Supporting Wolff’s Anarchism
Overview
In this paper I will examine Wolff’s defense of philosophical anarchism
given in his paper ‘The Conflict between Authority and Autonomy’. I will
first present Wolff’s central argument and then proceed to consider a
possible objection that might undermine his argument. I will conclude by
responding to this objection, clarifying and strengthening Wolff’s claim that
legitimate authority cannot exist.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(i) An obligation to social order
(ii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(iii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(iv) An obligation to social order
(v) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(vi) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(vii) An obligation to social order
(viii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based
on respect or an understanding)
(ix) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(x) An obligation to social order
(xi) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(xii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xiii) An obligation to social order
(xiv)An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(xv) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xvi)An obligation to social order
(xvii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based
on respect or an understanding)
(xviii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xix)An obligation to social order
(xx) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(xxi)An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxii) An obligation to social order
(xxiii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxiv) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxv) An obligation to social order
(xxvi) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxvii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxviii) An obligation to social order
(xxix) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxx) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxxi) An obligation to social order
(xxxii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxxiii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxxiv) An obligation to social order
(xxxv) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxxvi) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xxxvii) An obligation to social order
(xxxviii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xxxix) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xl) An obligation to social order
(xli) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(xlii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xliii) An obligation to social order
(xliv) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based
on respect or an understanding)
(xlv)An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xlvi) An obligation to social order
(xlvii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(xlviii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(xlix) An obligation to social order
(l) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(li) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lii) An obligation to social order
(liii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(liv) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lv) An obligation to social order
(lvi) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(lvii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lviii) An obligation to social order
(lix) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(lx) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lxi) An obligation to social order
(lxii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based
on respect or an understanding)
(lxiii) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lxiv) An obligation to social order
(lxv)An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g. based on
respect or an understanding)
(lxvi) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
Wolff’s Argument
Wolff begins with a concept of authority. Wolff defines legitimate authority
as authority that has the right to command. He is clear to differentiate this
from power, where we comply only due to threat of force, and distinguishes
it from persuasive argument where we are convinced that we ought to
comply with a command. I understand this to mean that true legitimate
authority implies that there can be cases where I am obligated to do what
the authority tells me to do for no other reason than that the authority tells
me to do it.
Next, Wolff describes the concept of autonomy. The essence of
autonomy is that an individual is responsible for their actions. If I possess
free will and am rational, I have an obligation to take responsibility for how
I act. As Wolff puts it, “The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous,
is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but
not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense
of the word, free” (pg. 27). According to Wolff, I have a moral duty to be
autonomous. I may take advice and consider possible punishment for my
actions, but ultimately the moral implications of my actions fall on my own
conscious as a consequence of my free choice.
Wolff finishes by claiming that the concept of legitimate authority is not
compatible with the concept of an obligation to autonomy. Blindly
complying with a command from authority necessarily means we do not
take responsibility for that action. He concludes that if we are to accept a
duty to autonomy (as he thinks we should), then there cannot be legitimate
authority. Wolff concludes that philosophical anarchism is the only
reasonable political philosophy.
Summarizing the argument,
(P1) Legitimate authority requires us to obey independent of other reasons
(P2) Obligation to autonomy requires us to take responsibility for our actions
—————————————————————————————————
—
(C1) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
Further,
(P3) Legitimate authority and an obligation to autonomy are not compatible
(P4) We have a moral obligation to autonomy
——————————————————————–
(C2) Legitimate authority does not exist
Objection to Wolff
I believe that (P1), (P2) and (P4) are difficult to defeat (or at least that it
would be bold to try). The critic will likely question (C1)/(P3), denying the
validity of Wolff’s argument. I will outline what I feel is the strongest
argument made against Wolff. Arguments for political legitimacy made by
Dworkin and Raz are flavors of this kind. It goes something like this:
Consider personal moral obligations separate from political ones. These
may include things such as
(lxvii) An obligation to social order
(lxviii) An associative obligation to a community or institution (e.g.
based on respect or an understanding)
(lxix) An obligation to act in the most rational way possible
Dworkin proposes something like (ii) and Raz something like (iii). What is
the best possible way to fulfill these obligations? One possible answer is a
general adherence to the law. It is not controversial to claim that
surrendering to an authority can be the best way to achieve social order
(e.g. coordination issues) or that surrendering to an authority that has
superior knowledge can be the best way to achieve the most rational
actions. I am simply making an autonomous decision to follow the law
independent of all other reasons.
This model still fits the definition Wolff gives for authority. Take the
example discussed in class where I stop at a stop sign in the desert. I have
no moral reason to stop and no fear of punishment. However, because of my
general obligation to social order, I have decided to follow traffic laws.
Although I would normally feel zero obligation to stop at this stop sign
specifically, my obligation to social order has in turn given me this
obligation. I am following the rule requiring me to stop at the stop sign only
because it is law, which according to Wolff is the mark of a legitimate
authority. This does not conflict with my duty to autonomy because I made
an autonomous decision to submit to the law in general.
It would appear that Wolff’s argument is at risk as this argument
implies that personal autonomy and legitimate authority are compatible
and therefore legitimate authority can exist.
Response
Wolff’s conclusion that there cannot be legitimate authority can be
salvaged by clarifying his definition of authority.
Wolff’s definition of legitimate authority is the following: an authority is
legitimate if we have an obligation to obey the law simply because it is the
law. I propose a stronger definition that more accurately captures the
intended meaning of legitimate authority: an authority is legitimate if we
have an external obligation to obey the law simply because it is the law. By
this, I mean that the obligation to obey that law originates from a source
that is not the individual being subjected to it. Why is this important? If the
obligation to obey the law is not external but internal, stemming from
personal moral obligation, then the obligation to the law is independent of
the authority itself. This case is anarchy, as the obligation to the law is
completely dependent on the person obeying it.
The argument outlined in the previous section is a case of internal
obligation to the law and therefore is not true legitimate authority. In the
example where I stop at the stop sign in the desert, the obligation to stop is
not uncaused. This obligation originates from my moral reasons (my
obligation to social order) and is subject to change, independent of the
authority.
In order to show that legitimate authority exists, Wolff’s critic must now
demonstrate that the obligation to obey the law is an external one, contrary
to what I have argued. However, this does not seem possible, as it is
undeniable that an external obligation directly conflicts with autonomy. If I
have an obligation that does not in any way originate from myself, I can in
no way say that I am taking responsibility for the action required to fulfill
the obligation. The conclusion is that legitimate authority, understood in
the new and more correct sense, cannot exist.
Objecting to the Definition of Legitimate Authority
Wolff’s critic might grant that the argument is valid, but deny its
soundness, insisting that the definition of legitimate authority is too strong
and is not accurate.
I have no problem instead calling the type of authority I am talking
about absolute external authority (AEA). I will then let the term legitimate
authority be interpreted in some weaker sense that does not require the
authority to impose obligation externally (if it pleases Wolff’s critic). It is
still a worthwhile endeavor to show that AEA cannot exist. I won’t develop
the idea here, but the belief that AEA exists is pervasive and it is important
to realize that this is false.
Anything weaker than AEA is consistent with philosophical anarchism.
If I do not have the obligation forced upon me, but instead am bound by an
obligation that is fluid, non-binding and influenced by my own internal
reasons, how is that not anarchy? Political obligation that is not completely
independent of the individual bound to it is a state of anarchy.
At this point I think it is a good idea to abandon names like ‘anarchy’
and ‘legitimate authority’ along with all the baggage that they carry.
Perhaps it is better to try to define an optimal authority. This term
accurately captures our interest in an authority that is to some degree just
but does not imply any right to command. For example, maybe an optimal
authority is one that achieves maximal local authority: an authority where
the largest number of individuals possible have some obligation to obey the
law and an act against the law is seen as a moral disagreement and not a
moral wrong.
Conclusion
I have shown how Wolff’s definition of authority leaves the argument
susceptible to claims that legitimate authority and autonomy are not in fact
contradictory. I then demonstrated how strengthening Wolff’s definition of
legitimate authority to include the notion of external obligation reaffirms
the conflicting nature of autonomy and legitimate authority.
