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DISPOSITIONAL HEARING
A. Burden of Proof :
If the State’s burden is met at Adjudication, the Court must determine whether it
is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the public that the
child be made a ward of the Court. In re N.B., 191 Ill.2d 338, 343, 730 N.E.2d 1086
(2000); 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) All findings at the disposition must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Christopher S., 364 Ill. App. 3d 76, 845 N.E.2d 830
(1st Dist. 2006) Of course, where the evidence at the Adjudicatory hearing is insufficient,
it is likely insufficient on the same issue at a Dispositional hearing. In re J.H., 212 Ill.
App. 3d 22, 570 N.E.2d 689 (3rd Dist. 1991) (It would be incongruous to hold that
evidence which is insufficient to find sexual abuse at an adjudicatory hearing is sufficient
to support a de facto finding of abuse at a dispositional hearing.) cf. In re Rider, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 1000, 447 N.E.2d 1384 (1983)
B. Unfitness/Fitness (Juvenile Act-Dispositional) Motions :
It is noteworthy that the fact of a previous finding of unfitness of a parent is not
conclusive evidence of unfitness in a new juvenile case. In re J.C., 396 Ill. App. 3d 1050,
1056-57, 920 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (3rd Dist. 2009) However, when a parent’s
dispositional fitness is being considered, “the standard of proof in a trial court's section 2-
27 finding of unfitness that does not result in a complete termination of all parental rights
is [the] preponderance of the evidence.” In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 257, 760
N.E.2d 85, 110 (1st Dist. 2001); In re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 638 N.E.2d 716 (1st
Dist. 1994) Because a determination of unfitness pursuant to section 2-27 does not result
in a termination of parental rights, the standard of proof is the less rigorous
preponderance of the evidence and the court's determination of unfitness under that
section will be disturbed on review only when found to be against the manifest weight of
the evidence. In re M.B. 332 Ill. App. 3d 996, 773 N.E.2d 1204 (1st Dist. 2002) citing In
re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992, 994, 697 N.E.2d 830, 835, 836 (1st Dist. 1998); In
re D.S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 586, 762 N.E.2d 16 (3rd Dist. 2001); In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d
1059, 574 N.E.2d 893 (4th Dist. 1991) Naturally, the standard of proof for finding a
parent fit to have the children returned is by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Lakita
B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 697 N.E.2d 830 (1st Dist. 1998) see also generally In re M.W.,
199 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 557 N.E.2d 959, 963 (3rd Dist. 1990) (Where a parent has made
reasonable and arguable significant progress and has willingly taken part in
recommended programs, such constitutes a sufficient refutation of the State’s claim of
unfitness). See discussion of “Modification of Dispositional and Custody Orders” below.
C. Rule(s) of Evidence :
If the trial court determines that the minor child is abused, neglected, or
dependent, the court shall then proceed to the second step—the dispositional hearing—
and determine whether the minor should be made a ward of the court. In re Timothy T.,
343 Ill. App. 3d 1260, 799 N.E.2d 994, 996 (4th Dist.2003); 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) The
civil rules of evidence modified by §2-18 of the JCA apply to dispositional hearings.
Also, proceedings at the dispositional hearing are governed by section 2-22 of the JCA,
which provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Dispositional hearing; evidence; continuance.
(1) At the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine whether it is in the best
interests of the minor and the public that he be made a ward of the court, and, if
he is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall determine the proper
disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the
public. The court also shall consider the permanency goal set for the minor, the
nature of the service plan for the minor and the services delivered and to be
delivered under the plan. All evidence helpful in determining these questions,
including oral and written reports, may be admitted and may be relied upon to the
extent of its probative value, even though not competent for the purposes of the
adjudicatory hearing.
(2) Once all parties respondent have been served in compliance with Sections 2-
15 and 2-16, no further service or notice must be given to a party prior to
proceeding to a dispositional hearing. Before making an order of disposition the
court shall advise the State's Attorney, the parents, guardian, custodian or
responsible relative or their counsel of the factual contents and the conclusions of
the reports prepared for the use of the court and considered by it, and afford fair
opportunity, if requested, to controvert them. The court may order, however, that
the documents containing such reports need not be submitted to inspection, or
that sources of confidential information need not be disclosed except to the
attorneys for the parties. Factual contents, conclusions, documents and sources
disclosed by the court under this paragraph shall not be further disclosed without
the express approval of the court pursuant to an in camera hearing.
(3) A record of a prior continuance under supervision under Section 2-20, whether
successfully completed with regard to the child's health, safety and best interest,
or not, is admissible at the dispositional hearing. . .” [Emphasis added] 705 ILCS
405/2-22
D. Admissible Evidence :
The plain language of section 2-22(1) (formerly section 705-1(1)) of the Juvenile
Court Act shows the legislature's intent to give trial courts wide latitude in admitting
evidence at the dispositional hearing. In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 760 N.E.2d
101, 114 (1st Dist. 2001) see also In re D.L., 226 Ill. App. 3d 177, 589 N.E.2d 680, 686
(1st Dist. 1992) ("Although hearsay and other types of incompetent evidence may not be
admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, they are admissible at the dispositional hearing");
In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872 (1st Dist. 1978) ( hearsay evidence may
not be admissible at the adjudicatory hearing, but is admissible at the dispositional
hearing); In re L.M., 189 Ill. App. 3d 392, 545 N.E.2d 319 (1st Dist. 1989) (Evidence
may include oral or written reports though it may not be competent at adjudicatory stage)
but see In re J.B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 77, 803 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 2004) (Section 2-22(1) of
the JCA does not provide that hearsay testimony is allowed at a best interest hearing or
dispositional hearing) The trial court may consider evidence beyond the conditions
requiring removal at that time but may consider other serious matters that have come to
light following removal. See generally In re Chyna B., 331 Ill. App. 3d 591, 772 N.E.2d
301 (4th Dist. 2002) This can include matters not necessarily raised in the petition. In re
J.H., 212 Ill. App. 3d 22, 570 N.E.2d 689 (3rd Dist. 1991) Also, any record of a prior
continuance under supervision is admissible at a dispositional hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-
22(3) Thus, all helpful evidence may be considered by the trial court at the dispositional
hearing. In re White, 103 Ill. App. 3d 105, 429 N.E.2d 1383 (4th Dist. 1982)
The court can order an investigation and preparation of a dispositional report
concerning the minor and the family. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2); In re J.H., 212 Ill. App. 3d
22, 28, 570 N.E.2d 689 (3rd Dist. 1991) (Statute contemplates admission of a
dispositional report) see also In re Calkins, 96 Ill. App. 3d 74,78, 420 N.E.2d 861 (3rd
Dist. 1981) (Social history containing hearsay statements admissible but subject to
contravention under Act) Where the trial court considers reports, the parties shall have
the opportunity to review the reports and cross -examine the authors on the record. In re
Rosmis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (2nd Dist. 1960)(Right to cross-examine
child representative who prepared report for court)
DCFS has an affirmative duty to provide full, accurate and timely reports and case
plans to the court and the parties. In re K.C., 325 Ill. App. 3d 771, 759 N.E.2d 15 (1st
Dist. 2001) see also Reports required by court. In re F.B., 206 Ill. App. 3d 140, 564
N.E.2d 173 (1st Dist. 1990)
E. Modification of Dispositional and Custody Orders :
Dispositional orders are subject to modification in a manner consistent with the
provisions of §2-28 of the JCA. 705 ILCS 405/2-28; In re Austin W., 214 Ill.2d 31, 823
N.E.2d 572 (2005) It has been stated that any modification of a dispositional order must
be made pursuant to a properly filed motion. 705 ILCS 405/2-12(6) & 705 ILCS 405/2-
23(2) & & 705 ILCS 405/2-28(5) The rules of evidence applicable to dispositional
hearings applies to motions and petitions to modify and review prior dispositional orders.
In re S.M., 223 Ill. App. 3d 543, 585 N.E.2d 641 (4th Dist. 1992) The trial court may
modify a prior dispositional order if it is in the best interests of the minor to do so. In re
Austin W., 214 Ill.2d 31, 823 N.E.2d 572, 580 (2005) On a petition for change of
custody, the burden of proof is on the person who filed the petition for change of custody
to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change of custody is in the best
interest of the minor. In re Austin W., 214 Ill.2d 31, 823 N.E.2d 572 (2005); 705 ILCS
405/2-28(4)
V.
PERMANENCY HEARINGS/REVIEWS [705 ILCS 405/2-28]
A. Burden of Proof :
Permanency hearings do not concern themselves with the issue of parental
unfitness. Permanency hearings (1) contain no burden of proof or standard of proof, (2)
are designed to hear probative evidence, and (3) result in no final orders. In re Curtis B.,
203 Ill.2d 53, 55, 784 N.E.2d 219 (2002); In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 817 N.E.2d
954 (1st Dist. 2004)
B. Rule(s) of Evidence :
It has been noted that the evidentiary rules that apply to the dispositional hearing
also apply to subsequent permanency review hearings. In re S.M., 223 Ill. App. 3d 543,
585 N.E.2d 641 (4th Dist. 1992) Any evidence sought to be introduced at a Permanency
Review hearing must be relevant to the stated purposes of §2-28. 705 ILCS 405/2-28
Section 2-28 provides in pertinent part as follows:
“(1) The court may require any legal custodian or guardian of the person
appointed under this Act to report periodically to the court or may cite him into
court and require him or his agency, to make a full and accurate report of his or its
doings in behalf of the minor. The custodian or guardian, within 10 days after
such citation, shall make the report, either in writing verified by affidavit or orally
under oath in open court or otherwise as the court directs.
* * *
(2) The first permanency hearing shall be conducted by the judge. . . If not
contained in the plan, the agency shall also include a report setting forth (i) any
special physical, psychological, educational, medical, emotional, or other needs of
the minor or his or her family that are relevant to a permanency or placement
determination and (ii) for any minor age 16 or over, a written description of the
programs and services that will enable the minor to prepare for independent
living. The agency's written report must detail what progress or lack of progress
the parent has made in correcting the conditions requiring the child to be in care;
whether the child can be returned home without jeopardizing the child's health,
safety, and welfare, and if not, what permanency goal is recommended to be in
the best interests of the child, and why the other permanency goals are not
appropriate. The caseworker must appear and testify at the permanency hearing.
* * *
The court shall consider (i) the permanency goal contained in the service plan, (ii)
the appropriateness of the services contained in the plan and whether those
services have been provided, (iii) whether reasonable efforts have been made by
all the parties to the service plan to achieve the goal, and (iv) whether the plan and
goal have been achieved. All evidence relevant to determining these questions,
including oral and written reports, may be admitted and may be relied on to the
extent of their probative value.
* * *
(5) Whenever a parent, guardian, or legal custodian files a motion for restoration
of custody of the minor, and the minor was adjudicated neglected, abused, or
dependent as a result of physical abuse, the court shall cause to be made an
investigation as to whether the movant has ever been charged with or convicted of
any criminal offense which would indicate the likelihood of any further physical
abuse to the minor. Evidence of such criminal convictions shall be taken into
account in determining whether the minor can be cared for at home without
endangering his or her health or safety and fitness of the parent, guardian, or
legal custodian.” (Emphasis added) 705 ILCS 405/2-28
Section 2-28.1 of the Act relating to permanency hearings conducted by hearing
officers provides in pertinent part that the hearing officer shall:
“***
(1) Conduct a fair and impartial hearing.
(2) Summon and compel the attendance of witnesses.
(3) Administer the oath or affirmation and take testimony under oath or
affirmation.
(4) Require the production of evidence relevant to the permanency hearing to be
conducted. That evidence may include, but need not be limited to case plans,
social histories, medical and psychological evaluations, child placement histories,
visitation records, and other documents and writings applicable to those items.
(5) Rule on the admissibility of evidence using the standard applied at a
dispositional hearing under Section 2-22 of this Act.” (Emphasis added) 705 ILCS
405/2-28.1
Duration of Permanency Review:
Although there are a number of cases holding that the trial court has wide
discretion in handling the cases on its own docket, there appears to be no case in which a
trial court imposed a predetermined time limit on the length of an evidentiary hearing.
Hilgenberg v. Kazan, 305 Ill. App. 3d 197, 207, 711 N.E.2d 1160 (1999) Given the
importance of establishing a permanency goal, it is inappropriate for the trial court to
establish an artificial time limit to present evidence. Hilgenberg v. Kazan, 305 Ill. App.
3d 197, 207, 711 N.E.2d 1160 (1st Dist. 1999) Although the trial court has the authority
to limit repetitive and irrelevant evidence, the trial court cannot properly predetermine the
appropriate length of the proofs. Hilgenberg v. Kazan, 305 Ill. App. 3d 197, 207, 711
N.E.2d 1160 (1st Dist. 1999) Fairness requires that the parties have the opportunity to
introduce all relevant evidence at a permanency hearing, regardless of the resulting length
of the proceeding. In re E.I., 309 Ill. App. 3d 392, 722 N.E.2d 779 (2nd Dist. 1999)
C. Admissible Evidence :
Pursuant to the JCA, permanency goals are to be set every six (6) months in order
to determine the future status of a child. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) At the permanency
review, the trial court is to set a permanency goal that is in the best interest of the child,
eview the child’s placement status, and set a placement goal for the child. 705
ILCS 405/2-28(2); In re Curtis B., 203 Ill.2d 53, 55, 784 N.E.2d 219 (2002) The purpose
of a permanency review hearing is to determine, inter alia, “the appropriateness of the
services delivered and to be delivered to effectuate the permanency plan and goal.” In re
Chiara C., 279 Ill. App. 3d 761, 665 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist. 1996)
Ample case law as set forth in the dispositional hearing section hereinabove
suggests that hearsay and otherwise incompetent evidence is admissible at a dispositional
hearing and, therefore, also admissible at a permanency review. This may be an
unfortunate extrapolation and, in some cases, dictum, as the language of §2-22 and §2-28
concerning admissible evidence is materially different. When the General Assembly uses
a particular phrase in one provision and different language in another, we must assume
that it intended different results for each. In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 811 N.E.2d
1285 (4th Dist. 2004) citing In re K.C., 186 Ill.2d 542, 549-50, 714 N.E.2d 491, 495
(1999) Thus, although in many jurisdictions it may be customary to allow the
introduction of virtually any information in a Permanency Review hearing purportedly
based on the language contained in §2-28(2) of the JCA, such a practice is not entirely
supported by statute or universally recognized by case law. The use of the word
“evidence” rather than “information” throughout §2-28 is an important consideration. See
generally In re J.B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 77, 803 N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 2004) (Section 2-18(1)
of the JCA states that the rules of evidence is applicable to proceedings under this
Article) but see In re A.L., 409 Ill. App. 3d 492, 949 N.E.2d 1123 (4th Dist. 2011) (The
same civil rules of evidence applicable to fitness hearings under the Adoption Act do not
apply at either dispositional hearings or permanency review hearings, which are
governed, in part, by sections 2–22(1) and 2–28(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987)
Also, the use of the term “relevant” in §2-28 of the JCA further implies that a relevancy
determination would be made by the court. In re C.H., 398 Ill. App. 3d 603, 925 N.E.2d
1260 (3rd Dist. 2010)(Even relevant evidence must be properly admitted) Again, it is
likely that such relevancy determinations would typically arise only where the party
seeking to tender the evidence has asked the court to admit the evidence and opposing
counsel has had an opportunity to object. Assuming that the moving party has met the
foundational requirements for admission and demonstrated that the evidence is relevant
to the specific purpose of a permanency review, a court is still not obligated to admit it or
give it any weight whatsoever. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) For example, it could be
cumulative or sufficiently collateral to the matter at hand. Likewise, the language of §2-
28 clearly relates back to the defined purposes of the Permanency Review hearing (not
the dispositional hearing) which pertain to the selection of a permanency goal, the
appropriateness of the service plan, the reasonable efforts of the parents and the
Department and whether (or not) the permanency goal has been achieved. 705 ILCS
405/2-28 Arguably, evidence pertaining to any non-permanency review matter before the
court is not statutorily covered by the liberal evidentiary standard in §2-28 of the JCA.
705 ILCS 405/2-28 At minimum, all evidence must be properly admitted in order to be
considered by a trial court. In re C.H., 398 Ill. App. 3d 603, 925 N.E.2d 1260 (3rd Dist.
2010)(Even relevant evidence must be properly admitted) citing Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d
293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956) Moreover, even in a Permanency Review hearing, proper
foundation should be established to support the admission of evidence. In re C.H., 398 Ill.
App. 3d 603, 925 N.E.2d 1260 (3rd Dist. 2010) The failure of counsel for a party to object
to the admission of evidence at a permanency review sought to be introduced without
proper foundation could result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. In re C.H.,
398 Ill. App. 3d 603, 925 N.E.2d 1260 (3rd Dist. 2010) citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) Presumably the failure to establish a proper
foundation properly authenticating evidence not only prevents its admission but would
simultaneously diminish its probative value to such a degree that it should hold little or
no sway in the court’s decision.
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