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Implication of the Defence on Criminal Liability and Responsibility
There are two ways in which the accused can be made criminally liable in court. The first is if the
accused pleads guilty to the charge (section 173(b) of the CPC). In this situation, the case does not
proceed with the trial. Secondly, the accused claims for a trial and after the full trial, the accused is
found guilty and an appropriate sentence is imposed on him (section 173(m)(ii) of the CPC). In
discussing one’s criminal liability, it is worth explaining the two terms which are “criminal liability”
and “criminal responsibility”. The term “liable” is mentioned many times in the Penal Code to
indicate the guilt of the accused person. In other words, to hold one criminally liable, he must first be
found guilty of committing the offence. For instance, under section 2 of the Penal Code, it states:
“Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or
omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Malaysia .” On the other
hand, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “responsibility” as “condition of being answerable or
accountable.” That is to say, a person is answerable for the crime that he has committed. Duff (2007)
however stressed that responsibility does not always entail liability, since the accused can avert
liability by raising a defence or providing explanations for the commission of the alleged offence.
There are a number of ways for the accused to defend himself in court. The first is denying
responsibility for the alleged crime, thus denying criminal liability. The second is by admitting
responsibility for the alleged crime, but denying criminal liability. For the former, the accused denies
both criminal responsibility and liability. He claims that he should not be answerable to the alleged
offence because he was not the one who committed the offence in the first place. An example of this is
when he raises the defence of alibi (Hall, 2008). Defence of alibi simply means a claim that he was
somewhere else at the time the offence was committed. In Malaysia, it is spelt out under section 402A
of the CPC. The burden is on the accused to prove such defence. An example of a case to illustrate
this point is Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Zaidi Zakaria & Anor [2019] 1 LNS 16, where the High Court
acquitted the accused of the charge because, among other reasons, the court accepted the defence of
alibi that was raised. The reason why the alibi was accepted was because the alibi was not properly
investigated, and that alibi was supported by the defence witnesses. In contrast, if the defence of alibi
is not supported by evidence or the evidence against the accused is strong, for example positive and
proper identification by a prosecution witness against the accused, then the chance for the defence to
succeed is very unlikely. This was explained in Duis Akim & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 9 CLJ
692, where the Federal Court agreed with the finding of the trial judge that since the appellants had
been positively identified by prosecution witness (PW 1), then the
alibi defence of the first and second appellants collapsed. Being criminally liable simultaneously
means criminally responsible, although the accused denies responsibility. This is because criminal
liability does not solely depend on the accused’s admission of the offence, but is also based on the
evidence adduced by the prosecution in court.
For the latter, the accused admits he is responsible for the act, which means he admits to
committing the criminal act, but denies criminal liability. In other words, he has a defence to
justify his commission of the offence. Thus, he needs to answer the allegation against him. If he
can meet all the conditions of the defence raised, then the defence can succeed, thereby shielding
him from conviction. Thus, while it may be argued that responsibility is a condition of liability
(Sistare, 1989), responsibility does not always result in liability. This is because if the accused can
successfully raise the defence, his liability can be absolved. The distinction between responsibility
and liability can be further illustrated by the justification defence (Duff, 2007). The justification
defence is raised by the accused to offer an explanation as to why the offence was committed. In
other words, the accused does not deny that he has committed the act, but offers justification as to
why he did so. The justification is given to explain the commission of the act due to the presence
of circumstances that would otherwise be unacceptable. Hence, the justification defence focusses
more on the act itself rather than the accused. Robinson (1982) named private defence as an
example of a defence that falls under this category. An example of this is when A injures an
attacker, which is the only way to defend himself from being killed, then A may raise the defence
of private defence. In Malaysia, private defence is mentioned from sections 96 to 106 of the Penal
Code. Section 96 states that: “Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of
private defence.” An example of a case to explain this can be seen in Ya Daud v. Public
Prosecutor [1996] 2 CLJ 540, where the appellant did not deny that he killed the victim, but
argued that the killing was in self-defence. In this case, the High Court accepted the defence as all
the conditions for it had been met. The appellant was therefore acquitted and discharged. In short,
private defence blocks the transition from responsibility to liability (Cruft, 2011).
Raising Defence in a Criminal Trial
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the accused has the right to present his defence to
prove his innocence. The effect of successfully raising a defense can either absolve the accused of
criminal liability or at least reduce the seriousness of the offence that he has been charged with.
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in Section 1.1, the CPC is silent as to when exactly the defence
should be raised. Thus, a reference to the case law is necessary to know the legal position on this.
Referring to the Supreme Court case of Lin Lian Chen v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 CLJ 285
(Rep) , Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ explained that:
Indeed, it behoves the defence to do so (to put its case at the earliest possible stage) for we
need hardly say that if a defence is sprung in court for the first time when the accused
makes his defence from the witness box or the dock, so that the prosecution is taken by
surprise, the accused runs the risk of being criticized for keeping his defence ‘up his sleeve’
so to speak, and it branded as a recent invention (p. 292).
This case shows that the defence should be raised at the early stage which refers to the prosecution
stage. Otherwise, the defence may be criticised for keeping the defence a secret, where it can be
regarded as a mere invention. The same principle was applied in the Federal Court case of
Anthony v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 LNS 595, which implies that defence should be presented
at the prosecution stage. This is to inform the court and also the prosecution from the very
beginning of his line of defence, which indirectly avoids the occurrence of any element of
surprise.
But how is a defence introduced when the accused has not yet been called to defend
himself at the prosecution stage? This is because it is not a duty of the prosecution to raise defence
on behalf of the accused. This was elucidated in Public Prosecutor v. Dato’ Sri Anwar Bin
Ibrahim (No. 3) [1999] 2 CLJ 215, where Augustine Paul J explained that: “the nature of the
defence is to be ascertained not only from the evidence of the accused himself but also from the
trend of the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses” (p. 424). It is therefore important for
the accused to put his defence to the relevant prosecution witnesses through cross-examination,
such as the investigating officer.
What happens then if the defence is merely raised at the defence stage? The issue was
addressed by the Supreme Court case of Lin Lian Chen and further clarified in the Federal Court
case of Alcontara A/L Ambrose Anthony v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 CLJ 705 where it was held
that: “… thus avoid the adverse comment, that the defence is a recent invention in other words,
‘kept up its sleeve’, as it were” (p. 718). Again, the same principle was adopted in Public
Prosecutor v. Lim Hung Wang & Anor [2012] 1 LNS 368, where the court held that since the
accused merely introduced their defence at the defence stage and did not put it through
prosecution witnesses, their evidence was merely an afterthought and/or recent invention,
doubtful and not credible.
While the principle has long been judicially recognised and has been part of the rule in raising
defence, there are still cases decided by the court where the defence was rejected on the grounds that,
among others, the defence was not put forward at the prosecution stage through relevant prosecution
witnesses. Among the recent cases where the court rejected the defence on the grounds that, among
other things, it was not being raised during the prosecution stage are the following: Public Prosecutor
v. Mohammad Jobi Ullah [2020] 1 LNS 972, Muhammad Nazrin Ayan v. Public Prosecutor [2020] 1
LNS 1513, Lim Chee Hwa v. Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 LNS 670, and Ariff Arhanan Che Udin v.
Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 LNS 657.
To address the issue that was raised in Section 4.4, reference to section 257(1) of the CPC is
important. The section states the role of the court in assisting the unrepresented accused in
situations provided for in the section. The section states:
At every trial before the Court of a Magistrate if and when the Court calls upon the accused
for his defence it shall, if he is not represented by an advocate, inform him of his right to
give evidence on his own behalf, and if he elects to give evidence on his own behalf shall
call his attention to the principal points in the evidence for the prosecution which tell
against him in order that he may have an opportunity of explaining them.
The application of this section was explained in Awaluddin bin Suratman & Ors v. Pendakwa Raya
[1992] 1 MLJ 416, where the court stated that under section 257(1) of the CPC, a trial judge should
explain to an undefended accused the main points of a prosecution witness’s testimony to enable the
accused to properly cross-examine such witness properly. In other words, if the accused is
unrepresented, then the court should play a role in clarifying important points from the evidence of the
prosecution witness to enable the accused to present his defence and in order for him to have an
opportunity to explain. Another relevant case to explain the application of this section can be seen in
Dolly bin Surop v. Public Prosecutor [2020] MLJU 1613, where the accused was not represented by a
lawyer before the prosecutor closed the case. At the defence stage, the appellant was informed of the
three options available to him. However, there was nothing in the notes of proceedings that showed the
case for the prosecution was explained by the court to the appellant, who was unrepresented, pursuant
to section 257(1) of the CPC. In this case, the High Court allowed the appeal and the convictions.
were quashed. Among the reasons for the judgment was that the appellant must be allowed the
opportunity to present his best defence and able to cross-examine. In other words, in a case where
the accused is not represented, the main points of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
witnesses, especially vital witnesses such as a victim should be explained to the accused. This is
to enable the accused to cross-examine the witness properly and to provide him an opportunity to
explain. Therefore, in accordance with section 257 (1) of the CPC and legal principles from the
judgment in Dolly bin Surop, the court should explain the important points given by the
prosecution witness. This is to not only allow the unrepresented accused to cross-examine the
witness with the aim to challenge the evidence or to raise doubt as to the truth of what the
prosecution witness has said, but also caution the unrepresented accused about the need to present
the defence (if any) at the prosecution level through relevant prosecution witnesses.
However, if the accused is represented by a lawyer, as explained above, section 257 of the
CPC does not apply. The principle was explained in the case of Kumarasamy Naciappan v. Public
Prosecutor [2014] 8 CLJ 760. That responsibility is borne by lawyers, who should discuss and advise
their clients on the best strategies in presenting their defence. It is worth noting that criminal cases are
unique in the sense that some of them are straight-forward cases, and some of them are complicated
cases. Also, the complexity of raising the defence depends of the uniqueness of why and how the
offence was committed. There are cases in which the defence is really spot on; for example, D injures
E to save himself from being unlawfully attacked by E. Based on this example, the best defence would
be private defence. Another example is when a police officer misses the shot, which was aimed at the
kidnapper, and the bullet accidentally hit the innocent hostage instead. In this situation, the best
defence would be the defence of accident. At the same time, there are cases in which it is hard for the
accused to provide a defence for the crime committed. For example, A, consciously and without
coercion, steals goods from a shop, which is later seen by other eye-witnesses. Although A may give
the reason that he is poor and the stolen goods were intended to feed his family, it is not a valid
defence. It can however instead be used as mitigation to plead for a lesser punishment. In certain
cases, a strategy that could be considered by the defence is to wait and see the evidence that is
provided by the prosecution witnesses. This is because sometimes doubts may arise in the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses themselves. This may happen when there is a material contradiction in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and the contradiction is not clarified. Also, there may be the
question of the handling of the exhibits that could raise suspicion as to whether the exhibits adduced in
court are identical to the items seized at the crime scene. Regardless of the strategy the defence
might use, the lawyer should take note, if there is a defence relevant to the case, then such defence
should be introduced at the prosecution stage in order to avoid any element of surprise, and above
all to avoid the presumption that the defence is mere invention and afterthought.
The right to defence is constitutionally protected and is well explained in the CPC. While not
explicitly mentioned in the CPC, a number of cases, namely Lin Lian Chen, Anthony and
Alcontara A/L Ambrose Anthony indicate that the defence should be put forward at the prosecution
stage through relevant witnesses. By failing to comply with this, the court may form the view that
the defence raised was mere invention rather than a genuine one. While the principle has been
regarded as law in raising defence, there are still cases where the accused did not present their
defence at an earlier stage. Regardless of the strategy the defence might use, the lawyer should
take note that if there is any defence relevant to the case, then such defence should be introduced
at the prosecution stage. While a represented accused may be advised of this by his lawyer, an
unrepresented accused may not be aware of this. Therefore, in accordance with section 257 (1) of
the CPC and legal principles from the judgment in Dolly bin Surop, the court should not only
explain the important points given by the prosecution witness, but also caution the unrepresented
accused, who may not be familiar with criminal procedure, his rights, and the need to present the
defence at the prosecution level through prosecution witnesses. This will allow the unrepresented
accused to cross-examine the witness, not only to challenge or cast doubt on the truth of what the
prosecution witness has said, but also to put his defence through by cross-examining the witness.
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