THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE
Introduction
Regulatory responses to climate change require collective action. However,
spontaneous collaboration is reduced in large-scale collective action problems because these
problems display the following characteristics: anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty, and
inactivity. At larger scales, collective action requires a third-party or external authority to
encourage cooperation with other actors1 . On climate change, such third parties are also
needed to achieve the translation of global climate regulatory regimes into regional
arrangements.
Regarding external authorities, this Article analyzes the opportunities and
limitations of international institutional arrangements relating to Arctic Ocean climate
change governance. Apart from global regulations on climate change, the focus is centered
on institutions that directly impact the Arctic Ocean to assess whether the global legal
regime, in which climate change is framed translates into regulatory capacity.
Climate governance in the Arctic Ocean is analyzed through the theoretical lens of
a large-scale action problem. The role of international organizations to deal with global
challenges is discussed from a functional perspective (i.e., the raison d'etre of organizations
is the promotion of cooperation to achieve common goals among different actors in
international settings).The article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 provides an overview of the leading international organizations that
influence climate governance in the Arctic Ocean. It discusses whether the regulatory
capacity of international organizations addresses characteristics that are large-scale
collective action problems. This section also highlights the limited regulatory capacity of
international organizations to effectively influence climate governance in the Arctic Ocean.5
discusses the capacity and limits of international organizations to foster collective action by
enhancing cooperation among different Arctic stakeholders.
Research Methods
The method is a scientific activity associated with a (systematic) approach to
studying a subject or research target in order to find solutions that can be scientifically
accounted for and contain validity. Research is a methodical, systematic, and consistent
scientific activity that involves analysis and construction, Sugiyono explains that research
methods are scientific methods of collecting data with the aim of describing, proving,
developing, and discovering information, theories, and understanding, solving, and
anticipating problems in human existence (Wijayanti, 2022: 33). According to Soerjono
Soekanto, legal research is a scientific activity, which is based on certain methods,
systematics, and thoughts, which aims to study one or several certain legal symptoms by
analyzing. Legal research besides that also conducts an in-depth examination of these legal
factors, to then try to find a solution to the problems that arise in the symptoms concerned
(Ali, 2021).
The type of writing used in writing this research is the normative legal research
method. Normative legal research method is a method that examines law from an internal
perspective with the object of research being legal norms. Normative legal research is a
process to find a rule of law or legal doctrine to be used as a basis for legal research answer
the legal issues at hand. Normative legal research (legal research) is usually only a document
study, which uses legal sources in the form of laws and regulations, decisions / decrees.
Another name for normative legal research is doctrinal legal research, also referred to as
library research or document studies. Soerjono Soekanto and Sri Mamudji, explained that
normative legal research is legal research conducted by examining library materials
(Muhaimin, 2020: 47). This type of research focuses on the study and analysis of the
existence of related conflict norms.
Results And Discussion
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
Anonymity
Large-scale action problems, such as climate change, involve many actors that are
not locally limited, and therefore, the possibility of cooperation is reduced. Anonymity
deepens as actors are located at multiple geographic scales (i.e., local, regional, global) and
include temporal scale (i.e., current and future generations).13 In the case of the Arctic
Ocean and climate governance, the relevant actors are not locally limited or homogenous.
The previous section highlighted that not only do Arctic States have vested interests in the
Arctic Ocean, but also all States have rights and obligations in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, such as the high seas. Over the past decade, several Asian countries have been
actively building their Arctic identities. There are also Arctic subnational regions (e.g.,
Alaska, Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Nunavut),14 and non-state actors (e.g., indigenous
peoples' participants and nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives) that over
the years have gained status as key Arctic actors with legitimacy in shaping future Arctic
policies including climate governance. Considering the large number and diversity of Arctic
actors, collective action is weakened as direct coordination and cooperation becomes
impossible. Instead, representatives of states, subnational regions, industries, indigenous
peoples engage in cooperation and coordination.15 The interests pursued by these
representatives are also diverse and may not always align with those of their principals.16
On collective action and climate change, Ostrom argues that "people most harmed by
impacts may not have adequate representation at higher levels and may not be able to
articulate clear ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the multiple
threats they face. "17 This is the case of Arctic indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are
threatened by climate change. Their representation at a larger scale is therefore an urgent
question. Long, for example, points out the need to make some actors, such as Arctic
indigenous peoples, more visible for climate governance.18 This article argues that
international organizations can be a platform to facilitate coordination and cooperation
among these diverse actors.
Large-scale collective action problems highlight uncertainties regarding the extent
and consequences of the problem. The science of climate change points to, among other
things, sea level rise, coastal erosion and changes in marine ecosystems.
Imagined futures include a world where humanity cannot survive unless mitigation
and adaptation policies are implemented. Uncertainty is intrinsically linked to risk as the
latter relates to various imaginary futures and how to predict and control adverse outcomes.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Since its formation in 1988, the IPCC has played an important role in 'assessing the
scientific information on climate change and presenting the environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change'. The IPCC prepared a Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere. The report highlights the impacts of climate change in the Arctic Ocean, e.g.,
increased mass loss of ice sheets and glaciers, further ocean acidification, accelerated sea
level rise, redistribution of marine species
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Without a doubt, IMO36 is the most important global organization for ship
sourcing and marine safety regulation. Regarding climate change, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol obliges state parties37 to reduce greenhouse gases from marine fuel bunkers
through the IMO. Since then, the IMO has been active in this area. In 2011, the Marine
Environment Protection Committee adopted energy efficiency-related amendments to Annex
VI (air pollution) of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), which entered into force in January 2013.38 With the potential
intensification of shipping in the Arctic Ocean, this is a welcome development.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in shipping is relevant in many ways for
the Arctic Ocean. First, it has a wider reach than originally envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol.
The ratification rate of MARPOL, Annex VI, is 96.71% of world tonnage.39 This means
that globally, all ships are subject to mandatory emission standards whatever flag they fly.
Second, while the climate change regime applies the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, this is not a case of regulating pollution from or through the
atmosphere. UNCLOS obligations are addressed to states in general without making
distinctions based on their level of development or regional features.40 In terms of setting
shipping standards, the law of the sea is lex spe cialis41 in relation to the climate change
regime. It is the law of the sea, which fully legitimizes the non-incorporation of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Third, the IMO performs an oversight and monitoring function as states parties
must communicate various information to the organization, including:
Legal regulations and other standards applicable at the national level to
implement the Convention.
Convention implementation compliance report
Statistical reports on penalties imposed for violations of the Convention.
The surveillance function is also in constant evolution. In January 2016, a
mandatory audit scheme to be conducted by IMO was included in MARPOL, including
Annex VI. IMO's cooperation with the climate regime shows how international
organizations can build synergies among related legal regimes. Finally, IMO became an
observer to the Arctic Council in 2019,45 and in the near future, the Arctic Ocean will be the
focus of further regulatory development.
Following the entry into force of the Polar Code, the two organizations committed
to engage in further cooperation.46 Considering the emergence of the Arctic Five, increased
cooperation between the IMO and the Arctic Council is an attempt by the Arctic Council to
consolidate its position as the leading regional forum for Arctic cooperation.
European Union (EU)
The EU is endowed with a comprehensive institutional framework and a strong
legal system in lawmaking capacity and judicial order. However, the EU's influence in the
Arctic region is limited as only three of its members, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are
Arctic states. As for the Arctic Ocean, it is outside the EU's jurisdiction.
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration created this intergovernmental organization. This soft law
instrument sets out a comprehensive mandate for the organization to promote cooperation
and coordination 'among Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and protection of the
Arctic environment.' Although giving preference to sustainable cooperation, the reference to
common issues is telling because it legitimizes the activities undertaken by the Council,
such as climate change, which has environmental implications and economic and social
dimensions. Through its working groups, the Arctic Council has adopted many scientific
reports combined with some policy advice. In general, the Council may adopt various soft
law instruments. The relevance of these non-binding instruments should not be
underestimated as they display several legal effects. First, soft law expresses the normative
commitments of legal subjects, and as such, it contributes to legal development. Second,
many instruments, especially those of a technical nature or detailed guidelines, are
precursors to binding regulations by being adopted as national laws or eventually attaining
the status of treaty law. Third, instruments such as guidelines, recommendations or best
practices help states implement and enforce their international obligations. In the context of
treaty law, they can inform treaty interpretation.
This section argues that international organizations can foster collective action on
climate governance in the Arctic Ocean by counteracting the characteristics found in large-
scale collective action, namely anonymity, heterogeneity, uncertainty and inaction. The first
step is to establish a typical scale of regulation. The establishment of international
organizations, such as the Arctic Council, encourages the development of specific regulatory
units beyond nation-states, such as the Arctic. Within this regulatory space, individual states
advance common policies, collect and disseminate data, increase international obligations,
and exert pressure on individual states. The emergence of the Arctic as a special region has
shaped legal development.
In particular, the adoption of the Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO
demonstrates how the political construction of a region results in legal regulations that
conform to that construction. The ability of international institutions to translate the global
climate change regime into regional arrangements is closely linked to regulatory capacity,
which varies from organization to organization. These functions can be divided into the
following categories:
Data collection, analysis and dissemination.
Monitoring and oversight: reports from members on the implementation
and enforcement of international obligations.
Dispute resolution mechanism.
Lawmaking: hard and soft legal standards, including further decisions,
resolutions and recommendations adopted by treaty organs that guide the
interpretation of treaty obligations.
Traditional dispute settlement under international law includes litigation in judicial
courts and arbitration and diplomatic methods, e.g., conciliation, mediation. Sometimes
dispute settlement is also a competence of international organizations. Other than the EU,
there is no formal dispute settlement associated with the organizations discussed in this
article. However, international organizations in the environmental context are a forum for
dispute resolution88 because they accommodate diverse and often conflicting interests by
providing a platform for negotiation and discussion. Broader participation is a welcome
development in the structure of international organizations. By allowing the participation of
indigenous peoples, local/national authorities, industry, and NGOs, spatial distances are
reduced, making it easier to identify relevant actors. Then, the initial contribution of these
actors is the articulation of their own set of values and preferences, which ultimately leads to
a decrease in heterogeneity and uncertainty. The Arctic Council allows observers outside the
Arctic region, which also closes the spatial distance between relevant actors. For example,
some Arctic Council observers include important greenhouse gas emitters, such as China.
Depending on the level of detail, hard and soft legal standards can effectively counteract
many of the challenges faced in large-scale action issues. For example, technical guidelines
and binding regulations adopted under the auspices of the IMO set clear limits on the actions
to be taken, the actors involved in those actions, and how risks (e.g., insurance) should be
managed. The IMO has taken a leading role in the regulation of shipping in the Arctic
Ocean.
The success of international organizations in promoting collective action depends
on their ability to engage diverse stakeholders. Many international organizations can serve
as platforms to accommodate the diverse or even conflicting interests of different countries
and actors, including indigenous peoples, industry representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. The Arctic Council, for example, has a tripartite structure. Eight states, six
participants and indigenous permanent observers (i.e., non-Arctic states, intergovernmental
and interparliamentary organizations, and NGOs). This structure demonstrates the flexibility
to involve multiple scales from local to global, private and public. International
organizations can also coordinate different but related areas of law; and address inconsistent
and incompatible obligations, as well as regulatory gaps.
Conclusion
Collective action has yet to be achieved in climate governance in the Arctic. This
mainly stems from the legal status of Arctic institutions. The Arctic Council is the central
forum for adopting regional policies for climate change. However, its lenient legal status, ad
hoc budget, and low political commitment from its member states prevent it from into a
regulatory agency. Without its transition into a treaty-based organization with expanded
powers, the situation will probably not change. While data collection and dissemination are
important, it is time to focus on policy and further binding regulations. As the EU has
limited regulatory and supervisory capacity in the Arctic, its policies are modest and based
on international law despite continuous efforts to shape the EU's Arctic identity.
This article argues that international organizations coordinate different but related
areas of law, develop consistent and compatible obligations, reduce regulatory gaps, and
sustain joint action, ultimately leading to collective action. However, in the absence of
formal or informal cooperation mechanisms among international organizations, there is 'the
possibility of confusion, duplication of effort and even conflict.
