Constructing Categories Imagining A Nation

“Immigrants are actual people born outside the country who have

been admitted to Canada, as well as symbolic representations of

those who, in the eyes of the resident population, should be given

or denied entry to Canada” (Li, 2003c:2).

1.0 Introduction

On April 23, 2009, clad in a white wedding dress and holding a bridal bouquet, Lainie

Towell was surrounded by on-lookers and flashing cameras as she scaled the steps of

Parliament Hill. Towell, an attractive artist and dancer from Ottawa, was accompanied

up the steps not by her future husband, but by a full-sized red door that she had strapped

to her back: “‘The door was red, my dress was white – the colours echoed the Canadian

flag,’ says Ms. Towell” (Bielski, 2009, April 30). Towell was climbing Parliament Hill

on her hands and knees as a symbolic portrayal of the burden she claimed to have

suffered at the hands of her estranged husband, Fodé Mohamed Soumah. Soumah, an

immigrant from West Africa, was granted entry to Canada in 2007 on the basis of his

marriage to Towell, a Canadian citizen. According to Towell, Soumah had tricked her

into marrying him just to gain entry to Canada and receive status as a permanent

resident, only to abandon her within four weeks of landing on Canadian soil. Appearing

alongside the jilted bride on CTV’s Canada AM the day of her Parliament Hill trek,

Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, noted with regret

that Towell’s experience was all too common, and that her case was evidence of “one of

the most frequent forms of immigration fraud.” Kenney commented that “migration

integrity officers” closely screen potential immigrants, and do their best to prevent

fraud. Kenney further emphasized to viewers that it is of central importance to Canadian

society that incidents of immigration fraud be prevented.

In August of 2009, Naema Ahmed, a 29-year old pharmacist from Egypt, joined

a government-sponsored French language class in Montréal. While attending class,

Ahmed, a Muslim, insisted on wearing a niqab – a face-covering veil that exposes only

the wearer’s eyes. She also requested that certain accommodations be made in the

classroom out of respect for her religious beliefs:

“The teacher allowed her to give an oral presentation at the back of the

classroom, facing away from other students. However, [Ahmed]

complained that some male students could see her face and asked that they

be moved to a different part of the classroom” (Scott, 2010, March

2).

During the next three months, the school accommodated Ahmed’s requests to wear the

niqab, have female instructors, and be segregated from male students. Yet, in November

of 2009, Ahmed was expelled from the school on the grounds that her niqab was

interfering with language instruction and that her demands were creating a tense

classroom atmosphere. In response, Ahmed lodged a human rights complaint, reigniting

the “never-far-from-the-surface debate over reasonable accommodation of minorities”

(Scott, 2010, March 2). The case made national headlines and sparked a major

controversy over the extent to which the Canadian nation-state should bend to meet

newcomers’ diverse needs:

“I think this is an illustration of when an accommodation becomes

unreasonable,” civil-rights lawyer Julius Grey said…Morton Weinfeld,

chair in Canadian ethnic studies at McGill University, said it will be up to

the courts to rule on the issue. “My personal view as a citizen is that there

are always going to be limits to the amount of reasonable accommodation

we can have. This may be a reasonable limit,” he said (Scott, 2010, March

2).

As these two cases poignantly illustrate, immigration and the ethnic, religious,

and cultural diversity it brings about are controversial issues in contemporary Canadian

society, despite Canada’s widely cited legacy as a ‘nation of immigrants.’ Indeed, these

examples are only two of innumerable instances of public and political debate

surrounding immigration in Canada. These cases also capture the essence of the various

issues being addressed in this thesis. They demonstrate tensions surrounding

immigration policy and common concerns pertaining to the admission of newcomers,

such as who should be granted entry and, once they have been granted entry, how they

should be dealt with by Canadians and the Canadian state. The examples illustrate

concerns over granting admission to ‘undeserving’ immigrants, and trepidation

surrounding how to deal with immigrants who have ‘non-Canadian’ traditions and

practices. These examples also demonstrate that the Canadian nation has both literal and

symbolic boundaries, and illustrate that both types of boundaries are often perceived as

being threatened by newcomers from diverse backgrounds to the end of requiring

safeguarding by the Canadian state. These cases also reveal the fact that immigrants

occupy a contested place in Canadian society, and that their admission as permanent

residents does not automatically render them uncontested members of the Canadian

national community in the eyes of Canadian citizens or the Canadian state. Moreover,

the two examples document how discourses on immigrants, such as those put forth by

the media, politicians, and academics, communicate ideological messages pertaining to

gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and national belonging in the context of immigration. Together,

these issues echo the overarching research question at hand in the present thesis –

namely, in a global era of international migration, how is the Canadian national

community imagined and discursively constructed in relation to immigration?

As Benedict Anderson (2006) notes, “nation, nationality, nationalism – all have

proven notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze” (p.3). In an effort to do just

that, Anderson examined the ways in which political and economic elites in postcolonial

nations brought together fragmented population groups to formulate relatively cohesive

societies. Across different settings, he noted that elites sought to create a shared sense of

belonging among all citizens of a nation-state. This sense of belonging, however, was

necessarily ‘imagined’ in light of the impossibility of personal connections among all

members of the nation. It follows that nations, for Anderson, are cultural artifacts that

are upheld through elite-led nation-building processes.

Importantly, according to Anderson, nation-building was historically facilitated through

the development of print and mass media.

Anderson’s notion of ‘national communities’ as constructed imaginings and his

views of nation-building bear directly on questions of immigration and constructions of

national belonging. In a settler society such as Canada, there is an inherent link between

immigration and nation-building. As Smith (1993) notes, Canada emerged as a

nationstate through “the gradual accretion of the right kinds of people, who acquire their

national identity by living in Canada and contributing to a Canadian way of life” (p.52).

Yet, with the emergence and acceleration of processes of globalization in recent

decades, the theoretical integrity of the ‘nation’ has come into question, in part due to

the widespread international movement of people, involving increasing temporary

migration, mobile refugee populations, and growth in transnational networks

(Appadurai, 1996, 1993; Basch et al., 1994; Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al.,

1995, 1992; Kearney, 1995; Papastergiadis, 2000; Smith, 1995). Global and

transnational processes have led some theorists to prompt the need for ‘post-national’

understandings that move beyond viewing the ‘nation’ as a territorially bounded

imagined community that is governed by a sovereign state (Appadurai, 1996, 1993;

Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al., 1995, 1992; Steger, 2009a, 2009b; see also

Nieguth, 1999).

The present thesis was inspired by these theoretical tensions surrounding the

configuration of imagined communities in an era of globalization and international

migration. As previously noted, immigration has historically been a central component

of Canadian nation-building (Simmons, 2010), yet remains a source of considerable

controversy that speaks to the gap between literal and symbolic national borders. The

present thesis contends that the configuration of the Canadian imagined community in

contemporary contexts can be most fruitfully understood through an examination of

immigration discourses. This contention also draws on Anderson’s (2006) emphasis on

modes of communication, particularly print documentation and media, in historical

nation-building efforts. To this end, the present thesis examines dominant discourses on

Canadian immigration, focusing on media discourse, policy discourse, and

‘measurement’ discourse (i.e., official surveys), in order to assess the manner in which

the Canadian imagined community is imagined and constructed in an era of

globalization and widespread international migration.

Discourse can be broadly understood as an extensive, ongoing dialogue

articulated in a wide variety of written, spoken, and symbolic forms. Existing research

on Canada’s immigration discourse has contended that immigrants are symbolically

constructed as outsiders to the Canadian imagined community (see Abu-Laban, 1998a,

1998b; Bannerji, 2000; Creese et al., 2008; Creese & Peterson, 1996; Henry & Tator,

2002; Henry et al., 2000; Jiwani, 1998; Li, 2007, 2003a, 2003c, 2001; Mahtani, 2008;

Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). This work commonly argues that

immigrants are socially constructed as symbolic or literal threats to the Canadian nation.

More specifically, much of the literature contends that Canada’s immigration discourse

constructs a racialized insider/outsider dichotomy between Canadian nationals and

immigrants that leads to the symbolic exclusion of immigrants and citizens of colour

from Canadian society. Gender has also been considered in this context, most often

addressed with a view to the marginalization of women immigrants of colour (see

AbuLaban, 1998a, 1998b; Jiwani, 1998; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). It

is my contention, however, that the immigration discourse accomplishes much more

than this. To this end, the present thesis builds on the strengths of the existing literature

and simultaneously helps fill the literature’s gaps by departing from it in important

ways. The thesis provides a more comprehensive and systematic examination of

Canada’s immigration discourse than previous work. This contribution involves both a

theoretical and empirical expansion upon the existing literature, the latter of which

focuses most directly on race and, importantly, on constructions of immigrants.

Although the existing literature recognizes that the construction of immigrants as

‘outsiders’ to the Canadian nation implicitly constructs the nation’s ‘insiders,’ the

present thesis contends that the focus on the ‘immigrant’ side of this equation, and, in

particular, the racialized immigrant, has left considerable room for a further theoretical

exploration of the ‘imagined communities’ framework in reference to contemporary

Canadian immigration. Moreover, the literature typically makes reference to an

expansive ‘immigration discourse’ to draw broad conclusions about underlying

discriminatory biases without exploring in detail the contours of different ‘strands’ of

discourse. Indeed, Canada’s immigration discourse is not monolithic, but is, in fact,

constituted by a number of discourses originating from diverse sources and representing

particular points of view and agendas in immigration debates. It is thus insufficient to

simply consider the construction of immigrants without contextualizing the potential

social and political reasons underlying these constructions in different contexts. To this

end, the present thesis explores three different immigration discourses with an eye to the

conceptualization of Canada’s imagined community in an era of globalization and

international immigration. In order to address this overarching objective, the thesis

examines the following research questions:

(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)

represent immigrants?

(2) How are different categories of immigrants (i.e., based on immigrant mode of

entry, with a focus on family-class and economic immigrants – defined in

section 1.3 below) differentially characterized and represented in discourse?

(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?

(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?

(5) How do these representations operate to discursively define the boundaries of

Canada’s national imagined community?

The thesis applies a social constructionist perspective to Canadian immigration

discourses in order to elucidate the manner in which Canada’s imagined community is

constructed in the contemporary era of international migration and globalization,

addressing the broader social, economic, and political contexts within which this

construction occurs. In doing so, the thesis expands on theoretical understandings of the

manner in which gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and immigrant mode of entry are

independently and interactively involved in the construction of Canada’s imagined

community.

Based on a multi-faceted examination of Canadian immigration discourse, the

present thesis argues that the Canadian imagined community is directly constructed

around a particular vision of the Canadian nation that entails the co-construction of

immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state. These constructions embody distinct

social and political tensions surrounding the presence of immigrants from non-European

countries, and occur alongside a neo-liberal agenda and national self-interest involving

an understanding of Canada as an economically strong, multicultural nation-state that

selects ‘good’ immigrants and prevents ‘bad’ immigrants from entering the country. To

this end, the construction of the Canadian national community through immigration

bears various stamps, including Canada’s discriminatory nation-building history,

national and global trends and controversies surrounding immigration, ideological

struggles to define Canadian national identity, and the state’s pursuit of legitimacy.

The remainder of this chapter provides the background for the thesis. First, a

theoretical framework of the various ways in which immigrants are socially constructed

is discussed, followed by a brief overview of Canada’s post-Confederation immigration

history and a description of the current immigration program.

It is important to briefly note here that this thesis does not specifically examine

the immigration situation in Québec. Immigrant settlement (in both historical and

contemporary contexts), immigration policies, ethnic relations, and national identity in

Québec differ significantly from the remainder of the country. A comprehensive

appreciation of Québec’s imagined community would require an analysis of Québecois

French-language discourses and an in-depth appreciation of the unique political and

cultural history and circumstances of that province – a study in and of itself. The thesis

thus focuses on English-language discourses associated with ‘Canadian’ immigration,

and does not address the unique immigration situation of Québec in either the

background chapters or the original analysis chapters of the thesis.

1.1 The Social Construction of Immigrants in Canada

According to Li (2003a), social assessments and understandings of immigrants and their

place in receiving societies are, in part, determined by the ideological preferences and

concerns of the assessor. In other words, the interests and subjectivities of the assessor

shape the manner in which immigrants, as well as their role in and their impact on

society, are viewed and interpreted; these interests and subjectivities ultimately affect

the outcome of the assessment and the manner in which immigrants are represented. To

this end, different social constructions of immigrants can be interpreted as different

vantage points from which immigrants are evaluated. Social constructions of

immigrants define who is considered an immigrant, in addition to the characteristics and

social value of those placed within the boundaries of this group. A useful framework is

offered by Li (2003a), who specifically articulates three different ways in which

immigrants are socially constructed: (1) a ‘folk’ version of immigrants; (2) immigrants

as an analytical concept, and (3) immigrants as a bureaucratic definition. Each of these

three constructions is addressed in the present thesis and thus requires brief explanation.

In Li’s (2003a) first type of social construction, the ‘folk’ version, the notion of

an ‘immigrant’ is associated with ‘racial’/ethnic categorization and cultural difference.

In the Canadian context of this type of construction, immigrants are understood as

persons who appear ‘foreign’ compared to descendents of mainly ‘White,’ European

settlers. In this social construction of immigrants, ‘fact’ and ‘myth’ are often

confounded, with ‘non-Whites’ being defined as ‘immigrants,’ regardless of their

national origin, and ‘Whites’ being defined as Canadian nationals, regardless of whether

or not they were born in Canada. As articulated by Kobayashi and Peake (1997),

“White, middle-class professionals from Britain or the United States are not commonly

perceived as ‘immigrants’” (p.7), even if they are, in fact, legally newcomers. In

contrast, visible minorities, regardless of whether they were born in Canada, are

constructed as immigrants based on their phenotypical features. Both Ng (1990) and

Mahtani (2008) similarly point out that ‘common-sense’ discourse constructs

immigrants as people of colour, and constructs people of colour as immigrants (see also

Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Bannerji, 2000; Creese & Kambere, 2003; Gonick, 2000),

despite the possible inaccuracies of these understandings. In the folk construction of

immigrants, ‘non-Whites’ are commonly problematized based on the assumption that

they are linguistically and culturally ‘different’ from ‘Canadians’ (Li, 2003a; see also

Creese, 2007 and Creese & Kambere, 2003).

According to Li (2003a), immigrants can also be constructed as an analytical

concept. In this sense, ‘immigrant’ is a conceptual label used to construct theoretical and

operational boundaries around a group of individuals for analytical purposes.

Researchers, for instance, may conceptualize immigrants as persons who have moved

from one country to settle in another. In research studies, immigrant status is often

assessed by comparing country of birth and country of permanent residence, the

assumption being that if an individual were born in a country other than the one in

which they are residing, then she/he can be considered an ‘immigrant.’ According to Li

(2003a), the term ‘immigrant’ in analytical contexts is often used inconsistently and

imprecisely, and can at times be misleading. For instance, children living in Canada who

were born to individuals themselves born outside of Canada are often referred to in

research contexts as ‘second-generation immigrants,’ even if the children were born in

Canada. Imprecision in analytical contexts might also arise from self-identification (or

non-identification) as an immigrant, or in the context of acquired citizenship. In other

words, in an analytical setting, it is not always clear when someone is, is not, or is no

longer an immigrant.

Li’s (2003a) third way in which immigrants can be socially constructed pertains

to the bureaucratic definition of immigrants; this form of social construction is of

central importance in the present thesis. In a bureaucratic context, individuals are

constructed as ‘immigrants’ based on their legislative status. Nationals from other

countries who are granted legal admission to Canada as permanent residents are

bureaucratically constructed as ‘immigrants’ until they become Canadian citizens, at

which point their designation as immigrants would cease from a bureaucratic

standpoint, as these individuals would legally enjoy the same privileges and rights as

native-born Canadians. At the same time, this bureaucratic shift from ‘immigrant’ to

‘Canadian’ precludes access to immigrant settlement services, despite the possibility

that these services may still be of value to newly defined citizens.

As this typology suggests, the notion of an ‘immigrant’ is surrounded by

ambiguities and imprecision, despite typically being used as if it were straightforward

and unambiguous. The present thesis reveals that, in the Canadian context, these

different constructions of immigrants are often intertwined in complex ways, and are

illustrative of broader tensions relating to the social imagining of Canada as a nation.

Moreover, the present thesis reveals that the social construction of immigrants is about

much more than just immigrants. Indeed, the thesis illustrates that focusing exclusively

on the social construction of immigrants ignores the broader effect of these

representations in constructing other constituent parts of the Canadian nation. The thesis

demonstrates that constructions of immigrants are not exclusively about immigrants but,

rather, serve as a key means for defining the Canadian national community and this

community’s identity. As background to the thesis’ analysis, it is necessary to briefly

review the history of Canadian immigration and the contemporary context of immigrant

admission and immigration debates. The remaining sections of this chapter offer this

background.

1.2 Building Canada’s Imagined Community: A History of Immigration

Canada’s post-Confederation immigration history is discussed in more detail in Chapter

Three, and an overview of Canadian immigration levels is located in Appendix A. For

now, however, it is relevant to briefly document the extent to which constructions of

immigrants have been a longstanding feature of Canadian nation-building.

Canada was founded as a settler society whose government actively sought to

build a ‘White’ nation through immigration by enacting policies to attract ‘desirable’

immigrants and to exclude or marginalize ‘undesirable’ immigrants (Stasiulis &

Jhappan, 1995). Indeed, as Canada was settled and built as a nation, the immigration

program was structured so as to promote the long-term settlement of persons and

families who were seen as ideal future citizens (that is, who could and would become

‘insiders’ to the Canadian national community) and to discourage or outright prohibit

the settlement of migrants who were viewed as inherently incompatible with the

longterm vision of the nation (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995; Satzewich, 1998a;

Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997). Public and political discourses, as

represented by immigration policies, published documents, public forums, politicians’

speeches, etc., reflected these ideological biases in both explicit and implicit ways.

The precise features of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ immigrants, and the manner

in which these features were defined in discourse, have varied to some degree over time,

depending on social norms and the economic and demographic needs of the

Canadian nation at any given point in time. For the first century of Canada’s

postConfederation immigration history, the distinction between ‘insiders’ and

‘outsiders’ was explicitly structured along lines of ‘race,’ ethnicity, and/or national

origin (Abella & Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd & Vickers, 2000;

Calliste, 1993;

Das Gupta, 1995; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1972; Li, 1998; Satzewich, 1989a,

1989b; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thompson & Weinfeld,

1995; Whitaker, 1991). The settlement of British, Western European, and American

immigrants was typically preferred, while the settlement of other immigrants was

discouraged or prohibited (Li, 2003a). Although some ‘non-preferred’ immigrants were

granted entry to the country throughout the nation’s early immigration history, often as

needed for immediate labour purposes, they remained marginalized ‘Others’ who were

excluded from the full privileges afforded to ‘White’ settlers (Stasiulis & Jhappan,

1995). Moreover, the intersection between the ideological construction of a ‘White

Canada’ and the economic needs of the growing nation interacted with gender and

social class in relation to norms of appropriate work and social roles. To this end,

immigrants, immigrant families, and the Canadian nation were constructed along

intersecting lines of race, gender, and social class (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995;

Stasiulis, 1985; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 2000; 1999, 1998). These points

are clarified in Chapter Three.

Since the late 1960s, the composition of the immigration population to Canada

has changed considerably compared to the first century of post-Confederation

immigration. During the 1960s, in the midst of growing social and political commitment

to principles of equality and non-discrimination, the Canadian government liberalized

the immigration system, abandoning the longstanding “nationality preference system”

(Simmons, 1990: 141) of immigrant selection. In the new system introduced in the

1960s, immigrants were selected according to ‘objective’ criteria pertaining to

individual skills and family relationships. As a result of these changes, the nation

witnessed a ‘new wave’ of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries,

including Asia, Africa, and Latin America (see Simmons, 1990). Moreover, increased

allowances for family reunification meant that a growing number of immigrants were

arriving in Canada on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident

or citizen. Notably, this change in immigration patterns sparked a controversy regarding

‘family’ immigration that has persisted for the past 50 years, and has come to occupy a

prominent place in Canadian public and political discourses on immigration. This

debate is discussed in Section 1.4 of this chapter.

Over time, non-European source countries have come to provide an increasingly

substantial portion of Canada’s annual intake of immigrants. For instance, 87.1% of all

immigrants admitted to Canada between 1946 and 1955 arrived from Europe (including

Britain, which alone accounted for 29.3% of immigrants over this time period); in

contrast, between 1979 and 2000, only 22.5% of all immigrants to Canada arrived from

Europe (with a total of only 5.1% from Britain), while 53.8% arrived from Asia. In

2008, only 20.9% of immigrants arrived from the United States, Europe, and the United

Kingdom (CIC, 2009b). These changes have been associated with a transformation of

the cultural landscape of Canada; as Simmons (2010) notes, “immigrants from Africa,

Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America have brought and continue to bring new

nationalities, languages, and cultures to Canada” (p.114). The growth in non-European

immigration source countries has also entailed a transformation of the ‘face’ of the

nation since the 1960s, with ever-increasing proportions of visible minorities

constituting the Canadian population. For instance, in 1981, 4.7% of Canada’s total

population was considered a visible minority (Statistics Canada, 1998). By 1991, this

proportion had increased to 7.7% (Statistics Canada, 1993). Fifteen years later, this

proportion had more than doubled, with the 2006 Census recording over 5 million

persons, or approximately 16.2% of Canada’s population, as visible minorities

(Statistics Canada, 2008).

1.3 A Brief Summary of Current Immigration in Canada

Broadly speaking, migrants to Canada are granted entry as either temporary residents or

permanent residents. Temporary residents are migrants who enter Canada for a defined

period of time. This group includes visitors, temporary workers, and students (see

http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp). There are various streams of admission for

immigrants whose entry is premised on the expectation of permanent residence (and

possible citizenship). Under current immigration legislation (the 2002 Immigration and

Refugee Protection Act – IRPA), permanent residents fall under one of three categories:

(1) economic immigrants, whose admission is based on their human capital and is

geared toward national economic development; (2) family-class immigrants, whose

admission is associated with social goals – specifically, the reunification of families;

and (3) refugees, whose admission is based on humanitarian considerations involving

Canada’s international obligation to protect individuals affected by imminent danger or

undue persecution (see Statutes of Canada, 2001). Importantly, although ‘immigrant’ and

‘refugee’ are legal categories, affecting individuals’ material reality in Canada (for

instance, in terms of access to settlement services), they can also be seen as discursive

constructions, in that they reflect ideological biases and constitute immigrants as objects

bearing institutionally defined characteristics.

In terms of these bureaucratic categories, the present thesis is most specifically

interested in family-class and economic immigrants (but also more broadly considers

‘immigrants’ insofar as this concept is articulated in discourse without being further

defined). In the current immigration legislation, the immigration program (associated

primarily with economic and social objectives) and the refugee program (associated

with humanitarian objectives) are guided by distinct regulations. Temporary labour

migration streams are also regulated by discrete policies and programs (see

http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/index.asp). Moreover, permanent resident

immigrants, refugees and temporary workers are generally treated as distinct groups in

the sociological literature and in public discourse, and thus, to some extent, are seen as

occupying unique sociological spaces. Although the decision to focus on economic

immigrants and family-class immigrants in this thesis may reinforce the notion that

bureaucratic categorizations are a meaningful way of identifying and constructing

immigrants, it is not meant to reify these distinctions, nor is it intended to indicate

support for bureaucratic categorization as the best way of defining immigrants. Rather,

it is merely a decision based on the existing nature of Canadian immigration, and a

means of providing a manageable scope for the present research.

1.31 Economic Immigrants

As described in the IRPA, economic immigrants are foreign nationals selected on the

basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada. This category

includes skilled workers, the self-employed, entrepreneurs, investors, and certain

provincial/territorial nominees (Statutes of Canada, 2001). Skilled workers are selected

through the point system, wherein they are evaluated according to a number of

‘objective’ criteria (specifically, education, language skills, experience, age, arranged

employment, and adaptability), each of which is associated with a defined number of

possible points. If an applicant’s total score exceeds the designated cut-off (currently, 67

points), they are eligible for entry as a permanent resident, providing that other criteria

for entry to Canada (such as health and security checks) are met (see

http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp). Business class

immigrants (including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) are granted entry based on

their likelihood of success in a business, athletic, or cultural venture in Canada, as

defined by different criteria depending on the activities in which the immigrant intends

to be involved (see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/business/index.asp).

‘Investor’ immigrants are required to have a net worth of at least $800,000 and are

required to invest a minimum of $400,000 in a business project in Canada. Eligible

spouses and dependents who accompany principal applicants are also enumerated as

economic immigrants. Notably, however, as the upcoming chapters illustrate, this

bureaucratic classification does not mean that economic-class spouses and principal

applicants are socially constructed in comparable terms. This disjuncture is discussed

throughout the thesis.

1.32 Family-Class Immigrants

Family-class status is reserved for immigrants who join a family member already

residing in Canada as a permanent resident or a citizen. These immigrants are granted

entry on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident/citizen, be it

a spouse, a child, a parent, etc. (in addition to health and security criteria) (Statutes of

Canada, 2001). Family-class immigration occurs in contexts of family reunification and

family formation (Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Merali, 2009, 2008). In somewhat of a

simplification of often complex processes, the first instance involves reunification of

families that pre-existed the migration of one or more member of the family, and thus

pertains to families that were geographically split by the migration process. This type of

migration is a common arrangement wherein one family member migrates first, and is

later ‘followed’ by other family members, known as ‘chain migration’ (Boyle et al.,

1998; Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Massey et al., 1994). Conceptually, this process

implies an active leader (a pioneer migrant), and a passive, dependent, follower. The

second sub-category of family-class immigration involves establishing new families in

various ways, such as through transnational marriages (e.g., culturally arranged

marriages, mail-order brides, new partners encountered over the Internet or through

travel, etc.) (Constable, 2003; Lauser, 2008, 2006; Merali, 2009, 2008; Piper & Roces,

2003).

Importantly, both family reunification and family formation are gendered

processes that materially and ideologically construct the secondary immigrant (most

often a woman) within relations of dependence (Boyd, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Merali,

2009, 2008; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). In the Canadian context, this construction of

dependence is tied into the legislative requirements associated with family-class

immigration. Under existing legislation, family-class immigrants are eligible for entry

into Canada only if a Canadian citizen or permanent resident signs a ‘sponsorship

agreement.’ With this agreement, sponsors commit to being financially responsible for

their sponsored family member for a minimum of three to ten years after the immigrant

acquires permanent resident status (with the specific length of time depending on the

type of family relationship between the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant). With this

commitment, the sponsor agrees to pay for any sponsored immigrant’s “food, shelter,

clothing, necessary goods or services, and health and dental care not already covered”

(CIC, 2010a: 47). For spouses or partners sponsored into the country under the family

class, the sponsor’s financial obligation is set at three years after the sponsored

immigrant becomes a permanent resident; this time period was set in 2002, at which

time it was lowered from the previous commitment of ten years. This change was

brought about in part by political activism relating to the potential dangers that

legislated dependence could entail for sponsored immigrants (for instance, in cases of

domestic violence; see Côté et al., 2001; Narayan, 1995; Thobani, 1999; Vukov, 2003;

Walton-Roberts, 2004a).

As previously noted, family-class immigration, including the sponsorship

program, has long stood as a topic of notable debate in the Canadian immigration

discourse, commonly addressed by both women’s advocates and immigration critics.

Immigrant advocates commonly emphasize the gendered nature of spousal sponsorship;

in this regard, some argue the need to abandon sponsorship requirements altogether,

pointing out that women who migrate through marriage are highly vulnerable in light of

their precarious status in society and the unequal power relations entailed in the

sponsorship process (Côté et al., 2001). Others maintain that the sponsorship process is

needed in order to ensure financial security for incoming spouses (Walton-Roberts,

2004a). For their part, immigration critics problematize family-class immigration and

the sponsorship program based on claims that immigrants entering the country through

this route impose a financial burden on the Canadian system, emphasizing that the

financial responsibility of sponsors is insufficiently enforced (see, for example, Francis,

2002a, 2002b, 1993). As illustrated in this thesis, the contention that family-class

immigration is a national burden represents a central theme around which this group of

immigrants is constructed in immigration discourses. The present thesis uncovers in

detail the contours of these social constructions of family-class immigrants, interpreted

in terms of the impact of these representations in symbolically positioning family-class

immigrants to the Canadian national community.

1.4 Canadian Immigration Discourse

At the heart of the present study is the contention that immigration discourse is a central

site for constructing the Canadian national imagined community, including the social

groups that inhabit this community, those that stand on its margins, and those that stand

outside its borders. In the Canadian context, the ‘immigration question’ speaks directly

to the imagining of the Canadian national community. This ‘question’ commonly

revolves around the theme of balance: balance between admitting ‘too many’ or ‘too

few’ immigrants into the country with respect to economic and demographic needs;

balance between the economic and the social goals of the immigration program; and

balance between the costs and the benefits associated with being a country of largescale

immigration (Puttagunta, 1998). Much of this debate over ‘balance’ translates into a

debate over the type of immigrants (and the respective volume of these groups) being

admitted into the country.

Broadly speaking, the ‘balance’ discourse is indicative of a widespread

utilitarian mentality and a widely held belief “[…] that the worth of immigrants is

contingent on the ability of newcomers to benefit the existing population in Canada” (Li

2003a: 164). Indeed, although immigration has long been justified on grounds of

national economic benefit, public and political discourses on immigration have

increasingly emphasized the value of immigrant ‘self-sufficiency,’ particularly since the

1990s, at which time Canada underwent a widespread process of neo-liberal

restructuring (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Arat-Koc, 1999). In this context, ‘ideal’

immigrants are those who will enrich the Canadian labour market with their skills and

who will not ‘drain’ public resources by relying on welfare and other social programs.

As it commonly plays out in the public and political discourse on immigration, this

ideology translates into a clear and unquestioned preference for economic immigrants

(and skilled worker principal applicants in particular), and a widespread

problematization of family-class immigration (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Creese et al.,

2008; Deshaw, 2006; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b, 1998).

Indeed, family-class immigration represents a common target for vocal critics of the

country’s immigration program (see Campbell, 2000, 1989; Collacott, 2002; Francis,

2002b; Gwyn, 1995; Stoffman, 2002, 1993). These critics most commonly espouse two

major classes of arguments: first, that admission of family-class immigrants results in

the exclusion of skilled and talented immigrants; and second, that family-class

immigrants place a burden on the public purse because they are not self-sufficient and

commonly rely on government assistance. In the public and political discourse

surrounding immigration, family-class immigrants are thus constructed as being “less

able [than economic immigrants] to integrate, more likely to go on welfare, and in

general more of a burden to Canadian society” (Abu-Laban 1998b: 201). Anti-

familyclass immigration arguments also imply this form of immigration represents a

detriment to the Canadian nation because it allows entry to those who will detract from

the country’s well-being at the expense of those who would be able to contribute to

Canadian prosperity (Puttagunta, 1998).

The remainder of this thesis elaborates on portrayals of immigrants in various

discourses, with a focus, whenever possible, on distinctions between economic and

family-class immigrants, and on the ‘racial’/ethnic and gendered nature of

representations. The thesis documents the subtleties, continuities, and contradictions of

these representations within and across different discourses, and demonstrates that the

social construction of immigrants serves distinct purposes and is revealing of broader

social concerns that are uncovered by linking representations of immigrants to the social

context within which they are articulated. The thesis links these representations to the

social construction of the Canadian ‘imagined community,’ demonstrating the central

role that the social construction of immigrants plays in defining ‘Canadians,’ the

Canadian state, and the Canadian nation.

1.5 Thesis Outline

Chapter Two describes the theoretical and methodological background for this thesis,

including an explanation of the overarching theoretical framework, definitions of key

concepts, and an explanation of critical discourse analysis as a methodology. Chapter

Three provides a critical examination of post-Confederation immigration history with a

focus on the intersections between economic and family-class immigration streams.

Chapters Four to Six constitute the thesis’ original data analysis. Each of these chapters

uses a different data set (to be described in each individual chapter), and focuses on a

different ‘type’ of discourse. More specifically, Chapter Four offers an analysis of print

news media, focusing on the social construction of a particular sub-group of familyclass

immigrants in Canada (namely, “marriage” immigrants); Chapter Five considers

immigration policy discourse; Chapter Six addresses analytical discourse (represented

by official measurement of immigrants, in the form of the Longitudinal Survey of

Immigrants to Canada). A focused literature review and a description of the specific

methods used for selecting and analyzing data are provided in these individual chapters.

Chapter Seven brings together the findings from the three analysis chapters to offer an

overarching conclusion regarding discourse and the construction of Canada’s imagined

community.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

“One of the key tenets of contemporary social theory is to

question the ideological construction of social categories and to

seek to uncover the material interests that such categorizations

inevitably serve” (White & Jackson, 1995: 15).

“We are surrounded by and immersed in discourses. They inhabit

all written and spoken material and are embedded in all systems

of signification” (Burr, 1995: 141).

2.0 Introduction

Overarching the individual theoretical frameworks guiding Chapters Four, Five, and Six

is a larger framework that informs this thesis as a whole. The thesis draws on a wide

range of perspectives that share an inherent epistemological affinity and that are highly

amenable to the methodology of critical discourse analysis. The present chapter outlines

these perspectives, and defines key concepts that surface throughout the thesis. First, the

overarching ideas of social constructionism, discourse, and the concepts of power and

ideology are described. Next, two main theoretical frameworks used in the thesis,

Imagined Communities and Imagined Futures, are discussed. From here, additional key

concepts (namely, race, racism, racialization, ethnicity, and gender) are defined in terms

of how they are employed in the present thesis. Having laid this conceptual

groundwork, the chapter concludes by summarizing the methodological principles of

critical discourse analysis that underlie the thesis’ analytical approach.

2.1 Social Constructionism

At the heart of theories of social constructionism is the understanding that categories are

used to structure experience and to understand the social world (Jackson & Penrose,

1993). Proponents of social constructionism contend that knowledge and reality are

produced and sustained by social processes whereby information about the world is

constructed in such a way as to provide a framework of understanding. From this

perspective, characteristics of individuals or groups, as well as social relationships

between people and groups (including unequal relationships), are often accepted as

natural or legitimate, when, in fact, they have been socially constructed. For instance,

using Hacking’s (2000) example, a ‘woman refugee’ can be understood as a social

construction:

What is socially constructed is not, in the first instance, the individual

people, the women refugees. It is the classification, woman refugee. […]

This way of classifying people is the product of social events, of

legislation, of social workers, of immigrant groups, of activists, of lawyers,

and of the activities of the women involved. This kind of person, as a

specific kind of person, is socially constructed. Or simply: the idea of the

woman refugee is constructed (p.10).

To this end, social constructionism questions essentialist views of the social world, and

problematizes taken-for-granted knowledge that is traditionally viewed as ‘natural,’

unbiased, or objective (Burr, 1995; Jackson & Penrose, 1993). Social constructionist

theories are critical of the status quo, and demand that a range of ‘givens’ be questioned

and re-evaluated (Burr, 1995; Hacking, 2000). A social constructionist perspective

involves identifying the components and processes of category construction. In this

context, the objective is not to demonstrate that categories are ‘false,’ but, rather, to

illustrate that they are not ‘natural’ and, as such, serve a social purpose. Insofar as

existing categories are exposed as constructs, they can be deconstructed so as to

“disempower them or appropriate their intrinsic power, to achieve more equitable ends”

(Jackson & Penrose, 1993:2).

2.2 Dominant Discourses: Elites, Orthodoxy, Ideology, and Power The notion of

discourse as a scientific construct was popularized by 20th century philosophers and

post-structuralists, and is commonly associated in the social sciences with philosopher

Michel Foucault and cultural theorist Stuart Hall. Broadly speaking, a discourse is a

body of representations (including written and spoken words, images, ideas, etc.) that

create meaning regarding a particular topic (Lilja, 2009). As defined more specifically

by Hall (1997):

Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a

particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and

practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and

conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional

site in society. These discursive formations, as they are known, define what

is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in relation

to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge is

considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sorts of

persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics (p. 6).

Discourses are a central site of social construction, and inform social practices by

providing meanings and by defining the social world (Lilja, 2009).

The present thesis focuses on dominant discourses pertaining to immigration

(namely, discourses originating from various components of the Canadian state and

from the Canadian news media). A discourse is distinguished as ‘dominant’ on the basis

of its connection to elite groups and structures in society, its power to be ‘heard’ and

‘seen’ in society, and its ubiquity as a framework for interpreting social life (relative to

other possible frameworks). As van Dijk (1989) explains:

It is the symbolic elite and its discourses that control the types of

discourses, the topics, the types and the amount of information, the

selection or censoring of arguments, and the nature of rhetorical

operations. These conditions essentially determine the contents and the

organization of public knowledge, the hierarchies of beliefs, and the

pervasiveness of the consensus, which in turn are potent factors in the

formation and the reproduction of opinions, attitudes, and ideologies (van

Dijk, 1989: 25-6).

The concept of ‘symbolic elites’ underlies the notion of dominant discourse employed in

this thesis. This term refers to groups (such as state actors and journalists) who are

implicated in the construction of dominant discourses through their privileged access to

powerful institutions and instruments in society (such as the mass media) (see van Dijk,

2006, 1996). Although the boundaries surrounding such a definition may not be precise,

symbolic elites can be broadly understood as “those who control the means of

communication and who are engaged in the manufacturing of public opinion” (van

Dijk, 1993b: x).

Importantly, scholars often argue that dominant discourses are characterized by

considerable ideological and linguistic coherence, and share a normative framework

rooted in the (conscious or unconscious) desire of elites to maintain the status quo.

Often, these discourses are interpreted in terms of hegemony (see Karim, 1993; Li,

2003c; Lilja, 2009; Williams, 1977). In contrast, from the perspective employed in this

thesis, dominant discourses on immigration are better understood in reference to Pierre

Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of orthodoxy. In Bourdieu’s formulation, social knowledge

consists of two fields, or ‘universes’: the universe of the undisputed (doxa), and the

universe of the disputed (consisting of heterodox and orthodox discourses). Doxa

consists of social knowledge that, at a given point in time in a given society, is taken for

granted and unquestioned. Doxa can thus be understood as that which “goes without

saying because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu, 1977: 167). Embedded in doxa is

the implication that the existing nature of the social (and natural) world is not only

legitimate, but entirely natural and incapable of human modification. Dominant groups

hold interest in protecting doxa, while dominated groups hold interest in advancing

discourses that push back the boundaries of doxa. The universe of discourse offers this

possibility in the form of heterodoxy. Heterodoxy consists of the radical arguments,

experiences, and suggestions that protest the order of the world laid out in doxa. In other

words, although doxa is upheld by dominant groups as being beyond question, it can be

brought into crisis and transformed through heterodox discourses that identify

alternative possibilities to the existing social order (that is, the constructed systems of

classification associated with the status quo).

In the presence of heterodoxy, another field of discourse – orthodoxy – emerges.

Orthodoxy represents the realm of dominant discourses, which offer manifestly

legitimate ways of thinking about the social and natural world. These discourses are

advanced to protect the integrity of doxa, and operate (albeit imperfectly) to protect the

interests of the dominant classes and preserve the status quo. Orthodoxy thus represents

the “imperfect substitute” (Bourdieu, 1977: 169) of doxa, geared toward rendering

heterodox discourses illegitimate opinions rather than viable alternatives to doxa.

Depending on the effectiveness of orthodoxy, heterodox discourses will be silenced to

greater or lesser degrees, which in turn affects the extent to which doxa is preserved or

altered.

Underlying this framework is the understanding that dominant discourses (the

universe of orthodoxy) act as vehicles of ideology. Ideology, as a theoretical construct,

has been understood and employed in different ways throughout the history of the

sociology, and remains variably defined across different approaches (see Mannheim,

1997; Minar, 1961; van Dijk, 2000). Although the notion of ideology can be traced back

at least as far as the French Revolution (see Hunt, 2004), the concept is commonly

associated with Marxism and its various theoretical offshoots (Hunt, 2004; Mannheim,

1997). In the work of George Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci, for instance, ideology is

understood in relation to false consciousness. Lukacs argues that false consciousness

emerges out of the practices of life in capitalist society, wherein impersonal economic

exchanges constitute the basis of most social relations, such that the socially constructed

nature of class inequality is obscured by the structure of capitalist production and

exchange. This leads to false consciousness regarding the reality of class oppression.

False consciousness benefits the bourgeoisie and is detrimental to the working class in

light of the fact that it preserves the status quo. In this context, ideologies serve as

explanations and justifications for the visible contradictions between the circumstances

of the capitalists and the working poor in capitalist societies (see Lukacs, 1971). Also

addressing class inequality in capitalist societies, Antonio Gramsci (1971) contends that

ideologies are normative sets of ideas and beliefs that guide observations and

interpretations of the capitalist social world. In Gramsci’s understanding, by virtue of its

general and intellectual subordination to the capitalist class, the working class adopts

ideologies that legitimate its oppression. In this context, social change is theorized as

coming about when the working class adopts a revolutionary ideology. Drawing on these

various ideas but stepping outside of the link between capitalism, false consciousness,

and ideology, Henry and Tator (2002) offer a useful definition that captures the manner

in which ideology is understood in the present thesis. According to the authors, an

ideology is:

A complex set of ideas that attempts to explain, justify, legitimate, and

perpetuate the circumstances in which a collectivity finds itself. It provides

the basis for guiding behaviour, making sense of the world, imparting

meaning to life, instilling a common bond among group members, and

explaining situations. Ideology provides a framework for organizing,

legitimizing, and maintaining relations of power and decision-making at

all levels in institutions and systems (Henry & Tator, 2002: 246).

Ideologies are propagated, in part, through discourses that represent and construct the

social world, including different groups of people, the relationships between them, and

their respective relationships with other entities and institutions in a given society at a

given point in time. In other words, ideologies operate in discourses that both reflect

existing ideologies and contribute to their stability (or their modification) (see van Dijk,

2002, 1989).

As the above discussion suggests, the notions of symbolic elites, orthodoxy and

ideology are all linked to the idea of social power. Power, a widely used concept in

sociology, is the source of considerable debate in terms of its meaning and analytical

usefulness (Grabb, 2007). This issue notwithstanding, the notion of power is commonly

invoked in critical discourse analysis, and is intimately intertwined with the notion of

dominant discourses, elites, and orthodoxy. Power is understood in the present thesis in

social (rather that personal/individual) terms. Social power is a property of the

relationship between social groups, premised upon differential access to, and control

over, limited social resources (van Dijk, 1995, 1989). It can be broadly defined in the

context of structured inequality, wherein dominant social groups have the capacity and

resources to enact processes and strategies geared toward the legitimation of inequality

and the preservation of the status quo (Grabb, 2007). In this regard, “the exercise and

maintenance of social power presupposes an ideological framework [which] is mainly

acquired, confirmed, or changed through communication and discourse” (van Dijk,

1989: 21). As previously discussed, dominant groups utilize orthodox discourses to

support the status quo (including their positions of power) while oppressed groups

deploy heterodox discourses to protest unequal social conditions. Deconstructing

discourse thus affords the opportunity to identify manifestations of social power, as well

as strategies that aim to resist inequality.

2.3 Imagined Communities

Benedict Anderson’s treatise on nationalism, Imagined Communities, offers an

important starting point for the present thesis, and can be tied to social constructionism,

orthodox discourses, and the other associated concepts discussed thus far in this chapter.

Based on an examination of the historical development of nation-states around the

world, Anderson argues that nation-building efforts on behalf of economic and political

elites revolve around creating a shared sense of belonging among all constituents of the

nation-state. In this understanding, a nation is a geographical, cultural, and ideological

entity with four defining features. First, it is “imagined because the members of even

the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even

hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson,

2006: 6). Second, it is “sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which the

Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained,

hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson, 2006: 7). Third, it is “limited because even the

largest [nation], encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if

elastic boundaries” (Anderson, 2006: 7). Finally, a nation can be conceptualized as “a

community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail

in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson,

2006: 7). As part of nation-building strategies employed by national elites, the creation

of imagined communities was an intentional process that was historically facilitated by

the spread of literacy and the development of mass media and improved modes of

communication. State actors and other elites, through access to various tools and

discourses (such as media and school curricula), are able to create a shared sense of

nationhood that legitimates particular sets of values, beliefs, and practices, and that

obscures internal fragmentation and diverse (non-national) forms of identification (such

as those based on ethnicity or religion).

Viewing a nation as an imagined, sovereign, limited community entails a series

of assumptions and implications that are highly pertinent to immigration discourse and,

thus, to the present thesis. First, insofar as a community is imagined, its reality lies in its

social construction. In this context, a nation is a cultural artifact that brings with it an

ideology of national belonging around which inclusion in the nation is premised. Yet,

given that a nation is limited, it is necessarily characterized by exclusion. To this end,

the construction of ‘us,’ as members of a shared imagined community, involves a

counter-construction of ‘them,’ consisting of ‘Others’ who do not fall within the

boundaries of the nation. Finally, Anderson’s articulation of the importance of modes of

communication and the role of elites in the construction of imagined communities

suggests the relevance of dominant discourses in symbolic nation-building strategies.

Indeed, as Creese (2007) explains, “imagined communities operate through discourses

[…] that tend to homogenize and erase differences internal to the nation, and separate

citizens from (both internally and externally located) ‘Others’” (Creese, 2007: 354). The

historical centrality of dominant discourses in nation-building highlights the relevance

of studying prevailing discourses with an eye to how they contribute to the social

construction of national imagined communities in contemporary contexts.

2.4 Imagined Futures

Alan Simmons offers a particularly useful expansion on Anderson’s notion of imagined

communities by directly addressing immigration policy (which, notably, was not

explicitly addressed by Anderson). For Simmons, each phase of a nation’s history can

be understood in terms of a prevailing vision of the nation’s future (that is, an ‘imagined

future’) around which nation-building efforts are constructed. Nation-building, in this

context, is “a historical process guided by political leaders through their implementation

of relatively coherent policy packages covering economic growth, trade, immigration,

and cultural goals and strategies, as well as other related matters” (Simmons, 2010: 14)

(see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy

Source: Reproduced from Simmons (1999: 35)

In developing policies, political leaders and policy advisors consider the various

combinations of policy options, and decide upon the most appropriate strategy for

achieving the desired ‘imagined future.’ Imagined futures are thus ‘conceptual spaces’

wherein nation-building is negotiated and planned (Simmons, 1999).

Depending on the historical circumstances and the nation-building goals being

pursued at any given point in time, there will varying degrees of tension involved in

determining the most complementary set of policies. In an over-simplified example,

political leaders may struggle to determine the best policy package for a nation in

instances where the nation’s imagined future requires a high level of immigration to

meet labour demands, the prevailing vision of the population is monocultural in nature,

and immigrants are only available from ‘non-preferred’ cultural sources. Alternatively,

if a pluralistic vision of the nation exists under the same circumstances, developing a

coherent policy package would be (in principle) less challenging.

As this description suggests, immigration policy does not emerge as an

independent and isolated decision, but is integrated into state leaders’ broader vision for

the nation within an international system. It follows that, depending on broader goals

CONTEXT

Nation’s position in the international system

Trade options

and preferences

Immigration options

and preferences

IMAGINED FUTURE

Cultural identity

options and

preferences

POLICY PROCESS

OUTCOMES

Immigrant integration?

Transformation of society?

and policy directions, immigration flows will wax and wane, and different immigrants

will be considered more or less ‘ideal’ with respect to their ‘fit’ with a nation’s imagined

future. On a related point, it is important to note that the formulation of a policy package

is based on assumptions about the ‘fit’ between various policies and, in the case of

immigration, the success of newcomers with respect to their ‘imagined’ role in building

the nation. At any given point in time, immigration policies (and the other policies with

which they are intertwined) will continue to make sense only insofar as they enable the

nation’s goals (as defined by political leaders) to be realized:

For example, if Canada’s hopes for future exports are not realized, the logic

of a policy favouring the immigration of skilled foreign labour and

entrepreneurs will be called into question. The skilled workers will be

without jobs and the entrepreneurs will seek greener pastures elsewhere

(Simmons, 1999: 46).

Given that immigration is an arena where economic and cultural values intersect

(Simmons, 1999), any imagined future will be based on the assumption that the cultural

identity of the nation will not be threatened by immigration, and that newcomers will be

accepted into the nation. Thus, if immigration policies are constructed around a

multicultural national vision, the assumption is that immigrants from diverse countries

and backgrounds will integrate into their receiving society, and that immigration will

not stimulate social conflict (Simmons, 1999).

The present thesis draws on Simmons’ useful framework, but approaches it from

a slightly different angle by focusing on discourse. More specifically, insofar as

Canadian immigration policies are based on a particular vision of the nation, then the

discourse advanced by the state can be expected to reflect and reconstruct that vision,

and to reiterate its underlying ideologies. Other dominant discourses can be expected to

echo the ideological underpinnings of state discourses based on their shared status as

orthodox discourses and their common role in protecting the status quo. To this end, the

concrete policies associated with any given imagined future are seen here as reflecting

and supporting particular ideologies; the present thesis thus explores how these

ideologies manifest in dominant discourse on immigration.

2.5 Additional Concepts

The present section outlines additional concepts that surface at various points in this

thesis and that are embedded to greater or lesser degrees in the construction of Canada’s

imagined community. The section specifically defines the manner in which the terms

nation, country, state, race, racialization, racism, ethnicity, and gender are understood

and used in the remainder of the thesis.

2.51 Nation, Country, and State

Throughout the thesis, the terms nation, country, and state are used to refer to related

concepts that are highly relevant to immigration. In this thesis, ‘Canada’ as a country, is

understood as a sovereign territorial entity that is separated from the remainder of the

world by its geopolitical boundaries. The Canadian nation is understood in the thesis as

a social construction; it is the community that is imagined (here, in media, policy, and

official measurement discourse) as corresponding to Canada (the country). This

understanding adheres to Anderson’s (2006) view of nations (see section 2.3 of the

present chapter). It is, however, critical to acknowledge that using the term ‘Canadian

nation’ is not meant to imply the existence of a monolithic, uniform nation. The use of

this term is not intended to suggest that all individuals contained within the geopolitical

boundaries of Canada share a sense of belonging to a unified ‘Canadian nation.’ For

instance, First Nations communities and Québec are widely regarded as distinct nations

residing within the geopolitical boundaries of Canada (the country). Yet, it is the

contention of the present thesis that, in media, policy, and official measurement

discourse, an ambiguously defined ‘Canadian nation’ is imagined, in neglect of the fact

that internal ‘national’ divisions exist within the country (i.e., the fact that there are

multiple communities within Canada that imagine themselves as being nations). Finally,

the term ‘state’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the set of institutions that are

manned by a heterogeneous group of actors who, as a collectivity, are charged with

carrying out the regulatory and administrative capacities associated with overseeing the

constituent population (including citizens, permanent residents, and temporary

residents). Although the government (at the federal level) is the component of the state

most relevant to the present thesis, the term ‘state’ is also frequently used in light of the

fact that the government is not seen as an independent entity but, rather, is understood

as being part of an overarching social structure (the state) that, as a whole, operates on

the basis of a shared organizational and bureaucratic logic, despite internal divisions and

conflicts.

2.52 Race, Racialization, and Racism

The term ‘race’ has had a long history of widespread usage in public, political, and

scholarly discourses. In biological terms, ‘race’ refers to genetic or biological

differences (such as skin colour) that have often served as the basis of scientific and

popular efforts to categorize individuals into ‘racial’ groups. Historically, efforts to

delineate biological ‘races’ coincided with attempts to attribute individual and cultural

competencies to racial difference (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Miles & Brown, 2003;

Satzewich, 1998b). Scientific evidence indicates, however, that phenotypical variation

across human population groups is not indicative of inherent ‘racial’ differences; as

such, the scientific validity of race has largely been rejected in contemporary scholarly

contexts. As Satzewich (1998b) explains:

Things like skin pigmentation certainly vary, and there may very well be

differences in the geographical frequency distribution of certain genes. In

other words, physical and genetic differences between individuals exist,

but these are not race differences. Race is simply the label that has been

used to describe certain kinds of human difference (p.29).

Despite the scientific rejection of the validity of biologically categorizing population

groups on the basis of ‘race,’ the concept of race persists in public, political, and

academic discourses. For instance, race is reified in the legislative definition of visible

minorities in Canada; according to the Employment Equity Act of 1995, visible

minorities are “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race

or non-white in colour”

(http://www12.statcan.ca/censusrecensement/2006/ref/dict/pop127-eng.cfm). It is in

contexts such as this that the notion of ‘racialization’ emerges as a useful framework.

Although there are various definitions of racialization, a useful definition is

offered by Miles and Brown (2003), who use the term “to denote those instances where

social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human

biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social

collectivities” (Miles & Brown, 2003: 101). Racialization can thus be understood as

processes that mark physical bodies with symbolic meaning, to the end of assigning

people to different social locations and organizing social interactions accordingly

(Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Kobayashi & Johnson, 2007). In this understanding,

groups that are ‘marked’ as a certain race are constructed as having specific nonphysical

qualities, such as intellectual capacity, work ethic, beliefs and values, etc. That is,

physical and cultural traits become associated with social attributes, regardless of

whether these associations legitimately exist. These social attributes are constructed as

being the inherent result of ‘racial’ group membership (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). The

traits that are considered salient vary across time and place and are a matter of

contestation and renegotiation, yet are largely contingent on power differentials, with

dominant groups in society holding the power and resources to dictate the

characteristics that define other groups as subordinate (Li, 1988; see also Omi &

Winant, 1994).

Racism and racialization are conceptually interrelated, albeit not coterminous.

Racism can broadly be understood as an ideology, doctrine, or dogma involving a

negative or prejudicial evaluation of a ‘racial’ collectivity (see Back & Solomon, 2000;

Fleras & Elliot, 2003; Henry et al., 2000; Miles & Brown, 2003; Satzewich, 1998b;

Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). In this context, racism presupposes a process of

racialization; groups must first be racialized before they can be evaluated on the basis of

their assigned characteristics. Insofar as these evaluations are prejudicial or negative,

and are rooted in the assumption of shared, inherent, group characteristics, they can be

considered ‘racist.’ Importantly, racism can be explicit or implicit and can operate as

both individual prejudices or as institutional forms of discrimination (of which social

actors may or may not be aware). Moreover, racism can take a variety of forms,

depending on the historical, social, and economic context (Miles & Brown, 2003). As

such, as Satzewich (1998b) explains: “what exists is not so much racism, but rather a

range of racisms […] Part of the task of sociology, then, is to analyze the varied

meanings, expressions, and significance of racism” (p.39). A critical examination of

dominant discourses of immigration in Canada allows for such an analysis, given the

‘racial’ diversity commonly associated with contemporary Canadian immigration

(discussed in Chapter One) and the ideological connection between ‘race’ and the

‘immigration question’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007).

2.53 Ethnicity

Closely linked to the issue of ‘race’ is the concept of ethnicity. In popular discourses, the

terms race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007).

This tendency reflects widespread confusion and conflation surrounding the two

concepts in a variety of contexts, including scholarly settings. As was the case for

‘race,’ the term ‘ethnicity’ is not straightforward to define, despite its widespread usage.

The word ‘ethnic’ has its origin in the Greek word ‘ethnos’ (translated as

‘nation’); in this context, it refers to group membership based on shared descent or

blood ties (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). In the term’s first English usage in the 15th

century, it carried with it the meaning of ‘others’ (in reference to religion) to refer to

persons who were neither Christian nor Jewish (Tonkin et al., 1989). Under these

conditions, ‘ethnicity’ served as a means of drawing boundaries around a religious

imagined community. In sociological contexts, one of the first theorists to offer an

explicit definition of ethnicity was Max Weber, who defined ethnic groups as “those

human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of

similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of

colonization” (Weber, 1968: 389). This definition acknowledges the subjective element

of ethnicity, wherein ethnicity is contingent on a belief in common descent or shared

ties, regardless of whether biological ties exist.

More recently, sociological definitions have addressed ethnicity in terms of

shared cultural characteristics or, in some cases, national origin. Feagin and Feagin

(2003), for instance, define an ethnic group as “a group socially distinguished or set

apart, by others or by itself, primarily on the basis of cultural or national-origin

characteristics” (p.8). Cornell and Hartmann (2007) elaborate on this idea, offering a

useful framework for the concept of ethnicity that reflects the manner in which it is

understood in the present thesis. First, Cornell and Hartmann (2007) note that ethnicity

can be linked to three (real or imagined) features: shared kinship or ancestry (which is

broadly defined, often involving descent from a common homeland); a common

historical trajectory; and symbolic means of group identification. Second, ethnicity is a

matter of contrast, and is thus inherently relational. In other words, “to claim an ethnic

identity (or to attempt to assign one to someone else) is to distinguish ourselves from

others; it is to draw a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on the basis of the claim we

make that ‘we’ share something that ‘they’ do not” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007: 20-21).

Finally, as this latter quote suggests, ethnicity can be a matter of self-identification,

involving self-conscious membership in an ethnic group. Alternatively, ethnicity can be

identified and assigned by external parties, in which case it can be understood as an

ethnic category that may or may not represent the manner in which individuals

selfidentify. In the present thesis, ethnicity is addressed in terms of how it is socially

constructed in discourse; to this end, it is interpreted primarily in relation to ethnic

categorization, based upon relational notions of cultural or national belonging.

2.54 Gender

In the present thesis, gender is understood as a social construction that operates at a

number of levels, ranging from the relations between individual men and women all the

way up to the structural organization of societies. In the social construction of ‘women’

and ‘men,’ the biological distinction between females and males is transformed into

socially significant differences in terms of roles and societal arrangements (Agnew,

2003; Rubin, 1975). In this understanding, the meanings associated with femininity and

masculinity and the differential roles that women and men occupy in society (for

instance, in terms of the family and the household, the economy, the education system,

the state, etc.) are not inevitable outcomes of being female or male but arise through

ongoing processes of social construction (see Ferree, Lorber & Hess, 1999). Gender,

then, is not fixed, but is constructed and reconstructed in given historical and social

contexts (Agnew, 2003). Gender, however, is not seen here as merely a characteristic of

individuals. Rather, it is a constitutive feature of social life that extends beyond socially

constructed meanings pertaining to individual women and men. It is an “organizing

principle of collectivities, social institutions, historical processes, and social practices”

(Nakano Glenn, 1999: 5). As a constitutive feature and central organizing principle of

social life, gender is linked to the allocation of power, privilege, and resources.

In the context of international immigration, gender operates at all stages of the

migration process and experience (Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003). In the

premigration stage, for instance, cultural norms define the opportunity that women and

men have to migrate, as well as the context within which such migration might occur

(i.e., independently as a labour migrant; as part of a family as a dependent, etc.) (Boyd

& Greico, 2003). Critical scholars have argued that contemporary determination

processes involved in the selection of immigrants often appears gender neutral, yet

actually occur within gendered frameworks, thus embedding gender in immigrant

access to receiving countries (see, for example, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997;

Boyd & Grieco, 2003; Mascini & van Bochove, 2009; Ng, 1990; Palriwala & Uberoi,

2008; Sweetman, 1998; Thobani, 1999). Gender is also implicated in the post-migration

stage in terms of the impact of gendered entry status on social rights and entitlements,

and cultural norms in the receiving country (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003;

Boyd & Pikkov, 2005; McKay, 2003; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Sweetman, 1998).

Much like race and racialization, gender is often obscured in ‘neutral’ discourses that do

not acknowledge pre-existing gendered norms and structures. Indeed, insofar as social

practices and processes are organized in gendered ways, then gender neutrality

facilitates the persistence of gender inequality. To this end, the gendered reality

underlying gender neutrality is a necessary consideration of all immigration studies, as

well as all studies of discourse.

2.6 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is highly attuned to the various frameworks and

concepts discussed thus far in the present chapter. CDA involves examining a

discourse’s construction of particular ‘objects’ with an eye to the ideological work it

performs (van Dijk, 1993c). In other words, CDA addresses “how discourse is shaped

by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has on

social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which

are normally apparent to discourse participants” (Fairclough, 1993: 12). From this

perspective, discourse is implicated in the social construction of reality, acting to

constitute identities and structure the social world (Fairclough, 2001).

Although CDA is theoretically and analytically diverse, what is consistent across

all critical approaches to discourse analysis is the contention that there is a de facto

relationship between discourse, power, and social inequality (van Dijk, 1993c). Most

forms of CDA thus focus on the manner in which discursive structures serve to

reproduce dominance and inequality, regardless of the genre or context of discourse

under examination (van Dijk, 2001). As Luke (2002) describes, “critical discourse

analysis […] is an explicitly normative analysis of how texts and discourses work in

ideological interests with powerful political consequences” (p.96).

According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), there are eight main tenets of CDA.

These tenets are briefly described here as general principles, as well as in terms of how

they relate to Canadian immigration and the present thesis.

(1) CDA addresses social problems. In CDA, discourse is examined in the

context of a social concern, pertaining to how discourse is implicated in the

(re)production of systematic inequalities. Thus, for instance, many analyses based on

the principles of CDA have been conducted on racism (see, for example, Goldberg,

1992, 1990; Li, 2007, 2001; Puttagunta, 1998; van Dijk, 1997, 1994, 1987; Wetherell &

Potter, 1992; Wodak, 1996b; Wodak & Matouschek, 1993) as well as on gender

inequality (e.g., Baden & Goetz, 1997; Ehrlich, 2007; Elliott et al., 1995; Kobayashi,

1994; Kondo, 1990; Marling, 2010; Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987). With respect to

Canadian immigration, inequalities along dimensions of ‘race’ and gender represent

important issues that have been addressed by numerous scholars (e.g., Abu-Laban,

1998a, 1998b; Agnew, 2007; Jiwani, 2006; Simmons, 1998; Thobani, 2000). Building

on this work, the present thesis examines dominant discourses more closely to ascertain

the manner in which discourse symbolically includes, marginalizes, or excludes

different groups of immigrants in the construction of Canada’s imagined community.

(2) Power relations are discursive. Dominant forms of discourse (e.g., in

arenas of politics, media, and science) play central roles in sustaining unequal social

relations and supporting discriminatory social structures. One the one hand, accessing

these discourses is a matter of power (van Dijk, 2001). Power is enacted through

discourse by placing certain individuals and groups in the position to constitute the

content of talk and text; this content subsequently plays a role in influencing the

knowledge and opinions of receiving audiences. In other words, groups who control the

most influential discourses have the power to socially construct people, things, and

relationships, to the end of positioning individuals and groups in particular social roles

and establishing, sustaining, and legitimizing unequal social relationships (van Dijk,

2001). With respect to Canadian immigration, the construction of immigrants in

orthodox discourses positions immigrants with respect to Canadian state and society,

and provides the means by which these relationships are to be understood and

rationalized. Dominant discourses also inform broader audiences about immigrants and

immigration, to the end of influencing knowledge and opinions about newcomers, and

providing symbolic resources for naturalizing discrimination against immigrants.

(3) Discourse constitutes society and culture, as well as being constituted by

them. Discourse has a role in reproducing or transforming society and culture, and must

be understood as having a dialectical relationship with the society and culture in which

it occurs. A discourse both informs social practice and is created, upheld, and/or

transformed through practice. In other words, discourse provides meanings that underlie

social practices, while social practices themselves become represented as discursive

formations. Take, for instance, an example offered by Lilja (2009):

Every hijab-wearing woman constitutes a representation within a religious,

sometimes nationalistic discourse, a discourse that she is upholding by

wearing the hijab. She is one representation among many forming an

Islamic discourse. She, acting from her identity, becomes a ‘living

representation’ and a powerful means to strengthen a discourse

(p.8).

In the context of Canadian immigration, relationships between immigrants and

Canadian society, as well as the positioning of different groups of immigrants relative to

one another, are constantly created and reproduced through discourses that socially

construct these groups in particular ways. The manner in which immigrants are

constructed in dominant discourses stands to affect public opinion, political agendas,

and the treatment of immigrants within society. Discourses thus reflect existing

conditions, yet also stand to configure the social life of immigrants (and nonimmigrants)

in symbolic and material ways. Social practices also have the ability to alter dominant

discourses by constituting and strengthening counter-discourses (i.e., heterodoxy).

(4) Discourse does ideological work. As discussed earlier in this chapter,

ideology is a means by which dominant groups exercise control over society – namely,

by legitimating the status quo and thus supporting prevailing power structures and

existing inequalities. In this regard, discourse serves as a conceptual space wherein

ideologies are expressed, often in coded ways, to the end of naturalizing a particular

social order. As Fairclough and Wodak note, “discursive practices may have major

ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power

relations through the ways in which they represent things and position people” (cited in

Wodak, 1996a: 15). With respect to immigration, the social construction of Canada’s

imagined community in discourse is based on ideological underpinnings that can go

unnoticed as ideological formulations in light of their seemingly ‘common sense’

nature.

(5) Discourse is historical. From a sociological perspective, any given

discourse must be considered within its broader context, and is only meaningful if it is

understood in terms of the events and discourses that have preceded it and that surround

it. It follows that uncovering the discursive meaning of given texts and talk necessarily

requires historical and social contextualization. As such, in order to deconstruct

contemporary discourses on Canadian immigration, it is necessary to examine the long

history surrounding immigration in Canada, particularly with respect to immigrants’

place in the Canadian nation and Canadian nation-building efforts; Chapter Three

provides this contextualization.

(6) The link between text and society is mediated. There is necessarily a

mediated relationship between discourse and social practice, involving intervening

socio-cognitive processes through which intentions, beliefs, and ideologies are realized

in discourse, and, likewise, through which interpretations of discourse produce beliefs,

attitudes, knowledge, and behaviours. In terms of discourse analysis, these

sociocognitive processes are most commonly addressed in social psychological

approaches; this is a major topic of study in its own right (see, for instance, Fiske &

Taylor, 1984; Giles & Peterson, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1985). For the present thesis, it is

necessary to acknowledge that there is a ‘black box’ between the content of dominant

immigration discourses and the manner in which their content does or does not affect

identity formation, discriminatory behaviour, and policy formation. The emphasis is this

thesis is on uncovering the ideologies and constructions in particular immigration

discourses, not on determining how these constructions are or are not translated into

attributions or actions. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind throughout the thesis that

a mediating socio-cognitive relationship, albeit undefined here, exists between

discourse and social practice.

(7) Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory. There are likely to be

various readings of any given discourse. In other words, in the context of CDA,

“interpretations are never finished and authoritative, they are dynamic and open”

(Wodak, 1996a: 20). The manner in which dominant immigration discourses are read,

interpreted, and understood in the present thesis is inevitably shaped by the theoretical

and methodological perspective and social location of the analyst – myself. In this

regard, the reading of the immigration discourse offered here is simply one reading that

could be contested by other readings. Rather than being a caveat, this point is seen as

reflective of the complex nature of any social science. Moreover, a critical reading of

discourse, involving systematic efforts to deconstruct a discourse and embed it within

its social conditions, may help to narrow down the range of possible readings and help

to link a particular discourse to ideologies and power relationships. To this end, efforts

were taken throughout the thesis to be transparent, and to provide as much as possible

the textual evidence contributing to the conclusions being drawn. In this way, the reader

is afforded the opportunity to configure an alternative reading of the immigration

discourse.

(8) Discourse is a form of social action. As discussed in point number four

above, CDA is rooted in the contention that analyses of discourse can reveal ideologies

that operate to uphold and legitimize the existing social order. It follows that the

ultimate goal of CDA is to uncover the hidden operation of power and oppression in

discourse, thereby contributing to changes in consciousness and leading to social action.

In this regard, CDA is a “socially committed scientific paradigm” (Young & Fitzgerald,

2006: 24) that encourages both reflective and reflexive thinking. Clearly, expecting

social change to come about from any single analysis, or even multiple analyses, is a

lofty goal. Nevertheless, CDA has had some notable successes in this regard. For

instance, van Dijk’s (1993b) analysis of Dutch school books raised awareness of their

racist undertones, ultimately leading to the production of new school materials (see

Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In terms of the present thesis, although it is not expected

that this work alone will alter orthodox discourses on immigration, it nevertheless

stands to contribute to a literature that contests inequality pertaining to immigration in

Canada.

Overall, these eight principles are implicit in CDA, and will be evident to

greater or lesser degrees throughout the present thesis. As discussed above, some of the

tenets are beyond the scope of the thesis (for instance, the socio-cognitive mediation

between ‘text’ and society), and thus will be not explicitly discussed in the remainder of

the thesis. Nevertheless, these principles provide background for understanding the

methodological usefulness of CDA in the context of this thesis and beyond.

The other frameworks and concepts outlined in the present chapter also inform

the upcoming chapters. Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities

represents the core framework for the thesis, which also draws inspiration from Alan

Simmons’ ‘imagined futures’ approach to immigration policy. The upcoming analysis

chapters elaborate on the manner in which immigration is tied into the social

construction of the contemporary Canadian imagined community, thereby extending

both of these frameworks into the realm of discourse. First, however, it is necessary to

address the history of Canadian immigration in more detail. This history lends insight

into current immigration patterns and controversies. It also sheds light on the relevance

of addressing the notion of imagined communities in reference to immigration, and in

considering the intersection of ‘race,’ gender, and immigrant mode of entry in such an

examination. Chapter Three provides this historical contextualization.

CHAPTER THREE: CANADIAN IMMIGRATION FROM CONFEDERATION

TO THE IRPA

“The exercise of examining the past reminds us that change is

constant and that the present is only the latest installment in an

unfolding story” (Simmons, 2010: 48).

3.0 Introduction

There have been several comprehensive examinations of Canadian immigration history

(see Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007), and nearly

every textbook and scholarly publication on Canadian immigration includes an

abbreviated version of this history. This work has documented the evolution of

immigration policies over time in accordance with economic and nation-building goals,

and has also articulated the widespread discrimination that characterized the first

century of Canadian post-Confederation immigration. Indeed, the manner in which

‘race’/ethnicity, national origin, gender, and social class were implicated in early

Canadian immigration have been well-documented in the existing literature (see, for

example, Abella & Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Bolaria & Li, 1988;

Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Buchignani & Indra, 1985; Calliste, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995;

Elliot & Fleras, 1992; Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Li, 1988; Ng, 1992; Satzewich, 1989a,

1989b; Simmons, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 1998).

Although the present chapter also addresses these issues, it adds to the existing literature

by looking more directly at how and why the ‘family’ entered into immigration policies

and flows, in combination with, and as distinct from, ‘economic’ immigration.

Familybased and economic immigration have both always been a part of Canadian

immigration; however, the relationship between these two types of immigration has

evolved considerably since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869. By examining these

changes over time, it becomes possible to see that the conceptualization of the family,

and its relation to economic immigration, has been directly implicated in racialized and

gendered constructions of Canada’s imagined community over time. More specifically,

the chapter demonstrates that the family has been a central site for defining three types

of relationships to Canada’s national community. The first of these three relationships

involves immigrants who most closely resemble the ‘ideal future citizen,’ be it based on

skin colour, national origin, gender, or skill; these immigrants have historically been

most readily granted entry into the country and permitted access to their family (either

through migration of the family unit or allowances for family reunification). The second

positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation involves persons who are constructed

as less than ‘ideal’ future citizens, yet are nevertheless granted access to the nation; this

group has typically been marginalized through limited or no access to family

reunification, and thus constructed as ‘outsiders’ within the nation. Finally, those most

strongly contradicting the image of an ‘ideal’ immigrant have typically been excluded

from entry, and thus most explicitly and literally constructed as ‘outsiders.’ Each of

these three relationships has been visible throughout Canadian post-Confederation

immigration history.

The present chapter defines sub-periods of post-Confederation immigration that

delineate the changing relationship between family-based and economic immigration.

The discussion is organized according to these periods, and addresses the manner in

which the relationship between family-based and economic immigration has manifested

in terms of gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and social class.

3.1 White Settler Families: 1869 to 1910

Prior to Confederation, Canada was conceptualized as a British colony within the

Americas. With Confederation in 1867, an official vision of ‘White Canada’ as its own

nation became firmly established (Simmons, 2010, 1998). Accordingly, despite a variety

of changes in immigration volumes and policies, immigration during the first hundred

years following Confederation in 1867 was guided by an overarching goal of building a

well-populated, economically successful, independent nation that replicated the

desirable features of Canada’s mother country (Simmons, 2010, 1998). These economic

and demographic goals were articulated within exclusionary immigration principles

based on gendered and class-based ‘racial’ preferences (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998;

Knowles, 2007; Stasiulis, 1997). Importantly, as the upcoming discussion illustrates,

these goals clearly manifested in the manner in which economic and familybased

immigrants were positioned in the context of nation-building and the construction of the

nation’s imagined community.

In the early post-Confederation years, the National Policy of Prime Minister

John A. Macdonald’s administration represented the package of strategies through

which the Canadian Dominion was to be solidified. Efforts were to revolve around

agricultural development, the completion of a transnational railway, tariffs to incite

industrial growth, and the promotion of immigration in order to protect the nation

(particularly in the West) from U.S. expansionism and to compensate for the loss of

population through emigration to the U.S. (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta,

1998; Simmons, 2010; Thompson & Weinfeld, 1995). As part of this set of national

policies, Canada’s first Immigration Act was implemented in 1869. This earliest

immigration program focused on excluding immigrants who were most immediately

constructed as a threat to the well-being of the emerging nation; this was expressed in

medical terms, geared towards avoiding the introduction of communicable diseases into

the nation (Whitaker, 1991). Efforts were also taken to safeguard the nation against the

possible burden imposed by less than desirable immigrants (defined in the Act in terms

of idiocy, lunacy, deafness, infirmity, etc.) through the imposition of a $300 bond, to be

collected for each individual deemed likely to become a public charge in the absence of

a family to care for them (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007; Whitaker, 1991).

The expectation that immigrant families were responsible for ‘burdensome’ immigrants,

currently embedded in the sponsorship agreement (discussed in Chapter One), was thus

evident in the earliest immigration policies.

At this point in time, official restrictions on immigrants were not explicitly

articulated in terms of ethnic or national origin of immigrants. Nevertheless, the

prevailing vision of the nation’s imagined future entailed an ideological preference for

‘White’ settler (i.e., agricultural) families (Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997;

Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In this context, economic and family-based immigration

were largely synonymous – the family was conceptualized as the unit of both economic

production and demographic/social reproduction. The assumption that women were

dependents of male heads of households was implicit in the patriarchal structures and

norms of the time (Côté et al, 2001). Consistent with these norms, women were only

indirectly addressed in the 1869 Immigration Act as dependents of males. To this end, in

the earliest years of Canadian immigration policy, ideal future citizens were

bureaucratically and normatively constructed as male heads of agricultural households.

Female immigrants were located within the family unit, and thus were constructed as

dependents of permanent settlers rather than as future citizens in their own right.

Although ‘White’ British and American women were recruited to come to Canada as

domestic workers at the time (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998), the presence of women as

workers was not articulated in the first Immigration Act. In this way, women’s economic

contributions to Canadian nation-building were obscured by the fact that they were

subsumed within families.

Through 1867 into the 1890s, emigration from Canada (primarily to the U.S.)

remained ahead of immigration; this heightened the demand for “large-scale British

immigration to retain the ‘British’ character of Canada” (Whitaker, 1991: 4). Yet,

despite the ideological goal of populating the nation with British agricultural families,

the labour needs required for the expansion of the nation meant that a larger influx of

immigrants was needed than was being provided by British settlers (Kelley &

Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). As a result, immigration in the early

postConfederation decades commonly involved admission of immigrants outside of the

ideal ‘White settler’ model (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995), albeit under circumstances that

clearly demonstrated the distinction between ideal future citizens and ‘undesirables.’ In

this regard, family-based immigration was particularly telling; when ‘non-White’

immigrants were admitted to Canada (typically for labour purposes), their spouses were

largely prohibited from entry. For instance, between 1880 and 1885, large numbers of

Chinese male labourers were recruited to work dangerous posts during the construction

of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Satzewich, 1993). Only single

male migrants or married men willing to leave their families behind were recruited; the

wives and children of married Chinese workers were not eligible for entry to Canada

(Satzewich, 1993). Access to family-based immigration thus existed very early on as a

feature that distinguished between those intended for permanent inclusion in the

Canadian nation and those intended for temporary residence. Moreover, specifically

excluding women of ‘undesirable’ races was not only a means of restricting the

permanent settlement of immigrants who were not ‘ideal’ future citizens themselves, it

also served to preclude the reproduction of ‘undesirables’ on Canadian soil (Satzewich,

1993; Stasiulis, 1997). In this way, the labour of Asian men contributed to building the

Canadian nation, while their marginalization in the Canadian nation was solidified

through the exclusion of their family members.

As suggested by the above discussion, immigrants of Chinese origin were

singled out for particularly restrictive treatment in the early decades of post-

Confederation immigration. Indeed, once railway construction was completed in 1885,

the government introduced the Chinese Immigration Act, which implemented an

immigration tax (‘head tax’) on newcomers of Chinese origin. This legislation

institutionalized efforts to exclude these ‘undesirables’ from the Canadian nation

(Bolaria & Li, 1988; Li, 1998; see Chapleau & Gray, 1885). Later amendments to this

Act illustrated the extent to which women immigrants were entrenched within the

family unit, as well as the extent to which Chinese families, rather than individual

migrants, were perceived as the most salient threat to the developing nation:

No duty shall be payable under “The Chinese Immigration Act,” in respect

of any woman of Chinese origin who is the wife of a person who is not of

Chinese origin; but, for the purposes of the said Act, such a woman shall

be deemed to be of the same nationality as her husband (Canada, 1887,

ch.35, section 1).

In other words, in cases where Chinese women were granted entry as wives of

nonChinese males, their national origin was erased in official documentation,

subsuming them under their husband’s origin.

At the turn of the 20th century, large influxes of immigrants continued to be

central to the growth of the Canadian nation and official efforts to populate the

Canadian west (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta, 1998). In

1896, Clifford Sifton was appointed Minister of Interior (the portfolio responsible for

immigration at the time). Sifton immediately initiated an aggressive recruitment

campaign with a focus on attracting farmers from Central and Eastern Europe (as well

as from the U.S.). Although small numbers of non-British immigrants had arrived in the

first three decades after Confederation, it was during Sifton’s post that immigration of

non-British immigrants was first actively encouraged. This immigration, however, was

not unrestrained, but involved clear limits geared towards encouraging agricultural

settlement (Whitaker, 1991). In this way, economic and demographic nation-building

goals were, to some degree, prioritized over the cultural boundaries previously

constructed around the Canadian imagined community.

Importantly, however, immigrant recruitment retained racial assumptions,

structured around racialized views of different groups’ abilities in ways that defined

which types of families were economically desirable. At this point in time, the

immigration of farming families was central to Canadian nation-building, relating to

official efforts to encourage the growth of western Canada. To this end, the Canadian

government entered into an agreement with the North Atlantic Trading Company

(NATC) in 1899 geared toward the recruitment of peasant families. The NATC was

mandated to recruit continental European peasant families who possessed at least $100

(Satzewich, 1993). In this context, the family, rather than the individual, was clearly still

the unit of immigration, corresponding to the Canadian state’s view of the nation’s

needs at that point in time. Moreover, the recruitment of continental European families

for settlement in the west “was based on a Social Darwinist belief that certain types of

families, conditioned by many years of oppression and arduous labour, were ‘racially’

suited for the labour intensive tasks essential to homesteading” (Satzewich, 1993: 320).

In this way, families of particular origins were racialized as a unit; their merit to the

Canadian nation was only realized in the context of family labour power. Additionally,

the racialization of continental European peasant families entailed gendered and

classbased implications: many of these families were granted land that was of inferior

quality, undermining their ability to meet a subsistence level of existence. The males

were thus forced to engage in seasonal labour (for instance, for logging companies or as

section hands on railroads); women, along with children, engaged in reproductive

labour on the homestead, while some women also performed domestic labour in the

homes of more established farmers in the area (Satzewich, 1993). These immigrants

were thus marginalized in the Canadian nation; they were included in literal terms

insofar as they served nation-building needs, but were simultaneously entrenched (as

both individuals and as families) in unequal relationships with settlers who more closely

approximated the model of ideal citizens.

Overall, the policy discourse of the early post-Confederation decades illustrates

the central role of family-based immigration in the construction of the Canadian nation

at the time. Indeed, the earliest immigration policies in Canadian history constructed the

nation’s imagined community around a vision of a nation composed of largely British

family units consisting of a male head who was responsible for his wife and dependents.

Accordingly, British male heads of households, as ideal future citizens, were granted the

most generous allowances in terms of family-based immigration; their wives were

allowed entry to Canada, guided by these women’s status as dependents and their role in

bearing the next generation of ideal citizens. Other European families were granted

entry on the basis of racialized views of their farming ability, yet were still symbolically

and materially marginalized with respect to the Canadian national community. Chinese

men during this time were not constructed as future citizens, but were more restrictively

viewed as labourers whose only purpose was to fill production needs that could not be

met by the existing population. In turn, their wives and families were largely excluded

from Canada. More generally, women of the most ‘inferior races’ were excluded from

entering Canada and constructed as a veritable threat to the nation’s (‘White’) imagined

future due to their risk of reproducing ‘undesirables.’

3.2 White Permanent Settlers and Domestic Labourers: 1906 to 1920s Sifton’s

recruitment of non-British immigrants generated considerable controversy,

illustrating the tension surrounding the intersection of economic and demographic

interests, on the one hand, and national cultural identity, on the other. Prompted by

a growing backlash against his approach to immigration, Sifton was replaced by

Frank Oliver in 1905. With his succession, Oliver reasserted the boundaries of the

nation:

It is not merely a question of filling the country with people …It is a

question of the ultimate results of the efforts put forward for the building

of a Canadian nationality…This can never be accomplished if the

preponderance of the population should be of such a class and character

that will deteriorate rather than elevate the condition of our people and our

country at large (cited in Whitaker, 1991: 8).

The immigration program, under Oliver’s direction, continued to aggressively recruit

immigrants, but no longer welcomed immigrants of non-British origin.

During this time, the intersection between ‘family’ and ‘economic’ immigration

surfaced in two main ways that were clearly articulated in new immigration regulations

implemented in 1906 and in 1910. First, as in the previous sub-period, British

agricultural families remained the ideal immigration unit from both an economic,

demographic, and cultural perspective. These families would populate the nation with

culturally suitable citizens, and would also reproduce the next generation of ideal

citizens. What was unique in this sub-period was the heightened articulation of gendered

norms of dependence, which further documented the extent to which the family was

viewed as the integral unit of settlement at the time:

In any case where deportation of the head of a family is ordered, all

dependent members of the family may be deported at the same time. And

in any case where deportation of a dependent member of a family is

ordered on account of having become a public charge, and in the opinion

of the Minister such circumstance is due to willful neglect or nonsupport

by the head or other members of the family morally bound to support such

a dependent member, then all members of the family may be deported at

the same time. Such deportation shall be at the cost of the persons so

deported (Statutes of Canada, 1910, ch. 27, s. 42.5).

The second unique feature of this time period was the active recruitment of female

domestic workers. This meant that the immigration of women for labour purposes

(albeit, notably, still within a ‘family’ setting) was officially articulated for the first time

in Canada’s post-Confederation history. At the time, the demand for British domestic

servants typically outstripped the supply, in part because wages and work conditions for

this class of worker were not substantially better than in Britain. As such,

encouragement of female domestic workers from other areas of Europe at the beginning

of the 20th century became part of the state’s broader recruitment efforts, otherwise

primarily focused on agriculturalists:

The policy of the Department at the present time is to encourage the immigration

of farmers, farm labourers, and female domestic servants from the United States, the

British Isles, and certain Northern European countries, namely, France, Belgium,

Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. On the other

hand, it is the policy of the Department to do all in its power to keep out of the country

undesirables [i.e.,] those belonging to nationalities unlikely to assimilate and who

consequently prevent the building up of a united nation of people of similar customs and

ideals (Statutes of Canada, 1910, cited in Department of Manpower and Immigration

Canada, 1974: 9-10). Overall, whether women arrived in Canada as dependents within

a family unit or as domestic workers, their place in the Canadian nation was constructed

solely in terms of the domestic sphere, and thus in the context of the institution of the

family. Consistent with social norms and ideologies at the time, the location of women

within the private sphere was embedded in the Immigration Act, which explicitly defined

women in positions of subservience and dependence within the home, either as domestic

workers or as dependents within a male-headed household.

In this context, social class was also central to immigration policy and the

construction of the Canadian national community, and again manifested in the realm of

the family. Women from higher social classes were expected to immigrate as dependents

of the male head of their household (either as wives or children), while women from

lower social classes were to immigrate as individual workers, in the form of domestic

servants who would contribute to the growth and well-being of the ‘ideal settler’

families they serviced. The intersection of gender and ‘race’ was also evident here; as

the above excerpt from the 1910 Immigration Act shows, the Canadian government

sought single, European women to serve as domestic workers (Abu-Laban,

1998a), while women of colour were still excluded from entry through such

immigration programs (Côté et al., 2001).

Overall, during this period, the intersection between economic immigration and

family-based immigration (either for permanent settlement or domestic labour) clearly

served as a site for defining the three relationships of immigrants to Canada’s imagined

community (i.e., inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion). ‘Black,’ working-class,

Caribbean women, for instance, were commonly singled out for exclusion (or

deportation) from positions as domestic workers, despite the aforementioned high

demand for workers to fill these positions. These women were assumed to be

‘immoral,’ likely to become public charges through pregnancy and single parenthood

(Calliste, 1993). Stasiulis (1997) notes that “the exclusion of prospective female

Caribbean domestic workers was … informed by invidious myths of the promiscuous

nature and proneness to single parenthood of Black women” (p.148). In this instance,

the racialized sexualization of Black women constructed this group as self-evidently

undesirable for membership in the Canadian nation, in direct opposition to ‘ideal’

British women in settler families.

More generally, the circumstances surrounding prospective Black Caribbean

immigrants, including domestic workers, demonstrates the tension between ideological

and economic needs that defined much of Canadian immigration history, wherein a clear

dialectic existed between ideological preferences for ‘ideal’ immigrants (historically

understood in gendered, class-specific, racial terms), and economic/employer needs.

Among Black prospective immigrants (as with Chinese immigrants, as previously

discussed), the end result typically involved selective entry under restrictive conditions,

most often when there was an urgent need for cheap labour; relegation to specific posts

within a racialized split labour market; and vulnerability to mistreatment and expulsion.

In this fashion, immigration to Canada and the construction of the nation’s imagined

community up until WWI was clearly structured in intersecting terms of ‘race,’ gender,

and social class, with respect to both individual immigrants and immigrant families.

3.3 British Family Recruitment: 1920s

During WWI, immigration to Canada had declined considerably, due to British and

European needs for workers in war-related industries and army recruits, and the expense

and hazard of transportation at times of war. As a result, the majority of immigrants

arriving in Canada during WWI originated in the U.S. (approximately 50,000 annually)

(Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Li, 2003a). Following the war, national economic and

political concerns visibly shaped both immigration policy over the next decade and

views of ‘foreigners’ within the nation. On the economic side, the return of hundreds of

thousands of soldiers to a post-war depressed economy and increasing demands on

federal funds brought about by various payments to veterans led to a rapid increase in

both unemployment and the cost of living (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Growing labour

unrest within the country manifested as a wave of radicalism towards the end of WWI,

culminating in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 (Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker,

1991). In the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and growing concern over

‘foreign agitators’ and ‘enemy aliens’ within the nation, this strike was constructed in

political, public, and legal arenas as evidence of a Bolshevik conspiracy (Horrall, 1980).

As Horall (1980) explains:

During the early morning of 17 June 1919 eight leaders of the Winnipeg

General Strike were arrested by members of the RNWMP [Royal North

West Mounted Police] and charged that as officials of the One Big Union

they had conspired together to replace constituted authority with a soviet

form of government. Although a royal commission which investigated the

causes of the strike found no evidence of any seditious conspiracy, nor any

connection between the strike and the [One Big Union], seven of the eight

accused were eventually convicted by the courts of trying to ‘overthrow’

the state (p.169).

Such suspicions meant that the borders of the Canadian imagined community tightened

in the immediate post-WWI years (both literally and symbolically), involving

marginalization and exclusion based on national origin, political anarchism, and labour

radicalism. For instance, concerns over ‘foreign agitators’ within the nation prompted

expulsions of persons suspected of conspiring against the Canadian government

(Whitaker, 1991).

These prevailing conditions also prompted revisions to the existing Immigration

Act in 1919. Although not explicitly expressed in the context of concerns over the soviet

threat, the new provisions created additional latitude for excluding immigrants by: (1)

establishing a literacy test for prospective immigrants; (2) expanding on how

prospective immigrants’ origins were defined by adding the term ‘nationality’ to the

word ‘race’; and (3) requiring prospective immigrants from anywhere other than the

U.S. or Britain to have a valid passport and/or visa prior to leaving their country of

origin for Canada (Green & Green, 2004). Kelley and Trebilcock (1998) argue that these

changes were intended to allow the government to screen out immigrants that would

place an added burden on an already depressed Canadian economy and potentially

contribute to even more unemployment. However, the policy restructuring also served

to expand the government’s power to strictly regulate the composition of newcomers;

this served to structure the Canadian imagined community through inclusion,

marginalization, and exclusion on ‘racial’ and ethnic ground. Thus, couched within

concern for the domestic economy persisted the belief that certain immigrants were a

threat to the Canadian nation, and the assumption that these threats could be screened

out on the basis of applicants’ ‘race’ and national origin. Overall, British immigrant

families remained the most ‘preferred’ settlers, followed by North Europeans, then

Central Europeans. Southern and Eastern Europeans were much lower on the list of

suitable immigrants, while Asian and ‘Black’ immigrants remained explicitly

unwelcome (Li, 2003a). Continued restricted access to family-based immigration

among marginalized groups remained in effect, thereby perpetuating the distinction

between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ within the nation through family settlement rights.

As the nation moved into the 1920s, British immigration to Canada lagged

behind Canadian official targets as a result of a lack of both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.

The lack of ‘push’ factors related to the relative prosperity of Britain at the time and the

expense of the overseas journey to Canada. In Canada, desirable tracts of land near

railways were no longer in abundant supply; land in more remote areas, although

available, was less appealing to potential settler families. At the same time, the economy

was reviving and growing in diversity. As such, although immigrant families of British

origin remained the ‘gold standard’ from an ideological perspective, business interests

resulted in a moderate level of continued immigration of ‘non-preferred’ groups (Kelley

& Trebilcock, 1998). In an attempt to continue building the Canadian population along

‘desired’ cultural lines, the Canadian government took strides to guarantee the exclusion

of the most undesirable immigrants and the inclusion of the most preferred. For

instance, efforts to exclude Asian immigrants became even more rigid. In the revised

Chinese Immigration Act, passed in 1923, the head tax system on Chinese newcomers

was eliminated in favour of broad provisions that were designed to effectively exclude

most prospective Chinese immigrants (see Statutes of Canada, 1923). By the mid-

1920s, immigration from China had virtually halted (Li, 1988). In contrast, in order to

encourage British immigrant families and thus to promote the immigration of families

that best suited Canada’s ideal ‘imagined future,’ the Canadian government entered into

several agreements with the British government involving efforts to recruit families for

agricultural settlement. In this context, economic and family-based immigration

remained synonymous, albeit only for the most desirable

(i.e., British) future citizens.

For instance, under the Farm Family Settlement Schemes, the Canadian government

provided assistance (including aid with travel, agricultural training, and the provision of

land on credit) to British families willing to settle on farms in Canada (Green & Green,

2004), thereby further institutionalizing racialized preferences for certain ‘types’ of

families. The original goal of the Canadian government was for 3,000 British families

to arrive through this program; in 1927, an additional 1,000 families were expected to

arrive under similar programs directed toward settlement in New Brunswick and Nova

Scotia. However, the Farm Family program was ultimately a disappointment: by the

time the program was terminated in 1929, it had attracted a total of only 1,500 families

(Green & Green, 2004). According to Whitaker (1991), relatively few competent

British farmers had been willing to immigrate, and many of those recruited eventually

abandoned farming for manual work in the cities, wound up on public assistance, or

returned to Britain. By 1941, over 50% of those families had abandoned their farms,

and a mere seventeen families had repaid their land credit loans

(Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).

With the relative failure of efforts to recruit British farming families, the

powerful transportation corporations Canadian Pacific Railway and Canadian National

Railway began placing pressure on the government to open the doors to central and

eastern Europeans. The companies’ interest in a more open-door immigration policy was

rooted in the fact that larger numbers of immigrants meant more passenger and

commercial railway traffic (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). In 1925, the

government ceded, and signed a Railway Agreement with the two companies. This

agreement permitted the companies to recruit agriculturalists and farm workers from

countries in continental Europe that had previously been discriminated against.

Immigrants who had not settled in farm work after one year were to be deported at the

cost of the transportation companies. Approximately 185,000 immigrants from central

Europe entered Canada under the Railway Agreement between 1925 and 1929

(Whitaker, 1991). Among the largest of these groups were Mennonites from Russia,

Ukrainians, Poles, and Hungarians (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Despite their entry, the

ideological preference for British settler families remained intact, prompting growing

anti-immigrant nativist sentiment (Whitaker, 1991). To this end, in 1928, a House of

Commons committee recommended that that the Railway Agreement be amended to

reinstate greater governmental control over the selection of newcomers.

3.4 Non-Asian Family Reunification: 1930 to 1944

With the door on certain immigrants already beginning to close again due to persisting

ideological preferences for British settler families, it was effectively shut on the

majority of immigrants with the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929 and the

further worsening of the Canadian economy. Indeed, the 1930s marked one of the most

exclusionary periods in Canadian immigration history, and also represented a time of

high levels of expulsion of ‘undesirable’ immigrants. R.B. Bennett, elected as prime

minister in 1930, rapidly implemented highly restrictive immigration regulations,

particularly against potential immigrants from outside Britain and the U.S. (Whitaker,

1991). In March of 1931, the Order in Council PC 695 effectively closed the doors to

immigrants of all classes and occupations; however, immigration officers could permit

the landing of a select few exceptions. These exceptions were clearly drawn along

racialized lines, embedded within economic interests, and included: British subjects (by

birth or naturalization) entering Canada directly or indirectly from “predominantly

white dominions” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 216) (such as Britain, Ireland,

Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia etc.) who had the proven means to sustain

themselves until employment was secured; agriculturalists with the proven means to

farm in Canada; United States citizens entering Canada from the U.S. having sufficient

means to provide for themselves until employment was secured; and wives and

unmarried children under the age of 18 of Canadian citizens with the means to provide

for them (Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991). This Order in Council specifically

stated that these provisions did not apply to any individuals of ‘Asiatic race’ (Hawkins,

1991). Again, Asian immigrants who had previously been granted entry for economic

purposes were thus marginalized from within the Canadian nation through non-access to

family reunification.

Family reunification among certain groups was further constrained through

restricted access to citizenship. At the time, British immigrants received naturalization

status automatically after five years of residence. Immigrants of all other national

origins had to apply for naturalization through the court system; these applications were

reviewed and decided upon by the secretary of state, whose decision required no

explanation and could not be reviewed or reversed. According to Kelly & Trebilcock

(1998), historical records clearly indicate that applications were commonly denied for

no explicit reason; however, “the pattern of rejections make it clear that such refusals

often were made on racial grounds” (Kelly & Trebilcock, 1998). Given that access to

family-based immigration depended on citizenship status, discriminatory access to

naturalization thus represented another means by which immigration was racialized and

the ideological model of ‘White settler’ families was preserved.

Overall, at a time of economic depression, the discriminatory nature of Canadian

immigration policy became increasingly visible, with immigration being rooted in

racialized nation-building efforts and the desire to guarantee a future nation of suitable

immigrant families. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, most immigrants granted entry to

Canada were of British or northern European origin, and were wives and minor children

of Canadian male citizens having the means to support them (Kelly & Trebilcock,

1998). Thus, even in conditions of economic devastation, certain ‘types’ of families

were allowed to reunite in Canada while others were not afforded the same right; in this

way, the Canadian imagined community was being continually constructed along the

lines of ‘ideal’ future citizens located within ‘preferred’ types of families. As evidenced

in the above discussion, these preferences entailed the intersection of ‘cultural’ goals

(i.e., for immigrants to be as ‘White’ as possible) and economic goals (with agricultural

families representing the ideal economic unit of immigration).

The restrictive immigration regulations surrounding family-based immigration

implemented at the onset of the Depression persisted throughout much of the 1930s,

easing only slightly in 1938 with a new allowance for fiancées of male citizens able to

support their intended wives. In 1944, regulations were again widened, this time to

permit immigration of non-British European wives and dependent children of members

of the Canadian armed forces. Reflecting gendered social norms, women residents in

Canada were not permitted to sponsor family members into the country, even if they had

adequate means to support these individuals. Other than these modifications,

immigration policy changed very little during the 1930s and 1940s (Kelley &

Trebilcock, 1998). As such, the construction of the Canadian imagined community

remained based around the ideal of British (and, to a lesser extent, Northern European)

families consisting of a male head of household and his dependent wife and children.

3.5 Humanitarian Pressures and ‘Family’ Controversies: Post-WWII to 1976 In

general, two major factors had a powerful influence over Canadian immigration policy

in the post-WWII years that led to a distinct change in the intersection between

economic and family-based immigration. First, government investment in infrastructure

and large-scale private investments in manufacturing and natural-resource industries,

low unemployment, and high post-depression/post-war consumer demand created an

economic environment that favoured elevated immigration for labour and consumption

purposes. Yet, the decline in agriculture as the predominant industry meant that the

family (as an economic unit) was no longer at the heart of economic development;

accordingly, family-based immigration and economic immigration began to formally

diverge into two distinct streams. The second major factor affecting Canadian

immigration policy was the changing international environment in the context of WWII

atrocities and Canada’s place in this environment. Such changes involved, for instance,

the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Canadian involvement in peacekeeping

efforts and post-war rebuilding in Europe, and Canada’s development of a

nondiscriminatory international trading regime (the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade) in 1947 (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). The post-WWII rise in humanitarianism

also brought about the official repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, at which

time Chinese Canadians were also afforded full citizenship rights. More broadly, the

devastation of atrocities during WWII stimulated growing opinion among some

politicians and interest groups that a more open immigration policy was needed. In

terms of family-based immigration, migrants’ rights emerged as an issue in the global

humanitarian discourse, bringing about pressures to increase allowances for family

reunification. To this end, it was during the post-WWII period that the notion of family

sponsorship, in its current form, first surfaced. Correspondingly, reunification emerged

as an increasingly important means for immigrants to enter the country during the 1950s

(Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock,

1998; Parai, 1975; Whitaker, 1991).

In 1956, an Order in Council (1956-785) specified that citizens by birth or

naturalization of any country of Europe or the Americas, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, or

Turkey could be sponsored by a relative in Canada who was a Canadian citizen or a

permanent resident, and who was able to provide for them financially. Eligible relatives

in this category included spouses, children and their spouses and children (under the age

of 21), siblings and their spouses and children (under the age of 21), fathers (over age

sixty-five), mothers (over age sixty), grandparents, and unmarried orphaned nieces and

nephews. The Order in Council also stipulated that citizens from countries other than

those listed above could be eligible for admission as a family member if they were a

spouse, unmarried child (under the age of 21), father (over age sixty-five), or mother

(over age sixty) of a Canadian citizen who applied to receive them and was in a

financial position to be able to provide for any ‘sponsored’ family member (Kelley &

Trebilcock, 1998). These differential allowances for family-based immigration meant

that the immigration of Asian and African populations remained considerably more

restricted than European immigration. Overall, in the two decades between 1946 and

1966, out of 2,500,000 newcomers to Canada, 900,000 arrived through family

reunification (Côté et al., 2001).

In light of the large numbers of immigrants entering the country on the basis of

family relationships, this form of immigration became an issue of considerable debate

during the late 1950s (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004). As Green and Green

(2004) note, different understandings of ‘family’ among immigrants who had been

granted new rights to family-based immigration (most notably those from southern

Europe) brought about changes in the composition of newcomers to Canada.

Immigrants from southern Europe in particular commonly made use of family-based

immigration rights, much more so than immigrants from ‘traditional’ source countries

(Green & Green, 2004). By 1958, while British immigration had fallen substantially

(specifically, to 5,000, compared to 23,000 at the same time in 1957), immigration from

southern and central Europe, and from Italy in particular, was steadily increasing. The

majority of immigrants arriving from southern Europe, Central America, and South

America entered through family-based immigration, given existing restrictions on their

independent immigration (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). On average, sponsored

immigrants represented about 37% of all immigrants entering Canada during the 1950s

and 1960s; at its peak in 1959, 55% per cent of all immigrants entered through family

reunification (Whitaker, 1991).

One of the specific points of contention that emerged in the face of the expanded

allowances for family members at the time (and which remains prominent in

contemporary immigration discourse) was where the line should be drawn in defining,

from a policy perspective, what constitutes ‘close relatives.’ A distinction was also

clearly emerging that would continue to structure the social construction of immigrants

up to the present, involving the assumed intersection of ‘skill’ with different types of

immigration, as discussed in Chapter One. Specifically, the large numbers of

immigrants arriving through family reunification during the 1950s prompted growing

concern over the influx of ‘unskilled’ immigrants (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green,

2004; Whitaker, 1991). In this regard, the predominant concern was that broad criteria

for family-based immigration would produce a ‘lower quality’ immigrant pool, and

would result in the country being flooded by ethnic groups that could potentially

develop undue influence in Canadian society. The following lengthy but important

quote from Whitaker (1991) both captures the controversy of the time and highlights the

manner in which family-based immigration continues to be viewed by many

contemporary immigration critics:

A policy of sponsored immigration had certain results: it encouraged the

entry of many more low or unskilled people; it led to uncontrolled growth

in numbers, skewed toward the expansion of ethnic groups already

established in Canada with strong kinship ties; and it helped foster,

especially in major cities, strong ethnic pressure groups with political

leverage, which seek to maintain and expand the system. Thus the state in

effect diminished the control and selectivity which it apparently sought in

other aspects of immigration policy (Whitaker, 1991: 16).

By the end of the 1950s, family reunification was being problematized in reference to

three main concerns. The first of these concerns was the impact of uneven family-based

immigration from different regions of the world (i.e., the changing ethnic composition

of the Canadian population). Second, concern was mounting among municipalities that

‘sponsored’ relatives would become public charges. Finally, the federal government was

concerned that family reunification lowered the skill level of the incoming immigrant

population and undercut efforts to align immigration with the country’s labour needs

(Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker, 1991).

As a result of these concerns, an Order in Council was enacted on March 19,

1959 that added restrictions to family reunification from regions most commonly using

this form of entry (specifically, southern Europe, Central America and South America)

by excluding married children and siblings (including their spouses and children) from

eligibility (Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). However, this measure was not

well received, as evidenced by political and media discourse at the time. The

Opposition’s immigration critic J.W. Pickersgill, for instance, viewed the Order as an

unjust and cruel legislation that directly targeted Italian immigrants, as indicated in his

speech to the House of Commons on April 15, 1959:

We are told by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or by some

so-called spokesman for the department, that the reason they made this

unnecessary, cruel and inhuman order was to give preference for skilled

workers. Of course, that is the most unadulterated camouflage; there is not

the slightest intention on the part of the government of doing anything

about that at all. This order was just a restriction. It was an unnecessary

and inhuman restriction […]. The reason it was done, sir, was that when

the government realized that more people of Italian origin than people

from the United Kingdom came in last year, they got in a panic. They were

afraid of many of their political supporters, and they felt they had to do

something about it. Then they did this stupid, cruel, silly and inhuman

thing (cited in Hawkins, 1972: 121-122). In this context, the

Conservative government rescinded the Order in Council in question.

Despite this action, Canada’s immigration system at the end of the 1950s

remained highly discriminatory, with the persistence of a hierarchical

organization of immigrant preferences, defined largely in terms of national

(and ethnic) origin. Thus, although family-based immigration widened

during the post-WWII era, it was racialized through restrictions on

families of specific ethnic and national origins. Foreshadowing the

decades to come, family reunification in the post-WWII period remained

a topic of active debate regarding its implications for the nation’s future.

With the passage of the first Bill of Rights in Canada in 1960, stipulating

nondiscrimination on the basis of “race, national origin, colour, religion, or sex” (Justice

Canada, 1960, part 1: 1), the discriminatory features of Canada’s immigration program

became increasingly incompatible with the broader principles of Canadian law.

Accordingly, the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker announced its intention

to overhaul the existing Immigration Act. The next major amendment to Canada’s

immigration system, undertaken by Diefenbaker’s government in 1962, would mark a

significant milestone in Canadian immigration history, involving a new vision of the

nation’s ‘imagined future.’ In this imagined future, the Canadian nation was envisioned

as a growing power in the international scene. The pursuit of this vision entailed efforts

to expand Canadian trade, and to remain engaged in peace-keeping, international

development and anti-racism activities. The 1960s thus marked an important

transformative period in Canadian immigration history, involving official abandonment

of the ‘White Canada’ policy and the beginning of Canada’s contemporary

‘nondiscriminatory’ immigration system (Simmons, 2010, 1999).

Importantly, 1962 was a landmark year for formalizing the distinction between

‘economic’ and ‘family’ immigration; from 1962 to the present day, immigrant families

were officially no longer at the heart of Canadian immigration. Moreover, the official

move toward ‘non-discrimination’ in 1962 was not uniform across the immigration

program, but, rather, further delineated between economic and family-class

immigration. More specifically, in 1962, new regulations to the Immigration Act were

developed in which explicit ‘race’ and ethnicity-based restrictions on immigration were

removed (Hawkins, 1972). These regulations firmly established ‘skill’ as the main

criterion for independent (that is, economic) immigration. Under the 1962 regulations,

persons from all national origins and ethnic backgrounds were eligible for entry into

Canada if, “by reason of his education, training, skills, or other special qualifications is

likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Canada” (An Act Respecting

Immigration, cited in Hawkins, 1972: 125; italics added to highlight the gendered

construction of independent immigrants at the time). The definition of ‘skill’ was, at this

point, still highly discretionary, with immigration officers having the power to

determine which skills were likely to ensure an immigrants’ ‘success.’ This discretion

meant that, although discriminatory stipulations had been removed from the official

regulations, the possibility for discriminatory biases in immigrant selection remained

intact. Indeed, numerous authors (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Satzewich, 1989a,

Simmons, 1999, 1998) have argued that, informal control over the entry of economic

immigrants was constructed around racial definitions and assumptions long after the

supposed deracialization of the system in 1962.

Also relevant to the present chapter is the fact that family immigration policy

retained a discriminatory character, despite the purported rejection of discriminatory

biases. Under the 1962 immigration regulations, all Canadian citizens or permanent

residents were able to sponsor their spouse, unmarried children under twenty-one years

old, parents, and grandparents (Hawkins, 1972). However, the sponsorship of children

over the age of twenty-one, married children, siblings and their spouses/children, and

unmarried orphaned nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one (s.31[d]; see

Hawkins, 1972) was restricted to citizens of the ‘preferred’ nations outlined in the 1956

Immigration Regulations (Parai, 1975). In this way, family-based immigration persisted

as a means of racializing immigration, with family reunification policy echoing earlier

patterns of excluding families of ‘undesirable’ groups more so than individual economic

immigrants. Given the gendered nature of immigration, with family-based immigration

being a more prominent means of entry for women (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995;

Thobani, 1998), differential allowances for family sponsorship additionally amounted to

gendered, racialized immigration flows.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour

were amalgamated into the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. In the

same year, the Liberal government commissioned a policy paper as part of the ongoing

efforts to reassess and revamp Canada’s immigration program. This paper (the White

Paper of 1966) provides a striking illustration of the official discourse on family-class

immigration at the time. The paper advocated changing Canada’s immigration program

to be more closely aligned with the country’s labour needs, and recommended

restricting the family-class sponsorship program in order to ensure immigrant ‘quality.’

In this context, ideal immigrants were educated, skilled, and trained (which familybased

immigrants were assumed not to be). It was recommended that the number of

immigrants entering through family sponsorship be restricted to prevent the influx of

large numbers of ‘unskilled’ foreign nationals. As Kelley and Trebilcock (1998: 359)

note, “the sponsorship issue was a continuing source of concern to immigration officials

because, allegedly, too many unskilled workers were being sponsored by relatives, a

process which was largely beyond the department’s control.” The White Paper

specifically recommended that family sponsorship be limited to spouses, unmarried

offspring under the age of twenty-one, orphaned relatives under the age of sixteen, and

parents and grandparents (who would not be eligible to work in Canada). It was further

recommended that while both Canadian citizens and landed immigrants be granted these

sponsorship rights, additional sponsorship privileges were to be afforded to Canadian

citizens, subject to literacy and/or employment requirements (including, for instance,

siblings, unmarried nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one, and parents and

grandparents, who would be allowed to work in Canada) (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).

The White Paper’s recommendations elicited considerable criticism from community

organizations and ethnic groups, yet were welcomed by the business community.

Political players stood on both sides of the debate, some problematizing

and others praising the recommendations. In the end, new regulations were introduced

in 1967 that seemed designed to provide a middle ground, supposedly rendering both

economic and family-based immigration ‘fair,’ ‘objective’ and ‘reasonable’ by creating

three categories of immigrants (namely, independent, family, and nominated relatives),

each with defined criteria for eligibility.

3.6 Further Divergence Between Economic and Family Immigrants: 1967 to 1976

Beginning in 1967, defined criteria according to which newcomers were to be selected

became an institutionalized dimension of Canadian immigration. The selection of

‘independent’ immigrants was to be governed by the ‘point system,’ which formalized

and systematized the 1962 regulations by creating a grid of criteria (e.g. education,

work experience, age, ‘personal suitability) each quantified by a defined number of

points (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Parai, 1975) (see Table 3.1

for the point system grid of 1967). Based on their qualifications and circumstances,

applicants were assigned a score for each criterion and, if their total score exceeded the

predefined ‘pass mark’ (set at 50 points in the original system), they were eligible for

admission as an independent immigrant (Parai, 1975). To this day, the point system is

cited as the step that finally limited the discretionary powers of immigration officials,

thereby eliminating “all traces of racial discrimination from Canada’s immigration

laws” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 351).

Table 3.1 Canada's Point System in 1967

Factors for Evaluation of Independent Range of Points Applicants

Arranged employment or designated occupation

0 or 10

Short-term

factors

Knowledge of English and/or French

Relative in Canada

0-10

0-5

Area of destination

0-5

Education and training

0-20

Personal qualities

0-15

Long-term

factors

Occupational demand

Occupational skill

0-15

1-10

Age

0-10

Total

1-100

Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada (1974)

With respect to family sponsorship, official European privilege was eliminated

with the development of one set of rules that applied equally to immigrants from all

regions of the world (Parai, 1975). However, to deal with concerns over the widespread

sponsorship of ‘unskilled’ relatives, family-based immigration was separated into two

types: ‘sponsored dependents’ and ‘nominated relatives’ (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley &

Trebilcock, 1998). The ‘nominated’ category was created for distant relatives, who were

evaluated according to a select portion of the points system – specifically, education,

occupational skill, occupational demand, ‘personal suitability,’ and age. These

applicants could receive a specified number of ‘bonus points’ if their family members

already in Canada acknowledged a willingness to assist them in their settlement.

Immediate relatives, defined as ‘sponsored dependents,’ would continue to be processed

exclusively on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian citizen or permanent

resident (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). At this point in time, aside from the general

statement about a sponsor’s ability to support their family members, no explicit

contractual obligation was built into family-based immigration, reflecting prevailing

ideologies about the nature of family relationships:

The assumption was that the term ‘sponsored dependents’ designated a

‘natural’ relationship of dependence or moral obligation that did not

require definition under contractual provisions. The subtext here leads us

to believe that the family model based on the patriarchal structure of a

[male] spouse who support the household and meets the needs of his wife,

children and aged parents was still very prevalent (Côté et al., 2001: 23).

The assumption of dependence, however, would soon become explicit, codified in

immigration policy.

3.7 The Growing Rationality of Canadian Immigration: 1976 to Early 1990s In

1976, a new Immigration Act was passed (although it did not come into effect until new

Immigration Regulations were introduced in 1978). With this Act came increasing

systematization of the immigration program, reflecting increasing rationality and

bureaucratic logic. Indeed, this Act was the first in Canadian immigration history to

specify objectives for the immigration program, as opposed to just the criteria for

immigrant eligibility. These objectives aligned with specific groups of immigrants as

follows: (1) family reunification (represented by both the family class and assisted

relatives); (2) humanitarian considerations (represented by refugees); and (3) national

economic development (represented by independent/economic immigrants) (Côté et al.,

2001; Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In the 1976 Immigration Act,

the point system remained in effect for the selection of independent immigrants;

however, it was adapted from its original (1967) form to place greater emphasis on

practical training and occupational experience. Preference was also to be given to

immigrants whose occupations were in high demand in Canada. (See Table 3.2 for an

overview of the point system over time). The ‘independent’ stream of immigration

would grow in subsequent years, with the additions of business-class immigrants

(including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) in 1978, and the ‘investor’ class of

business immigrants in 1986.

Table 3.2 Maximum Points and Selection Factors in Canada’s Point System

(Selected Years)

Selection Factor

1978

1986

1993

1996

2004

2010

Education

Proficiency in English and/or French

Specific vocational preparation

Work experience

Occupational demand

Labour market balance

Age

Pre-arranged employment in Canada

Personal suitability

Adaptability (levels control)

Relative in Canada

Destination

Total Possible Points

100

Pass Mark

*Pass mark varies by skill group: 52 for Professionals and Skilled Administrators; 47 for Technical; 45

for Trades

Sources: CIC, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp; Simmons (2010)

Under the 1976 Act, family members eligible for entry under the family class included

spouses and fiancé(e)s, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one, and parents (of

any age), as well as orphaned sisters, brothers, nieces, nephews, and grandchildren who

were under the age of eighteen and unmarried. Eligible members of the ‘assisted

relative’ class (previously referred to as the ‘nominated’ class), included brothers,

sisters, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and grandparents (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).

This group was evaluated according to a modified form of the point system, as

previously discussed.

Several changes pertaining to family-class immigration are important here, and

speak to changing conceptualizations of the ‘immigrant family.’ First, for the first time

in Canadian immigration history, the 1976 Immigration Act included a formal

stipulation of a contractual sponsorship obligation, wherein sponsors had to take

financial responsibility for their relatives for up to ten years after immigration (up to

five years for the assisted relative class) (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).

In previous Acts, it was merely specified that the sponsor was to ensure that their family

member did not become a ‘public charge’; however, in practice, there was very little

monitoring or enforcement of this matter. Although the expectation that the Canadian

citizen or permanent resident (the sponsor) was responsible for supporting sponsored

family members had always been inherent in immigration regulations, the formalization

of this commitment officially constructed this group as dependents.

A second relevant point pertaining to family-class immigration under the 1976

Act was the allowance for parents of any age to be sponsored. This change opened up

family-class immigration to heightened criticism in the face of growing pressures to

match Canadian immigration to the economic needs of the country. Described by one of

the most vocal critics of family-class immigration, Daniel Stoffman, as a “monumental

blunder” (Stoffman, 1993:13), the 1978 change in legislation has been widely criticized

for allowing entry to an elderly population. The concern here was that this group could,

in turn, sponsor additional relatives, thereby amplifying the influx of ‘unskilled’

relatives that, presumably, would not qualify to come to Canada as skilled workers.

Concern over the burden on the health care system imposed by sponsored relatives was

also prominent in the anti-family-class immigration discourse at the time (and, notably,

remains a feature of contemporary discourse).

It is also important to note that, while the 1976 Act removed overt discrimination

from Canadian immigration policy, in practice, the immigration system retained ethnic,

gender, and class biases (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Das Gupta, 1995;

Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Simmons, 1998). As

Côté et al. (2001) note, although the immigration program put forth in 1976 is widely

touted as marking the official end to Canada’s discriminatory immigration policies,

gendered access to education and training in many countries prohibits equal access to

immigrant admission. This contention bears directly upon the distinction between

family-class and economic immigration. According to Das Gupta

(1995), the point system of immigration:

…perpetuates systemic barriers for women and people of colour since it

emphasizes such things as education, skills, training, employability in

‘open occupations,’ and knowledge of English and/or French. Most

women from the working classes and from racial minority groups would

never qualify to immigrate on the basis of such criteria as they lack access

to the required training (p.166).

In other words, via the inherently discriminatory nature of economic immigrant

selection, the 1976 Act streamlined immigrants of particular national and ethnic origins,

particularly persons from lower social classes and women, into family sponsorship (in

addition to, for instance, domestic worker or temporary labour migration streams). In

light of the new contractual obligations of the sponsorship program, family-class

immigrants were additionally legislated into relations of dependence, and thus were

constructed as subordinates both within households and within society more broadly

(Abu-Laban, 1998a; Côté et al., 2001).

Moreover, biases in all immigration streams were still effectively instituted

through differential access to immigration posts abroad, with disproportionately more

posts in Europe and the U.S. than in other regions of the world and longer processing

times in non-Western countries (Abu-Laban, 1998a). In this way, the explicitly overt

discrimination of the first century of post-Confederation immigration became translated

into sanctioned practices and structures that rendered discrimination opaque and

implicit. Thus, more than a century after Canada’s first Immigration Act, the 1976 Act

continued to structure access to Canada along gender, ethnic, and class lines, with the

distinction between ‘independent’ versus ‘family class’ immigrants representing a

primary means of differentially positioning these immigrants (both literally and

symbolically) with respect to Canada’s national community.

3.8 Reconceptualizing and Dichotomizing Family and Economic Immigrants: 1993

to Present

According to Simmons (2010, 1999), a key shift in Canadian immigration policy

occurred in the late 1980s. This shift entailed a reimagining of the nation’s ‘imagined

future,’ involving a new vision of Canada as a competitive, multicultural nation that

holds a distinct economic and political presence in an international world. This vision of

Canada as a global player demands immigrants with skills that will boost Canada’s

economic development and trade-competitiveness. Immigrant selection thus became

centred around the ‘post-industrial’ requirements of a globalized, knowledge-based

economy, with ‘ideal’ immigrants constructed as self-sufficient innovators who “are

custom designed to meet the specific criteria of a neo-liberal nation intent on

productivity, cost recovery, and immigrant self-settlement” (Simmons, 2010: 85).

Key changes pertaining to family-class immigration associated with this

‘imagined future’ occurred in the early 1990s. These changes were intertwined with

economic immigration, involving a further dichotomization of family and economic

immigration. The polarization of the two groups of immigrants was directly associated

with an interest in admitting a more flexible, skilled labour force through revisions to

the point system (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Green & Green, 2004) (see Table 3.2). For

instance, the original pass mark for independent immigrants was 50 out of 100 points; it

was raised to 70 points in 1993 (Abu-Laban, 1998a). Further evidence of the push

toward prioritizing highly-skilled immigrants and marginalizing family-class

immigration came in 1993, at which time the ‘assisted relative’ class was eliminated

(Abu-Laban, 1998a). Moreover, with the stated intention to “capture more effectively

the concept of family” (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1992: 3), a cap on the

age of children eligible for sponsorship was established in 1993, such that children over

the age of 19 became ineligible for sponsorship unless they were demonstrably

dependent on their parents (i.e., not capable of self-support due to disability or full-time

studies). Overall, economic immigrants became increasingly conceptualized as a highly

skilled and valuable group of newcomers, while the value family-class immigration

increasingly came into question. The chasm between ‘economic’ versus ‘family’

immigrants thus continued to grow, again shifting the boundaries of Canada’s imagined

community.

In the mid-1990s, the Chrétien Liberals initiated the Immigration Policy Review

(IPR) as part of a broader agenda of neo-liberal restructuring. The IPR resulted in the

repeal of the 1976 Immigration Act, which was replaced by the Immigration and

Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The IRPA, which came into effect on June 28, 2002,

was tabled as nearly 300 pages of legislation. Yet, as Dauvergne (2003) notes, despite

some modifications from previous legislation, “one of the most surprising things about

the new IRPA is how little it [changed]” (p.726). As with the 1976 Immigration Act, the

three main categories of immigrant admission in the IRPA were the economic class, the

family class, and the refugee class (Statutes of Canada, 2001). The institutionalized

dependence of family-class immigrants on their sponsor, introduced in the previous

Immigration Act of 1976, remained in effect in the IRPA in the form of the sponsorship

agreement (see Chapter One). Spousal sponsorship, however, changed considerably,

and entailed two of the most notable modifications introduced in the IRPA. First, prior

to the IRPA, the required period of financial obligation toward a sponsored spouse was

10 years. This period of dependence was criticized by immigrant advocates and

women’s rights groups for the potential problems it could create for women immigrants

in violent relationships (see Walton-Roberts, 2004a). To this end, the sponsorship period

for spouses was reduced in the IRPA to 3 years. Second, with the IRPA, samesex

partners were, for the first time, made eligible for family-class sponsorship. These

modifications suggest, at least in part, the growing advocacy power of minority rights’

groups in the immigration policy process.

Despite the important move toward equality pertaining to sexual orientation in

the IRPA, the non-discriminatory nature of the immigration program remained (and

remains) in question in ways that pertain to both economic and family-class

immigration. For instance, it has been argued (see, for example, Arat-Koc, 1992; Boyd,

1992, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Li, 2003c, 2001; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis,

1997; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998) that the country’s current immigration

program maintains class-based racialization and gendering of Canadian immigrants

through policies that privilege certain immigrants over others. As Simmons (2010)

notes, “while Canada does not officially select immigrants on the basis of country of

origin, Canadian policy nevertheless uses socio-economic criteria that play an important

role in determining the countries from which immigrants come” (p.114). As in previous

policy eras, family-based immigration persists as an important way of structuring

differential access to the Canadian nation and for constructing Canada’s imagined

community. For instance, under current legislation, there is no minimum income

requirement for sponsors of spouses, common-law or conjugal partners and dependents;

however, those sponsoring any other family members must meet a low-income cut-off

to be eligible for family-class sponsorship. Specifically, “the sponsor’s income must

meet the minimum necessary income requirement […] to support all members of a

sponsor’s own family and all sponsored persons and their family members, including

family members listed as non-accompanying” (CIC, 2010a: 23-4). In this way, despite

official discourse promulgating Canada’s acceptance of ‘non-traditional’ families and

respect for a broad range of traditions and customs (see CIC, 1994a), reunification of

extended families is constrained by financial requirements, to the end of indirectly

promoting the reunification of nuclear families, or of families of higher socio-economic

status. As such, biases remain rooted in Canadian immigration policy in ways that most

strongly (albeit indirectly) discriminate against ethnic minority women from lower-class

backgrounds originating in disadvantaged regions of the world (Abu-Laban, 1998b; Das

Gupta, 1995; Thobani, 2007).To this end, family-based immigration remains a site for

differentially prescribing access to the nation and, by extension, membership in the

Canadian national community.

3.9 Conclusion

Since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869, the admission of immigrants has revolved

around defining the nation’s ‘ideal’ citizens within the context of the nation’s ‘imagined

future’; this has involved the intersection of economic interests and ‘cultural’

preferences in direct relation to economic and family-based immigration. Over time, the

boundaries for inclusion in the Canadian nation have evolved in reference to the

demographic and economic needs of the country, alongside social norms and

international pressures pertaining to human rights and humanitarian interests.

Intertwined with these factors has been an overarching vision of the nation’s identity,

which can be clearly discerned from the structure of the immigration program at any

given point in time. As demonstrated by the present chapter, the relationship between

economic and family-based immigration, and the role of these types of immigration in

defining membership to the nation’s imagined community over time, provides useful

insight into the contemporary construction of the Canadian national community.

Clearly, the role of ‘economic’ and ‘family’ immigration in Canada has shifted

over time in meaningful and telling ways. In the early post-Confederation decades,

family-based and economic immigration were inextricably intertwined, with the ideal

migratory unit being (largely British) agricultural families, Moreover, racialized access

to both immigration as a family unit and family reunification served as a central site for

defining inclusion in, marginalization to, and exclusion from Canada’s national

community. Over time, changing national needs and social pressures resulted in an

increasing polarization of ‘family’ and ‘economic’ immigration. At present, the two

streams of immigration are clearly divided in policy and discursive contexts.

Despite this shift, the positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation through

access to family-based immigration remains, in large part, intact. For instance,

permanent resident economic principal applicants (i.e., skilled workers, business and

investor immigrants) are currently granted the most generous allowances to family, both

in terms of being allowed to bring their family with them at the time of immigration,

and in terms of reunification (i.e., family-class sponsorship). Access to family

reunification, however, depends on the ability of the sponsor to accept financial

responsibility for sponsored newcomers. In this way, in the contemporary context,

access to family reunification requires socio-economic success. In the face of

discrimination and challenges experienced by racialized immigrants in the Canadian

labour market, it follows that visible minority immigrants (particularly those for whom

language is an added barrier to economic success) remain hindered in their access to

family. For other groups of migrants, the historical use of foreign labour without access

to family and permanent settlement is echoed in temporary migration programs (e.g.,

relating to agricultural work). For the majority of current temporary worker programs,

future citizenship is not a legal option, and permanent settlement is discouraged through

non-access to family reunification rights. These migrants are thus highly marginalized in

the Canadian nation through their severely restricted rights. Somewhat less marginalized

are live-in-caregivers, who enter as temporary workers as part of the Livein-Caregiver

Program under the stipulation that, after two years of work in home care, they are

eligible to apply for permanent residence (and, if successful, will have access family

sponsorship rights). Given that the majority of agricultural workers are male and live-in-

caregivers are female, the distinctive allowances between these two programs clearly

genders future membership in the Canadian nation. These brief examples demonstrate

continuity with Canadian immigration history, involving gendered and racialized

distinctions between family and economic immigration in ways that are directly

implicated in the positioning of immigrants to Canada’s national community.

The remainder of this thesis builds on the background offered by the present

chapter pertaining to the symbolic positioning of different groups of immigrants to the

Canadian nation. The upcoming three chapters examine in more detail the subtleties of

immigrants’ national belonging by examining the social construction of Canada’s

contemporary imagined community in a variety of discourses. Chapter Four begins this

examination with an analysis of media discourse surrounding one particular group of

family-class immigrants – marriage immigrants.

CHAPTER FOUR: NEWS MEDIA AS DISCOURSE – FOCUSING ON

MARRIAGE IMMIGRANTS

“In effect, journalists join with other agents of control as a kind

of ‘deviance-defining elite,’ using the news to provide an ongoing

articulation of the proper bounds of behaviour in all organized

spheres of life” (Ericson et al., 1987:3).

4.0 Introduction

As discussed in Chapters One and Three, family-class immigration is a source of

considerable debate in contemporary Canadian society. The value of this type of

immigration to the Canadian nation is generally questioned, to the end of symbolically

positioning family-class immigrants on the margins of Canada’s imagined community.

The present chapter offers a focused consideration of the social construction of a

particular group of family-class immigrants by examining media discourse surrounding

marriage immigration. This analysis focuses on media coverage of immigration relating

to the sponsorship of spouses or intimate partners. The chapter is based on a content

analysis of articles relating to marriage immigration in Canada published in four

newspapers (the Globe and Mail, the National Post, the Toronto Sun, and the Toronto

Star) over a ten year period. The chapter argues that marriage immigration serves as a

site for articulating anxieties pertaining to the presence of newcomers from

nontraditional immigration source countries. More specifically, it argues that media

discourse on marriage immigrants, which is characterized by ambiguity, conceptual

vagueness, and contradictory constructions, reflects underlying tensions pertaining to

ethnic and cultural diversity associated with contemporary international immigration to

Canada. The media discourse also demonstrates broader ambivalence surrounding

international marriages, and, more generally, upholds and reproduces dominant

discourses that devalue and problematize family-class immigration. To this end, the

media discourse largely marginalizes marriage immigrants with respect to Canada’s

imagined community.

The chapter begins by defining the recent Canadian context of the marriage

immigration ‘problematic,’ and proceeds to discuss the importance of studying media

discourse. The chapter then briefly reviews the two bodies of literature within which the

present analysis is grounded. First, research on the marriage-migration connection is

discussed, including a consideration of existing work on media coverage of marriage

migrants. Second, research on Canadian news media coverage of immigrants is

reviewed.

4.1 The Canadian Marriage-Migration Context

In Canada, 75% of all family-class immigration involves the sponsorship and migration

of a spouse/partner of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident (CIC, 2010a). As much

as 60% of male-initiated sponsorship applications involve efforts to sponsor wives from

a foreign country (Merali, 2008). According to Merali (2008), these statistics “reflect

the increasing number of immigrant men who are choosing to marry women from other

countries of origin, as well as the increasing number of non-immigrant males who are

choosing to marry women from other countries and cultures” (p.281). In recent years,

spousal sponsorship has entailed visible concern on the part of the Canadian

government, pertaining to the possibility that marriage could represent a route for

immigrants to enter the country under false pretenses. Indeed, the “abuse of the

immigration system through marriages of convenience” was first identified as a concern

on the main page of Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) website in 2006 as

follows:

When someone gets married for the sole reason of immigrating to Canada,

this is known as a marriage of convenience. Under Canada’s immigration

law, marriages of convenience are not allowed. Citizenship and

Immigration Canada’s officers are specially trained to recognize genuine

immigration applications, and they know how to detect marriages of

convenience [...] Canada’s immigration system is also set up in a way that

discourages marriages of convenience. Anyone who wants to sponsor their

spouse or partner to immigrate to Canada makes a serious legal

commitment. As part of this commitment, sponsors must support their

spouse or partner for three years, even if the relationship fails. If the couple

breaks up and the sponsored person gets social assistance, the sponsor

must pay back the amount of social assistance the former spouse received.

Given the legal obligations, sponsorship should not be taken lightly, and

everyone is responsible for ensuring that their marriage is genuine.

More recently, CIC initiated an online survey in which visitors to the website were

invited to provide input on the problem of marriages of convenience. The survey,

available on CIC’s website between September 27 2010 and October 27 2010, asked

respondents about their experiences with marriages of convenience, and their opinions

on what the government should do to protect Canadians and the Canadian nation against

this type of immigration fraud. The survey was launched by CIC Minister Jason Kenney

in advance of upcoming amendments to the IRPA regulations, and represented “part of a

wider government consultation that will likely lead to a crackdown on marriages of

convenience and tighter rules on immigration sponsorship.” CIC’s survey and Kenney’s

articulation of concern over inauthentic marriage immigration thrust this matter into the

national spotlight, with stories of the longstanding ‘problem’ of fraudulent immigrants

abounding in national television reports, print media, and radio programs.

Importantly, little is known about marriage immigrants in Canada (VanderPlaat

et al., 2009). This knowledge gap is arguably due, at least in part, to the neo-liberal

orientation of current immigration policies and the associated lack of official empirical

data on non-economic immigrants. In the absence of detailed information about

marriage immigrants and in light of the current controversies and official concern

surrounding this group, news media coverage of marriage immigrants becomes

particularly important to study. Indeed, news media is likely to represent one of the most

prominent sources of public ‘knowledge’ on marriage immigrants, and stands to have a

salient role in shaping social views about this group in their receiving society (Hsia,

2007). Widespread research has demonstrated that the news media play a role in

influencing public opinion and policy agendas by identifying and/or reiterating issues

that are, or that ‘should’ be, of public and political concern (Creese & Peterson, 1996;

Hay, 1996; Ungerleider 1991; van Dijk, 1995). Importantly, despite the ideal of neutral

and value-free media, a large body of critical literature suggests that the news media do

not provide objective coverage of people and events but, rather, provide particular

versions of a story, filtered through professional and personal ideologies and values, as

well as social, cultural, and organizational norms and corporate interests (Hay, 1996;

Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Karim, 1993; Mahtani, 2008, 2001; Ungerleider,

1991; van Dijk, 1989, 1983). As van Dijk (1983) comments, “news is not simply an

(incomplete) description of the facts, but a specific kind of (re)construction of reality

according to the norms and values of some society” (p.28). In other words, by reporting

selected stories in certain ways, news media contribute to the social construction and

reconstruction of reality. It follows that news media discourse acts to construct the

social groups it addresses, and contributes to an ideological climate replete with

assumptions about how the world ought to be, including who and what belongs and

does not belong in that world (Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Vukov, 2003).

Marriage immigration also represents a site of theoretical interest. In a time of

unprecedented ease in travel and communication across vast geographic distances,

marriages between nationals of different countries are becoming increasingly common

(Cottrell, 1990; Merali, 2008; Piper, 2003). These cross-border (or international)

marriages and their complex interconnections with migration have stimulated

heightened interest in scholarly circles in recent years. Indeed, the marriage-migration

link is a multi-faceted phenomenon involving implicit and explicit articulations of

gender, ‘race,’ and social class, embedded in historical and contemporary economic,

political, and social relations on the local, national, and international stage. To this end,

a rapidly growing body of literature has stressed the need for closer attention to the

manner in which the marriage-migration phenomenon is experienced, constructed in,

and influenced by local, national, and global social and political contexts (Aguilar &

Lacsamana, 2004; Constable, 2005, 2003; Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003; Merali,

2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003; Piper & Roces, 2003; Waldis & Byron,

2006).

Overall, marriage migration is a theoretical source of interest that is also

currently on the Canadian government’s policy radar and in the Canadian public eye. To

this end, an examination of how marriage immigration is understood and presented in

media discourse is both sociologically and socially relevant. Yet, an analysis of

Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not previously been conducted.

Existing research has addressed the complexity of the marriage-migration link and, in

other national contexts, media analyses of marriage immigrants have been conducted. In

the Canadian context, media analyses have focused primarily on negative, racialized

portrayals of immigrants. These bodies of literature are briefly reviewed here in turn.

4.2 The Marriage-Migration Link

The connection between marriage and migration is complex, entailing a wide variety of

relationships relating to both permanent and temporary migration (Kofman, 2003). In

Canada, marriage and migration can intersect in the following ways: (1) the

immigration of one spouse as a principal applicant (e.g., as an economic immigrant),

involving the simultaneous immigration of the other spouse as an accompanying

dependent who is not evaluated independently for admission; (2) the immigration of one

spouse as a principal applicant, who later sponsors the admission of their existing

spouse under family-class immigration policies; (3) the independent immigration of one

individual, who, as a permanent resident or Canadian citizen, subsequently marries or

becomes intimately involved with a foreign national and sponsors their immigration to

Canada; or (4) a Canadian-born citizen who enters into an relationship with a foreign

national and sponsors their immigration to Canada.

As this description suggests, marriage migration occurs in the context of both

family reunification and family formation. Although family reunification is associated

with its own set of concerns and is not viewed unproblematically by receiving societies

(as discussed in Chapters One and Three), it is nevertheless viewed as less suspicious

than family formation, as suggested by CIC’s ongoing concern over marriages of

convenience. A logical explanation for these diverging views of family formation and

family reunification is that the latter, in principle, involves unions that preceded

migration, and thus are less open to having their veracity questioned. As such, literature

on marriage migration associated with family formation is most relevant to the present

analysis. This background offers insight into the phenomenon of marriage immigration

against which this chapter’s analysis of news media coverage can subsequently be

considered.

Existing literature has highlighted how uneven economic development,

demographic pressures, unprecedented ease of communication across vast differences,

and accelerated international migration in the context of globalization have intersected

in the arena of marriage in complex ways (see, for instance, Bélanger, 2010; Constable,

2005, 2003; Lauser, 2008; Lu, 2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003, 1999; Piper

& Roces, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002). For example, some international marriages

across Asian borders have been associated with increasing gaps between the

expectations of women and men pertaining to work and marriage. These social changes

surrounding gender roles are occurring in the midst of social pressures for men to find a

suitable wife in order to carry on the paternal lineage. Together, these factors lead men,

typically from more developed Asian countries, to seek out foreign brides, often from

less developed countries; these women are perceived as being more willing to occupy a

traditional ‘wife and mother’ role (Bélanger, 2010). Cross-border marriages and the

migrations associated with these marriages are often brokered by matchmaking or

socalled introduction agencies in both sending and receiving countries (Bélanger, 2010;

Constable, 2005; Lu, 2008; Nakamatsu, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002).

Other research has further demonstrated the importance of cultural pressures in

shaping marriage migration on a global stage. Research on second generation South

Asian immigrants, for instance, has documented the role of transnational social

networks in establishing marriages between children of South Asian immigrants

overseas and nationals of their parents’ country of origin. This work has documented

how ‘arranged introductions’ often lead to cross-border marriages, entailing the

migration and settlement abroad of the South Asian spouse (Ballard, 1990; Brown,

2006; Walton-Roberts, 2004b). Walton-Roberts (2004b), for instance, has illustrated that

marriage immigration to Canada represents a means of satisfying Sikh marital

requirements (i.e., caste endogamy and village exogamy) in the midst of broader

migratory pressures and desires.

A growing body of literature has documented the complex intersections between

cross-border marriages and labour migration (see Piper & Roces, 2003; Piper, 2003,

1999). McKay (2003), for instance, argues that the de-skilling experienced by single

female Filipino migrant workers arriving in Canada through the Live-in-Caregiver

program represents a possible motivating factor for entering into an international

marriage with a Canadian citizen. In contrast, Pe-Pua (2003) demonstrates that the

marriage migration patterns of Filipino domestic workers in Spain and Italy less

commonly involve marriage to local men in their destination countries. Rather, the

majority of these women are married at the time of their migration. Some women thus

utilize labour migration as a means to gain admission to a foreign country, and

subsequently proceed to sponsor their family to join them through family reunification

policies. Other women do not sponsor their family, but rather live as part of a

transnational family, with their husband and children remaining in the country of origin

(see Pe-Pua, 2003).

Overall, the intersections between marriage and migration are complex, with

individual migrants’ experiences and motivations in different roles not always clearly

aligning with the category under which they gain admission to their receiving country.

Given this context, as well as the above-described importance of media representations

in reconstructing social and political realities and reiterating social norms and dominant

ideologies, the ultimate question at hand in this chapter remains – how are marriage

immigrants represented in the media? Although, as noted, this issue has not been

addressed in Canada, a small body of literature has documented media coverage of

marriage migration in other national contexts.

4.3 Media Research

Despite the complexity of marriage migration, existing media research has

demonstrated that portrayals of marriage migrants and cross-border marriages draw on

overly simplistic, highly gendered stereotypes. These stereotypes fail to capture the

multi-dimensional nature of immigrants’ lives and obscure the complex and diverse

motivations associated with both marriage and migration. The existing literature nearly

exclusively focuses on Asian ‘foreign brides’ involved in marriage migration. This

research has generally documented highly similar representations across national

contexts, involving long-standing and highly familiar popular images of Asian women:

“One is the sweet and innocent, sexual-romantic ‘oriental doll’ or ‘lotus blossom’; the

other is the conniving, devious, and shrewd ‘dragon lady’” (Constable, 2003: 13). These

representations involve dichotomous constructions of women as either passive victims

of controlling men, or as cunning and manipulative women who dupe innocent men in

order to get a free meal-ticket and immigration status (Constable, 2003; Hsia, 2007).

Importantly, these stereotypical representations are commonly invoked in the

construction of marriage migration as a social problem. For example, in a detailed

examination of Taiwanese news media, Hsia (2007) demonstrates that foreign brides are

discursively linked with prostitution and broken families; these women are constructed

as passive victims, materialist gold-diggers, or criminals. Taiwanese men who marry

foreign brides are broadly constructed as being socially undesirable, typified as

physically or morally inferior. These marriages are portrayed as a serious threat to

Taiwanese society, given their potential to lead to the deterioration of population

‘quality.’ To this end, Hsia (2007) argues that the Taiwanese media discourse reflects

national fear that a ‘low quality’ generation of children will interfere with Taiwan’s

competitiveness on a global economic stage.

Other research similarly demonstrates how national interests and concerns

underlie media representations of marriage immigrants. In the Vietnamese mass media,

for instance, marriage immigrants (namely, Vietnamese women married to Taiwanese or

South Korean men) are depicted, on one hand, as ignorant, uneducated, and poor

victims in need of state education and protection. On the other hand, these immigrants

are portrayed as selfish, materialistic opportunists who evade their duties as good wives,

daughters, mothers, and citizens (Bélanger et al., 2007). For Bélanger et al. (2007),

these images represent concerns over Vietnamese women’s abandonment of their duties

within a socialist society, and thus articulate the supposed threat that marriage migration

poses to Vietnamese nationalism, patriarchy, and masculinity.

Research on media coverage in receiving countries outside of Asia has similarly

revealed dichotomous representations of marriage immigrants. In the Australia media,

Asian foreign brides are alternatively constructed as sensual sex slaves or as the

“salvation of traditional family values” (Robinson, 1996: 60). Robinson (1996)

interprets these representations as an intersection between historically-rooted Orientalist

discourses of Western dominance and contemporary patterns of gender and marriage

relations in Australia. More specifically, media depictions reflect reactions to the

changing nature of family and marital relations in the face of feminist advances in

Australia, co-mingled with debates surrounding Australia’s relations with Asia. In this

context, patriarchal and Orientalist discourses intertwine in the struggle to define

contemporary Australian identity (Robinson, 1996).

As previously noted, Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not

been analyzed. Nevertheless, there exists a large body of work on Canadian media

coverage of immigrants and ethnic minorities (see Mahtani, 2008, for a review of this

literature) that deserves brief consideration. This research highlights the role of media

discourses in exclusionary nation-building, wherein immigrants and ethnic minorities

are symbolically located on the margins of the Canadian nation. Generally speaking,

immigrants and ethnic minorities are consistently portrayed in the Canadian media in

negative and stereotypical ways (Henry & Tator, 2002; Mahtani, 2008). Extensive

research on Canadian news media has demonstrated that immigrants and ethnic

minorities are widely racialized and criminalized in media coverage (Fleras & Kunz,

2001; Greenberg, 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Henry & Tator, 2002; Hier &

Greenburg, 2002a, 2002b; Jiwani, 2006, 1998; Ma & Hildebrandt, 1993; Mahtani, 2008,

2001; Mahtani & Mountz, 2002). For example, in an examination of three daily British

Columbia newspapers between 1995 and 2000, Mahtani and Mountz (2002) found that

articles associated with immigrant criminality rose in volume and intensity of negative

tone over time, accompanied by increasing anti-immigration rhetoric. Similarly, in an

analysis of the Toronto Star and the Vancouver Sun between 1970 and 1990, Ma and

Hildebrandt (1993) found that, over time, an increasing proportion of news stories about

ethnic Chinese in Canada (including but not restricted to immigrants) constructed this

group as criminals, and the balance of stories about the Chinese community generally

became more negative.

Hier and Greenberg have written cogently about media treatment of the 600

Fujian migrants, popularly and pejoratively termed the “Chinese boat people,” who

arrived on Canada’s west coast in 1999 (Greenberg 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Hier

& Greenberg 2002a, 2002b). The authors argue that news media coverage of the

incident was part of a process of ‘collective problematization’ of immigration

(Greenberg & Hier 2001), touching on public concerns about the ability of the Canadian

state to secure the nation’s borders and protect the Canadian population. In this regard,

the arrival of undocumented migrants was constructed into a narrative crisis that was

factually disproportionate to the reality of the situation, yet appealed to the population’s

concern over national security. To this end, even a relatively small group of migrants

became ‘legitimately’ defined as a ‘crisis’ (Hier & Greenberg, 2002a). Moreover, these

migrants were racialized as foreign ‘Others’; as the authors explain, “repeated reference

to the fact that [the migrants] were of ‘Chinese’ or ‘Asian’ origin [created] an instant

epistemological distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Canadian,’ ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident,’

‘Us’ and Them’” (p.498). In this way, insiders’ status in Canada’s imagined community

was solidified through the construction of the Fujian migrants as threats to the Canadian

nation.

The present chapter extends and draws together the above two bodies of work by

examining Canadian news media discourse on marriage immigration. The chapter

contends that this discourse reflects national anxieties about contemporary immigration

relating to the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of the Canadian nation, as well as

broader concerns associated with non-economic (i.e., family-class) immigration. The

media coverage is revealing of ambivalence and uncertainty surrounding the presence of

residents of non-European origins and about marriages between Canadians and

‘foreigners.’ The media discourse thus reflects and contributes to social tensions

surrounding marriage migrants, and contributes to this group’s symbolic marginalization

in Canada’s imagined community.

4.4 Methods

An initial keyword search of newspaper publications was conducted using the electronic

database LexisNexis. Broad search terms of “Canada,” “immigration,” and (“family” or

“spouse”) were used in order to ensure that as many relevant articles as possible would

be located. Given that marriage immigration has never been specifically examined in

existing analyses of Canadian media, there was no a priori expectation regarding the

volume of articles that might be published on this topic. However, given that Canadian

immigration is a very broad topic, and that specific coverage of any individual aspect of

this topic would not be likely to garner a particularly high volume of publications, a

relatively long time frame of ten years was selected for the present analysis. As such,

the search was conducted for articles published between December 1999 and December

2009.

The LexisNexis keyword search returned 958 newspaper results. Of this total,

approximately 79% were published in three newspapers: the Globe and Mail (n=242),

the Toronto Star (n=382), and the Toronto Sun (n=131); all others newspapers included

in the results were primarily non-Canadian publications, and were thus excluded from

the analysis. In order to ensure that articles of interest from these three newspapers were

not missed, an additional search with slightly more narrow search terms (“Canada” and

“immigration” and “spouse or marriage”) was conducted in the electronic database

ProQuest for these three specific newspapers. These results were cross-referenced with

the LexisNexis results to identify any non-duplicate articles. An additional search for

articles published in the National Post between 1999 and 2009 was also conducted in

ProQuest, again using the search terms “Canada,” “immigration,” and “spouse or

marriage.” Notably, the National Post is not included in the LexisNexis database;

however, it was purposively sampled in order to provide as national a perspective as

possible. Based on this search, a total of 304 results from the National Post were

reviewed for relevance.

Results from both the LexisNexis and ProQuest databases were obtained in

fulltext format and examined for possible inclusion in the current analysis. Publications

that contained the specified search terms but were not actually about marriage

immigration, articles that were only peripherally relevant (i.e., where marriage

immigration was not the substantive focus), and duplicate results were excluded from

the data file. In addition, articles that were not authored by journalists (e.g., letters to the

editor) were excluded from the analysis, on the basis that these types of pieces are not

bound by the journalistic standards and requirements of newspapers, and are viewed in

critical analytical and theoretical terms as being distinct from the discourse produced by

staff journalists.

The final sample for the present analysis consisted of 190 articles on spousal

sponsorship. This included 47 articles from the Toronto Star, 44 from the Toronto Sun,

62 from the Globe and Mail, and 37 from the National Post. For all individual articles,

the following information was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: (1) overall

tone (positive/sympathetic, neutral, or negative/accusatory); (2) article focus (e.g.,

policy, personal/human interest story); (3) specific topic(s) covered in the article (e.g.,

sponsorship policy; immigrants as a burden on Canadian society; difficulties associated

with spousal sponsorship); (4) whether the article specifically addressed female or male

immigrants or both; and (5) whether a specific country of immigrant origin or the ethnic

origin of immigrants were discussed. From here, content analysis was conducted in

order to identify themes and codified context.

It should be noted that, given this chapter’s focus on marriage immigrants, the

tone of the newspaper articles was evaluated with respect to this group or this type of

immigration. There were instances where, for example, articles discussed both

economic immigration and family-class (including marriage) immigration; in some

cases, the tone of individual articles was positive towards economic immigrants and

their contribution to Canadian society or positive towards immigration as a general

phenomenon, yet simultaneously negative towards marriage immigrants. For the present

analysis, articles as a whole were coded according to the dominant tone directed toward

marriage immigrants. In the small number of cases where both sympathetic and

negative elements were strongly present within individual articles, the articles were

coded as both ‘negative’ and ‘sympathetic.’ It is noted in the text when this type of

article is discussed.

4.5 Results

Overall, 56.2% of articles were categorized as having a negative tone, while 33.3% of

articles were categorized as sympathetic and 10.4% were categorized as neutral. The

breakdown of the number and percentage of each type of article in all newspapers is

provided in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Sympathetic, Neutral, and Negative Articles, by Newspaper

Newspaper

Sympathetic

Neutral

Negative

Total

Globe and Mail

42*

National Post

Toronto Star

22**

Toronto Sun

Total

113

201

*5 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic

**6 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic

Articles that were neutral in tone dealt mostly with immigration policy. The articles

primarily reported on changes relating to the spousal sponsorship program, most

commonly relating to regulations surrounding residency requirements during the

processing of sponsorship applications. Other articles in this category reported on the

change in immigration policy in 2002 that allowed spousal sponsorship among samesex

partners. Overall, the neutral articles were typically short in length and were very

straightforward, providing little to no evidence of ideological inclinations or political

leanings; as such, they offered very little content for meaningful and

theoreticallyrelevant analysis of marriage immigration. Moreover, these articles

represented a relatively small proportion of all articles (6% for both Globe and Mail,

16% for the National Post, 15% for the Toronto Star, and just under 7% for the Toronto

Sun, for an overall total of 10.4% across all newspapers). For these reasons, the

remainder of the chapter focuses on negative and sympathetic articles relating to

marriage immigration. These articles provide insight into the manner in which marriage

immigrants were socially constructed and symbolically positioned in the Canadian

imagined community through media discourse.

4.51 Negative Coverage: The Social Problem of Inauthentic Marriage Immigration

The analysis revealed that marriage immigration was presented in the media as a

distinct and growing social problem. In constructing marriage immigration as a social

problem, the media coverage emphasized immigrants’ growing use of marriages of

convenience and fraudulent marriages to undeservedly gain entry to Canada. As defined

in one article (Jimenez, 2006, July 29), marriages of convenience are unions entered

into with both parties’ knowledge that the primary purpose of the marriage is one

spouse’s immigration, with the migrating spouse commonly paying a fee to the resident

spouse for the marriage. In fraudulent marriages, on the other hand, the Canadian

counterpart is said to enter into a marriage not knowing that for the immigrant, the sole

purpose of the union is to come to Canada. Several sub-themes characterized articles

focusing on marriages of convenience and fraudulent marriages: first, that these types of

unions are a significant and growing problem in Canada requiring state attention;

second, that culturally arranged marriages are a common route for introducing

inauthentic marriage immigrants to Canada; and third, that marriage immigrants are

deviants or criminals who threaten the safety of the Canadian population, the integrity

of the Canadian immigration program, and the stability of Canadian values and norms.

Across these themes, marriage immigrants were commonly portrayed as evil-doers who

defraud Canadian citizens and the immigration system. Canadian partners, on the other

hand, were alternatively depicted as victims of marriage immigrants, or as victims of an

unduly harsh immigration system that imposes a financial burden on Canadian sponsors

via the sponsorship program.

Across articles from all newspapers, inauthentic marriage immigration was

portrayed as a widespread and growing problem, despite the absence of valid data to

support this claim. In the absence of such data, many articles attempted to quantify the

inauthentic marriage migration problem, often using quotes from immigration officials

or other elite voices (e.g., lawyers) to legitimize the claims being put forth:

Ms. Towell is one of a growing number of people going public with their

stories of marriage fraud in the immigration system. These are Canadians

who married a foreigner only to see their husband or wife leave them

within weeks or even days of landing on Canadian soil (Curry, 2009, April

20).

The Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim Society has already documented 200

cases [of marriage fraud] and believes there are many, many more

(Mandel, 2006, July 9).

When a New Democratic Party MLA organized a meeting on [marriage

fraud] in Burnaby, B.C., in 2006, nearly 200 people filled a town hall. An

advocacy group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society

estimates the number of victims to be in the thousands (Curry, 2008, May

21).

Ottawa immigration lawyer Julie Taub said thousands of Canadians have

fallen victim to marriage fraud and the 100 or so members of Canadians

Against Immigration Fraud ‘represent only the tip of the iceberg’ (Spencer,

2009, April 23).

Ms. Green is just one of 1,500 Canadians who fall victim to marriage fraud

each year, according to an advocacy group called Canadians Against

Immigration Fraud. Falling in love with foreigners, they are jilted weeks –

if not days – after the vows are exchanged. Commenting on this issue last

week, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said: “I would say it's one of

the most frequent forms of immigration fraud” (Bielski, 2009b, April 30).

When he first saw the front page of the Sunday [Toronto] Sun about a

woman abandoned shortly after sponsoring her Cuban groom here, Shah

nervously joked to his bride, “but you wouldn't leave me, right?” She gave

him a big hug. “What a stupid question,” she assured him. “Of course not.”

But the very next day the Cuban woman had vanished as well, joining an

epidemic of foreign brides and grooms who are ditching their Canadian

spouses soon after using them to get to this promise land (Mandel, 2006,

July 9).

The media discourse entailed constant assertion that inauthentic marriage immigration is

a widespread and growing problem that is nearing epidemic proportions, without

actually having data to this effect. The enumeration provided was based on

questionable, impressionist estimates or vague terminology (e.g., many; widespread),

yet served to lend a sense of ‘realness’ to the ‘problem’ under construction. In this way,

the media established a sense of prevalence and urgency, regardless of the extent to

which inauthentic marriage migration actually occurs.

Across the articles analyzed, the Canadian state’s concern over disingenuous

immigrants and active investigation of possible fraud was emphasized, further

contributing to the construction of inauthentic marriage migration as a notable social

problem:

“The government is concerned about marriages of convenience and is

currently engaged in the investigation of these cases,” said department

spokesperson Danielle Norris (Keung, 2008, May 23).

After being flooded with fake wedding photos, false forms and forged

signatures, the Canadian government is sounding the alarm over

immigration fraud (“Feds look out for immigration fraud,” Toronto Sun,

2009, March 11).

The Harper government is deploying clandestine teams to fan out across

foreign countries and gather raw information about elaborately staged

phony weddings aimed at duping Canadian immigration officials. The

teams, which comprise up to five people, are part of a wider bid by the

Department of Citizenship and Immigration to crack down on marriages

of convenience as immigrant communities warn that thousands of foreign

fraudsters are leaving lonely Canadians broke and brokenhearted (Curry,

2008, May 21).

Officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada are looking for input

from the Canadian Bar Association on possible changes to regulations

regarding ‘bad faith’ marriages, in which foreigners dupe Canadians into

marriage to gain a Canadian passport (Curry, 2008, July 10).

By defining inauthentic marriage immigration as an imminent problem affecting a

growing number of Canadians, marriage immigrants were cast under a shadow of

suspicion, while Canadians were directly represented as victims of immigration scams:

Palwinder Gill of Surrey, B.C., had an arranged marriage that quickly fell

apart two years ago. The 43-year-old said his wife left him one year after

he sponsored her entry into Canada from India. He is convinced she used

him purely for immigration purposes. Now he advocates for change as part

of a group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society. The group

says these marriages have devastating effects, leading to depression,

embarrassment and economic hardship (Curry, 2008, May 21).

Victims say such marriages of convenience stigmatize and humiliate them

before their family, friends and peers. Worse still is the depression that

follows the sudden marital abandonment. And there is a financial burden:

Sponsors are on the hook financially for any social assistance their spouses

might receive for three years – 10 years if they've also sponsored children

(Bielski, 2009b, April 30).

There are no statistics measuring the scope of the problem [of marriage

fraud], but advocacy groups argue it is widespread, leaving Canadians

feeling ashamed and possibly on the hook financially should a fleeing

spouse go on social assistance (Curry, 2009, January 22).

Their unwitting Canadian sponsors invest not only their hearts but

thousands of dollars in paperwork, long-distance phone calls and airfare.

They also mortgage their future: To sponsor their immigrant spouses here,

they must agree to financially support them for three years. If the

newcomer draws on social assistance – even if they have run out on their

spouse – their Canadian sponsor is still on the hook to pay that money back

to the Canadian government (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

The media discourse thus constructed a clear dichotomy between marriage immigrants

and Canadians, with overseas marriages emerging as a site for marginalizing marriage

immigrants to Canada’s national community. Also important to note from the above

descriptions is the attribution of inauthentic marriage immigration to both women and

men immigrants; this stands in contrast to previous research focusing on foreign brides.

Indeed, the analysis revealed that inauthentic marriage migration was portrayed as a

scheme commonly used by both men and women immigrants to enter Canada. The

gendered contours of these portrayals are discussed further in section 4.53 of this

chapter.

The ‘social problem’ of inauthentic marriage immigration was also articulated in

reference to the necessity of the sponsorship program. In these cases, the potential

financial detriment that Canadians may face if they marry a fraudulent immigrant

further contributed to the image of marriage immigrants as a problematic group of

newcomers in Canadian society:

[Lawyer Julie] Taub argues that those who cynically say Canadians

marrying foreigners deserve their ordeals are missing the point. “When

fraudsters become permanent residents, then they too have the right to

sponsor family members. They're entitled to health care, social assistance,

housing and all the benefits that Canadians are entitled to” (Bielski, 2009b,

April 30).

Ms. Finley is working with the B.C. government – which was asked to co-

operate with Ottawa on the issue – to warn and remind Canadians they will

be on the hook financially if their new husbands or wives immediately

leave them and apply for social assistance (Curry, 2008, May 21).

The duped Canadian not only suffers emotional distress and

embarrassment as the victim of a marriage fraud, but they are also liable

for financial support if their ex then applies for social assistance. Some

immigrant advocates would have the federal government waive this

obligation, saying it punishes only the victim, but under existing rules such

an arrangement is a necessary protection for taxpayers and should inspire

greater vigilance among Canadians who enter into arranged marriages (“A

Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22).

In this context, marriage immigrants were portrayed as a potential threat to not only

individual Canadian sponsors, but to Canadian taxpayers more generally. The potential

social burden associated with inauthentic marriage immigration not only depicted these

immigrants as a potential drain on the Canadian system, but also served as the basis for

articulating a warning to Canadians against entering an international marital union. It is

also evident from these latter examples that portrayals of Canadians within inauthentic

marriages were not always clear-cut. In some cases, Canadians were problematized for

marrying foreigners, and were portrayed as being at least partly responsible for their

own victimization. In other instances, as evidenced by the last article quoted above (“A

Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22), marriage fraud was associated with

culturally arranged marriages. Importantly, as this example illustrates, articles referring

to culturally arranged marriages inconsistently and often simultaneously referred to

alleged victims of marriage fraud as ‘Canadians’ and as ‘immigrants.’ These articles

thus served as a means of discouraging Canadians, in general, from entering marriages

with ‘foreigners,’ yet often also located the problem of inauthentic marriage migration

within certain ‘immigrant’ communities. This point will be discussed in detail in the

next section of this chapter (section 4.52).

Other articles linked marriages of convenience to foreign workers and students,

thereby expanding the reach of the ‘social problem’ of inauthentic marriage immigration

beyond newcomers who enter the country through marriage. Similar to previously

discussed articles, equivocal statistics were used in an attempt to establish the extent to

which temporary migrants remain in the country through inauthentic marriages. For

instance, an article in the Globe and Mail specifically stated that foreign workers and

foreign students can use marriage and spousal sponsorship as a way of gaining

permanent residence in Canada, then immediately noted that 90,668 workers and 56,536

students were granted entry to Canada two years ago (Jimenez, 2006, May 11). Putting

these two statements together suggested a direct connection, implying that these large

numbers of foreign workers and students are at risk of defrauding the Canadian system

through inauthentic marriages. The discursive effect of this connection was to cast

suspicion on a much broader population of migrants in Canada. In other words, the

media coverage suggested that family-class spousal immigrants as well as temporary

residents may abuse the system through marriage scams. By commenting that fraudulent

marriage is a common strategy used by temporary migrants to remain in the country, the

possibility that a migrant worker or student and a Canadian can actually fall in love and

be joined in a genuine union was dismissed, and marriages between Canadians and

temporary residents were inherently problematized. In this way, Canadians were

implicitly warned against marrying a ‘foreigner’ residing overseas or within Canada.

Indeed, unions between Canadians and foreign immigrants were directly

presented in the media discourse as highly problematic:

“In any overseas marriage,” says immigration spokesman Melanie

Carkner, "they [Canadian sponsors] are counselled that this [marriage

fraud] could happen. It's on their application" (Jimenez, 2006, June 1).

“It really is buyer beware when you marry overseas,” says Marina Wilson,

a spokeswoman for Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Jimenez, 2006,

July 29).

International marriage immigrants were characterized as a distinct threat to individual

Canadians entering unions with foreign nationals, and, by extension, cross-border

marriages were problematized. Moreover, concern about these types of union was

rendered legitimate by citing government officials. In this regard, the above-cited words

of state official Marina Wilson are particularly telling. Her statement portrayed foreign

marriage migrants as a ‘purchase’ that Canadians should be wary of ‘buying.’ This

statement explicitly conveyed doubt that international marriages can be based on

genuine love, and emerged as an official cautionary assertion against the sponsorship of

‘foreign’ marriage partners.

In other instances, the possibility that marriage immigration could escalate and

entail ongoing immigration scams was emphasized:

If marriages of convenience go undetected, the couple divorce once the

spouse receives permanent residency. Some then go on to marry for a

second time and sponsor someone from their homeland in a process known

as ‘chain sponsorships’ (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

Someone divorces their real spouse, then enters a marriage of convenience

to get into Canada. Their “ex” husband or wife does the same. Although

officially divorced, the couple end up living together again in their new

country (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

The possible spiraling of inauthentic marriage immigration amplified the

problematization of marriage immigrants; it also undermined the validity of familyclass

immigration as a component of Canada’s immigration system by suggesting that it is

inherently amenable to enabling the entry of inauthentic migrants. In this way, marriage

immigrants were presented as a source of ongoing threat to the Canadian nation through

their facilitation of additional disingenuous immigration. This further contributed to the

marginalization of marriage immigrants with respect to Canada’s imagined community,

constructing them as outsiders within the nation’s borders in light of their tendency to

continually take advantage of the Canadian immigration system.

In portraying inauthentic marriage immigration as a social problem, the media

coverage also delineated the differential value of economic versus family-class

immigrant types:

“The selection criteria [for economic-class immigrants] is set so high that

it’s increasingly difficult for someone who doesn’t have a relative here to

get into Canada,” said James Bissett, a retired Immigration and Foreign

Affairs official and critic of the system. “It’s a serious concern, because

the family class is squeezing out the selected classes like skilled workers”

(Blackwell, 2004, April 7).

Once spousal sponsorships are granted, the partner immediately qualifies

for permanent resident status – avoiding skills requirements and queues

that for economic-class immigrants can involve waits of as long as six

years. Too often, the bureaucrats get it wrong. There are many cases where

the partner, once in Canada, then dumps his or her unsuspecting spouse

(“A Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22).

“Marriages of convenience are increasing substantially…because it takes

so long to process immigration cases,” Tony Luk, president of the Chinese

Immigration Consultants’ Association, told the Toronto Star yesterday.

[…] Luk said it takes about four to five years for a skilled worker, for

example, to get landed immigrant status, compared with six to nine months

for someone married to a Canadian. “Under the new rules…you don’t even

need to be (legally) married as long as you are common-law,” Luk said

(Brennan, 2006, May 10).

Marriage immigrants were thus presented as unskilled and undeserving of entry to

Canada. Moreover, they were depicted as inhibiting the admission of deserving

immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). In this way, the media coverage discursively

located economic immigrants within the boundaries of the nation’s imagined

community by suggesting that they are necessarily preferable to family-class

immigrants, while simultaneously marginalizing marriage immigrants. Marriage

immigrants also served as a basis for articulating broader concerns about the current

state of the immigration system by indicating that qualified economic immigrants are

hampered from entering the country while marriage immigrants (and family-class

immigrants more generally) readily gain entry. It is also worth noting that, in portraying

economic and family-class immigrants in this fashion, the media coverage contributed

to an image of the Canadian state as an ineffective guardian of the nation’s borders. In

this way, marriage immigrants served as a means for highlighting ‘flaws’ in the

Canadian immigration system.

4.52 Negative Coverage: Inauthentic Marriages, Problematic Asians

Another characteristic of the media coverage of inauthentic marriages was the common

conflation of these unions with culturally arranged marriages. Alongside this conflation

was a tendency to largely attribute inauthentic unions to Asian communities. In this

context, ‘Asian’ partners in Canada were inconsistently presented as ‘immigrants,’

without clear indication of whether they were, in fact, immigrants or Canadian-born. As

discussed in the preceding section, these types of articles commonly used ambiguous

quantifiers and appeals to authority to legitimize the claim that marriage immigration is

a major (Asian) problem.

The conflation of arranged marriages and inauthentic unions was, at times,

blatant. For instance, an article in the Globe and Mail entitled “Arranged marriages

becoming more common, officials say” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics added) had as

its first line: “Marriages of convenience are more and more common, particularly in the

Chinese and South Asian communities, immigration lawyers say” (Jimenez, 2006, May

11, italics added). Other articles suggested that marriages involving immigrants and

Asian communities were highly likely to be inauthentic:

Marriages of convenience are common in the South Asian community, and

because of this, spousal sponsorships are scrutinized closely to ensure

people are not marrying for immigration purposes (Jimenez, 2006, June

1).

Mr. Parikh, according to his court filing, counts himself a victim of

marriage fraud, a new kind of immigration offence that is bringing

humiliation, financial ruin and distress to a growing number of immigrants

from India, China, the Philippines and other countries. […] “I would tell

Indo-Canadians, don't marry in India,” Parikh said in an interview

(Jimenez, 2006, July 29).

As this latter example also illustrates, the tendency to locate inauthentic marriage

immigration in Asian communities served as a means of obscuring whether sponsors

had previously immigrated to Canada or were born in the country. This contributed to a

broader depiction of Asian-Canadians as immigrants, thereby conflating ethnicity and

immigrant status.

Numerous articles attempted to demonstrate the growing problem of inauthentic

marriage among Asian immigrants:

Chinese women wishing to come to Canada literally line up outside the

Canadian Embassy in Beijing proposing to men who’ve been issued visas

to travel here, according to immigration officers in Hong Kong. The

officers said single women try to marry visa-holding men so they can be

sponsored here as their wives (Godfrey, 2003, March 5).

Canadian immigration officials say migration from China will remain the

most problematic issue their department will have to deal with this year.

[…] Canadian diplomats said 21% of Chinese sponsorship cases are

rejected because they consist of misrepresentation and marriage of

conveniences (Godfrey, 2000, January 3).

To crack down on those using phony marriages to come to Canada,

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, according to news reports, is now

sending investigative teams around the world, especially to high-fraud

regions such as India, China and Vietnam, to gather intelligence on staged

marriages (Keung, 2008, May 23).

Canadian bureaucrats who staff visa desks at places such as Chandigarh

have the unenviable task of trying to determine whether a marriage is

fraudulent or not. They are required to immerse themselves in local and

religious customs that would seem mysterious to many Canadians, but

which provide insight into a marriage’s legitimacy, for example the seven

steps associated with Hindu ceremonies (“A Simple Remedy,” Globe and

Mail, 2008, May 22).

Marriage immigration involving Asian migrants was thus presented as a growing

problem for Canada and as a major source of concern among immigration officials.

Moreover, as the last example above illustrates, marriage immigration among Asians

served as the basis for highlighting the ‘foreignness’ of this group. The ‘mystery’ of

their cultural practices was presented as a challenge to Canadian immigration officials

in determining the veracity of marriage immigration. These portrayals dichotomized

Asians and Canadians, and defined Asians as ethnic Others with norms and customs that

are not easily understood by Canadians. The media coverage thereby served as a means

of racialization, homogenizing both ‘Canadians’ and ‘Asians’ and positioning them to

each other in dichotomous terms.

Elsewhere, the previously noted link between inauthentic marriages and

temporary foreign residents (such as students, labour migrants, and visitors) was

reiterated in specific reference to Asian migrants:

A memo from an Immigration Canada intelligence analyst in Beijing cites

a Hong Kong newspaper article that told the story of a Hong Kong woman

willing to pay $30,000 for a Canadian spouse, and a Vancouver dating

service that routinely got calls, usually from Chinese people in Canada on

student or visitor visas, asking for marriage partners (Blackwell, 2004,

April 7).

It is often the cultural norm for Chinese Canadians and Indo-Canadians to

marry virtual strangers in arranged marriages overseas, making it difficult

for immigration officials here to assess the validity of these unions.

Foreign students and workers in Canada on temporary visas may also

persuade someone to marry them as a favour to be repaid in kind, or for

money, from as little as $1,000 to as much as $25,000, according to

immigration lawyers (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

As previously discussed, this type of coverage cast a broader shadow of doubt over

marriages involving all types of migrants, suggesting that marriage immigrants, foreign

students, and foreign workers all stand the risk of defrauding the Canadian system

through inauthentic marriage. These examples also further demonstrate the manner in

which marriage served as a basis for articulating the ‘foreignness’ of the Asian

community, effectively Othering both Asian migrants and Asian-Canadians.

Other articles addressed a new, more sophisticated marriage migration scheme

that was purportedly being used by South Asians to skirt Canadian immigration

regulations:

Arranged marriages, where parents introduce young people to each other

and couples marry after a brief courtship, are common among South

Asians, but “barter” marriages seem to be becoming increasingly common,

too. In other words: I'll get your son/daughter to Canada, you help get my

niece/nephew out of India. These ads have been around for some time, but

never as bold or pervasive as they are now, as people find new ways of

bringing relatives over after Citizenship and Immigration Canada plugged

legal loopholes and cracked down on marriage fraud in recent years

(Aulakh, 2009, June 29).

Once again, culturally arranged marriages were rendered comparable to inauthentic

marriages designed to fraudulently gain admission to Canada. This type of coverage

also cast suspicion on South Asians within Canada in light of their possible involvement

in marriage scams. Family-class immigrants in general were also problematized in

association with Asian marriage migration, with the implication that these inauthentic

marriage immigrants will sponsor additional relatives who are undeserving of entry.

It is relevant to note that the problem of inauthentic marriage immigration was

not exclusively attributed to Asian communities:

“This is a very huge problem in Canada,” Mr. Gill [a self-identified victim

of marriage fraud] said. “Marriage is the easiest and fastest way to get

Canadian immigration status, so people are using marriage as a route to

get into Canada. [...] There are thousands of cases in each and every

immigrant community” (Curry, 2008, May 21).

Vancouver immigration lawyer Andrew Wlodyka says he has seen it all

during his past 17 years in practice, and over the previous seven years in

various roles with the Immigration and Refugee Board. “In many

communities it's epidemic,” Mr. Wlodyka said. He mentioned India, China

and Vietnam as frequent sources of marriage fraud, but stressed those

countries are also a major source of overall immigration to B.C. and that

fraud is being committed by people of all backgrounds (Curry, 2008, May

21).

These runaway spouses come from every possible nation – from the

Dominican Republic and China to India and Pakistan, even Fiji – with one

common intent, to use a short-term Canadian marriage to escape poverty

back home and enjoy the good life here (Mandel, 2006, July 9). “Most of

[the cases] that we have involve spouses from India because we deal

largely with the Indo-Canadian community but I think it's happening in all

immigrant communities,” says [Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim Society]

spokesman Navdeet Dhillon, an abandoned bride living in Vancouver. “We

believe there are thousands of cases but people are too embarrassed to

come forward.” In her case, Dhillon married her husband in India in April

2004 and sponsored him here in October of that year. He stayed just one

day before telling her that he had used her to immigrate and wanted a

divorce (Mandel, 2006, July 9).

Marriage fraud was thus framed as an epidemic, and as a scam used by immigrants from

all regions (but especially Asian countries) to undeservedly gain entry to Canada.

Marriage immigrants were clearly portrayed as schemers seeking to escape poverty,

while their Canadian counterparts were depicted as embarrassed victims who are left to

pick up the pieces of their lives. The ongoing emphasis on Asian immigrants, despite

acknowledgement that inauthentic marriage immigration is a larger immigrant problem,

suggested that fraudulent marriage immigrants are most commonly Asian, and

simultaneously suggested that marriages between Asian nationals and (Asian-)

Canadians are suspicious and problematic.

Overall, ambiguity surrounding the distinction between culturally arranged

marriages and inauthentic marriages, and vagueness surrounding the immigrant status of

Canadian residents of Asian background are revealing of the tension surrounding

immigration from Asian source countries. Locating inauthentic marriage immigration

primarily within Asian communities inherently problematized the presence of

immigrants (and non-immigrants) of Asian origin, and defined ‘Asian’ cultural practices

(i.e., arranged marriages) as contravening Canadian norms. The identification of Asian-

Canadians as ‘immigrants’ that stand to defraud the Canadian immigration system

constructed this group as Others within the nation. In this way, Asians residing in

Canada, regardless of their legal or citizenship status, were racialized and marginalized

with respect to Canada’s imagined community. These findings offer discursive evidence

of a struggle to come to terms with ethnic and cultural diversity in the Canadian context,

wherein the lines around membership in the Canadian national community are blurred,

and the identification of an individual as an ‘immigrant’ is not clearly linked to their

legal status. In this context, ‘non-Canadian’ practices are viewed with suspicion, and the

‘Canadian’ status of persons from Asian ethnic communities is rendered unstable.

4.53 Negative Coverage: Deviants and Criminals

The analysis of negative articles pertaining to marriage immigrants further revealed that

these immigrants were commonly represented in terms of deviance and criminality. In

this way, marriage immigrants were presented as highly undesirable members of the

Canadian nation. Consistent with research on foreign brides in other national contexts,

this component of the discourse employed simplistic gendered stereotypes; women

immigrants were constructed as sexualized deviants, while male marriage immigrants,

for their part, were constructed as criminals involved in terrorism and murder.

In terms of the media coverage of women marriage immigrants, numerous

articles (e.g., Clements, 2004, December 24; Fife, 2004, November 17; Fife, 2004,

November 15; Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27; Friscolanti, 2004, December 4;

Girard, 2005, January 27; Jimenez, 2004, December 4; Jimenez, 2004, November 24;

Thompson, 2005, February 26; 2004, December 4) discussed the controversial case of

Alina Balaican, a female migrant from Romania attempting to remain in the country

through marriage. The articles recounted the fact that the Immigration Minister at the

time, Judy Sgro, had granted Balaican – a former stripper who had been residing in

Canada despite having an expired status, a permit to remain in the country while the

spousal sponsorship application submitted by Balaican’s Canadian husband was being

reviewed. The media coverage commonly implied that this marriage may be

inauthentic, intended only for Balaican to obtain immigration status. The coverage also

reiterated the fact that Balaican had previously volunteered on Sgro's election

campaign; to this end, the case came to be referred to in the media as ‘Strippergate.’ As

this label suggests, Balaican’s status as a former stripper became the dominant feature

of her identity as an immigrant, and served to cast her in a highly gendered, deviant

light:

This is where “Strippergate,” the controversy that threatens to derail the

career of Immigration Minister Judy Sgro, all began: on a stage like this

one, at the Diamonds Cabaret in Mississauga, Ont. The lights are dim. The

sound system blares Ludacris rapping about “all these women on the

prowl,” while a porn movie plays on the television. A customer lies on the

stage beneath a brass pole, as two blond Slavic women…wearing nothing

but leather boots stand over him and simulate lesbian sex. They spank his

backside with a belt, take the bills out of his mouth, and move on to the

next customer (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27).

Balaican’s case was use to paint all female foreign strippers as potential inauthentic

marriage immigrants:

Critics of the exotic-dancer program – and of Immigration Minister Judy

Sgro, who is accused of helping a Romanian stripper named Alina

Balaican prolong her stay here – say these foreign dancers are being

exploited by agents demanding kickbacks. But there is another side to their

Canadian journey. According to interviews with several people in the

industry, while some strippers are mistreated by corrupt agents, others use

the program as a back door into the country, and then marry Canadian men

in a bid for citizenship (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27).

Foreign exotic dancers were portrayed on the one hand as hapless victims of shady

businessmen, and on the other hand as scheming frauds who use marriage to remain in

Canada. In this way, ‘Strippergate’ served as a basis for painting both Balaican and

foreign exotic dancers more broadly as would-be marriage immigrant frauds. The

highly sexualized language used to describe these women cast them in an unfavourable

light, and relegated them to the ‘dark side’ of Canadian society. The implication that

foreign strippers who marry Canadians might simply be seeking citizenship served to

cast doubt on marriages involving these immigrants, and indirectly portrayed the men in

these marriages as victims of calculating women who use their sexuality to get what

they want – Canadian citizenship. In this way, foreign exotic dancers were portrayed as

undesirable members of the Canadian national community, at least in part due to their

risk of inauthentic marriage immigration.

The connection between marriage immigration and exotic dancing was also

articulated in passing in other articles. One article, for instance, stated that “the practice

[of inauthentic marriage] isn’t restricted to Chinese and South Asian communities; West

Indians, Americans, Filipinos, Fijians and exotic dancers from Eastern Europe have also

been known to marry for immigration purposes” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics

added). By noting that inauthentic marriage immigrants are commonly exotic dancers,

most readily assumed to be women, this statement sexualized women marriage

immigrants and simultaneously depicted them as abusers of the Canadian immigration

system. This statement also reflects the previously discussed tendency to present

inauthentic marriage immigration as primarily an ‘Asian’ problem, but also as a larger

‘immigrant’ problem.

With respect to male foreign spouses, these immigrants were more commonly

portrayed as organized criminals at risk of harming the Canadian nation. One example

of this theme concerns the case of Saïd Namouh. After immigrating to Canada through

marriage, Namouh was arrested on conspiracy charges pertaining to an alleged terrorist

act on Austrian soil:

Attempts to immigrate were unsuccessful until he married a Canadian

woman. A Moroccan-born man arrested in Québec in connection with a

bomb plot had tried several times to immigrate to Canada but wasn't

successful until he married a Canadian woman nearly 18 years older than

him…RCMP Corporal Sylvain L'Heureux said police seized a computer

and documents from Mr. Namouh but no bomb-making material because

the plot was “nipped in the bud” (Ha & Peritz, 2007, September 15; italics

indicate title sub-heading).

The above article emphasized the fact that Namouh was Muslim, and that officials had

linked the bomb plot to al-Qaeda. Marriage immigration to Canada thus became

discursively linked to the broader threat associated with Islamist ideological opposition

to the Western world, drawing on post-September 11 fears surrounding the possibility of

terrorism against Canada. It is also interesting to note from the last quote above that the

lack of bomb-making materials in Namouh’s residence was not interpreted in the media

as possible evidence of his innocence, but, rather, as evidence of the Canadian state’s

success in preventing him from proceeding with a terrorist plan.

It is also relevant that, in the media coverage of Namouh’s case, very little was

said about his Canadian sponsor, Carole Lessard, except for the comments quoted above

and the fact that, after sponsoring Namouh’s entry to Canada, the couple divorced.

Lessard was not explicitly blamed for enabling Namouh to enter Canada, nor was their

marriage specifically articulated as fraudulent or as a marriage of convenience.

However, the fact that Namouh had failed in his numerous attempts to enter the country

until he married Lessard, and the fact that she was 18 years older than him, served to

place doubt in the veracity of their marriage. The implication that Namouh was only

interested in gaining entry to Canada and was not interested in a genuine union with

Lessard was clear. To this end, portraying Namouh as a terrorist who likely scammed his

way into Canada through marriage served as a warning to Canadian women against

marrying and sponsoring foreign men. It also implicitly problematized marriages that

defy Canadian gender norms – that is, involving an older woman and a younger man.

Other articles further articulated that inauthentic marriage immigration is a

common strategy used by organized criminals and terrorists:

A growing number of would-be immigrants are resorting to marriages of

convenience and even divorces of convenience – some of them set up by

organized crime – to fraudulently enter Canada (Blackwell, 2004, April

7).

Numerous articles (e.g., Ivison, 2009, April 6; Jain, 2008, May 28; Keung, 2009, March

31; Spencer, 2009, April 23) discussed the concerns of the group Canadians Against

Immigration Fraud regarding spousal sponsorships and overseas marriages, citing the

group’s president Sam Benet as saying “It is very much possible for a terrorist to enter

Canada through (such) a marriage…” (Jain, 2008, May 28). Although the gender of an

individual marriage immigrant was not always articulated in these articles, the

stereotype that terrorists and organized criminals are men meant that marriage

immigrants were painted in these articles as evil, threatening, (and often Muslim) men.

Again, these articles implicitly located the ‘problem’ of inauthentic marriage

immigration within a highly threatening context, drawing on post-September 11

discourses of fear and national security to problematize marriage immigration and

international marriages.

In a case that received widespread media attention, marriages of convenience

were also linked to the kidnapping and murder of a young girl:

Min Chen, a student from China who pleaded guilty this week to the

second-degree murder in the killing of Cecilia Zhang, claimed he intended

only to kidnap the nine-year-old girl so that he could extract a ransom of

$25,000 from her parents. Failing in his studies and knowing his student

visa would run out, he was copying a friend’s desperate ruse and planning

to pay $25,000 for a marriage of convenience to secure permanent

residency here (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).

His student visa was about to expire and Chen was worried he would be

sent back to face his disappointed parents. But what could he do? Alone in

a foreign country, he turned to committing minor, non-violent crimes with

some fellow students in similar circumstances. But it wasn’t enough,

especially if he wanted to raise $25,000 to pay for a marriage of

convenience – like his friend had done – so he could stay in Canada and

finish his studies. And so the young man decided he would kidnap a little

girl he had met six months earlier while visiting a friend who lived at the

Zhang home (Brieger, 2006, May 10).

These latter articles used an isolated and highly sensationalized case (notably, involving

an Asian male) to illustrate the ultimate danger that Canadian society faces as a result of

foreign men entering or remaining in the country through marriage.

Overall, media coverage of marriage immigration discursively established a

clear connection between these immigrants and a wide range of activities that are

looked down upon or viewed as a threat to Canadian society. From relatively minor

contraventions of social mores (i.e., exotic dancing) all the way to serious and

frightening outcomes (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, and murder), marriage

immigrants were identified as a notable threat, requiring heightened vigilance on the

part of the Canadian population and the Canadian state. Portrayals of marriage

immigrants as deviants or criminals served as a basis for problematizing international

and interethnic marriages, involving doubt in the authenticity of marriages between

Canadians and ‘foreigners.’ These tensions and ambiguities suggest broader uncertainty

surrounding cultural and ethnic diversity in Canada in a time of globalization and

largescale movement across national borders. The presence in Canada of nationals from

nontraditional immigration source countries, in particular, served as the basis for fear

and concern over the dangers that such immigrants could entail for the Canadian nation.

Once again, marriage was highlighted as a particularly easy route through which

criminals and deviants could gain admission to Canada, thereby problematizing

marriage immigration as a valid component of the country’s immigration program.

These immigrants were constructed not only as non-contributing members of society,

but as outright threats to national integrity. To this end, the vilification of marriage

immigrants effectively marginalized them with respect to the nation’s imagined

community.

4.54 Sympathetic Coverage: Legitimate Unions

Not all articles analyzed were explicitly negative toward marriage immigrants.

However, an interesting finding from the analysis was the subtly contradictory nature of

much of the sympathetic coverage of marriage immigration. The use of the term

‘sympathetic’ instead of ‘positive’ is intentional here; it indicates that these articles

conveyed a sympathetic tone while simultaneously problematizing marriage

immigration. Indeed, the analysis revealed that articles in this category were never

positive about marriage immigration per se. Moreover, the sympathy put forth was often

contingent on the ‘legitimate’ Canadian status of one of the parties involved. In some

cases, the sympathetic tone of the articles, while distinctly present, co-occurred with

underlying suggestions of marriage immigrants’ own wrongdoings.

Examples of headlines for sympathetic articles are listed in Table 4.2.

Importantly, evidence suggests that newspaper readers tend to recall select, striking

details of individual newspaper stories (van Dijk, 1994, 1988, 1986). Headlines provide

the type of succinct, dramatic details that are most likely to be recalled; they also

present the major subject of the article and set the cognitive tone of the piece (van Dijk,

1988). As such, the wording of these headlines provides insight into the discursive

impact of the articles.

Table 4.2: Examples of Sympathetic Article Headlines, by Main Theme and

Newspaper

Main theme

Headline

Newspaper and

Reference

Bureaucracy

and spousal

reunification

“Red tape tearing Toronto family apart:

Application to stay in works, but mom with

Canadian son being deported back to China”

Toronto Star

(Javed, 2008,

December 30)

“Christmas reunions wrapped in red tape”

Toronto Star

(Keung, 2004, 26

December)

“Twist in red tape at Immigration keeping

husband and bride apart”

Globe and Mail

(Jimenez, 2006,

May 25)

“Red tape swept aside, couple to reunite at

last”

Globe and Mail

(Jimenez, 2006,

June 1)

“G’bye to the Rock? Feds may force

Newfoundland mayor’s wife back to Cuba”

Toronto Sun

(Godfrey, 2004,

January 3).

“His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old

minister’s application to sponsor Chinese

wife ignored for two years”

Toronto Sun

(Godfrey, 2008,

November 21).

“‘My love for her is real’: Chinese bride

denied entry”

Toronto Sun

(Godfrey, 2009,

August 12)

Main theme

Headline

Newspaper and

Reference

Abuse

“She was the ticket to a better life”*

Toronto Star

(Aulakh, 2009,

January 31)

“Marriage scam: Polish women forced to be

sex slaves to bogus husbands”*

Toronto Sun

(Godfrey, 2003,

September 10)

“Used ‘n’ abused: Polish Alliance rallies to

help keep sex-exploited women in Canada”*

Toronto Sun

(Godfrey, 2003,

September 20)

“Last illegal refuge of the brokenhearted:

Thousands of women in immigration void as

marriages to sponsors break down”

Globe and Mail

(Armstrong, 2003,

November 20)

“Slain woman kept marriage concealed:

What may have started as an act of kindness

ended in her death by strangulation”*

Globe and Mail

(Friesen, 2005, 23

February)

“Cataloguing coercion, abuse: Researchers

find mail-order brides often are victims of

poverty, family pressure, and myths of

Western affluence”

National Post

(Bell, 2000, May

19)

*Coded as both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in Table 4.1 due to elements of both

problematization and sympathy.

One of the main topics associated with sympathetic coverage of marriage

immigration related to the difficulties couples face in the sponsorship process. These

articles typically addressed the plight of spouses trying to join each other or to remain

together in Canada, and commonly made reference to bureaucratic ‘red tape’ that these

couples were facing. An example of this type of coverage involves the Wu-Chen family.

Articles on the Wu-Chen case discussed a pregnant woman’s (Chen’s) struggle to

remain in Canada with her husband and ten-month-old son. The Wu-Chen’s dilemma

was presented in the Toronto Star as follows:

Instead of looking forward to the New Year, the Wu-Chen family is

dreading its arrival. In two weeks, Jin Ming Wu, a factory worker, will put

his pregnant wife, Jaun Yun Chen, and 10-month-old son on a plane to

China – with no idea of when he will see them next […]. Chen, 28, who is

three months pregnant, is being deported by the Canada Border Services

Agency. This, despite the fact that her inland spousal sponsorship

application – which allows her to stay in the country while her immigration

application is being processed – is still being reviewed. And even though

she may be granted a stay in a matter of a few months, she won’t be

allowed to remain to find out (Javed, 2008, December 30).

Articles on the Wu-Chen case were clearly sympathetic towards the plight of this

family. However, the sympathy seemed largely built around the ‘Canadianness’ of the

woman’s husband and young child, and the fact that that she was pregnant with a

Canadian citizen’s child. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Wu-Chen’s sponsorship claim

revolved around the Wu-Chen family, and relied heavily on the presence of children as

‘proof’ that the marriage was genuine. The articles on the Wu-Chen case reiterated the

fact that Chen’s husband, Jin Ming Wu, is a Canadian citizen, and emphasized that both

her young son and unborn child are, by extension, ‘Canadian.’ This emphasis is

illustrated by the headline, “Red tape tearing Toronto family apart: Application to stay

in works, but mom with Canadian son being deported back to China” (Javed, 2008,

December 30, italics added). Emphasizing that Chen’s son is a Canadian citizen served

to promote concern that a legitimate Canadian could be taken away from his country.

Chen’s pregnancy was highlighted in a subsequent article detailing the success of the

Wu-Chen’s sponsorship claim, as indicated by the headline, “Pregnant mom won’t be

deported” (Javed, 2009, January 13). The Canadian status of her family was again noted

in this article:

The Star wrote about the red tape that has bogged down [Chen’s]

immigration application last month. Despite an inland application filed by

her Canadian husband more than a month ago, she was slated for

deportation by Canada Border Services Agency (Javed, 2009, January 13).

Coverage of the Wu-Chen family offers an interesting counterpoint to the broader

coverage of Asian marriage immigrants, wherein culturally arranged marriages were

problematized and presented as inauthentic. In contrast, the Wu-Chen’s marriage, which

was not arranged but, rather, was based on romantic love, was presented as genuine.

This contradiction demonstrates the manner in which representations of marriage

immigrants were embedded within broader uncertainty surrounding ‘non-Canadian’

practices. The recurring emphasis on Chen’s husband’s Canadian citizenship stands in

clear contrast to the manner in which, as previously discussed, Asians sponsors were

commonly described as ‘immigrants,’ without actual clarification of their status as

Canadians citizens (born or naturalized) or former immigrants. Indeed, there was no

indication in the articles whether Chen’s husband was Canadian-born or previously

came to Canada as an immigrant. It is also worth noting that the circumstances of their

union might otherwise be seen as suspect. Chen originally came to Canada as an

international student in 2002. She subsequently filed a refugee claim, which was denied,

as were numerous appeals. In 2007 (at which time she was living in Canada without

status), she married Wu, who submitted a sponsorship claim for Chen to remain in

Canada as his spouse. What is thus interesting about the coverage of the Wu-Chen case

is the fact that, in the presence of children, their marriage was portrayed as necessarily

more valid than other instances of Asian marriage immigration. In this case, the

ethnicity of the Wu-Chen family and the possibility of an inauthentic marriage was

downplayed in the face of ‘proof’ that the Wu-Chens are a legitimate family. Overall,

the Wu-Chen story demonstrates the fluid nature of the boundaries of immigrants’

symbolic membership in the Canadian national community constructed through media

coverage. Specifically, visible minority sponsors were inconsistently and ambiguously

presented as ‘immigrants’ and/or as ‘Canadians’ in cases where their international

marriages were deemed suspect – typically, in cases of arranged marriages. In contrast,

in the case of the Wu-Chens, whose marriage was deemed ‘legitimate’ by the media, the

‘Canadian’ status of the husband and the children were emphasized. In this way, the

media discourse revealed tensions surrounding marriages between immigrants and

‘Canadians,’ and highlighted uncertainty surrounding marriage immigrants’ status as

fraudulent schemers or as legitimate partners who deserve to be in Canada. This

contrast reveals the struggle associated with defining the boundaries of national

belonging in an era of international immigration and cultural diversity, wherein

‘nonCanadian’ practices generate uncertainty and facilitate suspicion of immigrants

from non-traditional immigration source countries.

In other articles, the social standing of the Canadian sponsor emerged as the

basis for sympathy surrounding marriage immigration. Importantly, the discourse

surrounding these ‘legitimate’ Canadians stood in direct contrast to the previously

discussed coverage of ‘immigrant’ Canadians, whose marriages were presented as

suspicious and concerning. Interestingly, most of the sympathetic articles involving

‘legitimate’ Canadians operated to gender and racialize the marriage immigrants; in

these examples, the immigrants were women whose status as legitimate partners was

discursively placed in question. In contrast, the Canadian men were portrayed not as

victims of would-be frauds, but as victims of an inept immigration system.

One example of this type of media coverage involved the case of Cec Stein.

Stein, the mayor of a town in Newfoundland, was married to a Cuban woman who was

being directed to leave the country and reapply for spousal sponsorship from Cuba.

According to Stein, who had been the mayor of Stephenville, Newfoundland for 14

years, immigration officials were attempting to paint his relationship as a marriage of

convenience. His wife, whom he met while vacationing in Cuba, had been staying in

Canada on a visitor’s visa, which had been extended several times. She was being

ordered to go back to Cuba out of her own free will or face deportation. The article

emphasized Stein’s standing in his community (including a mention of his city’s $8

million annual budget), and portrayed his marriage as a legitimate relationship that was

being unfairly questioned by immigration officials. In the media coverage of Stein’s

case, very little attention was devoted to Stein’s wife. She was thus silenced in the

debate over her sponsorship, which was presented as a matter of negotiation between

her Canadian husband and the state (see Godfrey, 2004, January 3). The only real detail

offered about Stein’s wife pertained to their age difference – Stein was 68 years old, his

Cuban wife was 31. It is interesting that this age difference, involving an older man and

a younger woman, was not highlighted as suspicious in the same manner as the

previously discussed case involving an older women and a younger man (see section

4.53 of the present chapter). This finding reveals an added dimension of gender,

wherein an international marriage that followed expected trends (i.e., a younger woman

from a less developed country marriage a older male of higher social status) was

deemed less suspect than a marriage that defied these norms (i.e., a younger Muslim

man marrying an older Canadian woman).

Another case similarly revealed how sympathy toward marriage immigrants

pertained largely to the status of the Canadian partner. This case involved James De

Frederico (nicknamed Jimmy D, age 71) and his wife from the Philippines, Veronica

Lopez (age 55). One article in particular, entitled “Jimmy D’s fight for love: Air Canada

retiree seeks status for wife” (Godfrey, 2009, June 24) revealed the manner in which the

sponsor’s symbolic membership in the Canadian national community rendered his

marriage to an immigrant acceptable. This article discussed the couple’s two year

struggle to obtain landed immigrant status for Lopez. The majority of the article,

however, was dedicated toward recounting Jimmy D’s contacts with elite society

members through his former job:

An Air Canada retiree who catered to former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott

Trudeau and the Queen Mother is worried he’ll die before his common-

law wife is accepted as an immigrant in Canada (Godfrey, 2009, June 24).

De Frederico has dozens of photos of himself with celebrities and sports

figures who travelled on the airline. He proudly displays photos of himself

with Muhammad Ali and George Chuvalo. He met Walter Matthau, fried

chicken king Col. Harland Sanders and John Diefenbaker (Godfrey, 2009,

June 24).

Once again, the female marriage migrant was rendered largely irrelevant in favour of

establishing her husband’s status, which served to imply that he deserved to be able to

sponsor a wife in the pursuit of love. Indeed, very little was said about Jimmy D’s wife

in this coverage. Rather, Jimmy D’s proven ‘legitimacy’ as a member of the Canadian

nation emerged as the primary basis for sympathy and for precluding a claim of

inauthentic marriage immigration.

In other cases, the status of Canadian sponsor served more directly as the basis

for racializing marriage immigrants as foreign Others. In these instances, the underlying

problematization and suspicion of international marriages was present, but was

obscured by an overarching sympathetic tone. A good example of this type of coverage

is the Toronto Sun article entitled “His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old minister’s

application to sponsor Chinese wife ignored for two years” (Godfrey, 2008, November

21). Notably, the opening line of the article reiterated the Canadian status of the male

sponsor and the Chinese origin of his wife (the would-be immigrant):

A Scarborough minister says he’s been trying for more than two years to

sponsor his Chinese-born wife to Canada and is hoping her case will be

looked at before he dies (Godfrey, 2008, November 21).

The Chinese origin of the minister’s wife was repeated numerous times throughout the

article. In contrast, the minister was specified as a “British-born Canadian citizen.” It is

worth noting here how this characterization of the minister differs from the manner in

which Canadian residents of Asian ethnic origins were often characterized as

‘immigrants,’ as discussed earlier in this chapter, without clarification of whether they

were born in Canada or abroad.

Moreover, despite maintaining an overarching sympathetic tone, suspicion of the

Chinese wife, Li Hua Han, was evident throughout the article. For instance, it was noted

that she initially overstayed her visa and then met and married the minister, who is 21

years her senior. In addition, the only quote from Li has her stating: “I miss my two

daughters and I want to bring them to Canada” (Godfrey, 2008, November 21). The

article also quotes the couple’s immigration consultant as saying: “‘How much longer is

this man going to live? […] If he dies there will be no one to sponsor his wife in

Canada’.” These details take on a clear discursive purpose when considered in reference

to the findings of this chapter and the wider problematization of family-class

immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and Three). Specifically, while avoiding

direct claims of fraud or suspicion, the cross-cultural nature of the minister’s marriage,

particularly in light of the cited age difference, served to cast Li in a suspicious light, as

did her stated interest in obtaining immigration status so that her daughters will be

eligible to immigrate to Canada. However, the minister’s status as a British-born

Canadian seemed to preclude outright accusations that their relationship was

inauthentic. Nevertheless, the coverage still hinted at the challenges associated with

international marriages, and provided room for problematizing immigrants who seek to

gain admission to Canada through marriage.

Overall, these articles illustrate how sympathetic coverage of marriage

immigrants focused on the status of the sponsor (the Canadian), presented as legitimate

members of the Canadian national community and thus as deserving of love and respect.

The treatment of migrant spouses, in contrast, subtly drew upon gendered stereotypes in

ways that either conjured additional sympathy or generated suspicion. In cases of cross-

cultural marriages, women marriage immigrants were indirectly presented as potential

frauds through a sub-text of suspicion. In contrast, in the case of the Wu-Chen family,

sympathy was derived from the fact that the marriage was not cross-cultural, and the

fact that the would-be immigrant could be viewed as a nurturer – a pregnant wife and a

mother of a young child. In this way, the boundaries of national belonging were

inconsistently drawn, with the positioning of marriage immigrants in social space

dependent on gendered and racialized imaginings of legitimate marital unions.

4.55 Sympathetic Coverage: Sponsorship and Domestic Abuse

Approximately 15% of the articles categorized as sympathetic dealt in some way with

the victimization of women marriage immigrants. These articles recounted experiences

of physical and sexual abuse, and even murder. Many of these articles were highly

contradictory in tone, containing distinct elements of sympathy, yet simultaneously

portraying marriage immigration as inherently problematic. Once again, this

problematization commonly revolved around the ethnic/cultural ‘difference’ of marriage

immigrants.

One example of this type of article involved the story of Amandeep Kaur

Dhillon. Amandeep, a 22-year old woman who immigrated to Canada from India

through an arranged marriage, and was allegedly murdered by her father-in-law

(Aulakh, 2009, December 26; 2009, January 31; 2009, January 11; O’Toole, 2009,

January 7):

Amandeep’s family has been left grieving with few answers. The slaying

has also shaken the South Asian community and again raised concerns

about the lack of social support for immigrant women, particularly young

brides who leave their home and family behind, to live with another family

they hardly know. Some endure a life of isolation and extreme hardship,

with the hope that their family – which has invested heavily in dowry

money – will one day join them in Canada (Aulakh, 2009, January 31).

The executive director of the Punjabi Community Health Centre in

Brampton says hundreds of young Punjabi brides arrive in Canada every

year. Many have arranged marriages. “They don’t know anyone, don’t

have any support system and battle pressures most people can’t even

imagine exist,” he said. […] Some women are so isolated that they are not

allowed to have communication even with their parents. […] In some cases

women, bruised and beaten, have been locked up in their homes, not

allowed to make or receive any calls (Aulakh, 2009, January 31).

Despite clearly presenting Amandeep’s story as a tragedy and documenting the hardship

her death has caused her family, the media coverage effectively portrayed arranged

marriages as potentially dangerous for South Asian women. In this way, Amandeep’s

death was directly attributed to her ‘non-Canadian’ culture, with Amandeep emerging as

a victim of an unreasonable cultural system. Amandeep’s victimization, and the broader

victimization of South Asian female marriage immigrants in general, thus served as a

means of problematizing arranged marriages and South Asian cultural practices. By

attributing blame for Amandeep’s murder to her culturally arranged marriage, the South

Asian community in Canada was constructed as not truly ‘Canadian,’ thereby

effectively marginalized with respect to the Canadian national community.

Other articles similarly retained a highly sympathetic tone while highlighting the

potential for domestic abuse associated with marriage immigration. For instance, a

series of articles discussed a group of Polish women who came to Canada as visitors,

overstayed their visas, and subsequently paid Canadian men to marry them and sponsor

their continued residence in the country:

Eva Nowak is 21, attractive, and will do just about anything to stay in

Canada, even if it means marrying a man she’s only known for five weeks.

Her hubby, Tony, 27, was found working in Kitchener by a marriage broker

who knew Nowak and three of her girlfriends were searching for husbands

to sponsor them so they could remain in Canada. The women, all illegally

in Canada from Poland, will pay their Canadian citizen husbands up to

$15,000 each for the marriage and sponsorship. Though they won’t live

together, community leaders say the women are used as sex slaves by the

men (Godfrey, 2003, September 20).

Hundreds of Polish women living in the country illegally are being fleeced

for up to $15,000 each by Canadian men in a phony marriage scheme that

often ends up in their being deported, says the country’s largest Polish

group [the Polish Alliance]. Alliance spokesman Ted Lojko said many of

the women end up being sexually assaulted by men they pay to marry so

they can be sponsored here (Godfrey, 2003, September 10).

In this case, marriage immigration was presented as problematic from several different

angles. First, the possibility that illegal migrants could remain in the country through

paid marriages of convenience served to present spousal sponsorship as a problematic

immigration program, and instilled doubt surrounding the veracity of marriages between

Canadians and immigrants. Second, the Polish women, although portrayed as victims,

were also presented as willing participants in their victimization and thus as sharing in

the blame for their own situation. Indeed, this point was highlighted in the articles:

Federal immigration officials say there’s little they can do to help Polish

women who are here illegally. “Appropriate action will be taken against

those who are in violation of the immigration act,” spokesman Rejean

Cantlon says. “We will take action when it comes to our attention”

(Godfrey, 2003, September 20).

In this instance, the women’s abuse of the immigration system, and not the abuse they

experienced at the hands of their sponsors, was presented as the foremost issue of

concern. In other words, marriage immigrants were still identified as the problem

requiring attention, regardless of their circumstances or the hardships they were facing.

Finally, these articles simultaneously represented the women’s Canadian male partners

as abusers of women, and as possible abusers of the Canadian immigration system

(through their involvement in marriages of convenience). Indeed, these articles

represent the most obvious instance in which Canadians were described in the media

coverage in clearly negative terms. These portrayals of Canadian men served to

highlight core values of Canadian society that help define the boundaries of national

belonging. In this instance, partner violence, sexual abuse, and willing participation in

defrauding the immigration system render even ‘Canadians’ less desirable members of

the Canadian nation. To this end, general sympathy toward marriage immigrants facing

abuse co-occurred with the problematization of both these immigrants and their

Canadian counterparts. As such, although the insider/outsider status of the involved

parties was not entirely clear-cut, marriages between Canadians and immigrants were

nevertheless cast in a concerning light.

4.6 Conclusion

In considering this chapter’s findings, it is important to contemplate both what the

media discourse accomplishes, as well as what it obscures. It is also important to locate

this coverage within current controversies surrounding the Canadian immigration

system. In the media coverage of marriage immigration, a very specific picture of these

immigrants was painted – they are frauds, criminals, and deviants. They victimize

Canadians and take advantage of the Canadian social system. They skirt Canadian

immigration regulations to the end of hindering the entry of deserving and contributing

immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). Indeed, marriage immigrants were

symbolically devalued, and were constructed as necessarily less valuable than economic

immigrants. The possible contributions of marriage immigrants to Canadian society as

wives, mothers, and workers never entered the scope of the media coverage. In this way,

the broader assumptions that marriage immigrants (and family-class immigrants in

general) are unskilled and do not contribute to the economic well-being of the nation

was upheld. Bureaucratic classifications were reified, with marriage immigrants being

located in their roles as spouses without acknowledgement of the fact that they can be

productive members of Canadian society, economically or otherwise. The media

coverage thus produced a highly biased image of marriage immigrants. These

representations served as the basis for articulating tangible doubt over the possibility of

genuine marriages between immigrants and Canadians, and implied that marriage

immigrants are not deserving members of the Canadian nation. Moreover, migratory

pressures associated with globalization and international inequalities were also largely

left of the picture. In this way, the broader context of international migration was

ignored, and national self-interest in protecting Canadian social space took centre stage.

It is also relevant that the media discourse was overwhelmingly one-sided, often

emerging out of the voices of Canadians alleging to be victims of marriage fraud. As a

consequence, claims of marriage fraud were presented as a fact rather than as one

partner’s perspective on a failed personal relationship. This coverage also largely denied

the possibility that Canadian sponsors may have failed to live up to their obligations

toward sponsored partners, and that sponsors’ claims of being defrauded may not be

accurate. The fact that Canadian ‘insiders’ were constructed as victims of immigrants in

cases of relationship failure demonstrates the symbolic exclusion that persons defined as

immigrants tend to face. This conclusion is further supported by the finding that

sponsorship breakdown was typically discussed in terms of its impact on Canadian

sponsors or Canadian taxpayers, but never in terms of its potential detrimental impact

on immigrants. All of these absences acted to silence marriage immigrants, including

those who have successfully formed families in Canada, as well as those who may have

been unsuccessful in their pursuit of this goal but, in reality, are not immigration or

marriage frauds.

In addition, the media discourse on marriage immigrants contributed to the

broader problematization of family-class immigrants beyond just spouses. Insofar as

marriage immigrants were constructed as frauds, deviants, and criminals, then

familyclass immigration, in general, was problematized. Concern over family-class

immigration also emerged through the media’s portrayal of inauthentic marriage

migration as a stepping stone for further family-class sponsorship. Tied into this

representation was the suggestion that these migrants might take advantage of Canadian

social programs upon their arrival. In this regard, negative media portrayals of marriage

immigrants were not isolated from other dominant discourses, but reflected and upheld

broader negative views of family-class immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and

Three). As such, family-class immigrants beyond just spouses were marginalized to

Canada’s imagined community through media discourse surrounding marriage

immigration.

Overall, the media’s coverage of marriage immigration reveals tensions relating

to ethnic/cultural diversity and the state’s ability to protect Canadian borders in the

contemporary era of international immigration. By constructing international marriage

migration as inherently problematic and inauthentic, the media discourse served as a

cautionary tale surrounding international marriages, implicitly discouraging ‘insiders’ in

the Canadian nation from marrying ‘outsiders.’ In doing so, marriage immigration

served as the basis for marginalizing immigrants from non-European origins (most

notably, Asia), and for questioning marriages that defy Canadian norms. By portraying

marriage immigration as an easy route for undeserved immigrants to gain access to the

country, the media discourse can also be interpreted as legitimizing extensive scrutiny of

spousal sponsorship and for justifying current efforts to impose further restrictions on

marriage immigration (discussed at the beginning of this chapter). In examining

sponsorship applications, Canadian immigration officers already hold the right to verify

personal documents (such as phone records), conduct site visits, demand invasive proof

of the veracity of spousal relationships, and ultimately deny the legitimacy of a union.

This process holds the default assumption that international marriages are questionable

and that immigrants arriving in Canada through marriage are disingenuous in their

intentions. Indeed, as addressed in the analysis, the nature of the spousal sponsorship

agreement is indicative of the skepticism surrounding international marriages and their

associated migrations. In this context, the possibility that marriage immigration may

become even more rigidly controlled by the Canadian state bears dangerous

implications for migrants’ rights and the rights of Canadian sponsors.

Admittedly, a direct link between the media discourse discussed in this chapter

and the current policy agenda cannot be empirically established here. Nevertheless, it is

significant that the predominant focus of media coverage on marriage immigration over

the past decade pertained to marriage fraud and marriages of convenience, and that

these concerns are presently at the heart of Canadian family-class immigration reform.

At the very least, the media discourse provides a climate conducive to suspicion of

marriage immigrants, international marriages, culturally arranged marriages, and

family-class sponsorship, while obscuring the possibility that marriage immigrants

might be ‘good,’ contributing, valuable members of Canadian society. In this way, these

immigrants were clearly positioned on the margins of Canada’s national community, at

best. Indeed, in the imagining of the Canadian national community that emerged from

media discourse on marriage immigrants, this group simply did not belong. As

explained in one Toronto Sun article on marriage immigration, “There are some true

love stories out there…but they’re few and far between” (Godfrey, 2003, September

20).

CHAPTER FIVE: IMMIGRATION POLICY DISCOURSE

“Liberal principles are the very language and conceptual

framework through which intolerance and exclusion are enabled,

reinforced, defined and defended” (Mackey, cited in Henry et al.,

2000: 25).

5.0 Introduction

Chapter Four of this thesis documented controversies and tensions surrounding marriage

immigrants in Canada, and revealed gendered and racialized portrayals of this group in

the Canadian news media. The present chapter steps back to consider the broader

immigrant population in a different discursive setting – the policy arena.

Since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869, immigration policy has

represented a source of public and political contention in Canada. Politicians, experts,

and diverse interest groups commonly dispute the costs and benefits of immigration to

the Canadian nation, and grapple with how immigration policy should be structured so

as to maximize the benefits of the immigration program. These debates arouse

deepseated passions on both sides, involving diverging views about the impact of

immigration on Canada’s national economy and the implications of immigration for

Canadian society. Importantly, controversies surrounding immigration are often

intertwined with the question of ‘race.’ Population diversity is widely attributed to the

increase in immigration from non-European source countries, such that opposition to

large-scale immigration is often interpreted by both immigrant advocates and scholars

as evidence of racial intolerance (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001;

Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007; Thobani, 2001a, 2001b). This matter is particularly

relevant in light of the inherent incompatibility between discrimination and the liberal

democratic values that purportedly define the Canadian nation.

A useful illustration of the complexity of the immigration policy ‘question’ and

its intersection with the ‘race question’ is provided by two recent events in Ontario,

Canada. The first incident relates to the 2010 mayoral race in Toronto, Ontario. During a

televised debate in August 2010, when answering a question about Tamil migrants,

mayoral front-runner Rob Ford noted that, in a “perfect world,” Toronto would not

become home to any more immigrants, further stating that: “We can’t even deal with the

2.5 million people in this city. I think it’s more important to take care of the people here

now before we start bringing in more people” (Alcoba, 2010, August 18). Immediately

after the debate, Ford was put on the defensive about his comments, and faced

widespread claims of racism and intolerance. His opponents demanded that he withdraw

from the race in light of his ‘racist’ statements. Yet, media reports confirmed that Ford’s

position on immigration policy was not unique:

Almost half of people who say they’d vote for Rob Ford also have qualms

about welcoming new Canadians to Toronto. A Nanos poll done for The

Globe, CTV and CP24 found 48.8 per cent of Ford supporters either

disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement “Toronto would benefit

from welcoming more new Canadians to the city.” By comparison, 32 per

cent of the broader Torontonian population felt the same way (“Almost

half of Ford supporters…,” Globe and Mail, 2010, September 21).

Media outlets jumped on Ford’s comments, keeping the connection between

immigrants, racism, and immigration policy directly in the public eye for months to

come (e.g., Balkissoon, 2010, August 17; Doolittle, 2010, August 18; Lilley, 2010,

September 28; Wente, 2010, October 7).

Just over a month after Ford’s comments, an unrelated occurrence in Ottawa –

the launch of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform on Parliament Hill on

September 28, 2010 – highlighted many of the same issues sparked by the Ford

controversy. The organization, headed by Martin Collacott (former ambassador to Sri

Lanka, Syria, Lebanon, and Cambodia), James Bissett (former director-general of the

Canadian Immigration Services), and Derek Burney (former ambassador to the U.S.),

emerged out of concern that Canada admits too many immigrants. In introducing the

Centre, the co-founders claimed that current immigration levels entail excessive

government expenditures, higher houses costs, pollution, and crowding in large urban

centres. According to Burney, “the [immigration] system is broken…there’s too much

abuse, too much fraud, and no rhyme or reason about what we’re doing. It’s just a

numbers game” (Wente, 2010, October 7). In establishing the Centre, Burney and his

co-founders further argued that honest debate over immigration in Canada is precluded

by politicians’ concern about losing the ‘immigrant vote,’ alongside broader social fears

of appearing racist: “Canadian society, [Burney] said, needs to stop treating immigration

as an untouchable ‘third rail’ that can’t be debated without prompting allegations of

bigotry” (http://www.cireport.ca/2010/09/centre-for-immigration-policyreform.html).

Indeed, opponents of the Centre were quick to contend that the founders’ anti-

immigration sentiments were evidence of their racial intolerance:

[The founders of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform] think our

immigration policies could be better. The NDP immediately attacked them

for being “un-Canadian.” One immigration lawyer called the group a

bunch of grumpy old white men who’d be hard to take seriously “were it

not for their ability to fan the flames of intolerance” (Wente, 2010, October

7).

These examples highlight the two interrelated issues that lie at the heart of this chapter.

The first pertains to state legitimacy in the face of controversies surrounding

immigration policy, while the second concerns the questions of ‘race’ and racism

relating to contemporary immigration in Canada. Indeed, as the above examples

demonstrate, immigration policy is mired in controversies that are often directly linked

to the questions of ‘race’ and racism, and that simultaneously bring the activities of the

immigration department into question. It is in this social and political milieu that the

present chapter is located. The chapter draws together two conceptual frameworks – one

on state legitimacy and another on “democratic racism” (Henry et al., 2000) – to offer a

critical qualitative analysis of Canadian immigration policy discourse.

Importantly, much of the existing literature on recent Canadian immigration

policy comments on the underlying racist (as well as sexist) biases of immigration

policy, and claims that these biases are obscured by neo-liberal discourses of skill and

the rhetoric of multiculturalism (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2003b,

2003c, 2001; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999).

This work often quotes specific policy statements as evidence of racism and/or

racialization. However, it is the contention here that the existing literature does not offer

a comprehensive assessment of immigration policy discourse that is sufficiently located

within the specific social and political contexts within which the discourse is articulated.

In other words, policy discourse is typically addressed as evidence of discriminatory

policy, and thus as indicative of structural ‘racism,’ but is not itself addressed as a social

phenomenon that serves a distinct purpose. Moreover, policy discourse is typically not

examined through a comprehensive analysis that examines both the content of the

discourse and the social purpose that it serves. The present chapter offers such an

analysis, and simultaneously advances a conceptual critique of Henry et al.’s (2000)

framework of ‘democratic racism.’ Democratic racism is commonly used to describe the

‘new’ racism of contemporary liberal societies, involving the use of discourse to

obscure underlying racist attitudes and practices. The ideas associated with this

framework are commonly used in the immigration literature. Yet, the sociological utility

of the democratic racism framework has not itself been critically evaluated through a

comprehensive application. Also, given the above discussion surrounding the politics of

immigration policy in Canada, the present chapter views a theoretical affinity between

democratic racism and state legitimacy that deserves focused attention.

The chapter begins by outlining the conceptual framework for the upcoming

analysis, addressing notions of legitimacy and democratic racism. The chapter then

proceeds to review existing research on immigration policy discourse in Canada and

beyond. Next, the chapter provides a critical analysis of Canadian immigration policy

discourse, organized in terms of Henry et al.’s (2000) democratic racism framework,

and interpreted in reference to the state’s quest for legitimacy. Materials for this analysis

consist of CIC reports published over the past 16 years (discussed in Section 5.4 of this

chapter). Based on this analysis, the present chapter advances two interrelated

arguments. First, it is argued that the Canadian state department responsible for

immigration (Citizenship and Immigration Canada – CIC) deploys discourses associated

with democratic racism (labeled ‘discourses of dominance’) as part of a concerted,

ongoing effort to demonstrate the legitimacy of its activities. Thus, in a social and

political context of controversies surrounding immigration, the state engages in self-

legitimating communications in which it attempts to appeal to a wide variety of interest

groups and stakeholders (including, for instance, Canadian citizens and permanent

residents, potential migrants and newcomers to Canada, NGOs, corporate Canada, other

governments around the world, various international players, etc.). The discourses of

dominance commonly associated with democratic racism are a key means by which this

legitimacy is sought. However, the analysis also illustrates that these discourses are not

strictly discourses about ‘race’ that can be interpreted in terms of ‘racism.’ To this end,

the second main argument advanced in the present chapter pertains to the sociological

usefulness of democratic racism as a conceptual framework. In documenting the manner

in which so-called discourses of dominance serve the state’s quest for legitimacy, the

chapter contends that democratic racism is a limited conceptual tool that risks reifying

race and racism. The chapter demonstrates that the framework of democratic racism is

not entirely without merit, but is arguably too broadly conceptualized, and is

problematic for its tendency to equate racialization with ‘racism.’ Moreover, it is argued

that the democratic racism framework is limited by its tendency to reduce

discrimination to ‘race,’ thereby precluding a consideration of other potential

dimensions of discrimination (such as gender and social class) and ignoring the manner

in which various dimensions of discrimination intersect. By applying discourses

associated with the democratic racism framework to an examination of immigration

policy discourse, the present chapter is able to highlight the dimensions of this

framework that are sociologically useful, while simultaneously illustrating the

framework’s limitations.

5.1 The Contemporary State and the Quest for Legitimacy

Legitimacy, which “pertains to how power may be used in ways that citizens

consciously accept” (Gilley, 2006: 499), is a critical component of effective governance.

A state is perceived as more legitimate to the extent that relevant people and groups

view the state as having the rightful will to execute political power and direct policy

activities (Gilley, 2006). In pre-modern societies, the legitimacy of authority derived

from metaphysical sources such as holiness, providence, or divine rights. However, the

growing rationality of modern societies brought with it a rejection of divine authority in

favour of the authority of reason, the latter of which involves rational legitimacy. In this

context, governance is largely legitimized through communicative processes that

employ principles of reasoning and rational deliberation (that is, rational discourse)

(Habermas, 1984; Weber, 1968). Under the authority of reason, state legitimacy can

only be generated through normative discourses, wherein the arguments advanced and

the decisions made will, in principle, receive a maximum degree of consent and a

minimal degree of dissent (Steffek, 2003). In other words, state legitimacy in

contemporary contexts depends on discourses that render state activities an obvious,

rational choice to as many stakeholders as possible.

The notion of rational legitimacy has been most extensively elaborated upon by

Jürgen Habermas in his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984). For

Habermas, legitimate governance emerges from rational exchanges of arguments and

eventual arrival at agreed-upon conclusions. Logically, in a contemporary country such

as Canada, it is not possible for all possible stakeholders to engage in such processes of

deliberation. In this context, legitimacy depends not on an actual consensus, but on a

rational, normative conclusion that can be articulated as a reasonable justification,

adhering to valid and established norms (see Habermas, 1984). Rational legitimacy is

thus achieved by advancing arguments that are generalizable and impersonal – in other

words, given a particular social context, reasonable people who are familiar with the

existing social conditions could be expected to support the logic underlying the state’s

perspective, even if they do not agree with the perspective per se. It is this element of

rationality upon which state legitimacy in contemporary contexts depends. Arguably, in

a contemporary liberal democracy, this legitimacy relies, at least in part, on the

articulation of state goals and activities as democratic, fair, and reasonable endeavours.

It is in this context that the theoretical affinity between the notions of state legitimacy

and democratic racism becomes apparent.

5.2 Democratic Racism

In liberal democratic contexts, the principles of equality, justice, and non-discrimination

are social norms, as well as institutionalized expectations encoded in law. Under such

conditions, overt expressions of discrimination, such as racism or sexism, are seen as

inappropriate in public discussions. This issue has primarily been addressed in terms of

‘race’ and ethnicity on the basis of what Henry et al. (2000) term democratic racism (see

also Henry & Tator, 2002, 2000). Henry et al. (2000) argue that contemporary racism

does not necessarily entail references to inherent biological difference or inferiority. In

other words, terms such as ‘race’ or references to skin colour need not be mentioned for

racism to be expressed. Instead, new forms of racism are elusive, articulated in subtle

ways through democratic modes of representation and communication. Democratic

racism can be understood as:

…an ideology in which two conflicting sets of values are made congruent

to each other. Commitments to democratic principles such as justice,

equality, and fairness conflict but co-exist with attitudes and behaviours

that include negative feelings about minority groups, differential

treatment, and discrimination against them (Henry et al., 2000: 23).

According to the authors, democratic racism can be addressed in terms of discourses of

dominance, which operate upon racist myths and unexamined assumptions. In other

words, discrimination is obscured through discourses of dominance that render racism

invisible and/or acceptable. These discourses include: (1) the discourse of binary

polarization; (2) the discourse of national identity; (3) the discourse of multiculturalism;

and (4) the discourse of moral panic, among others. These discourses can be understood

as follows:

(1) The discourse of binary polarization: This discourse involves the

fragmentation of social groups into racialized contingents of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (i.e., a Self

and an Other), often in implicit and subtle ways. This fragmentation most commonly

involves references to cultural differences that serve to dichotomize majority/minority

groups in normative evaluations. As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the process

of Othering is theorized as being central to definitions of national imagined

communities.

(2) The discourse of national identity: According to Henry et al. (2000), the

quest for national identity is at the heart of various dominant discourses in Canada.

Messages about national identity tend to democratically erase and silence the

contributions of ethno-racial minorities to the Canadian nation, often through the ‘myth’

that Canada was established by two founding nations (English and French). These

silences act as “the vehicles through which inequalities and imbalances are legitimized”

(Henry et al., 2000: 31).

(3) The discourse of multiculturalism: In this discourse, concepts of

tolerance, accommodation, harmony, and diversity are emphasized. According to Henry

et al. (2000), however, underlying these notions is an inherent element of racist

Othering and the implication that “while one must accept the idiosyncrasies of the

‘others’ … the dominant way is superior” (Henry et al., 2000: 30).

(4) The discourse of moral panic: This discourse draws on an underlying

climate of uncertainty, fear, and threat associated with economic, political, and social

destabilization and dislocation to convey racist beliefs and concerns (see also Henry &

Tator, 2002; Husband, 1994).

For Henry et al. (2000), discourses of binary polarization, national identity,

multiculturalism, and moral panic represent some of the main ways in which racism is

expressed and obscured in contemporary democratic societies. In other words,

discursive articulations associated with these discourses obscure the reality of racism,

and themselves act as subtle or invisible expressions of racism.

The present chapter takes issue with the fact that the democratic racism

framework identifies a broad range of expressions and actions as ‘racist,’ to the point of

locating racism where, arguably, it may or may not exist. By depending on highly

subtle, implicit, and often invisible references to race, the framework thus walks a thin

line between identifying racism and constructing racism. Notably, Henry et al.’s (2000)

framework was not specifically developed in reference to either state discourse or

immigration. However, there is a logical connection between the framework of

democratic racism, considerations of state discourse on immigration, and, drawing in

the second theoretical dimension of this chapter, the state’s quest for legitimacy. The

first point of relevance here is the fact that immigration stimulates questions about a

nation’s cultural values and identity (Simmons, 1999). Second, in liberal democratic

contexts, explicit discrimination or appearance of undemocratic principles in state

discourse could undermine the perceived legitimacy of the state. Given this context, it is

logical to infer that, insofar as discrimination is expressed or obscured in state

discourse, it would occur in a ‘democratic’ fashion. An examination of immigration

policy discourse in reference to state legitimacy thus offers a fruitful avenue for

critically evaluating the democratic racism framework.

5.3 Previous Research

The existing literature on Canadian immigration policy discourse is typically not

presented directly within frameworks of legitimacy and/or democratic racism, with only

a few exceptions (e.g., Simmons & Keohane, 1992 on legitimacy; Li, 2007 on

democratic racism). Despite the fact that legitimacy and democratic racism seem to

underlie much of the literature on discriminatory immigration policy and practices,

these two issues are rarely at the centre of analysis, nor are the two frameworks

addressed concurrently. Moreover, the Canadian literature draws on highly selective

evidence of immigration policy discourse, focusing either on a particular policy event

(e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a; Thobani, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) or relying on a small

selection of policy documents as evidence of the racial subtext of discourse (see Li,

2007, 2001). Outside of the Canadian context, much of the literature on immigration

and democratic racism focuses closely on discursive expressions of racism without

taking a critical approach to the application of the democratic racism framework, and

without an eye to the broader purpose that this discourse serves. The present section

briefly reviews this literature in order to highlight its contributions and its gaps, both of

which inform the upcoming analysis.

With respect to state legitimacy, Simmons and Keohane (1992) offer a useful

interpretation of debates over Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Their analysis

speaks directly to the state’s pursuit of legitimacy through communication strategies.

According to Simmons and Keohane (1992) (see also Simmons, 1994), the Canadian

immigration policy landscape changed in 1989, when economic transformations

associated with globalization and the subsequent responses to these changes by various

institutional actors (including labour, capital, ethnic communities, human rights groups,

and the provinces) brought about new concerns, agendas, and points of contention with

which the Canadian state had to grapple. It was in this social context that the state

introduced refugee bills (C-55 and C-84) in an effort to better control refugee flow, and

engaged in consultations in developing the immigration plan for 1990-1995. Simmons

and Keohane’s (1992) research approach was two-fold. First, they identified the key

players who sought to influence immigration policy and determined, of these actors,

whose interests were ultimately reflected in policy outcomes. Second, they considered

state actors’ management of communications in the policy formation process. Based on

interviews with key informants and observations of consultations on policy reform,

Simmons and Keohane (1992) argue that, in developing immigration and refugee policy

at that time, the state operated on the basis of three general interests: (1) the

perpetuation of economic security; (2) the pursuit of a rational-bureaucratic agenda;

and, overarching and dependent on these previous two endeavours, (3) the quest for

continued legitimacy. Simmons and Keohane (1992) also specifically demonstrate that

the state engaged in a concerted effort to manage the communication process associated

with policy formation so as to undercut opposition and establish the legitimacy of its

own agenda. The authors comment that:

In the period studied, the state’s awareness of potential threats to

legitimacy led to a general nervousness and anxiety among the key state

actors. Power was used to override opposition only when the support for

opposing groups was weak or could be undermined. Otherwise, the state

consulted and sought policy outcomes which would reinforce its

legitimacy, while allowing it to also achieve economic and rational

planning objectives (Simmons & Keohane, 1992: 445).

Simmons and Keohane’s (1992) work is relevant here for highlighting the centrality of

legitimacy to state communications surrounding immigration policy. Importantly,

Simmons and Keohane (1992) mention the widespread anti-immigration sentiment in

Canadian society, and the possible racist backlash against immigration and refugee

policy. However, the authors did not evaluate the content of state communications in

reference to racism per se. Rather, racism was merely acknowledged as a potential issue

that state actors keep in mind when attempting to establish and manage immigration

policy.

In contrast, other literature on the politics of Canadian immigration policy

largely ignores the issue of state legitimacy, focusing instead on the discriminatory

nature of contemporary policy and subtle race-based expressions of anti-immigrant

sentiment in public and policy discourse. For instance, Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and

Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have widely addressed the restructuring of

Canada’s immigration program during the 1990s (i.e., the Immigration Policy Review –

IPR; see Chapter Three). The IPR was presented in public and political domains as a

process that would include members of the Canadian general population as key

contributors to policy change via widespread consultations across the country. The

extent to which this public consultation process can be considered democratic, however,

has been challenged by Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b,

1999), in light of the fact that the agenda for discussion was already set by a select panel

of state actors. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999)

claim that the predetermination of the discussion topics enabled the state to present its

agenda back onto the public as if it came from ‘Canadian society’ rather than state

actors (Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although these authors did not interpret this process

directly in terms of state legitimacy, their findings speak to the state’s need to appear

democratic, while simultaneously managing the immigration program according to its

own agenda.

Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have

further documented the various ways in which racist (and sexist) biases in the

immigration system were obscured and/or expressed in democratic ways during the IPR

and beyond. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b), for instance, specifically contends that

discourses of skill and integration operate in a neo-liberal context as democratic ways of

obscuring discrimination in the Canadian immigration system. The author comments

that discourses of inclusion, equality and justice hide the fact that the Canadian

immigration system remains inherently discriminatory: “While the still unfolding liberal

policy reproduces the class, gender and race biases of post 1967/Policy Era Two it

nevertheless re-asserts these biases in the context of a productivist emphasis on the

‘economic worth’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ of immigrants” (Abu-Laban, 1998b: 205).

Thobani (2000a, 2000b) similarly argues that racist and sexist biases are a prominent

driving force behind immigration policy. For Thobani, these biases are obscured through

neutral discourses that facilitate the marginalization of immigrants arriving from non-

European sources (as well as men and women of colour, regardless of their immigration

status). For instance, according to Thobani (2000a), the ‘legitimate’ problematization of

family class immigrants (the majority of whom are women, with a large proportion from

non-traditional immigration source countries) is actually a manifestation of racism and

sexism. However, by framing these biases in terms of the burden associated with

family-class immigrants, racism and sexism are obscured and discrimination is rendered

palatable to the Canadian public. Thobani (2000b) further concludes that the

prioritization of economic goals and the problematization of familyclass immigration in

documents associated with the IPR acted to “… define immigrant women as requiring

increased control and management. The problems with both the ‘quality’ and ‘costs’ of

immigration thus become inscribed, quite literally, on the bodies of immigrant women”

(Thobani, 2000b: 307; italics in original).

While Abu-Laban’s (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani’s (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999)

work implicitly draws on the notion of ‘democratic racism,’ this framework has been

most pointedly been addressed in the Canadian immigration context by Peter Li. Li

(2007, 2003c, 2001) argues that academic, media, and policy discourses all construct

immigrants in opposition to ‘real Canadians’ based on implied, immutable ‘racial’

differences (see Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001). These constructions, however, are subtle,

occurring in such a way so as not to disrupt the normative conventions of liberal

democracy. For instance, Li argues that concepts such as ‘diversity’ and ‘cultural

difference’ represent coded references to race. He further argues that academic research

facilitates these formulations by developing “pseudo-scientific constructs” (Li, 2001:

92) that allow for masked race-based evaluations without appearing undemocratic. To

this end:

The stakeholders of the immigration discourse – academics, journalists,

pollsters, policy-makers, and individual citizens – participate in the

construction of a racial subtext that ultimately transforms the racial

messages into “valid concerns” and “scientific findings,” and transforms

what would otherwise be unacceptably racially based opinions into

acceptable voices in a legitimate public debate (Li, 2001: 92).

Legitimacy, in this context, refers to the fact that ‘racial’ concerns become rearticulated

as acceptable social concerns; the extent to which this occurs in state discourse in direct

service of state legitimacy, however, is not addressed by Li. Nevertheless, in reference

to state discourse, Li (2003c) contends that the commitment to diversity and

multiculturalism running through policy statements obscures underlying racist messages

that conformity to normative ‘Canadian’ values and standards is the desirable outcome

for immigrants. For Li, the subtext of policy discourse thus discriminates against

racialized immigrants and visible ethnic minorities by underscoring that their norms,

values, and behaviours are ‘non-Canadian,’ and act as impediments to their integration

into Canadian society.

Research outside the Canadian context has also addressed discursive forms of

discrimination and Othering in the context of immigration. This work predominantly

focuses on the specific discursive manifestations of racism in political talk and policy

discourse. In this literature, however, the focus is on how racism is expressed in

democratic ways, without a deeper appreciation of the legitimation purpose that this

discourse serves in the arena of immigration politics. For instance, in work specifically

focusing on parliamentary debates in Britain, France, and the U.S., van Dijk (2002,

1997, 1993a, 1992) has documented the widespread use of positive self-representations

and negative Other-representations in debates over immigration and ethnic relations.

According to van Dijk (2002, 1997, 1993a, 1992), political speakers in British, French,

and American parliamentary debates commonly invoke representations of national

selfglorification, involving repeated references to national values of tolerance and

democracy while espousing the threats associated with immigration. The author notes

that positive representations of ‘insiders’ are consistently intertwined with negative

representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and discrimination is obscured

through explicit disclaimers of non-racism and articulations of commitment to

humanism and equality. Similar findings were reported by Every and Augoustinos

(2007), who examined constructions of racism in Australian parliamentary debates on

asylum-seekers. These authors point out that invoking nationalist discourses and making

references to ‘cultural’ (rather than ‘racial’) difference conveys racist sentiment without

appearing ‘racist,’ thereby rendering the problematization of racialized Others more

socially acceptable.

Similarly, both Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) and Van der Valk (2003) have

documented the ways in which immigrants are racially discriminated against in political

discourse in ‘democratic’ ways. Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) specifically examined

a campaign speech given by the leader of the opposition party (Michael Howard) during

the 2005 British elections, while Van der Valk (2003) focused on the UDF/RPR’s

discourse in parliamentary during the 1997 election campaign in France. According to

the authors, in both national contexts, discriminatory biases were articulated without

references to ‘race’ or contravention of democratic norms. For instance, immigrants

were racialized through references to this group’s ‘cultural difference’ and the

challenges associated with their integration into host societies. Racial problematization

of immigrants emerged through nativist and nationalist discourses on the immigrant

‘problem.’ Immigrants were constructed, on the one hand, as a threat to the physical

safety of non-immigrants, and, on the other hand, as a threat to the moral integrity of the

nation. Racialized immigrants were also framed in both French and British contexts as a

potential burden to the respective nations and as an obvious source of social problems

(Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Van der Valk, 2003). These discursive strategies acted to

“produce, reproduce and stabilize racism whilst concurrently leaving it explicitly

excluded, otherwise unnamed and, apparently, invisible” (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008:

6).

The above research suggests the centrality of both ‘race’ and democracy in the

context of immigration policy, and, by extension, hints at the usefulness of Henry et

al.’s (2000) framework. At the same time, however, the role of democratic racism in

specific reference to Canadian state legitimacy remains largely unarticulated. In order to

demonstrate the inherent affinity between these two frameworks, the upcoming analysis

locates discourses of dominance associated with democratic racism (namely, binary

polarization, national identity, multiculturalism, and moral panic) within an examination

of the quest for state legitimacy in the arena of immigration policy.

5.4 Data Sources

This chapter is based on an analysis of twenty-four reports generated by CIC between

1994 and 2010. These consist of the core reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s,

each Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration published between 1995 and 2009

(with 2009 being the most recent report available), and each Report on Plans and

Priorities published between 1998 and 2010. These reports are all publically available,

and have, as their intended audience, “Parliament and the people of Canada” (CIC,

2002b: 3). These reports thus provide an overview of CIC’s official policy discourse

over the past 16 years.

With respect to the IPR documents, four main reports were tabled as a result of

the public consultations and the review process (Thobani, 2000). Three of these reports

were analyzed in depth for the present chapter: Into the Twenty-First Century: A

Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship (CIC, 1994b), which outlines the findings of

the public consultations and describes in broad terms the expected main directions for

the immigration program in the subsequent ten years; A Broader Vision: Immigration

and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000 (CIC, 1994a), which provides more specific

elaborations of the general policy directions outlined in Into the 21st Century; and

Building on a Strong Foundation for the Twenty-First Century: New Directions for

Immigration and Refugee Policy Legislation (CIC, 1998a), which specifies the major

directions slated for the immigration program moving into the new millennium. This

latter document was the White Paper that became the basis for developing the 2002

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Each Annual Report to Parliament describes CIC activities and initiatives during

the preceding calendar year; it outlines the selection of foreign nationals as permanent

and temporary residents during the previous year, provides an overview of the

department’s agreements and joint initiatives with provinces and territories regarding

immigration, and discusses the immigration plan for the upcoming calendar year.

A Report on Plans and Priorities is an annual expenditure plan that details

CIC’s main priorities and planned initiatives for achieving these objectives for the

upcoming year. These reports specify the department’s strategic outcomes, program

activities and planned/expected results pertaining to immigration.

5.5 Methods

The above reports were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Documents were

initially read in chronological order without being coded such that an overall sense of

the document could be established (with respect to overall tone, focus, and substantive

topics). A second reading, again in chronological order, was performed and major

themes tentatively identified. A third reading was conducted by section (in instances

where sections were repeated in reports published in different years). For example, each

Annual Report to Parliament opens with a Message from the Minister of CIC at the

time. These Messages were read together in isolation from other sections of the reports

in order to elucidate commonalities and differences across time. The same process was

repeated for all recurring topics/sections. From here, all reports were read again and

were coded to the point of thematic saturation (i.e., until no new themes emerged after

additional readings). Once the major themes were finalized, portions of the documents

corresponding to each theme were read together in order to identify sub-themes. Once

again, coded segments for individual themes across all reports were read to the point of

thematic saturation. Finally, the codified content of each sub-theme was interpreted in

terms of the chapter’s and the thesis’s theoretical framework.

5.6 Results

The analysis revealed discourses of national identity, multiculturalism, moral panic, and

binary polarization. The themes identified for discourses of national identity,

multiculturalism, and moral panic are listed in Table 5.1. Binary polarization was

interwoven throughout the other discourses, and thus will be addressed as applicable

throughout the discussion.

Table 5.1: Discourses and Themes Emerging from Critical Discourse Analysis of

CIC Reports

Discourse

Theme

National Identity

Nation-Building

Fairness

Economic Strength

Multiculturalism

Diversity and Tolerance

Moral Panic

Burden and Balance

Border Security: Health and Safety Threats

Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking

Importantly, these themes were not mutually exclusive, but commonly overlapped, and

were woven together in a narrative that outlined the meaning and value of immigration

in the Canadian context, defined the place of immigrants in the Canadian nation,

identified the Canadian population’s beliefs, values, goals, and desires, and explained

the role of the Canadian state in protecting and building the Canadian nation. These

portrayals functioned together to document state legitimacy by demonstrating how the

state was serving the Canadian nation through its immigration policies while

simultaneously protecting the Canadian nation from problems and dangers associated

with immigration. Through these representations, the symbolic borders of Canada’s

imagined community were defined in variable and shifting ways.

5.61 Discourses of National Identity

Throughout the reports, state legitimacy in reference to immigration was sought by

emphasizing the important contributions of immigrants in past and present

nationbuilding efforts. Canadian national identity was also defined in terms of fairness

and economic considerations in ways that served to document the legitimacy of CIC’s

policy activities.

5.611 Immigration and Nation-Building

Throughout the reports, immigrants were presented as having played a central role in

the historical development of the Canadian nation and as being vital to the maintenance

and building of a strong and prosperous Canada in the future. The reports also

articulated the nature of the Canadian population and the values on which the Canadian

nation was built in ways that linked Canadian national identity directly to immigration:

Canada’s history is replete with stories of people seeking a new life for

themselves and their families. As a country populated to a very large extent

by immigrants and their descendents, that experience is deeply rooted in

our national consciousness. Canadian values have been influenced by the

need to welcome and integrate people from many cultures, religions,

languages and national experiences (CIC, 1998a: 1).

Our country has been built and enriched by immigrants. Throughout our

history, immigrants have come to our shores seeking opportunities and a

better future for themselves and their families. Our shared immigrant

experience is central to how Canadians see themselves, and to how the rest

of the world sees Canada (CIC, 1999a: 2).

Immigration has been fundamental to the growth of Canada and to our

history of achievement. From our earliest days through to the global

transformations of recent years, hardworking people and their families

have come to Canada from all over the world. Collectively, they have made

a significant contribution to the development of our economy, our society

and our culture (CIC, 2005a: 7).

One of the many rewards of being a welcoming land has been the attraction

of newcomers who have played a vital role in the development of our

values, our culture, our economy, and our political institutions (CIC,

1998a: 1).

Clearly, portrayals of immigrants, Canadians, the Canadian nation, and the Canadian

state were inextricably intertwined in the context of nation-building in ways that sought

to document the inherent value of immigration. Immigrants were presented as having

played a central role in establishing the Canadian nation, with Canadian values

simultaneously presented as having been inevitably shaped by immigration. In this way,

the immigration program was legitimized as an integral part of Canadian history, and

the state was shown to be acting directly in the interests of the Canadian population by

granting entry to immigrants.

In this theme, binary polarization emerged through repeated use of pronouns

‘our’ (to represent both Canadians and the Canadian state). This implied that the needs

and values of the Canadian state and those of Canadians are one and the same, while

simultaneously creating a binary polarization between members of the Canadian

population and newcomers: immigrants (they) come to our shores to better their lives;

they have come to our land and have helped build our economy, society, and culture. In

this way, an in-group/out-group dichotomy was firmly established. Moreover, the ‘us’

and ‘them’ distinction simultaneously served to present Canada as a desirable place to

live, where newcomers are able to improve their lives. Canada was thus portrayed as an

open land, brimming with opportunity, for which the Canadian state is partly

responsible, and of which Canadians can be proud. Yet, despite the ‘us’ and ‘them’

polarization, the Canadian nation and Canadian national identity were at times presented

in inclusive terms (for instance, with the mention of “our shared immigrant

experience”). Acknowledging that many Canadians are descendents of immigrants

served to partially break down the symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that

had previously been drawn. In doing so, the borders of the Canadian imagined

community shifted to include not only Canadians, but also ‘good’ immigrants (as cited

above, “hardworking people and their families”).

As alluded to in the above discussion, the central role of the Canadian state in

historical, present, and future nation-building through immigration was emphasized

throughout the reports, and operated to confirm the legitimacy of CIC’s activities in the

eyes of diverse stakeholders:

Canada’s Immigration program has played a vital role in shaping and

enriching our country. Canada has and will continue to benefit

economically and culturally from the immigration of individuals and

families who come here each year to seek a better future (CIC, 2004a: 1).

For almost a century and a half, immigration has been an engine for the

economic and social development of our country. Since 1967, the

employees of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) – whether they

worked in this country or in our offices abroad – have played a crucial role

in welcoming newcomers to join our work force and participate as

community leaders (CIC, 2005a: 3).

Canada has a long history of being a choice destination for immigrants,

and our immigration system is one of the best known and most successful

in the world. Every year Canada welcomes thousands of new immigrants,

international students and temporary workers who help develop the

economic and cultural fabric of our country (CIC, 2008a: 5).

The historical legacy of immigration as a nation-building strategy discursively served as

a means of demonstrating the ongoing necessity and value of immigration to Canada.

The centrality of immigration in building the Canadian nation and shaping Canadian

values thus operated in the interests of state legitimacy by documenting the symbolic

and material necessity of immigration to the Canadian nation. By extension, the manner

in which the state structures immigration policy was legitimized by documenting the

ability of the immigration program to grant entry to deserving and contributing

newcomers.

In terms of the utility of the democratic racism framework, Henry and Tator

(2000) emphasize that the ‘myth’ that Canada was founded by French and Canadian

nations enacts democratic racism by obscuring the contribution of ‘non-Whites’ to the

Canadian nation. The present analysis uncovered very little evidence of this myth in the

discourse analyzed. In fact, as noted above, the contribution of immigrants in Canada’s

earliest nation-building years was commonly mentioned in the reports. Yet, the analysis

uncovered another ‘myth’ in the discursive construction of Canadian national identity,

involving the claim that Canada had always been open to and welcoming of immigrants

from around the world. To this end, the democratic racism that surfaced in the reports

was not one of obscuring the contributions of immigrants to Canadian nation-building,

but was one that denied the racial discrimination that was explicit in Canadian

immigration policy for nearly a century. This reflects the manner in which policy

discourse was shaped in large part to garner state legitimacy in the eyes of varied

stakeholders, including potential immigrants and Canadian nationals who might be

unaware of the nation’s discriminatory past.

5.612 Fairness

By definition, fairness is a central element of democracy, and, as such, is a widely

valued principle in liberal democratic societies. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter

Three, the emergence of a fair and objective immigrant selection system is widely

heralded as marking the official end of discrimination in Canadian immigration.

Accordingly, the fairness of Canada’s immigration program and the democratic nature

of the Canadian state were emphasized throughout the reports in reference to various

dimensions of the immigration process:

Canadians’ belief that all human beings should be treated with fairness and

dignity must be reflected in the policies and practices of their government.

For its part, the immigration and citizenship program will strive for

excellence in providing its services both home and abroad (CIC, 1998b:

xiv).

Canada’s immigration program is based on nondiscriminatory principles –

foreign nationals are assessed according to the same criteria regardless of

race, nationality, ethnic origin, colour, religion or gender (CIC, 2005a: 16).

As part of the federal Innovation Strategy, the Government of Canada is

committed to working in partnership with the provinces and territories,

professional regulatory bodies and stakeholder groups to address the

barriers to successful economic integration. An important objective is the

development of fair and transparent processes to assess and recognize

foreign credentials before and after an immigrant’s arrival (CIC, 2003a:

26).

Throughout the reports, the Canadian state and the Canadian (non-immigrant)

population were presented as sharing in the belief in fairness and democracy relating to

immigrants of various origins. In this way, fairness was established as a feature of

Canadian identity and as the backbone of the Canadian nation. By articulating the fact

that Canada’s immigration program operates according to principles of fairness and

non-discrimination, the state’s legitimacy was pursued through appeals to both

Canadians and immigrants. The discourse offered assurance that CIC abides by the

wider values of the nation by ensuring fairness and transparency it its immigration

program, confirming that potential newcomers will not be discriminated against. This

established a subtle distinction between ‘Canadians’ and ‘immigrants’ by constructing

the latter group as ‘different’ from Canadians through the implication that

discrimination against immigrants is possible. In some instances, emphasizing the

highly democratic nature of Canadian society involved obscuring well-documented

discrimination:

With passage of the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947, so began the

promotion of a great national identity that has put newcomers to this

country on an equal footing with residents born here and helped shape the

strong, united, independent and free Canada of today (CIC, 2007b:

3).

Throughout the reports, Canadian immigration history was rewritten so as to obscure

the discrimination and lack of fairness that characterized much of this history.

Moreover, aligning the omission of historical racism with claims of fairness and

freedom directly served the state’s quest for legitimacy with respect to audiences that

might be unaware of the long history of discrimination in immigration, including

potential immigrants, newcomers, and Canadian nationals. In terms of contemporary

immigration practices, emphasizing the fairness of the Canadian system through

references to the Citizenship Act obscures the manner in which access to the rights and

benefits of citizenship remains regulated and racialized (for instance, through temporary

labour migration programs; see Basok, 2002; Bauder 2006; Satzewich, 1991). More

generally, claims of fairness and non-discrimination pertaining to immigrant selection

and integration operated as discourses of democratic racism that served state legitimacy

by suggesting that the immigration program is structured in accordance with the broader

liberal values of Canadian society. Claiming that immigrants are on equal footing as

Canadian-born citizens operated as an implicit denial of structural discrimination,

suggesting that, if immigrants do not succeed in Canadian society, the Canadian system

is not at fault. In these instances, the framework of democratic racism was upheld by the

analysis.

At other times, claims of fairness coincided more directly with negative

portrayals of immigrants:

Access to Canada’s institutions is a privilege. Fairness requires that access

not be afforded to those who abuse Canada’s hospitality (CIC, 1994c: 55).

CIC’s activities … are designed to ensure that newcomers have fair but

controlled access to Canada and to reassure Canadians that CIC is

proactively managing risk (CIC, 2003b: 12).

Immigration has a role to play in addressing labour market challenges and

my goal is to ensure the immigration program better responds to our needs

as a country in a way that is fair, transparent and adheres to the rule of law,

while protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians (CIC, 2006a:

3).

In these examples, immigrants were implicitly presented as a risk to the Canadian nation

and the Canadian public, such that a binary polarization was again established between

immigrants, on the one side, and Canadians and the Canadian state, on the other side.

This type of direct pairing of negative ‘Other’ representations with disclaimers of

fairness is a defining feature of discourses of discrimination toward immigrants in

democratic contexts (see, for instance, van Dijk, 1997, 1993a, 1992). At the same time,

however, an ambiguous line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants that could not clearly

be reduced to ‘race’ was drawn, and the ability of the state to negotiate this line in the

interests of the Canadian nation, Canadian citizens, and (‘good’) immigrants was

emphasized. In this way, the legitimacy of state activities was articulated with respect to

multiple audiences. Emphasizing Canada’s nondiscriminatory approach to immigration

informed a discourse of fair and equitable governance directed toward Canadians,

‘good’ immigrants, and the interests of capital and labour. At the same time, the

boundaries of Canada’s imagined community were clearly drawn to exclude newcomers

who threaten the health, safety, and security of

Canadians.

5.613 Economic Strength

Although Henry et al. (2000) primarily address Canadian national identity in reference

to a particular vision of the cultural fabric of the nation, the present analysis revealed

that, in the context of immigration policy, the economic strength of the nation in a

global setting emerged as a defining feature of Canadian national identity. Supporting

the framework of immigration policy outlined by Simmons (2010, 1999; see also

Chapter Two of this thesis), the reports clearly articulated the prevailing ‘imagined

future’ of the nation as a sophisticated player in a global marketplace. In this context,

economic considerations were constructed as more than just a goal of immigration;

rather, Canada’s status as a strong economic player was entrenched in the nation’s very

identity. By extension, the contribution of immigrants to upholding the nation’s

economic identity was prominent in the reports, again ingraining (economic)

immigration as a necessary component of Canadian nation-building and establishing the

legitimacy of the immigration program. In this regard, skilled workers were highlighted

as being vital to the state’s ability to meet Canada’s needs in a knowledge-based

economy, in light of the fact that these immigrants are highly educated and represent a

flexible, skilled workforce that will ensure Canada’s global competitiveness:

Canada needs immigrants if it wants to continue to develop and grow in

the future. Specifically, Canada needs to attract highly skilled workers…as

an essential part of maintaining its competitive position in a knowledge-

based…world economy (CIC, 1999b: 3).

In an era of increased globalization with critical skill gaps in the labour

market and concern over demographic trends, the selection of skilled

worker immigrants who can successfully settle in Canada is vital for the

long-term economic development of the country (CIC, 2002b: 13).

Immigration can contribute to addressing both short- and long-term labour

market needs by attracting people with the right mix of skills and talents

to support economic growth today and in the future. With other

industrialized countries confronting similar challenges with respect to

sustaining population and economic growth, Canada will be operating in

an increasingly competitive worldwide market for higher skilled workers

(CIC, 2007a: 6).

Immigration has played an important role in building the strong and

vibrant economy that Canadians have come to enjoy. To remain

competitive in the global economy, Canada needs to continue to draw on

the talents and skills that immigrants bring with them (CIC, 2008b: 15).

Skilled worker immigrants were thus defined first and foremost in terms of their

ability to serve the needs of the Canadian nation; these immigrants were

depersonalized and depicted as resources that will help maintain Canada’s position

as a competitive player in a world market. Business immigrants, investors, and

temporary workers were similarly constructed in terms of their economic

contributions to the Canadian nation:

Migration is a positive force for economic and social development. CIC

continues to promote Canada as a destination of choice for talent,

innovation, investment and opportunity. Canada’s immigration policy

facilitates the entry into Canada of new immigrants and temporary

residents who are able to contribute to the labour market and economy

through the skills they bring, their business experience, or through capital

they invest (CIC, 2006b: 21).

[…] We must work with partners to consistently promote Canada as a

destination of choice, adopt policies that encourage the retention of

newcomers such as students and temporary foreign workers and select

applicants who have greater potential to succeed early upon their arrival

in Canada. Recent initiatives such as the Action Plan for Faster

Immigration and the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class will

improve Canada’s ability to compete for skilled labour (CIC, 2009b: 15).

Intersecting images of economic immigrants and the Canadian nation clearly served as a

vehicle for presenting CIC as a responsive, responsible, and forward-thinking state

entity that acts to support the nation’s interests:

The Speech from the Throne in September 2002 highlighted the important

role that CIC plays in the Canadian economy, while the federal Innovation

Strategy stresses the need for a skilled workforce. CIC has made it a

priority to deliver results for the Canadian economy (CIC 2003b: 12).

We are maximizing this country’s social, cultural, and economic benefits

by working to respond to labour-market needs, attracting and retaining

skilled foreign workers, and ensuring that we have the policies and

programs in place to support the successful integration of newcomers to

this country (CIC 2007a: 3).

CIC contributes significantly to strengthening Canada’s social

foundations, to building a 21st century economy and to ensuring Canada’s

role in the world (CIC, 2004b: 9).

By articulating the fact that CIC grants entry to ‘good’ immigrants (that is, immigrants

who are economically valuable to the Canadian nation), the importance of immigration

in securing Canada’s national prosperity and international standing was emphasized.

Moreover, the centrality of Canada’s international economic standing to the nation’s

identity meant that articulations of CIC’s ability to select economic immigrants directly

served the state’s quest for legitimacy. Yet, representations of the Canadian nation and

the Canadian state were also intertwined with portrayals of family-class immigrants:

Canadian immigration policy and legislation have a long tradition of

supporting family reunification. The support of family sponsors assists

new immigrants in achieving self-reliance and more quickly adapting to

their new circumstances (CIC, 2002b: 13).

Reuniting families is an important tradition in Canada’s immigration

program, as it allows foreign nationals to be sponsored by close relatives

or family members in Canada. This component [of the immigration

program] is based on the belief that people who immigrate to Canada will

tend to establish themselves more easily if their family supports them

(CIC, 2004b: 19).

Family reunification remains a key objective of IRPA. In order to facilitate

the reunification of families, Canadian citizens and permanent residents

may sponsor close relatives to become permanent residents. Canadian

citizens or permanent residents who are 18 years of age or older may

qualify as sponsors. In order to ensure that sponsored relatives are

adequately supported and do not need to rely on social assistance, sponsors

must meet certain criteria and are responsible for financially supporting

their relatives for a period of three to 10 years, depending on their age and

relationship to the sponsor (CIC, 2008a: 18-9).

Family-class immigration thus allowed the Canadian state and the Canadian nation to be

portrayed as supportive and appreciative of the institution of the family, while offering

assurance that family-class immigrants will come to be productive members of society

through the help of their sponsors. In this way, discourse on family-class immigration

was directly framed within considerations on the nation’s economic integrity.

Familyclass immigrants were presented as dependents who require the financial support

of their sponsors in order to succeed in Canadian society. In this way, family-class

immigrants were discursively constrained in their role as family members, and were not

acknowledged as productive immigrants. This group was thus portrayed as a potential to

burden the nation, who stand to interfere with the nation’s economic integrity. In this

way, a binary polarization was constructed between economic immigrants and

familyclass immigrants. In the context of the state’s quest for legitimacy, the expressed

support of family reunification upheld the state’s social commitment to family values,

and served to obscure the inherent devaluing of family-class immigrants relative to

economic immigrants. This discourse protected the legitimacy of CIC’s activities from

both sides: audiences that might protest family-class immigration on economic grounds

were appealed to through reassurances regarding the sponsorship program, while

humanists likely to reject a strictly economic immigration system as well as immigrants

seeking to have their family join them in Canada were appealed to through

acknowledgement of the importance of family reunification.

The centrality of the pursuit of state legitimacy in shaping policy discourse, and

the extent to which this pursuit shaped portrayals of both immigrants and the state, was

also evident in the reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s. Part of the IPR involved

a legislative review by an independent panel of consultants, which resulted in the

tabling of a report containing policy recommendations (Trempe et al., 1998). Following

the release of this report, public hearings were held across the country over a period of

several weeks, in which individual Canadian citizens and organizations responded to the

recommendations that the advisory group had outlined. Following these hearings, the

report Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century (CIC, 1998a) was released

by CIC. It was noted in the early pages of this report that the feedback from the public

hearings on Not Just Numbers revealed “concern with the report’s perceived economic,

market-oriented focus” (CIC, 1998a: 6). This statement is meaningful here in light the

impact that this public reaction seemed to have on policy discourse in the immediate

aftermath of the hearings.

Specifically, the analysis of Building on a Strong Foundation (CIC, 1998a)

revealed a clear downplaying of economic concerns and an emphasis on the importance

of the social and humanitarian considerations of immigration that was unparalleled in all

other reports. This report stood out in terms of its heightened articulation of the value of

the family as an integral aspect of Canadian identity, and its emphasis on the centrality

of family reunification to the immigration program. The report also stressed that

“immigrants are social as well as economic beings” (CIC, 1998a: 14):

The assessment of successful establishment for independent immigrants is

based on their economic potential. Economics, however, is only part of the

story. Highly skilled immigrants make an invaluable contribution to

Canadian society. As they integrate into communities, these immigrants

become integral parts of all facets of Canadian society. They enrich the

cultural and social fabric of Canada (CIC, 1998a: 28).

As this shift suggests, the audience plays an important role in the framing of policy

discourse. The state was clearly engaged in a concerted effort to address perceived

concerns associated with the immigration program and to demonstrate that the

immigration program serves both Canadians, immigrants, and the Canadian nation more

broadly. Yet, as the current analysis suggests, the specific elements of the discourse that

are played up depends on the prevailing social atmosphere within which state

legitimacy is being sought.

Overall, Canada’s economic competitiveness and high standing in the

international economic order were presented in the reports as a source of national pride

and a defining feature of Canadian national identity. This economic discourse enabled

CIC to address the interests of both capital and labour by demonstrating how the state

prioritizes the national economy by matching the flow of immigrants to meet economic

needs. In turn, this served to demonstrate how CIC upholds the material and symbolic

standing of Canada in the international order. This discourse also allowed the state to

‘prove’ the value and worth of economic immigrants to the varied audiences of the

reports. In this way, economic immigrants were symbolically included in the state’s

imagining of Canada’s national community, constructed as valuable economic

contributors and thus as worthy future citizens, while family-class immigrants were

ambiguously positioned with respect to the national community, yet nevertheless

presented as allowing the nation to meet specific social goals. The state’s quest for

legitimacy was thus evidenced through discursive assurance that the current

immigration program is the best possible approach for Canadians, corporate Canada,

and a large population of immigrants.

With respect to democratic racism, the analysis revealed many of the same

themes discussed by other authors pertaining to the discourse of immigrant skill and the

implicit devaluation of family-class immigrants (see Abu-Laban,1998a, 1998b;

Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although the current analysis did

not reveal explicit opposition to family-class immigrants, it found that family-class

immigrants were occasionally presented as potentially burdensome to the nation, and as

less valuable than economic immigrants. To this end, insofar as family-class immigrants

are interpreted as having been racialized relative to economic immigrants, then the

privileging of the latter group can be interpreted, to some extent, as an expression of

democratic racism. At the same time, however, the bureaucratic categorization of

immigrants is not clearly reducible to a single dimension such as ‘race.’ To this end, the

extent to which the discourse of skill and economic identity is evidence of ‘racism’ is

not entirely clear. This issue is discussed further later on in this chapter.

5.62 Discourse of Multiculturalism: Diversity and Tolerance

The theme of diversity revealed contradicting sub-texts that served to variably represent

both immigrants and Canadians, while consistently presenting the Canadian state as

respectful and welcoming of all peoples, and depicting the Canadian nation as

multicultural and pluralistic:

Canada is a multicultural and diverse country that is open to the world,

with an immigration program that enjoys public support and a track record

of successfully integrating generations of newcomers (CIC, 2005a: 8).

Canada is among the most ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse

countries in the world. The Government of Canada is proud of the

contributions that all communities make to the social, civic, cultural and

economic fabric of this country, and of the efforts that all Canadians make

to welcome and encourage newcomers’ full participation in our society

(CIC, 2010b: 6).

I believe the characteristic that most defines Canadians is their welcoming

nature. It has been a constant throughout our evolution as a country. Wave

after wave of newcomers, first from Europe, then from all corners of the

earth, have found themselves welcomed in Canada. They have also found

opportunity and tolerance in a country that genuinely appreciates cultural

diversity (CIC, 2007b: 3).

In these examples, both Canadians and the state were portrayed as welcoming and

tolerant. By extension, immigrants were implicitly constructed as ‘different’ than

‘Canadians.’ In this way, although diversity was presented as being valued in Canada

and respected by Canadians, a binary polarization of ‘Canadians’ and ‘diverse

immigrants’ was also evident. In this way, both immigrants and Canadians were

homogenized within their respective group boundaries. As mentioned for previous

themes, the Canadian state was coupled with Canadians in the polarization between Self

and Other (with statements such as “our society” and “our evolution as a country”).

Canadians and the Canadian state were thus both portrayed as being supportive of

‘diverse’ newcomers, and as constituting a nation that has a long history of welcoming

immigrants from around the world. As discussed in previous sections and as illustrated

by the above examples, the theme of diversity revealed a selective re-writing of

Canadian immigration history, wherein historical discrimination was obscured.

Similarly, the contemporary racialization of immigration policies and practices and the

persistence of discrimination in Canadian society were implicitly denied through

references to the welcoming, pluralistic nature of the Canadian nation.

At other points throughout the reports, the racialization of immigrants was more

explicit:

Settlement programs and services assist immigrants in becoming

participating and contributing members of Canadian society and promote

an acceptance of immigrants by Canadians. While helping newcomers

adapt and learn about their rights, freedoms and responsibilities and the

laws that protect them from racial discrimination, settlement programs

also sensitize Canadians to different cultures and how diversity

strengthens the economy and community life (CIC, 2002a).

Immigrants’ need for the state’s assistance in order to become productive members of

Canadian society served as an implicit negative representation of newcomers and an

overt positive representation of the state. Moreover, the racialized identity of

immigrants (and their difference from Canadians) was constituted through the explicit

mention of newcomers’ legal protection from racial discrimination. Interestingly, in

contrast to the vast majority of the policy discourse (which emphasized Canadians’

tolerant and welcoming nature), the above example suggests an acknowledgement of

the broader presence of discrimination in Canadian society and the need for Canadians

to be educated about the value of diversity brought about by immigrants. Again, this

served to polarize immigrants and Canadians as racialized opposites, while

simultaneously constructing the state in a patriarchal role as guardian, protector, and

educator of both newcomers and Canadian nationals. State legitimacy was thus

documented in reference to immigration by establishing the fact that the state protects

immigrants while simultaneously using their ‘diversity’ to broaden the horizons of

Canadians and the Canadian nation. In this context, the presence of institutionalized

discrimination in the immigration program and Canadian society was negated, and the

legitimacy of the immigration program was ‘proven.’

In other instances, references to multiculturalism seemed to acknowledge the

heterogeneity of the broader Canadian population, somewhat deconstructing the

racialized binary between Canadians and immigrants:

Multiculturalism fosters increased intercultural understanding, and

supports the goals of Canadians living in a society where they are treated

fairly and equitably, regardless of their background (CIC, 2009b: 35).

In response to our ever-increasing diversity and to ensure that our

Multiculturalism Program reflects the needs of all Canadians by promoting

integration, the Government of Canada has implemented three policy

objectives for the Program: building an integrated, sociallycohesive

society; making institutions more responsive to the needs of Canada's

diverse population; and engaging in international discussions on

multiculturalism and diversity (CIC, 2010b: 5).

These examples illustrate the inconsistent manner in which immigrants and Canadians

were concurrently represented in reference to diversity and multiculturalism. In

instances where immigrants and Canadians were not polarized as distinct (racialized)

groups, Canada’s national community was constructed as inclusive of diverse

newcomers and Canadian nationals alike. Yet, diversity was still presented as a potential

challenge to social cohesion; implicitly, this contributed to a ‘folk construction’ of

immigrants (see Chapter One), in the sense that ethnic minorities

(regardless of legal immigrant status) were portrayed as ‘different.’ To this end, the line

between immigrants and ethnic minority Canadians was inconsistently and ambiguously

drawn. Yet, in all cases, the Canadian state and the Canadian nation were consistently

framed in reference to tolerance and the value of diversity. In this way, the pursuit of state

legitimacy through multicultural discourse was evident throughout the reports, for

instance, through comments about the state’s commitment to multicultural programs, and

through repeated references to CIC’s role in ensuring the equitable treatment of all

members of Canadian society. The state’s activities pertaining to immigration were thus

presented so as to appeal to both newcomers and Canadian nationals of all backgrounds,

as well as to broader interest groups that advocate against discrimination.

5.63 Discourses of Moral Panic

5.631 Balance and Burden

As discussed in Chapter One, the ‘immigration question’ in Canada commonly revolves

around public concerns pertaining to the balance between economic and non-economic

immigration. This discourse contributes to an image of economic (particularly skilled

worker) immigrants as productive and valuable newcomers, while family-class

immigrants are comparatively devalued and constructed as a potential burden to

Canadian society. This devaluing of family-class immigrants is often interpreted in

racialized (and gendered) terms (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Thobani, 2007, 2000a,

2000b, 1999). In political and public contexts, the sponsorship agreement is presented

as a safeguard against family-class immigrants’ reliance on public programs. These

points were visible throughout the CIC reports, and contributed to a binary polarization

between family-class immigrants and economic immigrants:

The [immigration program’s] changes are also aimed at rebalancing

immigration so that Canada selects a greater share of immigrants who can

contribute quickly to its economic development. This may mean a

decrease in the share of immigrants in other categories (CIC, 1994c: 29).

The lower number [of immigrants to be accepted in 1995] will allow the

immigration program to be gradually reoriented in later years to applicants

who can make an immediate contribution to the Canadian economy by

increasing the proportion of the economic component in relation to the

family (CIC, 1994a: 7).

The government is committed to ensuring that newcomers to Canada can

integrate and contribute to Canada as quickly as possible, without adding

to the burden on social programs. This means raising selection standards;

ensuring that Canadians honour their responsibilities towards sponsored

family members; and achieving an appropriate balance between the

economic and family components of immigration (CIC, 1994a: 7).

As these examples illustrate, the assumption that family-class immigrants are unlikely to

contribute to the nation was implicit, serving to marginalize this group as valuable

members of Canada’s national community. Economic immigrants, in contrast, were

portrayed as self-sufficient contributors who are worthy of inclusion in the Canadian

nation. These images were built upon an undercurrent of ‘moral panic,’ conceptualized

in terms of the potential risk associated with family-class immigrants and sponsorship

default:

The government believes strongly in the principle of family reunification

based on the responsibility of the family itself to provide the resources for

supporting its sponsored members. Compliance with sponsorship

undertakings is key to achieving integrity in the family class program.

Default occurs when a sponsored immigrant whose essential needs were

guaranteed by the sponsor for a set period received social assistance (CIC,

1998a: 26).

In order to ensure that sponsored relatives are adequately supported and do

not need to rely on social assistance, sponsors must meet certain criteria

and are responsible for financially supporting their relatives for a period

of three to 10 years, depending on their age and relationship to the sponsor

(CIC, 2008a: 19).

The privilege of immigrating or resettling in Canada must be balanced with

‘reciprocal obligations,’ or responsibilities. Thus, for example, the

privilege of sponsoring the immigration of a family member must be

balanced with the responsibility to provide for that person once in Canada

(CIC, 1998a: 10).

The identity of sponsors as Canadian-born or former immigrants was typically not

articulated, and was rendered largely irrelevant in the context of potential sponsorship

default. In this context, the state was presented as ensuring that family-class immigrants

will not become a burden to Canadian taxpayers:

The government proposes to expand Citizenship and Immigration

Canada’s power to undertake collection action against defaulting sponsors

and to share the proceeds with the provinces (CIC, 1998a: 26).

In December 2004, a pilot project was launched with the Canada Revenue

Agency (CRA) and the Province of Ontario to facilitate the collection of

debts owed by defaulting sponsors. Sponsors in Ontario who default on

sponsorship commitments may now have their income tax or GST refunds

withheld to pay back the province for social assistance costs incurred by

family members they have sponsored. The intention is to expand this pilot

nationwide (CIC, 2005a: 20).

CIC continues to work with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the

provinces on measures to collect debts owing from sponsors (CIC, 2006a:

15).

To preserve public support for family class immigration, it is critical that

sponsors meet their obligations to provide for the essential needs of their

sponsored relatives. Links will be established with the provinces to ensure

that defaulting sponsors are identified and compelled to carry out their

responsibilities (CIC, 1998b: 11).

Overall, intersecting representations of family-class immigrants, their sponsors and the

Canadian state served state legitimacy by documenting the role of the state in

guaranteeing that the economic security of the nation would not be compromised by

family-class immigration. The boundaries of Canada’s national community were thus

drawn so as to marginalize family-class immigrants and defaulting sponsors. Through

these constructions, subtle discrimination against family-class immigrants was

articulated. Default on sponsorship was never expressed in terms of concern for

familyclass immigrants’ well-being, but, rather, was addressed exclusively in terms of

the well-being of the nation. The Canadian state’s legitimacy, in this regard, was

documented in terms of its ability to minimize the burden imposed by family-class

immigrants, and thus to preclude the need for public ‘panic’ about family-class

immigration.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the problematization of family-class immigrants

is often taken as evidence of racial discrimination when considered in the context of

Canadian immigration history (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997; Thobani,

2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999; see also Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed in

Chapter Three, the liberalization of family-class immigration in the 1950s brought about

an influx of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries. In contemporary

immigration flows, large numbers of ‘non-White’ immigrants (particularly Asian

women) arrive through the family-class stream. As such, critical scholars commonly

discuss family-class immigration in racialized and gendered, such that the attribution of

burden to family-class immigrants is often interpreted as an expression of democratic

racism (and sexism). While not disputing the possible value of this interpretation, it is

also relevant to point out that 40% of family-class immigrants are male, and that a large

proportion of skilled worker applicants are of Asian origin. In this regard, insofar as

Canadian immigration policy discourse reflects philosophies and agendas guiding

immigration policy and programming, then the construction of family-class immigrants

as burdensome stands to affect all immigrants within that category, regardless of gender,

ethnicity, or ‘race.’ As such, it is argued here that category of admission is a tangible

factor in defining membership in Canada’s national community that is not easily

reducible to the bureaucratic category’s majority demographic composition, nor can it

be exclusively linked to the socially constructed image of a family-class immigrant as a

female dependent and an economic immigrant as an independent male.

5.632 Border Security: Health and Safety Threats

Throughout the reports, immigrants were commonly presented as real or potential

threats to the well-being of Canada as a nation and to the Canadian population:

CIC…protects the public health and safety of Canadians through the

medical examination of all immigrants and certain visitors, and protects

the security of Canadian society by identifying and removing individuals

who are not entitled to enter or to remain in Canada (CIC, 2000: 5).

From a medical perspective, CIC’s overarching goal is to ensure that the

vast majority of immigrants are healthy when they arrive in Canada, thus

minimizing risks to Canadians and preventing undue demands on

Canada’s already overburdened health and social services (CIC, 2003b:

33).

As Canada seeks to attract and welcome permanent and temporary

residents, CIC has a critical role to play, in partnership with other federal

departments, in protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians.

Globalization of markets and ease of travel increase risks, ranging from

epidemics such as SARS and influenza, to the spread of infectious diseases

such as tuberculosis, to chronic conditions that can affect the overall health

of Canadians (CIC, 2008a: 8-9).

Health thus served as a ‘legitimate’ means for problematizing immigrants, drawing on

global health trends and also appealing to concerns of national well-being. It was telling

that threats to public health were clearly attributed to immigrants, with no recognition

that Canadians within the country or those who travel outside the country can contribute

to the spread of infectious diseases. In this context, health served as a means of

constructing a binary polarization between Canadians and immigrants. This finding is

particularly interesting in light evidence that, upon their arrival in Canada, immigrants

are, on average, healthier than the native-born Canadian population (known as the

“healthy immigrant effect”; see Ali et al., 2004; Chen et al., 1996; McDonald &

Kennedy, 2004). Moreover, the portrayal of immigrants as a health threat was framed so

as to document the legitimacy of state activities pertaining to the screening of

immigrants.

For instance, the image of immigrants as a health threat, and the manner in

which the state acts to minimize this threat, emerged through discussions of the

‘Migration Health Task Force,’ a joint initiative between CIC and Health Canada. The

Task Force was charged with the following responsibilities:

[…] to define the current public health and population health challenges

resulting from migration to Canada; to examine how well Canada’s current

migration health management system is meeting these challenges; and to

develop a series of strategic objectives and proposed actions to modernize

Canada’s system of managing migrant health (CIC, 2005b: 35).

Discussions of the Task Force clearly contributed to a binary polarization of immigrants

and Canadians on the basis of health ‘difference.’ Indeed, as reported in one document,

the Task Force was explicitly established in light of the fact that “most [immigrants]

come from countries with health backgrounds, beliefs and customs that are very

different from those in Canada” (CIC, 2005b: 35). Importantly, highlighting the fact that

health risks are largely associated with immigrants from countries with ‘different’

customs both racialized these immigrants, and operated directly in the state’s quest for

legitimacy. Racializing the immigrant ‘health risk’ legitimized the possibility of

heightened scrutiny of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries, rendering

suspicion of racialized immigrants legitimate. More generally, portraying immigrants as

health threats served as a basis for presenting the Canadian state as the protector of the

Canadian nation and the Canadian public. By acknowledging the ‘threat’ associated

with immigrants from non-traditional source countries while emphasizing the steps

being taken by CIC to protect against these risks, the state’s ability to protect the

physical well-being of Canadian citizens was established. In this way, the potential

threat to legitimacy imposed by the health ‘threat’ of immigrants was refuted through

assurances that the state was taking every effort to protect Canadians from (racialized)

immigrants.

Aside from the health threats associated within immigration, terrorism and

organized crime also emerged as central elements of the discourse of moral panic:

In the face of growing threats to Canadian security, CIC supports a key

government-wide priority to build safer communities. In this context, CIC

identifies and denies admission to those who do not comply with the

Immigration Act (e.g., suspected terrorists or members of organized crime

groups). It also detects evolving patterns of abuse of the citizenship,

immigration and refugee programs and detains or removes people who

pose a serious risk to Canadians or who are not legally entitled to remain

in Canada (in particular, those who have committed serious criminal

offences or war crimes) (CIC, 1999b: 6-7).

Growing international migration has increased the possibility of Canadians

being exposed to outbreaks, infectious diseases, acts of terrorism and

transnational organized crime. A range of mitigating strategies has been

adopted across government and with international partners to reduce the

possibility of these threats impacting the Canadian population (CIC,

2010b: 15).

Like the United States and many other countries, Canada has been

operating in a state of heightened security since September 11, 2001. The

critical need to intensify efforts to protect North America is widely

acknowledged. Terrorist attacks and continuing international tensions have

changed Canadians’ perceptions of our vulnerability in terms of public

safety and security, and have raised concerns about how we select and

admit people to Canada (CIC, 2003b: 30).

As these examples illustrate, CIC’s role as guardian of the Canadian nation and

protector of the Canadian people was constituted through representations of

international immigrants as threats. Moreover, Canadians were simultaneously, albeit

implicitly, portrayed as good, law-abiding citizens who do not pose a threat to public

safety. Canadians were also, once again, homogenized with respect to their fears and

perceptions, and were constructed as sharing the same beliefs as the Canadian state.

These findings pertaining to the immigrant ‘threat’ must be interpreted within

the social context of international migration in recent years. Since the terrorist attacks

on U.S. soil in 2001, the fear of racialized ‘Others’ has become an increasingly

prominent sentiment in the Western world. Political discourse, particularly in reference

to national security, border control, and international migration, has become ever more

imbued with xenophobia and heightened suspicion toward ‘outsiders’ (Ibrahim, 2009;

Nagel, 2002). The SARS health scare of 2003 added a further dimension of fear

associated with international migration to Canada. In these contexts, the racialized

construction of immigrants as dangerous ‘Others’ is rendered acceptable through

‘legitimate’ concerns over national well-being. Calling specific attention to the 9/11

attacks in the policy reports effectively located the threat to the Canadian nation within

a stereotypical image of a male, Islamist terrorist. This served to profile the threat the

Canadian nation in a very concrete, racialized, gendered, and religious-specific way.

It is interesting to note here that representations of immigrants as health and

safety threats in the CIC reports preceded the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the SARS

outbreak, indicating that these events did not directly prompt a new vision of

immigrants as safety and health threat. What did change, however, was the nature of

this theme in the reports of the decade 2000, where security and health risks were

framed as increasingly pressing concerns, as evidenced by an emphasis on increasing

collaboration between multiple federal departments to ensure border control, the

sophistication of the methods being used to screen immigrants, and the perceived

necessity of extensive efforts to protect Canadian society from potential threats

associated with immigration. In this regard, the intensity and focus of the state’s quest

for legitimacy changed in response to world events. Major scares such as terrorism and

health pandemics threaten to instill fear in the population about the ability of the state to

protect the national community. The current analysis revealed how, in the context of this

fear, racialized immigrants were constructed as the principal source of threat, while

Canadians were implicitly constructed as a vulnerable population in need of state

protection. Legitimacy, in this context, was established through a convincing discourse

regarding the steps being taken by the state to protect the Canadian public against ‘bad’

immigrants while simultaneously permitting the entry of ‘good’ (i.e., economic)

immigrants.

5.633 Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking

In the CIC reports, illegal migration and human trafficking were identified as inherent

features of global migration, and as prominent concerns for the Canadian state and other

stakeholders:

Migrant smuggling, including trafficking in women and children, is an

increasing concern for the international community…CIC recognizes that

human security and migration issues cannot be addressed in isolation and

that they require effective cooperation and exchange of information. CIC

works closely with domestic and international partners to promote and

protect Canadian interests relating to migration, refugee and citizenship

issues in international and multilateral forums. The Department has an

enviable worldwide reputation in combating the illegal traffic in people

(CIC, 1999b: 6).

Activities devoted to preventing illegal migrants from reaching Canada are

key to any effective enforcement program in terms of cost to the taxpayer,

program integrity and public safety (CIC, 2000: 21).

[CIC] contributes to the management of international migration and travel

by combating illegal migration, including trafficking in people, while

facilitating the movement of legitimate travelers (CIC, 1998b: 17).

The discourse on illegal migration and human trafficking operated to create a distinction

between ‘legitimate’ migrants, victim migrants, and fraudulent migrants. It is also

relevant to note here the explicit gendered portrayal of women and children as

vulnerable victims in need of state protection. As noted for other themes, however, the

portrayals of migrants were, in large part, secondary to positive portrayals of the

Canadian state. Indeed, the state’s quest for legitimacy was clearly visible in references

to CIC’s efforts to establish an effective program that both ensures Canadians’ safety

and assists victims of trafficking. In this way, the state was presented so as to appeal to

Canadians concerned with the threat and costs of illegal migration, while ensuring the

state’s commitment to protecting vulnerable migrants. This discourse thus sought to

establish the Canadian state as a humanitarian entity in the eyes of a wide variety of

national and international stakeholders.

At the same time, however, despite emphasizing migrants’ potential

vulnerability, the discourse on human trafficking was not unequivocal in its portrayal of

immigrants as victims:

In May 2006, the Minister announced that the federal government has

adopted new measures to help victims of human trafficking in Canada.

Trafficking in persons violates the basic human rights of its victims. […]

To assist victims of human trafficking, temporary resident permits can be

issued for up to 120 days. The permit will enable victims to recover from

the impact of this crime. Victims who receive temporary resident permits

will also be exempted from the processing fee, and will be eligible for

health-care benefits under the new Interim Federal Health program. The

new measures have been carefully designed so that only bona fide victims

of human trafficking will benefit from them (CIC, 2006a: 24-25; italics

added).

As part of the Department’s commitment to protecting victims of human

trafficking, guidelines were released in May 2006 which encourage

immigration officers to issue possible victims a short-term temporary

resident permit (TRP). A longer-term TRP can be issued when it is

established that the person is a victim of trafficking. The initial permit is

fee-exempt. The permit gives access to health care and counselling via the

Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) (CIC, 2007a: 26).

Would-be victims of human trafficking were commonly presented as potential abusers

of the Temporary Resident Permit system, and thus were placed under a shadow of

suspicion. In doing so, vulnerable victim migrants were at once distinguished from, as

well as conflated with, fraudulent migrants. Again, the state’s quest for legitimacy in the

context of this theme reflects the broader social context of contemporary international

migration, wherein human trafficking and smuggling are generating increasing demand

for political action (see Laczko & Gramegna, 2003). In the present analysis, addressing

potentially fraudulent victims of human trafficking tied into the state’s quest for

legitimacy by documenting the state’s ability to distinguish between ‘bona fide’ and

fraudulent trafficking victims. By portraying immigrants in these two polarized roles,

CIC’s concern for genuine victims and willingness to assist vulnerable migrants was

articulated, while the department’s ability to protect the Canadian nation from

fraudulent, criminal immigrants was emphasized. In this way, representations of both

the state and victims of trafficking (genuine and fraudulent) served to establish CIC’s

activities as securing a safe and peaceful world for Canadians, ‘good’ immigrants, and

vulnerable victims.

In terms of democratic racism, illegal migration and human trafficking serve as a

site for articulating doubt about populations of newcomers that tend to be widely

constructed in racialized terms. On the one hand, conceptualizing asylum seekers as

would-be frauds obscures the racialized persecution that often prompts forced

migration. Moreover, as Richmond (2001) points out, the requirements for obtaining

asylum in Canada are such that immigrants from particular regions, such as central and

southern African countries, face tangible difficulties in qualifying for selection as a

Convention refugee. Efforts to stem illegal residence of asylum-seekers in Canada

similarly racialize refugee protection; as Richmond (2001) explains, “the list of

countries whose nationals now require a visitor’s or transit visa includes virtually all

Third World countries known to have generated reactive migration flows in recent

years” (p.18). To this end, granting the potential abuse of the refugee system provides

ground for preserving racialized patterns of refuge in Canada, embedded in the

distinction between ‘illegal/fraudulent’ asylum-seekers and ‘bona fide’ victims.

5.7 Conclusion

The present chapter sought to demonstrate that immigration policy discourse in the

Canadian context is best understood in reference to the state’s quest for legitimacy in

the face of immigration controversies and the effort to appeal to diverse stakeholders. In

the current analysis, this quest for legitimacy involved a distinct imagining of the

Canadian nation that variably defined and represented different groups of immigrants,

while simultaneously representing the Canadian population and the Canadian state in

largely positive, shared terms of national self-glorification.

Underlying this analysis was the objective of evaluating the notion of

democratic racism. More specifically, the chapter sought to address whether, in the

context of immigration policy discourse, the deployment of discourses of dominance

associated with democratic racism can actually be interpreted as racism. This chapter

thus speaks to a socially and sociologically relevant topic of contention. From a social

perspective, it is critical to assess what constitutes racism such that anti-racist initiatives

can appropriately address new and subtle expressions of discrimination. However, as

illustrated by the Canadian examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter (i.e.,

about Rob Ford and the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform), uncovering and

challenging racist talk is difficult when racism is elusive, or even “invisible or

unwittingly practiced” (Henry & Tator, 2000: 287). From a sociological perspective, this

issue bears on the conceptual challenges of defining ‘racism’ and determining the extent

to which racialization, accomplished through expressions of ‘difference’ or ‘diversity,’

can be interpreted as racism. As demonstrated in this chapter, it is theoretically

necessary, from a sociological perspective, to evaluate the social context within which

racialization occurs in order to more fully comprehend the place of ‘race’ in

contemporary democratic societies, wherein racial (and other) discrimination is

prohibited by law and evokes widespread social disapproval. Given the intersections

between racialization, ‘racism,’ and contemporary immigration trends in Canada,

immigration policy discourse offers a conceptually fruitful avenue for pursuing these

issues.

Overall, the present chapter demonstrated that discourses of dominance

commonly interpreted as ‘democratic racism’ are not exclusively discourses of racism.

Rather, in the Canadian immigration policy context, these discourses involved elements

of both inclusivity and exclusivity, wherein immigrants were inconsistently and

ambiguously constructed in both positive and negative lights, depending on the

immediate context in which the state’s legitimacy was being pursued (that is, the social

issue and/or the audience being addressed). At times, ‘immigrants,’ as a broad group,

were at times depicted as outsiders who stood in binary opposition to Canadians and the

Canadian state, and at other times portrayed as insiders that contribute to the Canadian

nation. On other occasions, the primary polarization was between family-class

immigrants and economic immigrants, in which case the former were marginalized

while the latter were positioned as insiders to the Canadian nation. In some instances, an

ill-defined distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants was evident while, in other

instances, ‘immigrant’ or Canadian status was unclear, resulting in, for instance, a

marginalization of defaulting family-class sponsors, or a ‘folk’ construction of visible

minorities as immigrants.

In all of these instances, interpretations of democratic racism would be hinged

on the assumption that immigrants were conceptualized exclusively in terms of ‘race.’

Yet, in cases where this type of ‘Othering’ occurred in the discourse analyzed, it often

was not clearly reducible to ‘race,’ nor could it necessarily be interpreted as racist per

se. In the case of family-class immigrants, for instance, the framework of democratic

racism would suggest that the widespread problematization of this group is evidence of

racism. Yet, the extent to which this is the case is not entirely clear, given the complex

intersections between bureaucratic category of admission, gender, ‘race,’ social class,

and even age. In this regard, the present analysis provided an empirical confirmation of

Satzewich’s (1998) suggestion that democratic racism is perhaps too broadly

conceptualized, in light of its assumption that all expressions of racialization are

necessarily racist. In Satzewich’s (1998b) example, “it is difficult to see why critics of

employment equity and supporters of the federal government’s policy of

multiculturalism should necessarily be labeled as democratic racists” (p.38). The present

analysis upholds this conclusion by illustrating that democratic discourses of dominance

do not, in all instances, seem to revolve around ‘race,’ but, rather, are deeply embedded

in complex and multi-dimensional conceptualizations of immigrants. To this end, the

present chapter suggests that, in contexts where references to ‘race’ are obscure to the

point of being highly evasive or ‘invisible,’ the extent to which they should be labeled

‘racist’ is questionable; labeling them as such may thus serve to construct

(rather than simply identify) racism.

Overall, the present chapter uncovered both the usefulness and the limitations of

the democratic racism framework. In support of this framework, the discourses of

dominance uncovered in the analysis served to erase internal divisions, conflicts, and

inequalities within Canadian society, and acted to obscure racial discrimination at

Canadian borders in both historical and contemporary contexts. At the same time,

however, the constraints of the framework, including its focus on race in isolation from

other highly pertinent dimensions of discrimination (e.g., gender), and the tendency to

locate democratic racism in discourses that are at times ‘invisible’ in their allusion to

‘race,’ is somewhat problematic. To this end, the present chapter highlights the ongoing

challenge associated with the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ in sociological research,

particularly in the context of Canadian immigration. The upcoming chapter indirectly

addresses this issue by calling attention to the statistical measurement of immigrants in

Canada.

CHAPTER SIX: STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT AS DISCOURSE

“Statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are to

territories: they flatten and enclose” (Appadurai, 1993:

333-4).

6.0 Introduction

In 20 years, nearly half (46%) of Canadians over the age of 15 will be born

somewhere else in the world, or have at least one foreign-born parent,

according to new Statistics Canada diversity projections released this

morning (Vallis, 2010, March 9).

A new report from Statistics Canada reveals that…in 1991, only 12 per

cent of established male immigrants with a university degree were in jobs

that required little education, such as taxi or truck driving. In 2006, that

number had risen to 21 per cent. The trend among established degree-

holding female immigrants was similar (Weeks, 2009, December 23).

Newcomer Numbers: 44%: Proportion of GTA residents born in another

country. 43%: Proportion of newcomers to Canada since 1985 who have

settled in the Toronto area. 100-plus: Languages and dialects spoken in

Toronto. 252,000: New immigrants to Canada in 2009. 23,000: Refugees

arrived in 2009. Source: Statistics Canada (Doolittle, 2010, August 18).

These excerpts from media reports on immigration demonstrate that official data occupy

a distinct presence in Canadian immigration discourses. Politicians, the media, and

various experts commonly present ‘newcomer numbers’ to debate the merits and costs

of immigration to the Canadian nation. Through these discourses, immigration data

enter the public consciousness and inform Canadians about the ‘face’ of their nation.

Statistics from official sources hold weight in public and political debates and planning.

They can provide the basis for legitimizing policy continuation or, alternatively, policy

change. They can also be used by advocacy groups to lobby for funding or

programming. In short – there is power in numbers.

In principle, the objectivity of official measures used to produce statistical

knowledge ensures accurate understandings of population groups, suitable program

development, and appropriate distribution of public resources. However, official data

collection occurs within social, political and normative contexts that shape the impetus

for data collection, the nature of the data collected, the measures used to collect data,

and the fashion in which data are interpreted and used (see Bélanger et al., 2010; Boyd

& Norris, 2001; Curtis, 2002; 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; King-O’Riain, 2007;

Nobles, 2002, 2000; Rallu et al., 2006). Existing work has documented the manner in

which immigration and ethnic diversity in Canada have generated political and social

demands for particular data (e.g., on visible minorities) (Boyd et al., 2000;

Goldscheider, 2002). Yet, the manner in which official measurement constructs

‘immigrants,’ as types of people with particular social locations in the Canadian

imagined community, has not been addressed, despite the theoretical and practical

relevance of such an analysis.

To this end, the present chapter reports results of a critical discourse analysis of

the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) questionnaire and analytical

reports. An examination of the LSIC stands to elucidate in detail the bureaucratic

construction of immigrants in Canada. The LSIC is the only official survey in Canada

that provides a focused examination of recent immigrants in Canada; as such, it is likely

to contribute widely to the manner in which immigrants in Canada are statistically

constructed and understood in a wide variety of contexts. Moreover, the content of the

LSIC questionnaire can be viewed as evidence of the issues that have been identified as

being most relevant to study from the standpoint of officials and experts. Examining the

questions asked, the manner in which they were asked, and the questions not asked

allows for a consideration of the ideological influences shaping data collection. An

analysis of LSIC materials can thus be revealing of the Canadian state’s imagining of

Canada’s national community by highlighting the manner in which recent newcomers

are socially constructed by official measurement.

The chapter argues that the LSIC reflects concerns and tensions surrounding the

presence of immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Canada. The

questionnaire constructs these immigrants’ identities in accordance with the broader

public and political discourses on immigration in Canada. The chapter illustrates that the

LSIC contributes to the social construction of recent immigrants’ identities by

measuring them first, as ethnic beings, and second, as their bureaucratic categories of

admission. These identities are clearly located within an individualistic, ‘genderneutral’

human capital framework that mirrors Canadian immigration policy and policy

discourse. The LSIC thus informs the construction of Canada’s imagined community

along the lines of ethnicity and mode of entry to the end of upholding prevailing

dominant understandings of immigrants in broader academic, policy, and public

environments.

This chapter’s analysis is informed by two major bodies of scholarly work. The

first pertains to census-taking and the political project of official data collection. The

second body of work relates to critical examinations of migrant typologies. These

literatures are, to a large degree, distinct; indeed, critiques of migrant typologies are

often not articulated in reference to the issue of measurement. However, as the

upcoming discussion illustrates, measurement and typological constructions of

immigrants are actually quite intertwined. The present chapter articulates this

connection and draws together these literatures by locating them within the theoretical

context of imagined communities and imagined futures.

6.1 Population Measurement

Much of the existing work on the ‘political project’ of measuring population groups has

focused on censuses. Numerous authors have argued that censuses played a central role

in historical nation-building (Alonso & Starr, 1987; Anderson, 2006; Appadurai, 1993;

Boyd et al., 2000; Clark, 1998; Curtis, 2002, 1995, 1994; Dunae, 1998; Nobles, 2000;

Urla, 1993). In this literature, census-taking is interpreted as having been directly

involved in defining national communities by allowing states to meticulously “count the

objects of [their] feverish imagining” (Anderson, 2006: 169). Both Curtis (2002) and

Anderson (2006) view censuses as a means by which states historically solidified their

own existence, enabling them to define both their catchment area and their constituents.

According to Curtis, the census also enabled the Canadian modern state to “translate

visions of social relations in Canada into authoritative numerical accounts” (Curtis,

2002: 17). In a vastly different context – namely, colonial states in Southeast Asia –

Anderson (2006) similarly comments on the role of the census in states’ social

imagining. Anderson points out that precolonial population measurement involved

enumeration of specific segments of populations in the form of tax-rolls and levy-lists.

This served to document population members who were eligible for taxation and

military conscription. However, under colonialism, states developed increasingly

sophisticated means of enumerating entire populations under their domain, including

previously ignored population members such as women and children. Given the nature

of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, ethnic-racial classification was central to colonial

states’ efforts to numerically capture populations. As Anderson (2006) explains:

The new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional

roots as the colonial state multiplied its size and functions. Guided by its

imagined map it organized the new educational, juridical, public-health,

police, and immigration bureaucracies it was building on the principle of

ethno-racial hierarchies… (p.169).

In this context, population measurement was directly implicated in the state’s efforts to

build a nation’s infrastructure, yet was also central to the bureaucratic construction of

imagined communities along ethno-racial lines.

Other work has more pointedly addressed the central issue of measuring race

and ethnicity in official contexts. It is relevant to note that, while this work has not

typically been directly focused on immigration, it indirectly speaks to immigration, in

the sense that interest in data on race and ethnicity historically arose with the merging of

‘different’ population groups. Boyd et al. (2000), for instance, demonstrate that early

census-taking in North America was infused with motivations relating to nationbuilding.

In this context, documenting racial hierarchies was tied into efforts to define the

boundaries of states’ domination. In the early 20th century, for example, Canadian

Censuses included explicit questions about ‘race’ and ‘racial origin,’ and also provided

enumerators with express instructions on how to categorize respondents accordingly

(Boyd et al., 2000). For instance, measurement was structured such that offspring of

ethnically mixed marriages (that is, between ‘whites’ and ‘other races’) were

documented as ‘non-white.’ This classification subsequently excluded them from

official privileges associated with ‘whiteness’ (Boyd et al., 2000). Official data were

thus implicated in historically constructing Canada’s national community in both

material and symbolic terms by reifying boundaries that “…derived from and reaffirmed

prevailing ideologies in which white was superior and dominant in relation to other non-

white groups” (Boyd et al., 2000: 40).

Boyd et al. (2000) further demonstrate that variations in the official

measurement of race over time in Canada reflect changing conceptualizations of race

and race relations. For instance, the declining acceptability of ‘racial’ questions in the

mid-20th century led to shifts in the manner in which race was operationalized in official

surveys. In 1951, the notion of ‘ethnic origin’ replaced official survey questions on

‘race’ in Canada (Boyd, 1999). Issues surrounding race and race relations shaped not

only the manner in which questions were asked, but also the demand for certain data.

For example, in the later decades of the 20th century in Canada, concerns over racism

and equality brought about unique data needs that influenced both the impetus for data

collection as well as the nature of data collected in official surveys. Canada’s

multiculturalism policy in 1971, the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in

1982, and the implementation of the Employment Equity Act in 1986 all represented

specific political projects that required data in order to implement and evaluate their

mandate. These social concerns and administrative needs led to modifications of

population measurement. Demands for data on visible minorities, for instance, led to the

inclusion of a visible minority question on the Canadian Census for the first time in

1996. Again, these changes illustrate that questions asked and response options provided

on official surveys are shaped by broader social and political understandings

of social groups and their membership in society, as well as broader political pressures

for particular data.

Research on official surveys other than censuses has also documented the

manner in which ideological assumptions shape measurement of population groups. For

instance, in a critical examination of national surveys on foreign spouses in Taiwan and

South Korea, Bélanger et al. (2010) contend that ideological influences and prevailing

stereotypes influenced the production of statistics on migrants by shaping the

assumptions underlying questionnaire construction. Bélanger et al. argue that the

surveys demonstrate three ideologies: (1) a desire to ‘erase’ differences and assimilate

migrant women into Taiwanese or Korean society; (2) the location of these women in

patriarchal families; and (3) a nationalistic attitude that positioned foreign spouses as

inferior ‘others.’ These ideologies meant that immigrant women were first and foremost

constructed as foreigners married to Taiwanese or Korean men. The questionnaire also

implicitly and paternalistically constructed foreign brides as a potentially vulnerable

group of women in need of help. Bélanger et al. (2010) further conclude that these

official measures aimed to some extent at controlling immigrant spouses, in the sense

that the surveys implied an interest in assimilation, yet may also reinforce exclusion and

stereotypes by painting immigrant spouses in specific lights.

As the above literature demonstrates, official data collection is inherently

political, and occurs within broader social and ideological contexts that define the

phenomena that are relevant to measure, how these phenomena are understood, and, by

extension, how they are approached in survey construction and data collection. The

above review, however, also hints at the inherent categorization entailed in the

measurement of population groups. Generation of statistics from both census and

noncensus instruments necessarily entails grouping of cases. It follows that, in data

analysis and interpretation, individuals are located within particular groups – for

instance, according to gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, occupation, immigration status, etc. By

constructing statistical boundaries around categories, individuals are, in essence, located

within a series of typologies that, taken together, circumscribe the reality of their lives.

In the context of official measurement, individuals’ location within a typology also

stands to render them an object of public policy (see Schneider & Ingram, 1993),

thereby directly affecting their positioning to the state and to other groups in society. In

this regard, official measurement is implicated in defining group boundaries (often to

exclusionary ends), shaping access to resources and rights, influencing identity

formation, and affecting broader views about different social groups (Abramson, 2002;

Alonso & Starr, 1987; Blum, 2002; Curtis, 2002, 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). To this

end, it is relevant to address existing work criticizing the tendency to locate immigrants

in mutually exclusive categories, in light of the fact that measurement both depends on

conceptualizations of such categorizations, and is also implicated in upholding these

categorizations.

6.2 Constructing Immigrants: Problematic Dichotomies

One of the main categorizations of immigrants that has been addressed in the literature

speaks directly to the gendered construction of women immigrants – namely, the ‘wife’

or ‘worker’ dichotomy. This dichotomy, which is pervasive in both research and policy

contexts, has been problematized by Piper (2003) and Piper and Roces (2003). As Piper

(2003) explains in reference to South East and East Asian women migrants, “scholars

concerned with women’s migratory patterns typically discuss women as either migrants

for marriage or as overseas contract workers … (i.e. the woman as worker or as

‘bride’)” (Piper, 2003: 458). As a result of a mutually exclusive conceptualization of

women migrants as either economic migrants or family migrants, these women’s

multiple roles as workers, spouses, parents, and, more broadly, society members and

potential future citizens, are obscured. Indeed, the tendency to study women as either

‘workers’ or ‘wives’ misrepresents complex migratory pathways wherein these

analytical categories are, in reality, blurred, variable, and fluid (see Piper & Roces,

2003).

Another migrant categorization that has been problematized involves the

distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ status. Goldring et al. (2009) point out that

binary conceptualizations of migrant legality do not reflect the reality of migrants’

various legal statuses. As an alternative, the authors introduce the concept of

precariousness to capture a continuum of migrant legality, and to document the

connections between precarious status and citizenship. Goldring et al. (2009) illustrate

the value of a non-dichotomous approach by documenting the numerous possible

pathways toward precariousness. The authors demonstrate that, in Canada, migrant

precariousness is legally produced through temporary foreign worker programs or loss

of status. Temporary foreign workers are, by definition, conferred precarious status by

the state in light of their limited access to social programs and their pre-determined

restriction from future citizenship. Moreover, their legal status is directly tied to their

relationship with an employer; if this relationship is terminated, the migrant risks loss of

legal status. Permanent residents are also not exempt from precariousness. Legal

residents can lose their status under certain circumstances, such as if they are convicted

of a criminal offense, or if they fail to remain in Canada for the duration required to

meet residency requirements. Refugee claims made from within the country entail a

lengthy determination process. Throughout this process, claimants can find themselves

in various states of precariousness that can either lead to permanent status or formal

designation of non-status. Overall, as Goldring et al.’s (2009) work demonstrates,

immigrants can occupy a range of social locations that fall along a continuum of

legality. These varying gradations of immigrant status confirm the inaccuracy of a

simplistic, binary conceptualization of migrant legality.

Although not expressly articulated in the above work, it can be argued that

official measurement is intimately implicated in upholding distinctions between ‘wives’

and ‘workers,’ and between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants. Immigrants typically enter

their destination country under a certain ‘immigrant’ designation (e.g., temporary

foreign worker, economic-class permanent resident, family-class permanent resident,

etc.). Insofar as official data are collected according to these bureaucratic categories and

are subsequently used in scholarly research, then immigrants stand to be continually

reconstructed within the boundaries of the categories for which data were collected.

Thus, taking as an example the ‘foreign brides’ surveys discussed by Bélanger et al.

(2010), by virtue of the fact that these women entered their country of destination with

the designation of ‘foreign bride,’ the subsequent collection and analytical use of data

on this group maintains this categorization. In this example, women’s categorization as

‘wives’ (as opposed to workers, even if they are, in fact, employed) was also linked to

ethnic measurement, leading to their dual construction as wives and foreigners. In

reference to Goldring et al.’s (2009) work, the authors illustrate the inaccuracies

associated with dichotomous conceptualizations of migrant legality, as discussed above.

Yet, they also note:

There are no efforts to collect large-scale systematic data about people with

confusing or no migratory status…Estimates of the number of people

without an authorized migratory status in Canada range from 200,000 to

500,000. This range reflects the problem of defining the population in

question and the absence of systematic empirical analyses of ‘the numbers’

by academics, government, or NGOs (Goldring et al., 2009: 242).

As this statement indicates, collection of official data is typically limited to immigrants

with official legal status. By extension, statistical analyses conducted by state

departments, academics, or other experts on the basis of these data will maintain the

legal/illegal distinction. This conclusion speaks to the link between official data

collection and subsequent considerations of migrants.

These two examples shed light on the manner in which official measurement

contributes to the social construction of immigrants, both in an immediate sense (i.e., in

terms of conceptualization and operationalization) and in a broader sense (in terms of

the manner in which these categorizations are deployed through use of the resulting

data). Insofar as data – and the associated representations of immigrants – enter into the

public and political sphere, they become implicated in the construction of imagined

communities and the positioning of immigrants within the national imagination. To this

end, the present chapter explores the intertwining of official measurement and migrant

categorization in the construction of Canada’s imagined community. The chapter

specifically examines the LSIC questionnaire and data reports to evaluate the

representations of immigrants that are embedded in official measurement, and to

consider how these representations are circumscribed in categorical terms relating to

gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and bureaucratic category of admission. In this way, the chapter

addresses how the social construction of immigrants through official measurement

contributes to the broader construction of Canada’s imagined community.

6.3 Data Sources

The upcoming analysis addresses both the LSIC questionnaire and Statistics Canada

analytical reports of the LSIC results. These two sources of data provide important

insight into the contemporary bureaucratic construction of immigrants in Canada

through statistical knowledge.

6.31 LSIC Questionnaire

The LSIC is dedicated to understanding Canada’s recent immigrant population, and, as

previously noted, is the only official Canadian survey having recent immigrants as its

target population. Conducted jointly by Statistics Canada and Citizenship and

Immigration Canada, the LSIC was developed in the interest of generating information

on immigrant adaptation, settlement, and integration. Although other official data

sources (including the Census) contain questions about immigration status, these

measures typically address basic demographic considerations (e.g., country of birth,

citizenship, landed immigrant status, year immigrated to Canada), and do not consider

the immigrant settlement experience. As such, the LSIC was conducted in order to fill

existing knowledge gaps on recent immigrants in Canada (Ruddick et al., 2005). The

survey was officially implemented in order to provide detailed information on the

settlement process to “federal and provincial governments, immigrant settlement

assistance agencies, non-governmental organizations, and researchers” (Grondin, 2007:

46).

The LSIC is presented by Statistics Canada as “a comprehensive survey

designed to study how newly arrived immigrants adjust over time to living in Canada

[that will] provide a clear understanding of how the settlement process unfolds for new

arrivals” (Chui, 2003: 5). The survey was designed through a process of consultation

with federal departments and a committee of external researchers with expertise in

immigration. Wherever possible, questions were drawn from existing Statistics Canada

surveys in order to allow comparability between different population groups. A pilot

questionnaire was developed, and focus group testing was conducted. The pilot

questionnaire was implemented in the first wave of the survey. Based on these results

and in consultation with experts and federal departments, existing content was modified

and new content was added. It should be noted that the survey consisted of

predominantly closed-ended questions (although some questions allowed respondents to

select ‘other’ and specify an answer that was not included as a response option). The

present chapter specifically addresses the LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire. A summary of

this questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.

6.32 LSIC Reports

Examining the Statistics Canada analytical reports associated with the LSIC adds

another level of understanding to the construction of immigrants through statistical

knowledge. The reports document statistical ‘realities’ about immigrants that are

commonly cited in broader discourses, as revealed in the opening pages of this chapter.

The reports examined in this chapter were typically authored by one or more analyst

employed at Statistics Canada, at times in collaboration with consultants from

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (see Appendix D). Although it might be tempting

to interpret the content of these reports as reflecting the interests and opinions of these

authors alone, the reports were developed within a state context, and, as such, likely

reflect a particular organizational logic (see Acker, 1990; Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980

regarding the notion of organizational logic). More important than this point, however,

is the fact that these reports were published under the auspices of the Canadian state.

The content of the reports thus enters the public domain as official, privileged

knowledge about immigrants (see van Dijk, 1993a, 1989, regarding the power of

discourse emerging from official sources; see also Chapter Two of this thesis).

6.4 Methods

The LSIC questionnaire and analytical reports were obtained from Statistics Canada’s

official website. In order to select relevant publications for analysis, substantive reports

on immigration were searched, including ones geared toward a general audience and

ones intended for scientific and policy-oriented audiences (e.g., research papers,

technical papers). Publications were verified for use of LSIC data, and documents that

were exclusively based on the LSIC results were included in the present analysis.

The LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire and the selected analytical reports were content

analyzed. Major themes were identified and analyzed as a form of discourse, and were

interpreted within the conceptual framework of this thesis. Particular consideration was

given to the manner in which the questionnaire and statistical reports reflected and

informed categorical conceptualizations of immigrants, and the implications of these

categorizations for the symbolic positioning of immigrants relative to Canada’s

imagined community.

6.5 Results

6.51 Immigrant Identity: Ethnicity

The analysis revealed that ethnicity, particularly in reference to social networks,

occupied a central place in the LSIC. Indeed, the questionnaire contained numerous

questions about immigrants’ co-ethnic affiliations. Respondents were asked to quantify

how many of their connections in various social contexts involved individuals who

belonged to the same ‘ethnic or cultural group’ as them (with response options being

‘all of them,’ ‘most of them,’ ‘about half of them,’ ‘few of them,’ or ‘none of them’).

This question was asked in reference to: (1) new friends; (2) neighbours; (3) members

of community groups or organizations in which the respondent was involved; (4)

children’s school friends; (5) co-workers; (6) business partners; (7) employees; (8)

clients; and (9) business suppliers. If respondents reported obtaining employment

through a friend, they were asked whether this friend was from the same ethnic/cultural

group as them. In some instances, they were asked to clarify how many of the

individuals in the groups listed above were also recent immigrants to Canada (with the

same response options as previously noted). In addition, respondents were asked about

the importance of their ethnic/cultural group membership as follows:

(1) How important is it to you that the people providing health care are of the same

ethnic or cultural group as you? [response options: very important; important;

not very important; not important at all]

(2) When you think of others in Canada from the same ethnic or cultural group as

yourself, how close would you say that you feel to them? [response options:

very close; close; not very close; not close at all]

(3) How important is it for you to maintain ties with others in Canada from the same

ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [response options: very important;

important; not very important; not important at all]

(4) How important is it for you to establish and maintain ties with others in Canada

who are not from the same ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [response

options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all]

(5) How important is it for you to carry on the values and traditions of your ethnic

or cultural group or your homeland? [response options: very important;

important; not very important; not important at all]

(6) How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] knows and carries on the

values and traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or your homeland?

[response options: very important; important; not very important; not important

at all]

(7) Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how

strong is your sense of belonging to your ethnic or cultural group?

(8) Is [selected child’s name] currently studying the language or traditions of your

ethnic or cultural group or homeland at school or in special classes? [response

options: yes; no]

(9) Would you like to have [selected child’s name] study the language or traditions

of your ethnic or cultural group, or of your homeland? [response options: yes;

no]

These questions define immigrants as ethnic beings, and identify ethnicity as a key

principle according to which immigrants structure their lives. It is notable that, in

question 3 above, respondents were asked about the importance of maintaining ties with

people in Canada who are of the same ethnic group as them, yet, in question 4, they

were asked about establishing and maintaining ties with people who are not from the

same ethnic group as them. The implication here is that immigrants’ initial ties in

Canada are expected to be with people of the same ethnicity.

As questions 8 and 9 above suggest, language also emerged in the LSIC

questionnaire as a means of constructing immigrants as ethnic beings. Indeed, many of

the previously outlined questions were directly repeated to address language (see Table

6.1).

Table 6.1: Examples of LSIC Language Questions

What language do you speak most often at home?

In what language [is/was] [selected child’s name] mainly taught at school?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your business partner(s)?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your employee(s)?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your clients?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your suppliers?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the people you [work/worked] with?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the clients of the company you

[are/were] working for?

In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the suppliers [of the company you

are/were working for]?

How important is it to you that the people providing health care speak your language?

Does [selected child’s name] understand and speak the language of your homeland?

How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] continues to understand and speak

the language of your homeland?

How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] learns to understand and speak the

language of your homeland?

How important is it to you that [selected child’s name] speaks English well? [repeated for

French]

These questions are indicative of interest in determining the degree of co-ethnic

affiliations, particularly in the context of economic exchanges (i.e., in a business

context), as well as retention of ethnic/cultural practices. In this regard, the LSIC

seemed geared toward collecting information about ethnic enclaves. As Li (2003c)

notes, ethnic enclaves are often constructed in political and public discourses as

potentially detrimental to the integration process, and as being at odds with mainstream

Canadian society. In this context, it is assumed that, insofar as ethnic enclaves “restrict

their members and shield them from alternative norms, values, and behaviours, they can

discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation”

(Employment and Immigration Canada; cited in Li, 2003c: 8). Alternatively, although

evidence indicates that ethnic enclaves can have a detrimental impact on the economic

well-being of immigrants (Warman, 2007), they have also been interpreted as a resource

that promotes social cohesion (Qadeer & Kumar, 2006). Either way, the extensive

questions on ethnic affiliations serve to represent immigrants as ethnic beings, thereby

defining ethnicity as a foremost factor in immigrants’ lives.

Building on this point, the LSIC contained extensive questions about

immigrants’ competence in English and French and their intentions to improve their

language skills (see selected examples, Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Examples of LSIC Questions on English and French Language Skills

How well can you speak English? [also asked for French]

How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what your address is? [also asked for

French]

How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what you did before immigrating to

Canada? [also asked for French]

How easy is it for you to understand a message in English over the phone? [also asked for

French]

How easy is it for you to tell a doctor who speaks only English what the problem is? [also

asked for French]

How easy is it for you to ask someone who speaks only English to re-arrange a meeting

with you? [also asked for French]

How well can you write in English? [also asked for French]

How well can you read in English? [also asked for French]

Since your last interview, do you think that your English has improved? This includes

reading, speaking and/or writing English. [also asked for French]

Have you taken any steps to improve your English, other than English language training?

[also asked for French]

What steps have you taken to improve your English? [also asked for French]

How important it is for you to learn or improve your English? [also asked for French]

Since your last interview, have you tried to find information about English or French

language training?

What is most interesting about these questions is that they effectively reduced

communication to language skill. In this regard, language proficiency of immigrants

who speak English or French stood as cultural competence, while integration was

equated with linguistic competence in basic exchanges.

The LSIC questionnaire also included a small number of questions about

discrimination, which further revealed heightened interest in the ethnic identity of the

LSIC population:

Now I would like to end this section by asking you a few questions about

discrimination. Discrimination may happen when people are perceived as

being different from others. Since your last interview, have you

experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others because of

your ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language or accent, or religion?

(Statistics Canada, 2005: 28).

If participants responded that they had experienced discrimination, they were asked to

specify which of the above factors (i.e., ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language

or accent, or religion) was the reason for this discrimination (with the ability to mark all

that applied, yet no option to specify ‘other’), along with the frequency with which they

had experienced discrimination, and the setting within which it had occurred (e.g., on

the street; in a store, bank or restaurant; at work; when looking for a place to live, etc.).

What is notable here is that the response options for experiences of discrimination were

exclusively constructed around the presumption of ‘racial’/ethnic difference. The

questions also reveal the primacy that was attributed to ethnic identity over other

dimensions of social existence; most notable, in this regard, was the absence of gender.

Gender was not an option in questions on discrimination, nor could respondents specify

another response option. Again, these findings both reflect assumptions about who

‘immigrants’ are, in the eyes of the state, and contribute to the broader construction of

immigrants as ‘ethnic’ foreigners in Canada.

The construction of immigrants in terms of ethnicity and ethnic affiliations was

also visible in the LSIC reports:

One reason for the high proportion of co-ethnic friendships may be

because immigrants are more likely to carry on the traditions and values

of their ethnic or cultural group or their homeland with friends who are of

the same background (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).

Most immigrants reported that their new friends were from the same ethnic

or cultural background. This may ease the integration process of new

immigrants while helping to maintain ethnic or cultural ties with their

homeland, which was also important to new immigrants. However,

meeting friends who are not co-ethnic may facilitate a better understanding

of local norms and establish local networks (Ruddick et al., 2005: 89).

These statements dichotomize ‘Canadian’ values and traditions from ‘ethnic’ values and

traditions, positioning immigrants and non-immigrant ethnic groups in Canada on the

borders of the Canadian national community by suggesting that their ethnic status is at

odds with their ability to understand Canadian norms, and that their ethnic networks

segregate them from the Canadian population.

The implication that immigrant integration can be hindered by ethnic group

membership was visible elsewhere in the reports:

Examining new friends by ethnicity reveals variations in the extent to

which newcomers make friends within their own ethnic group. The

majority of East/Southeast and South Asians reported that all or most of

their new friends are co-ethnic (90% and 77%, respectively), followed by

58% of Eastern Europeans. This difference in social network composition

may affect the type and quantity of resources flowing through newcomers’

social networks, and help explain differences in the integration process by

ethnicity (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).

In Ruddick et al.’s (2005) interpretation of the statistics, networks composed of larger

numbers of ‘ethnic’ are presented as being less rich in the resources that will aid

newcomers’ integration into Canadian society. In other words, ‘ethnic’ friends were

presented as maintaining the ‘foreignness’ of newcomers, and as hindering immigrants’

ability to become more like ‘Canadians.’ The implication here was that different groups

are inherently more equipped for success in Canadian society, based solely on their

‘ethnic’ status.

Concerns over ethnicity also surfaced implicitly in the LSIC questionnaire in the

form of questions about family sponsorship. These questions also revealed evidence of

the broader problematization of family-class immigrants in Canada (discussed in

previous chapters). Respondents were specifically asked the following questions

pertaining to their sponsorship experience and intentions:

(1) Do you currently live with your sponsor?

(2) In the past 12 months, how often have you seen or talked to your sponsor?

(3) Was your immigration sponsored by your current spouse/common-law partner?

(4) In the past 12 months, what kind of help has your sponsor given you? [response

options: financial; information; legal help; child care; basic needs; general

support; transportation; language help; find/look for work; emotional support;

other; no help from sponsor]

(5) Are you currently sponsoring or do you intend to sponsor anyone/anyone else to

come to Canada?

(6) Who are you currently sponsoring/do you intend to sponsor to come to Canada?

Respondents who had indicated in a previous LSIC interview that they had intended on

sponsoring a family member were also asked the following questions, as applicable:

(1) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your spouse/common-law partner

to come to Canada?

(2) Since your last interview, has your spouse/common-law partner immigrated to

Canada?

(3) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your children to come to

Canada?

(4) Since your last interview, have your children immigrated to Canada?

(5) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your parents to come to Canada?

(6) Since your last interview, have your parents immigrated to Canada?

(7) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your grandparents to come to

Canada?

(8) Since your last interview, have your grandparents immigrated to Canada?

Interest in measuring sponsorship experiences and intentions is not politically neutral,

but can be linked to concerns over sponsorship default and the influx of ‘unskilled’

immigrants. Moreover, although the above questions regarding sponsorship do not make

any reference to ethnicity, concerns over the extended familialism of certain ethnic

groups have been historically entrenched in Canadian immigration discourse (Daniel,

2005; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed in

Chapter Three, controversy surrounding the liberalization of family-class sponsorship

rights in the 1950s has often been interpreted as evidence of a discriminatory bias

against certain ethnic groups’ ‘unreasonable’ commitment to family. As Li (2003c)

notes: “Immigration discourse periodically dwells on the extended familialism of other

cultures as a challenge to managing the ‘unchosen’ family-class immigration” (p.7). In

this context, LSIC questions about sponsorship are arguably built around broader

concerns relating to the sponsorship of immigrants from non-traditional source

countries.

6.52 Immigrant Identity: Mode of Entry

The analysis revealed that, in the LSIC reports, immigrants’ mode of entry into Canada

was the primary way in which their lives were circumscribed. In other words, the

avenue through which immigrants gained entry into Canada, either as an economic

immigrant, an accompanying spouse of an economic immigrant, a family-class

immigrant, or a refugee served as the primary basis according to which immigrants

were categorized through the presentation of statistics.

The construction of immigrant identity in terms of bureaucratic admission

category was accomplished in several ways. The first relates to the fact that the LSIC

explicitly gathered data on mode of entry (and, notably, is the only official data source

for which this information is available). As noted in one report: “the LSIC…contains

information regarding newcomers’ immigration category, an important variable for

understanding the issues and motivations of immigrants to Canada” (Grondin, 2007:

45). The manner in which information about immigrants’ mode of entry was presented

in the reports further informed the social construction of immigrants in two main ways:

first, by virtue of the descriptions themselves, and, second, through the subsequent

organization of data according to these categories.

Each report began by clearly defining the objectives of Canada’s immigration

program and the different types of immigrants corresponding to these goals. These

portions of the reports all articulated some version of the fact that Canadian immigration

policy is constructed around three broad goals: to foster a strong and viable economy, to

reunite families, and to honour the country’s commitment to humanitarian efforts. These

three objectives were then linked to their corresponding immigrant type and the manner

in which these immigrants are selected (namely, based on skills and experience for

skilled worker principal applicants in the economic class; other economic criteria for

business and investment immigrants; family relationships for spouses and dependents

accompanying economic immigrants as well as for family-class immigrants; or status as

a refugee). These categories were typically described as follows:

Skilled worker principal applicants are selected based on a number of

criteria including their education, language ability and employment skills.

These immigrants are deemed to be more likely to succeed in the labour

force and contribute to the Canadian economy (Chui & Tran, 2005: 3).

Immigrants admitted under the economic category are persons who have

actively sought to settle in Canada and have presumably prepared

themselves for the transition – some may have been recruited. They are

selected as individuals but may be accompanied by a spouse and

dependent(s) (Ruddick et al., 2005: 10).

In the economic class, spouses and dependent children are admitted along

with the principal applicants, without being individually skillstested

(Grondin, 2007: 48).

The family reunification category is made up of individuals who are

joining family members already in Canada. Immigrants are sponsored by

a relative in Canada who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and

who has taken responsibility of providing support for their settlement […].

There are no selection criteria for immigrants admitted under this category

(Ruddick et al., 2005: 12).

The refugee category is made up of Convention refugees and other

refugee-like persons who are deemed to require protection or relief. These

persons may not have wanted to leave their country of origin, and may not

have had the opportunity to prepare for moving to Canada (Ruddick et al.,

2005: 12).

The sex distribution of these categories was typically also presented at this point in the

reports: in the LSIC sample, 77% of principal applicants in the economic class were

men, 75% of spouses of economic class immigrants were women, 63% of family-class

immigrants were women, and 51% of refugees were women). These categories were

subsequently used throughout the reports as the primary means of organizing and

presenting data. In this regard, it is notable that, when results were reported for the

different immigrant groups, they were typically not disaggregated by sex for each

immigrant type. In the absence of this information for individual results, the sex

distribution of immigrant categories reported at the outset of the reports operated as a

way of discursively gendering the subsequent statistics.

In terms of the descriptions of specific groups of immigrants, economic

immigrants (and, most directly, skilled workers) were portrayed as active and skilled

individuals who are suitable for inclusion in the Canadian nation. They were presented

as having actively readied themselves for immigration to Canada, and as being likely to

contribute to the economy (particularly compared to other immigrant types); as noted in

Ruddick et al.’s (2005) statement above, some of these immigrants may have even been

recruited by the Canadian government or employers for their abilities and their expected

contribution to the nation. This representation portrays economic immigrants as

desirable and contributing future citizens of Canada, and as necessarily more likely to

succeed in Canadian society compared to other types of immigrants. Having already

presented skilled workers as predominantly males (77%), this group was subsequently

statistically constructed as male, such that ‘successful’ immigrants were presented as

being men.

The manner in which skilled economic immigrants were described in the reports

contrasts sharply with the manner in which skilled worker spouses (and dependents) and

family-class immigrants were presented. Descriptions of spouses (and dependents) of

skilled worker principal applicants emphasized the fact that these newcomers were

‘self-selected’ as opposed to having been selected by ‘Canada.’ While the reports

emphasized the fact that principal applicants are selected for their skills and therefore

their ability to contribute to Canada, it is made equally clear that spouses of these

applicants are granted entry as ‘followers.’ The dependent status of these spouses was

portrayed through the organization of statistics for this group throughout the remainder

of the reports. In all cases where statistics were presented for spouses of skilled worker

principal applicants, the data were reported together for ‘spouses and dependents’ of

skilled worker principal applicants (with results for principal applicants reported as a

separate category). This automatic categorization of economic-class spouses with their

dependent children is seen here as a very meaningful component of the construction of

immigrant women through official measurement. Having already statistically identified

principal applicants as male and their spouses and dependents as female, presenting

statistics according to these divisions established gendered representations of male

breadwinners on the one hand, and ‘women and children’ on the other. Although all of

these immigrants (principal applicants, spouses, and dependents) technically fall within

the economic class, they were never measured or interpreted on equal ground. More

specifically, statistics were never presented separately for spouses and dependents, nor

were results ever presented together for principal applicants and their spouses. Also

meaningful is the grouping together of spouses and dependents of skilled workers as a

single, distinct category; this infantilized women and constructed them as passive

dependents, more on parallel ground with children than with their skilled worker

spouse. The grouping of spouses and dependents together thus contributed to the

construction of spouses as unskilled women that are dependent on their (principal

applicant) husbands/partners.

Furthermore, while it is true that spouses of economic-class principal applicants

are not granted entry based on skills testing of their own abilities, they are often highly

educated, and their skill-level is taken into account in the evaluation of principal

applicants. Under the point system, principal applicants are awarded points for their

spouse’s education level (under the Adaptability factor). It other words, spouses’ formal

education contributes directly to the selection of skilled worker principal applicants and

professionals. This fact, however, is not mentioned in a single LSIC report analyzed

here. The exclusion of this information ties into the social construction of skilled

workers’ spouses as passive (female) dependents by denying their role in the success of

their partner’s application.

Descriptions of family-class immigrants also stood in clear contrast to the

portrayal of economic immigrants as active, contributing newcomers. As described

above, family-class immigrants were presented as passive, unskilled immigrants who

were self-selected (i.e., not selected by ‘Canada’) and who were being taken care of by

their family in Canada. Nowhere in the reports was it mentioned that only specific types

of relatives are eligible for entry under the family-class (see Chapters One and Three),

nor was it noted that these immigrants must pass health and security screening prior to

being granted entry to the country, thereby inaccurately representing family-class

immigration as largely uncontrolled and unregulated. Moreover, the presence of family

members is widely acknowledged as playing an important role in immigrant settlement

(Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar & Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993;

Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; Walton-Roberts, 2004b, 2003), a point that will

be discussed later in this chapter.

It is also relevant to note that the reports typically discussed data in a

comparative fashion across immigrant types. This structure of data presentation reified

these labels as a meaningful way of identifying immigrants, and naturalized these

groupings as the most legitimate way of evaluating newcomer success. Having already

described the features of these groups in terms of their mode of entry in the immigration

program, the reiteration of these categories throughout the reports and the use of these

categories to organize statistical knowledge served to construct immigrant types as

having concrete group boundaries. These categorizations thus homogenized immigrants

within the groups, erasing internal differences of immigrants within these categories. In

this way, immigration mode of entry was presumed to speak directly to immigrants’

situations and personal characteristics. Overall, statistical categorization within these

groups reduced immigrants’ lives to the objectives of the immigration program, and

oversimplified the complexity of immigration pathways and the multi-dimensionality of

immigrants’ motivations and experiences.

It should also be noted that statistics were not always presented for all groups of

immigrants. The reports typically presented statistics for family-class immigrants;

refugees; skilled worker principal applicants; skilled worker spouses and dependents;

and ‘other’ economic immigrants (i.e., business and investor immigrants; live-

incaregivers; provincial and territorial nominees). Disaggregated statistics were not

presented for ‘other’ economic immigrants in light of the fact that this group, together,

represented only 10% of principal applicants in the economic component of the LSIC

sample (i.e., skilled workers represented 90% of economic-class principal applicants)

(Ruddick, 2005). Although this decision was based on methodological constraints of

statistical analysis, it nevertheless served to render the settlement experiences of certain

immigrants invisible.

Overall, by organizing statistical data according to mode of entry

categorizations, these groupings were reified and transformed into identifiable and

veritable social types; in this way, intra-group variations in experiences were

homogenized through statistical aggregation, and immigrants’ experiences were

constructed as being exclusively a function of their mode of entry category. More

broadly, the categorization of data according to mode of entry is likely to be reiterated in

subsequent references to LSIC data (e.g., in the media, or in research reports). In this

way, the bureaucratic categorization of immigrants is likely to carry beyond the pages of

the Statistics Canada reports, thereby contributing to broader representations of

immigrants according to their mode of entry.

6.53 Immigrants and Economic Considerations: An Individualistic Focus The

analysis also revealed that the LSIC and its accompanying reports had an

individualistic, human capital focus, with an emphasis on individual immigrants as the

unit of analysis, and heightened attention to the economic dimensions of immigrants’

lives. This finding suggests that the LSIC was influenced by broader neo-liberal

discourses on immigrant self-sufficiency, and by the immigration program’s human

capital focus.

In terms of human capital, education and language skills represented

approximately 16% (79 questions) and 14% (69 questions) of all LSIC questions,

respectively. Examples of questions about education and training included:

(1) What is the highest level of formal education you attained outside Canada?

(2) What was your major field of study or specialization for your highest level

of education attained outside Canada?

(3) What was the language of instruction of your highest level of education

attained outside of Canada?

(4) Since your last interview, have you taken any education or training in

Canada, excluding language instruction?

(5) Since your last interview, have you taken or are you presently taking any

other/any English language training? [also asked for French]

(6) Do you plan to take (other) English language training in the future? [also

asked for French]

(7) Do you think you will start taking this English language training…?

[response options: within the next month; within the next 6 months; within

the next year; within the next two years; in two years or more. Also asked for

French.]

(8) Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in

getting English or French language training?

(9) Including all courses or training you have taken, what is the highest level of

formal education you attained in Canada?

(10) Since your arrival, have you obtained a license or certification to practice

[your] profession or trade or to use the professional or trade title in your

province?

Considerations of economic integration, in the form of questions about employment and

income, represented an additional 21% and 13% of the 495 substantive LSIC questions,

respectively (see Table 6.3 for examples of questions).

Table 6.3 Examples of LSIC Employment and Income Questions

When did you start working for [employer name]?

How did you find this job?

What kind of work do you do in this job?

Since your last interview, have you worked for any other job or business?

Is/was this job related to any education or training you were taking or are currently taking?

In [your] job, would you say your qualifications and skills are being…? [response options:

adequately used; underused]

How many hours per week do/did you usually work in this job/business?

In this job, what is your wage or salary before taxes or other deductions?

Since your last interview, have you been out of work for seven or more consecutive days?

At any time since your last interview, did you look for work?

Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in finding a job in

Canada?

Is your common-law partner/spouse working?

How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs within Canada? This is

before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.

How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs outside Canada? This is

before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.

Could you give me an estimate of your total personal income before taxes and deductions

from all sources inside and outside Canada in the last 12 months?

In the past 12 months, what was your main source of personal income?

How would you describe your present financial situation? Would you say that you…

[response options: have more than enough money to meet your basic needs; have just enough

money for your basic needs; do not have enough money to meet your basic needs]

Overall, of the 495 questions of substantive content (that is, excluding demographic

questions and interview ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ questions – see Appendix C), approximately

64% of the survey addressed topics that are directly linked to considerations of human

capital and/or economic integration (that is, education, employment, and language

skills).

Not surprisingly, the LSIC’s emphasis on human capital and economic

integration was mirrored in the LSIC statistical reports. Of the seven analytical reports

considered here, three (Chui & Tran, 2005; Grondin, 2007; Tran & Chui, 2006) were

fully concerned with the labour market involvement of immigrants. The remaining

reports considered other topics, but nevertheless still dedicated much of their analyses to

matters of employment and economic integration. Table 6.4 offers a summary of the

topics included in each report.

Table 6.4 Summary of LSIC Reports

Report

Main Topics

Immigrants’ Perspectives on their First Four

Years in Canada: Highlights from three waves

of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to

Canada (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007)

- what immigrants like and dislike

about Canada

- reasons for immigrating and for

staying

- quality of life and material well-

being after arrival

- quality of life and material well-

being after being in Canada four years -

challenges in the labour market

- types of obstacles immigrants

experiences when seeking employment

- barriers to employment

- accessing language training

- finding housing

- accessing health care

- assessments of life in Canada

Report

Main Topics

Knowledge of Official Languages Among New

Immigrants: How Important is it in the Labour

Market? (Grondin, 2007)

- ability to speak English/French -

perceived importance of improving ability

to speak English/French

- language training

- means used to improve language

skills

- employment rates

- job changes

- link between knowledge of

English/French and type of job held

(included analysis of proportions of

immigrants with: a high-skill job, a job in

intended field, a job similar to job held

before immigrating, a job related to

training, average hourly wage)

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:

A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences

(Ruddick et al., 2005)

- reasons for choosing Canada

- choosing where to live

- adapting to a new linguistic

environment

- health status

- use of health services

- problems accessing health care

- education

- training

- credential assessment

- employment (including

employment rates; labour market

characteristics by age, gender, official

language knowledge, and country of

origin; labour force status and hours

worked; occupational

classifications; number of jobs held; job

satisfaction; reasons for leaving a job or

not working; problems finding

employment)

- financial status (including analysis

of savings; personal income levels;

employment earnings; loans obtained) -

settlement (including examination of

ethnic/cultural ties; satisfaction with life in

Canada; sponsorship intentions) -

challenges to integration (including

analysis of housing; accessing health care;

accessing education; accessing training;

finding employment)

Report

Main Topics

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:

Process, Progress and Prospects (Chui, 2003)

- choice of destination

- housing

- health status and use of health services

- education

- training

- labour market entry

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:

Progress and Challenges of New Immigrants in

the Workforce (Chui & Tran, 2005)

- employment rates within first two

years after arrival

- employment rates compared to

Canadian average

- number of jobs held

- employment in intended

occupations

- lack of Canadian work experience

and barriers to employment

- reasons for not working

- job satisfaction

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:

A Regional Perspective of the Labour Market

Experiences (Tran & Chui, 2006)

- labour market experiences (variables

included employment rates, employment

in intended occupations, problems

entering labour market, reasons for not

working, number of jobs held) for 11

regions in Canada (Atlantic Canada,

Québec, Montréal, Ontario, Toronto,

Ottawa-Gatineau, Manitoba and

Saskatchewan, Alberta, Calgary, British

Columbia, Vancouver)

New Immigrants’ Assessments of their Life in

Canada (Houle & Schellenberg, 2010)

- social capital

- material well-being in Canada

(considered in terms of employment,

income, and housing tenure)

- comparison of immigrants’

material well-being in Canada compared

with their well-being country of origin

As this table suggests, the LSIC provided opportunities for an extremely detailed

consideration of immigrants’ human capital, along with the manner in which this human

capital was implicated in immigrants’ economic integration (in terms of employment,

labour market participation characteristics, and barriers to economic integration) and

their broader material well-being in Canada. Evidently, these were not the only topics of

consideration in the reports, which also addressed topics such as health and health

service utilization, housing, satisfaction levels, and views about life in Canada.

Nevertheless, the reports are notable for their focus on individual-level variables

pertaining to economic integration and human capital. This focus is viewed as

meaningful here for three main reasons.

First, as suggested by the descriptions of the LSIC questionnaire and reports

provided throughout this chapter (see also Appendices C and D), the LSIC seems to

have been largely constructed around concerns pertaining to the integration of

immigrants from non-traditional immigration source countries. Indeed, the declining

economic performance of recent immigrants relative to previous cohorts is commonly

attributed to the shift in immigrant source countries (see Picot & Sweetman, 2005). It is

important to consider this point in reference to the previous chapters of this thesis.

Chapter Four illustrated the manner in which concerns over immigration from Asian

source countries manifested in media’s portrayals of marriage immigrants. Chapter Five

demonstrated that policy discourse was largely constructed around maintaining the

legitimacy of the state’s immigration program in the public eye. It is also important to

recall that various federal departments were involved in the development of the LSIC

questionnaire. From a public and political perspective, insofar as immigrants do not

meet the expectations laid out in the immigration program, the value of immigration to

the Canadian nation stands to be questioned; this, in turn, holds implications for public

support of state programs and policies. The LSIC and the associated analytical reports

can thus be linked to state concerns pertaining to the success (or lack thereof) of

‘ethnic’ immigrants with respect to the objectives of the immigration program.

Second, insofar as the neo-liberal, individualistic focus of immigration policy is

reflected in the LSIC, then immigrants’ own views are, to some extent, obscured. In this

regard, it is interesting to actually consider some of the results offered by the LSIC:

LSIC respondents were also asked to identify which of the reasons cited

was the most important in their decision to stay in Canada […] Almost

80% cited one of four reasons – quality of life (32%), the desire to be close

to family and friends (20%), the future prospects for their family (18%)

and the peaceful nature of the country (9%)” (Schellenberg & Maheux,

2007: 5).

Explicitly economic-related reasons were endorsed by comparatively lower proportions

of immigrants as their main reason for staying in Canada, with 3.1% citing job

opportunities, 0.3% citing Canada’s business climate/free market, and another 0.3%

citing salary/pay (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007: 20). These statistics suggest that state

concerns do not necessarily mirror immigrants’ concerns. Thus, while the LSIC may

offer detailed self-report statistics on immigrants’ lives in Canada, immigrants’ own

interests and concerns were not necessarily reflected in the survey.

Third, the individualistic focus of the LSIC questionnaire and reports goes

against widespread evidence that the family unit is a central consideration throughout all

stages of the migration process, including integration. This point has been supported by

research in Canada (e.g., Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar &

Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993; Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; Walton-

Roberts, 2004b, 2003) and beyond (Booth et al., 1997; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Khoo, 2003;

Khoo & Mak, 2000; Mak 1997; Ong, 1999). The individualistic focus of the LSIC also

ignores the fact that 71% of immigrants in the LSIC target population arrived with

family members, with 42% of arriving as a family of two or more adults with children,

23% arriving as two or more adults without children, and 4% arriving as a single adult

with children. These statistics support the argument that the ‘autonomous immigrant’ is

largely a fiction (see Creese et al., 2008; Walton-Roberts, 2003). It follows that the

LSIC stands to miss out on the role of the household and various family members in

settlement and integration processes, despite the relevance of this information in both

material and theoretical contexts.

This latter point also ties into the previous discussion of migrant categorization.

Conceptual and methodological challenges associated with defining and measuring the

family as a unit of analysis contrasts sharply with the ease of measuring individual

immigrants, defined according to their mode of entry. Simplistic typologies of

individual immigrants (such as the typology provided by mode of entry) circumscribe

definable identities that can be directly addressed in statistical terms in both policy and

scholarly contexts. What these typologies miss, however, is an appreciation of the

multiplicity of roles within which immigrants are situated, and the fact that an imposed

categorization may not reflect immigrants’ views about themselves or their own lives. In

this way, despite its stated objective of understanding immigrants’ experiences, the

LSIC may, in fact, be missing out on how immigrants function as part of a family unit

within Canada.

6.6 Conclusion

The present chapter examined the LSIC questionnaire and its accompanying statistical

reports. The objective of this analysis was to demonstrate how official measurement can

operate as a form of discourse that reflects broader social norms and interests, and that

acts to socially construct immigrants as ‘types’ of beings in the analytical imagining of

Canada’s national community. Overall, the findings suggest that immigrants’ identities

as ‘ethnic’ newcomers clearly shaped the development of the LSIC questionnaire. The

LSIC seems to have been designed not so much to examine the settlement of

immigrants per se, but to evaluate the degree to which new immigrants were

maintaining ethnic connections versus integrating into Canadian society. Overall,

immigrants’ identity as ethnic beings emerged as one of the foremost considerations

informing data collection. It follows that ethnicity stands to figure centrally in the social

imagining of the national community that results from the use of LSIC data in political,

scholarly, and public arenas.

Importantly, as numerous critical scholars have noted (Balibar & Wallerstein,

1991; Barker, 1981; Li, 2007, 2003c; 2001; Satzewich, 1998; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b;

2007; see also Chapter Five of this thesis), with the declining social acceptability of

explicitly ‘racial’ discourse, concepts such as ethnic and cultural difference have

become euphemisms for ‘race,’ particularly in the context of immigration. Linguistic

difference has also been identified as a means of circumscribing ethnic/cultural group

membership, and thus acting as a means of racialization (Arel, 2002; Gonick, 2000;

Hill, 2008; Leeman, 2004; Thobani, 2000b; Urciuoli, 1996). Applying this perspective

to the present analysis, it is possible to argue that the LSIC stands to racialize ‘ethnic’

immigrants and speakers of non-Canadian languages (i.e., English and French) by

portraying them as essentially different from Canadians, both in terms of their social

interactions and their values and traditions. Inherent in this construction of difference is

marginalization of ‘ethnic’ immigrants with respect to Canada’s national community,

effected through subtle representations of barriers to full integration imposed by

coethnic affiliations and the tendency to dichotomize ‘ethnic’ and ‘Canadian’ social

networks, norms, values and traditions. Insofar as these differences are objectified and

statistically reified by the LSIC, this survey can be interpreted as an instrument of

racialization.

Using mode of entry as the dominant way of organizing data in the LSIC reports

served to reify these categorizations, and statistically circumscribed immigrants within

their roles as workers, spouses, family members, or refugees. Although data according

to mode of entry may be important insofar as it informs settlement service planning, the

statistical focus on mode of entry also entails important implications. Indeed, these

categorizations and the presentation of selected statistical knowledge around immigrant

mode of entry are socially relevant, in part due to the perceived objectivity of mode of

entry categories and the supposed objectivity of statistical information. Statistical

knowledge stands to inform how groups of immigrants are perceived, evaluated, judged,

and treated in the eyes of policy-makers and society members. Furthermore,

categorization can be linked to identity formation, influencing how individuals come to

view the organization of society and their respective place, as a member of a particular

category, among other categories of peoples (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). Newcomers

legally entering a foreign country literally become their category of entry. These

immigrants become further constituted as discursive formations through official

measurement, wherein they are statistically and thus politically and socially constructed

according to the dimensions that were selected for official measurement.

It is also important to address the silences surrounding gender within the LSIC

and its associated reports. As discussed, the highly gendered nature of immigration at all

stages – from the decision to migrate, the migration journey, and settlement and

integration (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Greico, 2003; Pedraza, 1991) – was not

acknowledged in the LSIC. The structural dimensions of gender inequality and the

different challenges that men and women from different regions of the world are likely

to experience in Canadian society was completely absent in the questionnaire. In cases

where differences between men and women were addressed in the LSIC reports, gender

was reduced to sex, involving simple sex-disaggregation of statistics. Although this type

of consideration is an important starting point, it offers only a superficial understanding

of the differences between women and men immigrants, and downplays the centrality of

gender as a dominant organizing feature of social life.

In terms of other silences, as discussed in the results section, while the LSIC did

collect some information on social networks, it was largely silent on the issue of

household strategies or considerations of the family unit in the context of settlement and

adaptation. In this regard, the LSIC clearly reflects the neo-liberal focus of current

immigration policy. Creese et al.’s (2008) comments on the implications of a human

capital focus and the associated silence surrounding the family is particularly relevant

here:

The focus of immigration policy on human capital, an individualistic

concept, cannot adequately recognize the binding of a particular immigrant

within complex household relationships and resources…This lack fails to

fully acknowledge the complex but undeniable links between economic

and social life that carve out conditions under which immigrants and

refugees come to participate in the labour force, make friends, raise

children and ultimately become ‘Canadian’ in quite specific ways (Creese

et al., 2008: 272).

Moreover, as discussed in the present chapter, focusing on human capital measures that

pertain most directly to the individual immigrant ties into simplistic typological

categorizations. It follows that the intersection between immigrants’ different social

roles within a family unit is dually obscured – first, through individual-level human

capital variables, and, second, through their location within a ‘mode of entry’ typology.

The human capital focus and neglect of the immigrant family speaks to the extent to

which family reunification is a subordinate objective of the immigration program.

More generally, the measurement of immigrants pertains directly to theoretical

understandings of Canada’s imagined community. As discussed in the early pages of

this chapter, the existing literature interprets censuses in terms of a state’s interest in

enumerating and defining the population under its control. In historical contexts,

census-taking represented a means of both material and symbolic nation-building. In

contrast, special surveys, such as the LSIC, are reflective of a perceived need to

understand and address particular social issues, yet similarly act to characterize the

population of interest in reference to national goals and concerns. Moreover, as

suggested by the opening quotes of the present chapter (see also van Dijk, 1995),

politicians and the media regularly use official data reports to support or refute

arguments relating to immigration policy. The knowledge gathered and presented in

official reports thus enters into the immigration debate, and stands to influence policy

agendas and public opinion. It follows that representations of immigrants surfacing in

public and political immigration discourses are influenced in part by the measures and

constructs underlying data collection. In this way, the categorization and measurement

of immigrants is tied into the discursive construction of Canada’s national imagined

community. Recognizing these interconnections is central both to critical scholarship

and to efforts aimed at understanding immigrants’ lives in Canadian society.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

“Discourses have enormous power not only to represent social

groups but also to identify, regulate, and even construct social

groups – to establish who is ‘we’ and who is ‘other’ in the

imagined community of the nation-state” (Henry & Tator, 2002:

27).

7.0 Introduction

The overarching goal of this thesis was to examine the social construction of the

Canadian imagined community in direct relation to immigration discourse. In order to

accomplish this goal, three analyses of immigration discourses were conducted: one

pertaining to media, a second pertaining to CIC policy activities, and a third pertaining

to official statistical measurement. By taking a multi-faceted approach that addressed

various sites of discourse, the thesis uncovered subtleties, continuities, and

contradictions associated with constructing Canada’s imagined community in the global

era of contemporary immigration. In order to tie these results together, the present

chapter provides a brief summary of the findings in reference to the thesis’s research

questions. The thesis’ limitations and future research directions are subsequently

addressed. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts on immigration discourse in

Canada.

7.1 Summary and Discussion

The overarching research question guiding this thesis was: In an era of globalization and

widespread international immigration, how is the Canadian national community

imagined and discursively constructed in reference to immigration? In order to elaborate

on this query, the following specific research questions were articulated:

(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)

represent immigrants?

(2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and

represented in discourses?

(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?

(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?

(5) How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada’s

national imagined community?

The present section briefly summarizes the thesis’s findings in relation to each of these

questions.

(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)

represent immigrants?

Across discourses, the thesis revealed that discursive representations of immigrants

were about far more than just immigrants – rather, representations of immigrants also

served as a basis for socially constructing Canadians and the Canadian state in the

imagining of the Canadian nation. Media discourse focused most clearly on the Asian

contingent of marriage immigration, and revealed concern over the impact of

immigration from non-European source countries and the burden of non-economic

immigrants to the Canadian nation. In this context, marriage immigrants were largely

portrayed as undeserving frauds who take advantage of Canadians and the Canadian

immigration system. Asian-Canadians were ambiguously portrayed, inconsistently

labeled as immigrants and Canadians. ‘Canadians’ were portrayed as unwitting victims

of unscrupulous immigrant frauds, or, alternatively, as victims of an unreasonable state.

For its part, the Canadian state was variably defined in direct relation to immigrants and

Canadians. The state was at times portrayed as having been ineffective in protecting

national borders, and, in other instances, as doing its best to keep dangerous immigrants

out of the country. The state was also often portrayed as imposing undue strain on

Canadians through the sponsorship program, either in terms of financial burden, or in

terms of the ‘red tape’ associated with spousal reunification. In this way, representations

of marriage immigrants in media discourse were inextricably intertwined with

representations of Canadians and the Canadian state.

For its part, policy discourse was shown to be operating directly in the interests

of state legitimacy. In this context, immigrants were variably represented so as to

document the ability of the state to support and maintain the integrity of the Canadian

nation. Ambiguous lines were often drawn between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants, with

would-be immigrants and newcomers being inconsistently defined as contributors to the

Canadians nation, as marginal members of Canadian society, or as outsiders that need to

remain beyond Canadian borders. These various representations of immigrants directly

served as a means for constructing the Canadian population and the Canadian state, both

of which were portrayed as sharing in the goal of welcoming ‘deserving’ or ‘good’

immigrants, and as being tolerant and accepting of ‘diverse’ immigrants with ‘different’

(i.e., non-Canadian) customs and traditions. The state was further portrayed as

protecting the nation’s physical and symbolic borders from ‘bad’ or ‘burdensome’

immigrants.

Of all three discourses, measurement discourse was the most subtle, yet

nevertheless revealed how immigration serves as a site for relationally defining

immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state as the three main contingents of the

Canadian nation. In this discourse, immigration category of admission and immigrants’

ethnic identity were foremost. Dichotomies between immigrants and Canadians were

established through questions that opposed immigrants’ ‘ethnic’ practices and traditions

from ‘Canadian’ practices and traditions. Underlying measurement discourse was the

neo-liberal agenda of the Canadian state, which served to define immigrants in

individualistic, human capital terms. The state thus defined itself in neo-liberal terms by

virtue of defining the objects of its inquiry relative to this agenda.

(2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and

represented in reference to the Canadian nation?

This research question was addressed in two different ways: first, through a

reexamination of Canadian immigration history with an eye to the specific intersection

between family-based and economic immigration; and, second, through the examination

of the three immigration discourses.

The historical examination (Chapter Three) revealed that family-based

immigration and economic immigration have intersected in different ways over time. In

early post-Confederation immigration, the family served as the ideal unit of

immigration, being the centre of both economic production and social reproduction

(although, as discussed in Chapter Three, this was not uniform, with access to

familybased immigration serving as a direct means of racializing and gendering

belonging in the Canadian nation). As the economic needs of the nation evolved, so too

did the relationship between economic and family-based immigration. Increasingly, the

ideal immigrant was conceptualized as a skilled resource; accordingly, immigrant

families became less central to national development and increasingly problematized as

a drain on the nation. The analyses of contemporary immigration discourses elaborated

on these representations.

Across all discourses, economic immigrants were clearly portrayed as valuable

members of the Canadian national community, and were characterized

unproblematically as contributors to the nation. In the context of media and policy

discourse, this emerged through explicit references to economic immigrants’ status as

skilled members of the Canadian nation. In measurement discourse, affirmation of

economic immigrants’ desirability was implicit, conveyed through the individualistic,

economic focus of the LSIC and the underlying neo-liberal bias of measurement

discourse.

In contrast, family-class immigrants were often represented in direct opposition

to economic immigrants, or were otherwise marginalized relative to the Canadian

national community. Media discourse on marriage immigrants, for instance, explicitly

portrayed this group of immigrants as unskilled, fraudulent, and undeserving of

belonging in the Canadian nation. Moreover, media representations informed a

dichotomous construction of ‘good’ (economic) and ‘bad’ (marriage) immigrants that

clearly operated in gendered, racialized, and bureaucratic (i.e., category of admission)

terms. The highly individualistic, economic focus of measurement discourse was most

closely geared toward examining immigrant skill, language ability, and economic status

at the individual level. In this way, the importance of the immigrant family was denied,

and, by extension, family-class immigrants were marginalized as contributors to the

Canadian nation. In policy discourse, Canada’s acceptance of family-class immigration

served as a rhetorical means for documenting the welcoming nature of the Canadian

population and the Canadian state. However, these immigrants were still portrayed as

dependents and potential burdens on the nation.

(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations? Of the

three discourses considered in this thesis, media discourse most vividly gendered

and racialized immigrants. In media portrayals of marriage immigrants, Asian

immigrants were clearly constructed as racialized ‘Others’ whose practices and

norms are problematic and threatening to Canadian national identity. This

racialization extended to the Asian-Canadian population, and symbolically served

to document the threat that ‘immigrants’ from non-Asian countries pose to

Canadian institutions and values. The gendering of marriage immigrants emerged

through representations of female marriage immigrants as sexualized deviants and

portrayals of male marriage immigrants as criminals and terrorists.

The other discourses were comparatively subtle, reflecting the institutional

contexts within which these discourses were produced. Policy discourse racialized

immigrants by emphasizing the diversity of newcomers and the tolerance of the

Canadian population in welcoming newcomers, thereby constructing a racialized

dichotomy between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Canadians.’ The LSIC subtly racialized recent

immigrants by emphasizing immigrants’ ethnic interactions and documenting interest in

these immigrants’ preservation of their ethnic and cultural values and traditions versus

their acceptance of Canadian values and traditions. Considerations of gender were

largely absent from both policy discourse and measurement discourse, thereby

operating to preserve existing gender biases in immigration by failing to acknowledge

them.

(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?

Media discourse operated as a cautionary tale against ‘non-traditional’ and ‘overseas’

marriages wherein Canadians were warned to find love ‘at home.’ In this way, the

problematization of marriage immigrants can be seen as acting in direct service of the

Canadian state’s scrutiny of spousal sponsorship applications, justifying intrusive

measures against both immigrants and their Canadian sponsors in the name of

protecting the nation. Policy discourse similarly acted to legitimize the sponsorship

program and state activities more generally. By constructing a dichotomy of ‘good’ and

‘bad’ immigrants, policy discourse acted as assurance that the state takes all steps

necessary to ensure the best possible outcomes for Canada, Canadians, and deserving

immigrants. Here, immigration discourse was clearly not only about immigrants, but

was used to speak directly to the Canadian state’s ability to serve all stakeholders in an

era of globalization and international immigration. On the one hand, this involved

confirming Canada’s need for ‘good’ immigrants and providing assurance that these

newcomers will succeed in Canada and contribute to the nation. It also involved

demonstrating the state’s ability to safeguard the Canadian nation against would-be

frauds, criminals, or terrorists, as well as immigrants who might be a burden to the

economy (namely, family-class immigrants). For its part, the LSIC can be seen as

facilitating categorical evaluations of immigrants in reference to immigration admission

categories. The LSIC also operated in the interests of the state by measuring aspects of

immigrants’ lives that are directly relevant to the state’s neo-liberal agenda, while

failing to consider aspects not on this agenda and neglecting to focus on what might

matter most to immigrants in the context of settlement and integration.

(5) How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada’s

national imagined community?

Across all discourses, tension existed between the principles of multiculturalism and

tolerance in Canadian society and the changes attributed to immigration from

nontraditional source countries. In media discourse on marriage immigration, the

boundaries of the Canadian nation were constructed so as to racialize and marginalize

marriage immigrants and Asian-Canadians to the Canadian national community while

being inclusive of ‘deserving’ economic immigrants. In contrast, policy discourse

operated to directly locate ‘good’ immigrants (namely, economic immigrants and,

inconsistently, family-class immigrants) within the borders of the Canadian national

community in both historical and contemporary contexts. Simultaneously, the state’s

ability to safeguard the nation from ‘bad’ (fraudulent, criminal) immigrants was

paramount, and operated to marginalize immigrants who could be perceived as

threatening national integrity. For its part, official measurement operated to reify

bureaucratic categories of admission and thus to position immigrants to the Canadian

nation in specific reference to those categorizations. Moreover, the LSIC findings were

revealing of a perceived need to conceptualize and operationalize migrants within

identities that can be deployed to understand new immigrants’ ‘differences,’ and to

determine how these differences interfere with immigrant integration, defined in

individualistic and ‘Canadian-centric’ terms. As such, in the formation of the Canadian

national community represented in measurement discourse, family-class immigrants

and, more generally, immigrant families, were subtly marginalized as a relevant site of

inquiry, while immigrants’ ethnic identities emerged as a discernable topic of concern.

Overall, the discursive representations uncovered in this thesis suggest that

Simmons’ (2010, 1999) understanding of the ‘imagined future’ guiding current

Canadian immigration policy extends beyond the policy context. Rather, a particular

vision of the Canadian nation manifests in broader discourses on immigration, directly

contributing to the social construction of immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state

and, by extension, the Canadian national imagined community. Across media, policy,

and measurement discourses, an overarching theme was that the purpose of immigration

is to serve the economic needs of the nation, and that the state needs to maximize the

benefits of the immigration program while minimizing the potential threats to the

Canadian nation associated with international immigration. Moreover, the multicultural

and diverse nature of the nation was widely acknowledged in different discourses

(although not unproblematically). In this way, the ‘imagined future’ guiding

immigration policy is visible in public realms in the form of dominant discourses that

construct both the value and risks associated with contemporary international

immigration. These discourses convey narratives about immigration in which

immigrants, in general, and specific groups of immigrants, in particular, are socially

constructed in relational terms alongside Canadians and the Canadian state.

It is relevant at this point to also reflect back on Benedict Anderson’s theorizing

about nations. The present thesis demonstrated that insight into Anderson’s

understanding of nations as imagined communities can be fruitfully gained by

considering various dimensions of national immigration discourses. This contention is

based on two key points. The first pertains to the role of immigration in defining a

nation’s insiders and outsiders in both material and symbolic terms, thereby enabling

national identity to be simultaneously defined. The second pertains to the centrality of

communications in the nation-building process associated with defining a national

community.

On the first point, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, immigration brings

about social questions and controversies that shed light directly on the issue of national

identity. Immigration necessarily involves allowing certain people into and keeping

others out of a nation’s geographic and social space (although, as illustrated in this

thesis, the boundaries of these two spaces do not always coincide). In doing so, the

qualities and characteristics of a nation and its community members are simultaneously

defined. By virtue of granting newcomers entry via different categories of admission,

immigration policy establishes gradations of belonging to the Canadian nation in both

material and symbolic terms. Moreover, the Canadian stance on immigration is linked

with representations of national identity, presented to widespread audiences around the

world. In this way, immigration stands as a central site for defining the desired

characteristics of the national community. Importantly, across the discourses examined,

it was clear that immigration is a source of contention and concern. In particular,

immigration from non-traditional source countries, and that which does not directly

service the nation’s neo-liberal goals, remains an object of contention and inquiry. Yet,

the place of immigrants in Canada’s national community does not fall strictly within

dichotomous conceptualizations of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In cases where dichotomous

constructions emerged, they could not be neatly attributed to any single dimension (or

any straightforward combination of dimensions) such as ‘race.’ ethnicity, gender, or

mode of entry. Often, ‘immigrants’ were constructed in ambiguous terms and were

inconsistently positioned with respect to other groups of immigrants, Canadians, the

Canadian state, and, by extension, Canada’s imagined community. It is thus impossible

to speak uniformly of ‘immigrants’ as ‘Others’ who are symbolically positioned on the

margins of the Canadian national community. Indeed, this thesis suggests that the

symbolic place of immigrants in Canada’s imagined community is much more

multidimensional, amorphous, and context-specific than is often implied by simplistic

‘immigrants as outsiders’ or ‘us versus them’ conceptualizations. To this end, it is

theoretically important to conceptualize the notion of imagined communities in fluid

rather than concrete, dichotomous terms.

The second main point of Anderson’s work addressed in the present thesis

pertains to the role of communications in defining a national community. In a

geographically expansive country populated by tens of millions of people, direct

communication among all community members is not feasible. As such, public

discourses disseminated through various communication media hold a critical role in

expressing ideologies, in socially constructing national identity, and in defining national

belonging. In this context, discourses on immigration constitute an important site for

defining the contours of the Canadian national community. Indeed, as demonstrated in

this thesis, discourses on immigration abound with representations of immigrants,

Canadians, and the Canadian state. Taken together, these discursive representations

constitute an elaborate, multi-dimensional imagining of the Canadian nation that is

communicated to widespread national and international audiences.

In sum, the present thesis demonstrates that representations of immigrants and

immigration serve, in symbolic terms, as vehicles for defining the public image of the

Canadian nation. In the imagining of the Canadian nation in official contexts,

immigration serves as a means for bolstering Canada’s national and international image

as a sovereign, competitive, tolerant, and socially-just nation. The admission of large

numbers of diverse immigrants alongside discourses of tolerance and fairness conveys

to national and international communities that Canada is a desirable place to live and

work. Canada’s official multicultural status and rhetorical celebration of diversity

discursively operates as ‘evidence’ that the nation has overcome its highly

discriminatory history. The ‘Canadian-centric’ nature of the imagined future guiding

current immigration policy and the reality of structural inequality in both national and

global contexts are thus obscured by discourses of tolerance, democracy, and inclusion.

They are also obscured by discourses that ‘legitimately’ construct immigrants as threats

or social burdens. Moreover, insofar as specific groups of immigrants are represented in

discourse as frauds, criminals, or social leeches, then the ideological stage has been set

for their marginalization in the Canadian nation in both symbolic and material terms. In

the bigger picture, positive images of immigrants serve to augment Canadian national

identity, while negative images of immigrants serve as a counterpoint for articulating a

vision of the ideal Canadian citizen. The social construction of immigrants thus affords

the opportunity to simultaneously co-construct Canadians and the Canadian state, such

that immigration operates as a key site for defining the Canadian national imagined

community.

7.2 Limitations and Future Directions

It is relevant at this point to address the thesis’ limitations, which fall into two

categories: the first pertains to data limitations, and the second relates to the highly

interpretive nature of discourse analysis. These limitations are discussed in reference to

future directions for research.

With respect to data limitations, a shortcoming of the present thesis was its

reliance on textual materials that may or may not be entirely representative of the

respective discourses under examination. The impact of this limitation was minimized

through systematic efforts to gather a comprehensive data set, and to analyze materials

to the point of thematic saturation. In the examination of media coverage of marriage

immigrants, articles from a total of four newspapers over a ten year time period were

examined. As discussed in this chapter, three of these newspapers (namely, the Globe

and Mail, the Toronto Sun, and the Toronto Star) emerged from a keyword search of a

newspaper database as the publications with the most numerous relevant articles. The

fourth newspaper (the National Post, which was not included in the primary database

used) was purposively sampled in order to obtain as national a perspective as possible.

The limitations of this approach are evident. First, the analysis addressed only a small

selection of print news media in Canada. Second, reliance on electronic search engines

means that only articles included within the electronic database would be captured by

the search. Third, the fact that two of the four newspapers are Toronto-focused might

also suggest that the findings pertain to a local or regional perspective. These limitations

are offset in part by the fact that three of the four publications (excluding the Toronto

Sun) are the most widely circulated and nationally read newspapers in Canada. The fact

that local or regional newspapers in other areas of Canada may or may not offer the

same portrayals as the newspapers analyzed thus does not negate the widespread

dissemination of particular messages about marriage immigrants accomplished by the

publications analyzed here. Future research could explore in more detail regional

variations in portrayals of marriage immigrants in order to determine whether the

representations uncovered here are upheld or subverted in other publications. Future

research could also involve media analyses that address in more detail other categories

of migrants in Canada. As noted in Chapter Four, widespread research in Canada has

documented the racialization and criminalization of immigrants in media portrayals.

However, specific analyses have not addressed representations of immigrants in direct

reference to their category of admission. Such analyses are relevant in light of the fact

that the merits and challenges of immigration are largely debated in reference to

bureaucratic immigrant types. The present thesis provided a useful case study of the

manner in which one particular group of immigrants is constructed with respect to

Canada’s national community. However, additional media research could explore this

topic further by addressing other immigrant types and other publications.

The data limitations of Chapters Five and Six similarly relate to the selection of

materials for analysis. In Chapter Five (policy discourse), key annual reports about

CIC’s policy activities and objectives were selected in order to best capture the

Canadian state’s perspective on immigration, as it is being presented to the broader

social world. These materials, evidently, cannot be taken as representative of any

individual state actor’s opinions or even necessarily as the template for state activity.

This concern was less relevant here because the goal was not to uncover state actors’

‘true’ opinions of immigrants and their place in the Canadian nation. Rather, the

objective was to discern how the Canadian national community is formally imagined

and plated for public consumption through official state discourse, in reference to state

legitimacy and democratic racism. The materials analyzed were suited to these

objectives. Future research could consider how the content of internal state documents

map onto, or diverge from, the images of immigrants, Canadians, the state, and the

nation that surface in publicly available reports. Such an analysis could shed additional

light on the frameworks of state legitimacy and democratic racism addressed in Chapter

Five.

Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, Chapter Five suggests that additional

critical reflection on the democratic racism framework is necessary, at least in terms of

its usage in the immigration literature (as opposed to the literature on visible minorities,

which the present thesis did not evaluate, and for which theoretical implications may be

different). In terms of the continued usage of the democratic racism framework, a more

moderate alternative may be appropriate in the context of immigration. More

specifically, it may be suitable to explore the development of a concept such as

‘democratic Othering’ or ‘democratic xenophobia.’ A concept such as this could capture

the fact that distinctions of ‘us and them’ and sentiments directed at the exclusion of

immigrants may be embedded in democratic language but are not neatly reducible to

‘race’ (as shown in Chapter Five). Alternatively, it may be necessary to abandon some

(but not all) elements of the democratic racism framework (that is, some of the

discourses of dominance associated with this framework), or to engage in a very careful

application of the framework so as to avoid overextending claims of racism. On this

latter point, although not all discourses of dominance outlined by Henry et al. (2000)

were evaluated in Chapter Five, sociological reflection on each discourse described by

the authors suggests a highly context-specific and thoughtful application is necessary so

as to maximize the utility of the framework. Indeed, some discourses of dominance

outlined by Henry et al. (2000) are much more convincingly ‘racist’ than others. For

instance, claims of non-racism followed by an overtly negative comment about a

racialized minority (i.e., “I’m not racist, but…”) seem suitably labeled democratic

racism. On the other hand, opposition to Canada’s multicultural policy could exist on

various grounds, and may not in all cases be borne out of racist beliefs or attitudes. To

this end, although a complete abandonment of the framework is by no means advocated

here, a more modest theoretical approach may be warranted.

In terms of Chapter Six, it is necessary to acknowledge that the LSIC is far from

the only survey instrument on immigrant settlement, nor does it represent the sole

source of official knowledge on immigrants in Canada. Similarly, the reports published

in association with the LSIC do not represent all that there is to glean from the LSIC. To

this end, the social construction of Canada’s national community via the LSIC depends

in part on the manner in which the LSIC results are used in public, political, and

research contexts. Nevertheless, the LSIC is the only official and nationally

representative survey of recent immigrants in Canada, and thus the questionnaire

provides insight into the manner in which newcomers and their lives are conceptualized

in official research contexts. Overall, future research could expand upon Chapter Six’s

analysis in two ways. First, research could investigate the manner in which the LSIC

data are utilized in other contexts (e.g., in scholarly research, or among community and

advocacy groups). Such an analysis could provide insight into the manner in which

representations of immigrants in the LSIC questionnaire do or do not feed into the wider

usage and interpretation of the data. Second, it would be useful to conduct similar

critical examinations of other instruments used in immigration research in order to

uncover the political projects within which they were designed, the ideological biases

encoded within their measures, and, by extension, their contribution to the broader

statistical construction of immigrants in reference to Canada’s imagined community.

The second main limitation of this thesis pertains to the interpretation of

materials selected for analysis. As Henry and Tator (2002) note, “discourses resonate

with very dissimilar meaning and consequences for both the producers of the text and

the diverse communities of readers” (p. 227). In other words, the present interpretation

of discursive formations does not necessarily reflect the intended purpose of the

producers, nor is it likely to be the only possible interpretation of the data. Indeed,

qualitative critical discourse analysis is often charged with being too impressionistic and

subjective (see Bryman & Burgess, 1994). Effort was taken to minimize this bias by

being as transparent as possible with the data, providing representative quotes that

directly informed the conclusions being drawn. At the same time, the present thesis also

operates on the underlying tenet that research is not an entirely neutral, unbiased

endeavour. As discussed in Chapter Two, critical discourse analysts recognize the

interpretive nature of their projects, and accept this feature as a necessary and useful

part of a socially engaged, reflexive and reflective social science. This thesis is thus not

intended to offer the final, authoritative word on the role of immigration discourse in

constructing Canada’s national imagined community. Rather, it is intended to offer a

new piece of dialogue that can stimulate further thought on this matter.

7.3 Conclusion

Regardless of how they are represented in discourse or perceived in Canadian society,

the reality is that immigrants are part of the economic, political, and social fabric of life

in Canada; in other words, regardless of whether they are imagined as being part of

Canada’s national community, they are part of Canada’s national community. They

work, they consume, and they pay taxes. They advocate and they vote. They contribute

to their communities in tangible and intangible ways. Despite the language employed

here, they are not a ‘them’ that stand in opposition to an ‘us’; indeed, day-to-day life in

Canada does not operate along clear-cut lines of ‘Canadian’ versus ‘immigrant.’

Immigrants are integral and often indiscernible parts of Canada’s social landscape who

engage in multiple social roles that are not necessarily captured in the ‘immigrant’ label.

It follows that simplistic discursive constructions misrepresent the reality of

immigrants’ lives. Nevertheless, discursive dichotomies, even ones that are diffuse and

ambiguous, stand to fragment Canadian social space in important ways by shaping

ideologies and, hence, attitudes and behaviours.

It is also impossible to ignore the fact that recent or former newcomers to

Canada are employed in arenas of media, policy, and research. In other words,

immigrants do not stand exclusively as objects of discourse, but are also involved in

producing discourses on immigration, including the discourses analyzed in this thesis.

Granted, it is not possible to discern the voices of immigrants versus non-immigrants as

producers of the discourse analyzed here. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge

the role of immigrants in discursive production, thereby avoiding unrealistic

dichotomies of ‘Canadians’ as producers of discourse and immigrants as powerless

subjects of discourse.

As an extension of this point, it is also relevant to point out that discourse is a

site of contestation and symbolic struggle. Alternative discourses that dispute and resist

racialized and gendered discourses of marginalization and exclusion, albeit more diffuse

than dominant discourses, do exist. In order to bolster the power of discourses of

resistance, immigrant advocates engaged in cultural politics must come armed with a

politicized understanding of cultural representations, and recognize the power of

imagery in shaping perceptions of the ‘reality’ of immigration. Simultaneously,

reflexivity on behalf of scholars, journalists, and policy-makers can contribute to a

better understanding of the implications of categorizations and characterizations in

shaping social belonging. Only in this way can the Canadian nation – as an imagined

entity – be re-imagined in more inclusive terms.

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