COMPARING EX-FATA AND KARANCHI
Ex-Fata
The former Federally Administered Tribal Areas was a semi-autonomous
province in the west bordering Afghanistan. The area operated under a separate legal
code than the rest of the state. However, this changed in 2018 when the region was
combined with the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province through a constitutional amendment
with the goal of integrating the people of this region more formally and increase state
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The main challenge facing the ex-FATA are the
continued insurgencies of Islamist organizations.
While it remains to be seen whether integrating the ex-FATA into a neighboring
province will increase legitimacy, it is haunted by a colonial law known as the Frontier
Crimes Regulation (FCR), which was designed to create a buffer zone as well as
regulate the affairs of tribal communities. The law meant that political parties could not
operate. A failing economy and a lack of formal governance means that there are
opportunities for Islamic extremists to fill those gaps, further decreasing legitimacy of
the Pakistan state in the eyes of residents. With the integration, new local councils
have been established, but reforms have frequently been disrupted by militants and
army operations (Rumi, 2015).
Karachi
Karachi is Pakistan’s most populous city and one of the fastest growing cities
in the world. Karachi experienced its first initial growth during the migration from India
during partition, and since then people relocate here in search of better economic
opportunities. This means that the country is extremely diverse. Despite the economic
opportunities created by its urban environment and its location as a port city, state
legitimacy is also weak in Karachi. This is due to intense competition by the various
ethnic and linguistic groups for resources, as well as a perceived lack of political
representation. The city is located in a province dominated by Sindhi speakers, but
few residents of the city speak this language. This situation has been exacerbated by
political elites that favor their own ethnic group over others. The federal government
has frequently usurped power from local institutions in the city (Javed & Nabi, 2022).
Conclusion
The main drivers that decrease legitimacy in both Karachi and ex-FATA are
largely rooted in the history of colonization and partition, and the resulting mosaic of
ethnic and language groups, some of which have more access to resources and
representation than others. This is not only reflected in the evidence discussed above,
but also in the FSI data. Pakistan scores high on the variables “group grievance” and
“factionalized elites.” Yet there are other indicators of state strength such as “human
flight and brain drain” and “security apparatus.” The government has made a number
of attempts to address these issues, with varying degrees of success. This case not
only demonstrates the power of a within-case comparison, but also shows that behind
state capacity measures that analyze fragility and resilience at the state level, are
varying patterns of capacity by region. While comparative politics as well as policy-
makers often takes the state as the most important unit of analysis, this can be
deceptive since state borders are arbitrary and often drawn by a former colonial power.
Effective interventions to increase state capacity must take local and regional nuances
into consideration.
Collapsed States
A collapsed state can be thought of as an extreme case of a fragile state.
Essentially, a collapsed state is one in which there is no effective governing structures
and public goods are obtained through private or ad hoc associations such as
warlords, gangs, churches, NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) or other informal
networks of community members. Thus, collapsed states are examples of anarchy. As
discussed in the section The Social Contract and Social Order, few examples of
anarchic communities exist, but in a collapsed state, no legitimate form of authority
exists.
This doesn’t mean, however, that the nation ceases to exist. Prior to the
normalization of sovereignty, a collapse of a government would often lead to division
of the territory and people into smaller units, or conquest by a neighbor, such as the
former Ottoman Empire or the Qing Dynasty discussed earlier. But in the era of
sovereign nation-states, the country remains at least an area on a map with nominal
external sovereignty, but internally there is no monopoly on the use of force. The social
contract is weak at best and security is provided not through a mutual exchange
between a government and the people, but often through extortion or loyalty to
whatever informal network comes to fill the gap left by the absence of government. It
is also important to note that a collapsed state can recover, and in fact, this is usually
the expectation of the international community. Collapsed states are often given aid or
other interventions in an attempt to rebuild and regain legitimacy (Ottaway, 2002).
Finally, a collapsed state is different than a state that “can’t form a government.”
As we will learn about in Chapter 6, many parliamentary democracies require a
coalition, or an agreement between multiple parties, to “form a government.” If no
agreement is reached, there is no government, at least in the formal sense. Belgium
has gone through several long periods in which no coalition could be formed amongst
its many parties, the longest of which lasted over 600 days. In this case, few new laws
were passed but everyday governing functions continue such as the administration of
education and security. Sometimes, what is called a “caretaker” government is
appointed to do minimal governmental functions until an agreement can be reached
or new elections are called. We wouldn’t consider Belgium a collapsed state. Its FSI
rating is 31/120 (remember 120 is at the most risk of failing). But we would consider
Belgium a state without a government (as of publication, there is a coalition
government in office). So most collapsed states once had a government, but suffer
from prolonged periods of weakness. Most often, on top of this prolonged period of
weakness, an external shock finally brings it to collapse. The following considers the
case of Haiti, which is a representative example of this process.
Student Feature: Haiti
Full Country Name : Republic of Haiti
Head of State : None
Head of Government : Prime Minister Ariel Henry
Government : Semi-Presidential Republic
Official Language : French, Creole
Economic System : Informal
Location : Caribbean
Capital : Port-au-Prince
Total land size : 27,750 sq km; 10,714 sq miles
Population : 11,470,261
GDP : $32.856 billion
GDP per capita : $2,900
Currency : Haitian Gourde, US dollar
The country of Haiti has had an unfortunate history of both catastrophe and
corruption, which has ultimately led the stability of the state to crumble, leaving citizens
to fend for themselves. Haiti does not currently have a head of state and has not had
one since the state’s former President, Jovenel Moise, was assassinated in summer
of 2021. After his assassination, Prime Minister Ariel Henry served as acting President,
although he was never officially sworn in. However, the mandate establishing him as
the state’s de facto ruler expired more than a year ago. As of January, Haiti “no longer
has any democratically elected government officials, after the terms for the remaining
senators in government expired” (Duwaji, 2023). Prior to this failure of the government,
Haiti was already struggling with the presence of almost 200 gangs. Without the rule
of law, any form of monopoly on the use of force the government previously held has
been completely abdicated to the gangs. A recent report from ABC News shows that
farmers are unable to bring their goods to the market to be sold, because the territory
between the rural farms and the city markets are controlled by gangs who either extort
bribes from the farmers or threaten to kill them. This is typical of other collapsed states
such as Somalia , Sudan, and Sierra Leone (Widner, 1995). Therefore, Haiti can be
considered a representative case of state collapse, although Haiti does display some
unique qualities of a collapsed state, which we will explore below (Gélin-Adams &
Malone, 2003).
Haiti has been plagued by weak governing institutions since its statehood. Haiti
as a state came into being through a successful slave rebellion, which led to the
overthrow of French rule in 1804. Thus, Haiti achieved independence much earlier
than many other states that would eventually collapse. Upon independence from
France, Haiti descended, much like many decolonized states, into civil war. When
France agreed to finally recognize Haiti’s independence in 1825, King Charles X
demanded that the former colony pay the equivalent of $21 billion in today’s dollars in
reparations for lost slave revenue (Sperling, 2017). The newly independent state had
to take out high interest loans from countries like the United States to pay this debt.
Given this colonial history, it is perhaps no surprise that it has experienced weak
institutions, low GDP, a series of despotic leaders, and low levels of community trust
since its establishment. A series of natural disasters is the beginning of its more recent
challenges. Between 2004-2008, hurricanes and tropical storms destroyed farmlands
and access to natural resources, ultimately dismantling 25% of the state’s economy.
In the weeks following each instance of natural, economic, and political disasters,
“sporadic violence, looting, and gang-related gunfire broke out across the country”
(Concern Worldwide US, 2023). Without much time to rebuild from the storms four
years prior, on January 1st, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, claiming
the lives of roughly 250,000, injuring over 300,000, and overall affecting approximately
3 million individuals (Bolton, 2011). The earthquake demolished much of the country’s
infrastructure, leaving many homeless without any access to clean water or food. Lack
of resources led many to live in harshly unsanitary conditions, leading to the state’s
largest cholera outbreak, which took the lives of more than 10,000 more Haitians.
Considering these disasters, the international community pledged roughly $5
billion in aid, however many states fell short of their monetary promises (Concern
Worldwide US, 2023). On top of the lack of aid received, corruption plagued Haitian
governments, often resulting in funds intended for the restoration being used
elsewhere. In the absence of any effective governance, gangs created an improvised
political community, brokering relationships between businessmen, politicians, and
NGO workers to secure resources. Therefore, gangs became the primary source of
security (Kivland, 2020).
Bringing no mercy to the country that has experienced so much suffering,
Hurricane Matthew hit in October 2016, destroying the majority of the country’s crops
just before harvest time. The disaster not only exacerbated the infrastructure crisis,
but it also worsened the previously mentioned cholera epidemic, leaving more than
200,000 without housing and thousands without proper medical care. Between 2020-
2022, the crisis in Haiti reached new heights. Starting with the COVID-19 shut down,
large populations experienced both heavy income loss and food insecurity. Political
corruption did not ease up during the two-year period, as former President Moise
exceeded his term limit and refused to leave office. Fuel shortages have remained a
prominent issue within the last year, as the countries supply has dwindled due to their
inability to pay for the resource on time, leaving the state with little to no available fuel
(Bolivar, 2022). This chain reaction of catastrophes made it increasingly easy for
violent gangs to infiltrate not only entire towns, but also varying levels of government.
The gangs have been able to maintain their power by recruiting the most vulnerable
of populations.
In 2003, Rotberg argued that while Haiti was one of the weakest states in the
world, it is “condemned to remain weak, but without failing” (Rotberg, 2003, p. 19). The
reason for this, according to his argument, was the absence of ethnic, religious, or
linguistic divisions, which drive so many other states to collapse into conflict. It seems
that while Haiti was able to remain on the precipice of collapse, the final straw was
indeed the assassination of its president and the inability of his successor to call for
new elections. This is also reflected in FSI and SRI data. According to the Fragile State
Index, as of 2023 Haiti is ranked 10th most “fragile” out of 179 countries, receiving an
overall fragility score of 102.9 out of the maximum possible 120. This rating is why
Haiti has been designated by the US government under the Global Fragility Act as one
of several states considered a priority for stabilization efforts. In 2009, the state was
ranked 12th out of 179 on the FSI, just one spot lower than the present day. The
organization notes that a fragile state may encompass many, all, or few of the
attributes used to measure state fragility such as: the loss of physical control of
territory, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to
provide reasonable public services, and the inability to act as a full member of the
international community. Not surprisingly, Haiti scores particularly high on measures
of state legitimacy and public services. However, notably, it scores low on group
grievances. Therefore, divisions within society are not a primary source of its
breakdown. Its SRI data offers few surprises. On nearly all indicators, Haiti scores
below 5/10, where 10 is most resilient. Three indicators—diversification, climate
stability, and information access—are the only variables in which Haiti scores above a
5. It received a score of only 1 for “dynamism” which measures innovation in the
economy.
Thus, Haiti is a representative case of state collapse and can teach us lessons
about what we can expect in the wake of the disappearance of government, the roots
of which can often be traced back to a colonial past. When natural disasters hit and
tanked both food production and economic stability in the country, gangs took
moments of weakness not only to rise to power but also to gain control over the very
limited resources available. After the assassination of the former President, one of the
first initiatives of gangs in the country was to take control of the fuel port, as they knew
how limited the supply was, which is just one example of how non-state groups fill
gaps left by a collapsed government. Since its founding, Haiti has been in a constant
state of poverty, debt, violence, and natural disasters. They have never fully recovered
from most of these challenges.
