THORIES OF DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN
Institutional theories
Certain institutions render a country more vulnerable to nondemocratic rule.
Presidential systems are famously unstable (Linz, 1990). They tend to centralize
power in a single individual, and there are fewer mechanisms in place to check that
individual from abuse of office. Compared to a parliamentary system, where
executives are appointed by the legislature and subject to no confidence votes,
presidents are relatively difficult to dismiss before they complete their term of office.
During this time, they may opt to abuse their power or degrade the democracy in
significant ways.
Countries which lack strong institutions of accountability, such as independent
judiciaries and independent anti-corruption bureaus, are also more susceptible to
democratic backsliding. When courts do not check those in power, and there is only
weak rule of law, then serious and flagrant abuse of public office is more likely.
Significant and pervasive corruption – defined as misuse of public resources for private
gain – can also degrade a democracy, both in practice and in the legitimacy of that
regime. Well-resourced, robust anti-corruption bureaus or inspectors general are an
important bulwark against this kind of internal decay. Another major institution which
can threaten a democracy is a politically motivated military. When a military is subject
to weak or inadequate civilian oversight, it can become a politicized actor and even
seize control, culminating in nondemocratic military rule. Building a professional
military which is focused on its security responsibilities and ability to prevail in complex
military operations, rather than be tempted by political power, is a deep ongoing
challenge for many governments.
Economic theories
Not unlike the explanations for authoritarian persistence, class distinctions can
be a reason for democratic backsliding as well. If the middle class, the ones that
supposedly form the backbone of a democratic society, feel as though they are not
getting the benefits they were promised, they can be convinced quite easily that
nefarious outside forces are to blame, such as immigrants or other minority groups.
An authoritarian leader will take advantage of these resentments and promise to limit
their influence, which can further lead to the erosion of institutions, accountability, and
human rights. These trends may be exacerbated by a postindustrial economy, in which
the voice and the power of the middle class has been fragmented. Furthermore, as
the state slowly outsources its economic and social capacities to private or charitable
enterprises, the middle class have fewer government resources, which also fosters
insecurity and vulnerability. This reduction in the capacity of the state also accelerates
the appeal of an authoritarian leader who promises a radical shift.
Cultural theories
Popular and elite beliefs in the appropriateness of democratic rule can shape
political outcomes. When there are strong democratic norms in place, this takes on a
self-perpetuating quality in which a society supports and reinforces democratic
practices and institutions. Yet democratic “habits of the heart” can take long periods of
time to mature and gain a taken-for-granted status in a society. Civic education can
play a role in this endeavor, especially education that addresses liberal values such
as liberty, fairness, representativeness, and accountability. When people in a society
think critically about where authority and power should rest in their society and believe
that they are empowered to challenge nondemocratic rule, this can offer a deep
societal buffer against democratic backsliding.
Charismatic, autocratic leaders can gain a national following and move a
democracy toward nondemocracy. Such leaders may call upon a variety of tactics to
gain a mass following. Many of these strategies might appeal to cultural fault lines or
vulnerabilities within a society. An aspiring autocrat might make populist appeals to in-
group grievances and label an out-group as the culprit. They might appeal to
nationalist ambitions or exploit ethnic divisions. They might present themselves as
messengers with a holy message. They might offer promises of a return to a golden
past or golden future. Such autocratic leaders take a variety of forms, but one common
goal is a degrading of democratic institutions in order to consolidate power in non-
democratic forms of governance.
One chilling example of this interplay between culture and political leadership
can be found in the breakup of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In the early years of the
republics that formed after the collapse of communist Yugoslavia, one fiery Serb
nationalist named Slobodan Milošević argued that a newly independent Serbia should
reclaim territories once occupied by the Serb nation. His calls fell on fertile nationalist
ground, which intersected with religious and ethnic fault lines in these Slavic territories.
Milošević, who was elected president of Serbia during the 1990s, was a major political
leader and instigator during a brutal civil war that ensued between former republics of
Yugoslavia. He was eventually indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina.
State Capacity
Recall the section titled State Capacity on page 164, in which the ability of the
state to conduct its core functions was highlighted. This idea also relates to
authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. If a state is weak or failing, this creates
the conditions under which an authoritarian leader is more likely to come to power. A
weak state is prone to a would-be ruler or party arguing for quick and sudden change
to save the state and the people from complete failure. State capacity is related to
economic theories as well as institutional theories but is more general—the state could
be failing in some ways but strong in other ways. State strength can also be measured
in the extent to which people believe in it, i.e. legitimacy. Even if the economy is
relatively strong, but people no longer believe in the state, this could an opportunity
for new leadership with authoritarian tendencies to take over and begin to corrode
democratic structures. Remember that state failure can be a dubious concept, and
that most theories in political science are not causal. Therefore, we cannot say that
weak states cause democracy to break down.
Barriers to Collective Action
This perspective is based on a larger theory of how human beings behave:
rational choice. These theorists believe that human behavior is based on a rational
cost-benefit analysis to maximize their interests as much as possible. Actors don’t
always make perfect decisions however, because they often do not have perfect
information. From this perspective, people will not act against democratic backsliding
if it doesn’t immediately benefit them. If protesting or joining the opposition is seen as
risky, or the chance of success is seen as low, then people will allow authoritarian
regimes to slowly take hold, while hoping that someone else will take the risk to stop
it. (Lichbach, 1998). This approach is distinct from cultural theories in that it assumes
that regardless of culture, most people will act in the interest of self-preservation.
International theories
A country may be susceptible to democratic backsliding as a result of
international factors. These can include “neighborhood effects”: if a country resides in
a region where countries are trending non-democratic, or if there is a high regional
concentration of non-democratic regimes, it is more likely to become a non-
democracy. Conversely, a neighborhood which is pro-democracy, such as the
European Union, can pull countries in the direction of embracing democracy.
International pressures for a democracy to backslide can be carried out via
technological means. New information and communication technologies encourage
countries to defy geographical constraints and reach into target countries to wage
influence campaigns. These influence campaigns serve to undermine democratic
governments around the world through the dissemination of misinformation via social
media platforms and the internet. This kind of sharp power tactic is a means to
destabilize democracies by sowing division within populations and undermining
democratic institutions such as the free flow of information and electoral integrity.
Students Feature: United States of America
Full Country Name: United States of America
Head(s) of State: President Joseph Biden
Head of Government: President Joseph Biden
Government: Presidential Federal Republic
Official Languages: No official language; English and Spanish widely spoken
Economic System: Market-based economy
Location: North America
Capital: Washington DC
Total land size: 9,833,517 sq km, 3796742 sq mi
Population: 339,665,118
GDP: $21.132 trillion
GDP per capita: $63,700
Currency: US dollar
The United States serves as a possible crucial case study for the process of
democratic breakdown in states consistently measured as highly democratic. It can be
considered crucial due to the US’s status as a highly democratic state that has served
as a model. Therefore, it democratic breakdown can happen here, it can happen
anywhere. Traits of failing democracies that are evident in the US include high
economic inequality, appeal to populism, reactionary movements, barriers to collective
action, as well as recent events to subvert elections and popular opinion. However,
there is at least two things keeping full democratic breakdown at bay in the US: the
cultural tradition of democracy that has stuck with the country since its founding in
combination with the strength of the state. One of the most pronounced factors of
democratic breakdown present within the United States is the economic inequality, a
factor that produces a great deal of tension between classes and opens the door for
populist and reactionary movements. According to the World Bank’s Gini index, the
United States has consistently had a Gini score higher than .36 since 1981, indicating
a higher- than-average inequality, as well as a score above .40 from 2016 to 2019,
which puts the United States on similar rankings with most of Central and South
America. This is higher than most countries in Europe, and it has no doubt caused
problems for the political situation in the United States by raising class tensions.
As discussed above, economic inequality can provide fertile ground for
authoritarian tendences to deepen and for populist leaders to take over in conditions
they would otherwise find challenging. Economic inequality, combined with the
institutional structure of the US such as the presidential system, which vests more
individual power in one person, and the two-party system, which disincentivizes the
party from distancing themselves from authoritarian leaders, has proven fruitful for
Donald Trump. Indeed, Trump was first considered a long-shot candidate for president,
but he quickly found popularity by appealing to the common American and blaming
their economic insecurity on immigrants. The Republican party struggled with Trump
as he became more popular, and ultimately supported him and his authoritarian style
of populism due to having few other options other than risk losing the election. The
backslide is even more alarming because authoritarianism seems to be taking over
the whole party, rather than lying with just one person. Indeed, observers such as
Grumback and Collier (2022) have declared that the Republican party no longer has
an interest in policy, it is only interested in power. This is a classic definition of single-
party and oligarchic authoritarian states.
But the role of Trump himself, and the image he sells of himself, cannot be
ignored. Another common theme among states that also experienced democratic
backsliding is what Schneiker (2020) calls the populist “superhero.” Similarly, Mounk,
a professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, says, “And one of the
key characteristics of populism lies in a leader’s belief that they, and they alone, truly
represent the people.” This relates to the difference between democratic and
authoritarian governments we discussed in the section titled Authoritarianism
Revisited. While both go to great lengths to stay in power, authoritarians see the state
and themselves as inherently linked—one cannot survive without the other. If followers
also believe this rhetoric, they are likely to support deepening authoritarian policies to
keep the government in power. Furthermore, Trump also engaged in other familiar
tactics of previous authoritarian leaders such as creating a patronage network
exclusively for his supporters, viciously attacking any opposition, using his media
connections to foster a cult of personality, and refusing to accept the results of an
election.
Another concerning development in the United States is the barriers to
collective action. Though there are not explicit legal barriers to collective action such
as protesting, there have been actions taken to hinder protests by politicians and the
media. This was evident when discussing the Black Lives Matter protests during the
summer of 2020 in reaction to the death of George Floyd. Political actors, including
then-President Trump, demonized the protests in a way that could discourage protests
and quell sympathies for them, as well as encourage justifications of violence from law
enforcement officers during these protestors. This creates a climate where collective
action is framed as irresponsible and immoral when conducted by the opposition, and
discourages those on the fence, even if it would benefit them to participate.
These issues proved to be a portent for things to come, because on January
6th, 2021, Trump supporters protested the verification of the 2020 election, and even
violently breached the Capitol building and actively disrupted the election process.
This is another common tactic by an authoritarian leader—encourage protest and even
violence among his supporters but condemn it when conducted by the opposition. It
followed claims by Donald Trump that the election was stolen from him, and his
supporters would need to fight on his behalf to save the country. Some of the
perpetrators of this event and their defenders have also used the perceived violence
at the 2020 BLM protests to justify or equate their actions. Even though this event was
not a successful coup d’état, it was still an attempt to disrupt democracy and does not
bode well for the democracy of the United States.
Finally, the case of the US also shows signs of international theories of
democratic breakdown. Trump came to power in an international environment which
also saw democratic backsliding throughout the world. Similar leaders with similar
styles came to power such as Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Boris
Johnson of the UK, and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines. This made it easier for him
to take power and to maintain legitimacy internationally. Finally, Trump was an effective
user of social media and other technologies to spread antidemocratic culture such as
a distrust in the media.
However, in accordance with the theories of democratic breakdown, there are
some reasons to be hopeful. Some theories for democratic breakdown claim that
certain political cultures set a more fertile ground for authoritarianism while other
cultures are more amendable to democracy. Despite this theory having some
deficiencies, the United States serves as a good example of how this dynamic can
work. The United States may have had a flawed democracy throughout its history and
in the present day, it has held democratic ideals since its inception. Even those who
participated in the riot on January 6th believed they were acting to protect democracy.
Another thing standing in the way of democratic breakdown is state strength, which
can make the difference in containing authoritarianism. In an essay evaluating the
harm of Trump’s populism, Kurt Weyland (2020) makes the point that “this fortunate
lack of crisis was no accident. In general, advanced industrialized countries like the
United States are less exposed to economic shocks than economically weaker Latin
America and Eastern Europe.” Therefore, stronger states tend to be better at handling
these sorts of crises.
Thus, while the US doesn’t clearly fit all the signs of democratic backsliding, the
theories that does fit should be considered a crucial case that can alert us to slow
regime change even in the states that have heretofore been considered the models of
democracy. Thus, democracy worldwide, if we agree that democratic ideal is
something we should strive for, should be monitored closer to make sure that it does
not make the full transition into authoritarianism.
