The leading account that Kant gives of the naturally sympathetic man in his Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals has led to much controversy on the part of his antagonists, who have
questioned the coherence of the account. On the surface, there appears to be a tension: Kant
defines this sympathetic man as a person who has "inner satisfaction in spreading joy around
them" without other self-interest, but at the same time, he notes that every action proliferated by
inclination is based on the 'inclination to happiness.' This appears to make a sympathetic man's
motivations self-interested after all, rendering the question of whether he qualifies for sympathy
in a contentious place. Yet, upon a critical analysis of Kant's theory of non-moral motivation and
the nature of sympathy to analyze the fact, I will point out that, indeed Kant was coherent. The
naturally sympathetic man can warmly wish everyone the best regarding all aspects of their lives
and not solely to receive pleasure from their assistance.
To understand this issue, Kant defines the principles of non-moral motivation in the Critique of
practical reason. Kant is particularly clear here as he tries to demonstrate that there are two forms
of desire: lower and higher. The lower faculty of desire is driven by what Kant calls material
principles, which place the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be felt
in the reality of some object (CPrR 5:22). In other words, the lower faculty of desire aims at the
pleasures partaking of which brings sensational, including the avoidance of physical pain. Kant
terms these as the 'material pleasures' as the value of these things depends on the existence of an
object or something that has occurred. Importantly, Kant argues that all material practical
principles "are, without exception, of the same kind and come under the general principle of self-
love or one's happiness" (CPrR 5:22). This is so because they are all receptors of the subject's
sensations of pleasure or pain which makes them empirical and subjective.
From this point of view, it may seem that any action performed willingly, even if it may appear
to be done in the direct interest of another person, such as sympathy, is also egoistic due to the
subject's intention to achieve personal gratification. After all, Kant states that if a representation
"can determine choice only by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the subject, its being a
determining ground of choice is wholly dependent upon the nature of inner sense, namely that
this can be agreeably affected by the representation" (CPrR 5:23). Thus, when we accompany
people out of sympathy, it becomes evident that the sole reason is due to the emotions of
pleasure. The naturally sympathetic man would then appear to be aiding them self-interestingly
or for egoistic purposes rather than for the altruistic objective.
However, this interpretation raises many unanswered questions and altogether misses numerous
subtleties in Kant's theory. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Kant admits that all material
principles involve self-love in some way, but it does not always have the sense that the agent
knowingly sought his pleasure as the objective of his action. However, pleasure could be
ancillary to the action or indeed could be a consequence of the action, although it cannot be the
reason for the action. As Kant puts it, material principles place the determining ground of the
will in pleasure to be felt in the reality of some object (CPrR 5:21). This means that pleasure is
the consequence of attainment of the desired object; one does not have to feel happy to develop
desire for the object. When sympathy is present, one may perhaps want good things to happen to
others and experience pleasure if and when they are received but wish for it not to receive the
pleasure.
Indeed, this affords better expressive phenomenology of sympathetic concern. As we act to
alleviate the suffering of one or more beings, there is a conscious concern with the victim and the
verity of their suffering instead of the possibility of the positive outcome we would get out of it.
What we want is that the suffering to cease for them; the positive feelings that emerge are side
benefits of the comfort. Thus, the naturally sympathetic man is portrayed by Kant not as giving
joy to others to cultivate happiness in the giver but rather as responding to an inherent tendency
to create happiness. Therefore, the satisfaction that he gets is derived from the pleasure of seeing
someone else help but this is not why he helps.
Of course, one can, as usual object that even though a sympathetic man may not actively aim at
his self-interest, he is nonetheless acting in accord with his self-interest if he were to help others
otherwise not. But this is placing the cart before the horse; it is not as though he does good deeds
and is pleased because he wants to help others; rather, he is a man who possesses the virtue of
benevolence and, therefore, the well-being of others please him.
This points to a deeper question: what makes a person selfish or self-interested? It cannot just be
that one's mental states serve, in some way, to help bring about action, for this would make every
action selfish and eliminate the distinction. It also cannot be that one harms oneself as one feels
good through acting. Thus, virtuous people are often pleased with the fact that they are doing
good. Bosses however looks at selfishness as involving putting the self above others and using
them for personal gain instead of valuing them as people. The key is the structure of one's
concerns: does one inherently possess a regard for other people's interests or do they provide
value only in how they are relevant to the self?
According to this standard, the Kant's naturally sympathetic man does not seem selfish. He is not
doing it for personal gain and as such, is not taking advantage of the misery of those who he
swindles their money by donating to this charity. He has an immediate concern for their joy an
interest that propels him into action without any ulterior self-motivation. That he then enjoys
inner satisfaction, does not make this concern self-interested, any more than a mother's love for
the child becomes selfish because she feels happy as the child is happy. Selfishness does not
refer to taking joy in the wellbeing of others but rather, that the other is only seen as valuable
when one stands to benefit from it.
We can further see this by cognizing cases where the act happening due to sympathy may not be
in the interest of the sympathizer. Kant gives the example in the second Critique of someone who
risks execution to avoid giving false testimony against an honorable man (CPrR 5:29). Someone
who is innately compassionate will likely have strong motivation to make this sacrifice in
consideration of the innocent man. The idea of self-interest in such action would be hard to
decipher even if the agent gets a shred satisfaction from the act of righteousness. Similarly, if a
man steals a drug so that he may use it to save his dying mother knowing fully well that he will
be going to prison that kind of action is borne solely out of love, not self-interest, even though
successfully saving her would bring him joy.
The problem is that Kant's theory assumes that we act solely for our self-interest, but it does not
seem to me that pleasure can be seen as an aim when it is actually the consequence of pursuing
the goals which may indeed be valued in of themselves. And once we extricate cause from the
results, we can readily observe how such forms' occurrence is motivated by necessarily stern
altruism, yet which is not devoid of pleasure. The pleasure negates none of desire's dynamics; it
seals but it does not start the circuit; regardless of its existence, he would help.
In conclusion, I think that there is enough to Kant's naturally sympathetic man for it to be a
coherent construct. Such a person can be largely motivated to care for the welfare of other people
for reasons that are other regarding, whereby even if happiness ensues, it is not the principal
focus of concern. The mental states and preferences of the individuals are involved as they ought
to be in any human decision-making, only here the direction of perspective is more extraverted
as it were. Perhaps Kant even hints at this when he speaks about sympathetic man being
'"without any motive of vanity or self-interest." Yet, the relating is done, not with any view to the
contentment that the relation brings to himself, even though contentment might be a by-product
of the relation. That is, sympathy in its 'pure' meaning is adopting of others' interests as one's
own, this feeling of their pain and joy as if it were one's own.
People's behavior is multi-faceted, and motivation is not the only thing in a human being that can
be 'mixed up'; motives and effects are often connected and complex in people's actions. Though
not all self-interest, and we do not have to regard the satisfaction of the naturally compassionate
man at heart as a diminution in his worthy character. Kant would dismiss them as having no
moral value other than duty, but it can be said that the motility behind his actions, even if it may
not be subtle, is worthy of admiration and their double-layered structure should not lead one to
question their authenticity. In this concern, what is important would be that we should not worry
if good feelings associated with doing good are never felt, as long as it should be done in the first
place.
