GLOBALLY AGREED UPON, LOCALLY TROUBLED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE LEGISLATION, HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA

GLOBALLY AGREED UPON, LOCALLY TROUBLED: THE CONSTRUCTION OF

ANTI-VIOLENCE LEGISLATION, HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, AND

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA

Introduction

The 1990s witnessed dramatic changes in feminist strategies to address problems

common to women across diverse cultural and political settings. Foremost among these is

the problem of violence against women, particularly domestic violence. Although some

feminists have been successful in defining violence as a problem of women in their

countries and around the world as early as 1970, strategies to address the problem and

public recognition of violence against women as a problem have varied greatly from

country to country.

What has changed during the 1990s is related to the emergence of heated

transnational and local debates regarding how best to approach the problem of violence.

One debate centers on whether to focus on providing services and support to women or to

focus on criminalizing and punishing the behavior of men. At the transnational level, the

acceptance of “women’s rights as human rights” at the United Nations Conference on

Human Rights in Vienna (1993)—ratified in 1995 at the Conference on Women in Beijing

—established a precedent that quickly became celebrated and agreed upon as a strategy:

implementation of a “human rights framework.” Agreement among

transnational feminists regarding the human rights strategy has led to networks of

collaboration and funding that have linked local feminists to their transnational

counterparts (also known as “femocrats”) located in global institutions like the United

Nations and to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and feminist

consultants. In 2007, there continues to be a growing trend in the increase in global

networks and coalitions that prioritize women’s issues and share “best practices.” That is,

transnational feminist coalitions emphasize the human rights framework to support policy

reform and new legislation with the goal of defending women’s “right to freedom from

violence” (Okin 2000; Merry 2003; Steans 2007; Lloyd 2007).

The emphasis on the human rights framework has ignited another debate. Local

feminists and some feminist scholars have questioned the usefulness of this framework.

They argue that it is based on Western concepts of law and citizenship that are not

universally applicable. Some also see this approach as representing a new form of Western

feminist hegemony that underestimates the importance of local contexts including cultural,

legal, political and other conditions and denies local feminists rightful autonomy

(Charlesworth 1994; Grewal 1999; Robinson 2003; Bovarnick 2007).

This dissertation considers these debates through a case study of local feminist

antiviolence activism. Specifically, the dissertation documents and analyzes the strategies

that South Korean feminists have implemented to construct domestic violence as a social

problem and crime that needs to be on the public agenda and, at the same time, to pass

anti-domestic violence laws and institutionalize the problem. The analysis focuses on

several key issues. First, the reasons behind and ways in which South Korean feminists

framed domestic violence privately and publicly are a major focus of the dissertation.

Second, how, why and with whom they formed strategic coalitions are discussed

extensively. And third, the dissertation analyzes debates and disagreements among local

feminists over strategic decisions such as framing of issues, coalition building, divisions

among feminists, and the goal of prioritizing laws to punish male perpetrators.

Within a broader context of the globalization of human rights language to combat

violence against women, this dissertation explores the dilemmas locally situated feminists

confront in their political and social contexts. One such dilemma has to do with the pros

and cons of the human rights framework versus an approach that fits better with cultural

and political goals to “preserve the Korean family.” The Korea Women’s Hotline, a

national organization with twenty-six branches, has been at the forefront of anti-domestic

violence activism and legislative initiatives. The dissertation focuses on their recent and

continuing struggle to combat domestic violence in South Korea.

Background

The Theoretical Context

A debate over universalism vs. cultural relativism has been at the center of internal

critiques of feminist studies since feminists became aware of ideological and cultural

differences among women and the theoretical and political significance of those

differences. Even when sympathetic to arguments in favor of a respect for these

differences among women, some feminists also have expressed concern that critiques and

a shift to “uncritical” cultural relativism have led to an over-emphasis on the notion that

differences are potentially irreconcilable. They argue that feminist politics have become

impotent and that feminists need to refocus energies on defending “all” women’s rights as

a matter of principle. The women’s human rights framework has become the preferred tool

for doing so.

On the other hand, the return to an emphasis on recognizing problems of violence

that women share across the world has contributed to newly emerging critiques. One such

critique is that a homogenizing of women’s experiences and of women themselves in other

parts of the world has contributed to over-simplified transnational feminist practices that

do not consider and may not apply to every context or location. Gunew and Yeatman

(1993) argue that the success of feminist politics relies upon the ability to deal with

differences among women. In response, feminist scholars such as Nussbaum (1999) and

Anthias (2002) have pursued ways of avoiding both false universalism and uncritical

cultural relativism. In regards to the issue of violence against women, therefore, local

feminist politics might need to address both rationalizing the human rights framework for

all locations and defending cultural differences against a potentially imperialistic Western

feminist approach. A logical conclusion would be that it is necessary to specify the ways in

which women in their situated locations experience, confront, and deal with a problem

defined globally as a common issue. At the same time, attempts to differentiate among

women’s experiences in different geographical and cultural spaces should be aware of the

danger of falling into cultural relativism because cultural relativism has been used often to

legitimate discriminatory practices toward women in the name of culture.

This dissertation, concerned with how women experience and combat this “globally

common problem,” is equally concerned with identifying the different strategies and

techniques at a local level that may contribute to more effective coalitions and realistic

collaborations between local and global feminists. Therefore, in exploring the different

cultural, social, and regional contexts, the dissertation is not concerned with emphasizing

difference. Rather, my research focused on the contexts where local feminist activities

occur and documented how the local feminist organization had to negotiate contextual

circumstances to keep its feminist principles. At the same time, contextualization was not

interpreted as resistance against Western-originated feminist theories or frameworks

because to do so would once again privilege the importance of Western feminists and their

frameworks. This dissertation highlights South Korean feminist agency and Western

influence is one of the many factors that local feminists considered (and challenged) as

they negotiated the local cultural, economic and political context.

An important feature of the backdrop to this dissertation is the acknowledgment of

the apparently universal feminist ideal or principle that violence against women is

unacceptable. An equally important feature is the recognition that there might be multiple

ways to achieve it. A human rights framework is one such way. Contextualizing feminist

movements against violence against women in their local settings will allow feminist

scholars see and assess the relative success of different strategies and how they are related

to local circumstances. Understanding strategies, local circumstances, and relative success

will improve understanding of the multiple ways for supporting feminist ideals. Extremely

important to this dissertation is a consideration of what apparently “less feminist” (per

Western notions) or “gender neutral” methods can offer to the theory and practice of anti-

violence politics beyond commonly-asked questions regarding the cooptation or failure of

feminist politics. Finally, by presenting an empirical case study of combating violence

against women in the South Korean setting, this dissertation addresses the gap in

knowledge surrounding the promotion of a universal human rights language and locally

situated feminist activities, frameworks and decision making. Specifically, the dissertation

provides an alternative discussion surrounding universalism and imperialism on the one

hand and cultural relativism on the other. To do so, it elucidates the ways in which the

local and the global are related with respect to the women’s human rights framework. The

specificities or contextualization of feminist activities in South Korea provides insight into

how both global and local space shape feminist practice and theory. For example, on a

global level women’s rights activists has strengthened understandings of the meaning and

potential impact of using the human rights framework to combat violence against women.

On a local level, feminist activists search both for ways of reconceptualizing (revitalizing)

the human rights language to escape from cultural “traps” and for ways of developing a

culturally resonant framework to gain public and political support for their goals.

Situating the Problem of Domestic Violence

There are many different forms of men’s violence against women: rape and other

forms of sexual assault, sexual harassment, prostitution, sex trafficking, stalking, and

domestic violence. Domestic violence has been widely acknowledged by feminists as

perhaps the most common and highest risk crime because it occurs in the home and in

intimate relationships so there is higher possibility of repetition and escalation. Although

domestic violence is a widespread phenomenon over the globe, there is a huge gap in how

it is conceptualized in different locations. There also is a widespread belief that domestic

violence is not a social matter because it takes place in the privacy of the home and

intimate relationships. In many countries, it is not considered a crime nor are there any

mechanisms in place to prevent violence or punish perpetrators. Despite the increased

pervasiveness and seriousness, therefore, it often is difficult for women’s movements to

construct domestic violence as a public issue or a crime in certain cultures.

This dissertation traces the ways in which the issue of domestic violence has been

constructed as a public issue in South Korean society. This was the first step in feminists’

campaign to demand social justice and influence the production of legislation and policies

to stop domestic violence. South Korean feminists are keenly aware that transnational

feminists employ human rights language as a strategy for stopping violence against

women. But, after much discussion and soul searching, Korean feminists constructed a

framework emphasizing “the preservation of the family” as a tool to fight domestic

violence. They did so because it was more useful than a human rights framework to draw

attention and garner support in their contextual reality. The dissertation presents an in-

depth analysis of the process Korean feminists went through to arrive at this decision. It

also presents an in-depth analysis of divisions among feminists because of this decision,

conflicts over collaborating with representatives of the State, and how decision making

was related to success in passing anti-violence legislation and failure to achieve

implementation of the legislation. One aspect of the analysis is improved understanding of

the ideal connection but practical disconnection between the global and local arenas; that

is, sharing ideals regarding women’s human rights does not lead to use of a human rights

framework by feminist activists. Feminist movements negotiate between competing

feminist ideals and cultural contexts to achieve a goal of legislative reform.

Research Objectives and Design

The primary purpose of my research was twofold: to address the usefulness of

human rights language for stopping violence against women around the world and to

understand local feminists’ strategies to redefine domestic violence as a social problem, a

public matter, and demand state intervention. There were two objectives underlying the

research design. The first was to contextualize the universal rights discourse as an

international tool, and norm, for struggling against violence against women in a local

setting. The second objective was to reveal contextual conflicts that locally situated

feminist movements confront and their decision making dilemmas.

To address questions related to “the global,” the dissertation begins with an overview

of the evolution of violence against women as a global issue, the redefinition of human

rights to include women’s human rights, and the development of a feminist politics of

rights. It includes attention to the debates among proponents of universal feminism and

postcolonial feminism surrounding the implementation of a common framework and the

significance of differential power in global campaigns against domestic violence.

To address questions related to “the local,” the dissertation analyzes the framing of

domestic violence as a public issue, coalition building for the anti-DV campaign,

construction of the anti-DV law, decision making and selection of objectives and

strategies, dissension and debates among feminists, problems with implementation of the

law once passed, measures taken to correct problems, and relations with State actors. The

analysis will address some key questions posed during fieldwork. These include: Whose

perspectives, values, and goals are reflected in anti-DV legislation? To what extent do

campaigns and legislation confront the public discourse and cultural beliefs that DV

represents individual deviance or pathology (especially given the law’s focus on

perpetrators)? Or do both the campaign and the law promote a new discourse on battering

as a social problem involving abuse of power and control? How have these competing

discourses affected the content of legislation, implementation, and prevention measures?

Have policymakers and feminists over-emphasized punishment over prevention and what

might the implications be?

The Specificities of South Korea

Despite the fact that the issue of violence against women has been on the global

feminist agenda for many years, there has been little research in Asian countries. South

Korea makes an interesting case because it has been a pacesetting country in East Asia,

both politically (a democracy) and economically. It has achieved considerable legal gains

for women’s rights through the efforts of women’s NGOs, not through government

initiatives. South Korea also is a leading member of the Asian Pacific Forum on Women,

Law and Development (APWLD) which is committed to enabling women to use the legal

system to advance gender equality and social justice.

Because it is a country undergoing considerable legal reforms that promote gender

equality, South Korean feminists have often been invited to Asian women’s NGO meetings

to share their experiences and strategies with other women in similar political and cultural

contexts. The South Korean feminist movement is known as a movement successful in its

efforts to pass legislation to stop violence against women and for building public-private

partnerships for solving the problem. After the passage of anti violence against women

laws in Mongolia in 2004, Mongolian feminist activists of the National Center against

Violence and government officers visited South Korea in 2005 to gather information on

how to follow-up with state intervention, agency responses, services and program models.

Japanese feminists also visited to study the 1366 program (a 24 hour hotline service that

operated year round) as an ideal model for developing a similar project in their country. In

the wake of the 9th Women’s World Congress held in Seoul in 2005, South Korea has

sought to collaborate in activities and plans to stop violence against women with women’s

NGOs in Japan, Mongolia, China, and the Philippines. South Korea, therefore, is an

excellent setting to study contextually situated feminist strategies, their successes, and

their limitations. Given the fact that it is held up as a model among feminists in Asia, the

South Korean case also provides an opportunity to consider the significance of a regional

shift in the transnational flow of feminist ideas and to re-consider notions of Western

feminist imperialism.

South Korea is interesting for other reasons. In what seems unusual when compared

to experiences documented for Latin America and Europe, anti-violence legislation was

passed before the Ministry of Gender Equality was established and without support from

any state offices1; the reverse tends to be the case elsewhere (excluding the US). Given that

establishing a women’s office usually is considered important to facilitate reforms, of

particular interest is how the South Korean feminist movement was able to garner

widespread support for their proposed anti-violence legislation before the establishment of

the Ministry of Gender Equality. The dissertation includes an analysis of how the

1 Actually, at the time there was a Special Congressional Committee on Women’s Affairs, but it did not

play

Domestic Violence Act (1997) resulted from coalitions that the Korea Women’s Hotline

formed with 22 other civic organizations, including both progressive and conservative

groups.

South Korea is interesting, as well, because it has a long history of feminist activism,

dating at least from the early 20th century. Over time diverse factors influenced, sustained,

shaped, and revitalized the feminist movement—and continue to do so. These include the

partition of the Korean peninsula, national liberation, dictatorship, modernization,

democratization, Confucian patriarchal ideology, and militarism. At times, Korean

feminism has been held up by political leaders as a nationalist strategy to undermine

colonial domination. At other times, Korean feminism has been reviled as an attack on the

family and on South Korea as a state (because of feminist support for reunification and

food programs for the North). The dissertation will place more recent anti domestic

violence activism within this broader historical and political context.

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will present a discussion of the

relevant feminist scholarship on the human rights framework, transnational/global

feminisms, social movements, and a comparative analysis of research on anti violence

any significant role in passing the Acts.

strategies and legislation. Chapter 3 provides details on the construction of the research

design, selection of conceptual tools for analysis—including institutional ethnography and

frame theory, and the specific methods used for each aspect of fieldwork. These methods

include in-depth interviews with feminist activists and coalition members; participant

observation at meetings and events; and analysis of documents, minutes of meetings,

media coverage and other studies of the Korean feminist movement, including scholarly

works.

Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion of the history of Korean feminism, the Korean

Women’s Hotline, and recent advances in women’s rights in South Korea. Chapters 5 and

6 include most of the analysis of the Korean Women’s Hotline’s campaign to combat

domestic violence by framing DV as a social issue, organizing a coalition, and achieving

passage (and subsequent reform) of anti-domestic violence legislation. The analysis

addresses issues of coalition decision making based on public and political responses to

alternative frameworks. These chapters also discuss limits to achievements and

contradictory effects of using culturally resonant framing, especially after

institutionalization and state intervention. Chapter 7 introduces the dilemma that locally

situated Korean feminists confront in challenging existing discourse, employing the

universal principle of the women’s human rights framework, and the search for a new,

culturally resonant frame.

Chapter 8 presents the conclusions. The chapter assesses the empirical and

theoretical contributions of the dissertation and the South Korean case to contemporary

social movement theory, understanding the nature of women’s engagement with the state,

and the international women’s human rights movement. Additionally, the final chapter

suggests the potential for alternative discussions about the usefulness of the human rights

frameworks by providing a new interpretation for the existing feminist debates over

universalism and cultural relativism.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

Four bodies of theory and research contributed to my conceptualization of the

research problem, influenced construction of the theoretical framework, and were critical

to the research design and selection of methods. These are feminist scholarship on violence

against women, debates among feminist scholars and transnational activists surrounding

the universality of the human rights framework promoted by activists, feminist studies on

transnational advocacy networks and women’s movements in global perspective, and the

sociological field of social movement studies. This chapter provides a brief overview of

the most relevant aspects of each.

Violence against Women

Battered Women’s Movements

The problem of violence against women, particularly wife abuse, was addressed by

feminist movements as early as the 1970s, though primarily in Western societies. Research

reveals that the battered women’s movement began in Britain in 1972 as a form of shelter

movement, which provided safe refuges and housing to women who escaped from

violence. Following the establishment of the first shelter for battered women in London,

shelters and crisis centers opened in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe

(Dobash and Dobash 1992; Tierney 2005).

The quick spread of the battered women’s movement was a consequence of sharing

experiences and ideas among activists who traveled within and across countries. For

example, many American women activists visited the shelters in British and were

stimulated by the idea of temporary residences for battered women. At that time, only safe

houses for wives of alcoholics were available in the United States (Dobash and

Dobash 1992; Schneider 2000). Chiswick Women’s Aid, the first shelter in Britain, and

Women’s Advocates and Transition House in the United States served as models for

subsequent shelters. Women activists who opened shelters or crisis centers in their local

communities also helped to launch some in other areas. Manuals and directories written by

activists were widely used to help women’s groups to set up shelters and provide

counseling to battered women (Dobash and Dobash 1992; Tierney 2005).

In the United States, feminist organizations gathered in 1977 and agreed upon the

need for establishing programs for battered women at local, state, and federal levels during

the National Women’s Year Conference (Tierney 2005). The emerging activism on refuge

provision grew from local needs and concerns, became the agenda of national

organizations, and eventually contributed to international recognition of the problem.

Feminist Perspective on Wife-beating

The rise and growth of the battered women’s movement was a direct result of the

women’s liberation movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s both in Britain and the

United States. This second wave women’s movement developed out of the civil rights

movements and proposed that wife-beating should be understood through the frame of

gender subordination and male domination (Dobash and Dobash 1992; Renzetti and

Bergen 2005; Schneider 2000).

Constructing wife beating as a social problem was both a goal and an achievement of

the battered women’s movement (Breines and Gordon 1983; Gordon 1988). Many scholars

have pointed out that wife beating has existed in every known culture and throughout

history and women have not been passive victims. But the 1970s were the first time

battering, or wife abuse, was resisted publicly at both a social and a political level (Gordon

1983; Dobash and Dobash 1992; Ferarro 1996).

The first step in identifying wife beating as a social issue was the employment of

gender as a crucial category for analysis. This was an attempt to illuminate male violence

in a male-dominated society where women’s lower social status forced them to depend on

men. In this sense, a feminist perspective on wife beating placed violence and the family in

their broader social context. Relating family to the public/private distinction, to a capitalist

society, and to the specialization of restrictive gender roles, this approach allowed seeing

male violence as a means of exerting power and control rather than as individual events or

caused by psychological traits (Gordon 1983; Bograd 1988; Mauricio and Gormeley

2001).

One of the ways of pursuing a feminist approach was to reveal and reflect on

battered women’s experiences, thereby defining the experience of battering from their

perspectives (Gordon 1988; Bograd 1988; Schneider 2000). By making battered women’s

voices heard, feminists challenged the traditional psychological view that reduces violence

to mental illness or individual actions. For example, in the framework of psychology,

personal experiences of trauma and learning or individual traits such as anger, depression,

or low self-esteem have been proposed as the main causes of wife-beating (Hamburger &

Hastings 1993; Holtzworth-Munroe et al. 1997).

Engagement with the State and Policy Effects

Defining wife beating as a social problem, the battered women’s movement realized

the need for social change but pursued it in different directions. A feminist approach that

views violence against women as the result of inequality in gender relations tends to

emphasize empowering women through practices supporting self-esteem, decision making,

and the assertion of independence—often by encouraging women to leave the batterer

(Bograd 1988 and 1990). Many feminists holding this position rejected any engagement

with the state because they believed that the patriarchal state enforced and maintained all

forms of male violence against women. Therefore, a priority strategy should be preserving

feminist philosophy and egalitarian organizational structures

(Ahrens 1980; Murray 1988; Rodriguez 1988).

For other feminists who also believed in the significance of women’s empowerment,

however, it was important to recognize that law and policy play key roles in helping women

attain autonomy and punishing men who are violent. From this perspective, women’s safety

and independence would be improved through change in formal criminal justice systems and

with formal support such as state-funded shelters and other services

(Smart 1989; Charles 1995; Dugan 2003).

In Western countries, in this respect, the criminalization of battering has become an

influential discourse, along with provision of a variety of support and educational services

for battered women. But research shows mixed evidence of the effects of State

intervention. For example, while some studies have found settings where mandatory arrest

and prosecution seem to be effective in stemming re-incidence (i.e., Minnesota, Arizona),

other studies have raised questions of both the effectiveness of mandatory arrest and the

implications for preventing violence before it begins. Feminist scholars question in

particular whether the shift toward mandatory arrest and criminal prosecution of individual

cases are the most appropriate responses for resolving domestic violence as a broad social

problem or even for meeting the needs of battered women. Some research suggests that the

effects of mandatory arrest depend on follow-up interventions

(Eisikovits and Edleson 1989; Dobash and Dobash 2000; Fleury, Sullivan and Bybee

2000). Other studies suggest that mandatory arrest leads to lowered rates of battered

women’s reporting because of women’s ambivalence toward state intervention and

criminal prosecution of partners (Ptacek 1999; Felson, Messner, Hoskin and Deane 2002).

Others propose that the symbolic effect of mandatory policies may actually empower the

state and the police rather than the battered women (Chancer 2004; Ferraro 1996; Kelly

2004).

The debate on the effects of legal intervention is inconclusive in part because of

different theoretical positions among feminists and differences between feminists and

battered women. Reviews of the literature on domestic violence services and feminist

jurisprudence reveal the dilemma that a feminist strategy faces when it considers the

potential effect of both the legal intervention and it emphasizes women’s autonomy

(Schneider 2000). While it is widely acknowledged that criminalizing battering conveys a

strong message that domestic violence should be treated as a crime, emphasis on

prosecution and civil protection orders do not reflect the complexity of battered women’s

experiences and situations. On the one hand, demands for state protection of women as

victims of domestic violence can lead to services and resources for women and represents

battered women as deserving sympathy. For battered women who kill their batterers, the

term of “battered woman syndrome” was introduced as a supportive claim for selfdefense,

a way to explain the consequence of battering as contributing to a type of posttraumatic

stress leading to an inability to accurately perceive reality.

On the other hand, victim strategies do not acknowledge women’s agency and often

deny them decision making power and control (as in mandatory arrest). Such strategies

have been criticized by feminists (including some who initially supported them) as

revictimizing women by taking their autonomy away or by reducing the experience of

battered women to an impaired mental state. Even worse, “battered women’s syndrome”

has been embraced by prosecutors who use it against women who “do not fit the profile.”

At the same time, feminist scholars also are concerned that the emphasis on women’s

autonomy and agency may place too much responsibility (blame) on the women and

overlook societal factors and structural discrimination that contribute to gender violence.

Ignoring the broader context also hinders women’s agency (Ferraro 2003; Schneider

2000).

Feminist legal scholars and social scientists argue that interventions relying on the

state as a protector of women ignore the ways in which patriarchal relations are inscribed

in social institutions. While the institution of the family may be considered in such

interventions, the patriarchy inherent in a broad range of legislation, the criminal justice

system, and other social institutions (education, media, religion, politics, economy) is

ignored. These scholars urge attention to a broader program of social change as both

appropriate to supporting women’s initiatives by providing them with greater options and

appropriate to prevent the reproduction of norms, values, customs, opportunities, and

practices that encourage violence in the first place (Yeatman 1997; Ferraro 1996;

Anderson and Umberson 2001; Eadie and Knight 2002; Grauwiler and Mills 2004).

Lastly, the discussion surrounding issues of “victim” or “actor” and competing

theories surrounding the “causes” of violence (individual pathology, social institutions,

patriarchal gender relations, alcohol and drug abuse, etc.) have focused attention on the

importance of discursive fields. That is, conversations about domestic violence (or wife

abuse or partner abuse or domestic altercations) both imply different ideological positions

and make difficult broader societal conversations about violence among different social

groups (lawyers, media, feminists, politicians, women, police, etc.). Therefore, any study

of anti-violence strategies must examine the origin and content of discourses attached to

differing conceptualizations of the problem and possible solutions (Bush 1992; Walker

1990).

The existing literature on the emergence of battered women’s movement and

feminist perspectives on wife-beating also lays the groundwork for the dissertation by

indicating the lack of information on the global nature of women’s movements against

violence. Some literature discusses cross-border networks and international conferences as

venues for sharing information and experiences among women across national borders.

And it is important to establish gender as a key analytic category to assess achievements

and limitations of the Korean feminist movement.

Yet, the literature does not appropriately reflect feminist movements against violence

against women in other contexts and settings. That is, analyses and research firmly place

the Western battered women’s movement as a part of the second-wave feminist movement,

itself a beneficiary of the civil rights movement. It was possible for Western actors to

establish important concepts such as gender and women’s rights as core concepts for the

movement. However, in other national settings such as South Korea, where the women’s

movement was developed in association with other social protest movements in the

context of colonialism, national division (North/South Korea), underdevelopment, and

military authoritarianism, problematizing violence against women itself was very difficult.

In this respect, the dissertation focuses on a very different trajectory of the emergence and

development of the Korean feminist movement and the ways in which the movement has

struggled to use the terms “gender” and

“women’s rights.”

The existing feminist research on the impact of institutionalization and state

engagement in other settings suggests ways to analyze the consequences of the

institutionalization of domestic violence in South Korea. Guided by this research, my

dissertation research sought to explain the reasons why Korean feminists sought

institutionalization and state intervention and also examines the potentials and limitations

of feminist strategies for the state. Rather than simply focusing on positive and negative

consequences of institutionalization, my research was designed to shed light on the ways

in which social institutions such as state offices, police, media, and the criminal justice

system re/produce and re/construct an issue that the feminist movement constructed as a

social problem that should be on the public agenda and state responses to this strategy.

Human Rights Discourse and Cultural Debates

International Feminism and the United Nations

International human rights discourse was a product of the creation of the United

Nations, and feminists have engaged in theorizing and practicing the notion of human

rights (Charlesworth 1994; Rupp 1997). During the creation of the United Nations, liberal

feminists fighting for equal rights influenced the process of drafting the Charter of the

United Nations. As a result of their struggles, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

included formal legal equality between men and women (Charlesworth 1998; Fraser 1999;

Parisi 2002). In this sense, many have argued that women’s rights and women’s human

rights were already guaranteed at the international level under the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights in 1948 (Poe et al. 1997). However, feminist scholars pointed out that

acknowledgement of women’s lives in some articles such an UDHR did not automatically

mean improvement of women’s human rights and a guarantee of gender equality at the

local level. Feminist critiques also paid attention to the fact that the UDHR reflects biased

perspectives on women’s lives by representing women as wives and mothers and by

presuming that the family is the natural foundation of society (Charlesworth 1998).

It has been widely noted that women’s rights at the international level were

recognized more explicitly through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in

1979. However, it also has been argued that women’s rights in this convention emphasize

formal political and economic equality based on the principle of non-discrimination.

Therefore, it has limitations to consider other forms of discrimination on the basis of sex or

gender (Coomaraswamy 1994; Merry 2003).

In this context, there has been growing criticism that the ideals of liberal feminism

based on the notions of equality, rational ability, and self-determination did not reflect the

different experiences of men and women across cultures (Binion 1995; Parisi 2002). This

criticism directly raised a question of whether feminist strategies to incorporate women

into the mainstream human rights system could reflect women’s specific or marginalized

experiences. From this perspective, feminist scholars and activists began to consider the

international human rights system itself as a direct legacy of Western European liberal

ideology (Binion 1995; Parisi 2002). As such, critics argue that it replicates the

philosophical and legal foundations that bolster sex and gender discrimination in Western

societies and it does not acknowledge other cultural and ideological systems as equally

valid. That is, Western liberal ideology is imperialist and racist and can be used to reaffirm

the superiority of Western European thought.

Gender-Based Violence around the Globe

As information, activities, and strategies of the battered women’s movement were

circulated, discussed, and shared across borders, violence against women emerged as a

common problem that women face all around the globe. As Sally Engle Merry (2001)

points out, “global declarations about gender violence” are the result of local feminist

activities and resistance “rather than a global imposition of a new moral order” (89). On

the other hand, given the context of feminist aspirations to find common ground without

homogenizing women’s experience, making gender violence a global issue was a

meaningful feminist attempt to deal with difference in a very specific but commonplace

situation. Another important factor that contributed to feminist activism on gender violence

in a global arena is globalization. Feminists have focused on globalization in several ways.

On the one hand, feminist theorists have addressed the ways in which a newly and rapidly

emerging power structure facilitated by global capitalism has exacerbated difficulties in

women’s lives. This perspective questions why women’s increased labor force

participation cannot be the source for women’s empowerment and how women in different

settings face similar or different problems under the current global system (Pyle and Ward

2003; Sampaio 2004).

On the other hand, feminist scholars have paid attention to an important consequence

of globalization such as “the unprecedented growth of international nongovernmental

organizations and global social movements” (Robinson 2003, 161). This perspective tends

to define globalization in more inclusive ways, moving beyond the conventional way of

seeing it as the spread of market capitalism. In this context, globalization is understood as

the dissemination of information, signs, symbols, representations and the movement of

people as well as the circulation of capital and commodities (Mackie 2001,187). Nelly

Stromquist (2000) points to “greater exposure to values of democratization and women’s

human rights” as an advantage of globalization (428). Broadening the dimensions of

globalization to include economic, political, and cultural relations, Sylvia Walby (2002)

argues that increased interrelations contribute to creating “gendered political opportunities

and resources” for feminist practices around the globe (535). One of these opportunities

includes a changing relationship with the state. This comes about because the weakened or

minimized authority of the nation state and “unsettled national boundaries” are unintended

consequences of globalization and imply the possibility of “transnational forms of

politicization” (Mendoza 2002, 299).

Given such arguments, recent feminist research on violence against women has

expanded to include more of a focus on the fact that women in all cultures suffer from the

threat and reality of violence. Research also has addressed the dominant causes of violence

against women as closely related to women’s being women and their lower social status.

For example, Charlotte Bunch (1998) points out that violence against women is “an

extension of the ideology that gives men the right to control women’s behavior, their

mobility, their access to material resources, and their labor, both productive and

reproductive” (60). In this context, violence against women is defined as gender-based

violence. In addition, based on the perspective that violence against women has been the

major obstacle to achieving women’s basic freedom and safety, this issue has also been

recognized as a matter of human security. Given this comprehensive understanding of

gender violence, feminists have taken a stand on this issue as a common problem of

women across the world and the resulting transnational campaign against violence against

women has provided an important stimulus for feminist coalitions all around the globe

(Bunch 1998; Fraser 1999; UNIFEM 2003).

Public/Private Distinction

In spite of the growing enthusiasm for transnational advocacy networks and

coalitions to fight violence against women as human rights violations, there have been

many critiques of the human rights approach—including the critique of its Western

European heritage. Feminist critiques of international human rights laws, specifically, have

been twofold: they include androcentric notions and reify the public-private distinction

(Binion 1995; Bahar 1996; Charlesworth 1994 and 1998; O’Hare 1999; Romany 1994;

Sullivan 1995). An outgrowth of the legacy of political and civil rights struggles at the end

of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, international human rights laws were

designed to serve the interests and needs of men who wanted to regulate their relationship

with the state. Under this regime, the primary actor in human rights violation is the state,

and this understanding presumes a public/private distinction with the notion that men have

rights to privacy (O’Hare 1999).

The notion of human rights refers to the virtue of being human based on Locke’s

liberalism, and it reflected the experiences of the elite men who, at the time, were entitled

to political rights in the public sphere (Charlesworth 1994; Parisi 2002). In other words,

identifying the public sphere as the primary location where human rights violations occur,

the human rights system does not address human rights violations within family contexts

in the private sphere.

Claiming that this androcentric notion of human rights cannot represent women’s

interests and issues, feminist scholars and activists also have problematized other aspects

of the public/private dichotomy deeply embedded in the notion of human rights. They

argue that the assumption that a man as the head of a household has rights to the personal

lives of household members has resulted in violations of the human rights of women and

children (Okin 2000). They also point out that the public/private dichotomy is gendered

and that this distinction not only legitimizes men’s domination of women in the name of

rights to privacy, but also preserves a gender-inequality status quo by making women’s

issues invisible (Charlesworth 1994). Consequently, it is noted that the gendered

dichotomy of the public-private plays a role in justifying and normalizing patriarchy

(Parisi 2002). Most of all, based on a “natural division” based on the sexual attributes of

men and women, this gendered dichotomy has naturalized the relegation of women to a

secondary position where they have little power to resist all kinds of oppression and

degradation.

Based on this critique, both feminist theorists and activists have attempted to extend

current notions of human rights and to fully integrate women’s experiences into the human

rights regime. In order to achieve this goal, the feminists involved believed that one of the

most important tactics would be to disrupt the public/private dichotomy. As long as the

public sphere is recognized as the proper space for human rights, the advantage of human

rights discourse in the name of the powerless will not be available to women’s experience

of oppression in the private realm. Agreement on this point helped feminists forge

alliances and argue that women’s rights should be recognized as human

rights.

Women’s Human Rights Movement

Through the U.N. Conferences on women that took place between 1975 and 1995,

global feminism has strengthened its networks, and the issue of violence against women

has drawn international attention through the language of women’s rights as human rights.

In part, this was due to a 1993 convention.

In 1993, a petition demanding that women’s rights should be on the agenda at the

Human Rights Convention in Vienna garnered over 300,000 signatures in 123 countries

and 20 languages and was sponsored by 800 organizations (Parisi 2002, 581). This shows

a successful consequence of the global feminist movement under the motto of women’s

rights as human rights. In addition to the goal of reconceptualizing the notion of human

rights based on women’s experience, the language of women’s human rights aims to resist

the violations of women’s rights committed in the name of respecting cultural differences.

According to Okin, it is important to recognize women’s rights as human rights because

“many violations of women’s basic human rights occur within families and are justified by

reference to culture, religion, or tradition” (2000, 33).

In accordance with the claim of women’s human rights, global feminism has

struggled to construct international laws in order to combat violence against women.

Despite the critique of problematic implementation, the international women’s human

rights movement’s focus on legal struggle has been regarded as meaningful. Using

women’s human rights allows feminists to lobby successfully for a number of treaties and

legal documents that affect women’s everyday lives. Most of all, feminist theorists point

out that the women’s human rights approach contributes to creating and shaping a cultural

understanding that holds governments responsible for impediments to basic human rights

(Merry 2003; Byrnes 1994). This argument indicates the potential impact of global

feminism on local movements. In fact, Bunch (2001) highlights that the global women’s

human rights approach plays a crucial role in strengthening local mobilization and

advancing local objectivities (138).

Once the links among violations of women's human rights, the private realm, and

cultural or religious justifications were envisioned, some feminists turned to a discussion

of the need for a universal claim to bolster a global feminist movement. Consequently,

despite some criticisms directed at both assumptions regarding the sameness of women

and the imposition of “western values,” feminist scholars have argued that broadening the

value of universalism for all women around the globe is necessary in order to establish a

universal norm. In claiming the necessity of universalism, one significant principle is to

remember that there is a commonality that women share by being women all over the

world. Okin calls this commonality “general truths that affect the lives of many women

around the globe” (2000, 39). This claim is based on the fact that “patriarchy and the

devaluing of women are almost universal” (Charlesworth 1994, 62).

As a global feminist strategy, the reemergence or increased reliance on universal

discourse attempts to pave the way for dealing with differences among women. Martha C.

Nussbaum (1999) clearly argues that seeking common problems does not deny that

different contexts and circumstances differently shape people’s lives and experiences all

over the world. Instead, common problems, according to her, refer to “a good deal of

overlap of problems within those lives” (7-8). For Nussbaum, in order to address basic

human rights and needs, “a long step” of scrutinizing particular contexts is not necessary

because universal issues could be identified with a universal method. For her, liberal

feminism is an ongoing feminist project that should not be jettisoned. Responding to the

criticism of imposing western thinking on other cultural contexts, Nussbaum highlights

that global feminist politics should be understood as a way of providing support (9).

Similarly, emphasizing the value of universal human rights by virtue of humanity and not

on the basis of sameness, Charlotte Bunch (2001) suggests that human rights would be a

regulative principle that women in local contexts can adopt in order to resist the exercise

of oppressive power, including cultural defenses. In this sense, Bunch identifies universal

human rights as “a system of accountability” (140).

As feminists have recognized that cultural relativism is utilized to justify women’s

oppression, feminist theorists and activists have reconsidered the assumed advantages of

the universal framework, especially the notion of women’s common problems around the

globe. In this context, feminist theorization of difference has focused on drawing

commonality from multi-layered differences of women’s lives, experiences and

perspectives. According to Okin, commonality can be conceptualized in the following

sense: “discrimination against women,” “patterns of gender-based violence, including

domestic battery,” and “the sexual and economic exploitation of women and girls” (2000,

38).

The reconsideration of the notion of universality and the new definition of

commonality in specific terms that are inclusive of different expressions of human rights

violations are directly relevant to understanding the issues in South Korea and Korean

feminists’ choices for defining and combating violence.

Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue

One of the significant controversies surrounding domestic violence relates to

explanations of its causes (Berliner 1990). Individual-level explanations emphasize that

domestic violence is a human issue rather than a gender issue, arguing that both men and

women engage in violent behaviors, based on statistics and survey data (McNeely and

Robinson-Simpson 1987; McNeely 1990). On the contrary, feminist scholars point out that

it is important to situate domestic violence within the entire social context rather than

relying on decontextualized data or statistics. Their perspective considers gender a

significant variable to address domestic violence (Bograd 1990; Berns 2001).

Even as individual-level theorists failed to explain the pervasiveness of domestic

violence through research on male perpetrators, it was reported that women all over the

world confront all forms of violence against women, transcending race, class, culture, and

national differences (Bunch and Carrillo 1994; Fitzpatrick 1994; Miles 1996). Among the

diverse forms of violence, domestic violence has drawn international attention because it

has been exclusively treated as a private matter even when consequences are fatal.

In constructing wife beating as a social problem, feminist movements have pointed

to gender inequality as the dominant cause and emphasized state responsibility for

eliminating this type of violence. In order to broaden the notion of human rights violations

which originally included only state-sponsored violence, it was necessary to hold the state

accountable for violence committed by private individuals. To do so, feminists used the

theory of government complicity. This theory focuses on government’s failure to prosecute

domestic violence compared to other violent crimes. By seeing government’s failure to act

as condoning or tacitly permitting wife beating, this theory defines domestic violence as a

human rights violation regardless of involvement of private actors (Thomas and Beasley

1993; Roth 1994; Meyersfeld 2003).

Rights Discourse and the Politics of Rights

Feminist and political/socio/legal scholarship has debated an ambivalent aspect of

human rights discourse. While human rights discourse is regarded as a crucial element of

political legitimization in the current political setting (Baynes 2000), it is criticized for

political impotence that is a consequence of its abstract, formal, individual rhetoric. In

particular, critical legal studies theorists have argued that legal victories of socially

marginalized groups under the framework of the rights discourse fail to change the social

power structure.

Feminist attempts to use rights discourse also have provoked controversial debates.

The central feminist criticism on using rights discourse is that an appeal to the language of

rights brings only a “rhetorical flourish” that superficially addresses the political and social

issues. In other words, the individualized issue of rights is problematic to identify

collective and structural disadvantages. In addition to this problem, there also has been a

critique that an emphasis on legal rights aiming at using state power to protect citizens is

too narrow to address complicated patriarchal expressions of power. Nonetheless, for some

feminist theorists and activists, this rhetorical mode can be understood as an important

tactic, especially in international arenas. These debates focus on the usefulness of rights

discourse for people in a disadvantaged position around the globe because the rhetoric of

rights can make a persuasive claim in the name of the powerless (Charlesworth 1994, 60-

62). Recognizing the advantages of rights discourse in the international arenas has

prompted feminists to explore the notion of international human rights with the question of

whether the established notion of human rights could be applied to address women’s

interests and concerns in specific contexts (Binion 1995;

Charlesworth 1994; Fraser 1999).

As mentioned above, feminist theorists have argued that human rights have referred

to men’s rights. Therefore, expanding the limited application of human rights as civil and

political rights to other types of rights (i.e. security, economic rights), and incorporating

women’s issues into the concept of human rights have been crucial projects for global

feminism. Another feminist critique has also claimed that the concept of liberal rights has

served to support the status quo rather than challenging gendered social relations of power.

Feminist theorists who criticize the concept of liberal rights do so because it individualizes

problems and inequalities that women suffer from just for being women and because of

social and structural circumstances (Rudy 1999; Schwartzman 1999). Criticizing the male-

centered rights claim, feminists have sought to revise rights discourse to reflect women’s

experiences. One suggestion is that the limits of abstract rights should be reduced by

specifying the concrete needs and interests of the marginalized people (Schwartzman

1999).

While there is growing recognition that masculinist liberal rights discourse is limited

in its ability to address women’s subordination, some feminists continue to call into

question the universalized notions of women and women’s rights. This critique argues that

a homogenized and simplified notion of women’s rights claims simply cannot reflect the

multiply constituted sites where women survive and struggle through their everyday lives

(Grewal 1999). Responding to this problem of differences among women, other feminists

argue that including women’s experience into rights discourse should aim to integrate fully

different women’s voices and perspectives from all specific settings. From this point of

view, rights discourse should seek complex understandings of differences among women

to provide better protection from their situated and contextualized experiences

(Hirschmann 1999).

While there is a need to particularize women’s experiences of injury within a rights

framework, it can also be argued that rights discourse is detrimental to women. Wendy

Brown (2000) asserts that identity-based rights claims based on women’s suffering and

injury function to reinforce women’s subordination and inequality. Focusing on the

constructive character of legal discourse, Brown points to this paradoxical aspect of

feminist rights claims. According to her, despite the need for being specific and concrete

about women’s suffering, this specificity functions to confine women to the identity

defined and reproduced through these very injuries, subordination, and inequalities.

However, other theorists point out that skepticism about rights discourse does not lead to

feminist abandonment of rights language. Rather, the problematic aspects of rights

discourse foster a more complex feminist understanding of rights discourse and feminist

rights politics (Lever 2000).

Although rights discourse has provided an important ideological foundation for

feminist theory and politics, the significance of its practical implications remains at the

center of feminist inquiry. This questioning shifts feminist revisions of rights discourse to

consider how internationally justified norms can construct their meanings in local contexts

and impact local feminist practices. Realizing how formal rights has intertwined and

interconnected with women’s lives in a variety of settings informs new feminist inquiries

about the politics of rights (Cornwall and Molyneux 2006).

Although many feminist activists and theorists believe that it continues to be

important to seek global networks and coalitions and to rely on the transnational

legitimacy of rights claims such as international human rights (Lazarus-Black and Merry

2003), they also argue that it is necessary to study the impact of transnational flows

through the internal dynamics of domestic arenas (Gordon and Berkovitch 2007). This

shift of focus encourages feminist activists and theorists to enhance their understanding of

how universal claims such as international human rights discourse are redefined and

transformed through local values and practices. However, there are important cultural

debates that directly contradict any use of a universal notion of women’s human rights.

Cultural Debates

Although an international norm of women’s human rights is drawing sympathetic

attention around the world, there also is a backlash that defends cultural and traditional

differences. “These are our practices and they should be respected” is one argument and

“women support and engage in these practices” is another. To confront this problem, some

international communities have reasserted the principle that harmful practices to women,

children, or other vulnerable populations cannot be a valid justification for cultural

difference (Merry 2003, 946).

Feminists’ rejection of multiculturalism is based on the same assumption. In her

classic piece, “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” Okin calls into question certain

multiculturalist policies that violate women’s equality and individual rights in the name of

advocating minority group rights. For her, granting multicultural practices on the basis of

respecting cultural differences contributes to enhancing and perpetuating patriarchal

cultures.2 Similarly, Linda Fisher (2004) points to the internal contradictions of defending

minority group rights. She argues that while a multiculturalist approach to group rights

advocates differences, this same position fails to respect differences within a group. She

raises the question of how can the logic of group rights deal with the matter of protection

for individual rights when some group member demands it in the name of respecting

difference (114). Furthermore, have all members of the group or representatives of

subgroups (like women vs. men) been consulted on the issue?

Although this rejection of cultural relativism aims to protect women’s human rights,

there have also been valid criticisms of a universal approach to cultural differences. Two

responses to this universal framework emerge. One is a Third World feminist defense of

multiculturalism that problematizes universalism as cultural imperialism. The other is a

suggestion to move beyond the binary opposition between universalism and multiculturalism.

The former perspective describes the feminist rejection of multiculturalism as implicit

2 She and other critiques also rightly point out that spokespersons for those minority groups tend to be

elites, almost exclusively men, whose privileges are threatened by advocates of change.

imperialism on the basis that it assumes the superiority of the liberal Western culture by

positioning racial ethnic minority cultures as inferior or uncivilized.

In rejecting this patronizing and stereotyping response to different cultures on the

part of (primarily) liberal feminists, Ranjoo Seodu Herr (2004) defends multiculturalism

on the basis that culture plays a crucial role in identity formation especially for racial and

ethnic minority women. She also argues that cultural values function “as a protective

bulwark against various kinds of oppressions that [minority cultures] face in the dominant

society” (93). She asserts that racial and ethnic minority women must be the primary

agents who figure out and determine the question of what their culture means to them.

From the latter perspective, on the other hand, constructing the binary opposition

between feminism and multiculturalism is criticized as problematic because it functions to

hide factors other than sexism that affect women’s lives (Volpp 2001; Anthias 2002). This

dichotomy is based on assumptions that minority cultures are more sexist and that Third

World women are victims of their culture—thereby positioning the cultures of liberal

feminists as “superior.” As Volpp points out, while cultural explanations of women’s

oppression are primarily given to explain the causes of violence against women in the

Third World or immigrant groups, culture is not considered as a key factor to be analyzed

in Western women’s experience of violence [although one could argue that gender

relations and patriarchy are cultural factors]. Accordingly, this problematic reliance on

culture as an analytical tool overlooks “structural forces that shape cultural practices”

(2001, 1205).

Cultural debates complicate feminist positions and reveal difficulties of maintaining

coalition building across borders, even with the agreement on shared issues and goals.

However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that a global feminism based on

commonality among women should be abandoned entirely. Rather, it suggests that another

form of feminist solidarity may be needed in order to understand and integrate differences

among contexts where the commonalities and differences among women may be silenced.

Transnational feminists articulate this issue.

Transnational Feminist Studies and Solidarity

The UN conferences on women provided a space for discussing women’s shared

problems and forging feminist alliances across the world. In this same context, while the

approach most often referred to by the name of “global feminism” (or “global sisterhood”)

focuses on drawing commonality from differences for feminist struggle, feminists who

advocate “transnational feminisms” (emphasizing multiplicity and difference) work

towards contextualizing feminist theory and struggles. While global feminism is accused

of constructing a general causality in order to establish a united, global political force,

transnational feminisms attempt to explore possibilities or impossibilities for feminist

coalitions across differences. In this sense, transnational feminisms refer to theoretical

dimensions of feminist coalition building around the globe (Tohidi 2005). Because they

deconstruct the concept of difference and reject the dichotomy between First and Third

worlds, transnational feminisms share their roots with postcolonial feminism. Breny

Mendoza (2001) designates this form of feminism as “feminist transnational postcolonial

critique” and clarifies two significant contributions it has made. According to Mendoza,

this critique “demystifies anti-colonial and nationalist liberation struggles as male

heterosexist constructs and as a reconstitution of male national power” by revealing their

gendered and patriarchal nationalist discourses (302). In addition, the feminist

transnational postcolonial critique uncovers the ways in which Western feminism has

contributed to producing imperial discourses about women in the so-called Third World on

the basis of the belief in their national/natural superiority.

Although transnational feminisms share with global feminism an emphasis on

coalition building, they reject both the universalizing tendency of formulating agendas and

oppositional binaries that pervade global feminist projects. Transnational feminisms seek

to theorize differences rather than leave behind or celebrate differences. Based on their

postcolonial critique, therefore, transnational feminisms attempt to elaborate feminist

theory and practical ideas by criticizing and contradicting the universal and imperialist

tendencies of global feminism.

The postcolonial perspective criticizes the discourses produced and naturalized by

Western feminisms.3 These criticisms call into question the conceptualization of Third

World women by western feminists as they devise global sisterhood politics. A key

criticism is that western feminists represent Third World women as homogeneous subjects

in need of help. In her first version of the twice-revised essay “Under Western Eyes,”

Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1988) criticizes the dominant representation of Third

3 It should be noted here that a major criticism of transnational feminisms and postcolonial feminist

theory is their tendency to homogenize and stereotype all Western feminist in just the way they accuse Western

feminists of doing.

World women as a singular monolithic subject. She argues that there is an accustomed

“pattern of representing the third world woman as the homogenized and systematized

oppressed being without considering the contexts that shape the heterogeneous lives of

women in the Third world” (53). The representation of third world women as victims and

dependents, she argues, is problematic because it erases any historical specificities that

could reveal women to be “subordinate, powerful, marginal, central, or otherwise, vis-àvis

particular social and power networks” (59).

In the same way, critiquing a common feminist approach to looking at non-Western

women, Aihwa Ong (2001) asserts that assuming women in non-Western societies to be

“identical and interchangeable victims of male control and of patriarchal cultures” reflects

the imperial tendency of Western feminism driven by “a belief in their own cultural

superiority” (113). Doubting the applicability of Western feminist theory or experience to

women in other locations, Ien Ang (2001) suggests a self-conscious politics of partiality.

She argues that, “feminism must stop conceiving itself as a nation, a ‘natural’ political

destination for all women” (57).

Third World feminists and anti-imperialist scholarship have also pointed to the

penetration of the legacy of colonialism into the discourses and practices of development

and modernization. Within the U.N. system, “women and development” became one of the

important issues for achieving gender equality and for achieving genuine development.

However, in the modernization theory that establishes features of Western societies as

norms for and models of development, Third World women not only were portrayed as

homogeneous victims, but also as disempowered to seek change through their

understanding and needs. Consequently, there have been many critiques for ignoring the

rationale and strengths of existing systems and of the specific contexts that create and

perpetuate women’s oppression (Parish 2002; McEwan 2001).

The criticism from women in different parts of the world has encouraged Western

feminists to reconsider the concept of global sisterhood and to acknowledge and celebrate

differences. Based on the understanding that the gender essentialism of western feminism

can be a form of cultural imperialism, cultural relativism has been used as one way to deal

with differences. However, it has been argued that feminists’ use of cultural relativism is

equally problematic as gender essentialism. Uma Narayan (2000) warns that an emphasis

on cultural differences among women can result in cultural essentialism, which once again

fixes women in totalizing categories such as “Western women,” “Third

World women,” “Western culture,” or “Third World culture.”

The debates outlined above and a generalized rejection of a universal version of

feminism call for exploring regional and cultural specificities. This stance argues that it is

important to “compare multiple, overlapping, and discrete oppressions rather than to

construct a theory of hegemonic oppression under a unified category of gender” (Grewal

and Kaplan 1994, 17-18). Because gender is a highly contingent formation, the unitary

notion of womanhood underlined by a global feminist approach cannot be a tool for all

women around the world. Therefore, it is significant to question and redefine essentialist

notions such as women’s human rights so that they will better reflect women’s lives in

various contexts (Grewal and Kaplan 1999).

It is important to not misunderstand the problematization of universalist arguments

as being a total rejection of the importance or validity of feminist coalitions across borders.

Rather than exclusively focusing on “colonizing effects of Western feminist scholarship”

(Mohanty 2004, 237) and then casting global feminism as an imperialistic form of Western

feminism, feminists can use postcolonial criticisms as a theoretical resource for enacting

transnational solidarity and politics. For example, Yuval-Davis’ (2006) “transversal

politics” and Mohanty’s (2004) “common differences” are alternative notions for

envisioning feminist solidarity. They do so by deconstructing women’s homogeneity

without erasing the possibility of decentered dialogues and coalition. Despite the

usefulness of theoretical insights on creating transnational linkages across boundaries

associated with race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and nations, this also raises the question of

whether and how the interdisciplinary criticisms brought by transnational and postcolonial

feminists will contribute to social transformation both in the global and local arenas.

One important focus of this dissertation is to place local feminist activism within the

broader context of global feminist struggles against violence against women. Existing

feminist theories on women’s human rights and violence against women provide pivotal

insights to assess the past and present of the Korean feminist movement’s struggle against

violence against women. By clearly articulating the problem of violence against women as

a women’s human rights violation, the theory suggests how the Korean feminist movement

“should” address domestic violence, i.e., by implementing global norms to challenge the

status quo in a national setting. However, feminist critiques based on postcolonial

perspectives warn that the imposition of universal standards does not automatically

produce emancipatory change because of the fact that women’s lives and suffering are

historically contingent and contextually different. This critique provides a useful lens to

examine the relative (im)possibility for Korean feminist activists to use a women’s human

rights language if their goal is to raise public consciousness about domestic violence and to

elicit broad support and concern. Therefore, the above discussion reinforces the

importance of understanding local feminist strategizing within the local social, political

and cultural context.

While controversial feminist debates over universalism vs. relativism/essentialism

pave the way for my research to focus on local and transnational relations, neither

perspective is able to elucidate the contradictory position of locally situated feminist

activists who may find a universal framework such as women’s human rights appealing

and consistent with their own positions, but who may be forced to work within a more

culturally resonant framework. By articulating this dilemma, this dissertation suggests

alternative ways to discuss the usefulness of the women’s human rights framework.

Social Movement Theory: Political opportunity and resource mobilization

Underpinning and influencing dissertation questions and analysis are primarily

sociological theories and research on social movements. I briefly review key features of

key social movement theories that have informed my understanding of social movements

themselves as well as providing an opportunity, in conjunction with the feminist critiques

above, to recognize the limitations and shortcomings of these theories.

Most social movement theorists and researchers focus on the concepts of “political

opportunity structures” and “resource mobilization” or critiques of them. Recently, studies

conducted through the lens of both political opportunity and resource mobilization theory

often include a discussion of frame theory, an emerging way to analyze social movements.

Frame analysis and the related concept of cultural resonance are discussed for their

importance as analytical tools for my dissertation research. Following is a very brief

overview of the social movement theories and critiques that influenced the research

design.

Social Movements Theories and Critiques

In much of the literature in social movements, the concept of political opportunity

structures has been regarded as a key element and condition to account for the

mobilization and outcomes of social movements. As an external force, on one hand, the

concept of political opportunity structures refers to the state and political institutions, and

research uses this concept to examine the interaction between social movements and social

change, especially through policy change (Charles 2004, 298). On the other hand, the

notion of political opportunity structures also indicates political environments or variables.

While empirical studies of social movements have broadened the range of variables

considered, Sidney Tarrow (1983) theorizes an integrated model of political opportunity

structures: “the degree of openness or closure of formal political access,” “the degree of

stability or instability of political alignments,” “availability of allies and support groups,”

“divisions or conflicts between/among elites” (quoted in Noonan 1995,

84 and in Della Porta and Diani 2006, 16).

In explaining the origins of social movements in terms of how people’s discontent

leads to collective mobilization, theorists of political opportunities emphasize the role of

resource mobilization as another significant external force. In terms of the capacity for

mobilization of social movements, resource mobilization focuses on “material (work,

money, concrete benefits, and services) and nonmaterial resources (authority, moral

engagement, faith, friendship)” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006,15). While political

opportunity structures provide insights on the emergence and development of social

movements, this approach is primarily criticized for its exclusive focus on external forces4

(Morris 2000, 446). In addition, critics have noted that such a political process approach is

problematic because it assumes democratic conditions such as those found in most

Western societies constitute a model of a generalizable political environment

(Noonan 1995, 83).

A way to broaden the existing concept of political opportunity structures has been

sought. For example, Ray and Korteweg (1999) suggest that the transition from

colonialism to independence or from dictatorship to democracy should be included in the

concept of political opportunity structures in order to analyze women’s movements in the

Third World. Particularly useful have been studies that consider “movement

communities”—such as the proliferation of non governmental organizations seeking

democratization or conservation or even women’s movements themselves—an important

factor in the success of women’s movements (Molyneux 2001). Denying the unilateral

impact of political opportunity structures on social movements, Morris (2000) affirms the

need to look at how collective action functions to create political opportunities. This is an

important aspect of my research on the South Korean anti-domestic violence movement.

4 For more detail, see Della Porta and Diani 2006, 16-19 and Noakes and Johnston 2005, 1-2.

While a resource mobilization perspective offers one interesting factor to understand

mobilization of social movements, this approach is also criticized for ignoring an

interpretive role in peoples’ movement participation (Snow et al 1986, 465). Critiques

focus on the fact that the analysis emphasizes macro-level or external factors in examining

social movements. Such critiques have led to a more micro-level analysis on the

assumption that “mobilizing people to action always has a subjective component” (Noakes

and Johnston 2005, 2). Myra Marx Ferree (2003) conceptualizes this theoretical shift as a

“cultural turn” on the grounds that it highlights the “role of discourse” and culture in social

movement theory (304).

While both political opportunity and resource mobilization are still significant

elements to analyze the Korean feminist movement (given feminists’ objective of

institutionalizing the issue of DV), they do not provide impressive explanations for some

of the most interesting features of Korean feminists organizing. These include how and

why the Korean feminist movement was able to build a coalition with 22 non-feminist

civic and political groups and to successfully construct the issue of domestic violence as a

social problem with widespread support. In addition, while this particular social movement

approach may explain the policy success of some social movements, it does not make a

meaningful link between the process (strategy) of movements and their policy outcomes.

Other, new social movement theories and analytical tools, such as frame theory, can help

explain this.

Frame Analysis

The concept of “frame” in the social sciences emerged and developed in relation to

greater understanding of the dynamic features of social movements. Focusing on the roles

of “meaning work” in producing “mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings,”

social movement scholars have theorized the significance of meaning construction in the

study of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000, 612-3). Given the assumption that

individual understanding and interpretation of social problems or issues are closely related

to movement participation, frame theory contributes to illuminating the social construction

of social movements. It also broadens understanding of the process and course of social

movements along with the more widely used concepts of “political opportunity” and

“resource mobilization” (Snow et al 1986; Benford and Snow 2000; Noakes and Johnston

2005). In this respect, frame theory offers a useful insight to explore the question of how

activist groups construct social issues from issues once ignored or regarded as non-public

matters and to investigate how meaning construction shapes movements and

countermovements as they seek social change and transformation.

Given the increased recognition of the importance of discourse or “framing” in

social movements, one of the important features of framing theory is its emphasis on

human agency. Frame analysis identifies movement actors as “signifying agents actively

engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and

bystanders or observers” (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). The concept of “collective action

frames” reflects human agency, which generates and develops new frames and challenges

existing ones. In this respect, Benford and Snow (2000) define collective action frames as

“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and

campaigns of a social movement organization” (614)

Feminist theorists also have become interested in frame theory. Sylvia Walby (2005)

notes that frame theory has a significant implication in theorizing gender mainstreaming

by providing “a fluid vocabulary to engage with the contestations over and shifts in

meaning that are key to the understanding of social movements and related civil society

activities” (324). Feminist theorists apply the potential of framing theory to gender-

sensitive analysis (Ferree and Merrill 2000) and to women’s movements under unusual

conditions such as authoritarianism (Noonan 1995). Furthermore, the role and effects of

framing in women’s movements are discussed more specifically, including in the abortion

debates (Ferree 2003) in gay/lesbian movements, in violence against gays and lesbians

(Jenness 1995), and in domestic violence (Krizsan 2005).

My analysis relies heavily on the analysis of particular framings, their rationale, and

their consequences.

Cultural Resonance

The emphasis on the significance of meaning construction in social movements

implies cultural dynamics in which social movements arise and operate. This returns us to

the issue of context. As Ferree (2003) points out, “a movement’s objectives, opportunities,

and choices are socially constructed and culturally variable” (304). Taking the case of the

civil rights movement, Rita Noonan (1995) indicates that the frame of “liberty and justice

for all” played a key role in the success of the movement because this frame “struck a

chord in dominant cultural beliefs”—American cultural beliefs (85). Benford and Snow

(2000) identify this “mobilization potency” or “the issue of the effectiveness” as frame

resonance (619).

However, critics have pointed out that it is hard to measure the relationship between

frame resonance and mobilizing due to the fluid nature of movement processes (Noakes

and Johnston 2005, 16). Benford and Snow (2000) also acknowledge that the field lacks

empirical studies of the influence of frame resonance (620). Nevertheless, the concept of

frame resonance has significant implications for thinking about the contexts and

circumstances in which social movements are developed and elaborated. Noonan (1995)

rightly points out that, “social movement participants do not frame their campaigns in a

cultural or social vacuum” (86).

Ferree (2003) also emphasizes the role of discourse in social movements in tracing

the activities of movement actors who recognize opportunities and the flow of material

conditions and resources within their environments (307). In this vein, the concept of

frame resonance provides an important clue to understanding the sociopolitical and

cultural contexts in which movement actors are situated and the ways in which movement

participations negotiate for movement success.

While culturally-based frame resonance is one of the factors that affect movement

recruiting, cultural resonance should be balanced in terms of appealing to existing cultural

value systems and challenging the status quo (Hewitt and McCammon 2005, 34). In her

study of abortion debates both in the United States and Germany, Ferree (2003)

demonstrates that resonance was a costly choice for feminist movements in that cultural

resonance sacrifices feminist ideas and renders a certain portion of women invisible. As

will be seen in later chapters, cultural resonance also was a costly choice for South Korean

feminists in their struggle to pass legislation and institutionalize domestic violence as a

social problem and crime.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Overview

I conducted the field research for my dissertation from December 2005 to September

2006 in Seoul, DaeJeon, DaeGu, and JaeChon in South Korea. My approach was multi-

method and multi-level. It included document research, in-depth and semistructured

interviews with key actors, participant observation, and frame analysis and institutional

ethnography. In the field, the primary site was the Korea Women’s Hotline, which has led

the Korean women’s movement against violence against women for over 24 years. But I

visited other organizations and institutions to meet and interview service providers or

professionals in local areas.

In this chapter, I will explain the ways in which I accessed, collected and obtained

relevant documents, including academic, administrative, and organizational sources for

analysis. I will also describe the process, challenges and benefits I experienced while

conducting both in-depth, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. In the

last part of this chapter, I will briefly introduce Institutional Ethnography and Frame

Analysis as research and analytic methods, and I will show how and why IE and FA are

applied to analyze the collected data.

Document Research

Document research was used to assess important differences among major NGOs

and institutions in exploring how each constructs women, the problem, and solutions. Print

media were collected for representations of DV and of batterers and battered women, both

during the campaign for the anti-violence law and after passage. The earlier stage of

document research also was used to find relevant information for preparing for observation

and in-depth interviews.

South Korea is well known around the world as one of the fast-growing countries in

terms of its developing information and technology sector.5 Based on the development of

technology and the growing recognition of the significance of improving the quality and

opportunity of education and information sharing, South Korea has committed to

digitalization of academic resources and materials as a part of a national plan to construct

an information, communication, and technology infrastructure (White Paper on

Educational ICT 2006). My document research in South Korea took advantage of this

integrated search system and online full-text and downloading services.

In order to examine the academic conceptualization and interpretation of domestic

violence and anti-domestic violence discourse and legislation in South Korean society,

several databases were used to retrieve academic works and publications, including journal

articles, books, statutes, theses, and administrative reports. I used five

5 In 2007, ITU (International Telecommunications Union) announced that South Korea ranked No.1

among 181 countries on the DOI (Digital Opportunity Index). The DOI, comprised of eleven separate indicators,

includes data on internet and mobile subscriptions, household level internet access and personal computers, and

measures of advanced technologies in broadband access. South Korea has been No. 1 for three years since 2005

(Measuring Digital Opportunity 2005).

comprehensive databases for searching relevant information on the issue. The Korean

National Assembly Library owns and lists a broad range of materials published in South

Korea and the Korean Digital Library provides an online full-text and downloading service

on its website and through associated libraries across the nation. The RISS

(Research Information Service System), run by the Korea Education and Research

Information Service to provide support for scholars and graduate students, also provides

access to electronic journal articles and theses. I also used KISS (Korean Studies

Information Service System) and DBPIA (Database Periodical Information Academic),

which contains a vast range of academic journal articles and provides an electronic text

service.

The full text of statutes and congressional minutes (1996-2007) on The Act on the

Prevention of Domestic Violence and for the Protection of Victims in 1997 and the

Special Act for the Punishment of Domestic Violence in 1997 was obtained from the

Korea National Assembly Library. These legislative-related documents, which include

assembly hearings and declarations on the Anti-Domestic Violence laws, were provided by

the legislators who initiated or participated in reforms of the laws or by their legislative

staff through websites or during my visits for interviews. Administrative reports, rule-

making, and policy statements on Domestic Violence, gender-related statistics, and white

papers on women were obtained from the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Other

gender-related research reports or publications were available at the Korean Women’s

Development Institute.

Newsletters, minutes, declarations, statements, pamphlets, research reports, and

other relevant materials on the battered women’s movement for enacting the anti-DV laws,

written or published during the legislative movement period (1995-1997), were obtained

directly from the Korea Women’s Hotline. The KWH also provided invaluable materials

such as documents from a series of symposia, forums, public hearings, and meetings on

domestic violence, statistics, internal minutes, and case studies of battered women. I was

able to easily access their online periodicals and frequently updated documents. They have

constructed a complete electronic archive that allowed me to search and look up the full

text of newsletters and articles published since 1983, date the organization was founded. I

could get some useful publications of the Ministry of Justice6 through the KWH. They

were happy to provide and share the relevant materials they owned when they could.

Fortunately, I have kept in touch with the interviewees at the

KWH and they have provided further information since after I came back from the field.

The Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) also was a significant site for

document research. They provided access to the precious archives of progressive Korean

women’s movements, such as research reports on state policies for women, statements,

periodicals, newsletters, and photographs.

For mass media collections, I used KINDS (Korean Integrated News Database

System) run by the Korea Press Foundation, a non-profit organization serving the media

and public interests since 1991. KINDS provides the most comprehensive and integrated

archive of online full-text newspapers, newsmagazines, newsweeklies, and television news

reports. This database contains over 10 million news articles and reports from 181 mass

6 The Ministry of Justice is in charge of the Special Act for the Punishment of Domestic Violence.

media around the nation and is updated daily. I used this database to find meaningful

information on domestic violence and laws and to analyze how the issue of domestic

violence and anti-DV legislation has been represented in the mass media. Five key terms

for searching the database included “domestic violence” (gajung pokruk),

“wife battering” (a-ne guta), “violence against women” (yosongae daehan pokruk),

“battered women’s syndrome” (maemaatnun a-ne junghugoon), and “the Act for the

Prevention of Domestic Violence” (gajung pokruk bangji bub). I collected all relevant

newsletters, reports, and editorials through this database between 1996 and 2007. I also

collected the data from the Women’s Newsletter, which contains more detailed and

dedicated reports on women’s issues from the perspective of women.

In-depth Semi-structured Interviews and Participant Observation

To explore the activities, strategies, conflicts, and contributions of the Korean

women’s movement in enacting the anti-DV law, and to understand the relationship and

coalition building between and among women’s movements and civic organizations,

interviewing feminist activists who have been closely involved in constructing the antiDV

legislation movement7 was a crucial method. In-depth interviews had three key objectives

—1) document/compare versions of events, 2) explore the reasons underlying specific

wording and strategies, 3) explore with those interviewed a range of broader issues that

included a discussion of the pros and cons of state intervention for battered women’s

empowerment, assessments of transnational feminist frameworks, etc. In-depth

7 Sometimes interviewees refer to the movement as a battered women’s movement.

interviewing is the most appropriate way to understand the processes, ideas, tensions, and

dilemmas experienced by feminist activists.

During the earlier stage of document research, I identified key informants who made

significant contributions to the Korean women’s movement and have led major feminist

organizations as representatives and/or activists.

My priority concern for the interview process was how to gain access to key feminist

activists who are really busy and may be unwilling to give up their time to meet with a

student. Another concern was related to my position as a Ph.D. student studying women’s

studies in the U.S.A.8 Despite the overwhelming pressure and tension this caused me, I

tried to remember the ideal that “philosophical theorizing has practical political value”

(Nussbaum 2000, 10), and that “it is important to emphasize the importance of grassroots

organizing, as well as political teaching and research work, in bringing about change”

(DeVault and Gross 2007, 175). Encouraged by my interest, responsibility, and passion for

social change, I contacted the organizations to explain what I was doing and asked whether

I could meet relevant people for the research. To my surprise, renowned feminist leaders

agreed to be interviewed and I learned that they have experience with this kind of

interview. Even so, I decided to go beyond the formal and often dry relationship of the

interview format. As Kirsch (2005) points out “close friends do not usually arrive with a

tape-recorder, listen carefully and sympathetically to what you have to say and then

disappear” (2166, quoted in Cotterill 1992, 559).

8 To be specific, first, I am an outsider. Second, what I know comes from books, not from real

struggles. Third, I didn’t want to take time away from important activists’ struggles. So, the natural question

was would these women allow me to interview them and how could I give something back to them? I decided

that the ethical thing to do was to offer my services as a volunteer, be part of their struggles, and accompany

them.

After several visits to the KWH for photocopying and access to documents and

archives they owned and following my first interview, I was asked to be a volunteer during

the campaign day against Domestic Violence. I accepted this as an opportunity to “give

something back” and as a chance to let them get to know me, my sincerity and my passion.

The campaign day was so hot and equipment and other materials were so heavy.

All of us were busy and it was a great learning experience and place to make contexts.

I was assigned to the table where the general secretary of the KWH was working and

drew her attention to my research. I had conversations with other activists while hanging

banners and folding tables. We had dinner after the campaign day which gave me the

opportunity to talk about my dissertation project. This interaction made a big difference in

my field research, because most feminist activists in South Korea come from similar

backgrounds. They had shared experiences from their participation in labor, student, and

democratic movements. Activists are well connected, and this connectedness has been the

basis of mutual understanding, coalitions, and political and emotional support for each

other’s causes. That day was important because they embraced and began to support my

research. I had established rapport.

Once I gained the trust of the activists and they became interested in my research, I

found that this produced snow-ball effects.9 Interviewees recommended appropriate

informants and directly introduced me to people and encouraged them to participate in my

9 All renowned feminist activists were willing to answer my questions and they gave me their contact

numbers or email addresses for further questions.

research. Many spent time writing and making calls for me. For example, the general

secretary of the KWH directly connected me to one of the co-representatives10 of the

KWH and each co-representative recommended other informants and introduced me to

them. This not only happened in KWH, but also in other organizations. For example, when

I interviewed the legislator who led the reform of the anti-DV laws in 2004, she also gave

me a referral to meet another legislator. I took advantage of “snow-ball sampling” at nearly

all stages of my field research.

This rapport or friendliness11 created and opened new experiences and opportunities.

I got calls from the KWH notifying me about their meetings and seminars and I was

encouraged to participate. I attended several forums with titles such as

“Rethinking Domestic Violence from the Perspective of Human Rights,” “Is there a State

Policy for Stopping Domestic Violence?” “Divorce in Korean Society, Is It Really

Problematic?” I participated in the forums through discussion and activities with KWH

staff members. I also was invited to meetings of staff members and activists of KWH and

its local level branches (KWH has branches throughout the country). Before and after

meetings, I was introduced to members and guest speakers, and engaged in informal

conversations. I also was invited to lunch or dinner, both of which were great opportunities

to share stories and interact. In addition, I am now on the e-mail discussions for the KWH,

which allows me to “observe” activities, plans, and struggles in the organization.

10 As of 2008, one standing-representative and two co-representatives serve on KWH’s executive. Two of

them participated in this dissertation.

11 According to Kirsch (2005), feminist researchers need to be realistic in building our relationships with

participants based on “friendliness, not genuine friendship” (2170).

As part of my volunteer work with them, I was asked to translate some materials into

Korean. I was invited to a three-day private organizational meeting where I had an

invaluable opportunity to observe their interactions, hear thoughts, learn of conflicts and

commitments during three days and two nights. I met participants from local branches

there and I re-connected with previous interviewees. I attended every meeting and seminar,

and I was allowed to use a recorder and take notes. I also was assigned to assist staff

members at the meetings.

Some feminist theorists point to accompanying risks when a researcher seeks a more

comfortable relationship, including friendship or egalitarian relations with participants, as

part of the research process (Cotterill 1992). This critique is based on an assumption of an

inevitable power differential between researcher and researched that would favor the

researcher.12 In the case of my field research, however, I was able to develop a

collaborative relationship with the members of the KWH because of a perception of shared

goals. They welcomed a researcher who could bring her own feminist perspective. Also, as

a student and a Korean woman, I wielded no immediate power and the success of my

project was entirely dependent on their good will and collaboration.

Regarding the structure of interviewing, I prepared two sets of tentative questions for

activists and policy makers respectively before entering the field. I selected other questions

or revised existing ones according to the interests, activities, and commitment of

interviewees. The process of interviewing also was diverse, varying according to the type

of conversations the interviewees preferred. As a result, many interviews became more

12 In Korea, university study abroad is prestigious and usually reserved for the wealthy. Many times I was

asked how I could afford it and my answer “by working for the department” helped to break down barriers.

open-ended and comprehensive once relevant responses were obtained for the focused

questions. I also asked follow-up questions through conversations over the phone or while

having coffee or at dinner after interviews.

Some interviewees expressed concern about how their stories could be interpreted

and under which contexts. I introduced the “right to co-interpretation” (Newkikr 1996, 13

quoted in Kirsch 2005, 2168) and interviewees were asked to comment on and review

interview transcripts. Prior to each interview and following procedures and a script

approved by the Internal Review Board (IRB) of The Ohio State University, I also

provided information on the purpose of the research and the right of each interviewee to

refuse participation, to refuse to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time.

Interviewees were given the option of confidentiality and use of a pseudonym. A few

former and current public office holders at the MGEF refused to participate and some

interviewees asked for “off the record” portions of the interview. One counseling service

provider refused to be recorded. Table 3.1 provides basic information on each person

interviewed, including name/pseudonym, organizational affiliation or place of

employment, sex, date of interview, place of interview.

Integrating Methods

During field research, I realized that while each research method plays a distinctive

part in fieldwork, they all are interrelated and mutually supportive in terms of creating

opportunities, reducing tensions and conflicts about the interview process, and shaping my

broad understanding. For example, document research allowed me to identify major

informants and revise research questions in addition to providing texts for analysis. The

interview process led to opportunities for participant observation. Participant observation

broadened the spectrum of interviewees. More importantly, it helped me to integrate my

scholarly understandings with the insights and practices of the activists and fostered more

complex understandings based on interdependent and integrated use of theory and practice.

Analytical Techniques

One analytical technique merits special attention because of its key importance to the

process of research and interpretation. It is institutional ethnography.

Institutional Ethnography

To collect and analyze data from and about organizations and their members, I

employed “institutional ethnography” (IE) – a research and analytic method developed by

Dorothy E. Smith, Canadian feminist sociologist. IE, as a method of inquiry, aims to

provide an alternative to the objectified knowledge produced by established social

scientific methods and discourse. It questions how to know and who is a knowing subject.

Like most methods in sociology, IE seeks to develop descriptive and analytic

understanding of social phenomena or problems. Therefore, the start point of IE is people’s

experience and the concerns they confront in everyday life. Mainstream scientific

sociology is based on positivist orientations that seek to understand and explain social

problems focusing on people’s experience or people themselves as objects of study.

According to Smith, however, IE is different from established sociology in terms of

constituting a knowing subject and the way of seeking knowledge. In other words, IE

creates a subject position rather than targeting people’s experience or people themselves as

objects of study.

IE also broadens the scope of research by paying attention to institutional relations

and organizations and then explores the relations of ruling13 from the perspective of people

(Smith, 2005, 31; 2007, 409). As Marjorie L. DeVault (1999) describes, Smith’s IE is an

attempt to see “how the powerful tool of sociological analysis might be used effectively by

‘outsiders’ for our own purposes rather than those of a governing regime” (47). Therefore,

IE seeks to understand how peoples’ everyday lives and experiences are socially connected

and constructed. From the standpoint of people, according to Smith, IE aims to “reorganize

the social relations of knowledge of the social” through allowing people to “discover the

social” and to map social organizations as institutional forces which shape, manage, and

control people’s lives (29, 10).

For implementing IE, Smith emphasizes that it is significant to focus on the crucial

role that texts play in constituting relations of ruling. According to Smith (2005), relations

of ruling depend on texts and “new textual technologies”14 that expand institutional

relations through public discourses (18). The primary role of these “textually mediated

forms of ruling” is the process of objectifying “knowledge, organization, and decision

13 Smith’s notion of “relations of ruling” or “ruling relations” refers to power relations permeating all

aspects of everyday life. According to Smith (2005), this concept refers to “a new and distinctive mode of

organizing society” and “forms of consciousness and organization that are objectified in the sense that are

constituted externally to particular people and places” (13). Relations of ruling exist as forms of

“bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization, and the media. They include also

the complex of discourses, scientific technical and cultural, that intersect, interpenetrate, and coordinate the

multiple sites of ruling” (1993, 6). But it does not mean that people are dominated by organizations and

institutions. Rather, Smith points out that “We are ruled by people who are at work in corporations,

government, professional settings and organizations, universities, public schools, hospitals and clinics, and so

on and so on” (18).

14 Smith (2005) points to the existing newspaper, radio, and television industries (18).

processes,” normalizing and standardizing the properties and activities of formal

organizations (1993, 212; 2005, 166). In addition, this “textually mediated character” of

ruling relations depends on a distinctive performance of texts: text-reader conversation.

Smith identifies reading texts as a social action but one-way responsive relation.15

Furthermore, through the behavior of reading texts, people activate texts and become

the agent of texts. In this respect, the behavior of reading texts means people’s

participation in institutional standardization, which regulates and controls the lives of

people. However, it does not mean that texts produce similar effects no matter who reads

or when a text is read. The emphasis is on people’s resistance, disagreement,

interpretation; and any responses cannot take place without or beyond the texts (2006, 108-

111).

As an analytic project, the aim of IE is to discover social relations that coordinate

and manage people’s lives, expanding people’s knowledge of institutional connections and

relations “across and among various sites of activity” (DeVault 1999, 48-9). In this respect,

the understanding of institutional process helps us draw a map to see how institutional

practices operate. This map of social relations also helps feminist activists to develop more

effective strategies for social change based on knowledge (52). While IE provides useful

insights to understand indirect operations of ruling relations, the map of institutional

connections itself does not show the ways in which institutional regimes confront

resistance and seek transformation. If one of the crucial goals of IE is to provide a chart of

15 According to Smith (2005), while people respond, interpret, and resist through reading activation,

texts are fixed and unresponsive no matter how many times people read them and react to them (105).

interrelated institutional practices for social change, it is worthy to investigate how

feminist activists create an opportunity to engage in such institutional transformation.

Interpreting the Field: Institutional Relations, Feminist Negotiations and the Framing

Project

Given the method of inquiry of institutional ethnography, the analysis of data starts

with the experience and concerns of feminist activists who have been involved in

constructing DV as a social issue and who have confronted a variety of challenges.

Exploring and interpreting their experiences is a necessary process but not an ultimate

goal. Rather, the analysis aims to reveal the ways in which contemporary Korean

feminists’ struggles have been connected, operationalized, negotiated, and regulated by

social relations and socially dominant discourses. In doing so, the analysis also reveals the

ways that feminist actors critically examine their situated contexts, negotiate their

relationships and institutional relations in local contexts, and theoretically engage with

others in global spaces.

The primary questions raised for analysis include: how domestic violence legislation

is conceptualized and interpreted; how feminists, policy makers, researchers, women

citizens and others articulate problems and devise solutions in South Korea; and in what

ways does a meaning construction of the issue of DV have implications for establishing a

problem as part of a public agenda. Other interests are to explore the competing theories of

the causes of violence held by different sets of key actors in South Korea; the impact of

violence on individuals, families, and the society; the limitations to seeking a legislative

solution; and alternatives that may be or have been proposed for South Korea.

One very important feature of the feminist construction of domestic violence as a

social problem and a crime has to do with the relative success and problems associated

with their choice of a culturally resonant frame over other available frames. By

investigating interpretative themes surrounding the crafting and implementation of the

anti-domestic violence Acts, I established a theoretical starting point for understanding the

context within which the legislation was constructed, discussed and adopted; the options

that proponents perceived; the varying ideological and political positions of relevant

actors; the reasons for their choices; and their assessments of problems with the legislation

and its implementation. For this, I especially used interviews conducted with key actors

who directly participated in the process of legislation and institutionalization.

I also explored the ways in which a public discourse on domestic violence is/was

produced, supported, challenged, or reinforced. This included exploring judicial

precedents and procedures that reflect fundamental, culturally-based assumptions about

women and family. Mass media also were examined for representations of domestic

violence, batterers, and battered women both preceding and during the campaign for the

anti-violence law and following its passage. There is substantial evidence that mass media

played an important role in raising awareness of domestic violence, supported the

campaign for legislation, and provided stories eliciting sympathy for battered women as

victims. But other evidence suggests that it also has reproduced and supported

malecentered viewpoints on domestic violence in ways that have hurt implementation or

exacerbated problems with the legislation. I paid particular attention to print media given

the difficulty I had with accessing television or radio coverage for the period of the

campaign.

Available advice literature published by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family,

shelters, police, local governments, and women’s organizations were also explored and

analyzed for their ideological underpinnings and diverse framings of the problem. These

publications sought to provide information on domestic violence for a general public. It

was important to assess how they construct women, the problem, and solutions. This

aspect of research is directly related to the debates surrounding the victim or agent

positions of battered women and whether violence is presented as an individual or family

problem versus a social problem and a crime.

I identified and reviewed all academic and administrative research and evaluations

conducted after passage of the anti-domestic violence legislation in South Korea to

determine the extent to which each provided additional insight into the questions at the

core of this dissertation. I analyzed other sources of evidence of the Korean experience

(i.e., international reports, white papers, etc.) taking special care to identify the political

and conceptual approaches represented by each. All of these can contribute to better

understanding of the societal context, institutional relations, and relations of ruling in

terms of how the issue of DV was constructed and reconstructed in society and by whom

for what purpose.

On the other hand, while I focused on the challenges and backlash contemporary

Korean feminist movements have confronted and continue to confront in relation to the

institutionalization of the DV issue, I found interviewees and myself reflecting on issues of

inevitability and of strategizing. I explored the process of feminists negotiating among

themselves as well as with legislators, media, the public, and government agencies over

the potentials and limitations of institutionalizing the feminist anti-DV agenda. Given the

intense contemporary concerns over institutionalization, I also explored the relationship

between women’s civil society groups and women/supporters in politics and government.

In particular, I studied the authority and limitations of the Ministry of Gender Equality and

Family in its role of supporting the implementation of laws and its cooperation with other

Ministries. I also considered how political parties and platforms may have influenced

choices regarding legislative content and strategies.

Throughout the analysis, I applied frame analysis. FA was useful to explore how and

why an individual’s interests, values, beliefs, and ideology become (or not) congruent with

those of a broader social movement. FA was useful especially to analyze the achievements

of feminist movements given their social, political, and economic contexts. In the S.

Korean case, FA helped with assessing how factors specific to the context have interacted

with and impacted feminist issues and strategies—and vice versa. FA also was applied to

other global issues such as the cultural-institutional-legal (in)compatibility of a universal

women’s human rights framework applied to S. Korea.

Finally, among other potentially important contextual factors that I considered are

foreign domination, military repression, and the reality of a culture dominated by

Confucian norms and values. In analyzing the trajectory of Korean women’s movements

against violence against women, IE and FA both have been useful not just to reveal

indirect power relations exercised by institutional knowledge and standardization; more

importantly, they have provided invaluable insight into how the local is connected to the

translocal/global. Smith’s concept of the circulated, replicable, but fixed nature of texts

allows us to deepen our understanding of the ways that global feminist movements

promoting a discourse of human rights have or do not have implications for the study at

the local level. They also has implications for the extent to which local feminist

movements can create a space for expanding their knowledge of the potential traps they

face in their locality and for rupturing existing and future entrapment.

Name Position Affiliation Sex Date of

Interview

Place of

Interview

Ahn Myung

Ock legislator National Assembly F September

11, 2006 Seoul

Cho Yoon Sook general

secretary DaeGu Women’s Hotline F May 30,

2006 DaeGu

Cho Young

Sook director

Center for Women’s

Human

Rights

August 17,

2006 Seoul

Cho Young Hee director

Conflict Resolution

Center Women

Making Peace

F June 19,

2006 Seoul

Choi Sun Ae director

Center of Young Kwang

Women’s Counseling

Young Kwang Women’s

Hotline

F September

9, 2006 Jaechon

Heo Lan Young

head

coordinator

Family Policy

Program Korea

Women’s Hotline

September

8, 2006 Jaechon

Hong Mi Young legislator National Assembly F August 23,

2006 Seoul

Nam Jee

Hyang

head

coordinator

Media Program

Korea Women’s

Hotline

F July 13,

2006 Seoul

Jung Choun

Sook

president Seoul Women’s Hotline F April 5,

2006

Seoul

Kang Hyun

Hee

legislative

Staff National Assembly F August, 23

2006 Seoul

KimYu

EunKyung

head

coordinator

International Solidarity

Program Korea

Women’s Hotline

F June 23,

2006 Seoul

Ko Mi Kyung

general

secretary Korea Women’s Hotline F

May 3,

2006 July

12, 2006

Seoul

Ko Mi Kyung coordinator

Women’s Rights

Counseling Center, Seoul

Women’s Hotline

September

7, 2006 Jaechon

Lee Do Ock president Daegu Women’s Hotline F May 30,

2006 DaeGu

Lee Mi Hye, director

Women’s Rights

Counseling Center, Seoul

Women’s Hotline

F June 20,

2006 Seoul

Lee Moon

Ja director

Counseling center

KimPo Women’s

Hotline

May 11,

2006

September

2006

Seoul

Jaechon

Lee Young Hee director

Counseling Center of

Violence against

Women

Suwon Women’s Hotline

F September

7, 2006 Jaechon

NamYoon In

Soon

standing-

representativ

Korea Women’s

Association United

(KWAU)

F May 10,

2006 Seoul

Park So Hyun counselor Korea Legal Aid Center

for Family Relations F September

14, 2006 Seoul

Table 3.1: Basic Information on Interviewees (CONTINUED)

Table 3.1: CONTINUED

Park Inn Hea

co-

representativ

Korea Women’s Hotline F

August 30,

2006 Seoul

Roh Eun Sook director ChonAn Women’s

Hotline F September

9, 2006 Jaechon

Shin Bo Mee counselor

Daejeon Catholic

Domestic Violence

Counseling Center

January 20,

2006 DaeJeon

Shin Youn

Sook

head

coordinator

Domestic Violence

Prevention

Program, Korea

Women’s

Hotline

F May 2, 2006 Seoul

ShinHa Yeong

Ok director

Policy and Region

Division Korea Women’s

Hotline

F July 13,

2006 Seoul

anonymous

participant

Former KWH

activist - F January,

2006 N.A

anonymous

participant

Staff person

at public

agency

- F May, 2006 N.A

anonymous

participant DV survivor - F September,

2006 N.A

anonymous

police - - M June, 2006 N.A

N.A. – Not given in order to protect identity

Note: Surname appears first followed by the individual name per Korean style. Some

people have 2 surnames. Surnames are underlined.

CHAPTER 4

SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS AND THE KOREA

WOMEN’S HOTLINE16

Overview

This chapter explores the historical trajectory of Korean women’s movements

through consideration of the sociopolitical and cultural contexts in which such movements

have advanced and promoted gender equality and women’s empowerment. Understanding

the contexts in which women’s movements emerged and flourished provides important

clues for analyzing both opportunities and limitations faced by movements. Contexts also

reveal the complicated and multiple ways in which different women’s experiences are

linked or separated. This chapter has two goals in addressing contextualization: first, to

strengthen understanding of how a feminist principle is negotiated and compromise is

achieved in the local context and, second, to reveal how similar experiences and strategic

activities in other settings may contribute to redefinition

16 From this point on, when reference is made to “Korean” women’s movements, “Korean” applies to

South Korea only after 1953 and to both “Koreas” prior to that date. The Korea Women’s Hotline has alternated

between the spelling “Hotline” and the spelling “Hot Line.” Some member organizations use the latter spelling,

though most use the former spelling. Given its acronym of KWH, this dissertation will uniformly use the

spelling “hotline.” Readers should note that the organization uses “Korea” in its title, though it operates only in

South Korea.

of and linkages among feminist activities at the local level.

The first section of this chapter provides a brief discussion of Confucian ideology as

a functional principle of the Korean social system, especially for gender roles and

positions. Confucian ideology dominated the Chosun Dynasty (1393-1910) for over five

hundred years and has had contradictory impacts on contemporary Korean society. This

section also discusses how this ideology has been destabilized and how the process of

destabilization relates to the emergence and development of consciousness regarding

gender equality and women’s emancipation. In addition, this section briefly describes the

early relationship between nationalism and women’s movements in South Korea.

The second section of this chapter explores the different contexts and components of

the relationship between Korean women’s movements and Western countries in terms of

issues of national independence, democratization, modernization, and reunification of

North and South. This includes the emergence and development of the Korean women’s

labor movement in the 1970s, which led to a progressive feminist movement during the

struggle against the military regimes of the 1980s. Exploration of the ways in which the

Korean progressive feminist movement identified gender oppression in the context of

democratization and reunification is important background to the anti-domestic violence

movement. This section also presents the coalition-based struggles of the KWAU (Korean

Women’s Association United) and women’s participation in the construction of a

democratic state and the remarkable achievements of women’s movements in the 1990s in

incorporating women’s agendas into public policies.

The third section of this chapter explores the historical trajectory of the Korea

Women’s Hotline, focusing on the circumstances of its establishment and on its primary

activities and organizational development.

The History and Legacy of Women’s Movements in Korea: Brief Background

Confucianism and Women’s Consciousness-raising

Since the founding of the Chosun Dynasty at the end of the 14th century (13931910),

Confucian ideology17 dominated Korean society as a type of state religion and regulated

closely women’s positions and permissible roles. After the 17th century, Chosun’s

Confucian patriarchy was at its peak. This was a response to the growing instability of the

country due to the wars with Japan and China, economic changes, and internal

disturbances. As it sought to rebuild the Confucian, well-ordered society, the ruling class

targeted women and introduced extreme controls over their behaviors and emphasized

women’s chastity (Kwon 1999, 47). Confucianism’s central principle is based on a rigid

distinction between men and women. Based on sex differences, women’s whole lives were

defined and determined by a dependent relationship with men. In Confucianism,

“preservation of the family” also is more important than the welfare of individuals in the

family. Important to this is the eldest male’s authority over all women and younger men.

There is a well-known tenet of Confucianism to describe this – Samjong jido (the three

17 Confucianism was adopted in Korea as early as the era of Three Kingdoms (B.C. 57). Along with

Buddhism, its ideology was important to maintain social order. The form of Confucianism varied from time to

time and from country to country. For example, women’s social status in the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) was

different from that of Chosun. Koryo women enjoyed a great deal of social and economic freedom and rights:

they had equal inheritance of property rights and shared ancestral patrimony with their brothers.

obediences of women). Women should be obedient to their fathers when they are young, to

husbands after marriage, to sons when they get old.

Korean women’s primary role was to give birth to as many sons as possible to continue the

male family line. Because a family name is carried on only by sons, daughters were

discriminated against in their own family. Furthermore, daughters were not even regarded

as family members after they married. As a chulga oein (a married daughter who is almost

a stranger to her own family), married women were not allowed to return to their families

of origin even if their marriages were a disaster.

As daughters-in-law, women were supposed to be obedient to all in-law family

members. A young bride was told that she must be “dumb for three years and deaf for three

years and blind for another three years.” This saying means that newly married women

must keep quiet about what they heard and saw and must endure all, no matter how hard

her life was with a husband and his family. Given the circumscribed nature of women’s

lives, women were praised for being self-sacrificing mothers or as a yeol-yeo, a virtuous

young widow who stays in her husband’s house and supports his family even after the

husband’s death. In some cases, a woman whose fiancé died before marriage had to

support the dead fiancé’s parents for a lifetime.

Three important influences had an impact on raising questions about the previously

unquestioned Korean women’s subordination: the introduction of Catholicism and

Christianity, the struggle for Korean nationalism based on Donghak Sasang (Oriental

Thought), and GawHwa Sasang (Enlightenment Thoughts). Catholicism stressed universal

commonality and natural equality among people, an idea threatening to a Korean society

dominated by a very rigid caste system and Confucian patriarchy.

However, the Catholic and Christian notion of equality among people in God’s eyes

attracted attention among Korean women who were exposed to such ideas.18

Donghak Sasang was established in 1860 by a Korean philosopher, Choi Jae-Woo.

Popular among Korean intellectuals, it led to the inclusion of Korean women’s subordinate

status and roles as a part of the revolutionary movement in the 1890s (Kim 1996). In

particular, GawHwa Sasang19 facilitated consciousness-raising about gender equality by

arguing for the importance of women’s education (Lee 1990). But Korean women’s

organizing and autonomous consciousness-raising were fostered and achieved through

education at the end of the 19th century (Cho et al 1992).

Christian missionaries made very important contributions to providing modern

education20 for girls and women by establishing schools for women for the first time in

18 By 1909, the number of Korean Christians reached 200,000 and the majority were Korean women

(Kwon 1999).

19 At the end of nineteenth century, Western modernization was introduced to the Chosun Dynasty. A few

reformists who were exposed to Western civilization argued for the need to adopt Western modes and also called

into question women’s subordinate status.

20 According to Cho Kyung Won (1994), establishing schools and hospitals was an indirect approach for

Protestant missionaries to disseminate Christianity. The failure of Catholic missionaries to convert Koreans led

Protestant missionaries to start their Christian schools. The expansion of women’s modern education benefited

from Protestant missionary activities. Protestants established 174 schools for girls by 1905 when the first

missionary came to Korea in 1885 (Kwon 1999, 42).

Korea.21 While Protestant missionaries made a crucial contribution to opening space for

Korean women’s education, Korean women themselves also played a part in broadening

and developing women’s educational opportunities by establishing schools for women.

From 1897 to 1915, Korean women established 38 private schools for girls and women

(Cho et al 1992). Although the dominant discourse argued that women’s education would

prepare them to provide appropriate support to husbands and children22, these new

educational opportunities played a crucial role in promoting women’s consciousness and

led to women organizing themselves. Though acknowledging the historical importance of

raising questions about women’s status by male pioneers and reformists, Lee Song Hee

(1990) points out that the Korean women’s movement first appeared in 1898 with the

establishment of the first Korean autonomous women’s organization – Chanyanghoe.23

Between 1898 to 1910, the first Korean women’s movement focused on gender

equality and improvement in women’s social status. At the time, therefore, the Korean

women’s movement activities were identified with the Western liberal feminism (Lee

1990). However, under the colonial domination, the Korean women’s movement became

21 During the Chosun Dynasty, there was no formal education open to women. Korean women were not

encouraged to enhance their intellectual ability or physical strength. The most important value in educating

women was for them to be virtuous. Korean women, especially upper-class women, were prohibited from

going outside, so there was no need for formal institutions for women’s education. Therefore, women were

taught at home how to be the virtuous Confucian women (Ha 1972). Ewha Haktang, was the Korea’s first

school for women, established by Mrs. Scranton, a missionary, in 1886. Reformists, women intellectuals, and

Western missionaries argued for the need for educational opportunities for women. They emphasized that

women’s education is important for national development and for nurturing future generations (Cho et al

1992).

22 Confronting colonial power in the early 20th century, the nationalist discourse emphasized the

importance of woman’s role as a mother in nurturing future generations. The importance and necessity of

women’s education was addressed in the context of recovering Korean national power (Jung 1989). 23 The

first women’s organization, Chanyanghoe, was established in 1898 claiming women’s rights to political

participation, education, and labor. Its primary members were wives of Yangban [the aristocratic class] who

resided in Seoul, and the organization sought to establish schools for girls and women. (Lee 1990; MGE

2004).

an agent of the Patriotic-Enlightenment movement. During the struggle against

colonialism, there was little room for addressing women-only issues such as sexual assault

or domestic violence. In 1923, the YWCA was established and called for the abolishment

of concubinage, early marriage, and licensed prostitution (Yoon 1999).

In order to understand differences in the trajectory of the Korean women’s

movement compared to Western women’s movements, it is necessary to explore women’s

activities and consciousness raising that took place during the colonial period

(19101945).23

Under brutal Japanese occupation, organized Korean women actively participated in

the resistance movement and openly expressed the belief that women’s liberation is not

possible without national independence. By 1920, the Korean women’s movement was

divided into a nationalist women’s movement and a communist women’s movement; many

women nationalists were Christians. Despite the ideological chasm between the two, both

sides reached an agreement that it was necessary to build a coalition in order to resolve

both national and women’s problems at the same time (Yoon 1999). This resulted in the

first nation-wide Korean women’s organization, Geunwoohoe, which was founded in 1927

by groups of women nationalists and communists and included some Christians. Through

its 61 national and 3 international branches, Geunwoohoe was able to unite and mobilize

diverse national women’s movements concerned with enhancing women’s status.24

23 Korea was colonized by Japan primarily, but between 1879 and 1910 several other imperialist

countries, including the U.S., France, Russia, and China also competed with Japan and each other to colonize or

open the Korean market. Japan won out (Kwon 1999, 40).

24 Geunwoohoe’s code of conduct included the elimination of all discrimination against women,

breaking down irrational superstitions and feudal rules, the elimination of early marriage and freedom to

choose marriage, the elimination of trafficking of women and licensed prostitution, protection of economic

interests for women peasants, equal pay for equal work and guaranteed paid maternity leave, and the

protection of women and juveniles from risky work conditions (Geunwoo 1929 Declaration).

Although the primary goal of Geunwoohoe was to achieve women’s emancipation and end

all practices that discriminated against women, they recognized that women’s subordinate

status should be understood within the context of contradictions such as Japanese

colonialism and capitalism. In a 1927 Declaration,

Geunwoohoe proclaimed that “our [Chosun women’s] struggles for our emancipation

should aim to advance Chosun society and the entire world” (Declaration of Gunwoohoe

1927).

The Japanese responded with severe repression and the leaders of Geunwoohoe were

arrested at the height of the anti-Japanese imperialism movement. This incident generated

conflicts among Geunwoohoe members over what the top priorities of the organization

should be. Should they include the enlightenment of women? The friction led to the

dissolution of the organization in 1931 (Kim 1996). Furthermore, given the brutality of

Japanese colonialism, it was extremely hard to maintain resistance movements, including

the feminist movement. The Korean feminist movement went into abeyance until it

revived in the late 1970s as the democracy movement got underway.

Nationalism and Women’s Movements

The emergence and development of the women’s movement in Korea differ from the

trend in Western countries in that Korean women’s mobilization was needed to support

goals of national independence, democratization, modernization, and reunification (Cho

1992). Women were important actors and some were leaders of these movements. Given

these particularities, Korean women’s involvement in political activities started as part of a

movement for national independence and not from a suffrage movement as in many

Western countries.

After national independence from Japan was achieved in 1945, a new constitution

was introduced with the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Under the new

constitution, women were guaranteed access to basic rights such as voting, employment

and education (Park 1993; Jung 2003). With these “given” rights, the demands of a self

proclaimed women’s movement began to reflect the interests of middle-class women

rather than seeking to influence and respond to all women’s needs. After the enactment

(1954) and implementation (1957) of South Korean Family Law, the Korean women’s

movement focused on reforming the male-dominant provisions of family registration,

property, succession, divorce, and custody. The fundamental perspective of this movement

was that reforming family laws might significantly improve women’s social status. The

movement, organized and led by upper or middle class women intellectuals, tried to appeal

to the upper-class men who had vested rights or interests in the existing law, rather than

promoting mass mobilization through consciousness-raising (Byun 1982). At the same

time, some women’s organizations and groups emerged that were based on friendship and

leisure activities among upper/middle-class women (Park 1993). The period from 1946 to

1961 is identified as a vacuum period for women’s movements in South Korea (Jung 1996,

263).

Korean Women’s Labor Movements

Before exploring the rise of independent and progressive women’s grassroots

movements in the 1980s, it is important to address young female factory workers’

movements during the Park Chung-Hee regime (1961-1979). After overthrowing a

parliamentary regime through a military coup in 1961, Park’s regime sought to promote

economic development based on labor-intensive and export-oriented industries such as

textiles, shoes, electronics, and garments. These relied on foreign capital and technology

and indigenous cheap labor (Park 1993, 131). Through an inducement policy that fostered

low prices for agricultural products, Park’s regime easily mobilized a large cheap labor

force from devastated rural areas. During this systemic mobilization of cheap labor, young

women in rural areas were the primary target. As of 1975, statistics reveal women factory

workers were unmarried (95.1%), less-educated (89.4% had not completed middle school),

and young (87.6 % under 24 years old). Even though they typically worked over-time,

their wages were 46.5% of men’s wage (Lee 1986, 175).

There are contradictory implications of women’s wage employment through

multinational and local factories. For example, Linda Y.C. Lim (1997) points to the

opportunity presented by women’s factory work as alternatives to patriarchal control and

oppression such as early marriage, prostitution, domestic service, and so on (225).

However, the low wage employment of young female factory workers in South Korea

made little contribution to providing alternatives. The primary reason was, of course, that

women factory workers earned too little. But it was notable that, no matter how little they

earned, most of them voluntarily spent their wages to support their poor parents and to pay

their brothers’ tuition25 rather than to improve their own lives.

25 The seed capital generated through exploitation of these women factory workers contributed to new,

heavy industries where their more educated brothers occupied better jobs (Louie 1995: 418).

Kim Eun-Shil’s exploration of discursive power penetrating Korean modernization

provides illuminating insights into why women’s incorporation into the industrial economy

did not empower women workers. According to Kim (2000), the Korean modernization

project (1961-1987) successfully mobilized the whole nation by diffusing cultural, ethical,

and moral values and discourses based on collective interests. These values and discourses

identified the modernization project as “our project,” constructing an identity of “us and

we” (51). Under this framework, all Koreans were called on to cooperate together to build

a modern nation. In mobilizing and exploiting young women as a cheap labor force, this

new nationalism combined with Korean patriarchy to emphasize women’s responsibilities

and contributions to constructing the nation and to supporting their families (64-66). Given

the discourse of protecting the nation and family, female factory workers endured harsh

living and working conditions and supported parents and siblings. It can be argued that

their lives were sacrificed for their brothers’ education. In this respect, Kim argues that

industrialization itself did not pave the way for women to move from private spaces to

public spaces nor did it construct women as independent workers. Rather, women in public

spaces experienced an “extension of patriarchal gender relations” (65). In a similar vein,

Aihwa Ong (2001) points out that even weakened family control over female factory

workers does not necessarily mean women’s empowerment or autonomy because factories

could be another place for exercising patriarchal power. Therefore, women’s subordination

should be understood through notions of “the multiple and fluid nature of power relations”

(111).

While young women factory workers suffered from internationally notorious poor

working conditions during this period, a sense of desperation emerged among young

female factory workers. The brutal capitalist exploitation that was supported by the

repressive military regime led to women’s collective resistance and activism. By

participating in wage labor markets as female factory workers, they directly experienced

discrimination and exploitation on the basis of gender and class and became conscious of

the fact of such discrimination and exploitation. In addition, their workplaces and

dormitories functioned as a space for sharing their common problems and developing

collective identities and activities. These situational circumstances shaped female factory

workers’ understandings of their reality and facilitated their mobilization toward

democratic unionization (Lee 1986, 175).

Because of the martial law that suffocated political freedom and labor rights, their

struggle was as tough and life-threatening as their work conditions were terrible. Their

strikes led to cruel treatment by police; union supporting women were dragged, beaten,

and thrown into jail.

Despite brutal state violence, female factory workers continued to struggle against

state-sponsored oppression throughout the 1970s, electing a woman as union president in

1972 (Louie 1995, 418). The suffering of women factory workers continued to be the

motivation and justification for continued struggles and eventually for creation of

independent women’s labor organizations. Furthermore, the establishment of autonomous

women’s labor groups played a significant role in fostering a progressive feminist

movement in the 1980s by separating working women from male-centered organizations

that overlooked gender issues (Nam 2000). Additionally, witnessing young female factory

workers’ oppression and activism led other women activists, including middle-class

women, Catholic Church members, and college student-turned-workers, to support the

women’s labor movement. Their participation deepened their understanding of

multilayered systems of women’s oppression (Nam 2000; Louie 1995).

In particular, college student activists were directly involved in the labor movement.

Some became factory workers under false identities to raise workers’ consciousness and to

help them organize labor unions. Their experience in the labor movement became the

cornerstone of the progressive women’s movement. NamYoon In Soon, one of the leaders

of the Korean women’s movement and standing representative of Korea Women’s

Association United, recalls the process of combining consciousness raising from her

experience as a factory worker with that of an oppressed woman:

When it comes to differences between the first generation women’s

movement and my generation, we were not those who got access to

women’s reality through scholarly work; we were in the field as

student/democratic movement activists…Most people involved in

democratic movements turned into labor movement activists. At the

time, social movements were illegal. I was teaching an evening class

and working as a factory worker and activist… But, this doesn’t mean

that I was aware of women’s issues or feminist consciousness because

my focus was on female workers subjected to over-time and low wages.

After the establishment of Yosong Pyonguhoe [Women’s Association

For Equality and Peace] and after reading articles on women’s

oppression, I came to realize that my problem and struggle as a female

factory worker and a married woman can be explained as dual

oppressions. This understanding encouraged me to be a feminist labor

activist and it also encouraged me to participate in broader women’s

movements. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon,26 standingrepresentative

of Korea Women’s Association United (KWAU), May 10, 2006, Seoul)

26 In the dissertation, reference to each person interviewed shows the surname appearing first followed

by the individual name(s); this conforms to the Korean style.

Other Influences

South Korean women’s activism also was influenced by increased global women’s

activities, especially through the United Nations women’s conferences beginning in the

1970s; this also supported democratization activities. Although it was a limited formal

concern, the South Korean government responded to the international community’s call for

participation by sending five delegates to the first International Women’s Conference in

Mexico in 1975 and by declaring 1975 as the national women’s year (Jung 2003; Nam

2000).

Education became important to women’s activism in this period. The Christian

Academy, established in 1973, produced important women activists and leaders, a huge

contribution. They also offered educational programs on gender consciousness and social

justice. About 1500 graduates of the “Social Education for Women” program at the

Christian Academy have played significant roles in Korean feminist movements since the

1980s. Women’s Studies was imported by elite women who had studied in the United

States and Europe and the first Women’s Studies course in South Korea was introduced in

1977 at Ewha Woman’s University (Jung 2003; Nam 1998).

The Emergence of Progressive Women’s Movements

Based on the ideology and practice of women’s labor movements and the

antimilitary movement in the 1970s, some labor activists, women intellectuals, and student

activists began to form a progressive feminist movement based on their understanding and

awareness of structural oppression associated with patriarchal capitalism, male

domination, and military regimes. The Yosong Pyonguhoe (Women’s Association for

Equality and Peace) and the Korea Women’s Hotline (KWH) were established in 1983 by

young women intellectuals and activists from labor or student movements of the 1970s.

They were joined quickly by other feminist and women’s organizations in the early and

mid-1980s. The influential democratic movement organization, Minjuhwa Undong

Chongnyon Yonhap (United Youth for Democratization Movement), also established a

women’s division within its existing organizational structure in 1984 as part of the move

toward focusing on women’s issues (Kang, Yoon, and Nam 1999).

At the time, feminist activists and intellectuals recognized women’s movements as

one of many social reform movements—including the democratization movement. This

strategically placed women’s oppression within the context of other forms of oppression,

including imperialism, military dictatorship, capitalism and sexism. In this context, the

women’s movement of the period deliberately prioritized the issues of democracy (Minju)

and nationalism (Minjok) (Jung 2002). In the same vein, women at the lower levels of

society—including factory workers, peasants, and the urban poor—were identified as the

main force behind Korean women’s movements because they were “the most oppressed of

the oppressed” because of the double oppression of sexual discrimination and capitalist

exploitation (Kim 2000; Kang, Yoon, and Nam 1999). As a result, the Korean women’s

movement was referred to as Minjung feminism.27

27 Minjung refers to “the masses.” Therefore, calling the women’s movement a minjung movement

means that the basis of the women’s movement is the majority, including the most oppressed classes in

society. For more details, see Yoon Louie Miriam Ching. (1995). “MinJung Feminism: Korean Women’s

Movement for Gender and Class Liberation.” Women’s Studies International Forum 18(4): 417-430.

However, this does not mean that the Korean women’s movement overlooked the

gender issue specifically during the struggle to end military dictatorship and reconstruct a

democratic society. Rather, women’s movements attracted national attention and

recognition by problematizing gender-related issues such as sexual violence perpetrated by

male government representatives against female anti-government activists. In fact, Korean

women’s organizations and groups used the newly created political opportunities to join

forces28 to accuse the military government of adopting sexual assault as a tactic

for oppressing anti-government movements. For example, The Women’s Hotline, An

Alternative Culture, women’s divisions in progressive organizations, and Korea Church

Women United joined together to protest the sexual assaults by police of three female

college students who were arrested at an anti-government demonstration in 1984 (Ji

2002).

In 1986, the Korean women’s movement led a coalition to fight against the military

government. This led to the brutal incident of rape of Kwon In-Sook by a policeman

during the investigation of her anti-government activities. She spoke publicly about her

rape and filed charges against the state for violation of her rights. Women’s movements

mobilized in support. They accused the military government of using sexual abuse as a

routine strategy to repress female student activists and made this incident a national and

political issue, not an individual tragedy. As a result of their dramatic protests against the

brutalities of the military regime, there was a successful public outcry against sexual

28 Between 1983-1987, the Chun regime gradually bean to alleviate its repression. The Chun regime’s

illegal coup and brutal suppression of the Kwangju uprising led to the mobilization of ordinary people

(minjung) as well as of professionals and civil society activists. The growth of the minjung force eventually led

to the mass protests of 1987 and it was one of the key factors that weakened the military junta’s grip.

torture, the policeman was imprisoned (Kim 1996; Nam 1998), and Kwon won her case,

the first of its kind in South Korea.

Nam Jeong Lim (2000) argues that Kwon’s case had significant implications for both

Korean women’s movements and the democratization of South Korea. According to her,

on the one hand Korean women’s movements recognized the significance of achieving

democratization if they were to end sexual violence against women. Women’s movements

established new and broadened existing relationships with other progressive organizations

such as democratic church groups and The Korean Federation of Bar

Associations while they supported and defended Kwon’s case. On the other hand, Kwon’s

case was the catalyst that contributed to destabilizing the military regime by mobilizing

public outrage and facilitating collective action against sexual torture by the government.

Kwon’s case also was used to enhance the political understanding that gender equality is a

crucial part of democratic practices and elements.

Kwon’s case played a significant role in broadening women’s movement connections

to other democratic movements, and this connection led Korean women’s movements to

participate in the democratization movement during the late 1980s. In particular, the

experience of temporary networks and alliances among women’s organizations encouraged

women’s organizations to maintain their capacity to apply political pressure. These events

and experiences led to the establishment of Korean Women’s Associations United

(KWAU), a national coalition of women’s organizations that includes twenty-one diverse

women’s organizations or groups that range from religious, professional, farming,

housewives’, labor, and environmental groups to human rights organizations (Ji 2002;

Nam 2000). The Korea Women’s Hotline is an influential member of KWAU.

The KWAU and its Activities

Following establishment of the KWAU, the women’s movement experienced

organizational growth in both quantity and quality through active participation in the

democratization movement. However, their involvement in democratization movements

also created internal debates and conflicts. Progressive nationalistic and democratic

movements were male dominated, which led to internal debates and tensions in the

women’s movement surrounding the roles and goals of women’s movements. The major

issue was over whether and how to continue to prioritize women’s equality and

emancipation. The internal tension in KWAU increased when they joined the National

Alliance for Nationalist and Democracy Movements (NAND), which focused exclusively

on democratization and reunification. Eventually, the decision to join the NAND led to the

withdrawal of three organizations from KWAU. Their members were middle-class and

Christian women whose priority goal was to put women’s rights at the top of the activism

agenda. In order to reduce internal tensions, KWAU adopted the slogan and practice of

“Together and Separately.” In other words, while the unified Korean women’s movement

joined nationalism, reunification, and democratization movements (“together”), women

activists and leaders in the women’s movement asserted their freedom and that of their

members to focus on separate women’s issues in the fight against patriarchy, capitalism,

and dictatorship from women’s perspectives (Ji 2002, 103; Kang, Yoon, and Nam 1999).

Even as they struggled against repressive authoritarian military rule, most women

activists agreed that achieving women’s emancipation and democratization should be

pursued simultaneously. Among others, Korean women’s movements remained prominent

in resisting sexual assaults committed by police. During the fight against statesponsored

sexual violence, Korean women activists sustained collective actions by suspending

attention to differences among them related to the women’s diverse backgrounds and other,

competing issues. This was an important strategy; through their active participation in the

democratization movement, women’s movements gained legitimacy among other anti-

government activists and groups (Kim 1996, 72), a move that would pay off in following

decades as women sought support for anti-domestic violence legislation.

With the restoration of a civilian administration in 1993, Korean society also

experienced a rapid expansion of civil society organizations. This proliferation and

diversification of civil society included establishment of new, diverse women’s

organizations with agendas identified with a broad range of topics ranging from radical

issues such as violence against women to more conservative ones including consumer and

environmental issues.

This changed sociopolitical situation posed a challenge to women’s movements. Not

only were women’s organizations and groups more diversified, but nationalistic and

democratic movements declined and disappeared following democratic transition. The

progressive women’s coalition, the KWAU, confronted the need to clarify its political and

activist identity. Because their activities had been somewhat restricted under the leadership

of the major nationalistic and democratic movements, the women’s movement participants

involved now recognized the significance of an independent and autonomous political

force to achieve women’s empowerment. Simultaneously, KWAU members realized the

need for mass-based women’s support and mobilization to develop an autonomous

women’s movement. Through the internal debates and conflicts, the KWAU sought to

transform and broaden struggle issues and to meet the needs and interests of various

groups of women. The KWAU focused on developing common interests of diverse

women, including middle-class, professional, clerical workers, and urban housewives as

well as those of their traditional members—factory workers, peasants, and the urban poor

who had been a central force of the women’s movement during the authoritarian military

period. The KWAU leadership decided to focus attention on producing legislation that

guaranteed women’s shared interests and needs. Based on the reaffirmation of the principle

of gender equality, the KWAU has played a crucial role in developing a new women’s

movement that incorporates diverse women’s organizations, including those organized

following the democratic transition.

After the inauguration of the civilian regime, the KWAU as an organization became

increasingly aware of the possibilities and limitations of the state as a counterpart for

establishing state policies for gender equality. The KWAU concentrated specifically on

incorporating women’s agendas into existing patriarchal laws. It quickly embarked on a

focused and dedicated project that has promoted women’s legal rights through reform of

existing laws and enactment of new gender-related legislation for 15 years. The rise of the

democratic state allowed women’s movements to create a space for social change in terms

of gender equality.29 According to Moon (2002a), “gender equality” was the rhetoric that

transition governments around the world adopted as one way to differentiate themselves

from previous military authoritarian regimes. After the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung’s

regime (1998-2002), which represented a complete transition to a civilian regime, KWAU

sought more engagement strategies with the intention to achieve gender mainstreaming in

government policy. Consequently, the Ministry of Gender Equality30 was established in

2001 and six other Ministries established their own offices of women’s policy.

It is clear that the political opportunities opened up by the democratic transition

created a critical space for women’s movements. However, this political process cannot be

the only factor that can explain the success and achievements of Korean women’s

movements since 1990. Organized women were adept at making the most of this critical

space. A small number of dedicated feminist activists were the key to breaking through the

barriers of an androcentric civil society and to transforming gender-insensitive state

policies.

As part of their strategies to enhance women’s status through legal rights, the KWAU

played a crucial role in building coalitions with other civic organizations, drafting bills

with the cooperation of professionals in line with the interests of women, and running

large-scale campaigns. The KWAU also lobbied National Assembly members, held a series

of nationwide public hearings, used mass media to attract public interest on issues, and put

pressure on the government—especially during major election campaigns.

29 We can see similar patterns in Latin America and Africa where the contribution of women’s

movements to anti-dictatorship struggles made it possible for women’s movements to subsequently move their

genderbased demands into the state-level of policy making (Okeke-Ihejurika and Franceschet 2002).

30 Later, the name was changed to Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, accompanied by a

significant shift in policy focus.

Through a combination of political opportunities and dedicated feminist activism,

the KWAU has had success with several reforms of Family Laws and the Equal

Employment Act and with enacting a series of gender-related laws. These include the

Child Care Act in 1991, the Special Act on the Punishment of Sexual Assault Crimes and

the Protection of the Victim in 1993, The Act on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and

for the Protection of Victim in 1997, the Special Act for the Punishment of Domestic

Violence in 1997, The Act against Gender Discrimination and for the Victim Assistance

in 1999, and The Special Act on the Prevention of Sex Trafficking and Protection of the

Victim in 2004. Most recently, the KWAU successfully completed an ambitious project

focused on women’s legal rights with the Abolition of the Family Headship System (hoju-

je) in 2005.

Korea Women’s Hotline

Although the KWAU has been at the forefront of women’s movements for a long

time, it is not the only national organization that has been instrumental in fighting for

women’s rights and legislation. The Korea Women’s Hotline has long been at the forefront

of the anti-violence movement, is a leader among specifically feminist movements, and

was instrumental in the passage of the 1997 anti-domestic violence legislation that is the

focus of this dissertation. Details of its role will be found in the following chapters. The

following section provides background information about the organization.

The Establishment of the Women’s Hotline (KWH)

While the battered women’s movement emerged both in the United States and

Britain from the revived women’s liberation movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s

in the context of civil rights movements, a Korean women’s group that politicized the issue

of wife beating was formed during military authoritarian rule. Therefore, unlike Western

countries where pre-existing feminist groups played a crucial role in building battered

women’s movements, KWH carved out a progressive women’s movement for the first

time. KWH was founded in 1983 and KWAU was established in 1987. KWH was the first

women’s group to exclusively focus on “women-only issue (wife battering)” For civil

society organizations struggling under the hardship of the military regime, the formation of

independent women’s groups that focused on issues like wife beating (considered a

“private matter”) was not appreciated. Such issues were considered to have a secondary

status far beneath nationalist and democratic struggles. Therefore, the appearance and

survival of KWH generated both curiosity and on-going interest among the feminist

activists who were involved in other social movements at that time.

[Most] women were interested in how to promote a democratic

movement, not a women’s movement. The reason for the break up of

Yosong Pyonguhoe [Women’s Association for Equality and Peace] was

a disagreement on this—women’s movement vs. democratic

movement. Within this context, Korea Women’s Hotline was an off-the-

wall happening. (Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-representative of

Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

Feminist theorists have pointed out that women’s long exclusion from formal

politics, including under authoritarian and military regimes, paradoxically contributed to

women’s access to the political arena because of hardships experienced under military

rule. In other words, in the context of authoritarianism that suppressed conventional

political activities, greater political space was given to women because women’s activities

were not regarded as political resistance or struggle—they were seen as social welfare and

cultural activities. Susan Francheschet (2001) argues that “during the authoritarian period

women can organize precisely because their gender associates them with the non-political

sphere, thus their participation is not perceived as a threat to the regime” (210-1). In

exploring the case of Brazil, in a similar vein Gerard Huiskamp (2000) found that feminist

groups and women’s organizations were able to occupy political space due to the “cultural

belief that women were inherently apolitical” (388-9). During the military dictatorship in

South Korea, women’s resistance struggles swayed public opinion and garnered support

and the attention of the mass media by playing on gender roles, especially that of the

mother (Nam 1998, 3). For example, in street demonstrations women wore handkerchiefs

(sambae sugun) on their heads, a traditional symbol of mourning and loss in South Korea,

used here to represent the death of democracy (Nam 2000, 103). This created a cultural

contradiction between Confucian inspired interpretations of motherhood and women’s

roles in defense of the family on the one hand and the overt political objective of defense

of the nation by women.31

This aspect of Korean women’s participation in the democratic movement had

important implications for the emergence of the Korea Women’s Hotline in 1983. Lee

Hyun Sook and Jung Chun Sook (1999) point out that the preparation period (1980-1983)

31 Similar situations have been identified in Southeast Asia and Latin American for motherist human

rights groups.

for establishing the KWH was precisely at one of the lowest points for civil society due to

increased government repression and the consolidation of military authoritarianism (108).

Despite these hostile conditions, the fact that KWH advocated for and provided assistance

to battered women seems to have protected it; apparently, the KWH was not regarded as a

major threat to the authoritarian government.

The Women’s Hotline started with very small, scattered so-called

hotlines. The Women’s Hotline was less political than we were

[democratic/labor movement]. At the time, the appearance of the

Woman’s Hotline seemed extremely bizarre but we now know that it

was progressive. (Interview with Cho, Young Hee, director of Conflict

Resolution Center, Women Making Peace, June 19, 2006, Seoul)

In the Korean context, Jung (2003) and Moon (2002a) identify the military regime’s

appeasement policy after 1983 and the inauguration of a civil regime in 1993 as two

extremely crucial political spaces for the development and spread of civil society,

including women’s movements. They argue that the loosening of political restrictions was

a factor that fostered the emergence of “single-issue women’s groups” (Jung 2003, 265;

Moon 2002a, 489).

Nonetheless, the establishment and achievement of KWH cannot be explained

without understanding the roles, activities, and dedication of the progressive women

intellectuals and activists who comprised the organization. These, in turn, were

“products” of the “social education for women’s program” of the Christian Academy and

Young Women’s Group (KWH 1983, 2). The experience of the national year of women in

1975 and the emergence of women’s studies classes through the Christian Academy also

played a role. They motivated some middle-class and intellectual women to address the

issue of gender oppression and male dominance through the establishment of independent

women’s groups in South Korea. Park Inn Hea, a current co-representative of KWH and

graduate of the Christian Academy, stated:

The experience of the year 1975 and of women’s studies was like

standing under a waterfall. They presented the most progressive stories

heard in the most oppressive society. (Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-

representative of Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

The contribution of women intellectuals to developing the issue of wife beating was

not confined to pushing the limits of the state. Just as battered women’s movements in

Western societies benefited from sharing information and experiences between and among

countries, the Women’s Hotline took advantage of even indirect exposure to feminist

movements in Western countries. For example, intellectuals who visited battered women’s

shelters while studying abroad in the 1970s and the early 1980s played key roles in

founding KWH (Han 2005, 97). In this respect, the emergence of KWH in Korean society

cannot be explained with a single factor or unitary measure or even solely by local context

or events.

In sum, progressive women became interested in women’s issues and activities

through their involvement in labor and democratic movements under the brutal military

regime, and they used to their advantage whatever political opportunities emerged during

and following military authoritarianism. At the same time, while some women’s

movements confined themselves to a meta-narrative of nationalism and democratization,

members still shared oppressive experiences as women. This contributed to a crossing of

boundaries to support shared causes in spite of differences as factory workers, students, or

intellectual women. The latter facilitated the subsequent establishment of autonomous and

independent women’s groups.

The Evolution and Activities of the Women’s Hotline

Following establishment, the KWH conducted and presented the first research

results on wife battering in South Korea in 1983. Research indicated that 42.2% of 708

women respondents surveyed said that they had experienced beatings after marriage

(KWH 1983, 4). In this research, KWH used the feminist term “wife beating” instead of

the culturally-accepted term of “marital spat.” The latter term represents conflict as a

private, married couple’s issue and ignores the gender-based power differentials suggested

by the former term. Despite their scant resources32 and an oppressive political milieu, this

first survey on wife beating in Korean society drew widespread public attention through

mass media coverage and reports.

KWH is widely credited with launching the first organized movement against

violence against women in South Korea. It organized the first open discussions on wife

beating and established a crisis hotline service with two telephones.33 Services were

provided by volunteers who received feminist counseling education beforehand.

Although KWH’s main goal was to construct the issue of wife beating as a social

problem, its members decided to participate in democratic movements. KWH members

understood women’s issues in terms of sociopolitical factors such as capitalist exploitation,

cultural mores, and military authoritarian regimes. KWH tied the causes of wife beating to

32 KWH began with donations from individual members and volunteers as staff.

33 According to Lee and Jung (1999), KWH received 541 calls in the first 15 days despite having just two

telephone lines. KWH, mass media, and Korean society were surprised by the number of calls and their content

(113).

the normative use of sexual and other forms of violence by the military regime as well as

to deeply-rooted patriarchy and institutionalized gender discrimination (Han 2005, 98).

Given the goal of social change as a significant condition for eliminating wife beating,

KWH members saw participation in democratic movements as one strategy.

They participated by building coalitions with other progressive organizations and groups.

However, these activities caused an identity crisis among some members and staff of

KWH. They raised a question of organizational identity—whether KWH is a counseling

center, a women’s movement organization, or a political group. KWH also confronted

challenges from progressive activists who regarded KWH’s activities on the issues of wife

beating or sexual abuse as a disturbing activity of secondary importance at a time when

building a democratic nation should be the primary goal (Lee and Jung 1999, 111). As a

result of this internal discussion, KWH made a decision to build an identity as a women’s

movement organization but supported a broad range of goals including struggling against

“wife beating, sexual abuse, sexual discrimination,” attaining

“women’s labor rights,” and building “an independent unified democratic society” (111).

Following a declaration to this effect, KWH opened the first shelter for victims of wife

beating in South Korea in 1987.

In November 1991, KWH organized a campaign in Seoul to mark “International

Day against Violence against Women.” They were joined by a coalition of women from 26

countries. KWH identified this and similar activities as actions of a “women’s human

rights movement” involving international networks and coalitions in the mid 1990s. In the

meantime, KWH extended its service activities through the establishment of local branches

of the Hotline.34

In terms of organizational structure and democratic process, local branches have

autonomy and authority to make decisions to recruit members and volunteers and to

develop ideas and practices appropriate to their local area. At the same time, all local

branches are closely connected in a network, sharing information and discussions and

building coalitions to deal with emerging issues and challenges. As an umbrella

organization, KWH fosters participatory decision-making and control. A system of

corepresentatives is one of the ways KWH “decentralizes” power within the organization.

Through a leadership structure that involves co-representatives and collaboration with

professionals and staff members, KWH focuses on developing national agendas targeting

women’s rights issues and on incorporating feminist perspectives into state policies on

women.

The evolution and growth of KWH cannot be understood adequately without

addressing its human resources—dedicated women activists. As a previous section already

describes, many of these activists are former student/labor/democratic activists. However,

this does not necessarily mean that KWH and other progressive women’s organizations are

the direct heritage of other progressive social movements. While progressive women

activists benefited from participating in other social movements, they realized that so-

called progressive movements and progressive male activists were not free of patriarchal

34 In 1997, the Korea Women’s Hotline split into 2 organizations—the Korea Women’s Hotline and the

Seoul Women’s Hotline. As of 2007, KWH has 26 local branches under the leadership of three

corepresentatives. This year the Korea Women’s Hotline became a national network headquarter and no longer

provided direct counseling services. The Seoul Women’s Hotline continued to provide services and both are in

Seoul.

values. This realization triggered women activists’ decisions and choices to join a women’s

movement with explicit awareness of gender issues.

When I was a college student, I was a student movement activist. When

I was at school, I thought that a women’s movement was trivial because

at the time the focus was democratization and labor movements. We

criticized women’s movements as a cause of divisiveness and conflict. I

thought that I might participate in a women’s movement someday, but

not now. During my involvement in the labor movement, I became sick

of gender discrimination and patriarchy within social movements. Those

things caused conflicts inside me and I happened to come to the Korea

Women’s Hotline…It was fascinating to think about how to prove that

the personal is political. (Jung Choun Sook, president of Korea

Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

In a similar vein, other women activists found new strength and effectiveness through their

women’s movements and experienced such movements as an interesting venue to engage

in “real” movements for and with people.

I was a former student activist. I was interested in women’s issues, but

rather than the issue of violence itself, I was attracted to the way that

Korea Women’s Hotline approached women and their lives. What I

mean is the directly meeting with women victims and then working with

and for them. I love that part, finding issues together and organizing,

strategizing together. (Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-representative of

Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

A younger generation of feminist activists at KWH today expresses interest in combining

their individual goals and values with the movement’s goal.

I always believe that everyone should be respected. I wanted to live my

life according to this belief. So, it was important for me to find a job to

realize this belief through my career...I majored in social welfare. While I

was in [social welfare], I felt stuffy because social welfare focuses on

serving individuals rather than changing society. I didn’t like that part.

Now I am happy to do something for social change at Korea Women’s

Hotline. I get on well with KWH. (Interview with Nam Jee Hyang, head

coordinator of media program, Korea Women’s Hotline, July 13’ 2006’

Seoul)

Identifying itself as a women’s rights activist group today, KWH defines its goals as

“protecting against all kinds of violence and advancing women’s social position as well as

establishing gender equality in the spheres of family, work, and society.” The

organizational purpose that KWH clearly articulates in promotional materials and

interviews is to realize women’s full participation in socio-political and economic arenas,

and then to maintain a peaceful and democratic society. The main activities of KWH

include the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement, Family Equality and a Peaceful

Community Movement, Spousal Property Partnership Policy Movement, Local Women's

Media Movement, and the International Solidarity Program.

The establishment of a new civilian government in 1993 facilitated an environment

that actively encouraged women’s groups to participate in governance. Because of this,

progressive women’s groups considered obtaining legal entity status by becoming an

incorporated association. KWH became a registered, incorporated association in 1994. But

its members also were concerned about the danger of cooptation that could undermine the

radical force of the progressive women’s movement following incorporation. This was a

controversial issue under the political circumstances of the time as explained in the

following paragraphs.

According to Ji (2002), the umbrella organization, Korea Women’s Association

United, discussed possible incorporation for three years. But financial independence was

100

considered to be a significant factor to maintain political independence and autonomy.

KWAU was able to avoid incorporation initially through the unconditional financial

support of the EZE (Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe/Protestant

Association for Cooperation in Development) which played a key role in the development

of many Korean progressive women’s movements. The Women’s Hotline also was able to

extend the number of shelters for battered women and children with their own funding

from EZE in 1991. However, once South Korea became a member of OECD (Organization

for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1997, EZE decided to stop its financial

support in South Korea in order to help other women’s groups in underdeveloped

countries. This financial crisis hastened many women’s groups’ decision to incorporate.

Transition to an incorporated association allowed women’s groups to apply for

governmental-funded projects, to do fundraising, and seek corporate donations. Although

funding is still a significant issue, KWH and its branches have been able to maintain

relative financial independence and stability through recruitment of new, unpaid

volunteers, members and donors. Volunteers are crucial to running the organizations and

maintain the spirit and passion necessary to the struggle.

Because of its focus on combating domestic violence and promoting women’s

human rights in South Korea, KWH and its branches recently have sought possible

opportunities for coalition building across Asia as part of the regional globalization

process. Specifically, they have focused on the needs of immigrant women from Asian

countries who come because of international marriages and for work. For example, KWH

closely cooperates with the Mongolian National Center Against Violence (NCAV). In

101

2006, Volunteers Crossing Borders for Women’s Rights, a sub-group of KWH, launched a

fundraising project for establishing shelters in Mongolia. In 2007, KWH embarked on a

project to help married immigrant women from the Philippines and Vietnam to arrange

visits to their hometowns.

Concluding Comments

This chapter explored the context in which Korean women’s consciousness of

gender equality was awakened and the Korean women’s movement emerged and

developed in tandem with other social movements, including national independence,

student, labor, and democratic movements. Given historical circumstances such as

colonialism, economic underdevelopment, national divisions, and military

authoritarianism, Korean women were closely involved in national independence,

modernization, reunification, and democratization movements. This historical trajectory of

feminist consciousness-raising and Korean women’s movements shows the ways in which

the women’s movement identified and brought gender issues into broader sociopolitical

structures and systems. It also shows how closely women’s issues and discrimination

impacted individual lives and were dealt with primarily as private or secondary matters.

Only with the appearance of a progressive women’s movement have Korean women

activists continuously and successfully advanced issues of gender equality, especially and

most recently through a focus on legislative reforms. As Korea’s leading progressive

women’s umbrella organizations, the experiences and history of both KWAU and KWH

reveal how Korean women’s earlier participation in colonial resistance and other social

movements led to strong networks and coalitions.

102

CHAPTER 5

THE CAMPAIGN TO CONSTRUCT ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION:

THE POLITICS OF FRAMING IN SOUTH KOREA

Overview

This chapter discusses the emergence of the campaign to construct and pass

antidomestic violence legislation. It introduces aspects of the political and cultural context

and analyzes choices and negotiations involved in deciding on two effective strategies to

support legislation—coalition building and a framing strategy. The framing strategy was

intended to transform and subvert problematic cultural concepts that deemed wife abuse a

private, trivial and even benign aspect of married life. The new frame, arrived at through

much reflection and negotiations among feminist activists, was designed to re-construct

wife beating from a “private issue” to a “social issue” that has a legitimate place on the

public policy agenda. The chapter also introduces some unanticipated consequences that

resulted from the agreed upon frame and from the institutionalization of responsibilities for

implementing the legislation. Following chapters delve more deeply into an analysis of

outcomes.

103

Wife Beating: The Problem that Was Not a Problem

At the time it was established in 1983, the Korea Women’s Hotline (KWH) first gave

a name to hidden violence in the home, rendered battered women’s lives visible, and

defined wife beating as a serious social problem for the first time in Korean society.

Needless to say, the issue of domestic violence had been regarded as a private matter

for a long time in South Korea. The old saying that “a woman and bullock, the more you

beat them, the better they be” is a vivid manifestation of traditional cultural notions

regarding domestic violence. Another saying, “a couple’s quarrel is like slashing water

with a knife,” suggests that spousal conflict is not serious or violent and that it has no

important or lasting effects. Yet another saying, “the quarrel of lovers is the renewal of

love,” actually suggests that spousal conflict is constructive rather than destructive.

Determined to challenge these notions and address the problem of wife abuse, KWH

opened two crisis lines and provided counseling programs and temporary refuges for

abused women; services were supported by volunteers and donations. Establishing shelters

and providing services without state funding was important in terms of the ideological

significance and practical autonomy. However, just as their counterparts in

Western societies ultimately had to turn to the state out of financial need, so did the KWH.

Over time, it was increasingly difficult for the Korean feminist activists to maintain

independence from state authority not just financially, but also politically and conceptually.

In addition to providing services to battered women, Korean feminist activists

wanted to raise public consciousness about domestic violence. Defining the problem and

104

its causes quickly became an important goal of the movement.35 Ultimately, feminist

activists hypothesized that state engagement through financial and institutional support

potentially could play a crucial role in enhancing the understanding of the problem and its

seriousness. Confronting a deeply-rooted patriarchal ideology that permeates all levels of

society also quickly emerged as an issue. Over time, a commitment to conceptual/cultural

reform acquired increasing importance, in part due to real life events.

One such event was a 1991 incident involving the police. The incident led to the

realization that biased and scornful attitudes toward women’s groups and women activists

not only existed, but they were supported by institutionally-sanctioned antipathy and

practices—not limited to personal beliefs or values. In 1991, KWH’s work protecting

battered women was reported to the police by a batterer who accused the organization of

“trafficking” women. Police officers broke into the offices of the KWH and threatened the

activists and advocates present. They took three of the activists to the police station to

investigate them; the three accused the police of brutality. They also reported that police

officers called the batterer “Sir” and treated him with respect. The KWH activists, on the

other hand, received a very different treatment.

As soon as we were brought into SeoDaeMoon police station, police

officers shouted at us saying “come here, Ah-zum-ma36, what the hell

are you doing there?” Although the Women’s Hotline has been

35 The concept of “feminist activists” refers to people who understand domestic violence or wife

beating as a form of gender violence whose underlying cause is gender discrimination. This definition is

inspired by Schechter (1982, 107): “…feminists were the first to analyze violence against women as part of the

power dynamic operating between men and women in a sexist society. By their persistence, feminist and

grassroots activists forced the words ‘battered women’ into public consciousness. Professionals then moved in

to claim violence as a mental health or criminal justice problem. The political analysis disappeared, was

changed, or was considered beyond the scope of professional concern.”

36 This is a Korean term for married women, especially middle-aged housewives. It is common and

informal but is not considered polite. Some people use this term to humiliate women.

105

operating in the jurisdiction of SeoDaeMoon police and we have worked

for women’s rights for 10 years, we were treated like criminals in a very

harsh manner. On the contrary, they treated Kim gently; he was the one

who reported us as traffickers (From “Is shelter a broker’s house?”

Batle, March 11,1991, p.13).37

This shocking event convinced the KWH of the need to seek institutional reforms through

the criminal justice system and to target the social welfare system as well as changes in

medical services and in family relations. To end problems like this, feminist activists

identified establishing a law as a priority on their change agenda. Because of the particular

cultural significance of the legal system and respect for its authority in Korean society,

feminist activists believed that anti-domestic violence legislation would be the best way to

challenge practices and transform this ignored “women’s issue” into a public issue. In the

same vein, they also believed that criminalizing all forms of gender violence in the name

of social justice would be the fastest way to get people to accept gender violence as a

serious crime. In what Rebecca Emerson Dobash calls the “symbolic effect” (2003, 135),

state intervention in gender violence itself can contribute to challenging traditional

attitudes and assumptions regarding violence against women. Korean feminist activists

decided at this time that the first task was to develop a new way to conceptualize the

problem and to identify causes.

Based on their own theorizing/understanding of gender-based violence and

recognizing the state as a significant site for ending violence against women, the KWH

initiated the anti-gender violence legislation movement. They held the first public hearing

on a special act for eliminating gender violence on April 18, 1991. In this public hearing,

37 Batle was a periodical published by the KWH from 1983 to 1994.

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KWH activists defined the notion of gender violence as addressing all forms of violence

against women:

The Women’s Hotline’s definition of gender violence includes wife

beating, rape, sexual assault, trafficking, prostitution, sexual

harassment and violence against women within the work place, as well

as the gender inequality and psychological abuse to which women are

subjected for being women (Han Woo Seop. “Facts and Problem of

Gender Violence.” Booklet of Public Hearings on Gender Violence

Legislation, published by KWH in 1991.).

However, this concept of gender violence created an internal controversy among

feminists and women activists. Despite agreement over the need for legislation to stop

gender-based violence, how to define the notion of gender violence was questioned by

some. One group of actors agreed with a comprehensive definition of gender violence that

would combine wife abuse and marital rape with rape and sexual assault. Another group

wanted to limit the concept of gender violence to sexual assault and rape. Jung Choun

Sook, president of the Seoul Women’s Hotline, explained these debates regarding the

notion of gender violence within the organization:

The initial draft of the law included rape/sexual assault, wife beating,

and marital rape. During internal discussion, however, it was suggested

that wife beating and marital rape should be separated from the

concept of sexual assault in order to increase the possibility of passing

legislation. Although we (KWH) argued that wife abuse should be a core

issue in defining gender violence, other organizations and activists

identified only rape committed by strangers as an appropriate issue for

defining sexual violence…In relation to this debate, the primary issue

was the possibility of passing the law. One of the Assembly men38

present commented that “if a law concerning marital rape is passed,

most Korean men should go straight to the police station instead of

38 South Korea’s national legislature is known as the National Assembly.

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going to work in the morning.” (Interview with Jung Choun Sook,

president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006)

Feminist activists confronted the need to balance a realistic approach (focused, selective)

with an ideal approach (more comprehensive). Given the reality at the time of political

constraints and an unfavorable political climate, feminist activists decided that the broader

definition of gender violence was not appropriate for the feminist politics of the time.

Although many continued to share a comprehensive notion of gender violence, they were

skeptical that the issues of wife beating and marital rape would both be accepted by the

National Assembly and by the public for a comprehensive law on gender violence.

Furthermore, it was argued that the inclusion of wife beating in the concept of gender

violence might jeopardize the passage of the anti-sexual violence law that was a parallel

feminist legal project at the time (Through Women’s Eyes, 1992, p. 7).39

The failure to conceptualize gender violence as incorporating all forms of violence

against women can be blamed on widely accepted cultural understandings of differences

between rape and wife beating. Rape was more easily defined as a crime based on the

cultural assumption that it is usually committed by strangers. In comparison, wife beating

was more difficult to define as a crime because it always occurs within the family and

involves family members.

At the time, the concept of rape was mainly limited to rapes in public

places. What I mean is that many cases of rape targeted women

walking in the street at night. Men with a van suddenly kidnapped

women and raped them. Given this understanding of rape, the public

raged against the brutality of sexual violence against women. Another

39 Through Women’s Eyes was a periodical published by the KWH from 1995 to 2004.

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situation that added understanding was provided by the case of BoEun

and

JinKwan40. The shock that followed publicity on the case increased acceptance of the

idea that women wanted to end rape. Then our society had this actor,

the Korea Women’s Hotline, struggling against violence against women

for years. However, in the case of wife beating, the reason we were not

able to deal with the matters of rape and wife beating at the same time

was that there was disagreement even among feminists over the issue.

In addition, state intervention in domestic matters was not socially

acceptable because of a strongly-held expectation for the separation of

public and private spheres. (Interview with Cho Young Sook, director of

the Center for Women’s Human Rights, August 17, 2006, Seoul)

Confronted first by the urgency to pass a law against sexual assault, feminist activists

reached an agreement that the issues of wife beating and marital rape should be dealt with

separately. These actors believe that this decision contributed to the passage of the Act on

the Punishment of Sexual Assault Crimes and the Protection of the Victims in 1993.41

In strategizing over the best way to strike down cultural attitudes about wife beating,

Korean feminists were keenly interested in the possible effects of state intervention and

law enforcement. They decided to rely on authorized institutions such as the justice system

as the best option because it could define what is deemed to be “rights” or “wrong” and

would establish what will or will not be tolerated within society (see Dobash 2003 for a

discussion of this approach). They did not foresee that their attempts to integrate women’s

issues into mainstream institutions and institutional practices might bring an unexpected

consequence of self-censorship (discussed below). Rather, given the circumstances of the

time—including that the issue of violence against women was not really considered a

40 BoEun, a survivor of rape, had been brutally molested and raped by her stepfather for 12 years. After

she went to college, she met JinKwan, who became her boyfriend, and she told him everything. One day,

JinKwan and BoEun dropped by her stepfather’s home to tell him never to touch her again, but JinKwan

accidentally killed the stepfather.

41 Although the law was passed, serious questions have been raised regarding implementation and public

acceptance.

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problem—institutionalization through constructing legislation and demanding state

funding was believed to be a crucial and significant strategy for challenging the lack of

public awareness and attitudes regarding the importance of gender violence.

Although subsequent conflicts arose among feminist activists over the details of

constructing legislation and assuring passage, those at the forefront of these initiatives

believed that the best option was to negotiate with actors in the existing legal and political

systems. It seemed unproductive to focus their energies on a search for some kind of

consistent, agreed-upon feminist perspective on the issue of violence against women,

especially when there was no guarantee that the feminist perspective would have the

desired impact on politicians or the general public.

The internal dynamics of the movement—that is, the ways in which feminist

activists dealt with tensions, compromise, and negotiations to get the subject of private

shame onto a public policy agenda—shed light on the complicated and contradictory

situations they faced. In other words, feminist choices and decision making need to be

examined through a consideration of the broader socio-political and cultural context that

comprised both opportunities and constraints. Such an approach allows us to explore the

key factors that contributed to the movement’s success in meeting the goal of legislation

and to limitations and unexpected consequences that created obstacles to achieving the

outcomes that feminists expected to follow passage of new legislation. The following

analysis of the factors that feminist activists had to negotiate can contribute to a more

clearly-situated understanding of the origin and development of this women’s antiviolence

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movement and has implications for a broader, more general understanding of such

movements.

Sensationalizing Wife Beating: Contradictory Effects

Even before the issue of domestic violence gained the interest of both the general

public and the state, feminist activists became aware of the fact that a series of desperate

homicides committed by battered women was attracting media attention. Then, the case of

Lee Sang-hee halmoni (grandmother) became a catalyst for bolstering the new

antidomestic violence (DV) legislation movement nationwide and provided an argument

for state intervention. Lee’s case attracted public attention because it was different from

the usual reports of wife beatings. Lee, a mother-in-law, accidentally killed her son-in-

law42 when she was protecting her daughter from being beaten by the son-in-law. Her

daughter, Jung Mee Sook, was married to Oh Won-Jong who raped her repeatedly. She

was seriously beaten, had attempted suicide, and she ran away several times. On the day of

the accident, Oh was brutally beating Jung with a weapon, and Lee stabbed him with a

knife to protect her daughter. When the police got to the scene, the daughter told the police

that she alone had killed her husband and the police arrested her. However, the police

investigation revealed that the real perpetrator was Lee. The mass media widely reported

this case in a sympathetic way by focusing on a mother’s inevitable need to protect her

daughter. They did not focus on the incident as a homicide. At the same time, the media

played up Lee’s case as an example of a daughter’s filial affection toward her mother (by

42 Traditionally, the relationship between a mother-in-law and son-in-law has been different from the

relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in Korean society. Given the patriarchal nature of the

family, there is a saying that a son-in-law is a “guest for a hundred years.” This saying means that a sonin-law is

precious and should be treated with respect and courtesy no matter how long or close the relationship. Because

of cultural beliefs that a woman’s life was exclusively up to her husband, a mother tried to protect and promote

a daughter’s happiness through generous and welcoming treatment of the sonin-law.

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confessing to the stabbing).43 Television news reports also repeatedly showed the daughter

crying a lot while watching her elderly mother (72 years old) being arrested. The media

treated this case differently from previous cases of homicide committed by battered

women. This provoked widespread sympathy and understanding for the mother and

daughter.

Lee’s case was a revelation for strategizing. It helped the Korean battered women’s

movement realize that the media played a crucial role in defining and representing the

issue of domestic violence. In direct contradiction to social and cultural norms that defined

wife beating as a private matter, media coverage in Lee’s case paved the way for

introducing alternative understandings. This, in turn, suggested the feasibility of a

transition to wife beating as a public issue of domestic violence. The Korean battered

women’s movement responded quickly to take advantage of the precious opportunity that

the media could offer given treatment of Lee’s case. By tying this case to a recalcitrant

attitude and response of the police to domestic violence, KWH was able to emphasize the

urgent need for appropriate police intervention to prevent horrific homicides. This was a

clear shift from a previous approach where they had attempted to raise awareness by

emphasizing problems of gender inequality or male domination.

This would not have happened if the police would come and use

appropriate measures when they receive calls. This homicide happened

because the police do not come or refuse to assist the woman or ignore

the incident as just a domestic disturbance…We ask whether or not

43 Newspaper headlines evidence the emphasis on sympathetic reporting: “Mom, why did you confess?”

(Seoul Daily, May 8, 1996, p. 22); “I am the real criminal! Wailing reunion of mother and daughter”

(Kookmin Daily, May 7, 1996, p. 27); “Released motherly love” (Kookmin Daily, July 6, 1996, p. 25);

“Homecoming with tears” (Dong-A Daily, July 6, 1996, p. 37); “Sobbing mother and daughter between the bars”

(Hankyoreh, May 8, 1996, p. 23); “Weeping on Mother’s Day” (Kyunghyang Daily, May 8, 1996, p. 22).

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under the circumstances our society is entitled to punish [Lee]? (KWH,

“The Request of a Report,” May 9, 1996).44

Given that one of the major political goals of the battered women’s movement in its

earliest period was to make the issue of domestic violence a focus of national discussion,

the media became a primary tool to achieve the goal. However, it did not take long for

feminist activists to realize that the media play a contradictory role in terms of “the public

expression of opinions and opinion formation” (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 220). Given

the social and cultural context, the media also repeated popular sayings and cultural myths

surrounding domestic violence. For example, the saying “wind and rain can come in the

home, but laws never do” was frequently used in support of tolerance for domestic

violence or in pieces that attacked the proposed anti-domestic violence law. Feminists

found that it was naïve to think that the media would so easily be convinced to limit

publicity to favorable positions on proposed legislation or the movement itself as the

antiDV campaign progressed. As soon as the movement had been successful in efforts to

focus national attention on ways that police aided and abetted perpetrators by refusing to

intervene to help battered women, a counter-discourse immediately emerged. This counter-

discourse disseminated the idea that state intervention in domestic violence constitutes a

threat to the privacy of families and of individuals (clearly men).

The attempt to sustain the peaceful family through the law and public

institutions is inevitably limited. The only way to keep a family united

together with peace and harmony should be through love and respect

among family members, not through the law or policy. In this respect,

44 This report was a document sent to the media, especially women reporters, asking for cooperation in

publicizing the case.

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the anti-domestic violence law should consider the matter of individual

privacy violations (Editorial, Kyunghyang Daily, June 25, 1996, p. 3).

Even when the media circulated serious messages about domestic violence, they also

replicated established myths surrounding domestic violence. This contributed to an even

more confusing binary understanding of public and private and the myth that wife beating

can be equated with trivial quarrels. In addition to reinforcing the existing cultural

perspective, proponents of the counter-discourse also used media to shape a second new

understanding of the problem. While admitting that domestic violence might be a serious

matter, counter-discourse suggested that feminist demands for state intervention created a

problem they defined as a human rights violation by failing to protect privacy. They

proposed that:

…state intervention should guarantee individual privacy and family

secrets. Domestic violence in the form of a mild beating can occur as a

result of normal arguing between couples. There also may be a “special

reason” that such an incident should not be exposed to others. In many

cases, attempts to eliminate domestic violence is likely to cause

another violation of human rights, namely privacy violation. Domestic

violence should be resolved within the family (Editorial, Dong-A Daily,

June 26, 1996, p. 3).

It is interesting that domestic violence was addressed as a human rights violation not in the

sense of a person’s right to be free from violence (as it is contemplated in international

accords), but because of the presumption of a right to privacy and personal secrets that

apply not just to individuals, but to the family as a unit. This example sheds light on a

significant contextual factor that made it impossible for the Korean battered women’s

movement to appropriate and apply the transnational anti-violence campaign’s preference

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for using a universal women’s human rights language. In South Korea and the Asian

region in general, the notion of human rights has its own unique and limiting history. It is

conceptualized and interpreted in ways that are very different from the West European

experience that cannot easily be applied to individual citizens and even less so to women.

Another way that counter-discourse attacked domestic violence was by accusing

feminists and the media of failing to give equal attention to “battered husbands.” Much

like anti-feminist counterparts in the U.S. and elsewhere, opponents claimed that husband

abuse was as pervasive and serious a problem as wife beating.45

The media often do provide a space for “the spread of movements’ ideas” (Della

Porta and Diani 2006, 220) and, in spite of such contradictions and frequent

counterdiscourse in the media, the Korean battered women’s movement still regarded the

media as a crucial avenue for generating support and attention to the issue. However,

activists noted that homicides committed by battered women to defend themselves were

not given the same attention and sympathy. This led to a realization by feminists that the

issue of wife beating can be interpreted, represented, and manipulated to different ends

within specific social and cultural contexts like that of South Korea. Feminist activists

concluded that various translations have an impact on public understanding of the issue.

And they sought to play a more central role in the process of translation for public and

political consumption.

45 During reporting on the case of a battered husband, a newspaper article identified four causes for

husband battering based on their “analysis” of real-life cases: the perpetrator is a man-like woman who wants

to compete with men; a husband has a feminine side that causes his victimization; a woman has morbid

suspicions about her husband’s chastity; a middle-aged woman expresses her suppressed anger once she has a

trust fund obtained as a consequence of women’s rights to a division of property ( “A battered husband,”

Segye Daily, July 10, 1996, p. 11).

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For example, while feminists often point to Lee’s case as making a contribution to

the passage of the anti-domestic violence law because it was among the first where media

coverage encouraged sympathy for cases of domestic violence, they rightly recognized that

coverage did not lend itself to establishing DV as a social problem involving women’s

human rights or citizen rights. Rather, the focus on the miserable story of mother and

daughter dramatized the issue of wife beating but also individualized it.

There are the daughter who was behind bars for 20 days while covering

up her mother’s murder and the mother who surrendered herself to the

police to pay for the crime she committed. This mother and daughter…

broke a thousand people’s hearts before finally being released (Seoul

Daily, July 6, 1996, p. 21).

Dramatizing that individualizes wife beating is not the only problem feminist activists had

to address. Medicalizing DV also is a problem that continues the process of individualizing

the issue.

He was an alcoholic and suffered from morbid doubts about his wife’s

faithfulness and it seems that both diseases were the cause of his

violent behaviors. If so, he was a patient who needed psychological

attention. I could not find any evidence of efforts by the family to

recognize his violence as a disease and seek a cure. All the family did

was to report him to the police. I think that a recycling of violence took

place being reported and then released from by the police (“The people

who were called “animals” after the death,” HanKook Daily, May 23,

1996, p. 4).

Critiquing individualization and medicalization of the issue of wife beating does not mean

that feminist activists denied that individual histories, behaviors or factors have anything

to do with wife abuse. They realized, as Schechter (1982) points out, that while it is

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important to consider the role of backgrounds and psychological illness as factors in men’s

violence against women, neither answers the question of why there is “a specific target,

women, or…a specific context, their home” (210). A feminist perspective assumes that the

problem of wife beating is linked to issues of male supremacy and women’s oppression

based on gender. As members of a feminist movement, Korean activists agreed that

addressing the problem of wife abuse from this feminist perspective is fundamental.

However, in reality, how to define the problem for public consumption is a political matter

and each discourse potentially generates a counter-discourse. And when a discourse was

identified with “feminists,” the backlash was worse. Media coverage provided important

lessons to feminists on the need for a larger, more practical strategy to construct DV as a

social issue, especially when seeking public support and state engagement to improve the

possibility of success for movement goals. This realization led feminists to focus on

building a coalition with non feminist civic and political organizations and, through this

coalition, to build widespread agreement on domestic violence as a social problem and

anti-DV legislation as a solution to that problem.

Building an Ad hoc Coalition

In her study of the impact of the women’s movements on violence against women,

Laurel Weldon (2002) points out that autonomous and independent women’s movements

have played a crucial role in arousing government response to the issue of violence against

women. “Women’s movements can be coded as autonomous if they have an organizational

base outside political parties, unions, and other political institutions…Autonomous

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women’s organizations are not subsidiaries, auxiliaries, or wings of larger, mixed-sex

organizations” (2002, 80).

The KWH qualifies as an autonomous and independent organization on the basis of

its political and financial independence from the state. As the first progressive46 women’s

organization in South Korea, the KWH first made the issue of wife beating public through

its devoted work on behalf of real battered women. But part of KWH’s success owes to the

leadership and membership of experienced women activists who were closely involved in

previous labor, student, and democratic movements. Activists themselves point to these

experiences as a crucial factor that contributed to the development of the battered women’s

movement.47 Jung Choun Sook, who was directly involved in the coalition to construct

anti-DV legislation, points to the fundamental resources behind

KWH and the broader battered women’s movement.

KWH already generated its own resources and we were an autonomous

organization. We had compiled many cases of wife beating, set up

shelters, and had collaborating professionals…I don’t know whether I

can say that there was a “special strategy” for passing the law. If there

was something special, I’d like to say that it was “the history of KWH.”

What I mean, we were very organized and professional in terms of

finding people who drafted the bill, conducted research and translated

foreign laws, lobbied congress and contacted the media. When we

began work on the anti-domestic violence legislation campaign, we

were all set. I don’t think that I learned all about organizing, to do all of

those things, from somebody. Instead, I already knew how to organize

groups and how to gather appropriate people because I was involved in

the student and labor movements like many others in KWH. This

46 As detailed in Chapter 4, “progressive” women’s organizations were made up of factory workers,

poor women, peasants, students, etc. and were involved in broader “resistance” movements that sought

democratic social change under the repressive military regime.

47 Those interviewed and documents consulted often use terms such as “battered women’s movement,”

“feminist movement” and “women’s movement” interchangeably.

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organization already knew what to do. (Interview with Jung Choun-

Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

The work with real battered women and knowledge about their lives gave the activists at

KWH confidence and motivation to transform wife beating into an important social issue.

In parallel fashion, women with similar activist backgrounds were organizing in

professional and other activist associations such as the Korea Women’s Association United

(KWAU).48 Many of these women shared values and concerns over women’s priority

issues, including sexual violence and domestic violence. Some of them also knew each

other from previous organizing. Their shared values and histories were critical factors in

the organization of the successful legislative campaign.

In 1996, KWAU also decided to pick up the issue of domestic violence as a priority

project. This was a key event, one that enabled KWH activists to begin the process of

making domestic violence a truly national women’s issue. The leaders and activists of

KWH and KWAU pooled their political and organizational skills and used tactics drawn

from their previous involvement in labor, student, and democratic movements. The two

organizations began the task of systemically organizing the coalition that drew up and

passed anti-DV legislation.

As progressive (left of center and oppositional) women’s organizations concerned

with broader issues (class and nation, democratization, reunification), both KWH and

KWAU were able to gain the trust of other progressive civic organizations and groups;

they were respected because of their past records of activities and contributions to student,

48 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the KWAU, an umbrella organization and national coalition of 21

diverse women’s organizations, including religious, professional, farming, housewife, worker, environmental

and human rights groups. KWH is a member of KWAU.

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labor, and democracy movements against the military regime. This trust was the basis for

coalition building among progressive civic organizations. In contrast to the Western

battered women’s movement that gained ideas and support from the women’s liberation

movement, the Korean bettered women’s movement benefited from involvement in

progressive social movements.

An interview with Jung Choun Sook, formerly a labor activist who served as the

executive director of The National Campaign Center for Legislation on Domestic Violence

Prevention,49 demonstrates and confirms KWH’s connections with progressive

organizations.

I think that the coalition was based on agreement with issues. But

another thing was that progressive civic activists had a basic trust in the

KWH because so many members were involved in other social

movements and they shared similar perspectives…[Coalition building]

was possible because of the commonality that we all experienced in the

1980s. Basically, there was strong agreement that domestic violence is

wrong…but also that “what KWH is doing is trustworthy and reliable.” …

These two things played a role in drawing support from other groups.

(Interview with Jung Choun Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline,

April 5, 2006, Seoul)

In addition to trust and respect for the previous contributions of women activists to other

social movements of the 1980s, the issue of domestic violence drew attention. Progressives

agreed that it was an undeniable problem. While the issue of domestic violence remained

controversial for the general public, there was complete acceptance by progressive civic

organizations and groups.

49 The Center was the official representative of the campaign and all 22 groups were members of the

Center..

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Building a relationship with other organizations and groups was not

new. [For example,] the members who established SungNam Women’s

Hotline were involved in labor and democratic movements. We already

cooperated with other organizations on activities… Especially in the

case of domestic violence, what I think,… the most important thing was

that, while there are controversies among people on other issues, for

example FTA,50 there was no disagreement with the statement that

domestic violence is wrong. There was an understanding that domestic

violence should be accepted as a problem. The situation was that

nobody protested about making domestic violence a social problem.

This supportive attitude, I feel, still exists. (Interview with Shin Youn

Sook, head coordinator of domestic violence prevention program,

Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2, 2006, Seoul)

Providing a similar perspective about background conditions and processes of gaining

support from progressive groups, one activist suggested that a notion of “moral obligation”

explained the participation of some coalition activists in the anti-domestic violence

legislation movement.

I think that coalition building among civil organizations can be explained

in the context of the history of Korean social movements. Currently, we

have various social issues such as environment and women, but in the

1980s there were only two divisions: democratic vs. anti-democratic.

Given the context that democratic or progressive forces were

marginalized and oppressed by the military regime, women’s

organizations struggled for nationalization and democratization just as

other civil organizations did…When I visited Asian NGO centers to

participate in training programs, people I met there asked questions

about the coalition building among NGOs in Korean society. They asked

how it is possible to collaborate despite differences in organizational

goals and areas…In the case of domestic violence, I think, the

possibility was basically was set up by the traditional [democratic]

concerns of Korean social movements. Another important thing is, I

think, so-called progressive forces agreed that they had a moral

obligation to fight against all kinds of oppression and discrimination.

How could they as self-identified “progressive activists” refuse to give

50 Referring to a free trade agreement.

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support when confronted by photos of battered women and fact sheets

on domestic violence? (Interview with ShinHa Yeong Ok, director of

policy and regional division, Korea Women’s Hotline, July 13, 2006,

Seoul)

Explicit organizing of the coalition—above and beyond “collaborations”—was important

to address the trivialization of domestic violence in a culture dominated by Confucian

ideology. The coalition was both a goal and a tactic important to garnering nationwide

support for the legislative campaign and the re-framing of domestic violence as a social

problem. Feminist activists had learned the usefulness of coalitions during their previous

experience in the anti-sexual violence movement (early to mid 1990s).

If we evaluate Korean women’s legislative movements, the anti-sexual

violence law was a partial success (50%), but the anti-domestic

violence law met 80-90% of our demands. This happened because of

the experience we went through in the process of constructing the anti-

sexual violence law. In terms of garnering public attention to the anti-

sexual violence movement, we faced huge resistance. In order to

resolve this backlash, we put together 74 civic coalitions in a hurry.51 So

we realized that categorizing the topic of domestic violence as a

women’s issue would not be a good strategy. Thanks to this historical

lesson, when working on the anti-domestic violence legislation

movement, we thought that emphasizing the issue of domestic violence

in the context of women’s broader victimization is not a good idea

because Korean society was accepting of violence in a private

relationship. As you know, it was supposed to be common sense to say

that “battered women deserve it” at that time. So, in order to get public

support, we thought that this movement should go with the strategy of

coalition building from the beginning. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon,

Standing-representative of Korea Women’s Association United, May 10,

2006, Seoul)

51 That is, they issued a joint statement to put pressure on legislators. The 74 groups allowed the

campaign to include their names in the official statement. But, unlike the anti-DV campaign, the 74 groups

didn’t provide funds or participate in public events or demonstrations.

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Broad coalition-building beyond women’s movements contributed to social consensus, and

it helped the movement evade sexist ridicule and an organized backlash. However, most

participating organizations and groups did not necessarily play any part in drafting proposed

legislation or in constructing a detailed plan for the legislative campaign. Rather, a

relatively small group of activists worked intensively through their own networks and

articulated with other groups. Plans for the draft of the bill were prepared primarily by a

“Special Committee on Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation of KWAU” and then presented

to other groups for comments and feedback.

The first draft of the bill was produced through internal negotiations and

with controversies.52 We persuaded other organizations to cooperate

once the draft was ready. Although I listened and considered other

opinions if necessary, everything was already set before we even

started coalition building. (Interview with Jung Choun Sook, president of

Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

The anti-domestic violence legislation movement successfully built coalitions with 22

civic organizations and groups (see Table 5.1). The campaign benefited from coalition

building in ways that raised funds and took advantage of human resources from other

organizations and benefited from progressive organizations’ fame.

Coalition building had various levels. For example, sending money or

people or being able to use their names. In the case of the anti-DV legislation

movement, we usually asked to use other organization’s names and

requested funding. When we held a huge campaign day in 1996, we asked

other civic organizations to send us people and we still asked them for

money. We also assigned them a task or role to play on campaign day.

52 Although many groups and organizations trusted in KWH and KWAU, some only supported the

campaign when feminists tied domestic violence legislation to the framing of the issue of DV as one of

“family preservation.”

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(Interview with Jung Choun Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April

5, 2006, Seoul)

Cho Young Sook recalled concrete examples of how the ad hoc coalition with civic

organizations and groups had a big impact on lobbying activity.53 A new form of lobbying

was developed. It made conservative legislators realize the power of a women’s movement

that is supported more broadly by other civil society organizations. The activists involved

were convinced that this coalition functioned to mitigate attempts to organize a backlash

against the issue of domestic violence specifically and feminism more generally.

When we met legislators to explain the need for the law and to

persuade them, men activists from other organizations were stood

beside us but we led the discussion. Legislators there knew that

everything was prepared by the women’s groups. They were not stupid.

But they had to feel the power of women’s organizing and they could

see how women’s groups had an in with social power [influence over

public opinion]. They realized then that the movement was connected to

leaders of civil society and to organized forces and powers. This put

pressure on the politicians. We benefited a lot from it. (Interview with

Cho Young Sook, director of Center for Women’s Human Rights, August

17, 2006, Seoul)

The exclusively male-dominated and conservative members of some political groups and

legislators who might not otherwise pay attention to the issue of domestic violence had to

respond to the concerns of civil society leaders and national networks of organizations.

53 For example, to include the “People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy” (the largest and most

powerful civil society organization in South Korea) as a supporter of KWH’s project was hugely important

symbolically and influenced both politicians and the general public. It is a common practice for social/citizen

movements to ask each other to use their names when launching new campaigns or organizing an event.

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Organization Type

Association of Physicians for Humanism Humanist movement

Buddhist Citizen’s Coalition for Economic

Justice Citizen movement based on religion

Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice Religious group

Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice Activist organization

Federation of Korean Trade Union Labor union

Green Korea United Environmental movement

Korea Confederation of Trade Unions Labor union

Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations Legal aid for the poor and the uneducated

Korean Federation for Environmental Movement Environmental movement

Korean Information and Referral Service Center

on Aging

Anti-abuse movement for elderly

population

Korean League of Women Voters Women’s movement/democratic movement

Korean People’s Artists Federation Interest group

Korean Producers Association Interest group

Korean Women’s Association United National umbrella organization, women’s

movement

Lawyers for a Democratic Society Democratic movement

National Association of Professors for Democratic

Society Democratic movement

National Parents Association for Real Education Citizen’s movement to reform education

New Society Common Good United Citizen’s movement

People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Democratic movement

Research Institute of the Differently-abled

Person’s Rights in Korea Disability movement

Special Committee on Anti-Domestic Violence

Legislation of KWAU

(Catholic Women’s Place, KyungNam Women’s

Association, DaeGu Women’s Association, Seoul

Women Workers Association, JeJu Women’s

Association, Chungbuk Women’s Association,

Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center, Korea

Women’s Hotline, Sexual Counseling Center of

Korea Women’s Link)

Women’s movement

The Korea Association for Prevention of Child

Abuse and Neglect Anti-child abuse movement

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Table 5.1: Organizational Members of the Anti-DV Legislative Campaign Framing Domestic

Violence as a Matter of Preservation of the Family

There have been previous analyses of the Korean anti-DV legislation movement

(KWDI 2003; Nam 2002) that have contributed important insight into the role of material

conditions and resources behind the movement. But due to the almost exclusive reliance

on structural theories to explain the construction of the anti-domestic violence legislation,

this research paid very little attention to social construction theories that employ the

concepts of framing, identity, culture, and emotion as analytical categories. Another study

(Kim 2000) focused on the movement’s use of patriarchal discourse and interests for

passage of the law. According to the study, this strategy was fundamentally limited and

troubling because it did not challenge the patriarchal society or family system, both

identified by feminists as root causes of wife beating. However, Kim (2000) did not

specifically address the reasons that led feminist activists to turn to this framing strategy.

Rather than simply criticizing decisions and choices that feminist activists made at the

time, the next section explores the process of decision-making and in context which

feminist activists were forced to negotiate a frame that could contribute to successful

passage of the legislation.

The Feminist Definition of Domestic Violence: Wife Beating/Battery

In order to understand the Korean battered women’s movement, we must understand

how and why movement members conceptualized, changed, and compromised their

primary agenda of eliminating violence against women by addressing patriarchy. A first

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step is to establish the starting point for feminist activists of the KWH in terms of how

they conceptualized the issues.

From its establishment in 1983 and until 1994, KWH published a newsletter, Batle.

Since KWH was the first women’s organization to focus on the problem of domestic

violence in South Korea, Batle is a significant resource for identifying the conceptual

progress on the issue and the emergence of an anti-DV movement. In its first issue, KWH

clearly defined the issue of domestic violence as a gender-based phenomenon based on

unequal gender relations. KWH also articulated the problem as a public issue.

Is it right to define beating and abusing of one gender by the other one

as a private matter or even “love”? It is problematic to believe that

relations of subordination and domination between two human groups

are aspects of a natural or harmonious relationship. It is a matter of

power and control rather than one of affection and respect…In this

sense, what takes place between men and women should be identified

as a public, political, and social problem going beyond the framework of

a private matter (“Weave threads of peace,” Batle 1, 1983. p. 1).

It is clear that KWH—the first progressive women’s group—already addressed the issue of

wife beating from a feminist perspective at its founding. This immediately positioned

KWH as an indigenous feminist organization. And, because KWH’s first activities

emphasized counseling programs and a crisis hotline, its feminist identity became an issue

in the early stage of the broader women’s movement in the 1990s. KWH responded to

criticism regarding the decision to frame DV as a problem of family preservation by

clarifying that its ultimate goal was to challenge patriarchy:

The Women’s Hotline argues for the inherent, human value of women

who are injured as a result of beating, psychological assault, and rape

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by men. Women’s Hotline also seeks to empower women who are

subject to subordination and domination by giving them courage and

the blessing of future, newly independent lives… Without destroying

brutal patriarchy’s tolerance for and even facilitation of beatings and

rape of women, we cannot expect women’s lives to have human dignity

and we cannot stop transferring this suffering to future generations, our

daughters (Lee Hyun Sook, “Counseling Service? Women’s

Movement?” Batle 12, 1986, p. 5).

KWH differentiated violence against women from more general forms of violence and it

identified a male-dominated society as a core cause of the problem.

Wife beating should not be simply understood as just another form of

violence; it should be called violence against women…Women are

subject to this crime because they are women and subjected to

patriarchal power. In this respect, providing more welfare services to

battered women cannot be the ultimate solution. The recognition of wife

beating as a form of gender violence, like rape, relies on the direction of

the women’s movement. This is why we have to emphasize it (gender

specific aspects of wife beating) whenever we are able to do so (Han

Woo Seop. “Women’s movement must solve the serious problem, wife

beating,” Batle 63, 1992, p. 2).

Women activists in KWH took advantage of the existence of a global women’s

movement by participating in international meetings to discuss gender violence in the early

1990s. Han Woo Seop, who took part in the meeting titled “Women Violence, and Human

Rights” held by the Women’s Leadership Institute at Rutgers University in 1991, reflected

on international interaction and the expectations members of the KWH had for global

networks.

We used the term of “violence against women” or “gender violence” in

the meetings. Gender violence here refers to what the Women’s Hotline

uses to indicate physical violence such as rape and wife battery, as well

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as invisible forms of violence against women…The global network will

enrich our movement and help us reflect on directions for the

movement in the long run. Especially, global interaction will help

alleviate our impatience. Therefore, I believe that it is necessary for the

Korean women’s movement to build continuous global coalitions and

cooperation (Han Woo Seop. “Meeting with Women Activists of Global

Human Rights NGOs,” in Batle 54,

1991, p. 4).

Balancing Ideology and Reality

Although defining a social problem is a fundamental step to start a self-help

organization and to recruit activists and members, developing a social movement requires

more than clarifying a view or position on an issue. As pointed out in previous sections,

their experience during the anti-sexual violence legislation movement made Korean

feminist activists realize the great difficulty involved in using the notion of “gender

violence” (which relates all forms of violence against women to gender discrimination and

inequality). They needed to circumvent limitations in order to construct the problem of

wife beating as a social issue and a subject of public policy. They needed to decide

between the idealism of ending patriarchy and more realistic choices for generating

support for anti-DV legislation. They needed to build social consensus, which feminist

activists concluded early on would be a prerequisite for the new legislation movement.

Feminists field experiences and prior activism provided insight into how widespread

and deeply-rooted wife beating was in private and public discourse and how difficult it

would be to challenge this. All these factors contributed to their decision making.

Jung Choun Sook, a leading activist in the Anti-DV legislation movement, described

the biased views they confronted during campaigning and lobbying: wife beating does not

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exist in society; it was inevitable between couples; it was a waste of time to focus on such

a “trivial” matter.

When we first held anti-wife beating campaigns in streets, people’s

most common responses were that “battered women deserve it” or

“don’t you have anything better to do?” or “where are those people in

this country?” Legislators were not aware of actual condition. What they

said was that “does it really happen?” or “it is wrong for the state to

intervene in domestic matter.” It was really difficult to challenge those

patriarchal understandings and misconceptions. (Interview with Jung,

Choun Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

Faced with goals of raising public consciousness and gaining support for concrete changes,

feminist activists knew that they had to find realistic, practical strategies that did not

revolve around philosophical positions or ideological definitions. They were ambivalent

about this, but heeded realistic advice that came from the very legislators who had the

most influence in constructing laws. Jung Choun Sook explained that while “familism”

was regarded as a target that needed to be deconstructed, it also was quickly identified as

an appropriate strategy for transforming domestic violence into a legitimate public policy

problem:

At the time, the dominant atmosphere was that this [anti-DV] law would

not pass if the issue of wife beating was not linked to “family” matters.

(Interview with Jung Choun Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline,

April 5, 2006, Seoul)

Once feminists realized that there was such a huge gap between the feminist view

and general understanding of the issue, they shifted emphasis to a redefinition of the

problem in order to draw attention and to gain support from the public and the

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government. If public support is a precondition for passing the law, bridging or

overcoming the conceptual gap would have to be a priority. For this reason, feminist

activists deliberately decided to reinterpret the problem of wife beating to make it more

politically and culturally acceptable. In addition, they decided to change existing

perceptions regarding the relation between feminism and family. Until this point, not only

was there great hostility toward feminist interventions such as shelters for battered women,

but feminists’ public statements about the issue frequently stressed the idea of “women’s

human rights”—an approach promoted by transnational feminist campaigns that did not

resonate in the South Korean context—and emphasized the problem of patriarchal/male

domination in Korean culture.

In thinking about building social consensus, it was hard to expect that

the general public would able to recognize the issue of domestic

violence based on the concept of human rights. … what we sought was

to make people see it at least as a crime, a social offense. That would

be great progress--people treating it as a crime not a private matter. But

still a problem was that there was much doubt that this law would

eventually be able to deconstruct the Korean family. In fact, a criticism

raised by the general public was that women’s movement activists are

only interested in claiming the need for such a law without any

consideration regarding how it would affect the family unit. In order to

avoid the suspicion that the women’s movement seeks family

breakdown, the only choice available was to describe the issue in a

conservative way. I like to call it a strategy to encourage social

agreement [and that it was necessary ]considering the level of

consciousness of our society at the time. (Interview with NamYoon In

Soon, standing-representative of Korea Women’s Association United,

May 10, 2006, Seoul)

Certain social phenomena become public issues as a result of their interpretation and

recognition by the public rather than due to any inherent rights as “objective entities”

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(Araujo et.al 2000, 150). The decision to reinterpret the problem was an outcome of the

political realization that feminist explanations of wife beating functioned to cause a

backlash rather than to promote responsible public concern. To achieve the goal of passage

of the law, the way of addressing the issue itself became the key political strategy and

tactic.

Yes, we were interested in what would be the core in order to pass this

law and to balance people’s various tastes. We needed a “core” and we

strategically made “the core” visible. (Interview with Cho Young Hee,

director of Conflict Resolution Center, Women Making Peace, June 19,

2006, Seoul)

The question of the strategy that feminists decided on to gain public attention and

support is inevitably related to the context in which the feminist movement emerged and

developed. Western societies such as the U.S. and Britain were able to justify state

intervention by arguing that “battered women deserved the same rights as any other crime

victims” (Schechter 1982, 159). The existence and experience of civil rights movements

and the second-wave feminist movement explain the context in which the Western feminist

movement was able to use a rights discourse to combat violence against women.

Differences in historical and socio-cultural context shape different interpretations and

understandings of the issue. For example, the need for a Violence against Women Act

(VAWA) was addressed through an economic rationale at congressional hearings in the

U.S.:

In pure economic terms, the sheer loss of productivity attributable to

violent genderbased assault is staggering…The dislocation of the

nation’s labor force that is caused by fear of violent gender-based

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assault is enormous: women who do not enter or who leave the labor

force because of fear; women whose choice of job is dictated by fear;

women whose performance on the job is affected by fear (Burt

Neuborne, quoted in Shargel 1999).

Like their U.S. counterparts, Korean feminist activists had access to research regarding the

negative effects that violence against women caused. However, what to focus on first and

how to address the issue were a matter of politics and choices above and beyond research

findings. And it should be remembered that actors do not make political choices and

decisions in a vacuum. The contextual nature of constraints and opportunities make it

unlikely that any common problem could be addressed or resolved in similar ways around

the world.

Korean feminist’s choice to use a framework of “family protection” or

“preservation of the family” was a consequence of strategic decision making in order to

keep the issue in the public eye. This seemed to be the most reasonable option for

challenging the perception of wife beating as a “private matter,” based on the

public/private binary. The state has an interest in defending Korea’s institutions and the

family is one of the most basic institutions. Therefore the framework of family

preservation was politically and culturally viable.

Feminists recognized the essential contradictions in using the rhetoric of family

preservation to address the issue of wife beating. There was conflict and disagreement over

this choice in the KWH. On the other hand, the opportunity to reconstruct wife beating

from something considered a private matter to something recognized legally and

politically as a serious social problem also offered the opportunity to deconstruct the very

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concept of “family” itself. Given Korean values that emphasize family, this seemed to be

the only feasible strategy. It was at this moment that something once considered an

obstacle to the anti-DV movement turned into a campaign strategy.

Subsequently, feminist activists have defended this choice. They argue that using this

family-oriented framework should not be considered a mistake or failure of the Korean

battered women’s movement. Rather, it should be understood as a necessary strategy that

emerged at a particular socio-political juncture and that had some extremely important

outcomes. These include constructing the issue of wife beating as a social problem in

Korean society and promoting the institutionalization of violence against women as a

policy issue.

As you know, institutionalization is the process of construction and

inclusion within the existing system, not destroying established system.

At the time, the common understanding of family was that family should

be sustained and harmonized. Given this understanding, it was difficult

to challenge and ignore that idea of family. So, our choice was to stress

that eliminating domestic violence helps to prevent the breakdown of

families, it strengthens them. In this sense, the women’s movement

used the rhetoric of “protection of family” in accordance with

widespread social consciousness and the spirit of law at the time.

Feminist theorists sometimes have misinterpretations of this strategy,

because their analysis is primarily based on texts. But a real women’s

movement in the field is a matter of breakthrough. We have to focus on

strategic options rather than practicing feminist epistemology. I would

say that it was inevitable that we had to choose a rhetoric that was

acceptable and understandable to the other actors. If this is defined as

a betrayal or co-optation of the women’s movement… I don’t think that

it is possible to judge the women’s movement when it comes to

strategies to achieve gender mainstreaming or institutionalization.

(Interview with Cho Young Sook, director of Center for Women’s Human

Rights,

August 17, 2006,

Seoul)

134

Nonetheless, there was much criticism from feminists outside the movement regardless of

the arguments that the strategy was forced by contextual constraints. The fact that feminist

activists appropriated and depended on a patriarchal discourse fostered many critiques

regarding the way that feminist activists achieved their goals of coalition building and

passage of the anti-DV acts. However, critics have been admonished to be careful not to

assume the reasons and processes involved in feminist activities, and not to evaluate

movement choices by considering a single moment or strategy in isolation. NamYoon In

Soon explained that when the Korean battered women’s movement employed the frame of

“preservation of the family,” it did not do so in ways that would preserve traditional

patriarchal family relationships. The feminist framing of ‘family preservation’ should not

be considered as evidence of any co-optation of the Korean battered women’s movement.

It is necessary to explore the processes and conflicts that arose during the efforts to

develop the movement.

When we called for “restoring” family, it did not mean the existing

patriarchal family. Rather, we called for a family based on gender

equality…I know there are those people criticizing the movement

because they say we only relied on established patriarchal discourse.

But they need to study strategic decision making at the time. Our

demand for criminalizing abuse and violence that occurred in the home

challenged patriarchal discourse. In the case of the battered women’s

movement, only ten years ago, Korean society was overly forgiving of

domestic violence. The battered women’s movement was strongly

critical of that social attitude, and successfully promoted a social

consensus that domestic violence is wrong. When considering that the

Korean patriarchal family was a reality, our concern was how to

reconstruct that family rather than immediately destroying the entire

notion of that family. In this respect, our vision was to change family

relations through corrective training or consciousness-raising of

perpetrators. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon, standing-representative

of Korea Women’s Association United, May 10, 2006, Seoul)

135

While it is important to understand feminist’s strategic intent in using the framework of

“family preservation,” it also is important to avoid concluding that feminist activists’ sole

objective was the passage of legislation. As feminist activists and advocates, they began

working on violence against women because they believed that women had a right to be

free from violence in their lives. Cho Young Hee, previous executive director of The

National Campaign Center for Legislation on Domestic Violence Prevention, pointed out

that redefining family and eliminating violence within family were goals that went beyond

the institutionalization of the issue through passage of legislation. They also wanted to

change the way people thought about and lived family life.

When the anti-domestic violence legislation movement was launched, I

suppose that many people asked questions like “what is it?” or “what

does that mean?” It is true that we used the frame of family

preservation to appeal to those people. But I don’t think that feminists

were okay with just deconstructing the concept of family. As a basic unit

of society, family is important and many agreed that breakdown of

families needed to be prevented. Most of all, I think, the fundamental

reason to support the anti-DV law was to break the vicious cycle of

violence within real families. (Interview with Cho Young Hee, director of

Conflict Resolution Center, Women Making Peace, June 19, 2006,

Seoul)

Institutionalization: Focusing on Benefits rather than Risks

Interviewees cited above contradict critics who have argued that the feminist

strategy to frame the issue of wife beating as a preservation of the family was naïve. In

reality, feminist activists were not optimistic that the problem could be solved by passing

the law. Because of their extensive experience working on earlier legislative initiatives on

gender issues, Korean women activists already recognized the contradictory effects of

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engaging with the state. In other words, they were aware of what Claire Reinelt (1995)

points out: “engaging with the state is a strategy that has risks…but any strategy that has

risks also has benefits” (101). But, in the case of wife beating, feminist activists rejected

tying up their efforts and time in discussions of the dangers and risks of engaging with the

state. Instead, most reached an agreement early on over the need for institutionalizing the

issue of wife beating first, and dealing with consequences later. When asked, they stated

the belief that institutionalization would be the best option for battered women themselves

and this outweighed other considerations regarding feminists’ ideals or values.

The ideals we were aiming for were high and comprehensive...But we

had to focus on achieving the first priority, the legislation and to do that,

it was important to persuade relevant actors and institutions. We faced

two paths: adhere to feminist ideals? Follow reality? We opted for a

dream based on reality, in other words, helping women benefit from the

law and then seek to bridge a gap between feminist values and reality

through the ongoing women’s movement. If somebody criticizes this as

co-optation or failure, …I would say that we were willing to risk it

because of the benefits that the law would provide. I believe that many

battered women have been able to take advantage of the law despite

its limitations. (Interview with Cho Young Hee, director of Conflict

Resolution Center, Women Making Peace, June 19, 2006, Seoul)

The situation of scant resources and support for women’s self-help groups also encourage

feminist activists to focus on possible advantages to be gained by institutionalization. This

meant discussing state responsibility in the context of protecting all citizens and providing

services to which they are entitled.

I strongly feel there are important benefits from institutionalization

through social movements…for example, if NGOs are able to only

reach a small part (10%) of the women who need help, this means that

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90% are abandoned or unattended. But institutionalization enhances

the possibility of embracing the other 90%. The needs of victims would

be met through programs provided for in the laws and state intervention

would take place if needed. Institutionalization can serve areas in which

NGOs are limited. I think that social movement activists feel the need

for institutionalization if validation and generalization of an issue can be

improved. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon, standing-representative of

Korea Women’s Association United, May 10, 2006, Seoul)

Grassroots feminists and activists’ long-term work with battered women helped them fully

understand what battered women needed and wanted. Therefore, important though it may

have been for the feminist movement to be legitimate organizations and to pursue

legitimate goals through institutionalization, their real concern was to find ways of best

meeting battered women’s needs. Given the circumstance that continuation of their

activities were threatened because of political and financial pressures, activists decided

that it was premature to focus on the question of whether state funding would undermine

movement principles. In seeking engagement with the state, therefore, it seems that

sacrificing what Stephanie Riger terms “the spirit of feminism” (1994, 282) did not cause

great tension within Korean feminist groups at that time.

Korea Woman’s Hotline worked for battered women long before the

institutionalization of the problem, and the Korean women’s movement

has had close links with various women’s groups and victims in the real

world. What I mean is that the Korean women’s movement was not

about scholarly work. Rather, we directly witnessed women being

abused and provided them with the services we could. In doing so, we

experienced the significance of working on an individual level, such as

carefully listening to their sufferings and offering alternatives, although

social change is the ultimate feminist goal. Of course, the Korean

women’s movement has focused on institutional reform and

policymaking, but that was not the only thing we sought. Rather, while

meeting people and learning their needs, we were open to the real

women and their real sufferings. Working with and for them, we realized

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that the Korean Women’s Hotline simply could not do everything. At the

moment, we strongly felt that engaging with the state was really

needed. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon, standing-representative of

Korea Women’s Association United, May 10, 2006, Seoul)

Reinterpreting and Redirecting the Issue

Once aware of both growing needs and possibility for change, the battered women’s

movement sought realistic and practical opportunities for keeping the issue of wife beating

on the national agenda. This effort began by establishing a link between wife beating and

family deconstruction while undermining the previous approach to combating violence

against women based on fighting gender inequality. Once the KWH decided to address the

problem of wife beating in the context of family breakdown, they inaugurated the anti-

domestic violence legislation movement in 1994.

From the beginning of the year, we have witnessed the breakdown of a

family caused by a murder committed by a battered woman. Wife

beating is a violence that destroys the family. Therefore, we have to

launch the legislation movement to eliminate violence within family

relationships (Lee Moon Woo. “KWH will concentrate on the legislation

movement for stopping domestic violence and on providing substance

counseling,” Batle 77, 1994, p. 2).

Once the issue of wife beating was situated discursively within family relationships and

feminist activists had stopped linking it to the broader issue of patriarchal/male

domination, battered women were grouped with children and the elderly as the most

vulnerable and at risk groups in society. This approach helped reduce the backlash by

emphasizing that the proposed anti-DV Act would protect all vulnerable groups. But it also

prevented further discussion on women’s civil rights and civil remedies.

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Most victims of domestic violence are socially marginalized people such

as women, children, and the elderly. In this respect, the prevention of

domestic violence act is about protecting their rights to live (Jung

Choun Sook. “The Construction of the AntiDV Law: Isn’t it done yet?”

Through Women’s Eyes,54 11, 1997, p. 14).

During the process of putting the issue on the public agenda, the KWH drafted the

bill in cooperation with legal professionals. Although feminist activists considered the

potentially important role that state engagement may play in conveying symbolically

meaningful messages at the beginning of the legislation movement, it also became

important to reform the criminal justice system to make a real difference for battered

women. Criticizing the typical attitude of police when intervening in wife abuse cases,

some feminist activists called initially for strong legislation and enforcement such as

mandatory arrest. However, this suggestion was reconsidered based on the real conditions

and expectations of battered women themselves.

We asked the question of whether battered women really would use this

law, if the law emphasizes enforcement of mandatory arrest. Ultimately,

we concluded that women would use the law only if they had decided to

file for divorce. We did not want to make a law that women never use.

Therefore, the law has two options: criminalizing perpetrators or

enforcing mandatory counseling. But prosecutors have ruined this rule

of the law by applying it in ways that actually condone domestic

violence. (Interview with Jung Choun Sook, president of Seoul

Women’s Hotline, April 5 2006, Seoul)

In fact, in the early stages of drafting the anti-domestic violence acts I found that the

public and members of the National Assembly were not accepting of the idea of severe

punishment. In addition, feminist activists and advocates who closely worked with

54 Through Women’s Eyes was a periodical published by the KWH from 1995 to 2004.

140

battered women knew that leaving a violent partner would not be a realistic solution due to

the extremely vulnerable economic condition of most battered women. Early evidence of

social bias against the early drafts of anti-DV acts and against divorced women, combined

with battered women’s economic vulnerability, contributed to feminist negotiations that

sought to restore damaged relationships and to prosecute only if absolutely necessary.

Feminist activists interviewed stressed that they believed this to be an unavoidable and

realistic choice. But it left the Act open to political control and manipulation.

At the time, most battered women just wanted to stop their husbands’

violence, and reunite them with the family. As far as I remember, this

was true for approximately 80% of the cases. In order to meet their

needs, we thought about developing two ways to deal with battering—

one for a criminal case and another for a family protection case.

Although we succeeded in passing the law, our intent was distorted and

subverted by prosecutors who decided to treat most domestic violence

cases as family protection cases. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon,

standing-representative of Korea Women’s Association United, May 10,

2006, Seoul)

In sum, the historical struggle of the KWH has been to name the isolated, shamed,

and hidden experiences of violence in women’s lives. Although there were political and

strategic difficulties and controversies in developing the battered women’s movement,

feminist activists agreed that government should provide appropriate support for battered

women and criminalize battering in the family. But, in redefining wife beating as a public

concern Korean feminists faced dilemmas. The need to disrupt patriarchal discourse about

wife beating became tied to the strategic value of calling on certain aspects of the

patriarchal family code to draw public support and gain legitimacy for a public agenda that

would include wife beating. At the time, what seemed to be a realistic approach was not

141

considered an obstacle to feminist ideals of helping battered women. It was because of

this that the Korean battered women’s movement framed the issue of wife beating as a

matter of family breakdown rather than one of male domination. The term “domestic

violence” then replaced feminist concepts of “wife beating,” “gender violence,” or

“violence against women” before these concepts had been fully conceptualized and

developed.

Feminist activists clearly understood that the concept of domestic violence indicated

a problem of wife battering. But for the general public and in the political arena, the

concept served a function shifting attention from women to family. Criticism of this shift

does not deny that wife beating has to do with family relations or that violence perpetrated

on other family members is insignificant. But the shift to the term “domestic violence” was

problematic for feminists because this naming erased the reality of the gender-specific

nature of wife beating in the process of constructing the issue of wife beating. In other

words, domestic violence was identified and accepted as an important social problem not

because it threatened women with harm, but because it threatened a traditional form of

family in Korean society.

Korean feminist activists found themselves in a Catch-22 situation. They tried to

deconstruct the traditional notion of family and institute an innovative, new definition of

family in their discussions of the notion of “preservation of the family.” But they could not

control how others chose to interpret the notion of “preservation of the family” and did not

anticipate how easily others (politicians, prosecutors, the public) would re-link it to

traditional notions of family. Ultimately, their framing was interpreted in traditional ways

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within the established cultural context and did not produce an alternative concept of family

based on gender-equality.

The next chapter continues the discussion of framing and institutionalization. The

analysis shifts away from close scrutiny of dilemmas and framing decisions discussed

from the vantage point of activists and incorporates social movement theories that promote

understanding of specific contextual factors. The dissertation takes a closer look at the

content of the anti-DV legislation, issues involved in implementation, and feminist

activists’ recent decision to campaign for reform of the legislation and their

reconsideration of the consequences of their original approach to institutionalization and

framing.

CHAPTER 6

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION:

CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION, STATE INTERVENTION AND

FRAMING OPERATIONALIZED

Framing, Proliferation of the Issue, and Movement Development: Passage of the Acts

Because social movements and social change are dynamic and complicated

processes, it is difficult to simplify all the factors that affect the progress and development

of either. Nevertheless, it is important to identify some key and crucial elements associated

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with both an evaluation of the anti-DV movement’s transformation and relative success

and the subsequent trajectory of social change.

As preceding sections have revealed, an autonomous feminist group, an ad hoc

coalition, and media attention to the issue contributed to the re-construction of domestic

violence as a social problem and generated public interest and support for solving the

problem in South Korea.

The theoretical approach that emphasizes resource mobilization and political

opportunities as keys to analyzing social movements is one that has been widely used to

identify primary factors that affect the emergence and growth of movements. These

concepts have been useful to understand much about the factors that contributed to the

development, strategies and relative success of the anti-DV movement. And this

dissertation has discussed changes in political context and resources that were important to

the anti-DV movement. But neither political opportunities nor resource mobilization can

adequately address how those conditions were created, why the movement was supported

by specific actors, or why some policy outcomes had desired effects while others did not.

We need to explore not only the process of creating a favorable atmosphere for the

development and initial success of the battered women’s movement, but what took place

after the immediate goals (legislation, institutionalization) were achieved.

Contemporary South Korean feminist advocates and activists now believe that

legislation and institutionalization have been counterproductive. They have subverted the

real goals of the anti-DV movement—to raise public awareness of DV as a crime and to

empower battered women. Legislation and institutionalization were short term objectives

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—two steps in the long term struggle to end violence against women. But both backfired in

several ways. To pass legislation, feminists had to give up their own convictions that

women are citizens with rights and that a state should recognize their right to freedom

from violence. They had to frame legislation in culturally-relevant, patriarchal terms as

family preservation. Institutionalization of the issue in the Ministry of Justice and the

MGE/F backfired because feminists became irrelevant to policy making. State actors took

over and used the frame of family preservation to resuscitate stereotypes and values

regarding men’s authority, women’s duty to sacrifice for the good of children and family,

the idea that violence was an aberration limited to those who are mentally ill or to lower

classes, that the most important thing about the family is its function as a fundamental

social institution (not as a place that nurtures the wellbeing of its members). The following

sections consider these issues.

Autonomy or independence often are mentioned by researchers as necessary

preconditions for women’s movements to provoke state responses to violence against

women. But organizational autonomy or independence does not imply power or social

influence. Weldon (2002) points to “widespread public support” as one important factor

that helps movements become powerful and influential (80). Seen from this perspective,

the framework of “the preservation of the family” developed by the Korean battered

women’s movement—and subsequently picked up by the media and the general public—

was a tool to legitimatize the issue of wife beating as a social problem. It helped elicit

widespread public support within a social, legal, and cultural context in which wife beating

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was widely treated as tolerable and acceptable. This public support was a source of

influence for the movement.

If constructing a culturally resonant frame is important to maintain and develop

social movements, mass media serve to define and circulate the frame and to justify social

activism on the issue. Korean media’s dramatic treatment of Lee’s case (above) provided a

concrete example to support the argument that, in general, “media interest [has been]

crucial to the growth of the battered women’s movement” in diverse settings (Tierney

2005, 250). However, while it might be true that media interest and concern contributed to

mobilizing public support, the existence of media interest and public concern itself should

not be confused with success of the battered women’s movement nor can media coverage

be a measure of success. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the ways that media take up

the issue and suggest solutions for the problem and the extent to which the movement

influences the media.

Given that the framing of “preservation of the family” had strong cultural resonance

at the time, it was immediately picked up by mass media that had rarely treated wife

beating as a problem prior to the emergence of the anti-violence movement. In fact, the

movement’s frame provided the media with a convenient way to report on a variety of

related social issues and to have an opinion on them—without causing strong resistance or

a backlash among the public and politicians. The frame also suggested a solution. That is,

while the term of “wife beating” is a description of a social phenomenon, the framing of

“preservation of the family” implies an idea of what should be done about it (act on it) and

what consequences will result if nothing is done (the family will break down). In this

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respect, the framing reshaped the non-issue of wife beating into a national problem

because of its emphasis on the increasing risk of family breakup and harm to society.

The victims of domestic violence are not limited to wife, children, and

the elderly. The serious part of domestic violence is that it is not just a

domestic matter. The family is a basic unit of society; its peace and

stability guarantee health of society and a whole nation. It is difficult to

expect stability and democratization of society and a nation under a

condition of family breakdown. Therefore, domestic violence is our

business. In this sense, citizens should be willing to take part in a

signature petition for enacting the prevention of domestic violence law

(Editorial: “The urgent issue – the prevention of domestic violence law”,

Kookmin Daily March 18, 1996, p. 3).

Once wife beating became relevant to societal interests, legislation on domestic violence

could address family protection (as a social institution). Feminists believed the laws would

be protective of women and children, while early on the media focused on notions of

pathology and the family.

The demand of the women’s movement to enact anti-domestic violence

legislation is not about protecting women’s rights and interests. The

purpose of the law is to recover the family by curing and correcting a

husband who suffers from pathological violent behavior and by

temporarily protecting a battered wife by providing a safe space for a

while (Editorial: “The prevention of domestic violence act, which is to

preserve family”, Hankyoreh. May 14, 1996, p. 3).

The media also focused on the notion of family dysfunction. This included a denial

of wife beating as the most common form of domestic violence and rejected the notion that

women as a group are at greater risk than men or children. This reflects language in the

legislation on domestic violence that emphasizes the need for constructing a “healthy

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family” and that paves the way for arguments that any legal intervention should be wary of

violating family privacy, contradicting the idea that individual rights should be protected in

the private sphere.

There is a view that equates domestic violence with wife beating. But

abused children and the elderly should not be a secondary

consideration of the law. Abused children suffer from serious aftermath

including physical and psychological injuries. In the wake of the

legislation on domestic violence, society should pay more attention to

the matter of abused children and the elderly. Also, the issue of battered

husbands should not be treated as a joke. According to the research of

the Korean Institute for Criminal Justice Policy, there are not just a few

battered husbands in this society. Family is a basic unit of the society.

The family free from violence is the basis of the healthy society. In order

to construct the healthy society, social consciousness toward domestic

violence should be changed. In addition, it should be obvious that a

special attention has to be paid to privacy violations that may be

committed during implementation of the law (Editorial: “Toward society

free from domestic violence”, Dong-A Daily, November 19, 1997, p. 3).

Feminists had few options for framing the issue. The initial success of preservation

of the family in media coverage led to the somewhat inevitable selection of this frame as a

politically expedient but problematic way to address the problem of wife beating. The

particular context and period of time constrained feminist activists. They needed a frame

that would be clearly understood and chose one that worked because it reflected key

aspects of existing cultural ideology. At the time this strategic choice was made, movement

agents believed they understood well the social context in which they were involved.

The [public and media] support for the anti-domestic violence law at that

time [1997] should not be automatically interpreted as support for

women’s human rights. As you know, the mass media has played a

fundamental role in generating public opinion about gender-related

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issues. When the Korean women’s movement constructed a gender

issue as a public one, the media reported it in a favorable way because

women’s status was very low at the time. When we tried to claim that

this is a matter of women’s human rights, maybe it was acceptable to

some part of the society but not others. But the reason that the general

public did not express an intense and widespread opposition to the anti-

domestic violence law was that they thought that the law is not about

destroying the family. I think that the frame of “preservation of the

family” is why the anti-domestic violence legislation movement worked.

(Interview with NamYoon In Soon, standing-representative of Korea

Women’s Association United,

May 10, 2006, Seoul)

Since the first goal of the anti-DV movement was to construct and pass legislation on

domestic violence, a most important task was to lobby legislators effectively. The strategy

of organizing a coalition that included politically influential civil society organizations

(i.e., from the democracy movement, labor unions, professional organizations, etc.)

positioned the anti-DV movement and its leaders from the KWH and the KWAU to do so.

Their contact with legislators pushed them even further in the direction of using the family

preservation frame and avoiding arguments that might provoke resistance among

conservative legislators. The concern expressed by one of the few women legislators at the

time is an indication of the importance of the family preservation discourse for passing the

laws. She urged the movement to articulate more strongly that the “real interest” of the law

is to preserve the family:

The problem that remains is how to map out the detailed action agenda

as a legislative strategy, especially for legal experts and legislators.

First, it is important to develop a logic that emphasizes that this draft is

designed for the preservation of the family by effectively intervening in

families in danger of breaking up, that is to avoid family breakdown or

privacy violations (Shin Nak Yun, in the Minutes from a public hearing

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on draft for anti-domestic violence law, held at The National Campaign

Center for Legislation on Domestic Violence Prevention 1996, p. 49).

It already has been established that the ad hoc coalitions were a critical resource for

lobbying; they bolstered the legitimacy of the anti-DV movement and provided strength in

numbers by their backing. Once again, above and beyond the legitimacy that feminists

achieved during military resistance campaigns, a factor that made coalition building

possible was that consensus could be built around the issue of domestic violence through

the frame of family preservation. Given this circumstance, when the ad hoc coalition

named The National Campaign Center for Legislation on Domestic Violence Prevention

submitted their petition to the National Assembly, it assured that the primary focus of the

legislation was to preserve and foster healthy families.

The state has an obligation to preserve society by protecting human

rights of socially and economically marginalized groups, namely,

women, children, and the elderly, and by promoting the stability of

family. It is significant to enact “the prevention law of domestic violence”

aimed at preventing domestic violence and protecting victims in terms

of preserving a healthy family, which nurtures the next healthy

generation and maintains peace in family (Quote from the petition

submitted by The National Campaign Center for Legislation on

Domestic Violence Prevention, October 25, 1996).

At a congressional committee meeting held in 1996, another legislator described the

purpose of the law in a similar way. Her words already suggested that resistance to

punishment was beginning and that the concept of punishment and the concept of family

preservation seemed to contradict each other.

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The ultimate purpose of this law is to protect, restore, and foster healthy

families by preventing family breakdown as much as possible. This

purpose can be also achieved by state intervention aimed at correcting

violent behaviors and supporting victims rather than punishing

perpetrators” (Choo Mi Ae, legislator, in the Minutes of the special

committee on women’s affairs, National Assembly, December 6, 1996,

p. 3). Italics mine.

In summary, through the dedication of the women’s movement, domestic violence

was publicly recognized as a serious social problem, one that should be dealt with through

a state-based action plan. Leaders of the women’s movement failed to foresee a future in

which their real goals—helping battered women and ending violence—would be distorted

and subverted. They did not object to what research has uncovered as the clearly growing

idea that the objective of state intervention would be the protection of family (that is, avoid

the social problem of family breakdown) and not one of protecting individual family

members who are being abused.

While domestic violence is a serious problem that destroys family

members’ lives and family itself, it has been ignored and regarded as a

private matter on the grounds that it occurs in the home unlike other

violent crimes... From the perspective that constructing a family-related

law should be careful, despite the significance of the legislation on

domestic violence, the priority should be the idea of preservation and

sustaining of family. In this respect, what is really needed is the

government’s will to protect families in danger of breakdown as a part of

social welfare policy (Byun Woong Jeon, legislator, in the Minutes of the

special committee on women’s affairs, National Assembly. December 6,

1996, p. 18).

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As feminists would quickly become aware, once the problem was defined legally

and in public policy, the “solutions” would conform both to how the problem was framed

and who (the state) was to be in charge of decision making and funding.

State Intervention and Its Consequences

The 1997 Act against Domestic Violence is two separate “sub”-acts. One is the

“Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act” that focuses on victim

services and the other is a “Special Act on the Punishment of Domestic Violence Crimes”

which details police intervention and punishment for batterers. The Ministry of Gender

Equality and Family is in charge of implementing the prevention of DV and protection of

victims act and the punishment of perpetrators act is the responsibility of the Ministry of

Justice. This division of responsibilities has interfered with adequate implementation of

both Acts, leading legislators and feminists to seek subsequent reforms.

Details on the objectives of both acts state clearly the interests they are intended to

serve and the results expected.

Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of this Act is to prevent domestic violence and to protect

victims of domestic violence in order to nurture and promote healthy

families. (November 18, 1997. Enacted) Italics mine.

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of this Act is to prevent domestic violence and to protect

and support victims of domestic violence. (April 28, 2006. Amended)

Italics mine.

Special Act for Punishment of the Crime of Domestic Violence

Article (Purpose)

The purpose of this Act is to recover peace and stability for families

affected by domestic violence and to nurture healthy families by

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establishing special provisions in criminal punishment procedures for

domestic violence crimes and establishing a protective disposition to

change the living environment and the character and behavior of

domestic violence offenders. (November 17, 1997. Enacted)

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of this Act is to recover peace and stability for families

affected by domestic violence, to nurture healthy families, and to protect

the human rights of victims and family members by establishing special

provisions in the criminal punishment procedures for domestic violence

crimes and establishing a protective disposition to change the living

environment, character and behavior of domestic violence offenders.

(December 18, 2002. Amended) Italics mine.55

The following section discusses the actions and programs that were put in place

immediately following passage of the Acts. The concept of “state intervention” refers to

the fact that passage of the Acts represented institutionalization of DV policies and

programs through direct state intervention, interpretation of the Acts, and state incentives

for private programs.

At first, the acceptance of domestic violence as a serious social problem was

associated with the appearance of expected and needed services for victims of domestic

violence, such as shelters and counseling centers. The earliest were primarily the work of

feminist groups. Following passage of the legislation, ironically most new counseling

services and centers were initiatives of non feminist organizations and private and public

agencies. This was another warning sign that the feminists who understood the problem

best were not going to remain at the forefront of solutions. Neither the state nor most new

service centers revealed any notion that their work was to help battered women; rather, it

55 This change was initiated by government actors following establishment of the National Human

Rights Commission in 2001. The 2006 reform of the Prevention law and a second attempt to reform the

Punishment law are discussed in Chapter 7.

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was to prevent family breakdown and to promote “healthy” families through counseling

programs.

Legislative discussions also showed early on how the legislation was being

interpreted in ways that could be used against battered women’s interests and threaten the

more feminist and woman-focused services that might serve their needs for protection.

Each provision indicates the need for the establishment of counseling

centers to help victims of domestic violence escape from the danger of

violence…But, these facilitators should be designed to help victims

return to their home and be careful not to be used as a tool for escaping

from home…Because the ideal is that the domestic violence problem

should be resolved within the home, solving the problem through

shelters and counseling centers should be allowed for some limited

cases (A review report discussed in the Minutes of the special

committee on social welfare, National Assembly, December 16, 1996,

pp. 7-8).

As minutes from some committee meetings have illustrated, the way that domestic

violence was defined and interpreted in the legislative process in South Korea in 1996

clearly demonstrates the powerful link between the chosen frame and subsequent policy

outcomes. “The preservation of the family” gave the issue of domestic violence both legal

and cultural legitimacy, but it also led to government responses that were made in the

narrow context of the societal value of preserving families—in direct contradiction to the

needs of individual battered women, children, and the elderly.

The most visible consequence of state intervention in domestic violence has been a

proliferation of agencies and shelters to serve battered women and their children. The

prevention Act specifies a state obligation for providing facilities to protect battered

women. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MGEF) has primarily focused on

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offering limited financial support to existing and new counseling centers and shelters. As a

result, the number of counseling centers grew rapidly. According to MGEF, 372 domestic

violence and/or combined domestic/sexual violence counseling centers were in operation

as of December 2006; 85 of those centers56 (less than 23%) were financially supported and

monitored by MGEF as of 2007.57

At first, the increased number of counseling centers around the nation was regarded

as a great achievement by feminists since there were only 17 centers in 1998 (Park 2007,

191). However, it is not possible to make a direct link between the proliferation of

domestic violence facilities and any improvement in the treatment of domestic violence or

even of MGEF commitment to the problem. On the one hand, feminist run centers have

been displaced and MGEF has become antagonistic to feminist services. MGEF prefers

services that focus on temporary shelter, counseling for reunification, and counseling for

“healthy” family life. On the other, violence against women is not high on MGEF’s budget

priorities.

In fact, budget allocations for all MGEF programmatic areas are good indicators of

MGEF commitment and/or capacity to respond to violence against women.59

56 They consist of domestic violence counseling centers (75), and consolidated (domestic/sexual violence)

counseling centers (10).

57 The law stipulated that state or private agencies and groups could establish and operate facilities

for victims of domestic violence. Many were established with the expectation of getting future funding

from the government. There is no research that details who runs centers or what services are provided. For

this reason, feminists in the KWH say that the MGEF does not know what happens in centers. 59 The

MGEF has a small budget compared to other ministries. Assigning implementation to MGEF immediately

presented serious limitations to funding of programs and likely signaled low political will among

legislators.

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Section 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Total budget 28,792 42,735 43,548 48,479 643,775 872,939 1,137,935

Administration

on Women*

- - - 39,309 33,867 32,691 38,623

Child-care

Project

- - - 1,200 600,091 791,008 1,043,474

Family Project - - - - 200 37,144 43,424

Misc. 4,376 6,586 7,463 7,970 9,617 12,096 12,414

Table 6.1: General Budget of MGEF in Millions of Won**

Source: MGEF webpage http://mogef.go.kr/html/sub06/sub06_37.jsp?menuID=kg0307 *

DV budgets located here.

**1 million won = about a thousand dollars

At the time that the Ministry of Gender Equality (MGE) was established, it was the

smallest government department both in scope and influence. In June 2005, the MGE was

renamed the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and child care and family policies

were reallocated to the new MGEF from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This transfer

of responsibilities explains the dramatic increase in MGEF budget since 2005.

The table shows also that most of the agency’s budget is allocated to child-care projects

(91.70%). This precluded any priority to gender-related issues. That is, the ministry that

started out with a focus on gender equality has become a ministry that now focuses on

children.

Financial support for DV programs belongs to the section for “Administration on

Women.” “Administration on Women” is divided into three sub-sections: women’s policy

and human development; promotion of women’s rights; executive support for MGEF.

Again, promotion of women’s rights includes three sub-issues: prostitution,

sexual/domestic violence, and “comfort women.” So, not only is funding limited to begin

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with, but there clearly is no prioritization of domestic violence or any type of violence for

that matter. The following diagram illustrates the organizational placement of the issue of

sexual/domestic violence and, hence, the limitations imposed on funding specifically for

violence.

Chart 6.1: Organizational Placement of Sexual/Domestic Violence Issues

And the following table shows the budgets for prevention of sexual/domestic violence and

protection of victims of sexual/domestic violence.

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Promotion of

women’s

rights

10,777

11,442 14,481

20,267

*(2.32%)

24,185

*(2.16%)

Prevention of

sexual/domestic

violence…

6,142 6,946 7,338 12,773

*(1.46%)

14,530

*(1.28%)

Table 6.2: Allocated Budget for Prevention of Sexual/Domestic Violence and Protection of

Victims in Millions of Won (~ US$1,000)

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Source: Ministry of Gender Equality, Budget Outline, 2004, and Ministry of Gender

Equality and Family, Budget Outline, 2005-2007.

* percentage of the total budget of MGEF

As can be seen, the budget for sexual/domestic violence programs has gradually

increased but overall only a tiny part of the MGEF budget is allocated to programs of

sexual/domestic violence. As of 2007, the budget of MGEF amounts to 1,137,935 million

won (approximately US$ 1.14 billion). But only 1.28% of the total budget is allocated to

preventing and combating sexual/domestic violence. This percent actually declined

compared with 2006.

While the establishment of counseling centers and shelters has been described in the

press and by legislators as the most remarkable accomplishment following passage of the

anti-DV acts, it is not reasonable to attribute the increase to any commitment or allocation

of resources by the MGEF. If budget is any indicator, MGEF does not prioritize the

problem of domestic violence and earlier statistics indicated only a minority of centers and

shelters receive MGEF funding.

Feminist activists are keenly aware of these contradictions today. Furthermore,

feminists evaluate the DV problem not only in terms of growth in centers and shelters, but

also in terms of the principles in place and the training of personnel. Note in the following

interview the ironic tension between what are implicitly referred to as appropriate

(feminist) approaches versus approaches criticized that actually reflect the very framing

used to pass the Acts in the first place.

Since the legislation went into effect, over 300 counseling centers were

established. We are skeptical about the people and institutions that

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established and run those facilities. We don’t think that those people

have an appropriate concern for and understanding of the DV issue.

Anybody can open a counseling center with minimum conditions such

as a counseling program… In addition, because civil society groups

have provided services for a long time, MGEF staff are not willing to

take responsibility. Therefore, the problem is that nobody is monitoring

who is giving advice to whom with what kind of approaches. The

Women’s Hotline occupies a very small part of the service sector.

Religious groups or welfare facilities have become the dominant force.

The problem is that their basic position is very family-centered and the

emphasis is always on the significance of family reunion. (Interview with

Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of domestic violence prevention

program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2, 2006, Seoul)58

As the above interviewee indicates, another concern expressed is how

institutionalizing the issue of DV has led to the marginalization of the KWH in providing

services and/or in providing ideological orientation and training to new service providers.

Even though Korea Women’s Hotline played the most significant role in making the

problem of wife beating visible and led the campaign to pass the new legislation, with

institutionalization their influence and power (which should have been based on their long-

term commitment, knowledge, and experience) were undermined by state control and by

increased public and private agency attention to the problem in ways that do not present an

important challenge to cultural values.

Another factor played a role in the marginalization of the KWH. It stems from a

decision made by feminist activists to separate the anti-DV legislation movement from the

anti-sexual violence legislation movement (Previously, both violence issues had been

58 Some Catholic foundations support some counseling centers. Although KWH branches runs rape

crisis centers and receives state funding to do so, the state made an arbitrary decisions to NOT provide funding

to or sanction KWH-run domestic violence centers. State representatives decided that one agency should not run

two different types of services at the same time. Rather, other private groups and agencies were favored to run

anti-DV programs.

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combined in activist campaigns). After the passage of the Act on the Punishment of Sexual

Assault Crimes and for the Protection of the Victims passed in 1993, the state needed an

agency that provided counseling and services. The MGE was not even thought about at the

time. Because KWH had a long experience working for victims of rape, state agencies

agreed to fund KWH to run rape counseling centers.

In spite of their efforts to remain at the forefront of DV programs, KWH’s many

requests for financial support have not received consideration for government subsidies for

shelters and counseling centers against domestic violence. The MGEF says that KWH

already receives funding for rape centers and cannot receive for both. This opened the way

for other organizations and institutions to become a dominant force in anti-DV services

and the result has been a growing importance for non-feminist, pro-government private

organizations to cooperate in addressing the issue of domestic violence. This has

strengthened dependence on the concept of family preservation as the goal.

This split between feminist leadership for both DV and sexual violence has served to

divide the two issues and has made difficult any public and programmatic discourse that

could point to shared causes and potentially shared solutions to both types of violence.

This is associated with a political retreat on the part of state agencies and the legislature.

There appears to be no political will for creating a comprehensive understanding of gender

violence. Part of the reason for this is the belief that sexual violence involves strangers and

public space while DV involves family and private space. In fact, the political use of a

conservative framing of DV in terms of family preservation, while successful in

motivating public and political support, actually contributed to the “de-radicalization” of

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the broad-based women’s movement against violence against women and to a split

between feminists and non feminist service providers. One conclusion is that construction

of the Anti-DV Acts opened the way for quantitative development in the form of shelters

and counseling for battered women, but, as feminist activists rightly complain, the growth

in services represents a conservative approach to the problem of domestic violence—one

that builds on traditional notions of family life and does not protect women specifically.

Some core feminist activists refer to this situation as the “entrapment” of domestic

violence within the discourse of family protection (see next chapter). Though they criticize

government agencies for this, it obviously follows from the decision to use the family

preservation frame for the anti-DV legislation campaign.

What MGEF primarily is doing is monitoring counseling centers. I don’t

think that MGEF is interested in developing more effective and practical

policies. I don’t think they are aware of the seriousness of domestic

violence. For those government officials who are in charge of

counseling centers, the main interest is to manage centers without

making any trouble. While we have been insisting that policy reform is

needed in relation to family concepts, MGEF is stuck on the principle of

family protection—stressing that it is the Ministry of Gender Equality

and FAMILY. I think that there is a huge gap between us and the MGEF.

When it comes to family values, I believe that it is important to focus on

wellbeing of an individual family member… As someone whose

research found that domestic violence occurs in one out of six

households in S. Korea, I think that MGEF should pay attention to the

human right to be safe and not be beaten in the home. However, their

interest is fixed only on protecting victims who seek a safe family

relationship [i.e., not those who wish to escape an abusive relationship].

But I would say that “family safety” is only possible if family members

respect each other and are aware of the problem of violence. MGEF

should concentrate on consciousness-raising and go beyond the

principle of protecting families. (Interview with Shin Youn Sook, head

coordinator of domestic violence prevention program, Korea Women’s

Hotline, May 2, 2006, Seoul)

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The lack of a sustained, comprehensive understanding of gender violence resulted in

a marginalizing of domestic violence on the policy agenda. There is a widespread belief

among policymakers that domestic “disturbances” can be dealt with easily and that they

cause less harm to victims than other crimes against women such as rape. In spite of earlier

media coverage of tragic cases, following passage of the Acts this belief has not been

challenged publicly. This and budget limitations suppress possibilities of rethinking and

reframing domestic violence in the policy arena. So it should not be surprising that MGEF

has shown little concern about the matter of domestic violence beyond fulfilling the

minimum requirements of the law.

Although the creation and presence of MGEF has had a strong symbolic effect in

Korean society, feminist activists share the opinion that its activities on gender issues in

general and domestic violence specifically have not contributed to meaningful change.

I can’t say the law is effective in terms of protecting women’s human

rights.59 With such a law, I also would say that MGEF is not interested in

domestic violence. What they are doing in relation to DV is to manage

counseling centers and they are somewhat concerned about batterer

programs. Except those, I don’t think that there is any other activity

performed by the MGEF. They are not doing anything about

consciousness-raising targeting the public. The other problem is that

too small a budget has been allocated to domestic violence. Compared

with sexual violence, there is little support for domestic violence. It’s

because while sexual violence is understood as violence committed by

a stranger, domestic violence is not regarded as equally serious. No

activities, no money, no movement. Do you know any other

organizations and groups still involved in the anti-domestic violence

movement? Korea Women’s Hotline is the only one. (Interview with

KimYu Eun Kyung, head coordinator of international solidarity program,

Korea Women’s Hotline, June 23, 2006, Seoul)

59 Several quotes include reference to women’s human rights. Korean feminist perspectives on human

rights will be discussed in the next chapter.

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For feminist activists who struggled to establish the Anti-DV law, one of their more

realistic expectations was the idea that the anti-DV law would have a symbolic effect.

Their expectations were based on the idea that state intervention in domestic violence

would lead to public and political interpretations of the problem as a significant one that

should be dealt with in a substantial way. The enactment of the law, as a formal

declaration, partly meets those expectations by circulating the idea that domestic violence

is not acceptable.

People … admit that violence is bad, rape is bad, and domestic

violence is wrong even though their behaviors have not significantly

changed. (Interview with KimYu Eun Kyung, head coordinator of

international solidarity program, Korea Women’s Hotline, June 23,

2006, Seoul)

On the other hand, some feminist activists complain of other, unexpected effects following

passage of the law.

What makes me feel anxious is that people think that domestic violence

was totally resolved with the enactment of the law. I think that all

established laws should be monitored and reformed if it is necessary.

But in the case of the Anti-DV law, there has been a widespread belief

that domestic violence is no longer an issue because the law is there to

serve the problem. (Interview with Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of

domestic violence prevention program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2,

2006, Seoul)

South Korean feminists are not alone in their expectations that state intervention

would be a solution. Among feminists around the world, maintaining an independent and

solid feminist base has been considered important to challenge mainstream institutions that

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reproduce and reinforce social conditions that foster violence against women. Yet, at the

same time, the tendency has been to consider engagement with the state as a significant

objective for many women’s movements at national and international levels— particularly

in new democracies (i.e., Latin America). In order to have access to key resources and

political opportunities, Korean feminist theorists and activists believed that enhancing their

relationship with the state should be one of their main strategies to combat violence against

women.

Nonetheless, following initiation of the state’s increased role as what feminists

thought would be their counterpart to advancing women’s interests both in symbolic and

practical ways, Korean feminists have realized that state engagement per se does not

guarantee the political influence of the women’s movement on state policy. Instead, state

intervention led to a discontinuation of movement influence. It was feminists who

identified the problem of DV and who helped draft the very Acts that have resulted in their

marginalization and disempowerment.

The perspectives are different and the goals are different. There is their

goal and here is our goal. Nobody is monitoring individual counseling

centers.60 Nobody is asking about the direction in which they are

headed. The history of the movement--how many women activists were

devoted to it and how much effort was made--is just being erased.

(Interview with Choi Sun Ae, director of Young Kwang Women’s

Counseling Center, Young Kwang Women’s Hotline, September 9,

2006, JaeChon)

60 MGEF monitoring activities only focus on accounting matters (budgets) for agencies who receive state

funding; monitoring does NOT include evaluations of the contents or outcomes of counseling. For example,

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The lack of political will or a strong commitment to protect battered women and

prevent domestic violence on the part of state agencies and private service providers are

not the only threats that contemporary feminists and members of a surviving feminist

movement must face. The biggest crisis comes from a criminal justice system that

decriminalizes domestic violence and reconstructs the problem yet again in spite of the

content of the Acts.

The Punishment Act was enacted as a “Special Act” rather than being integrated into

existing criminal law. Enactment as a Special Act does not mean that domestic violence

cases have high status. Instead, it means that all forms of violence occurring within family

relationships are subject to this law regardless of their seriousness. On the one hand, it

conveys an important message that the state takes this problem seriously. On the other

hand, this Special Act rarely allows domestic violence cases to be treated as criminal cases

and the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice) completely supports this position.

Superficially, the construction of the Punishment Act was meant to lead to

meaningful change because it requires police intervention and mandates criminal

proceedings for domestic violence cases—two things previously unimaginable in Korean

some religious groups emphasize that a wife should be obedient to the husband. MGEF does not oppose this.

society. However, considering the formidable power that legal discourse can exert, the Act

needs to be re-evaluated in terms of how the legal system interprets and reconstructs the

problem including when the Act is compared to other, competing, legislation.

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All legal discourse defines problems and suggests options for resolution. It also

produces relevant subjects. Therefore, exploring the ways in which the Punishment Act is

implemented can reveal much about the nature and interpretation of the law.

Under the Punishment Act, prosecutors may take emergency and temporary

measures such as restraining orders. Prosecutors also may transfer cases into family court

and the court may order perpetrators to medical or custodial care facilities, may limit the

exercise of perpetrators’ parental rights, and may order them to take behavior modification

classes or attend counseling programs. If the case is serious and the prosecutor believes

that it clearly constitutes crime, prosecutors may charge perpetrators with a violent crime.

But, the stated purpose of “promoting the recovery of peace and stability in families and

fostering a healthy family” interferes with and contradicts the possibility of charging

perpetrators with a violent crime. This would move the case to criminal court where a

guilty sentence would lead to incarceration, separating the perpetrator from the family. For

this reason and because prosecutors have great autonomy in deciding how to proceed, law

enforcement personnel continue to treat most domestic violence cases under the category

of a family protection case.61

Although one objective of the Act was to increase public awareness so more women

would report abuse to criminal justice authorities, follow ups have revealed a serious

problem. The Ministry of Gender Equality published a report in 2005 (“Fact Finding

61 Twice a month since October 1998, the National Police Agency has provided education to police

officers on the laws and acceptable procedures for responding to reports of DV and on steps that should be

taken to protect victims. Some activists and advocates of KWH have participated in education programs as

instructors. Feminist activists’ response to the effectiveness of police training programs is mixed. While some

feminists point to the problematic attitudes of some police, others say that many police officers changed.

According to Lee Mi Hye, when she participated in police training programs some officers said

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Survey of Domestic Violence”) on the incidence of violence and actual use of services and

the legal system by abused women. This national survey of 6,156 married persons—

women (3,085) and men (3,071)—found that one in six households experienced physical

violence at some point during the previous year. Some 44.6% of the respondents

experienced diverse forms of violence—physical (15.7%), psychological (42.1%) and/or

sexual (7.1%)—during the period. However, only 11.8% reported calling police directly.

Of those who did, 55.6% found police responses problematic and 11.9% said police

refused assistance.

Results of a separate study of crime data reported by police departments throughout the

country are shown in the following table. The table shows that 92.4% of 12,775 accused

batterers who were reported to the police in 2005 were not prosecuted. Both sets of data

provide explanations for why victims avoid using the criminal justice system.

that they often feel like encouraging women to leave the relationship because of the brutal violence women

endured (Interviewed in 2006). An anonymous police officer interviewed in 2006 also expressed the

contradictions to which officers are subjected: “in the field, I see many cases where women should leave and

file for divorce, but according to the orders I got from the state, I am supposed to help them get back together

to keep the family united.”

Classifi Family Protection

-cation Number of Number Persons Results/Actions Taken Case (not criminal)

Reported

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year Cases hended Appre- Arrests arrests Non-Received Warning Number Cases

Number Persons

’99 11,850 12,719 868 11,804 47 990 1,031 ’00 12,983 14,105 678 13,380 47 3,813 4,404

’01 14,583 15,557 691 14,760 106 4,559 4,813

’02 15,151 16,324 586 15,127 611 3,702 4,083

’03 16,408 17,770 496 16,787 487 4,186 4,459

’04 13,770 15,208 329 13,969 910 2,587 2,616

’05 11,595 12,775 181 11,800 794 1,881 2,022

Table 6.3: Measures of Domestic Violence Crime

Source: Korean National Police Agency, White Paper on Police, 2006, p.187.

Although some cases included in the table were prosecuted, all were treated as

family protection cases. Although the White Paper on Police (2006) categorizes domestic

violence as a crime, it does not express any concern over the low rate of prosecution.

Rather, it confirms that the purpose of state intervention in domestic violence is to

“smoothly restore the family” (187). That is, the report explicitly argues that prosecution

would threaten the stability of the Korean family system and justifies the criminal justice

system’s use of the law to decriminalize domestic violence. Feminists consider this to be a

tremendous problem and a failure to implement the law faithfully.

The Punishment Act was designed to resolve the problem of domestic violence in

two ways. On the one hand, it criminalized domestic violence to punish perpetrators and to

improve public awareness of the illegality of DV. On the other hand, it was to provide

perpetrators with counseling to give them an opportunity to change and then rebuild family

relationships. However, under the reality of family-oriented legal responses, it appears

unlikely that law enforcement can or will play any role in creating a symbolic link between

domestic violence and real criminal behavior. Feminist activists and advocates point out

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that this family-oriented legal intervention, therefore, has functioned to spread the idea that

domestic violence is a matter of family reunion and not a real crime. Given this, it should

not be a surprise to find that batterer programs are not effective in terms of educating

batterers or correcting their abusive behavior.62

We are also running batterer programs. I can’t describe how extreme

their resistance is. Their excuses usually begin by saying that they

never beat their wives or that it was just a spat. Given that the law is too

generous to offenders, they never have to realize that their behavior

was a crime or how it seriously damages their wives. For them,

battering means just an incident that can be resolved with paying fines

or taking classes. (Interview with Cho, Yoon Sook, general secretary,

DaeGu Women’s Hotline, May 30, 2006, DaeGu)

I have met perpetrators who have received court-ordered counseling

four or five times. What can I expect from them? They already know

that nothing is going to happen if they do not follow the orders. They

know that paying fines resolves the [legal] problem. The counseling can

be scheduled 10 times. But their attitude remains abysmal all the time.

They are full of complaints saying “why do I have to be here?” “why is

that woman (wife) free despite the fact that she deserved battering?”

This is getting really bad. Even when they injured women with

weapons, they still only get a counseling order. Is that normal? Is that

really the law? (Interview with Lee Moon Ja, director of counseling

center, KimPo Women’s Hotline, September 8, 2006, JaeChon)

According to the law, battered women should be able to use the criminal justice

system to accuse their abusive partners and a few do, at least initially. Feminist advocates

have observed that most battered women then withdraw their charges and attribute this to

economic dependence on the man. Some also express their decisions in terms of their

62 It should be acknowledged here that even when DV is recognized as a crime (as in the U.S.),

evaluations of batterer programs also show weak outcomes related to perpetrator resistance (Babcock and

Steiner 1999; Bennett and Williams 2001).

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moral duties as a mother. They decide to endure and sacrifice for their children rather than

to file for a divorce or pursue prosecution.

Of course, police should immediately separate a perpetrator from a

victim when domestic violence is reported. But victims also need to

change their attitudes. They have to request appropriate protection. As

long as they are conscious, they have to ask for help and should come

to us. Women should prosecute and prosecutors should investigate.

But women usually withdraw the charge because a batterer is a

breadwinner and a father. Without social change, this problem is never

going to be solved. What else can they do without social protections?

Women have no option but to return home even though they will be

battered again. [It is] because they have no financial security and they

have children to support. (Interview with Lee Mi Hye, director of

Women’s Rights Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline, June 20,

2006, Seoul)

Even though the construction of the law was thought to be a fundamental step to

eliminate domestic violence, both pragmatic and personal obstacles have shown that

solutions are far more complicated and—even if the law were applied in criminal court—

that DV cannot be resolved solely through legal intervention. Some feminists interviewed

focused on the ways in which judges and prosecutors often use the law to condone

offenders.63

Judges show much more sympathy for perpetrators than for victims.

Under these circumstances, it is hard to expect a severe [meaningful]

punishment. There are serious domestic violence cases that need to be

prosecuted and there are perpetrators who must be punished. But, you

know, one of the underpinnings of our justice system is that it is better

63 Maxwell (2005) suggests that research should focus on “the effects of interventions (arrest) at the

beginning and at the end (court ordered treatment) of the criminal justice” intervention (528). Research should

evaluate outcomes and examine the continuous or deterrent effects of legal intervention. Lewis et al. (2001)

argue that it is important to examine both process and outcomes to fully understand the effectiveness of legal

interventions in domestic violence.

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to set a hundred guilty men free than to imprison even one who's

innocent. Under this principle, it seems that victim protection can’t work.

Prosecutors and judges that I met before were willing to listen to

perpetrators. But

they are not really willing to take stronger measures to punish or correct

their behavior. In this respect, this is not a problem that can be handled

at an individual level [it is systemic]. (Interview with Lee Young Hee,

director of Counseling Center of Violence against Women, SuWon

Women’s Hotline, September 7, 2006, JaeChon)

Korean feminist advocates’ experience with batterer programs demonstrates that

although rehabilitation in the name of family protection is a cultural and even a legal ideal,

it cannot be effective when it does not hold offenders accountable nor does it condemn

domestic violence as serious crime. Their position and experiences are supported by

numerous studies in other settings. In her study comparing state response to domestic

violence between the U.S. and Sweden, for example, Peter (2006) argues that the state’s

attitude toward domestic violence determines “the way in which police gather evidence in

such cases” (102). This observation has a significant implication: the attitude of law

enforcement personnel cannot be changed unless the state clearly condemns domestic

violence and supports women’s efforts to change their life situation and conditions. This

can be taken further: the role of the criminal justice system ought to be to resolve domestic

violence by defending victims, not by protecting perpetrators.

In addition, it is wrong for state actors or the general public to critique feminist

demands for more severe legal intervention and to accuse feminists of misunderstanding

battered women’s reality or of being so-called “man haters.” If the state is to develop the

political will to resolve the problem, it should listen to feminist activists and advocates

who have witnessed both the lethal consequences of domestic violence and an increasingly

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brutal pattern of violence among repeat batterers to whom the criminal justice system

simply gave a tap on the wrist. Feminists can provide evidence of the consequences of the

contemporary legal approach that both decriminalizes domestic violence and promotes the

ideology of family reunion. Their proof may be anecdotal, but is based on actual cases and

direct observations of real situations. They can provide similar evidence of the failure of

counseling programs for the most serious violent offenders.

I don’t believe in the effectiveness of batterer programs. I think that

severe punishment is necessary. I had an unbelievable case where a

perpetrator who severely assaulted his wife (she needed 9 weeks

hospitalization) got court-ordered counseling only. If any other violent

crime caused that degree of harm, such a legal response would have

been impossible. I don’t think that this is fair. Domestic violence is

serious crime. (Interview with Lee Mi Hye, director of Women’s Rights

Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline June 20, 2006, Seoul)

The decriminalization of wife beating means that there is no reason for perpetrators to feel

guilty or ashamed. Rather than focusing on curbing their violent behaviors, courtordered

counseling programs often find batterers spend their time threatening counselors.

Of course, there are some people who can benefit from the batterer

programs. But there are also people who should receive a different

treatment. I even heard about cases where perpetrators have seized

counselors by the collar. Shouted arguments and insults are normal

here. We can scarcely imagine how perpetrators must treat their wives

in the home when we see how they behave here, where they are

attending a court-ordered counseling program. Punishment needs to be

strengthened. Not everyone benefits from counseling programs. A more

severe punishment law is really needed. (Interview with Cho Yoon

Sook, general secretary, DaeGu Women’s Hotline, May 30, 2006,

DaeGu)

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For feminist activists, unsatisfactory outcomes of state responses to domestic

violence are always disappointing and sometimes incomprehensible. But also of increasing

importance to activists is the significant loss in bargaining power they have experienced

following institutionalization of DV policy making and dissolution of the anti-DV

coalition once legislative goals were achieved. They now have very few options to

participate in any search for a way out of the impasse caused by the obstacles embedded in

the legal and ministerial systems themselves. Many found it particularly heart-breaking to

realize that the Ministry of Gender Equality was far from what they had imagined.

Engaging with the state and seeking state feminism may have been a basic step and

eventually a great resource to address violence against women in other political settings.

But this has not been the case in South Korea. When it was founded, the MGE was

supposed to be supportive of civil society women’s organizations and movements. This

changed very quickly. A feminist activist explains the gap between expectations and what

actually happened:

When the MGE64 was established, we had hopes that we would not

need to concentrate so much of our energies on law reforms anymore.

We thought that what we were supposed to do with the MGE would be

to suggest feminist values and principles [for policy making]. We had an

expectation that MGE would produce appropriate policies and

institutional management if we made suggestions or provided

information gained from the field. But we are witnessing an absolute

obstacle. MGEF is reinforcing [patriarchal] family values. We realize

now that MGEF is nothing but another government agency. I don’t think

that we have any high expectations for MGEF now. (Interview with

ShinHa Yeong Ok, director of policy and region division,

64 As indicated earlier, the Ministry of Gender Equality was established in 2001. When assigned child

support and family policy formerly under the Ministry of Health and Welfare, MGE became the Ministry of

Gender Equality and Family in June 2005.

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Korea Women’s Hotline, July 13,

2006, Seoul)

On the other hand, their experience with the state women’s machinery has helped

feminist activists to understand better the nature of institutionalization and its

consequences. This, in turn, has led them to differentiate more clearly between government

goals and movement goals.

After the establishment of MGE, its main task was the

institutionalization of counseling centers. In preparing for this, MGE

relied on research conducted by a social welfare institution. The

research concluded that “counseling centers are in trouble because

women’s groups run them” and “protection of victims is problematic

because of feminist counseling.” It was true that both counseling

centers and protection of victims had some problems. We also had

concerns. But our interpretation of causes of the problems was totally

different. As you know, establishing and maintaining counseling centers

were 100% our struggle. So, in my opinion, the state or MGE should

support us to overcome some problems. But, what they did is to set a

standard65 and ordered us to meet the standard. If not, they just cut us

out…What we learned is “A-ha, this is institutionalization.” We realized

the nature of institutionalization then. We also got to realize that we

were so idealistic. We now know that Institutionalization is not about

giving us access to the state or asking it to do this or that. Now, we are

aware that we have to decide whether we participate or not rather than

just cling to institutionalization. We also know that we have to

differentiate the movement sphere from the institutional sphere.

(Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-representative of Korea Women’s

Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

Lessons Learned

As the organization that first provided counseling programs and temporary shelters

for abused women in South Korea, the Korea Women’s Hotline launched the anti-gender

65 Standards are mostly bureaucratic/administrative demands or procedures having to do with

facilities, budget expenses, and so on. But the state objects to feminists doing “feminist counseling” which

sees DV as a structural problem, not a private (psychological) matter, and which seeks to empower women to

end violent relationships.

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violence legislation movement (for both sexual assault and domestic violence) in the early

1990s. They did so initially with arguments that patriarchal practices and attitudes are the

main cause of this violence. Setting aside their own misgivings and internal conflicts about

doing so, they made a conscious political decision to use a political rhetoric rather than

their own feminist perspective. That is, they “shelved” their own understanding of causes

and solutions in order to appeal to the public, the media, politicians, and the non feminist

civil society organizations they asked to join in the antiDV coalition. But experience has

shown that this “successful” frame both achieved the goal of passing the anti-DV Acts and

undermined the spirit and deeper impacts that feminists hoped would result from

interpretation and refinement of the Acts. Although it seemed reasonable at the time—

given scant resources, women’s low representation in the legislature,66 and the absence of

state machinery for women—this decision meant that feminist influence over legislation

and state policy both occurred within a vacuum and may have occurred “by default.” That

is, the Korea Women’s Hotline and the Korean Women’s Association United played crucial

roles in constructing the issues of sexual and domestic violence as subjects of state policy

because there was no state agency or actors who were in a position to assume leadership,

but were marginalized when state agencies chose to take over and provide their own

interpretations and objectives to the Acts. The lessons feminists have learned subsequently

are beginning to have an effect on how they talk about violence and have generated a

renewed interest in the concept of women’s human rights (as could be seen in several

quotes above). This issue is explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

66 There were only 9 women legislators who were 3% of all National Assembly members.

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Given the way most social movement theories define movement success (see Bush

1992, 588-9), the Korean anti-violence movement would be classified as successful

because of its achievements in promoting legal reform, encouraging new state funding for

the issue, and because the new MGE and the Ministry of Justice were assigned roles of

institutional support and of interpretation and implementation of the new Acts.

Nevertheless, as Bush points out and as Korean feminists are now aware, these indicators

are insufficient because they do not answer the question of whether or not “movement

success at reforming state policy actually creates changes” that are meaningful and

transformative (589).

In the South Korean case, there are several answers depending on one’s vantage

point: “yes” or “no” or “in some respects.” Some social movement theorists would argue

that, yes, the anti-DV movement has been successful. Others would delve more deeply into

obstacles or unpredicted consequences. I would qualify the notion of success. The fact that

the anti-DV coalition was successful in passing the desired legislation, through which

institutional changes have taken place, was an event of enormous significance because

violence against women was firmly on the policy agenda for the first time. But these

changes have not had the desired or a significant impact on resolving the problem of

domestic violence. Regrettably, some desired impacts—raising the public’s consciousness,

implementing serious consequences and punishment for perpetrators, prioritizing victims’

needs—have backfired.

However, disappointing consequences of engaging with the South Korean state

should not be accepted as inevitable or “just expected” outcomes of the institutionalization

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process. Rather, it is important to investigate more deeply the ways in which state policy

and institutional interventions have reconstructed the problem in ways that are

counterproductive to the goal of ending domestic violence. This knowledge will be

important to feminists’ plans to reestablish relations so they can influence the state and its

institutions and to once again work at constructing more appropriate mechanisms for

combating violence against women.

Institutional Reconstruction of Domestic Violence and Battered Women

This section will provide a brief overview of other ways in which domestic violence

and battered women have been transformed discursively as a result of institutionalization

beyond or because of the emphasis on family preservation and healthy families.

Analysis already has established how the women’s movement rearticulated wife

beating as a social problem, not a private issue. It has established that, subsequently, the

frame of family preservation subverted the notion of wife beating as a social problem and

substituted “domestic violence” for “wife beating,” making the social problem one of

“family breakdown” rather than “woman abuse.”

State agencies that intervene in domestic violence as a problem have been

handicapped by bureaucrats and politicians who did not share feminist understandings of

the issue and considered feminist involvement to be not politically advisable. As a result,

state actors’ interpretation of the family preservation frame was literal, not symbolic as it

was for feminists. Already discussed is the fact that, divorced from the deeper

understandings of the anti-DV movement and of feminist counselors dealing with abuse

cases, institutionalization quickly embraced earlier cultural notions of the family and

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applied rights of protection and privacy to the family as a unit and not to victims of

violence. Even worse, lack of consciousness raising among police, prosecutors and judges

led to their reaffirmation of the emphasis on men’s authority and rights (until recently, as

legal heads of the family unit) and their emphasis on reunification as a means to preserve

the family—at the expense of other family members.

One way to interpret the rapid subversion of feminist goals and discourses is through

identification of factors that could have played a role. First, if the frame of “family

protection” was so quickly embraced, it must have been because there was an already

existing hegemonic discourse that could tolerate or incorporate the frame. On the one

hand, this helps explain why feminists might have been so eager to use this frame to insert

a discussion of wife beating into hegemonic discourses. But it also should have been a

warning sign that the family protection frame could be vulnerable to cooptation and use in

ways not desired by feminists.

Closer examination of institutional discourses also reveals how they have offered

new understandings of the problem of domestic violence and of battered women

themselves.67

As indicated above, the original and continuing objective of the original Punishment

Act was “to recover peace and stability for families affected by domestic violence and to

nurture healthy families.” The original purpose of the Prevention of Domestic Violence

and Victim Protection Act was to “prevent domestic violence and protect victims of

67 Of course, there will be many political considerations that come into play here as well as personal

values and beliefs. But these are beyond the scope of this inquiry.

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domestic violence in order to nurture and promote healthy families.”68 In this legal

discourse, the feminist articulation that wife beating is a result of male domination and that

it is gender-based violence was erased.

From a societal and an institutional perspective, the problem of domestic violence is

seen as deserving of public support because family break up will certainly increase the

social welfare burden and create costs. Furthermore, institutions that mainstream

discourses also have introduced the idea that domestic violence is linked to juvenile

problems. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, for example, identifies domestic

violence as a public concern because of it preoccupation with juvenile delinquency. From

this perspective, domestic violence is no longer a private matter not because it violates

women’s rights but because it leads to family breakdown that may result in juvenile crime.

Therefore, the establishment of counseling centers for temporarily protecting battered

women and simultaneously providing batterer programs, including marital counseling

programs, was a logical move intended to restore healthy families.

Violence that occurs within family is not just a family matter. Conflict

between couples may result in child abuse, juvenile delinquency, child

runaways, and eventually destroy family and family relationships

(MGEF. “Domestic Violence: Not My Private Matter, But Everyone’s

Problem,” Women and Policy, Autumn 2005, p.9).

68 In 2006, both Acts were modified. (This process will be explained in the next chapter.) The

Prevention Act dropped reference to “in order to nurture and promote health families.” It now states its purpose

is to “prevent domestic violence and to protect and support victims of domestic violence.” The Punishment Act

has added to its purpose the following statement “and to protect human rights of victims and family members.”

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In light of these changes, feminist advocates found that the only available way to address

the unresolved seriousness of domestic violence was to once again place the problem

within the dominant framework—the concern for children.

What we are currently arguing is that domestic violence is closely

related to violence at school. When we asserted that violence at school

cannot be tackled only by school regulations, we found that [state

agencies] were listening to us. (Interview with Park

Inn Hea, co-representative of Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006,

Seoul)

However, as the previous experience of the domestic violence legislation movement

has demonstrated, using another culturally and politically resonant framing may not be

such a useful strategy in terms of correcting the institutional definition of the problem of

domestic violence. Rather, it may once again reinforce the institutional response by

supporting emphasis on family reconciliation and reunification. Once domestic violence is

viewed as a matter of family mediation, the problem will not be the subject of legislative

or criminal intervention. Instead, it is likely to gradually integrate with the discourse on

medical and psychological treatments. In fact, despite the MGEF’s call for “various

approaches” to domestic violence, its discourse actually is located within a medical

discourse. Under the title of “Domestic Violence: A Disease that Should Be Cured by

Family Together,” MGEF emphasizes that DV can be resolved by a genuine apology and

forgiveness under the violent behavior modification program.

Domestic violence should be investigated with various approaches. If

we only focus on punishing perpetrators and protecting victims, it

[overlooks] other forms of violence. The ultimate goal is to find a

substantial way both at social and national levels to help couples

maintain a happy family life (MGEF. “Domestic Violence: A Disease that

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Should Be Cured by Family Together.” Women and Policy, Autumn

2005, p.13).

Medical discourses provide a plausible excuse for legislators who oppose reforming

the DV Act towards more severe punishment and allege that their concern is family

protection.

Modern life is tough and that sometime makes people crazy…It is not

desirable for the state to be involved in family matters. But we can’t

neglect the need for protection of family because there are too many

psychos these days (Choi Byung Kook, legislator, in the Minutes of the

5th legislation and judiciary subcommittee, National Assembly, April 19,

2007, p.5). Italics mine.

The feminist choice to use a family protection frame was intended to create a link between

wife beating and crime. Legal intervention was regarded as a prerequisite to challenging a

widespread perception that domestic violence should be dealt with in the home. However,

once legislation was in place, both legislation and state agencies established the allowable

“discursive opportunity structures.” According to Ferree (2003), discursive opportunity

structures can be defined as “institutionally anchored ways of thinking that provide a

gradient of relative political acceptability to specific packages of ideas” (309). She goes on

to differentiate discursive opportunity structures from hegemonic discourses on the basis

that discursive opportunity structures have more a political and institutional aspect.

Therefore, discursive opportunity structures, such as major court decisions and legislation,

can more effectively “deploy power to shape ideas directly” (309). This is why engaging

with the state, which has long been a crucial liberal feminist strategy, cannot be counted on

as THE solution across place and time. Therefore, to assess both the choices and chosen

strategy of the Korean women’s movement in its local context, we also need to evaluate

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the effectiveness of the chosen frame (already determined to be problematic) and

scrutinize the discursive opportunity structures that emerged as a result of the culturally

resonant framing.

Korean feminist activists and advocates who now struggle to overhaul and reform

the Acts find themselves having to confront legislators’ adherence to the established

principles in the Acts. They are now aware of how the established discursive opportunity

structures have standardized the legislation and normalized legislative interpretation.

They are struggling over how to respond to positions such as the following.

Punishing perpetrators is not the only way to deal with domestic

violence. Isn’t the purpose of this goal to prevent family breakup and to

restore a healthy family?…As far as I know, there is a way to treat DV

as a criminal case even if it is severe. Avoiding that was the original

purpose of this law. I guess that because some legislators have some

misunderstanding of this law, they proposed the [2006] draft

amendment that emphasizes the need for severe punishment…Victims

of domestic violence are not limited to women. Men are also victims of

domestic violence (Lee Sang Min, legislator and chairman of the

legislation and judiciary committee, National Assembly, in the Minutes

of the 5th legislation and judiciary subcommittee, National Assembly,

June 22, 2007, p.12).

Smith’s notion of “relations of ruling” help explain how both dominant discourses

and discursive structures shape people’s understanding and lives. From this perspective,

such family-centered and family-valued discourses reconstruct the problem of domestic

violence within the principle of family protection in a more specific way. In the name of

restoring a peaceful family, a legislator who has direct influence on legislative reform

expresses concern for the feelings of perpetrators rather than for the safety and rights of

victims of domestic violence:

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We have to consider whether family would be okay if a wife prosecutes

her husband and puts him behind bars. We also think about whether

father would be willing to protect his children after he comes back from

jail with child abuse on his record (Choi Byung Kook, legislator, in the

Minutes of the 5th legislation and judiciary subcommittee, National

Assembly, April 19, 2007, p.5).

Another manifestation of shifting discourse intersects with the feminist preoccupation

initially with women’s victimization and vulnerability. It also coincides with international

social welfare discourse that emphasizes the need to address the vulnerabilities of certain

social groups. The discourse on social group vulnerabilities has contributed to a backlash

against anti-DV legislation:

I would like to say what I felt while reviewing the [2006] amendment of

Special Act on the punishment of Domestic Violence Crimes. While

there are laws that affect most people, there are also laws that are

relevant to only some people in society. I think that this Act is the case

of the latter…Neither I nor anyone I know has seen such a situation

[domestic violence], I haven’t had anybody complaining about it so far

(Kim Dong Cheol, legislator, in the Minutes of the 5th legislation and

judiciary subcommittee, National Assembly, June 22, 2007, p.20). Italics

mine.

In this environment, one legislator who presented a reform proposal said that an emphasis

on children and home rather than women’s rights to life free from violence is a useful

framework to attract legislators’ attention to the issue.

In terms of appealing this matter strategically to the conservative men in

legislature and the administrative branch, the better option is to

emphasize that state intervention is needed to protect children and to

prevent the breakdown of family. If I am seeking the passage of a

reform of the Acts, I should do that. If we only talk about or repeat the

principle that this is a matter of women’s rights, it may cause a lot of

backlash and resistance. It should be remembered that emotion and

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sympathy play a role when they [legislators] make a decision. They are

people who are touched by emotional feelings. (Interview with Hong Mi

Young, legislator, August 23, 2006. Seoul)

Nonetheless, feminist activists and theorists have sought other ways to address

women’s issues, especially concerning rape, sexual harassment, pornography, and

battering. For one, they have used women’s collective image as victims in order to

emphasize women’s subordination to a gendered power hierarchy. Representing women as

victims seems an inevitable step for situating individual women’s suffering in the private

sphere within a broader context of mass social problems. In this context, to define a certain

phenomenon as a crime, the women’s movement also needed to construct the categories of

perpetrators and victims. This is because a crime is defined to the extent that it is relevant

to harm perpetrated on someone. The construction of woman as victim has been a common

strategy for addressing women’s issues in the context of crime and broader social problems

(Dunn 2005: 3).

Many feminist scholars have pointed out that victimization can have positive

political effects on the recognition and construction of social problems by promoting

social/societal solutions. Victimization can lead to an early victory that “facilitates

shortterm political gains” (Carolyn Sorisio 1997, 145); the political potential of

victimization is that it “makes powerful appeals for sympathy, solidarity, compassion, and

attention” (Schneider 2000: 75). In fact, in spite of the backlash provoked among

legislators concerned with “special group interests,” stressing women’s victimization also

played a considerable role in helping to make domestic violence a social problem in South

Korea. But, as was the case with the family preservation frame, the Korean women’s

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movement wound up in a cultural trap that prevented a deep, reasoned understanding of

the problem of domestic violence and of battered women.

Another problem that feminists are confronting is that sympathy for women’s

victimization, combined with institutionalization of the family protection frame, has led to

the construction of deserving and undeserving victims. State actors, counselors, and the

general public have constructed a stereotype of a battered women who deserves public

attention and support only when she is the perfect victim who faithfully performed her

duties as mother and wife. Even so, while the stereotype evokes emotions, it does not seem

that the tragedy of such a woman’s suffering is enough to encourage changes to the

established law and policy. One legislator expressed her frustration after attempting to

raise awareness of battered women’s suffering.

Why I organized a photo exhibition of battered women in the National

Assembly was to emphasize the need for protection of victims rather

than to link this to issues of feminism or women’s human rights. This is

the best way to avoid resistance. If battered women’s killing of the

husband is understood in the context of their intention to protect their

children, there might be very little resistance compared with that for

cases such as prostitution or abolition of family headship, affirmative

action, and women’s property rights. However, most male legislators

still are in line with the views held by the Ministry of Justice, that is, that

women should be patient and try to restore peace in their families.

Despite showing some sympathy for cases of domestic violence, most

legislators prefer stopgap measures rather than permanent solutions for

dealing with this problem. (Interview with Hong Mi Young, legislator,

August 23, 2006, Seoul)

As described earlier, media sensationalization of domestic violence cases was a direct

catalyst for drawing public attention and creating relevant laws at the very beginning of the

campaign. Dramatizing both domestic violence cases and battered women is still used by

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some feminists as a political tool to renew attention to the problem of domestic violence.

However, legislator Hong’s experience suggests that even extraordinary cases are unlikely

to have any impact in terms of influencing public policy.

When the case of middle-school girl69 occurred last year, we were all

shocked and deeply saddened by the tragedy. But when it comes to the

matter of reforming legislation, their [legislators] attitudes immediately

changed like “is it [legal intervention] really needed even in the home?”

“Does a couple really need to be separated or divorced just because of

such a problem?” “It is true that the case was so sad, but it should not

be related to the matter of legislative reform.” (Interview with Hong Mi

Young, legislator, August 23, 2006, Seoul)

The history and varied effects of sensationalizing victimization in South Korea

suggest that the politics of emotion may have different effects at different stages such as in

the beginning of a movement versus during the process of institutionalization. This also

suggests that attention should be paid to the ways in which the established discursive

opportunity structures operate to interpret the problem and to reconstruct the relevant

subjects as an effect of institutionalization.

The concept of vulnerable groups leads to other problems for women’s rights. The

White Paper on Police (2006) equates women with children in terms of social

disadvantage by categorizing domestic violence and sexual assault as crimes against

“vulnerable populations” in society. When the state assigns funds from the lottery to

support shelters and related programs, state actors clearly indicate that funds will support

victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, and of sex-trafficking and classify them as an

69 On April 15, 2005, a 14-year-old middle school girl killed her father while protecting her grandparents

from violence. Her father, a divorced alcoholic, had beaten both his parents and his daughter for years.

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“alienated class” in society. This constructs battered women not as deserving state

protection because they are citizens who have citizen rights, but because they are

vulnerable and marginalized class of people. If Korean activists want to revive the battered

women’s movement, it would be important to transform the discourse back to gender-

based violence and gender discrimination rather than playing on sympathy or pity to gain

access to resources. One of the original goals of the battered women’s movement was to

challenge the conventional ways that people think about wife beating. But their strategies

clearly have undermined feminist discursive politics and have produced some negative

effects: people recognize only severe cases as real domestic violence crimes and such a

particularization precludes the chance to address domestic violence as a universal issue

that affects all women.

Although some Korean feminist activists argue that women’s sufferings have not

been fully addressed yet, others have begun to speak out against the feminist politics of

victimization.

Of course, an emphasis on women’s agency makes it hard to gain

people’s sympathy and support. However, representing women only as

victims is problematic because it may prevent women from revealing

what they went through or from defending themselves. Also, the unified

image of battered women contributes to making people doubt women’s

credibility as survivors to violence if they do not fit into the stereotyped

image of battered women. We can see this point in the following story:

a nicely dressed survivor who visited a religious group to get financial

relief funds confused people who were there [because she didn’t fit their

image of a battered woman] (Jung Choun Sook. 2006. “Current issues

of Anti-DV as women’s movement.” Paper from symposium on Anti-DV

named “Rethinking Domestic Violence from the Perspective of Human

Rights,” held by KWH on May 11, 2006).

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An interview with another feminist advocate supports the idea that the hegemonic

discourse alienates and individualizes battered women and reinforces the idea that

domestic violence happens only to alienated women.

It seems that there is a misunderstanding. Most people see domestic

violence as a very unusual thing. They believe that this is a story about

unusual people. Battered women who visit our center want to know if

this happens to other women. Whenever I get this question, I say “Yes”

and go on to say that “this counseling center is here not only for you.” I

also say that this is a common matter in our region, it’s a national

problem, and it’s a global issue. But it is hard to make them understand

this. (Interview with Choi Sun Ae, director of Young-Kwang Women’s

Counseling Center,

Young-Kwang Women’s Hotline, September 9, 2006,

JaeChon)

Hegemonic discourse among politicians, the public and some agencies also disseminates

the belief that only a marginalized class of women suffers from domestic violence.

Feminist theorists point to the danger of making such a link between poverty and domestic

violence or perpetuating the idea that it is only poor women who experience domestic

violence; “not all women living in poverty are abused.” (Terry 2004: 470). Through

interviews and personal conversations, many Korean feminist advocates have confirmed

that women’s social status and occupation are not determinants of being beaten. According

to them, women are beaten because batterers decide to beat, a position long supported by

feminist research in other countries like the U.S.70

Of course, there may be many causes of domestic violence. But, the

point is that domestic violence depends on batterers. Violence itself

70 Constructing a marginalized class of women as a vulnerable group to domestic violence also leads

to the stigmatization of poor men. Consequently, domestic violence is defined as a social problem that is

related to social class rather than as a matter of unequal power between women and men.

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relies upon the person who wants to use it. Violence cannot stop unless

perpetrators change their attitudes and behavior. Victims’ efforts never

make any difference. (Interview with Lee Mi Hye, director of Women’s

Rights Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline, June 20, 2006,

Seoul)

Middle class women want to keep violence secret and they can do it

when they have money. They choose to cover up for perpetrators

because they want to pretend to manage a “happy home.” In such

conditions, perpetrators can more easily manipulate and control

women. They usually beat women’s heads because they know that a

bruise on the head is not noticeable… Violence has nothing to do with

women’s class, their level of education. If men want to beat, then

women are beaten…From the perspective of victims, they did not

choose to be victims. All depends on perpetrators. Perpetrators who

want to beat women also have nothing to do with the degree of wealth

or education. It can happen anytime. It is absolutely not true that

domestic violence occurs in a particular class and group. (Interview with

Choi Sun Ae, director of Young Kwang Women Counseling Center,

Young Kwang Women’s Hotline, September 9, 2006, JaeChon)

When feminists undermine the assumed link between poverty and domestic violence, they

are not saying that women’s social and economic status have nothing to do with women’s

victimization. In South Korea, women’s economic dependence on men is one of the

primary reasons that battered women stay in a violent relationship. And battering also can

contribute to impoverishment because of lack of choices.

Most women who decided to stay at shelters were at serious risk of

death. As a matter of fact, if they were my sisters or I was their mother, I

would have forced them to file for divorce. But, when they face the

moment of making a decision, most of them choose to return home

because of their children and economic problems. Especially, their

economic dependence on the husband is the main reason. If they had a

security fund, I am sure that many of them would choose to file for

divorce. But some would become poor as a result of violence. They

lose everything, including material and human resources. They are also

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in poor health and have no place to survive. So, ironically, they have to

return home. (Interview with Lee Mi Hye, director of Women’s Rights

Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline June 20, 2006, Seoul)

For some feminist activists, the state responsibility for women’s poverty should be

clarified. By failing to promote women’s opportunities and to stop male violence, the state

plays a role in shaping and maintaining women’s poverty and violence against women.

Categorizing domestic violence as the social problem related to only a particular

group of women effectively impedes the consideration and construction of the notion of

gender-based violence. The lack of a fundamental understanding of gender-based violence

generates false policy and spreads the wrong message about domestic violence.

One more example of a way that wife beating can be distorted by the state adds to

understanding of how the way that the problem is addressed reflects the social context. For

example, at the time that wife beating was addressed through a family preservation

framework in South Korea, U.S congressional hearings articulated gender-motivated

violence as a national problem because it “depletes the nation’s workforce” (Shargel

1999). This example shows that the social construction of the problem of wife beating

depends on a variety of political, economic, and cultural structures. It seems clear that

different understandings of the problem will lead to different strategies across women’s

movements.

Concluding Comments: Feminist Activism Preserved, Women’s Movement Trapped

In South Korea, a women’s movement was the main force in developing the antiDV

movement and eventually enacting the anti-DV laws through its continuous challenges and

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struggles. Feminist activists were at the center of the movement and expected that the

construction of the laws would herald a new age. As high as their expectation were,

disappointment was deeper when they confronted the institutional backlash that moved the

focus away from an understanding of gender and violence in a patriarchal society. As seen

above, institutional discursive power was strong enough to reconstruct and reinterpret the

issue. This reconstruction process has had a profound impact on feminist activists and the

battered women’s movement. Despite the successful construction of the law by the

movement, feminist leaders rightly feel that there is an unresolved need. Jung Choun Sook,

who played a leading role in the legislation movement and is now president of Seoul

Women’s Hotline, expressed her disappointment:

Nobody has been asking me “why did you make the law this way”?’ But

I have been feeling some responsibility and I have been asking myself,

“why has nothing been changed”?’ I dedicated to make this law and

have been continuously working to improve this movement for over 23

years and have been tirelessly providing services for victims. Why are

there no changes in domestic violence? (Interview with Jung Choun

Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

It is painful for feminist activists to see how the state has turned its back on them and how

the laws compare to what they know about the problem. Lee Moon Ja, who dedicated her

life to work for and with battered women since 1988, expressed serious concern over how

the power of authorities deprives newly empowered women of their courage and strength.

She met over two thousand battered women at a shelter where she lived with these women.

Women have changed. They know and say, “this is crime, bad behavior,

I should report it.” They wake up. But raised consciousness is not enough to

handle the violence they face. So, they want to report it to the police and they

want the state to do something for them. But soon they realize they can’t get

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what they need. So they are disappointed, frustrated, and give up. They don’t

want to use the law. It is really problematic, isn’t it? (Interview with Lee Moon

Ja, director of counseling center, KimPo Women’s Hotline, September 8.

2006, JaeChon)

Although feminist activists are disappointed and dissatisfied with the ways that

institutionalization has worked, they continue to believe that there are ways to deal with

this situation. While legislative and institutional agents spread the message that domestic

violence is being controlled and monitored because the state is producing statistical

evidence, feminist activists and advocates who directly work with battered women and

witness their sufferings see no significant changes. Because they are marginalized, they

cannot observe close up the institutional practices or contribute insight into the depth of

the problem.

Rather, the treatment of domestic violence is a symptom of other

problems. By seeing how our society treats this problem, I can see how

problematic our society is. I am working at a shelter. I am supposed to

meet women who come to stay at the shelter for the first time. Of

course, it is important to calculate how many domestic violence cases

there are in order to argue that this is a serious social problem. But, if

we dare imagine how horrible the suffering and fear are for a woman

who is facing them alone, we can immediately understand how very

serious the problem is. (Interview with Ko Mi Kyung, coordinator of

Women’s Rights Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline,

September 7, 2006, JaeChon)

The extended and profound insights that feminists working with battered women have and

their feminist perspectives are contributing to an agenda for future work. In particular, they

recognize that feminist practice has contributed to fragmentation of efforts and made it

difficult to get together and formulate a more comprehensive perspective, one that more

clearly articulates the concept of women’s human rights.

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I think that gender violence should be discussed within a broad

spectrum. But we [women’s movement] are divided into domestic

violence, sexual assault, trafficking in women. It makes it difficult for us

to get together. This is a very real problem that disturbs us. So what I

suggested was to make a comprehensive law, such as a “Women’s

Human Rights Act.” Most of them [feminist activists] agreed on it.

(Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-representative of Korea Women’s

Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

Social movements often focus on preserving their identity and values when they find

themselves in a hostile political climate. Research on this issue also points out that this

choice can be politically costly due to less involvement in the policy process (Sawyers and

Meyer 1999). This seems to be happening to the Korean battered women’s movement at

this time, though the Korean case also raises a question of whether an internal

consolidation strategy is a voluntary choice. After all feminist activists were marginalized

by the state. They also find themselves being isolated from civic organizations with which

they closely engaged and cooperated in the past. Both isolating trends need to be dealt with

if the activists are to re-enter the political realm and promote fundamental change.

In civil society, it is said that the “women’s movement already achieved

everything,” “all women’s issues are under control through

institutionalization,”’ “even the male headship system was abolished, is there

anything more to do?” (Interview with Ko Mi Kyung, general secretary, Korea

Women’s Hotline, July 12, 2006, Seoul)

Ironically, the idea of a successful resolution of women’s problems extends beyond the

country’s borders.

A U.N. report shows that we [South Korea] are doing well…Other

countries think that South Korea has developed the necessary systems

and resources…But if those are not in the right direction, the problem

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becomes more serious and scary. (Interview with Ko Mi Kyung, general

secretary, Korea Women’s Hotline, July 12, 2006, Seoul)

The KWH and its branch organizations continue as a progressive social force. They have

maintained political autonomy and members believe that this shows that it is premature to

conclude that the battered women’s movement has declined or failed. Rather, the political

conditions accompanying and following institutionalization forced them into temporary

abeyance as political actors and contributed to ongoing reflection and debate surrounding

how to proceed given the failure of the Acts and the state to effectively combat wife

beating. Ko Mi Kyung, general secretary of KWH, points out that internally the movement

is facing fragmentation from mainstream civil society. Externally, the government has

changed its position. It seems no longer interested in marginalizing KWH. Rather it is

trying to control the movement by seeming to invite feminists to participate in the policy

process. KimYu Eun Kyung explains that inviting their participation is not for building real

cooperation or genuine policy impacts. Instead, it is like a polite gesture.

In the name of civil-society centered governance, the government

contacts and invites us to meetings. But actually, they call us because

they have to. At meetings, what they [government] ask us is for “the

correct answer.” They [government] urge us to offer the solution to the

problem of DV. But how can we know “the correct answer?” (Interview

with KimYu Eun Kyung, head coordinator of international solidarity

program, Korea Women’s Hotline, June 23, 2006, Seoul).

Once their initial goal of anti-DV legislation was achieved, the ad hoc coalition was

dissolved, and women’s groups competed to obtain government projects. This weakened

the movement. Given subsequent decrease in their bargaining power, it can hardly be

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expected that women’s NGO would be in a position to be in a systemic dialogue with the

state to improve policies for women. Rather, organized women have become vulnerable to

these new, multiple demands from the government. One major problem is the different

ways in which organized women and government agencies define, measure, and evaluate

the problem of domestic violence.

As soon as the problem became part of the public agenda, state agencies emphasized

producing statistics and interpreting them. Feminist activists are not able to respond to

demands to provide statistics in order to legitimate their perspective on the problem. This

then provides a good excuse for government agencies to ignore them or to treat their

opinion as unsubstantiated complaints.

The most common question we get from the government is “what’s the

[statistical] basis of your argument?’” “Show evidence.”’ “How do you

know whether so many women want this or not?” “How can you prove

it?” That’s the way they treat us. (Interview with Heo Lan Young, head

coordinator of family policy program, Korea Women’s Hotline,

September 8, 2006, JaeChon)

These brief quotes reveal clearly that the new opportunities and invitations to join in

mainstream political discussions with representatives of the state do not signal that

activists or a revived women’s movement will have policy influence on women’s issues.

Rather, since the government monopolizes information and resources, activists’

participation serves to confirm and justify the position of the government on the issue of

domestic violence.

What I am saying is a confession. When we are having a discussion,

we have nothing to say... But they [government] keep talking. What I

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mean by we have nothing to say is, while we stick to principles,

justifications, morality, they display data and analysis. That simply ends

discussions or debates. (Interview with Ko Mi Kyung, general secretary,

Korea Women’s Hotline, May 3, 2006, Seoul)

There has been little research on violence against women. We know all

about it, we know what’s going on. But we can’t prove it. For example,

“the indictment suspension with consultation,” we know that measure is

useless. But the Ministry of Justice and Family Court have the ball.

Data is accessible only to them and they interpret it their way. Our

protests of their interpretation are not accepted. (Interview with Park Inn

Hea, co-representative of Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006,

Seoul)

What are South Korean activists to do given these circumstances? Some seem to

follow a strategy discussed by Walby (2002) and other feminist theorists. They are forging

new, systemic and wide ranging feminist networks that include feminist academics and

legal professionals (whose research and expertise are needed to counteract state statistics

and legal interpretations). The hope is that such networks will strengthen their bargaining

power with the state at the national level. This process will be facilitated and supported by

growing transnational networks, especially among Asian feminists. The critical issue in

relation to building solidarity both at the national and transnational levels concerns the role

that the women’s human rights framework can play. Once set aside in the interest of a

more culturally relevant frame, interviews have revealed that the issue of women’s rights

as human rights is gaining political momentum among feminists who hope that the

political context will be more responsive to their arguments than was possible in the

1990s.

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CHAPTER 7

CULTURAL ENTRAPMENT71 AND HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

Overview

This chapter discusses the dilemma that the Korean battered women’s movement

confronted and still confronts as they sought/seek to alter existing discourses and create

alternative perspectives on domestic violence. This chapter revisits the conundrum

feminists faced initially. They were well aware of the internationally preferred human

rights framework and it resonated with their own perspectives on the problem of domestic

violence, but they found it impossible to employ a human rights discourse for the anti-DV

campaign in South Korea in the 1990s. So they developed a more culturally and politically

relevant discourse based on the concept of family preservation. The fact that anti-DV Acts

were passed in 1997 was a genuinely revolutionary event in South

Korea at the time and for that reason the anti-DV movement is considered a success.

However, feminists’ celebration of successful passage of the anti-DV Acts was shortlived.

It was not long before they observed with dismay how the very frame of family

preservation was being expanded and applied in ways that defrauded the true spirit and

71 This concept of “cultural entrapment” was developed for this dissertation because, of all possible

options that I considered, it most closely reflects the way feminists interviewed talk about cultural pressures, their

search for culturally resonant frames, and the influence of Confucian values in the interviews.

197

intent of the Acts, which were to support battered women and end wife beating. The very

frame that led to success in passing legislation also led to cultural entrapment and

discourses that emphasize women’s reconciliation with abusive husbands and avoidance of

any significant punishment for abusers.

This chapter discusses feminists’ renewed mobilization to reform the legislation and

their attempts to identify a new conceptual frame more likely to lead to changes supportive

of women. On the one hand, as seen in several quotes in the preceding chapters, feminist

have attempted to reintroduce the concepts of women’s rights and of human rights into

reform campaigns. On the other, they have turned recently to a new culturally resonant

discourse that emphasizes the concept of “peace” in the nation and in the home.

Reflecting on the Past: Framing Revisited

When feminist activists sought to bring wife beating into the public agenda, their

ultimate goal was to end patriarchy’s hold on the most private space—the home. They

sought to do so through state sponsored legal and judicial services and by strengthening

women’s social status and rights. However, the cumulative experience of the Korean

women’s movement revealed how state engagement reinforced private patriarchy through

the state’s interpretation of legal discourses and criminal justice practices.

Upon confronting the distorted implementation and subversion of the law and the

risks that came with institutionalization, the immediate response on the part of feminist

activists was to intervene as they could in order to rescue their legal agenda. Some turned

to law enforcement personnel such as police officers and state agents like prosecutors who

are responsible for enforcing laws and regulations. Providing needed training for police

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officers was one strategy that feminists employed as a bottom up approach. Feminists also

advocated monitoring implementation of the Acts and follow up of cases; but these

strategies failed to achieve financial support or approval from state agencies.

Even as they pursued institutional reforms, Korean feminists focused on the

constitutive power of public patriarchy, which regrettably was legitimized and supported

by the culturally resonant framing employed by the anti-DV movement and the goal of

state intervention. They realized that there would be no substantial changes unless

fundamental questions were addressed, such as why does the state consider the problem to

be addressed adequately? But Korean feminist activists and theorists confronted another

issue based on their own understanding of the problem: how to deconstruct systemically-

linked power relations to create and disseminate a new perspective of gender-based

violence in Korean society? In response, feminists conducted and continue to conduct

meetings to reflect on the factors that contributed to the success of the anti-DV movement

and how success contributed to current dilemmas:

I still think that [the framing of family protection] was the best option

available to us at the time… What we regret is that we failed to

challenge patriarchy, the core of the problem. As we see it, because it is

an anti-domestic violence law, the term of domestic violence has come

to mean all other violence happening in the home, but not necessarily

wife abuse. You know, we are proud of our over twenty-four-year history

of the [anti-violence] movement. But we realize now how difficult it is to

disrupt the root cause of the problem, patriarchy. (Interview with Nam

Jee Hyang, head coordinator of media program, Korea Women’s

Hotline, July 13, 2006, Seoul)

The idea that the battered women’s movement failed to challenge patriarchy has lead

feminist activists to interrogate the ways in which the movement developed, how it was

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transformed, and the ways in which it succeeded. Reflecting on why they developed a

specific framing strategy helps feminists to identify the specific conditions and context

with which they engaged at the time. Given that passage of the anti-DV laws was the main

focus for all actors involved in the movement—including feminist activists, legislators, the

general public, and the media—feminist activists admit that the question of how to define

the problem could not be a matter of feminist philosophy or principles. Rather, primary

concerns were to attract attention from legislators and the public and successfully persuade

audiences to support legislation. Interviewees often use the term “revolutionary” to reflect

the practical and symbolic significance of passing such a law at the time.

Before the law, we always expected and believed that once the law was

established, it would mostly solve the problem of wife beating. In

leading and participating in a women’s movement to make social

change, the law was like an Oasis to us… That [framing of protection of

family] was a so-called inevitable choice [because of context]. Most

men were really afraid that the law would change everything. Making

that law [Anti-DV Acts] at the time was revolutionary. (Interview with Lee

Do Ock, president of DaeGu Women’s Hotline, May 30, 2006, DaeGu)

Deveaux (2006) states that “when women’s status and potential remedies for their

inequality are viewed in a vacuum, important contextual factors are neglected” (82). In the

same vein, women’s movements cannot be evaluated simplistically without culturally and

historically contingent understandings. This is to say that the focus should not be on

simply attributing a feminist framing strategy at the time as a failure or as a co-optation.

Rather, the focus should be on understanding the contexts that led to the development and

employment of the framing strategy. Only through such understanding can both feminist

activists and human rights theorists escape being stuck in the contemporary feminist

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debates over universalism and particularism (and cultural relativism). If the effectiveness

of the human rights framework is no longer simply regarded as a matter of choice, a new

cross-cultural theoretical project can be created. Such a project can explore complicated

processes that reflect contradictory needs for universal human rights within constrained

cultural and political contexts. Such a project would provide opportunities to examine the

variable implications of using the women’s human rights language both in local and

transnational settings.

Problem Revealed but Reality Remains the Same

The experience of the Korean battered women’s movement has revealed the

important role that framing plays in developing a successful social movement, that is, a

movement that achieves its objective. Simultaneously, the Korean case demonstrates how

a culturally resonant frame can continue to have an impact on producing and implementing

legal discourses and practices for years. Despite their pride in substantial achievements

such as making laws and influencing public policy and because of subversion of the intent

of the legislation, the Korean battered women’s movement is facing once again the

fundamental question of how to redress the problem of domestic violence. This time, they

have focused on domestic violence as a violation of women’s human rights. That is, the

framework of women’s human rights is being embraced as a possible tool to break the

impasse created by the culturally resonant framing of family preservation.

As Merry (2006a) has pointed out, even though questions remain regarding whether

using human rights is the most effective approach to diminishing VAW, this debate does

not necessarily mean that feminist activists in the local setting do not want to use or deny

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the validity of the human rights framework. Rather, as the case of Korea feminist activists

shows, there are circumstances under which the women’s human rights framework may

not make a meaningful difference at a specific point in time.

I think that using that rhetoric [preservation of the family] caused the

trouble we are going through now. We have always believed that DV is

a matter of women’s human rights. But for so-called political and

strategic reasons, we addressed the issue of domestic violence in the

context of women’s sufferings and women’s victimization in order to

motivate people’s participation and support. We could not say that “this

is a matter of women’s human rights,” “this is a matter of power and

control,” or “women’s human rights are so important.” The same still

applies today. (Interview with Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of

domestic violence prevention program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2,

2006, Seoul)

Even while still arguing that articulating wife beating as a matter of preservation of

the family was an inevitable choice, many Korean feminist activists and advocates now

point to this framing as the cause of the contemporary problems that quickly emerged after

the successful institutionalization of domestic violence. They believe that the movement

can learn from the past and share this experience for the future. This ambivalence toward

the previous feminist framing strategy allows feminist activists to reflect on their situated

locations and to look for alternative framings to redress the still unsolved problem. In this

respect, Korean feminist activists have started to actively employ the idea of human rights

to challenge the existing conservative legal discourse of violence against women and to

deal with anti-feminist backlash coming from the argument that gender equality has been

achieved already because of legislative reforms.

Feminists first attempted to implement a women’s human rights frame beginning with a

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2004 campaign to reform the established anti-domestic violence Acts.

When we worked on reform drafts, we started talking about inserting

human rights into the statements of purpose of the Acts. And we also

discussed the reasons for changing some details and words. Our

understanding was that the purpose is really important because it

identifies the whole system and practices, so we have to change it.

Absolutely, we were concerned with whether the reforms to the Acts

could be passed and we worried about it. But, we decided to maintain

our identity as feminists. So we went for it. (Interview with KimYu Eun

Kyung, head coordinator of international solidarity program, Korea

Women’s Hotline, June 23, 2006, Seoul)

Frustrated by the fact that the purposes of the Prevention Act had backfired and

implementation was weak, underfunded and not based on feminist principles, Korean

feminists initiated a new, legislative reform movement in 2004. They focused on

transforming the original purpose of the Act from “in order to nurture and promote healthy

families” to “protect women’s human rights.”72

The first public hearing was held on October 28, 2004 with the title of “From

protecting and preserving the family system to protecting and strengthening victims’

human rights.” The goals were to shift the focus of the Acts to protecting women and

applying appropriate punishment of perpetrators. Feminists introduced a suggested draft

for amending the Acts including erasure of the concept of “fostering healthy families”

and replacing the concept of “family protection case” with that of “domestic violence

special criminal case” for prosecution. The draft also included a mandatory arrest policy

72 In 2002, government actors introduced a successful proposal to amend the purpose of the Punishment

Act, adding “and to protect human rights of victims and family members.” This action followed on two

governmental changes that took place in 2001—establishment of the Ministry of Gender Equality and

establishment of Korea’s National Human Rights Commission. However, they did not change the stipulated

purpose of “to recover peace and stability for families affected by domestic violence and to nurture healthy

families.” This remained intact.

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that would clearly criminalize DV. Following 11 public hearings, KWH revised the final

draft in 2005. Hong Mi Young, a legislator, proposed the legislative reforms with backing

from 87 legislators in June 2005. In the meantime, KWH members visited the Ministry of

Justice, National Police Agency, Ministry of Gender Equality, and the National Assembly

to discuss the proposed changes. They also hosted a symposium and a photo exhibit of

battered women at the National Assembly.

The proposed reform of the Prevention act was passed in April 28, 2006 and the

concept of fostering healthy families was removed. The purpose was changed to “prevent

domestic violence and protect and support victims of domestic violence” (but still with no

reference to women’s human rights).

What happened in the case of the Punishment of Act, which was to play a more

important role in raising public awareness and supporting battered women, was

disappointing. Instead of removing the very conservative sentences that had allowed

subversion of punishment, the phrase “to protect human rights of victims and family

members” had been added in 2002. As a result, the Punishment Act has a long and

ambiguous objective: “to recover peace and stability for families affected by domestic

violence and to nurture healthy families” and, simultaneously, “protect human rights of

victims and family members.” In August 2007 another amendment was made, but not that

demanded by feminist activists. The amendment to the Punishment Act that finally passed

on July 2, 2007 did not remove the objectionable references to peace and stability in

families and healthy families. It also did not include a mandatory arrest policy. Rather, it

strengthened leniency toward perpetrators by making it easier for prosecutors to suspend

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indictments “with consultation.” (Consultation would be with one of the many unregulated

batterer counseling programs.) KWH activists organized a protest of the “backward

reform” for continued decriminalization of domestic violence; the protest was held in front

of the National Assembly on July 5, 2007.

Through her analysis of internal documents at the public prosecutor’s office, Lee

(2006) concluded that this system is designed to “restore peace in family and preserve

family” by correcting perpetrator’s behavior and resolving marital conflict, rather than

punishing batterers. Superficially, this system seems to meet the requirement of

“rehabilitation” that is regarded by the state as one appropriate way to deal with domestic

violence. However, the public prosecutor’s office’s internal guidelines indicate that this

system also is expected to prevent perpetrators’ seeking of revenge against their wives by

placing perpetrators in counseling programs instead of imprisoning them or applying fines

(Lee 2006: 173). Under these guidelines, it is very clear that “protection of women” does

not mean to provide resources and support to help women be free from violence. Instead,

appeasing men’s anger against women who report DV to police is the priority

consideration and contributes to restoring the couple relationship. The internal document

raises very serious doubts that the criminal justice system has any understanding of the

nature of domestic violence. It also confirms an institutional intent to regulate the problem

in a way that reaffirms patriarchal power.

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Human Rights as a Contested and Confusing Concept

Although the institutionalization of DV is still considered an important achievement

for the Korean women’s movement, it also has contributed to a crisis for, more

specifically, the battered women’s movement, which has sought to change conventional

attitudes and practices regarding wife beating. This experience has led to feminists

understanding that while institutionalization may have been a necessary step to bring

gender issues into the public arena, it also contributed to state distortion of the nature of

the problem and to the reintroduction of dominant norms and patriarchal practices that

reaffirm DV as a family issue. With the realization that the political framing of protection

of the family now is used to justify non-prosecution of domestic violence, Korean feminist

activists have attempted to change this discourse by adopting women’s human rights

violations as a frame to address domestic violence. But the human rights frame has not

been as successful in motivating fellow citizens or to transforming the discourse on

domestic violence. As they learned through the 2006 and 2007 amendments of the Acts, it

does not seem that the now publicly familiar human rights discourse can replace the

framing of family protection.

Resistance is really extreme. When we use our motto the “women’s

human rights movement is love, please be our supporters” in order to

recruit benefactors, we face people’s rejection of the concepts of

“women’s rights” and “human rights.” We are told “why don’t use the

term of ‘making peaceful families’ rather than ‘rights,’ then we would be

willing to help because you are women who work for families.”

(Interview with Lee Do Ock, president of DaeGu Women’s Hotline, May

30, 2006, DaeGu)

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While feminist activists experience this rejection of the notion of “women’s rights” on the one

hand, they also observe a different use of the term of “human rights” on the other. “What

about men’s human rights? What about perpetrators’ human rights?” People always

talk about this. As [the concept of] human rights circulates and becomes widespread,

people try to twist human rights to fit other issues. For example, smokers talk about

their human rights to smoke. Of course, human rights are not a fixed thing. We

should be open to many possible meanings of that [human rights]. But, now, it is

really misused. According to the trend, everything is about human rights, everything

should be respected. (Interview with KimYu Eun Kyung, head coordinator of

international solidarity program, Korea Women’s Hotline, June 23, 2006, Seoul)

Cho Young Sook, one of the Korean women’s movement’s leaders, also complains

that the concept of human rights is overused, underdefined, and mistreated, even among

civil society organizations:

That term is too often misused. It is totally contaminated. For example,

people talk about disabled men’s sexual rights to buy prostitutes in the

name of human rights. This happens not just at an individual level.

Even human rights groups [do it]. Chaos and confusion abound…Now it

is very hard to differentiate the real [rights] from the fake. There are just

people and groups that do not feel any responsibility for the fact that

such an application distorts the meaning of human rights. And some

already are involved in the human rights movements. (Interview with

Cho Young Sook, director of Center for Women’s Human Rights, August

17, 2006, Seoul)

The circulation and growing awareness of the human rights concept is due in part to

the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission. In the wake of the World

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Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, which made recommendations to

establish national human rights institutions, Korean NGOs called for such a commission

by the government. Finally, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea was

established in 2001. The Commission identifies its purpose as follows:

…As a national advocacy institution for human rights protection, it is

committed to the fulfillment of human rights in a broader sense,

including the dignity, value and freedom of every human being, as

signified in international human rights conventions and treaties to which

Korea is a signatory (NHRC’s Website).

One of the NHRC missions is to “determine human rights violations and make policy

recommendations in accordance with the principles set forth in the Constitution,

international law and international customary law.” Because of this, the NHRC in South

Korea opened the possibility for enhancing women’s human rights. Although NHRC uses

a gender-neutral term to describe its main tasks, one of its top ten priorities includes

immigrant women’s human rights: “to improve human rights of foreign spouses married to

Koreans and foreign workers.”

As of June 23, 2005, the NHRC took over gender discrimination and sexual

harassment-related issues from the Committee for Promoting Gender Equality at the

Ministry of Gender Equality. This constituted an official declaration that gender

discrimination is a women’s human rights violation. However, it does not seem that the

NHRC in South Korea has accepted domestic violence as a women’s human rights

violation that is based on gender discrimination and inequality. Its web-magazine, Human

Rights, reported that gender discrimination issues come under the control of NHRC. But

there was no mention of violence against women, even though the NHRC included a broad

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focus on “women with disabilities,” “woman inmates,” “people of mixed race on

American military bases,” and “sexual assault in the military” (Human Rights, July 2005,

online).

This seems ironic since international conventions clearly include violence against

women as a human rights issue and South Korea is a signatory of the human rights

convention. With regard to the political implications of the notion of human rights, Bunch

(1999) argues that the framework of women’s human rights can be useful both to “lobby

for legislative and policy change” and to “provide an important tool for grassroots

organizing” (vii). She goes on to say that “the women’s human rights movement has

utilized human rights approaches to strengthen local mobilization efforts and to advance

local objectives” (138). Similarly, Steans (2007) points to human rights as a potentially

effective tool for women activists because it can hold their governments accountable for

their lack of implementation of international human rights norms that they ratified.

However, it is still unclear whether and under what circumstances the theoretical, political,

and juridical correctness of a women’s human rights discourse has a powerful impact on

states and political parties in the local context. The question of whether and how a human

rights idea may induce social change to benefit women is valued. More research is needed

on cases where the introduction of a certain notion or ratification of international treaties

per se do not automatically guarantee full understanding or suggest implementation. Shin

Youn Sook’s experience with the Ministry of Justice over the death of a female inmate

illustrates how the Korean state lacks a full understanding of women’s human rights.

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Do you remember the sexual assault against a female prisoner by a

prison officer?73 That crime was addressed as a women’s human rights

issue, but we [KWH] were not able to be involved in the case because

we were not identified as a women’s human rights group; this was

based on the fact that KWH focuses on domestic violence! That’s the

view of the Ministry of Justice. We have identified ourselves as a

women’s human rights organization for a long time. In our society,

however, because the concept of human rights has mostly referred to

matters related to prisons and the military, women’s human rights is a

still unfamiliar notion. Needless to say, the [non feminist] human rights

groups hardly ever define gender issues as a women’s human rights

issue. (Interview with Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of domestic

violence prevention program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2, 2006,

Seoul)

Because the South Korean state and human rights groups establish no link between

domestic violence and gender-based violence, Korean feminists continue to face

conceptual obstacles as they try to take advantage of “human rights language and

techniques” (see Merry 2006a, 38). By now it should be clear that this does not mean that

the term of human rights is new and that there is no understanding of human rights in

Korean society. What it does mean is that understanding at the local level has excluded

women’s human rights.

Uma Narayan (2000) has pointed out usefully that terms such as “equality” and

“human rights” frequently have been attacked as products of imperialism that co-existed

with imperialist practices and anti-colonial struggles (and not just because they also have

been seen as “Western values”). According to Narayan, while denial of equality and

human rights to minority groups existed widely within Western countries, both terms also

played an important role for criticizing and challenging colonialism within non-Western

73 A female intimate was sexually abused by a male prison officer during the process of reviewing a

conditional release application on February 1, 2006. After nineteen days, she attempted a suicide, remained

unconsciousness for 20 days, and unfortunately died on March 11, 2006.

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contexts (91). This seems relevant to the Korean setting. Based on a similar historical

trajectory with Japanese colonialism, division of the country into North and South, and

military authoritarian regimes, the term human rights has been widely circulated, used, and

recognized in South Korean society. However, it continues to be conceptualized primarily

as violations by the state and its agencies. This perspective explains why the

Ministry of Justice could acknowledge that the above case may be a human rights issue.

But the Ministry did not agree that the Korea Women’s Hotline was entitled to be involved

in the issue because KWH is not a human rights group due to its main focus on domestic

violence (implying a rejection of DV as a human rights violation). This confirms feminists’

earlier understanding that human rights discourse has zero resonance with the issue of

domestic violence in South Korea.

Women’s Human Rights: A Concept in Progress

Progressive Korean feminist activists continue to play a leading role both in the

attempt to promote women’s human rights within Korean society and in efforts to transfer

global women’s human rights discourse into a national discourse. Korea Women’s

Hotline has been at the forefront of the women’s human rights movement. In the early

1990s, KWH articulated violence against women in terms of women’s human rights and

activists of KWH started participating in international meetings. In the wake of the 50th

anniversary of the U.N. declaration on human rights in 1998, the Korea Women’s Hotline

and the Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI) jointly held a symposium on

women’s human rights. Participating in this symposium were law professors, lawyers,

feminist activists, researchers from KWDI, and Committee members of the Convention on

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the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). At the

symposium, women’s human rights were addressed in relation to discrimination, violence,

CEDAW, and government-civil society cooperation building. In 1999, KWH published a

book titled History of the Women’s Human Rights Movement in South Korea which traces

in detail the history of the Korean women’s human rights movements on sexual/domestic

violence, Japanese comfort women, sex trafficking and prostitution, lesbian rights, and

women with disabilities.

Shin Hei Soo, who was one of the key leaders of KWH (president from 1995-1999

and standing representative from 2000-2002) and who has worked as a member of the

Committee on CEDAW since 2001 (vice-chair of the U.N. Committee on CEDAW from

2003-2004), has contributed to building a bridge between Korean women’s issues and

international organizations and networks. However, as Shin points out in the preface of the

book on History of the Women’s Human Rights Movement in South Korea, “the apparent

lack of theoretical research or data on women’s human rights as well as the

underdeveloped notion itself” (8) seem an obstacle to applying the framework of human

rights for realizing women’s equality. Furthermore, establishing a theoretical link between

domestic violence and human rights is a recent and rare attempt.

In South Korea, most existing studies on DV have been produced through the

perspectives of law, welfare, psychology, Christian religion, and medical fields. It is safe to

say that theorizing domestic violence through the notion of human rights is a new field of

study. There are a few theoretical articles addressing DV within the human rights

framework. These include Kim Hye Young (2003), “Familism and Women’s Rights in

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Korea;” Lee Keum Ok (2006), “A Discussion In the U.S on Domestic Violence as Human

Rights;” and Yang Hyun Ah (2006), “Critical Examination of Domestic Violence: Based

on the Notion of Gender Based Violence.”76

76Recently, some theorists also have started pointing out problematic consequences of state responses to

domestic violence. They include Park Young Ran (2007), “Changing Needs of the Victims of Domestic

Violence and the Paradigm Shift of Victim Protection Policy from a Feminist Perspective;” Chang Hee Suk

(2007),“The Effects of Legal Intervention on offenders in Domestic Violence -Focusing on Wife Batterers

Who Received Legal Sentences;” Park Mi Eun (2007), “Prevalence and Characteristics of Client-

Perpetrated Violence toward the Domestic and Sexual Violence Centers Workers.”

Given the popularity and prevalence of the concept of human rights both locally and

globally, the idea of women’s human rights appealed to progressive feminist activists who

enthusiastically adopted it for their discussions and work. However, as argued above, it has

not played a role in empowering and protecting women in Korean society. This disparity

clearly shows that endorsing and adopting international human rights treaties does not

automatically produce emancipatory effects for women even when those treaties explicitly

include women. However, two important factors should be considered. First, this situation

does not mean that women activists in the local settings are reluctant to adopt or use

human rights language. Second, the lack of resonance can be an opportunity to provide

insightful feedback on local realities that can contribute to a more crosscultural human

rights perspective in international human rights norms. Studies such as this dissertation can

provide such feedback.

In an interview, Park Inn Hea, co-representative of KWH, pointed out that although

the Korean women’s movement has been in line with the international trend of adopting

the term of women’s human rights, there has been no specific research on how the

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women’s human rights framework can be a useful tool for empowering women in diverse

settings:

As a matter of fact, there is no agreement regarding what women’s

human rights refers to, even among civil society [organizations]… In

relation to that term, we [women’s movement] need to critically reflect

on the process of adopting a human rights-based approach. Actually,

we blindly accepted that term after the Beijing Conference. Namely,

“let’s call ourselves a women’s human rights group and let’s name what

we are doing as promoting women’s human rights.” We just did that

because the term sounded great. We didn’t have time to think about

what the term means or why what we were doing could be a matter of

women’s human rights. (Interview with Park Inn Hea, co-representative

of Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

In a KWH internal meeting with presidents and senior activists of its 26 national branches,

Park expressed the same concern by raising the question of how the progressive women’s

movement could consolidate its identity and power through the notion of human rights.

The term of human rights is very comprehensive and multi-layered. We

are using the term much more than any other organization or group. But, we

have not had focused discussions about it, and then we failed to accumulate

possible meanings of the term. Identity is political. But, for any political

position whether conservative, progressive, men, or women, the term of

human rights has an important value (Park Inn Hea. 2006. “Current status

and problems of Korean women’s movement,” in the Minutes from KWH’s

2006 Policy Forum, an internal meeting of officials from KWH branches and

main office, p.5).

Following self-reflection and evaluation of their own work, the Korean battered

women’s movement is attempting to revive the anti-DV movement and the issue of DV

itself in Korean society. At the time this dissertation was written, the notion of women’s

human rights lies at the heart of this project. For example, in 2006 on the occasion of the

8th anniversary of the implementation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Acts in South Korea,

KWH held series of public forums seeking to introduce a new approach to domestic

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violence. The first meeting was held on the topic of “Rethinking Domestic Violence from

the Perspective of Women’s Human Rights.” At that meeting, Korean feminist activists

reaffirmed the principle that domestic violence should be addressed based on an analysis

of the power relations of gender and the concept of women’s human rights.

Now that experience has revealed that the culturally resonant framing Korean

feminists promoted might be part of the problem, it is necessary to find an alternative,

universally acceptable and transferable method. If the ineffectiveness of a human rights

paradigm is caused primarily because of a gap between theoretical discussions and

practical activism, it would be important to consider the ways in which the human rights

framework is and has been viewed and interpreted contextually.

When seeking a reformulation of the women’s human rights framework for a

specific cultural context, a battered women’s movement needs to be aware of the ways in

which cultural power is exerted. But the movement also should avoid oversimplistic

thinking. As the Korean case shows, replacing the framework of the preservation of the

family with the discourse of human rights is being considered as a potentially necessary

step for readdressing the problem. Perhaps in Korean society where women are expected

to assume responsibility for taking care of husbands, children, the elderly, the weak, and

the disabled, it would be naïve to believe that a human rights concept can challenge

existing power relations based on patriarchal assumptions about women. However, there

are many reasons to think more deeply about the issue other than simply blaming cultural

expectations for women’s roles. A consideration of current debates among transnational

feminists sheds light on this.

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Based on principles of liberalism, the approach of the global women’s human rights

movement, headed by Western feminists, has aimed to paralyze cultural defenses that

justify women’s subordination and oppression and they argue that culture is the problem.

But non-Western feminists have pointed to the historical, colonial perspective that also

excessively blamed cultures and traditions for women’s victimization in order to justify

colonial intervention. Many non-Western feminists argue that blaming cultures is

problematic because it is based on a dichotomy of civilized and uncivilized societies74 that

constructs non-Western women as helpless, childlike, and incompetent to defend

themselves.78 However, these critiques pay little attention to another consequence of

constructing non-Western cultures in an extreme way without in-depth knowledge or

understanding of contextual realities. When only the most exotic cases are held up to

signify cultural oppression, this can prevent both Western and non-Western women from

recognizing or being sensitive to the cultural power that they also confront. For example,

Korean society in general shudders with horror at stories about female genital cutting, sati,

and dowry deaths from abroad, while remaining unaware of the horrible and deadly

situations that Korean women confront from brutal violence that takes place in their own

homes. As long as citizens fail to perceive and understand this invisible cultural power of

Confucian patriarchal ideology and its silent operation, violence against women will never

be resolved through any frame, legislation, or policy change. The Korean context has

demonstrated very well how the presence of legislation, state women’s machinery, and

state policy can be subverted, counterproductive, and delay eliminating violence against

74 “Uncivilized” societies are considered so because they differ from so-called civilized societies. The

most

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women. Lee Mi Hye’s experience as a feminist advocate and counselor shows how culture

is deeply involved and intervenes in the operation of human rights.

There is a limitation for our society to admit the fact that domestic

violence is a matter of women’s human rights. Survivors themselves

can’t say it either. Survivors who killed father or husband often deny the

fact that they are victims because they usually are full of great guilty.

They isolate themselves. They do not want to meet anyone because

they regard themselves as immoral criminals and their feeling of guilt is

deeper than that of other criminals. If they get our emails or letters

expressing our full

“exotic” features of so-called uncivilized societies are emphasized over the many similarities between the two.

support, then they begin to understand how this might have happened.

We say “I would do the same thing if I were you” or “I am in the same

situation and am eager to do what you did. I understand you.” Through

this kind of communication, they gradually begin to open up with us.

And they find legitimacy for their behavior. Afterwards, they come to

accept the fact that they are also victims. Once they realize that they

are victims, they are able to escape from the great feelings of guilt.

Seeing their recovery processes, I realized that this is a matter of

women’s human rights. Yes, this is theoretically correct. But because of

our [Korean society’s] traditional thinking that is family-centered and

relation-centered, we are different from Western [societies] such as the

U.S.A. It is difficult for us to separate me from you. So, if we say that it

is a matter of human rights, I don’t think that will persuade people. So

we need a different strategy. Violence is crime could be the strategy. …

I expect that it would be natural to say that society would see DV in

such a way someday. This is what we hope. (Interview with Lee Mi Hye,

director of Women’s Rights Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline,

June 20, 2006, Seoul)

International Factors and Changed Circumstances

The consequences and effects identified for state engagement and institutionalization

of the DV issue have helped feminist activists to reflect on the situations in which they are

located. Thus, unlike their earlier expectations that the presence of the MGEF and the

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passage of a series of gender-related legislation would contribute to resolving women’s

problems, feminists are now keenly aware that that those features were counterproductive.

Yes, because of the battered women’s movement, political institutions responded by

making laws and public policy. But they did so in ways that allowed them to undermine

the movement’s fundamental goals of combating domestic violence and helping battered

women.

Systemic response to women’s movements remain a crucial step for achieving

gender equality, but Korean feminists now realize that it is not a transparent process and

that they must always be on guard. The visibility and formality of state response to antiDV

demands made the public think that the movement achieved all that it originally proposed.

This combined with unchanged traditional norms that confine women to the private sphere

and the absence of an awareness that women are citizens who deserve citizen rights. So,

both the state and the public now regard achievements and goals of the women’s

movement as “extra protections” or even unwarranted “advantage” for women.

This creates adverse circumstances for the contemporary struggle for legal reform.

Recently, the circumstances under which the women’s movement

operates has changed. After the abolition of the family headship

system,75 the KWH officially began to mention divorce [as an option]

and to demand serious punishment in handling domestic violence

cases. We need to analyze to what extent circumstances have changed

in terms of how the women’s movement is viewed [by politicians and

the public]. In the past, there was at least an atmosphere that was

75 Under the Hojuje [the family headship/register system], family headship must pass to male

descendants only. In some cases, an infant becomes the family head instead of his mother. It means that the

law sanctions male authority over the rest of family members. It has long been blamed for discrimination

against women and for facilitating male preference. The abolishment of Hojuje was part of the U.N.’s

recommendations in 1999 and 2001. Following energetic lobbying by members of the women’s movement, it

was eliminated on March 2, 2005. The first attempt to scrap hojuje took place in 1953.

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willing to listen to agendas that the women’s movement raised and

accepted some gender issues as undeniable problems. However, there

are new, growing opposition groups, and media support also has

weakened. Then, after passage of the anti-prostitution law, there was

even more of an anti-women’s movement attitude. Although people

pretend to agree with [our goals], they are really opposed in their minds.

So, the key question is whether the women’s movement can bridge this

gap or not. (Interview with NamYoon In Soon, standing-representative

of Korea Women’s Association United, May 10, 2006, Seoul)

Another immediate task faced by contemporary Korean feminists is to identify

forces and conditions that could help them overcome both the backlash and the crisis

following institutionalization (subversion of the Acts and public impression that problems

have been solved). Feminists could return to their prior strategy of looking for ways that

external variables can contribute to addressing the problem of domestic violence in South

Korea.

For the construction of anti-DV laws and relevant policies, international influence

was one of the key elements that feminists used. When feminist activists claimed there was

a need to enact anti-DV laws, they managed to get the attention of conservative legislators

by emphasizing the fact that there were good laws against violence against women in

developed Western societies such as the U.S., England, and Germany. They also

highlighted the case of a developing Southeast Asian country with a similar law. By

comparing South Korea with other countries—both so-called “advanced Western” and

nearby “developing”—feminist activists stimulated a nationalist response among

legislators: South Korea should enact the anti-DV legislation to be more like “advanced”

countries and not fall behind even less developed countries. This played on legislators’

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desire to keep up with international trends. In effect, Korean feminist activists developed a

“discourse of civilization” that played a role in justifying the need for anti-DV legislation.

The emphasis on the fact that many foreign countries already enacted

anti-DV legislation was helpful especially to persuade legislators. It was

helpful to let them know that developed countries …had passed

relevant laws to eliminate violence against women. It was also useful to

mention the Vienna conference in 1993 and the international women’s

movement against violence against women. We emphasized that this is

an international issue and that there are many women’s NGOs out

there struggling against violence against women. I can’t remember

even the name of the country, a small one in Southeast Asia, that we

brought up. We said that it was shameful not to have such a law when

even this small and poor country already had one. (Interview with Jung

Choun Sook, president of Seoul Women’s Hotline, April 5, 2006, Seoul)

This discourse on international norms combined with the coalition mobilized

because of the women’s movement’s favorable relations with civic organizations and

groups. Since many civic groups (i.e., democracy groups) had ample public support and

trust, this translated into great influence over legislators who wanted to gain support from

voters. Nonetheless, civic groups also have become a problem for contemporary anti-DV

mobilizing. Most seem to share the perspective that the women’s movement accomplished

its goals with the Acts and institutionalization. At the same time, their influence as a

progressive force is not as powerful or persuasive as it was in the 1990s.

One legislator who was a civil society activist previously, Hong Mi Young, stated:

Civic organizations are not as influential they were before. In the past,

there was a clear-cut division: democratic vs. anti-democratic. Civic

groups gained broad and strong public support and they formed a

powerful and healthy political force. But circumstances changed and

their role in confrontation has dissolved. Civic activists have entered the

government and political parties. Neither the public nor political parties

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think that civic groups or organizations are neutral or independent any

more. (Interview with Hong Mi Young, legislator, August 23, 2006,

Seoul)

As one of the legislators who initiated the amendments to the anti-DV laws, she was

aware that emotional appeal is still a useful political strategy to address the problem of

domestic violence. Legislator Hong tried to redirect the problem by using a global

discourse and she found that employing references to global norms can be politically

attractive strategy.

I tried to convey two messages during an interpellation session. One

thing was to put pressure on the Prime Minister to take care of the issue

of domestic violence at the level of the state, because I realized that

this problem cannot be resolved only by the Ministry of Gender Equality

and Family. The other thing was to help other legislators fully appreciate

the problem of domestic violence. I do not think that patriarchal culture

or their traditional perspectives can change in a day. But what I tried

was to let fellow legislators know that my statement was based on

substantial data and reflected a global concern and not any sentimental

or blind defense of women. In that respect, I mentioned “global norms”

and “recommendation of the U.N.,” and I argued that legal reforms

should satisfy the global standard. After the session, some legislators

came to me and said that they were impressed. I realized that what I

said was understood as an “objective approach” and “rational demand”

whether or not they agreed with the proposed amendment. (Interview

with Hong Mi Young, legislator, August 23, 2006, Seoul)76

If in fact a so-called “global standard” would be interpreted as “objective” and

“rational” and given serious consideration by Korean legislators, it might be an alternative

to overcome the limits of previous feminist strategies. These include strategies that

emphasized women’s victimization (vulnerability and need for protection) or tried to

76 It was Hong Mi Young who introduced the proposed amendments in 2005, leading to changes in the

Prevention Act in 2006, but not to requested changes in the Punishment Act.

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introduce notions of women’s citizen and human rights when there still was no such

concept in South Korean culture or law.

Legislator Hong’s experience also has implications for using the transnational human

rights framework. The framework intersects with the discourse on a global standard.

Korean feminists can learn a precious lesson from the global women’s human rights

movement. Rather than giving up the concept of human rights, which reflected men’s

rights, feminist theorists and activists in many cultural settings have reinterpreted and

reemployed the concept in ways that reflect women’s reality, concerns, and problems. In

some ways, their experience is similar to strategies employed by Korean feminists when

addressing specific problems and reforms. Nonetheless, whether or not and how to use a

human rights framework will depend on how Korean feminists decide to connect with the

transnational feminist movement and whether feminists decide to use

globallyrecommended discourses and techniques in their situated context.

Another issue facing South Korean feminists is the question of why the South

Korean states—or any state for that matter—became involved in the issue of domestic

violence. If legislators and other government actors were so resistant to the underlying

goal of helping battered women, what was the real reason they actually passed the

legislation? Feminists need not only to identify the factors that arouse state responses, but

how political and social forces can be used to facilitate appropriate state responses.

In their attempt to answer this question, Hawkins and Humes (2002) point out that

both an autonomous women’s movement and international socialization have played key

roles in drawing attention to the issue of domestic violence around the globe. Rather than

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seeing these factors as independent variables, they have conceptualized a “two-stage

model of norm diffusion,” which suggests continuous and associated effects of both

factors. They argue that “domestic women’s movements have more influence at an early

stage, and international socialization has a greater effect at a later stage” (232). This theory

may be relevant to understanding the difference between the early impact of the Korean

battered women’s movement that put pressures on the state in the 1990s. It certainly fits

what Legislator Hong describes regarding the attention generated among conservative

legislators when confronted with global standards. For the Korean women’s movement,

this theory would be relevant to strategizing about how to gain more practical responses

from the state through some type of international socialization.

There are precedents in the South Korean case that suggest Korean feminists are

open to such strategizing. The Korean women’s movement has benefited from contact with

various international movements. The 1993 Vienna Conference and the 1995 Beijing

Conference helped Korean feminist activists conceptualize the notion of “gender

mainstreaming” (institutionalization) and to strategize about violence against women

(VAW) issues. Furthermore, the Korean government officially committed to improve

women’s rights when they ratified CEDAW in 1984. Nonetheless, the experience of

CEDAW reveals that it takes more than ratification to achieve implementation.

The primary goal of CEDAW is to construct cultural understanding about women’s

rights through transnational legitimacy (Merry 2003; Lazarus-Black and Merry 2003), but

no important messages about women’s rights were conveyed in South Korea following

ratification. And CEDAW per se is still unfamiliar to most South Koreans. In First

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CEDAW Impact Study, Cho (2000) points out that this is partly because women’s NGOs

had no opportunity to publicize CEDAW during the militaristic and authoritarian regime of

the time. In addition to lack of publicity, there was little cooperation between NGOs and

the government at the time. As a result, the government failed to provide information to

women’s NGOs.

Because the government prepared and submitted periodic reports to the international

CEDAW Committee without any consultation with women’s NGOs, Korean feminist

activists who were supported by the United Nations Development Fund for Women

(UNIFEM) and the International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) wrote and

submitted a “Shadow Report” (1998) contradicting the highly positive situation described

by government reports. The NGOs’ growing concerns about CEDAW implementation and

their “Shadow Report” with support by international organizations led the government to

invite women activists to discussions. In 1998 (one year after antiDV Acts were passed),

for the first time the government included seven representatives from women’s NGOs in

their review meeting for the 4th report. On July 31, 2007, the fifth and sixth periodic

reports submitted by South Korea were reviewed in New York by CEDAW committee

members, who also invited representatives from Korean NGOs to join them in New York

to discuss the government report. Under the leadership of the

KWAU and Lawyers for Democratic Society, NGOs once again submitted a “Shadow

Report.”

While commending the country’s efforts to enact or revise laws, the CEDAW

Committee’s concluding remarks expressed concerns about gaps between de jure and de

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facto equality. In the area of violence against women, the Committee pointed to low rates

of reporting, prosecution, and conviction. The Committee urged the Korean government to

address VAW as a violation of women’s human rights and to use the Committee’s general

recommendation No. 19.77 The Committee also pointed out that South Korean courts rarely

invoked CEDAW and that lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and women have little knowledge

of the Optional Protocol and the general recommendations of the Committee (CEDAW

2007). This response was intended to serve as a wake-up call to South Korean legislators.

Numerous feminist theorists have proposed that CEDAW can play an important role

in supporting local political change, even though it is an international convention without

sanctions. They define this role as “cultural work.” For example, Merry (2003) argues that

“the process of ratification, preparing reports, and presenting and discussing reports fosters

new cultural understandings of gender and violence” (943). From the vantage point of

South Korean feminists, this is an important idea since they know very well that culture

has a great impact in defining social problems and that it plays a key role in navigating

decisions of how to resolve it.

Despite the proposed fundamental and practical significance of cultural work, the

influential power of international human rights conventions that lack sanctions is still in

question, particularly when the South Korean case has revealed that the regulatory

influence of state laws has not been enough to change attitudes or public consciousness.

The “Shadow Report” submitted by Korean NGOs strongly proposes that the government

should report on whether and how existing laws are applied to women’s reality rather than

77 Here, gender-based violence is defined as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is

a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm

of suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and any other deprivations of liberty.”

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simply laying out the content of laws and policy in the official reports (KWAU 2007). This

comment suggests that the notion that international “cultural work” can regulate and

inspire a genuine response is not straightforward; it can wind up inspiring national “paper

work.”

While the members of the Korean women’s movement interviewed during dissertation

research realize the significance of the CEDAW, they doubt whether the movement can use it

effectively and strategically for improving women’s reality and promoting gender equality.

Despite their doubts, there also have been some positive signs.

When elected as a member of the inaugural U.N. Human Rights Council on May 11,

2006, South Korea made pledges to accede to the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW

Convention and to consider withdrawing their reservation (meaning they did not agree to

it) to CEDAW 16-1-g (the same personal rights for husband and wife, including the right

to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation).

In this case we see that the Korean government tried to use CEDAW because it is a

useful strategy to appeal to international society, but then the international community can

put pressures on an individual state to accept the international standard if they want to

become an important and influential member of an international body. This case also

reveals clearly that the presence and ratification of a convention like CEDAW does not

determine its degree of influence. Feminists writing about other settings (e.g., Sonia

Alvarez on Latin America) often point out that the usefulness of such conventions is the

leverage they give to local women’s groups who use them to demand implementation

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through new legislation or legislative reforms. So far, South Korean feminists had not used

these conventions in this way.

Another Culturally Resonant Strategy: Peace Discourse

The realization that the institutionalization of DV reinforced patriarchal discourses

and practices encouraged Korean feminist activists to reframe the problem and refocus

their political strategy. But now that the South Korean state has tremendous power to

interpret and reproduce public discourse on DV and battered women, feminist activists

face a more complicated task than simply challenging the form of institutionalization.

After all, it was the goal and one of the major achievements of the movement.

As pointed out above, while the battered women’s movement had a legitimate goal—

passing new laws—and acceptable reasons that justified the movement in its first stage, the

subsequent institutionalization of DV reifies state’s interests—family reunion and

protection—and has created a situation where the contemporary battered women’s

movement is seen as unnecessary or excessive (by the state, civil society organizations,

and the general public). As a result, the feminists at the forefront of the earlier battered

women’s movement are attempting to restart a movement against violence against women

in accordance with the globally agreed upon principle of women’s human rights. They face

the continuing practical limitation that the human rights framework still does not play a

meaningful role in cultural or political discourse, Though it could be cultivated through

international influence, feminist activists have turned to an alternative framing— peace

discourse.

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Peace discourse is borrowed from the Korean women’s peace movement, which

developed during the 1990s. Although the women’s peace movement concentrates on

helping North Korean women and on building relations with them, it also tries to raise

public awareness and sensitivity to peace issues. At one point, while seeking to form a

coalition with the national reunification movement led by students and members of the

democracy movement, the women’s peace movement criticized the male-dominated and

patriarchal aspects of that reunification movement. Feminists stated that leaders of the

reunification movement are not free from patriarchal values. For example, women

peace/reunification activists are often excluded from decision-making, and their proposals

are given secondary consideration (women asked to arrange a meeting with North Korean

women to chat about women’s issues during a planned North-South joint

event).

The Korean women’s peace movement is characterized by its grounding in a

feminist perspective and practice. In fact, knowledge of the brutality that East German

women faced after German reunification was one factor in the emergence of the Korean

women’s peace movement and ending sexual oppression is a crucial goal of the movement

(Jung 2004). Therefore, for Korean peace movement activists, the term of peace does not

simply refer to an absence of war or conflict. Rather, peace means a peaceful co-existence

both at a structural and an individual level.

Violence we are witnessing and experiencing in society and in our daily

life is associated with the fact that we are living in the only divided

nation in the world. They are related to structural violence. So, any

attempt to solve these conflicts should be through maintaining peace on

the Korean peninsula…On the other hand, violence is not entirely a

structural thing. It is important for an individual to have a spirit of peace.

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This is a matter of how to express myself, how to communicate with

others, and how to make my everyday life peaceful. We are talking

about peace from this broad framework, from political and structural to

individual conditions. (Interview with Cho Young Hee, director of Conflict

Resolution Center, Women Making Peace, June 19, 2006, Seoul)

In this respect, Korean peace movement activists employ Johan Galtung’s concept of

positive peace: “Positive peace is more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of

social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal

protection and impartial enforcement of law” (quoted in Lee Hyun Sook. 1999.

“Women and Peace Movement,” unpublished working paper from Women and Peace

Movement in the 21st Century, Women Making Peace). Based on this notion of positive

peace, the Korean women’s peace movement challenges an androcentric perspective that

defines peace within the dichotomy of war and peace. The movement also points out that

this narrow conceptualization is based on a hierarchy of state over individual and of male

over female. In this respect, the peace movement can align with the feminist anti-violence

movement.

Structural violence facilitates sexual violence. This is because structural

violence is partly based on sexism, and then this violence contributes to

reproducing sexual inequality under patriarchal society. In this respect,

the peace movement is an inherent part of seeking gender equality.

This is why women actively participate in the peace movement (Chung,

Hyun Back. 2004. “Korean Women’s Peace Movement: Its Achievement

and Task,” Social Science Review 12(2): 286-326).

Because of the condition of national division and military presence along the border,

violence that women are subjected to is regarded by some as one consequence of

militarism and the effects of a military culture. Lee Hyun Sook, who was one of the

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founding members of Korea Women’s Hotline and became a peace movement activist,

emphasizes the “conspiracy relationship” between militarism and patriarchy.

National division precludes social development and peace by forming

and maintaining military culture and reinforcing patriarchy. Military

culture is the ideology of “power over others” and a system based on

male domination. Militarism impedes women’s efforts to eradicate

patriarchy by supporting patriarchal ideology and system. In addition,

militarism defines others enemy, supports the use of armed force, and

advocates violence as a legal tool for resolving conflicts. In this respect,

militarism and military culture are a root cause of domestic violence and

sexual assault that women continuously face in our society (Lee Hyun

Sook. 1999. “Women and Peace Movement.” Unpublished working

paper from Women and Peace Movement in the 21st Century, Women

Making Peace).

In the only divided country in the world, militarism is inevitably a highly sensitive

issue, and critiques of militarism cause fierce resistance. This issue has intersected with

resentment toward feminists’ insistence on advancing women’s rights. There are

controversial debates surrounding the male-only conscription system78 that created

divisions between feminists and anti-feminists.79 For feminist activists, militarism or

78 Kwon In Sook (2001) explains that compulsory male military conscription is justified by “the need

for a strong military” because of the trauma of the Korean War (1950). Furthermore, “as a national priority,”

militarism plays a pivotal role in defining what South Korea is and ought to be. Kwon is the woman cited in

Chapter 4, who as a student, was sexually assaulted in jail and who was the first person to win a case against

the police. She received a Ph.D. in Women’s Studies from Clark University where she was supervised by

Cynthia Enloe.

79 Under the male-only mandatory conscription system, the state launched and managed a

symbolically successful incentive program: men who finish military service are given 5 additional points

when they apply for government official positions (employment is based on a point evaluation system).

However, as the government official positions became more competitive, it was almost impossible to get in

without those 5 points. This meant that women and some men (especially with disabilities) who are exempt

from compulsory military service were not able to get the positions. In a society where discrimination against

gender and disability is rampant, public service positions have been important because women and disabled

people expected fair and open competition. Therefore, a group of women and a man with disability filed for

the elimination of the extra points system, and the Constitutional court declared that the system is

unconstitutional on December 23, 1999. This was the moment when many Korean men became antifeminism

and anti-women. Even though the incentive program was not to compensate all men for their military service,

men fiercely condemned women for attempting to steal men’s opportunities despite the fact that women do not

perform the male duty of national defense. Following a period of protest over military corruption and

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military culture became one of the most important issues that should be dealt with even

though activists expected clashes. Korean feminist activists had avoided making an official

statement about the link between violence against women and military culture in their

campaigns (1990s, 2004) for anti-domestic violence legislation. Instead, they paid

attention to the potentiality of the term of “peace” to problematize a culture that condones

the use of violence in general. In addition to offering an opportunity to elucidate some of

the causes and interaction among factors of domestic violence in Korean society, the term

“peace” drew the attention of feminist activists who were looking for a better way to

articulate domestic violence and mobilize the public once again.

Rather than emphasizing domestic violence, we realized that using a

different term is useful to spread information on the issue of violence

and to gain access to the public.

If we adhere to the fundamental approach, people’s response would be

that “domestic violence is a problem for particular people” and “I have

not seen such a case around me.” (Interview with Lee Mi Hye, director

of Women’s Rights Counseling Center, Seoul Women’s Hotline, June

20, 2006, Seoul)

The link between militarism and domestic violence is conceptually clear. On the one

hand, a history of violent state repression and the significance of military power for

national security from North Korea contributed to a violence-tolerant culture. On the other

hand, the social reality made people desire and strive toward a state of peace. With respect

to claims that the idea of peace has no meaningful connotation associated with the value of

family, the general public has a favorable attitude and understanding toward peace and

peace of mind. Because of this, some feminist activists are paying attention to the potential

suspicious deaths in the army, this court decision channeled men’s rage onto women.

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role that peace discourse can play in reviving and rewriting a discourse of domestic

violence. Most of all, the usefulness of peace discourse lies in its strong resonance with the

public and culture.

(Question: What made KWH pick up on a peace discourse?) Because

we have no alternative (laugh). You asked me about resistance. That’s

closely related to popularity. Our priority concern is violence, but we will

be isolated from the public if we exclusively focus on [military] violence

[or exclusively on violence against women]. So, we thought, let’s make

a slogan that can draw public attention and that is adaptable. Let’s

make an issue and talk about alternatives. That’s the process where the

“peace” discourse emerged. That’s the word available to us at this

moment. Of course, our ultimate goal is to seek a gender-sensitive

peace. In reality, however, we can’t explain the term that way. So, we

picked up the slogan, “peaceful community, egalitarian families.” That’s

for attracting public attention. (Interview with Park Inn Hea,

corepresentative of Korea Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

The above quote indicates that there was a realization that peace discourse can

resonate with many Koreans. This then led to the emergence and importance of peace

discourse as a discursive strategy for combating violence against women. By using peace

discourse, feminists try to make sensitive and persuasive links between peace, gender

equality, and violence against women. By suggesting the need for building a peaceful

society where all forms of violence are eradicated, feminists provide a view of domestic

violence in its broader structural context. More importantly, with the recognition that the

term “peace” is neither radical nor intolerable, and that it does not provoke a backlash, the

battered women’s movement has changed its focus from one exclusively on women’s

plight to one inviting men’s participation in building a peaceful society, community,

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family, and relationships. Shin Youn Sook explains how the new “men’s declaration for

peace” emerged as a tactic to address violence against women:

We thought that it is problematic to focus exclusively on women as

victims to address domestic violence. Recently, we began to talk about

the link between equality and peace. Through the Committee on

Violence against Women, we decided to use a new slogan, “men’s

declaration for peace,” based on the idea that it is time to encourage

men to reflect on themselves. So, in the coming campaign, we are not

going to focus on survivors. Instead, we are going to talk about how

men can be changed and can contribute to making peaceful families.

(Interview with Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of domestic violence

prevention program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2, 2006, Seoul)

Despite the attractiveness of the peace discourse, this new framing calls into

question whether it is appropriate for addressing the gendered nature of domestic violence.

While a successful framing has to have great resonance with an existing belief system for

recruiting potential supporters, it also should challenge the status quo for social change.

This was the problem confronted by the anti-DV Acts. And this is a continuing dilemma

that the contemporary Korean battered women’s movement confronts. Some feminists

doubt whether this frame can function to redirect institutional discourses on domestic

violence and to help the masses understand the nature and seriousness of the problem.

We are still facing confusions and questions: we are not a group

focusing on peace and we doubt whether “peace discourse” can be the

solution for violence against women. Furthermore, we realize that once

the term of family is used, everything becomes gender-blind. That’s the

dilemma. (Interview with Park Inn Hea, corepresentative of Korea

Women’s Hotline, August 30, 2006, Seoul)

Nevertheless, what I am struggling with is whether emphasizing peace

is really a right direction when so many people are still resistant to the

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seriousness and pervasiveness of domestic violence. (Interview with

Shin Youn Sook, head coordinator of domestic violence prevention

program, Korea Women’s Hotline, May 2, 2006, Seoul)

Given the institutional and cultural circumstances, Korean feminists are going ahead

and using peace discourse to eventually pave the way for employing the concept of human

rights to articulate violence against women. Walker (1990) points out, however, that while

it is important to “create knowledge for women’s use,” it is worthwhile to address how

feminist knowledge is being incorporated and depoliticized within existing discursive

processes. In regard to the concept of peacemaking, it often is interpreted as a feminine

attribute and women are often symbolized as lovers of peace. The risk exists, then, that

peace discourse will stereotype women as protectors, nurturers, and comforters based on

their femininity and motherhood. In fact, one of the Korean women’s peace movement’s

goals is to develop a new form of street demonstration that avoids unnecessary violence or

clashes. As a part of their practice, the women’s peace movement held a street campaign

for protesting the Iraq war and convoked it in the name of

mothers! Their performance made moral claims against war through a demonstration

conducted, in the words of Jung, “in more peaceful and affecting ways” (Jung 2004, 301).

Regrettably, this also served to reinforce traditional feminine roles by conveying the

message that it is primarily as mothers that women are concerned about sending Korean

soldiers (our sons) to Iraq.

Many feminist activists still believe that some way of emphasizing the value of

family is the best option for drawing public attention and support. In July 2006, for

instance, Bu-San Women’s Hotline called attention to violence against women by offering

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a prize for a photo essay competition titled “a million bad things that may happen to my

daughters.” This “women’s suffering is your business” approach is one strategy feminists

use to respond to opponents.

When we ask the question “what are you going to do if you know that

your daughter is being beaten in the home?” most response are that

they would never let their daughter go back home. And then when we

asked the question “why do you think that there are many women being

beaten by their husbands?” they answer “they deserve it.” So, we

continued to ask, “would you think that your daughter deserves it too?”

Their answer is “no.” This shows how people separate my problem from

that of others.

(Interview with Cho Yoon Sook, general secretary, DaeGu Women’s Hotline, May 30,

2006, DaeGu)

Although patriarchal culture and the value of family are problematic for all the above

reasons (especially, reification of traditional roles and notions of motherhood and

femininity), neither culture nor family need always be anti-women. Perhaps women’s

movements can manipulate patriarchal culture and family values to achieve some

movement goals (though it backfired with the anti-DV Acts). But feminists must exercise

great caution and fully examine the possible consequences of a decision to highlight

women’s “risks” or women’s “rights” in a particular context. In this respect, Oliver and

Johnston (2000) differentiate between ideology and framing with framing considered a

strategic tool to mobilize people and to influence public policy. They argue that framing

processes “do not persuade people to adopt whole new ideologies” (195). Other things

must take place.

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Concluding Comments

Given its action-oriented perspective, selecting a frame has meaningful implications.

It encourages decisions and choices to be made by assessing reality, rather than basing

them on abstract philosophy or theories. However, as the Korean women’s anti-DV case

shows, while socially and culturally resonant framing played, as expected, an important

role in evoking political and people’s responses, it also contributed to reinforcing the very

patriarchal ideas that the Acts were meant to overcome. As applied to this empirical case,

frame analysis has provided an important perspective that has helped construct feminist

activists as agents who recognize their situations and build what they think is an

appropriate strategy. This interpretation allows us to focus on the context in which decision

making took place and not focus on what they did as an example of mere co-optation.

Also, some of the problematic consequences of their framing will help feminist theorists

analyze the ways in which the established dominant discursive structures reinterpret,

reconstruct, and absorb the frame and achievements of a women’s movement. In addition,

the emergence of an appropriate frame that only fits a particular context means that it is

imperative to revisit debates regarding the usefulness of universal principles such as

women’s human rights. Either way, more information on the consequences at the local

level of applying one or another frame will be useful to local feminists as they search for

alternatives that can help them escape from existing or avoid future cultural traps.

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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

Overview

This dissertation has explored the ways in which the problem of violence against

women has been constructed and interpreted as a public/social problem and a crime in

South Korea. Strategies for constructing the problem of violence against women have

varied greatly from country to country and from culture to culture over time, leading

feminists (primarily in Western countries) to debate over how best to approach the issue of

violence against women. These debates have emphasized the fact that domestic violence

is a common problem that women share all around the globe in spite of differences such as

race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and nationality.

At the Beijing conference in 1995, feminists seemed to arrive at a global agreement

that a universal human rights framework would be the best way to combat all forms of

violence against women. Such a framework, first introduced and approved in a global

convention in 1993, would use what were considered “universal principles” to challenge

and dismantle cultural/religious and other defenses and the uncritical relativism that had

supported and justified oppression and discrimination against women in the name of

respect for culture, religion, and tradition. Supporters of the women’s human rights

framework regard it as an important political resolution to differences among women and

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as laying the significant groundwork for forging a transnational feminist coalition.

However, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are many critics who attack the framework as an

example of Western feminist imperialism that prioritizes Western European notions of

human rights over other options. Supporters of the human rights framework charge critics

with falling into a trap of “cultural relativism” that allows patriarchal cultures to exploit

and subordinate women. These debates tend to take place among academic feminists and

primarily at a global level. This dissertation contributes empirical data on the relevance or

lack of relevance of such arguments for feminist activists who struggle in their own

cultural contexts to advance women’s rights.

The dissertation examined the question of whether this “universal” feminist human

rights ideal can produce desired effects and has political implications in local settings. The

dissertation analyzed the reasons behind and ways in which South Korean feminists

framed domestic violence; how, why and with whom they formed strategic coalitions and

new organizational identities (local political culture); how they mobilized resources and

took advantage of and created new political opportunities; what the debates and

disagreements over strategic decisions were and how they were resolved; and what the

consequences of framing and institutionalization were.

The dissertation presented historical and other contextual details necessary to

understanding the context in which the anti-domestic violence campaign took place and in

which legislators and government offices interpreted and applied the Acts once they were

passed. For example, the Korean women’s movement was born at the end of the19th

century during the challenge to Japanese colonialism. The movement developed and

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flourished as part of a broader community of social movements fighting for or against

national independence, industrialization, modernization, national reunification,

democratization, and military authoritarianism. Through their contributions and

involvement in these multi-layered political and social struggles, the Korean women’s

movement achieved political legitimacy and learned skills in leadership, strategizing,

consensus building, and negotiation.

On the other hand, the evolution of the women’s movement through relations with

other social movements meant that there was little opportunity to deal with gender issues

as a primary issue. It was not until the appearance of more progressive women’s

movements in the 1980s that Korean women activists began to place the issue of gender

equality at the top of their agenda. Among the gender equality issues, violence against

women was one important issue that could generate interest and led to coalitions. It was in

1991 that the Korean feminist movement activists first launched a legislative reform

movement to combat violence against women; they included sexual assault, marital rape,

sexual harassment, and domestic violence. However, they learned very quickly that they

had to separate different forms of violence and focus on one form at a time. Korean

feminists found that they had to negotiate and focus on forced sexual assault. While this

compromise led to the passage of the 1993 Act on the Punishment of Sexual Assault

Crimes and for the Protection of Victims, the movement failed to develop a comprehensive

notion of gender violence based on gender inequality and discrimination.

Confucian cultural and societal understandings of sexual violence emphasized it as

a crime against the family (rather than against individuals) and this was tied to the notion

that loss of chastity (including that of married women victims) destroyed families. Given

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this emphasis, feminists were confronted very early on with the cultural and legal barriers

to introducing a claim to women’s individual rights as human or citizen rights; when they

mobilized to combat domestic violence, they sought a more acceptable discursive frame.

Korean feminists’ framing of “preservation of the family” for the campaign against

domestic violence seemed to represent the best available alternative to construct domestic

violence as a social problem and a crime within the South Korean cultural and political

climate. The dissertation has shown that Korean feminists’ decision to use this frame

should be understood through analysis of the context and not as an example of

“cooptation.” It also should not be confused with a lack of support for or understanding of

the human rights framework. Feminists were keenly aware of and embraced the concept of

women’s human rights; they found it impossible to apply to the problem of domestic

violence at the time.

Feminist framing politics played a crucial role in transforming the hidden problem

into a social problem deserving a place on the public agenda. In propelling social support,

the Korean women’s movement—under the leadership of KWAU and KWH—was able

to achieve the participation of 22 respected and influential civil society organizations and

groups in the anti-DV coalition. This exerted crucial influence on generating sympathetic

public opinion and media coverage and eventually enacting the anti-DV Acts. Although a

prior relationship of trust that existed between feminist activists and other civil society

activists because of previous shared experiences in other movements partly explains

coalition building, the framing of “preservation of the family” also was critical. This frame

strengthened civil activists’ sense of a “moral obligation” to address domestic violence as

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an undeniable problem and did not force groups to confront their members’ cultural and

personal beliefs or the patriarchal nature of society or social movements themselves. Given

these framing politics and coalition building, the legislators began responding to the

problem, attracted by their own concern over family breakdown. The framing of the

preservation of the family, therefore, played a crucial role in passing the anti-DV Acts in

1997.

The dissertation also revealed how the very advantages of using the frame

“preservation of the family” determined the direction of relevant policy outcomes. Given

the stated purpose of the Acts—to foster healthy families and peace and stability, the

Korean criminal justice system focused on restoring families by appeasing husbands’ rage

rather than by helping women in violent relationships. The culturally acceptable and

resonant framing did not challenge patriarchal notions of women’s place in the family and

society. And implementation of the Punishment Act built on those patriarchal notions.

In the case of the Prevention Act, it was assigned to the Ministry of Gender Equality and

Family, where it suffered from two realities. First, Ministerial staff deferred to non

feminist interpretations of problems and to notions of woman-blaming (battered women’s

characteristics were assumed to include low education and lower class status). Second, the

Ministry suffered from a small budget and, when it was given responsibility for child care,

most of its budget and staff focused on children rather than on the problem of violence

against women. As a result, state intervention, supported by the family preservation frame,

has erased any understanding of domestic violence as a form of gender-based violence

related to gender discrimination and inequality—the very goal that Korean feminists

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originally had hoped to construct. In addition, The Korea Women’s Hotline, at the

forefront of services to victims of violence, was marginalized as a result of

institutionalization and lack of access to statistics and research that would back up their

protests over implementation of the Acts.

With the realization that justifying stopping domestic violence based on preventing

family breakdown was the key cause of the negative consequences of institutionalization,

Korean feminists launched a legislative reform campaign in 2004 with the aim of

removing “fostering healthy family” from the purpose of the Acts and inserting “protecting

women’s human rights.” The result was modest change. While the purpose of the

Prevention Act was redefined as “prevention of domestic violence and protection of

victims of domestic violence,” the terms of “promoting the recovery of peace and stability

in families and fostering healthy family” is still in the Punishment Act. And the modest

changes have not contributed to a change in cultural understandings of the problem nor in

how the Acts are implemented. They still protect male batterers in the interest of “apology

and forgiveness.”

Discussion of empirical research ended with a focus on Korean feminists’ efforts to

find an alternative discursive frame for raising public and legal awareness of domestic

violence and to challenge the current situation of institutional entrapment. Korean

feminists have long regarded the women’s human rights claim as the most important and

appropriate framework for conceptualizing violence against women. However, they still

find themselves confronting cultural entrapment. The human rights framework still has

little cultural resonance and is not helpful to make a meaningful link between domestic

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violence and human rights. At this time, Korean feminists have turned to a “peace

discourse” which, given public discussions over national reunification with the North and

protests over the presence of Korean soldiers in Iraq, is culturally and socially acceptable.

Contributions of the Dissertation

Empirical and Theoretical Implications for Social Movement Research and Women’s

Human Rights Theory

This dissertation challenges previous social movement research that has focused on

macro-level variables such as political opportunity structures and on resource mobilization

as the most important factors to understand social movement success or failure. This

dissertation also challenges feminist research on transnational human rights advocacy

networks and the local level impact of international conventions. That research also has

tended to focus on macro-level policy making and organizing at the expense of a much-

needed and rich understanding of the process and context in which local-level movements

emerge and evolve. Even when feminist scholars have conducted research on anti-violence

organizing at the local level, such research too often emphasized the implementation of the

human rights framework and the roles of international advisors in development of new

anti-violence legislation and programs. Such research has tended to confirm the

importance of international conventions as tools that feminists can use to pressure national

governments and to leave unanswered the question of what happens at the local level

beyond accusations of “cultural relativism.” This dissertation differs from this research

because it approached the study of the anti-domestic violence movement in South Korea at

the micro-level and used methods that prioritized understanding movement participants’

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experiences, concerns, and their reflections on the decisions they made and outcomes of

those decisions.

The dissertation has documented the ways in which a movement’s chosen framing

can and does create new political opportunities (rather than waiting for the state or external

actors to “confer” them) and contributes to resource mobilization by successfully

persuading fellow civil activists, legislators, and the public. Therefore, the dissertation

does not reject this theoretical approach to social movement research, it illustrates its

shortcomings and suggests alternative ways to discuss and identify political opportunities.

A previous study of the KWH available in South Korea only realized the problem

but did not publish anything on it. There is one Master thesis (Kim 2000) in Women’s

Studies that analyzed the anti-DV movement and concluded that it failed to challenge

patriarchy because it used patriarchal discourse. Another study (OhJang 2005) uses the

anti-DV Acts as an example of the negative consequences of gender mainstreaming. But

these studies did not put the experience in the broader context and did not evaluate why

feminists made the choices that they did. Rather, they dismissed feminists’ use of the

framework of “preservation of the family” as an example of patriarchal co-optation. This

dissertation disagrees and sheds light on details of the internal dynamics of the

antiviolence campaign and decision making. It places feminist conflicts and decision

making in the broader context of South Korean traditions and beliefs and its changing

political culture and dynamic civil society, providing an entirely different and empirically

validated understanding of feminist choices and decisions.

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The focus on framing and the use of the analytical technique of institutional

ethnography revealed clearly that resonant framing should be examined as an indicator that

reveals power struggles and relations of ruling. These in turn reveal, for the Korean case,

the pitfalls of institutionalization following legal reform (which has often been a preferred

strategy of Western feminists for fighting against violence against women) and the ways

that the cultural frame was subverted and used by opponents to undermine implementation

of the legislation it was designed to support. The dissertation shows very clearly not only

the negative consequences of institutional intervention, but also how subordination of

women shifts to public patriarchy in support of private patriarchy rather than challenging

patriarchy per se. The dissertation also reveals the ways in which established institutional

agencies can exclude feminist activists from service provision and from the policy

decision-making process, including by requiring “objective” statistical evidence to prove

feminist demands.80 Recent events suggest that external factors, such as Korea’s

involvement in U.N. human rights committees, may lead to increased state vulnerability to

human rights arguments—at least for those that come from outside the country (because of

the country’s interest in maintaining a positive image abroad).

In rethinking feminist debates on the theoretical implications and policy usefulness

of the women’s human rights framework, the dissertation can make some contributions to

the debates. Recent and current debates seem to have gotten stuck on arguments over the

power of human rights as a concept and over the process by which global consensus versus

imperialism are avoidable or inevitable. The South Korean case study leads me to

80 The dissertation suggests that collaboration with feminist academic researchers and legal

professionals may be important to strengthen activists’ bargaining power with the state.

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conclude that circulating human rights language and arguing over its origins or implicit

values are not productive, neither for scholars nor for activists. For a more productive

discussion, the focus should shift away from problematizing the human rights framework

or questioning whether or not its principles are “universal” or “Western.” Feminist

scholars should focus on producing more in-depth research into the on-the-ground realities

that feminist anti-violence activists confront in different cultural contexts, the discursive

and political choices open, the strategies they employ to open new political spaces, the

decision making processes that explain their strategies and chosen framing discourse, and

—extremely important and almost never addressed—the consequences and outcomes of

their decisions.

I believe that feminist scholars need to conduct research on social movements that

can produce useful insights for feminist activists. This dissertation has tried to do this. For

example, activists’ experiences of “cultural entrapment” and resulting “institutional

entrapment” can be an important factor for South Korean feminists as they strategize for a

new anti-violence campaign. They also can be useful tools for feminists theorists and

activists who, rather than debate about whether the human rights concept is good or bad,

are looking for ways to expand it and improve its usefulness as a tool for policy and

advocacy. Enhanced understanding of feminist struggles under diverse circumstances

should be useful to efforts to extend and deepen feminist discussions on the universal

women’s human rights claim.

In other words, in the interest of developing improved feminist theory for the

transnational women’s human rights movement based on “several streams of ideological

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thought and varying strategies” (Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999, 11), this dissertation

concludes that it is important to listen to feminist activists who confront concrete and real

obstacles and struggle to realize women’s human rights in their local contexts. In this

respect, the dissertation bridges a gap between the human rights concept defenders and its

opponents by showing the contradictory position in which a local feminist movement is

situated.

Future research is needed to bridge the gap between ideological principles and

realistic political needs in various national settings. I propose that the notion of “cultural

entrapment”– which does not deny the usefulness of human rights but reveals its practical

limitations or political dissonance – could be an important concept for developing and

practicing a transferable or flexible universalism. We need to identify and compare the

contextual trajectory in which “needs are translated into rights” (Peled et al. 2000, 10)

rather than blindly pursue or discard human rights language. In doing this, special attention

should be given also to whether transnational forces and political support can impact

specific nation states on behalf of women’s human rights and what kind of women’s

movement might provoke appropriate state responses or resistance. Certainly, research

needs to abandon the assumptions of the universality of Western democratic experience as

a precondition for successful social movements and pay closer attention to the

particularities of different political cultures and institutions so that movements like the

Korean anti-DV movement do not mistakenly assume that institutionalization is a good

way to help battered women. Exploring broader political, economic, and cultural contexts

in which local and international pressures operate differently could both improve social

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movement theories and help activists and advocates envision new and more realistic

possibilities and strategies for more effective transnational coalition building and local

feminist organizing.

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GLOBALLY AGREED UPON, LOCALLY TROUBLED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE LEGISLATION, HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA

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