academic Publisher.