Macro-level criminal phenomena

ORGANIZED CRIME

Macro-level criminal phenomena have captured the attention of criminologists

and comparative scholars alike, as they utilize sociological concepts embedded in social

organization to understand aggregate trends in crimes such as homicide (e.g., Maume

and Lee, 2003; Messner et al., 2011), property crimes (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran, 1995,

Cochran and Bjerregaard, 2011; FBI, 2012a), and street crimes (e.g., Sampson and

Groves, 1989). Homicide trends are one of the most common crime-types examined

cross-nationally, principally because of the likelihood of an incident being reported to

police (due to the seriousness of the offense), and the continuity of cross-national legal

definitions of ÒhomicideÓ (LaFree and Drass, 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994).

However, there is one macro-level crime-type that has struggled to receive the same level

of attention from criminologists: organized crime.

Organized crime is a complex, multifaceted concept that scholars have struggled

to define (Maltz, 1985), resulting in fragmented research and policies. Yet, within this

criminal phenomenon are embedded the same elements of social organization that may

prove crucial in understanding its larger, aggregate movements and patterns.

Criminologists have largely struggled to routinely apply theoretical guidance from socio-

culturally centered theories, yet have employed a range of other theoretical orientations

(i.e., economic theories of crime, Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activities Theory, and

Situational Crime Prevention) to the empirical context of organized crime.

Further, the impact of transnational crime has been felt on a global scale for decades

(Council of Europe, 2005; FBI, 2012b; OCTA, 2011; Passas, 1999; Plywaczewski and

Filipkowski, 2004; UNODC, 2010), but nations have not been able to

effectively combat this problem. Policies have been created by national and

international governing bodies, and a multitude of reports have been published

documenting descriptive accounts of organized crime activity and involvement in

various regions of the world. However, these policies have been mostly informed by the

economic based research of academics, which, in turn, has resulted in largely ineffective

legislation. This chapter details these and related complications, beginning first with

theoretical and definitional aspects related to transnational organized crime from the

academic perspective and from the legal perspective. Next, the chapter examines

geographic areas most affected by organized crime activity from a global perspective

before taking a particular focus on organized crime levels in Europe and Central and

Eastern Europe. Finally, this discussion concludes by addressing the current issues in

criminology that this research has address.

Theoretical and Definitional Aspects

Organized crime is Òclearly not an obscure or esoteric topicÓ (Finckenauer,

2005: 63); yet, basic definitional issues render this criminal phenomenon problematic

(Hagan, 1983; 2006; Levi, 2002; Small and Taylor, 2006). Currently there does not exist

a universal definition of Òorganized crimeÓ in either an international legal setting or an

academic one. This often results in unstructured research with underdeveloped theoretical

foundations. For instance, academic research tends to focus on aspects of organized crime

groups that may or may not match a countryÕs legal definition. These incongruities

speak to the complexity and diversity of the criminal phenomenon itself, leaving some

criminologists to liken Òorganized crimeÓ to a psychiatristÕs Rorschach inkblot because

Òone can read almost anything into itÓ (Levi, 2002: 887). Other scholars claim that

organized crime is best conceptualized as Òa phantom that can only be interpreted

through the use of metaphorsÓ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 356; see also Albanese,

2007; Paoli, 2002). In the early 1980s, researchers conducted content analyses on

criminological publications about organized crime and found Òa large number of

works, including textbooks, fail[ed] to offer a clear definitionÓ (Hagan, 1983: 52).

More recent research has shown the problem has not improved much (Albanese, 2007;

Hagan, 2006; Smart and Taylor, 2006).

The differences in definitional approaches have led to a fractured theoretical basis

for understanding Òorganized crime.Ó In other words, how scholars define organized

crime often relates directly to the theories they employ to explore the criminal

phenomenon or some aspect of it. This has led researchers to inconsistently seek

guidance from multiple criminological perspectives/paradigms. Additionally, the vast

majority of government reports, national and international legislation, and other official

documents are descriptive in nature and do not take advantage of theoretically informed

research provided by criminologists. This has resulted in largely enforcement-based

directives that are void of theoretical guidance and also have problems developing

consistent and conceptually whole definitions of Òorganized crime.Ó

The Academic Perspective

There continues to be an ongoing struggle to reach a consensus on what constitutes

Òorganized crimeÓ from the academic perspective (Hagan, 1983), which has led

researchers to attempt to explain the abstract criminal phenomenon through multiple

theoretical lenses. In the course of academic research, organized crime Òinconsistently

incorporates the following two notions: a) the provision of illegal goods and services; b) a

criminal organization, understood as a large-scale entity primarily engaged in illegal

activitiesÓ (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2006: 308; Paoli, 2002; 2008).

The first perspective identifies organized crime groups through their participation

in providing, manufacturing, and transporting illegal goods and services (Hobbs, 1994).

This has been a popular approach, with researchers surmising: ÒWhat is organized

crime without organizing some kind of criminal trade; without selling and buying of

forbidden goods and services in an organizational context? The answer is simply

nothingÓ (van Duyne, 1997: 203). Therefore, this point of view has led a large group of

criminologists and other social scientists to take an economic and Rational Choice

approach to both define and explain the development and trends in organized crime

activity at local, regional, national, and international levels. These theoretical paradigms

have Òdominated the field of [organized crime] study from the first building blocks of

academic literatureÓ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 356). Additionally, smaller group

of criminologists have examined both perspectives on organized crime (Paoli and

Fijnaut, 2006) by employing the same theoretical paradigms.

Political scientists, economists, and criminologists alike have long taken an

economic theoretical approach to crime (Allum and Sands, 2004; Arsovska and

Kostakos, 2008; Becker, 1968; Gambetta and Reuter, 1995; Naylor, 2002; Reuter, 1983;

Reuter and Haaga, 1989; Reuter and Rubinstein, 1978; Schelling, 1967; 1984; Sullivan,

1973), believing that organized crime trends, development, and activity can be explained

by better understanding how illegal criminal markets are organized and operate.

Economic models of criminal behavior have strong roots in utilitarian philosophy,42 using

this philosophy to predict human behavior Òby asserting that actorsÕ choices are

motivated by an expected utilityÓ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 356; Becker, 1968),

which translate into profits and economic gains. Indeed, Òorganized crime is often

conceptualized as a business enterprise formed by actors motivated by profitsÓ (Arsovska

and Kostakos, 2008: 352). Thus, economic theory:

É could help in identifying the incentives and limitations that apply to organized

crime, in evaluating the different kinds of costs and losses due to crime, in

restructuring laws and programs to minimize the costs, wastes, and injustices that

crime entails, and in restructuring the business environment in which organized

crime occurs with a view to reducing crime, or at least, its worst consequences.

(Schelling, 1967: 114)

This view separates the legitimate economy from the illegitimate, defining

organized crime as operating in the Òcriminal underworld.Ó Thus, Òother criminal

businesses, such as robbery, operate in the Ôorganized economyÕ but they do not meet the

definition of organized crimeÓ (Allum and Sands, 2004: 135; see also Arsovska and

Kostakos, 2008).43

The study found that the prices of drugs were not moving in the expected direction;

economic theory suggests that as demand rises, prices should also increase if there is not

an increase in supply. However, Reuter and Haaga (1989) found that cocaine prices were

falling significantly in some regional markets in the 1980s despite the increase in

popularity of the drug. In terms of the supply-side of the drug market controlled by

organized crime groups, which is targeted by law enforcement efforts, economic theory

suggests wholesale prices Òwill increase as a result of interdiction and targeted

enforcementÓ (Reuter and Haaga, 1989:

3). Yet, evidence again pointed to the contrary; the price of retail cocaine continued to

decline despite a large increase in drug enforcement efforts. This led the authors to shift

their attention from a simple, local or regional market analysis to the national level, while

also investigating the organizations themselves to uncover their structure, size, and nature

of the persons involved (Reuter and Haaga, 1989). The study found that the barriers to

entry into higher-level drug markets were minimal, successful operation did not require

the creation of a large or enduring organization, and the wholesale market appeared

national rather than regional. In other words, wholesale markets were not bound by their

particular local or regional locations, and instead were driven by an entrepreneurial

ambition at the national level.44

44 However, this set of findings is debated in the literature. For example, other research has suggested

that categories of organized crime activity are best studied at the sub-national level, because using global

assessments of organized crime activity (e.g., political bribes, human trafficking) are meaningful for

drawing attention to the problem, but are not useful for actually studying or combating the problem

(Albanese, 2008).

The economic theoretical perspective has proven helpful in providing a

framework for understanding these inner workings of illicit market operations,

hierarchical structures, and rational (cost-benefit) motivations of organized crime

(Becker, 1968; Reuter and Haaga, 1989; Schelling, 1967; 1984), but the overall

perspective has faced a barrage of criticism from criminology (Clarke and Felson, 1993).

Clarke (1997: 9) points out four main criticisms of economic theories of crime:

(i) economic models mostly ignore rewards of crime that cannot easily be

translated into cash equivalents; (ii) economic theories have not been sensitive to

the great variety of behaviors falling under the general label of crime, with their

variety of costs and benefits, and instead have tended to lump them together as a

single variable in their equations; (iii) the formal mathematical modeling of

criminal choices in economic theories often demands data that are unavailable or

can only be pressed into service by making unrealistic assumptions about what

they represent; and, finally, (iv) the image in economic theory of the self-

maximizing decision maker, carefully calculating his or her advantage, does not

fit the opportunistic and reckless nature of much crime.

These criticisms have led criminologists to, in some cases, modify this perspective in

varying degrees, not fully rejecting the underlying assumptions of economic theory.

Indeed, rational, economic notions have become the fundamental basis for an entire

school of thought in criminology (i.e., the Rational Choice perspective). In other cases,

criminologists have fully rejected the rational philosophy of economic theories of crime,

turning instead to different theoretical orientations.

Criminologists that have accepted some underlying economic philosophies have

since expanded on SchellingÕs (1967; 1984) definition of organized crime to include

those crime groups that operate in the both licit and illicit markets (Braithwaite, 1989;

Chambliss, 1988; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Reiss and Biderman, 1980; Shover and

Hochstetler, 2002), and have applied economically oriented criminological theories to

this expanded conceptualization of organized crime. Theories including Rational Choice

Theory, Routine Activities Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention, adopt similar

assumptions to the economic approach and have been utilized by criminologists as

theoretical frameworks from which to study the decision-making process of organized

crime syndicates.

Rational Choice Theory Òis the mainstay of economics and has been applied

widely in sociologyÓ (Clarke and Cornish, 2001: 23), and assumes that people or groups

will rationally choose to engage in crime because Òof the benefits it brings to the

offenderÓ (Clarke and Cornish, 2001: 23). In other words, the Rational Choice paradigm

considers criminals and people in general to be hedonistic in their decision-making.

Similar to economic theory, Rational Choice Theory assumes that Òcriminal activities

are rational alternatives to legitimate activities, undertaken by actors motivated by

expected economic gainsÓ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 357). This theory believes

that most criminal acts involve some element of planning (if even for a moment) and

foresight, seeking to explain not only crime, but also criminality (Clarke and Cornish,

1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; 2003; Pratt, 2008). The immediate influences of

situational variables trigger the actual decision of whether or not to commit a particular

crime, which is termed the Òsubjective expected utilityÓ (Paternoster and Simpson,

1996: 553). If the influence of situational variables poses too great a consequence for the

would-be criminal without reaping enough benefit from commission of the act, Rational

Choice Theory predicts the individual will be deterred from engaging in the criminal act.

Some criminologists have employed this Rational Choice framework to better

understand the decision to engage in illicit arms trafficking by organized crime groups in

the Balkans (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008). Noting the fight against illegal arms

trafficking remains a low priority at a European level, Arsovska and Kostakos (2008)

investigate this criminal phenomenon through the lenses of both economic theory and

Rational Choice Theory. Both theories are employed for guidance in whether the Òrule of

supply and demandÉcan be applied in the case of arms traffickingÓ and whether the Rational

Choice approach is Òthe appropriate method to combat this phenomenonÓ (354). Following

Rational Choice ÒprotocolÓ (Mouzelis, 1995), the authors began by developing a basic

framework that accounts for legal market forces in the Balkans, the assumed specific needs

of organized crime (e.g., physical and material resources), and the potential situational factors

that may influence the organizationÕs decision-making (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008;

Clarke and Cornish, 2001). Assuming the goals of the organizations are to maximize profit

and economic gain, Arsovska and Kostakos (2008) made basic predictions regarding the

dynamics of the illicit arms trafficking market in the Balkans. The authors found that

economic conditions were favorable for organized crime to become increasingly involved in

this illicit market, yet they also uncovered evidence that is contrary to market rationality.

Arsovska and Kostakos (2008) found that the decision to engage in illegal arms trafficking

was not always solely profit-driven, and was at times more strongly influenced by the

Òpolitical, historical, and socio-cultural contextÓ of the various groups (370). This stands in

contrast to the traditional assumptions of Rational Choice Theory, which traditionally did not

consider bounded or limited aspects

of rationality45 (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008). The authors concluded that it is important

45 Bounded rationality is situationally based, and takes into account variations in perceptions about the

probable consequences of a particular behavior. ÒThis is to say that criminal decision making is inevitably

less than perfect, because it reflects imperfect conditions under which it naturally occursÉ Offenders are

rarely in possession of all the necessary facts about costs and benefits (the risks, efforts, and rewards)Ó of

crime (Clarke and Cornish, 2001: 25). Thus, offenders are said to be ÒboundedÓ or limited in their ability

to make a ÒrationalÓ decision.

to consider ÒrationalityÓ in terms of the cultural context and the existing social

structures when Òtrying to understand how [criminal organizations] make decisions and

formulate goalsÓ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 376).

Two other criminological perspectives, Routine Activities Theory and

Situational Crime Prevention, follow similar assumptions as Rational Choice Theory.

These perspectives also assume for rational actors who will make calculated cost-benefit

decisions to engage in crime based on situational factors (Clarke, 1997; Cohen and

Felson, 1979; 1993; Felson, 2001). However, Routine Activities Theory shifts the focus

from the offender (i.e., the individual making the rational decision to engage in crime) to

the target,46 and from illegal intentions to the ability to carry out the criminal act (Cohen

and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2001). Therefore, Routine Activities Theory examines

Òchanges in larger society that might provide crime opportunityÓ (Felson, 2001: 43).

Similarly, the Situational Crime Prevention approach borrows from both Routine

Activities and Rational Choice theories, focusing largely on methods of reducing criminal

opportunities (Clarke, 1997; Clarke and Felson, 1993). Situational Crime Prevention and

Routine Activities Theory are often employed together by criminologists, as these

perspectives demonstrate how to Òidentify circumstances which facilitate crime as well

as viable opportunity-reducing measuresÓ (Kleemans, et al., 2012: 87). By altering the

physical environment, Situational Crime Prevention Òseeks to forestall the occurrence of

crime, rather than to detect and sanction offendersÓ (Clarke, 1997: 2).

In past decades, criminologists have begun applying the Situational Crime

Prevention and Routine Activities frameworks to the study of organized crime, with the

46 Felson (2001) notes ÒUsing the impersonal word target rather than victim emphasizes the physical

nature of each criminal actÓ (43).

specific purpose of preventing crimes committed by organized syndicates (Bullock et al.,

2010; Kleemans, et al., 2010; 2012; Levi and Maguire, 2004; Von Lampe, 2011). These

situational analyses are crime specific, meaning they are Ònot focused upon organized

crime in general, yet [they] concentrate on, for example, cocaine smuggling or preferably

even more specific activities or eventsÓ (Kleemans, et al., 2012: 88). For instance, some

criminologists have focused on removing excuses for organized crime involvement in

money laundering and other transnational crimes (Bullock, et al., 2010; Soudijn, 2012).

More specifically, Soudijn (2012) targeted financial specialists that have Òexpertise and

unique capabilitiesÓ (146) within organized crime groups that facilitate the laundering of

illegally obtained money. Soudijn (2012) outlined cases of rule-setting in relation to

money laundering by organized crime, to include a duty to report wire transfers

exceeding a set amount, legislative bans, and targeted law enforcement operations against

instances of money laundering. These create ÒguardiansÓ under Routine Activities

Theory, but Soudjin (2012) noted situational rule-setting needed to be supplemented with

other situational prevention techniques. These other techniques were identified as alerting

the conscience (ensuring that financial facilitators in organized crime groups change their

mind before laundering illegal proceeds by increasing communication between bank

employees and management), controlling disinhibitors (controlling all specific aspects of

money laundering, such as ceasing to print 500 Euro bills), and assisting compliance

(making it easier for financial facilitators of organized crime groups to leave the criminal

underworld, such as allowing them to become informants) (Soudjin, 2012).

Also from the Situational Crime Prevention perspective, Rengelink (2012)

analyzed a unique type of organized crime in the form of Somali pirating, proposing

preventative and alternative measures to make it Òunattractive for [pirates] to attack passing

shipsÓ (180). Citing the ineffectiveness of the Somali government due to internal conflict,

Rengelink (2012) details other forms of guardianship and Situational Crime

Prevention techniques necessary to prevent future attacks.47

Additionally, Kleemans et al. (2010) explored opportunities for situational crime

prevention in the Netherlands of four specific transnational organized crime activities:

ecstasy trafficking, cocaine trafficking, money laundering, and human smuggling. Each

crime-type exhibited aspects of mobility and transportation, either coming into or

exiting the country. These authors believed through employing situational crime

prevention techniques to tackle the aspects of mobility and transit, they could prevent

organized crime from partaking in these illegal activities (Kleemans, et al., 2010).

Situational Crime Prevention and Routine Activities Theory have proven

popular theoretical frameworks for criminologists studying organized crime. However,

these measures are limited in scope, applying only to organized crime activity under

specific circumstances. Moreover, these rationally based perspectives do not consider

the Òother so-called ÔirrationalÕ and holistic sociocultural explanationsÓ of crime

(Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008: 356), thus leaving some criminologists to seek guidance

from other schools of criminological thought.

Criminologists wary of the Rational Choice paradigm noticed that Òorganized

crimeÓ was not always as rationally organized as commonly assumed, and groups were

47 These measures include creating fortified Ôsafe roomsÕ in ships designed for the captain and crew

to retreat to during an attack. The crew would be able to cut the engines and send alarm signals to nearby

vessels, thus reducing the ÒattractivenessÓ or ÒsuitabilityÓ of the target for piracy (Kleemans, et al.,

2012; Rengelink, 2012).

often more opportunistic than business-like (Barlow, 1981; Passas, 2003). Research was

uncovering varying degrees of organization between and within organized crime groups:

While some crime families or syndicates exhibit many of the elements found

in highly rationalized bureaucratic structuresÉ others do notÉ To exclude these

loosely organized groups from discussions of organized crime is to ignore an

important facet of organized crime. (Barlow, 1981: 253)

Some criminologists also criticized the Rational Choice perspective for the

Òdisturbing biasÓ of focusing solely on the behavior of individuals or groups of

individuals (Gross, 1978: 55; Braithwaite, 1989), thus excluding any potential macro-

level influences on organized criminal groups.

As such, a much smaller group of criminologists have employed other theoretical

perspectives to investigate the multiple facets of organized crime. Conceptualizing and

defining organized crime in more macro-level terms has led researchers to notice, Òthe

individuals, structures, and events associated with organized crime do not exist in a social

vacuumÓ (von Lampe, 2005: 85). This observation has led a smaller group of

criminologists to attempt to account for socio-cultural factors associated with organized

crime. One such faction has investigated organized crime through the lens of

Globalization Theory.

The study of globalization48 focuses on Ònot only the intensity of transnational

connections, but also the paradoxes, unevenness, concrete modalities, and

disconnectionsÓ (Aas, 2007: 13) of global transformations and structural inequalities

(Passas, 2000). Global interconnections are viewed as cultural processes (Robertson,

48 Globalization is defined as Òthe growing interconnectedness of states and societies and the

progressive enmeshment of human communities with each otherÓ (Held, 2000: 42).

1995) and institutional processes that examine economic and political ÒglocalÓ49

expansions and contractions (Aas, 2007; Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 2004; Held and

McGrew, 2003; Naim, 2006; Passas, 2000). Aas (2007) examined macro-level transnational

organized crime that takes multiple forms, to include terrorism and drug trafficking

organizations, in the context of Òthe dark side of globalizationÓ (102). That is, as global

connectivity increases, Òthe emerging world of global networks and flows are creating new

challenges for the national, local and international authoritiesÓ (Aas, 2007:

102),50 because transnational organized crime groups have taken increasing advantage of

these new connections and rapidly expanding illicit markets. Scholars of Globalization

Theory have also noted that national and local organized crime groups Òhave gone

through a process of internationalizationÓ that resemble business networks (Aas, 2007:

123; Castells, 2000). These groups are now able to connect with criminal groups in low-

risk locations Òwhere they have relative control of the institutional environmentÓ

(Castells, 2000: 171) and establish international networks for the production,

management, financing and distribution of their illicit products and services. Moreover,

scholars have argued that globalization has caused previously formal, rigid hierarchies of

criminal organizations to transform into many Òsmaller, more flexible groups or

ÔnetworksÕÓ (UNODC, 2010: 28). Overall, Globalization Theory has aided

criminologists in describing the (global) conditions that facilitate the development and

movement of organized crime involvement in cross-border illicit activities.

49 Glocalization is a term used to describe the intertwining of the global and the local that Òcannot be

treated as two distinct entities: they are a new synthesis, involving both transnational and local

elementsÓ (Aas, 2007: 6; Robertson, 1995).

50 Passas (2000) has termed this Òdysnomie.Ó

Aside from this theoretical application, few other criminological theories that are not

economically based have been applied to an empirical study of organized crime. This

conversation has largely been restricted to undergraduate textbooks that briefly summarize a

handful of criminological theories the books suggest may be helpful to understanding this

criminal phenomenon. For instance, Mallory (2012) briefly outlines ÒDurkheim and

MertonÕs Anomie Theory and AnomieÓ in a few short paragraphs, likening organized

crime group members to MertonÕs (1938) conception of Òinnovators.Ó Organized crime

groups are seen as seizing every legitimate and illegitimate opportunity to gain material

wealth with little regard for societal norms. Within the same discussion,

concepts of subcultures and culture conflict51 are introduced to suggest that the

phenomenon of organized crime might be a result of ethnic clashes in relation to

blocked legitimate opportunities to achieve goals, thus creating pockets of organized

ÒsubculturalÓ groups (Mallory, 2012). Often, similar discussions draw from MertonÕs

emphasis on universal goals of material wealth and economic success, thus leading

most discussions back towards economic theories of crime (Abadinsky, 2010).

Following an extensive search of existing literature, no academic studies were

uncovered that applied MertonÕs Anomie Theory to the problem of organized crime.

Moreover, these brief theoretical summaries fail to elaborate on newer extensions

of MertonÕs Anomie Theory, such as Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner and

Rosenfeld, 1994) and Global Anomie Theory (Passas, 2000), which may have more to

offer the study of organized crime than MertonÕs original conception. For instance,

Institutional Anomie frames elements of social organization, in line with MertonÕs

51 Culture conflict describes situations in which Òcrime is the result of different cultures having

different norms about what to believe or valueÓ (Mallory, 2012: 38).

Anomie Theory, into a macro-level framework to explain shifts in serious forms of

crime (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). In terms of organized crime, this theory might

shed light on the various institutional and Anomic pressures guiding organized crime

development and involvement at the national and international levels.

The handful of studies that have employed other criminological theories as

frameworks have been successful in their endeavors. For example, Kleemans and de Poot

(2008) applied developmental and Life-Course criminological frameworks to better

understand the development of criminal careers of organized crime members prosecuted

in the Netherlands. Braithwaite (1989) applied an integrated theoretical model to the

study of organizational crime.52 The model

É consider[ed] the insights of strain theories on the distribution of legitimate and

illegitimate opportunities, of labeling theory on the way stigmatization can foster

criminal subcultural formation, of subcultural theory as applied to organized

business subcultures of resistance to regulation, and of control theory.

(Braithwaite, 1989: 333).

Finally, Shover and Hochstetler (2002) drew from Neutralization theory (Sykes

and Matza, 1957) and organizational cultural theory to investigate techniques of

neutralization within organizational crime.

This discussion illustrates that the vast majority of academic research on

organized crime has been limited in theoretical applications. Criminologists have largely

conducted descriptive studies of organized crime, either conducting case studies of

particular ethnic or ÒMafiaÓ group(s) (Albini , 1971; Arlacchi, 1988; Catanazaro, 1988;

Dorn, et al., 2005; La Spina, 2008; Paoli, 2003; 2008), describing the characteristics of

and differences in hierarchical structures and levels of organization (Becucci, 2008;

52 Organizational crime is defined as Òcrime perpetrated by organizations or by individuals acting on

Hagan, 1983; Smith, 1975; 1978), document law enforcement and legal approaches to

combating organized crime (Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012), or trying to define

what really constitutes Òorganized crimeÓ (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004; Finckenauer, 2005,

Hagan, 1983; 2006; Passas, 2003; Small and Taylor, 2006; von Lampe, 2012).53 Without

question these publications are both necessary and useful for understanding specific

details of particular organized crime groups and for building a general concept of

Òorganized crime.Ó Yet, the gap in literature utilizing other theoretical orientations from

criminology is quite substantial, thus creating fertile ground for criminologists to seek

guidance from other theoretical perspectives that can inform researchers on socio-

cultural elements of societies and social organization that may impact organized crime

(Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012). Doing so will advance a more dynamic and

conceptually whole theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of organized crime.

The Legal Perspective

Despite a plethora of definitional issues, national and international councils across

the globe have recognized Òorganized crimeÓ in its many forms as one of the most

pressing threats to global communities (Council of Europe, 2005; FBI, 2012b). The

Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2011) noted that organized crime Òis changing and

becoming increasingly diverse in its methods, group structure, and impact on society,Ó

warning that Òa new criminal landscape is emergingÓ (8). However, governments have

struggled between viewing and thus defining organized crime as Òmulti-crime groups of

professional criminals, [or as illegal activities] on illicit marketsÓ (UNODC, 2010). The

latter are classified as mala prohibita, with governments generally focusing enforcement

53 Moreover, in a recently published edited volume on international organized crime (i.e., Siegel and

Nelen, 2008), all fifteen chapters were void of criminological theory.

efforts on curbing drug trafficking, human trafficking, fraud, cigarette smuggling,

counterfeiting, weapons trafficking, organized property crime, cyber crime, money

laundering, and environmental crime (Council of Europe, 2005; OCTA, 2011). The

former has resulted in the formation of common stereotypes in North America and

Europe, largely because the concept is often seen as synonymous with the also

ambiguous ÒMafiaÓ (Hagan, 2006; FBI, 2012b; Paoli and Fijnaut, 2006; Peak, 2012).

From this perspective, organized crime is generally pictured and often romanticized

by the media as the Russian mafia (Finckenauer and Waring, 1998; Varese, 1994), the

Italian mob, or even Columbian and Mexican drug cartels (Finckenauer, 2005). For

instance, the legal definition of Òorganized crimeÓ in America first developed in the

1920s with the rise of criminal groups in Chicago (Landesco, 1968/1929), and throughout

the mid-1900s U.S. legislative bodies defined organized crime activity with an Italian

Mafia-centered view (Blok, 2008; Hagan, 2006; Paoli and Fijnaut, 2006). That is,

Òorganized crimeÓ meant a Òcentralized criminal organizationÉ allegedly derived from

an analogous parallel Sicilian organization and was headed by andÉ consisted of migrants

of Italian (and specifically Sicilian) originÓ (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2006: 309). Since the

1970s-1980s, however, the political atmosphere shifted towards defining organized crime

in terms of illegal activities.

European government officials and law enforcement agencies have closely

monitored both aspects of organized crime within its borders, though the United Nations

Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2010) suggested that Òmost of the attention has

been given toÉ addressing transnational organized crime groupsÓ (v; for instance,

Council of Europe, 2000). Instead, the UNODC (2010: v) proposed shifting the

attention to illicit activities:

Most organized crime problems today seem to be less a matter of a group of

individuals who are involved in a range of illicit activities, and more a matter of a

group of illicit activities in which some individuals and groups are presently

involved: strategies aimed at the groups will not stop the illicit activities if the

dynamics of the market remain unaddressed.

These varying legal definitions and foci differentially impact law enforcement

responses to combating organized crime. That is, should law enforcement focus on

reducing the supply of illegal goods and services provided by organized crime groups,

or should their efforts focus more on arresting and removing specific organized crime

groups? The European Union Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2011), which Òis

the basis for the identification of EU crime prioritiesÓ (7), has suggested a more holistic

approach. The report details three perspectives on organized crime: criminal

commodities, criminal groups, and their geographic areas of operation (OCTA, 2011: 7).

This report has identified five Òcriminal hubs,Ó or hotspots, in the European Union that

vary in intensity depending on the criminal activity in question. This intelligence is

designed to aid countries in or close to the criminal hubs in targeting the illegal activities

and the groups involved in each geographical location.

How each governing body approaches and defines organized crime within their

borders has dictated subsequent legislature formation and law enforcement responses

(EICPC, 1998). The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with

the U.N. (EICPC, 1998), noted that for the large part, the countries that have refined

their legislation specific to organized crime were those most seriously threatened by its

presence. One such example is the United States. In the United States under the Mafia-

centered definitions of the mid-1900s, popular law enforcement initiatives included the

expanded use of wiretaps and confidential informants54 to target specific organized crime

groups (Peak, 2012). As the country shifted away from viewing organized crime as Mafia

groups, new legislation designed to curb organized crime activities emerged. One such set of

legislation, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, became known as Òthe single most

effective piece of legislation ever passedÓ (Hagan, 1983: 55), mostly because of a provision

known as RICO, or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (18 USCA

¤ 1961). This complex provision prohibits the proceeds from Òpatterns of racketeeringÓ55

to be used to either obtain or maintain an illegitimate business through illegal activity, or

from using these illegal proceeds to maintain a legitimate business or enterprise (Hagan,

1983; Jacobs, 2008). The RICO provision also made it a Òseparate and serious federal crime

to conspire toÓ maintain or acquire an illegitimate or legitimate business or enterprise

(Jacobs, 2008: 187). Those prosecuted under RICO face Òvery heavy prison termsÓ if

found criminally liable, and face the possibility of civil lawsuits by RICO victims for

compensation (Jacobs, 2008: 186). Further, RICO broadened the legal definition of

Òorganized crimeÓ to include political corruption and white-collar crime, which in turn

expanded the scope of law enforcement involvement. RICO has proven so successful

because Òit was designed to take racketeers out of businessÓ (Mitchell, 1981:

54 A confidential informant is an individual who provides the police with intelligence information

and/or evidence about a particular crime in exchange for some form of compensation (e.g., money,

prosecutorial immunity). In this case, informants were typically relatives of older Mafia group members

who would provide information to the police in exchange for prosecutorial immunity and witness

protection (Peak, 2012).

55 ÒRacketeeringÓ constitutes over twenty-five crimes defined in 18 USCA ¤ 1961, Title 18 of US Code, and

Title 29 of US Code, including bribery, extortion, fraud offenses, gambling, money laundering, murder for hire,

and sexual exploitation of children. To be charged under RICO, an offender must commit any two of the listed

racketeering crimes in a ten-year period, thus establishing a Òpattern of racketeering.Ó

41); meaning, it was designed to remove all forms of organized crime from

both legitimate and illegitimate markets.

A second notable example is Italian legislation. In 1982, Italy enacted a series of

laws designed to combat organized crime that mirrored aspects of the U.S. Organized

Crime Control Act of 1970. For instance, the 1982 Act in Italy created the new offense of

Òparticipation in organized criminal associations,Ó in which it became a crime to

conspire with known organized crime syndicates (EICPC, 1998: 132). These Òcriminal

associationsÓ were defined as embodying three types: common associated crime, drug

trafficking associated crime, and mafia-type associated crime. Under Italian criminal

code Article 416bis:

An association is mafia-type when its members systematically exploit a situation

of environmental intimidation and the widespread condition of duress deriving

therefrom, not only in order to commit crimes but also to acquire control of

economic activities, or at any rate to gain unlawful advantages. (EICPC, 1998:

132-133)

Both the controversy and the effectiveness of the 1982 Act has come from the stipulation

that Òeach specific crime committed within the association is to be punished separatelyÓ

(EICPC, 1998: 133). For instance, a mafia-type association commonly includes drug

trafficking associations. In this case, both association incriminations will be considered

separate criminal charges each carrying harsh imprisonment requirements.56 The

controversy is embedded in the assumption of the Òmembership of an organized crime

associationÓ provision, in which it is assumed that Òthe members of criminal organizations

commit crimes,Ó thus allowing courts to Òconvict a person upon sole proof of his/her

membership of a certain type of organizationÓ (EICPC, 1998: 133). However,

56 Penalties for each association are as follows: Ò a minimum of four yearsÕ imprisonment, which in

particularly aggravating circumstances is increased to fifteen years for ordinary members and twenty-

two years for bosses and managersÓ (EICPC, 1998).

the success of this 1982 Act in Italy has come from the countless trials, convictions, and

sentencing of top-ranked mafia leaders.

Countries that have not experienced high levels of organized crime involvement have

been hesitant to follow the harshness and specificity of U.S. and Italian legislation,

Òconvinced that the category of Ôconspiracy crimeÕ suffices to deal with new types of

organized crimeÓ (EICPC, 1998: 136). Thus, these countries have developed legislation

based on their perception of organized crime. For example, Germany provides a legal

standard for determining when a criminal group can be identified as Òorganized crime,Ó

which focuses largely on business crime (BKA, 2010). Yet, German law does not consider

Òorganized crimeÓ to be a punishable offense (BKA, 2012). Canadian Criminal Code C-24

has criminalized Òparticipation in activities of a criminal organization,Ó which had to be

composed of three or more persons for the purpose of engaging in multiple illegal activities

designed to gain material or financial wealth (Skinnider, 2006). Article 210 of the

Argentinean criminal code stipulates that organized crime groups must consist of three or

more people forming an association created for the purpose of committing crimes

(INTERPOL, 2012), but the law does not specify which crimes are necessary. Similarly,

under Hungarian Criminal Code Section 98, any person Òwho has knowingly committed a

criminal act in affiliation with organized crimeÉ shall be subject to double the punishment

specified for the crime in questionÓ (BTK, 2005: 24), but again the law does not specify any

particular crime. These examples illustrate the broad nature of what Òorganized crimeÓ can

legally constitute, the lack of specificity in the wording of legal statutes, and the variation in

viewing Òorganized crimeÓ as a punishable offense.

To overcome these fragmented definitional and legal gaps between countries,

international governing bodies and regional organizations, including the Organization of

American States (OAS), the European Union, INTERPOL, the Council of Europe, and

UNODC, have joined forces in addressing the transnational nature of organized crime.

These international organizations have devised numerous treaties outlining policies and

protocols, setting Òbasic minimum standards for countries which are able to contribute to

the global effort to control organized crimeÓ (Skinnider, 2006: 5). The Òmain

international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crimeÓ is the United

Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, which was adopted by the

General Assembly resolution 55/25 in November 2000 (UNODC, 2012b).

States that ratify this instrument commit themselves to taking a series of measures

against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal

offences (participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering,

corruption and obstruction of justice); the adoption of new and sweeping

frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement

cooperation; and the promotion of training and technical assistance for building or

upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities. (UNODC, 2012b)

This Convention provides detailed definitions of ambiguous terms related to organized

crime, such as Òorganized criminal group,Ó Òserious crime,Ó Òproceeds of crime,Ó and

Òparticipation in an organized criminal groupÓ (UN Convention, 2004). In ratifying this

Convention, each U.N. Member State agrees to adopt compatible legislature as needed to

establish criminal offences outlined and defined in the Convention. These include

criminalizing the laundering of proceeds gained from organized criminal activities and

criminalizing corruption (UN Convention, 2004). Importantly, the Convention Against

Transnational Organised Crime emphasizes international cooperation between Member

States. In other words, once ratified, the Member States agree to share any intelligence

gathered in a timely manner, share jurisdiction in the event of seized property or

currency, provide mutual legal assistance, and provide extradition of any organized crime

group members upon request (UN Convention, 2004). Each element of this Convention is

designed to create a unified starting point for all of the ratified Member States in terms of

definitions, legislations, and cooperation in the battle against transnational organized

crime.

In 2006, the Organization of American States (OAS)57 adopted the Hemispheric

Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime, which directly promoted the U.N.

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The four objectives of the Plan of

Action are to:

1) Prevent and combat transnational organized crime in full observance of human

rightsÉ in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial

integrity of states and of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states;

2) Enhance cooperation in the areas of prevention, investigation, and

prosecution of, and judicial decisions related to, transnational organized crime;

3) Encourage coordination among OAS bodiesÉand cooperation among those

bodies with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); and

4) Strengthen national, sub-regional, and regional capacities and capabilities to

deal with transitional organized crime. (OAS, 2006)

The OAS Plan of Action lays out similar stipulations to the U.N. Convention in terms of

jurisdiction, information sharing, funding, and adopting effective domestic criminal

sanctions (OAS, 2006). The purpose in creating this separate Plan of Action was to reach

out to countries that are not members of the U.N. and encourage them to join the

international collaboration against transnational organized crime by ensuring their

57 There are 35 Member States of the OAS: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize,

Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica (Commonwealth of), Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,

Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the

Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas (Commonwealth of), Trinidad and Tobago, United States of

America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

policies and training are modernized, but also to ensure countries requiring help combating

corruption in relation to organized crime are able to receive the necessary aid.

Other collaborative efforts have been made by regional organizations such as the

Council of the European Union, and have devised similar initiatives to address more

specific aspects surrounding transnational organized crime. These include the Internal

Security Strategy (ISS) of the European Union and the Stockholm Programme, Òa plan

of the EUÕs activities for the years 2010-2014, intended to promote the growth of the

area of freedom, security, and justiceÓ (Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012: 3). These

strategies were part of a larger collaborative initiative by the Council of Europe to devise

a multidisciplinary approach to combating organized crime that emphasized identifying

members of organized crime enterprises through Passenger Name Records systems,

confiscate all criminal assets, and establish a cybercrime center by 2013, operated by the

European Union (European Commission, 2010; Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012).

These international proposals of cooperation,58 along with individual national

initiatives, have established the shared consternation of the threat of transnational organized

crime among the global community. Indeed, these treaties, conventions, and national policies

largely reflect a focus (of varying degree) on the members of organized crime groups, as well

as the illicit activities of the groups. However, considering membership in an organized

crime group alone does not constitute a crime in a number of countries (e.g., Germany),

recent criminal statutes largely emphasize the illicit activities

58 Among countless others, including: UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), amended by

its 1972 protocol; UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); United Nations Convention

against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); Inter-American Convention

against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other

Related Materials (CIFTA); United Nations Convention against Corruption; Inter-American Convention

against Corruption; and Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

of these groups (OCTA, 2011; UNODC, 2010). This has led policymakers to view organized

crime from a more economic perspective, investigating the local, national, and international

flows of illicit markets. For instance, the Council of EuropeÕs (2005) most recent Situation

Report was a special edition focusing on the convergence of Òeconomic crimeÓ with

organized crime activities. The Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2011) concluded that

the impact of transnational organized crime has led to a Òglobal economic crisis,Ó the

effects of which Òare likely to be felt in the EU for some time to comeÓ (48). This

sentiment is shared across the global community as governments have come to view the

operation of organized crime as businesses, thus resulting in the creation of specialized task

forces in various countries like the Integrated Market Enforcement Teams in Canada

(Skinnider, 2006: 36; CISC, 2012). These sentiments have come to shape the way organized

crime is legally defined, conceptualized, and enforced.

Nonetheless, the general belief among the international community is that the

current state of existing policies are predominantly ineffective, with the few exceptions of

harsher policies targeting organized group members in some countries (i.e., the U.S. and

Italy) (EICPC, 1998; Hagan, 1983; Jacobs, 2008). What is needed is a marrying of the

academic perspective with the legal perspective. Criminologists have long argued about

their lack of influence in the policymaking arena, believing that the Òpolicy development

process seems to run on a track independent from the path of evidenceÓ (Clear, 2010: 1).

Even though academic research has become increasingly funded by government agencies

(Canton and Yates, 2008), scholars have been under pressure to deliver ÒevidenceÓ on a

wide range of crimes and criminal behaviors that will lead to the development of

effective, practical policies that Òwork.Ó However, organized crime policies do seem to

parallel the work that has been done in criminology. The largely economic approaches

that government agencies and international organizations have adopted are compatible

with the past four decades of studies on organized crime by academics (Shelling, 1967;

1984; Reuter, 1979; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Reuter and Haaga, 1989; Grossman,

1991; Dick, 1995; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Garoupa, 1997; Haller, 1997;

Scaperdas, 2001; Levi and Maguire, 2004; Arsovska and Kostakos, 2008; Bullock et al.,

2010; Von Lampe, 2011; Kleemans, et al., 2012; Soudijn, 2012). There is a handful of

research that has ventured away from the economic and Rational Choice paradigms

(Braithwaite, 1989; Kleemans and de Poot, 2008; Shover and Hochstetler, 2002), but the

vast majority of academic research on organized crime remains in these traditional

paradigms.

As the predominance of nations and international organizations have stated in

countless publications over the past decade (e.g., Council of Europe, 2005, FBI, 2012b;

Skinnider, 2006; UNODC, 2010), the problem of transnational organized crime (in all of

its varying definitions and conceptions) is only growing and intensifying. This presents

the prime opportunity for criminologists to step back from purely economic-based

research or studies based on the Rational Choice perspective and seek direction from

other theoretical frameworks that could present original insight into the socio-cultural

aspects of organized crime. ÒUndeniably, the policy world is complicated Ð too often

sullied by the hard edge of politics and ideologyÓ (Clear, 2010: 20); yet, in order to

activate change within the policy arenas, criminologists need to take the first step toward

broadening the basic understanding of this complex criminal phenomenon.

Geographical Significance

As previously discussed, the threat of organized crime facing nations across the

world has reached elevated levels (OCTA, 2011; UNODC, 2010). The United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (2010) keeps a constant pulse on organized crime activity

throughout the world, indicating geographic areas most at risk for being used or corrupted

by organized crime syndicates for natural resources or trafficking routes, and those areas

most at risk of becoming destination countries for organized crime.59 Additionally, the

UNODC (2010) has identified the most prevalent activities of organized crime that vary

depending on the geographic location.

The United Nations and the Council of Europe, among other organizations, have

identified the most common global illicit activities of organized crime as trafficking in

persons, smuggling of migrants, cocaine trafficking, heroin trafficking, firearms trafficking,

trafficking in environmental resources and counterfeit products, maritime piracy, and

cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2000; 2005; OCTA, 2011). To better understand the factors

associated with organized crime activities, such as regional stability, resources, and

trafficking routes, these international organizations have broken the world down into various

regions. The regions that have been identified as problematic (UNODC, 2010) are the

Andean region, Central America, Mexico, United States of America, Caribbean, Brazil, West

Africa, Southern Africa, DR of the Congo, Central and East Africa, The Horn of Africa,

North Africa, Middle East, Southeast Europe, Western and Central Europe, Ukraine, Russian

Federation, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India,

59 Destination countries are those countries where the markets are prime opportunities for organized

crime to either sell their illicit goods or operate illegal businesses. For instance, heroin cultivation generally

takes place in the Middle East, but it is trafficked to destination countries in Western Europe where heroin

and its derivatives are sold.

Myanmar, China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Appendix A illustrates the global and

directional flows of illicit organized crime activities with these associated regions of

the world.

The Council of Europe (2005: 7) has identified drug trafficking as Òone of the most

significant activities of organized crime groups,Ó noting that while most groups are

increasingly Òmulti-commodity,Ó60 the global common denominator between criminal

organizations is drug involvement (Council of Europe, 2000; OCTA, 2011). In reviewing

Appendix A, these observations are compatible with the most recent global threat

assessment that has identified cocaine and heroin trafficking to be the most dominant

activities of organized crime (UNODC, 2010). The Andean region has been identified as

the worldÕs main source region for cultivating coca plants that are then harvested and

made into cocaine. This region does not face any threats from organized crime other than

cocaine trafficking and subsequent corruption of local officials. Once the cocaine leaves

the Andean region, it is trafficked north through Central America and east largely through

Venezuela, with the main destination countries being the United States, West Africa, and

Western and Central Europe (UNODC, 2010). Organized crime groups, such as the

FARC and ELN, have used this cocaine source region to finance further illegal

enterprises, with these groups making over 70% of their total income (an estimated

US$6.6 billion)61 from cocaine related activities (UNODC, 2010: 229).

Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Central Asia are the main source regions for

cultivating poppy plants, from which opium and heroin are derived. Heroin has been

recognized as Òthe worldÕs most problematic drugÓ (UNODC, 2010: 109) for its high

60 ÒMulti-commodityÓ indicates that single criminal organizations are becoming involved in multiple

illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling (OCTA, 2011).

61 The estimated annual value of the global market for cocaine is US$88 billion (UNODC, 2010: 227).

addiction qualities, severe withdrawal symptoms, deaths from overdoses, and method of

use.62 Since 2005, approximately 12,000 tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan,

which the UNODC (2010) estimates is Òenough to meet global demand for two yearsÓ

(109). The annual global flow of heroin has been estimated at 430-450 tons. Organized

crime syndicates traffic heroin from these source regions through the Russian Federation,

the Middle East, and Southeast Europe to destination countries almost exclusively located

in West and Central Europe, with some of the Afghan heroin markets destined for the

United States (UNODC, 2010). More specifically, the most common trafficking routes

begin in Afghanistan, entering Western and Central Europe via Turkey and the Balkans

(OCTA, 2011). However, in recent years heroin trafficking routes have diversified, to

include the Black Sea Route via Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine destined for

Europe. Increasingly, organized crime groups have utilized maritime shipments of heroin

from Iran and Pakistan through the Mediterranean Sea, as well as trafficking the drugs

from source countries via commercial and freight air into Europe (OCTA, 2011).

Other secondary organized crime activities, to include trafficking in firearms,

migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and trafficking in counterfeit medicines, have

smaller markets that follow more specific patterns. For instance, firearms trafficking by

organized crime groups originate in the United States and the Ukraine, destined for

Mexico and Central and Eastern Africa respectively (UNODC, 2010). Counterfeit

consumer goods are trafficked directly from China to Western and Central Europe.

Female trafficking victims originate from three source regions: Brazil, Southeast Europe,

and the Russian Federation, with Western and Central Europe as the main destination

62 Heroin is most commonly administered through injection, raising additional concerns for

the transmission of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C (DEA, 2012; OCTA, 2011).

region for each point of origin (UNODC, 2010). Mexico, West Africa, North Africa, and

East Africa are source regions for migrant smuggling into the United States and West and

Central Europe (UNODC, 2010).

From these trafficking flows of various illicit activities by organized crime

groups, a few patterns emerge. Source regions and destination regions illustrate the

markets for supply and demand of these illegal goods and services (OCTA, 2011). While

there are many source regions supplying various illegal commodities indicated in

Appendix A, there are only a few destination regions where the majority of global

demand is centered. The smaller destination regions are the United States, China, and

Southeast Asia, but by far the largest destination region for almost 60% of all global

illicit organized crime activities is Western and Central Europe. This indicates the region

is a high demand Òhot spot,Ó which has cultivated an environment conducive for

organized crime groups to operate in at various levels. Thus, a further look at the Western

and Central European region more closely is warranted.

A European Focus

Drug trafficking continues to be Òthe primary problemÓ associated with organized

crime in Europe, with the Council of Europe (2005) noting ÒEurope is probably the most

profitable drug market globallyÓ (6). While this overall region houses the highest prevalence

of drug users, particularly heroin, worldwide, the Western European section of Europe

experiences the highest volume of drug abuse and the Central and Eastern European (CEE)

section experiences the highest levels of drug trafficking by organized crime (Council of

Europe, 2005; OCTA, 2011). In the case of heroin, much of the heroin and opiate derivatives

originate in the Afghan and Central Asia regions. This is because

organized crime groups have exploited the disorganization and lax border controls of

former Soviet Bloc countries, entering Western Europe through countries in the CEE

section, namely Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic (Summers and Plywaczewski,

2012). The organized crime groups most prominent in trafficking illicit drugs into the

European region are Albanian groups, Lithuanian groups, Russian groups, and

Vietnamese crime groups (OCTA, 2011).

The other secondary forms of crime that organized criminal groups are involved in

also share common trafficking characteristics of the drug trade. For instance, the CEE is

also a point of entry to Western Europe in terms of migrant smuggling and human

trafficking, with organized crime groups exploiting routes similar to drug trafficking.

ÒTurkey is a key nexus point for transitÓ of illegal migrants into Europe (OCTA, 2011:

21). As illustrated in Appendix A, North, East and West Africa are points of origin for

immigrants, and smugglers have taken advantage of the Turkish-Greek border.63 The

Turkish-Greek border provides both sea and land access, leading EU authorities to focus

on Greece as a new focal point for migrant smuggling.

Another secondary form of organized crime activity, cybercrime, also shares

trafficking characteristics that connect the CEE section with the rest of Europe. Organized

criminal syndicates use cybercrime to target legitimate credit card holders in other regions

of Europe Òby means of malicious software installation, or by using social

63 Organized crime groups Ònow recruit would-be migrants by offering them an apparently legitimate

means of entryÓ (OCTA, 2011: 21) by providing them with forged or otherwise falsified travel

documentation and identification. In some instances, once the organized crime groups have arranged

safe (but illegal) passage to their final destination, the illegal immigrants are forced to work for the

groups to Òpay off their debtsÓ through forced labor or sexual exploitation, thus becoming victims of

human trafficking (OCTA, 2011). The organized crime groups most actively involved in migrant

smuggling and human trafficking in Europe are Turkish groups, Brazilian groups, Pakistani groups, and

West African organized criminal groups (OCTA, 2011).

engineering to encourage them to divulge dataÓ (OCTA, 2011: 30).64 This problem is

most serious in countries in CEE where Òsprawling geographies and weak institutional

infrastructure make education and enforcement all the more difficultÓ (BSA, 2007: 2).

The ease and rapidity at which organized crime groups can access electronic documents

and make transactions and connections has led to more efficient methods of money

laundering and drug trafficking, producing still greater concerns and challenges for law

enforcement. Russia, the Ukraine, Armenia, and Bulgaria hold the highest rates of

software piracy by organized crime groups (between 68-93%), with the Czech Republic

experiencing the least from this country cluster (39%) (Council of Europe, 2005; BSA,

2007).65 European countries of most concern for organized crime cyber targets are

Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (UNODC, 2010), located in the

Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon country clusters.

With these levels and diversity of organized crime activities within EuropeÕs

borders, it is evident that countries in Europe are indeed a Òhot spotÓ destination for

organized crime. Moreover, the CEE countries present additional concerns for the region,

because it appears to contain not only demand for illicit goods and services provided by

organized crime groups, but it is also the gateway into Western Europe. That is, criminal

organizations are also utilizing countries in this section as the final trafficking routes to

reach their Western European destinations (UNODC, 2010). International organizations

and scholars alike have noted this may be the case largely due to the fall of communism

64 This includes phishing scams, computer espionage (i.e., Trojan horses), or computer sabotage and

extortion (e.g., viruses, worms, denial of service attacks, spamming) (Council of Europe, 2005: 40).

Organized criminal syndicates have also utilized the Internet to conduct software piracy to increase their

revenues.

65 By comparison, the U.S. experiences a piracy rate of 20%, and all countries in the Western

Europe cluster experience rates of less than 30% (with the exception of France) (BSA, 2007).

in 1989; since then, former Eastern Bloc countries have experienced increased intensity

of organized crime activity related to the disorganization of countries in transition

(Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004; Krajewski, 2003; Plywaczewski, 1997; 2004; Plywaczewski

and Filipkowksi, 2004; Summers and Plywaczewski, 2012; UNODC, 2010). Many of the

former Soviet Bloc countries initially struggled to transform their governments and

transition away from communism. This left many weaknesses at national borders, leading

the way for organized crime to exploit opportunities for corruption (Fijnaut and Paoli,

2004; Krajewski, 2003). Moreover, these countries provided vast unsaturated markets for

drugs, as drug use and abuse was not prevalent behind the Iron Curtain (Krajewski, 2004;

Kramer, 1990; Plywaczewski, 2004). As drug trafficking remains the most significant

activity of organized crime groups on a global scale (Council of Europe, 2005), the

development of trafficking routes and new demand markets for illicit drugs in CEE has

attracted and encouraged large volumes of organized crime activity since the early 1990s.

This country has faced many of the same social, economic, and political issues as its

former Eastern Bloc neighbors (e.g., Czech Republic, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia) since

the collapse of communism. Poland, like its neighbors, experienced a Òmoral panicÓ

regarding the sharp rise in organized crime activity following the collapse of communism

as citizens became increasingly aware of the social situation via the newly liberated

media (Krajewski, 2003; Plywaczewski, 2004). This social situation included surges in

violence, use of firearms, the Òprocess of moral corruptionÓ of juveniles, and full

integration into the international drug trade (Plywaczewski, 2004). However, one factor

separates Poland from its neighboring CEE countries: amphetamine manufacturing.

For almost a decade, Poland has been recognized as ÒEuropeÕs center for

amphetamine productionÓ (DEA, 2004: 1). PolandÕs Central Bureau of Investigation

(CBI) reported that 25% of all amphetamines seized in Europe were produced in Poland,

while the UNODC International Narcotics Control Board estimated that 60% of

amphetamines seized in Scandinavian countries was either produced or trafficked through

Poland by organized crime (DEA, 2004). In 2004, it was noted:

Well-organized criminal groups operate extensive international networks to carry

out the illicit production of amphetamines in Poland. WhileÉ sources indicate

that there are over 200 domestic criminal groups with ties to the drug trade, there

are three syndicates operating in the Warsaw, Krakow, and Gdansk areas that

largely control the production and trafficking of amphetamines. (DEA, 2004: 2)

Updated reports since 2004 confirm increased levels of specialized organized crime

involvement in amphetamine production within Poland: ÒProduction facilities are

reported to be often set up by organized criminal [groups], which employ chemists and

operatorsÓ (EUROPOL, 2011: 33). This indicates that organized crime groups in

Poland are evolving by becoming increasingly sophisticated in its methods of drug

production, and are becoming more hierarchical in structure by separating and dividing

responsibilities among its employees. This, in turn, decreases the risk for higher-level

criminal syndicates to be detected by law enforcement, or be injured or killed during the

manufacturing of amphetamines (Krawczyk et al., 2009).

Precursor chemicals needed to produce the synthetic drug and its many

derivatives (e.g., methamphetamine, MDMA) have been trafficked into Poland since the

late 1980s from mainly Russia and the Ukraine (DEA, 2004; EUROPOL, 2011). Once

the amphetamines have been manufactured, organized crime groups traffic them to the

Baltic, Northern, and Western European countries clusters (DEA, 2004; EMCDDA,

2012).67 More recently, Polish-made amphetamines have been mainly destined for

Sweden, Norway and Finland (EUROPOL, 2011), which is thought to be related to

increased competition from Western European countries in recent years. This is

67 Countries with the highest consumer demand for amphetamines include the U.K., Germany, Spain,

the Netherlands, and Belgium (EUROPOL, 2011).

evidenced by reported expansions in amphetamine production in the Netherlands and

Belgium, but Poland remains the major source country in CEE for amphetamines

consumed in other regions of Europe (DEA, 2004; EUROPOL, 2011; Krawczyk et al.,

2009).

PolandÕs status as a source country for the production of a major illicit drug by

organized crime syndicates sets it apart from the severity of organized crime prevalence

in other CEE countries. This is further underlined by the market for drugs within the

country, as well as the prevalence of trafficking routes through the country. Demand for

drugs has steadily increased in Poland since the early 1990s, as evidenced by the number

of persons admitted to treatment centers increased from 7.4 per 100,000 in 1990 to 22.2

per 100,000 in 2000 (Reitox National Focal Point, 2005). Currently there exists an

estimated 56,000 Ð 103,000 Òproblem drug usersÓ68 between the ages of 15-64, while

deaths from drug overdoses rose from 155 in 1990 to 247 in 2009 (EMCDDA, 2012;

Reitox National Focal Point, 2011). From the law enforcement perspective, arrests for

drug law violations surged from 4,284 in 1995 to 72,357 in 2010 (EMCDDA, 2012;

Reitox National Focal Point, 2005). Moreover, two well-established trafficking routes

exist in Poland on which organized crime groups have traversed the country from east

to west. The first route transports mainly opiate derivatives through southern Poland

from Romania, the Ukraine, and the Czech Republic, while the second route transports

illicit drugs from source countries in the Afghan region Òthrough former Soviet

countries into the Ukraine and Belarus before entering through PolandÕs eastern border

(Summers and Plywaczewski, 2012: 236; Krajewski, 2001).

68 ÒProblem drug useÓ is defined as Òregular (daily or almost daily) illicit drug use causing

serious problems, with all illicit drugs includedÓ (EMCDDA, 2012).

These statistics indicate a worrisome combination for Poland: there exist both an

enticing drug market for organized crime to target and well-established trafficking routes

to utilize through the country. These factors, multiplied by PolandÕs status as an

established source country for amphetamines, place it in a concerning category for

exploitation by organized crime. Located in a section of Europe already at elevated levels

of vulnerability for criminal organizations Ð a section that is situated in a larger global

region of the world identified as the main Òhot spotÓ for demand of organized crime

activities Ð Poland is a country warranting further attention from researchers and

policymakers alike.

Summary

This chapter has demonstrated the dynamic, multifaceted nature of the increasingly

complex phenomenon of organized crime. Examining this crime problem through the

academic lens, it becomes apparent that research is lacking in drawing from theoretical

perspectives other than the Rational Choice paradigm. Other avenues in criminological

research, particularly those theories that emphasize socio-cultural elements related to crime,

require further attention in the context of organized crime. The legal approach has increased

global awareness of organized crime presence and activities, but the fragmented nature of

national and international definitions and policies have been largely ineffective (Council of

Europe, 2005; OCTA, 2011; Skinnider, 2006). Together, however, academics and

policymakers have somewhat reconciled these shortcomings. That is, academic explorations

of the nature of the supply and demand markets for illicit goods and services from the

economic and Rational Choice perspectives (e.g., Rengelink, 2012; Reuter, 1979; Reuter and

Haaga, 1989; Scaperdas, 2001) have aided international

organizations in concluding where the global Òhot spotsÓ and source regions are for

supply and demand (OCTA, 2011; UNODC, 2010). These discoveries have led to

countless reports and publications on descriptive factors associated with organized crime,

detailing the current Òstate of affairsÓ of organized crime prevalence in various global

regions (e.g., Council of Europe, 2005; EICPC, 1998; EUROPOL, 2011; Reitox National

Focal Point, 2005; 2011; UNODC, 2010).

Even though these reports are undoubtedly useful, the fact that organized crime

continues to proliferate in all corners of the world indicates that different approaches are

now needed. Academics now need to move forward, applying what has been learned

from past research endeavors to new investigations of the many aspects of organized

crime through the lens of other theoretical orientations. Both scholars and official reports

have recently begun to push for the development of more comprehensive research on the

social phenomena (culture, the development of societies, emerging pathologies) related

to organized crime (BSA, 2007; Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012). Organized

criminal proliferation cannot be approached in the one-sided manner it has been

(Plywaczewski and Filipkowski, 2012), and future policies now rely on academics to

pave the way toward a more comprehensive and conceptually whole understanding of

this criminal phenomenon.

Addressing the Current Issues in Research

By merging two bodies of research in criminology, namely Institutional Anomie

Theory and the large body of work on organized crime, this research has addressed three

main issues in the field of criminology.

This first issue that was addressed regards the measurement of key elements in

Institutional Anomie Theory. The model of Institutional Anomie Theory proposed by

Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) is clearly articulated; the elements of culture and social

institutions are clearly identified. Yet, Chamlin and Cochran (2007) noted that while the

theory is intuitively appealing, Messner and Rosenfeld provide little guidance on how their

theory might be tested or how their key theoretical constructs might be operationalized. The

more cryptic definitions of Anomie, culture, and social institutions have led scholars to

debate and interpret the meaning and operationalization of these concepts for themselves

(e.g., Bernburg, 2002; Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008a; 2008b; Chamlin and Cochran,

1995; Gross and Hausmann, 2011; Maume and Lee, 2003).

The largest issue lies within operationalizing Messner and RosenfeldÕs concept

of ÒAnomie culture.Ó To-date, only two studies have attempted to partially measure this

key element of Institutional Anomie Theory (e.g., Cullen, Parboteeah and Hoegel, 2004;

Gross and Haussman, 2011), and have done so using individual-level scales compiled

from items on the World Values Survey and other surveys, with limited success. Aside

from these examples, no studies have been able to operationalize Messner and

RosenfeldÕs (1994) conception of culture. This is quite a problem, because the authors

argue in their original conception of the theory that the two dimensions of social

organization (i.e., culture and social institutions) should remain distinctive of each other;

these two dimensions cannot be combined or singularly emphasized. Moreover, Chamlin

and Cochran (2007) further noted that if these elements of culture are not able to be

operationalized (e.g., perhaps ÒcultureÓ cannot be captured in empirical data), then the

theory is non-falsifiable and unable to be tested without being misspecified because only

half of the Institutional Anomie model can be empirically measured.

Therefore, this research addressed this issue by attempting to operationalize both

elements of ÒAnomic cultureÓ and social institutions in this exploratory test of

Institutional Anomie Theory. This was done by also identifying Anomie as an embedded

element within culture, and by making empirical distinctions between social institutions

and Anomie culture as the theory originally intended (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994).

The second issue that was addressed was the applicability of Institutional Anomie

Theory to other settings. The specific orientation of ÒcultureÓ in the theory and Messner

and RosenfeldÕs conceptualization of this latent construct has imparted a Western bias

on how the theory has previously been tested. In their model of the theory, Messner and

Rosenfeld very clearly consider the element of culture to be embedded directly in

MertonÕs concept of the American Dream. The authors do not set out to define

ÒcultureÓ more generally; instead, the type of culture Messner and Rosenfeld (1994)

identify as Anomic (e.g., producing normlessness and higher crime rates) is a culture that

stresses a commitment to the goal of material success that is shared by all members of

society, under conditions of open, individual competition. The values that anchor this

cultural concept of the American Dream (i.e., achievement, individualism, universalism,

fetishism of money) have naturally led some researchers to apply this concept of Anomic

Culture to comparative research in the United States (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran, 1995;

Piquero and Piquero, 1998).

Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) themselves argue that Institutional Anomie Theory

is most applicable to developed countries only, because these countries are most likely to

have the Anomic cultural pressures identified coupled with a dominance of the economy

over the non-economic social institutions. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) acknowledge that

countries in transitioning stages or that are still developing, like countries in Eastern Europe,

Southeast Asia, or even South America may be more likely to have a dominance of non-

economic institutions (e.g., the family) in addition to less cultural pressures to succeed as

defined by the American Dream. However, Messner and Rosenfeld clearly state in 2009 that

ÒA core claim of Institutional Anomie Theory is that the type of institutional configuration

conducive to high levels of crime is one in which the claims of

the economy are awarded the highest priorityÓ (215).69 As a result, past empirical studies of

Institutional Anomie Theory have largely involved Western or developed countries.

Interestingly, more recent studies, to include MessnerÕs (et al.) own work in

2011, have taken a different direction by incorporating data from many countries in their

cross-national analyses, which sometimes include data from forty or fifty countries (e.g.,

Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008a; 2008b). While these studies include data from

countries like Venezuela, Thailand, and Uruguay, the data are lumped together and little

(or no) effort is made to consider any between-country differences, or to group countries

to examine how the impact of the theory might vary in these different settings. Instead,

the goal of many of these studies (e.g., Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008a) has been to

simply examine how the proxies for social institutions and Anomie behave more

generally in relation to homicide rates. These studies take for granted the fact that the

theory operates the same in all countries.

69 This somewhat conflicts with their own statements in 2001, in which they claim that Òsocieties

with differing institutional configurations, for example, those in which political or religious

institutions are dominant, also may exhibit high levels of criminal activity, even if the type of crime

differs from that observed in anomic societiesÓ (153).

As such, this study broadened the range of geographical settings for Institutional

Anomie theory by testing the theory in multiple cultural settings that accounted for

differences between these settings. The different cultural settings included fourteen

countries in Europe (which contained three countries in transitioning stages). This

research also considered how Institutional Anomie Theory applied within and between

six country-clusters over time (from 1995 to 2009).70

The final issue that was addressed in this study regards the fact that past empirical

tests of Institutional Anomie Theory have almost exclusively used homicide rates as the

dependent variable, with a handful of other studies branching out to include property

crimes or other utilitarian forms of theft (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Cochran and

Bjerregaard, 2011; Maume and Lee, 2004; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997c). This may be

the product of Messner and RosenfeldÕs (1994) original claims that criminologists

largely ignored explaining Òserious crimesÓ in the early 1990s, while they also noticed

that the U.S. had the highest rates of homicide comparative to other developed nations.

Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) further noted that ÒhomicideÓ was a more reliably

recorded measure internationally. As such, they decided to operationalize Òserious

crimeÓ through intentional homicide rates, which they now label as Òthe most serious

form of conventional crimeÓ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2012: 20).

The question becomes whether or not Institutional Anomie Theory can explain

other forms of serious crime. Messner and Rosenfeld (2012) themselves suggest that their

70 Considering changes in Institutional Anomie over time is an important point; to-date no explicit tests

of the theory have considered how changes in crime rates over time affect or are affected by changes in

levels of Institutional Anomie. Messner and Rosenfeld (2009) themselves point this out: ÒNearly all of the

macro-level research on IAT has been cross-sectional in nature. Typically, one society or community is

compared in snap-shot form with others at a single point in time. But, of course, crime rates vary over time

within social units and not merely across different social unitsÉ On occasion crime rates also exhibit abrupt

turning points and rise or decline rapidly over very short time intervalsÓ (220).

theory might be able to explain forms of white-collar crime and even ÒstreetÓ crimes.

Yet, to-date, no studies have applied Institutional Anomie Theory to these or any other

crime-types.

Therefore, this study broadened the range of dependent variables to be tested

against by employing a different dependent variable representative of serious crime:

organized crime. The United Nations and other international governing bodies have

recognized transnational organized crime to be one of the greatest concerns and threats to

the security of the global community. Moreover, these organizations have identified

patterns in flows of organized crime within and between various regions of the world,

suggesting that the social organizations of societies play a role in the movement and

development of transnational organized crime (Passas, 1997; 2000; UNODC, 2010). This

indicates that this form of serious crime may be well suited for further empirical analysis

using the guidance of Institutional Anomie Theory. Moreover, because drug trafficking

is the common denominator between organized crime activities worldwide, and because

markets of drugs are known to vary between geographic regions (which perhaps drives

the movement and flows of transnational organized crime), this study operationalized

organized crime using seizure rates of four drug-types known to be trafficked by these

groups: cannabis, cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines.

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