INTRODUCTION After the fall of the Soviet Union

After the fall of the Soviet Union, many scholars celebrated the victory of liberalism and

democracy. Democracy was now king in Europe, and it seemed there to stay. One such scholar

named Francis Fukuyama went so far as to state that the fall of communism marked:

‘not just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as

such: That is, the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of

Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’

Yet today in Europe, democracy is in peril; fascism and the radical right pose the greatest threat

to democracy since the height of their power in the Second World War. Understanding the

reasons behind this resurgence and being able to differentiate this new threat is vital to defend

democracy.

The first chapter will give a sufficient introduction to Europe and democracy. I will begin

by explaining how Europe is defined. I will provide a historical account of both the conceptual

and geographic evolution of the continent. Europe is difficult to define geographically, especially

along its eastern border. For the purposes of my thesis, I settle with the conventional border that

stretches from the Ural Mountains to the Caucasus Mountains. Although some may argue

otherwise, I will exclude Turkey and Russia for various cultural and political reasons.

Conceptually, Europe is currently united with the values of political liberalism and democracy

that first arose from the French Revolution. However, these values do not define Europe, rather,

they act as the glue that holds the continent together. A Europe without democracy is still

Europe, albeit a weaker and fractured one.

I will then give a historical account of European democracy. I will begin with the French

Revolution in 1789 and explain how the ideas born from this event evolved until the creation of

the European Union. The fight for democracy, especially in Europe, was wrought with change

and violence. Democracy is a feeble thing that must constantly be fought for as its own existence

allows for its challengers' existence.

The second chapter will attempt to define fascism. Rising fascism and similar movements

are the focus of this paper, so I must have a working definition to give the reader. I begin with

how fascism first arose in interwar Europe, specifically in Italy and Germany. I will underscore

the conditions that led to its creation to compare them in later chapters to contemporary Europe. I

then compare the varying definitions of fascism and examine generic fascism, classical fascism,

and neofascism. Through this analysis and comparison, I arrive at a “fascist minimum” that

serves as the criteria for defining fascism.

In chapter three, I conduct a case study analysis of three popular far-right parties in

Europe, often described as fascist. In each case, I begin with a brief historical account of the

party. I then examine how each party may have changed over time. The party is examined further

through analysis of its policies, leadership, and supporters. After this is done, I will then assess

whether it is appropriate to label the party is fascist, using my “fascist minimum” as the final test.

If fascist is proved an inappropriate label, then I will provide one that is better suited for that

party.

In my conclusion, I will then state the ramifications of these movements on Europe and

democracy as a whole. I will also discuss how these movements have changed the European

political landscape. I will then analyze the radical right movement as a whole, incorporating my

case study analysis with other examples and overall trends. The state of European democracy as

a whole is then examined with recent data that measures the strength of democracy and using

this, I provide an outlook on its future.

CHAPTER ONE: EUROPE AND DEMOCRACY

Europe has long been a beacon of democracy and political liberalism in the world, but

now that seems to be in jeopardy. In recent decades, Europe has been experiencing a steady

increase in anti-democratic sentiment. Voters across Europe have become angry and disillusioned

with their democracies and have shown increasing support for movements and parties that would

challenge democratic institutions. These groups are largely on the radicalright, showing some, if

not outright, fascist tendencies. The reasons behind this shift vary in each country and cultural

region, whether it be rising xenophobia, economic strife, Euroscepticism, or several others. This

chapter will give a historical account of Europe itself and its many definitions, then discuss the

origins and evolution of European democracy.

What is Europe?

To first understand European democracy and fascism, it is important to ask what Europe

itself actually is. This is no easy task; the concept of Europe and its borders has been debated

since its creation, continuing to this day. There are multiple definitions of Europe, varying both

ideologically and geographically. These definitions have changed over time with war, religion,

and political and technological revolutions. The answer to the question of Europe depends on

who one asks and what one is looking for.

Geographically, Europe is thought of as a continent. However, unlike most other

continents, its borders are hard to pin down and have changed drastically over time. A continent

is defined as a very large and contiguous landmass. Europe has many obvious borders: it is

surrounded by the Arctic Sea to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Mediterranean

and Black Seas to the south. Its eastern border, however, is the cause of much debate. Many

geographers would simply draw no border at all and call the vast Eurasian expanse of land a

single continent. But for many, the two seem far too different to be considered a singular entity.

The problem, then, has been deciding where to divide this large landmass when, at least

geographically, there is no reason to do so (Jacobs 3).

Europe was originally thought of as merely a stretch of land that the Persians used to

invade ancient Greece. This land now exists in Turkey, which, ironically, is thought by many to

be excluded from Europe. Turkey, then may have a claim to be the original Europe (Jacobos 3).

Turkey's general exclusion in Europe is based upon a broader concept that forms the backbone of

most definitions of Europe today. This concept was formed in the early Middle Ages where

Europe constituted a third of the world’s landmass, the other two-thirds being occupied by Asia

and Africa. All three regions converged on Jerusalem, thought to be the center of the world.

Increasing threats from the Tartars in Russia and the Turks in the 13th century caused the concept

of Europe to become more spiritual, bringing forth the identity of Christendom. This new

concept forged a border between Turkey and Europe. This border, however, has changed over

time with the advancement and eventual retreat of the Ottomans, creating the classical definition

that places the border at a waterway that connects the Mediterranean and Black Seas (Jacobs 4-

5).

As one looks farther north of the eastern border, things become increasingly complicated.

The question of this border essentially boils down to how one defines Russia. In Western

Europeans' eyes, this definition has changed much over time, and, subsequently, Europe’s

borders. Even from its earliest conclusions, the consensus from the West has always seemed to

be that Russia is of little relation to Europe, if not something totally alien. Sully (1560-1641), a

French minister, expressed his thoughts on the inclusion of Russia into Europe, saying, “[T]here

scarce remains any conformity among us with them; besides they belong to Asia as much as to

Europe. We may indeed almost consider them as a barbarous country, and place them in the same

class with Turkey” (Jacobs 5). The feeling was often mutual, as was seen in 1703 with the

founding of St. Petersburg, its mission claiming the city was to be a “window on Europe”

(Jacobs 6).

Joe Burgess/The New York Times

The eastern border has varied vastly as attitudes towards Russia changed over time.

During the Renaissance, the border began with the river Don and continued upward to the White

Sea. In the 17th century, this border changed to follow the rivers Don, Volga and Kama, and

extended across to join with the river Ob. In 1730 Swedish geographer Philip Johan von

Strahlenberg proposed the Ural Mountains as the eastern border, which was widely accepted. In

the early 19th century, this border was amended to include the Caucasus Mountains as the

southern portion of the border by Conrad Malte-Brun and other French geographers. This

amended border that stretches from the Urals to the Caucasus Mountains is still today regarded

as the most conventional eastern border of Europe (Jacobs 7).

The widely accepted Urals-Caucasus border, however, is merely a geographical guideline.

This border has been and continues to change as Europe as a concept changes. For instance,

during the Cold War, this border was moved much farther west to exclude the Eastern

Bloc countries and the Soviet Union, who were, at the time, not thought of as European (Jacobs

7). The balance of power in Europe has always been heavily favored towards the west. Western

Europe holds the power to grant any given country or region entry into the European community.

Eastern Europe, however, has always had trouble fitting in with the rest of the Europe. Eastern

Europeans are not to blame for this; the region is simply a product of an unfortunate

geographical location. Its proximity to Asia makes it the first to be hit by foreign invaders.

Eastern Europe has acted as Western Europe’s convenient buffer zone for centuries. The last

invasion of Western Europe by non-Europeans was in 711 when the Moors invaded Spain. They

were beaten in 732 and finally driven out in 1492. By contrast, Eastern Europe was not free of

Turkish invaders until 1913. The lack of geographical barriers also makes it prone to attack

(Roskin 7). Eastern Europe is also largely without many rivers and has little access to the open

sea. This makes it hard to facilitate trade with a lack of trade routes, putting the region's economy

at a disadvantage (Roskin 8). The history of weakness and poverty relative to the rest of Europe

makes the “Europeanness” of the Eastern countries seem less real. Many of these countries,

however, found themselves legitimized when granted entry into the European Union.

The members of the European Union often define contemporary Europe. However, some

countries are not members of the EU yet are undoubtedly European, such as Britain and

Switzerland. There are also members that are in the EU yet are questionably European, like

Cyprus. Therefore, it is unwise to view the European Union as synonymous with Europe itself. It

is merely an open membership body consisting of democratic states that cooperate for political

and economic ends (Rose 5).

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How then can contemporary Europe be defined? The answer is nearly impossible to find.

According to Richard Rose, “Any attempt to reduce contemporary Europe to a single idea is

bound to fail, for Europeans differ about almost everything imaginable. There are striking

differences between countries in language, religion, and economic prosperity” (3). Nonetheless,

for this thesis's purposes, the concept of Europe that I will analyze will be those states that exist

within the conventional geographical borders previously mentioned, excluding Russia.

As championed by Richard Rose, the political concept of Europe is founded upon

democratic values, political liberalism, and economic freedom. However, it is important to note

that Europe is united by these values, not defined by them. A Europe without democracy is still

Europe. Therefore, Europe is best defined in geographic terms, even though this can be difficult.

It is not only important to settle Europe’s borders; common historical experiences must also be

accounted for that have contributed to its formation. Examples of such events are the

Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. These cultural experiences shaped the

countries they touched with revolutionary ideas that created common ground. It is easier to

define Europe today by looking at which countries experienced these revolutions, especially in

Eastern Europe. Russia was largely left out of these events, so it is hard to categorize it as

inherently European. Other eastern countries, such as Poland, were a part of these events and

therefore share a link to the rest of Europe.

Dr. Gayle Olson-Raymer/Humboldt State University

These common democratic values serve to unite Europe and make it stronger, but the

resurgence of forces that would undermine them only exist to weaken it. This can be seen in

rising Euroscepticism, which has led to Brexit and defiance from other countries such as Poland

and Hungary. A democratic Europe is undoubtedly worth fighting for, but will it remain united

and survive rising stress from fascism?

European Democracy

Before analyzing democracy’s challengers, it is important first to understand the

conception and context of modern European democracy. Democracy in Europe began with the

French Revolution in 1789. With the collapse of the hereditary authoritarian regime and the

introduction of many civil and political rights, this was the start of a new era in Europe.

However, this did not last long, and in the span of a decade, France was back in control of

another authoritarian regime led by Napoleon Bonaparte. Although democracy in France did not

last long after its inception, its impact was still felt across Europe. Even France’s authoritarian

rule following the revolution saw many adjustments that included elements of political

liberalism. The expectations of government changed with the new ideals of the revolution. King

Louis XVIII ruled under a constitution after taking over in 1814. This new form of government

included a two-chamber parliament and many civil liberties such as freedom of speech and

equality before the law. This “liberal authoritarian” government was not met with open arms.

King Louis XVIII and his successor Charles X never attained the power that kings had held

before the revolution. The French people simply would not allow themselves to be ruled under

such authority ever again. Even King Louis-Phillipe, who took power in 1830 and implemented

an even more liberal government by greatly reducing the aristocracy and clergy's power and

expanding suffrage, was met with widespread rejection (Berman 31-33).

This feeling was shared all across Europe had reached its tipping point with the

Revolutions of 1848. The French regime fell, and, once again, this caused political upheaval

across Europe. Protesters took to the streets all over the continent, demanding change. Even

Europe’s most authoritarian regimes were forced to heed the calls of their people. Emperor

Ferdinand of the Austrian Empire adopted policies that decreased the power of the nobility and

other reforms. Prussia’s King Frederick William IV was forced to accept a reform constitution, a

move one scholar stated, “...seemed to complete and make definitive the collapse of absolutism”

in Europe (Berman 33). The Revolutions of 1848, however, as influential as they were, did not

result in the culmination of a democratic Europe. Many places saw reform but remained under

authoritarian rule.

The aftermath following the 1848 Revolutions created a highly charged political

environment in Europe. Leaders across the continent now knew that they must respect the

masses' wishes lest they face significant backlash. The unification of Italy and German came

with even more debate over political representation. Italy settled on a constitutional monarchy,

parliamentary government, and a lower house of elected officials (Berman 34). Germany

instituted a liberal authoritarian regime, one that saw foreign policy ruled by the kaiser and

domestic policy overseen by the kaiser, the Bundesrat (delegates from Germany’s constituent

states), and the Reichstag (democratically elected officials). Both governments, however, failed

to deal with the plethora of issues they faced. In Italy, this resulted in decades of civil unrest.

Germany, by 1914, found itself in political gridlock and much social tension. The failed

transition to a more liberal government was not only seen in these two cases, however. The

Austrian Empire, Spain, and France all instituted increasingly liberal reforms and forms of

government, yet all seemed unable to govern properly and became increasingly unstable. The

result was that Europe entered the first World War with decades of growing political discontent

and mobilization (Berman 36).

World War I brought an end to the old order of governance, allowing democracy to take

hold over much of Europe. These young democracies, however, were weak and overwhelmed

with the vast amount of issues they faced, many resulting from the war, including, “the

reintegration of huge numbers of veterans into peacetime society; economic devastation,

inflation, and sometimes an obligation to pay reparations; paralyzing political divisions; violent

oppositional movements of both right and left; and, for the losers, national humiliation” (Berman

37). Consequently, many of these democracies quickly collapsed. Italy resorted to Fascism in

1922, Germany adopted National Socialism, and Spain and Austria both found themselves in

civil war and dictatorship in the 1930s. Like France and Britain, others were severely weakened

and ill-equipped to fight the Second World War (Berman 37).

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After the Second World War, the West began the gradual march toward peace and

prosperity across Europe. The aftermath of the war had brought an end to the old authoritarian

regimes and ideal conditions for the consolidation of democracy. The old authoritarian order was

largely discredited and lost most social, political, and economic support (Berman 37). With the

Axis powers defeated, the Allies sought to bring democracy to the whole of the continent. The

United States made a substantial commitment to the political and economic reconstruction of

Europe, one that embodied liberalism and economic freedom. The European states, at least the

Western half, echoed this sentiment, recognizing that democracy was the superior mode of

governance. This endeavor is known as the European project. In summation, Takis Pappas

defines the main goals of the project as “1) the spreading of pluralist parliamentary democracy to

nation after nation across the continent; 2) the forging of a multiethnic, multicultural, and ‘ever

closer’ union of European peoples and states; and 3) the continual advancement of political

liberalism” (Pappas 23). This project would face much opposition, however, as Europe was

divided during the Cold War as opposing ideologies struggled for dominance.

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With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of communism, these goals were

fully realized. Liberals viewed this event as a victory that promised future prosperity and that

economic and political liberalism had won and was here to stay. Francis Fukuyama prophesied

this event as “the end of history,” or rather, “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and

the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (4).

History, however, has obviously not ended, and it seems that the threats to democracy, thought to

be defeated, are back from the dead.

Democracy is hard to attain and even harder to uphold. It certainly seems naive of Francis

Fukuyama to believe that the consolidation of European democracy would remain forever stable

and unchallenged. After all, even in France, the birthplace of modern democracy, it took over 150

years of violence and change to create a stable democracy. Two competing theories of

democratization have emerged over the years, those two camps being preconditionists and

universalists. Preconditionists believe that democracy can only emerge through a set of specific

conditions and experiences. Universalists believe that democracy can emerge from a wide range

of ways (Berman 28).

The preconditionist view could be a valid reason for the recent challenges to democracy.

Many of the movements are seen in Eastern European countries that did not follow the West's

same path of democratization. However, these movements are being found all across Europe,

even in countries considered models of democracy like Britain and France. According to Sheri

Berman, “The idea that a gradual, liberal path to democracy exists and that it makes sense to

discourage countries that do not follow it from democratizing is a chimera based on a misreading

or misinterpretation of history” (38).

John Higley and Michael G. Burton offer a notable addition to how democracies rise and

fall over the course of history, hinging on elites' role. They add that a “stable regime” can only be

attained through a “consensually unified” national elite. A stable regime can then have the chance

to eventually become a modern democracy. Such is the case with Britain, the United States, or

Sweden. This, however, is rare. The most common state of national elites is a

“disunified” one, where a series of “unstable regimes” that alternate back and forth from

authoritarian to democratic is the result (Higley and Burton 17-18). They define “national elites”

as “persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and

movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially”

(18). Higley and Burton consider a consensually unified national elite one where its members:

‘(1) share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting

to a "restrained partisanship", and (2) participate in a more or less comprehensively

integrated structure of interaction that provides them with relatively reliable and effective

access to each other and to the most central decision-makers’ (19).

The cooperation of these elites has been observed to be vital in forming a stable regime,

and therefore modern democracy. The table below illustrates the historical timeline of

consensually unified elites vs. the creation of the nation-state for many modern democracies.

Higley and Burton

The influence of national elites on the success of democracy is interesting as it opposes

the notion that democracy is made for the people and by the people. By paying attention to elites'

behavior in contemporary Europe, we can better understand and predict the longevity of

established regimes and prepare for the emergence of new ones, whether they be stable or not.

Modern democracy, in the grand scheme of human history, is still a very new

phenomenon. Throughout the course of its inception and implementation, there has been much

violence and turmoil. To think that it will no longer experience issues and challenges is ignorant.

Democracy requires a devoted populace that embraces its core values of political liberalism and

freedom, however, it is this same freedom that gives rise to its challengers. Fascism, for instance,

can only succeed in a liberal democratic system. In instances where fascism competed with a

military dictatorship or a Communist regime, it was defeated. Fascism thrives in a democracy

where there exists a full political spectrum of Left and Right. In this system, the fascists find

weaknesses to exploit and indoctrinate those who would not have thought themselves radical.

Historically, the collapse of democracy occurred because there were not enough democrats

willing to take up its defense (Laqueur 18).

CHAPTER TWO: FASCISM

Opponents of Democracy and liberalism have risen from both the left and the right

extremes of the political spectrum, ranging from communists to fascists. However, most of the

movements seen portray more fascist tendencies, and these will be the focus of the following

chapters. These radical-right movements oppose both liberalism and Communism, however since

the fall of the Soviet bloc, the threat of Communism has significantly weakened. Therefore, these

movements now hold antiliberalism and anticapitalism at the forefront of their ideology (Laqueur

4). Before these specific movements are analyzed, it is important to attain an understanding of

what fascism itself is and how applicable this term can be in contemporary Europe. This chapter

will give a historical account of fascism and outline varying definitions that have been presented

and argued since its conception, ultimately deciding upon a working definition for the remainder

of my thesis.

Fascism’s Roots

Fascism first emerged during the interwar period in Europe. The ramifications of the first

World War and the treaty of Versailles changed the landscape of Europe, carving up old empires

into young democracies. As previously mentioned, these new democracies were weak and

illequipped to deal with the problems they faced. Vast amounts of returning war veterans were

not adequately dealt with and often turned into revolutionaries. The world economic crisis of the

late 20s and early 30s brought high unemployment, increased inflation, and a decline in industrial

production. These factors rocked these countries and fueled anti-democratic sentiment, causing a

polarization of politics and support for anti-democratic movements (Berg-Schlosser 343). Some

of these countries buckled under the stress of these issues, giving in to authoritarian regimes. In

the cases of Italy and Germany, they turned specifically to fascism.

Both countries were dissatisfied with their place in the world following World War I.

Germany was the ultimate loser of the treaty of Versailles, and Italy, although being a winner of

the war, did not achieve the spoils of victory that it wanted. In hindsight, conditions in each

country were perfect for a fascist victory. According to Walter Laqueur, “Fascism prevailed in

countries in which the old order seemed to no longer work, in which democracy was not deeply

rooted, in which waves of nationalist resentment were running high, and which felt threatened by

economic breakdown and social disorder” (16). Without World War I and the following postwar

crisis, fascism would have never prevailed. Economic strife was not all that contributed to the

victory of fascism in Italy and Germany. Economic issues of the same kind were seen all over

Europe. Therefore, the postwar crises that fueled fascism were of moral and cultural origins, not

economic.

It is important to note that there are stark differences between Italian Fascism and

National Socialism. These two movements are textbook examples of fascism; however, they are

each unique. To gain support, the Nazis looked to the peasantry, which was most vulnerable after

the war. The Italians, however, found support among war veterans who struggled to reintegrate

into civilian life and unemployed students (Laqueur 18). Both movements were able to mobilize

previously inactive parts of the population.

Nazi ideology was based upon the myth of the Volk, which juxtaposed the German people

to the Western idea of society. This idea placed the German people at the top of a hierarchy and

called for a return to traditional values and community. It also warned that the superior German

people were in danger of total destruction, and therefore the purity of their race must be

protected. Germany's main enemies were seen as the Jews, liberalism, Marxist socialism, and all

supernational forces (Laqueur 24). National Socialism is also unique from other fascist

movements in that it facilitated the Holocaust. Such mass extermination has not been seen in

other fascist regimes.

Italian Fascism was rooted in the nation and the role of the state. They believed that the

state creates the nation, not the other way around. This view of the state was a truly independent

one, outside of which no human or spiritual values could exist. This state should control all

political, moral, and economic forces, with its ultimate value being the greatness of the nation.

The idea of a nation, however, was a myth, and fascists were aware of this. Mussolini himself

stated, “We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, it is a passion, in our myth is the nation,

and to this myth, to this grandeur we subordinate all the rest” (Laqueur 25). The myth of the

nation and the supreme aim of greatness is echoed in both Italian Fascism and Nazism.

According to Mein Kampf, one nation is the other’s enemy, and therefore any war is justified.

The nation with the greatest willpower and brutal intent will prevail.

Although they share certain doctrinal differences, German National Socialism and Italian

Fascism share much in common. Their differences seem to only be relevant philosophically

rather than in their actual implementation of fascism.

Generic Fascism

Defining fascism is no easy task; even historically, this term is problematic as it seems to

ignore the differences between Germany and Italy. Fascism is a complicated concept that is

becoming increasingly complex. Even in its inception during the interwar period, there were

multiple varying forms of it throughout Europe. This concept has also continued to evolve over

time and has become harder to define. The good news is it doesn’t need to have an exact

definition. According to Walter Laqueur, one does not need to define something in order to study

it precisely. In his words, “Fascism resembles pornography in that it is difficult - perhaps

impossible - to define in an operational, legally valid way, but those with experience know it

when they see it” (6). Fascism is difficult to define because it can have many definitions. One can

define fascism through National Socialism's lens; however, it would not be wholly applicable to

any other fascist movement. The same is true for Italian Fascism. The problem arises when one

tries to reach a definition that transcends a place and time, or “generic fascism” (Scholtyseck

258).

Some scholars, such as Stanley Payne, argue that a definition of fascism can never escape

the confines of interwar Europe. Payne believes it is simply a historical phenomenon and that

"the full characteristics of European fascism could not be reproduced on a significant scale

outside Europe" (Payne 175). This is an understandable conclusion, as fascism emerged from

Europe and was created from European models of organization and politics. However, other

scholars, such as Roger Griffin, disagree. Griffin upholds that fascism did not end in 1945 but is

still relevant today due to its connection with modernization and modernity. Griffin is a founding

scholar of “generic fascism,” stating that the ideal type of fascism has a “mythic core” where

"the vision of the (perceived) crisis of the nation as betokening the birth-pangs of a new order"

(Scholtyseck 258). According to Griffin, “a certain amount of secularization, a broadened

suffrage, and a democratic setting were necessary prerequisites for the emergence of fascism,

which used the attractions of traditional religion but distorted its values” (Scholtyseck 258).

These conditions were, and are currently, primarily found in Europe, leading Griffin to reserve

the label of “fascism” for mostly European movements. In Michael Mann’s Fascists, he agrees

that fascism should remain solely a European phenomenon, however, he takes it further by

focusing on movements in Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Spain (Scholtyseck

259).

How, then, do we treat movements outside of Europe? “Islamofascism” has been a

popular term to describe Muslim terrorist groups and dictatorships in the Middle East in recent

decades. In some ways, the movements of this region share similarities with European fascist

movements. Both share a fear of modernity have nationalistic elements. Both have charismatic

leaders and are willing to resort to violence to achieve their goals. But to classify al-Qaeda and

similar groups in the Middle East as fascist is incorrect. The main component of truly fascist

movements is the perception of a “faltering liberal order” (Scholtyseck 254). Fascism in Europe

arose from the failures of interwar democracy as a “Third Way” from both capitalism and

communism as a means to fight against the established European order (Scholtyseck 250).

“Islamofascist” groups and regimes in the Middle East simply do not have the appropriate

preconditions to spawn true fascism. The “widely varying national fascisms of interwar Europe”

have “very different resentments, demands, and strategies of the (equally heterogeneous) Muslim

movements and insurgencies of our own time” (Judt 2). Also, fascist movements have been seen

to create a "political religion,” defined by Geovanni Gentile as something that "sacralizes an

ideology, movement or a political regime through the deification of a secular entity transfigured

into myth” (Scholtyseck 252). Muslim extremist groups, as we should appropriately call them,

such as al-Qaeda, do not have a “political religion” at the core of their being; rather, it is a radical

interpretation of Islam. Comparing Muslim extremists and fascists primarily because of their

similar actions is misguided. A fascist movement need not be specifically in interwar Europe to

be considered fascist, but it still must share the core elements of the fascists in that time and

place.

Neofascism

Fascist movements in recent decades have been classified as neofascism. However, this

term, like fascism, is hard to define. European fascism today is set in a completely different

world. Democratic institutions are now heavily rooted all across Europe, Communism is no

longer a threat, and Europe is no longer the center of world power as it once was. In its heyday,

fascism coexisted with war. The ability to so easily declare war on your perceived enemies is no

longer possible, even if some neofascists may want it. How then can this new idea of neofascism

be linked to generic, historical fascism? What is being seen today is something new and different

(Laqueur 7). In an attempt to describe this new movement, many terms have been used, such as

right-wing extremism, right-wing radicalism, right-wing populism, national populism, and

national revolutionaries, among others (Laqueur 7-8). Any term that has been used, however, is

to some degree unsatisfactory.

It is also important to distinguish fascism from populism, as the two are commonly

confused with one another. The term “populism,” while sharing many characteristics with

fascism, is used to define any illiberal but democratic and non-revolutionary form of politics.

Populist movements are fueled by widespread mistrust of the ruling elites, both political and

economical, both domestic and international. Fascist longing for an ultra-nation is not the driving

force behind populism. Instead, it is the “feeling of vague existential threat streaming from

modernity itself, of being a stranger in your own country, the longing to have roots, to have an

identity, and to be ‘somewhere’ familiar, not to live in the new world of the revolutionary

imaginary” (Griffin 96). Populism, then, seems like merely a side effect of a modernizing and

increasingly globalized world. Fascism, however, is completely antisystem and antidemocratic

and steeped in racism, sexism, xenophobia, and ultranationalism.

It may help to analyze the mind of a fascist to better understand both historical fascism

and neofascism. Fascists are propelled more with feelings than actual rational thought.

Passionate rhetoric leads to a tribal mentality that unites the masses. According to Robert O.

Paxton, this rhetoric has “mobilizing passions” that are present in all fascisms. He organizes

these characteristics as follows:

‘1. The primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right,

whether universal or individual.

2. The belief that one’s group is a victim, a sentiment that justifies any action against the

group’s enemies, internal as well as external.

3. Dread of the group’s decadence under the corrosive effect of individualistic and

cosmopolitan liberalism.

4. Closer integration of the community within a brotherhood (fascio) whose unity and

purity are forged by common conviction, if possible, or by exclusionary violence if

necessary.

5. An enhanced sense of identity and belonging, in which the grandeur of the group

reinforces individual self-esteem.

6. Authority of natural leaders (always male) throughout society, culminating in a

national chieftain who alone is capable of incarnating the group’s destiny.

7. The beauty of violence and of will, when they are devoted to the group’s success in a

Darwinian struggle’ (Paxton 6-7).

These beliefs are shared and echoed by fascist leaders to recruit followers. These “mobilizing

passions'' can be seen in Nazsim and Italian Fascism and the fascist movements that are seen

today. The fascist also substitutes tradition in the place of reason. Fascism cannot exist in

harmony with reason, as it is irrational and opposes reason at its very core. Arthur J. Jacobson

states:

‘The fascist knows that in a world where reason is always a temptation, tradition must be

merciless and hard. If it is not, then reason, which is always merciless and hard, will

triumph and humanity will be destroyed. The fascist knows that sustaining a tradition in

the face of reason requires discipline and violence. It requires total immersion in the texts

and ways of the tradition. It requires intolerance. It requires keeping the strange, the

different, the other at bay’ (403-404).

Fascism favors tradition over reason and the absence of reason is remedied with faith. The fascist

has faith that reason is not suitable for the human experience and successful civilization. Whether

it be communist, liberal, or conservative, the products of reason are doomed because they do not

hold the irrational terms of fascism (Jacobson 404). The foundation of the fascist tradition is

bogus pageantry. The fascist “mobilizes its resources through theater, through music and the

visual arts. Fascist emotions are theatrical emotions” (Jacobson 404). The passionate rhetoric and

showmanship of fascists inspire the masses to look past reason and believe in tradition.

These theatrics allow fascism to be capable of adaptation and disguise, especially today.

In an interview with the US New Republic in 1986, concentration camp survivor Primo Levi

spoke on the nature of fascism, stating:

‘Since it is difficult to distinguish true prophets from false, it is well to regard all prophets

with suspicion. Yet it is clear that this formula is too simple to suffice in every case. A

new fascism, with its trail of intolerance, abuse, and servitude, can be born outside our

country and imported into it, walking on tiptoe and calling itself by other names; or it can

loose itself from within with such violence that it routs all defenses. At that point, wise

counsel no longer serves, … and one must find strength to resist. But then, too, the

memory of what happened in the heart of Europe, not very long ago, can serve as support

and warning’ (Griffin 142).

No matter what it is called or how it is disguised, it is important to be vigilant against fascism in

all its forms in defense of democracy.

The evasiveness of defining fascism today should not discourage the study of it. As

fascism changes and adapts, so should we in being able to recognize it. We must pay attention to

certain warning signs and ask ourselves the appropriate questions when analyzing these new

movements. According to Robert O. Paxton, the important questions to ask are:

‘Are they becoming rooted as parties that represent major interests and feelings and wield

major influence on the political scene? Is the economic or constitutional system in a state

of blockage apparently insoluble by existing authorities? Is a rapid political mobilization

threatening to escape the control of traditional elites, to the point where they would be

tempted to look for tough helpers in order to stay in charge?’ (22).

By asking these questions and being cognizant of fascism's past, we will better identify today’s

equivalents to fascism.

Finding the “Fascist Minimum”

The misuse of the term “fascism” and “neofascism” has muddied the waters in today’s

political landscape. These terms are often used as synonyms for racialism, xenophobia, sexism,

right-wing conservative and reactionary views, and more. Fascism is so commonly used and

thrown around so liberally that it has essentially lost its meaning. Not every anti-Semite,

ultranationalist, or someone who opposes immigration is fascist. There exists a “fascist

minimum,” as Walter Laqueur puts it, and people may sympathize or share certain basic

characteristics of fascism without being full-bodied fascists (7). Ernst Nolte identifies the

requirements for the “fascist minimum” as being “anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, a partial

anticonservatism, the existence of a party army, and the leader- principle” (Scholtyseck 248). The

“fascist minimum” is similar to the concept of “generic fascism” as both attempt to identify

fascist movements with a definition that transcends time and space.

The “fascist minimum” outlined by Nolte ignores some key concepts, however. Italian

historian Emilio Gentile, in his definition of fascism, accounts for the religious aspect of fascism.

According to Gentile, fascism includes a “sacralization of politics” that is unique from other

religious institutions (Scholtyseck 249). His definition also accounts for the ideological

background that birthed fascism:

‘A mass movement with multi-class membership in which prevail, among the leaders

and militants, the middle sectors, in large part new to political activity, organized as a

party militia, that bases its identity not on social hierarchy or class origin, but on the

sense of comradeship, believes itself invested with a mission of national regeneration,

considers itself in a state of war against political adversaries and aims at conquering a

monopoly of political power by using terror, parliamentary tactics, and deals with leading

groups, to create a new regime that destroys parliamentary democracy’ (Scholtyseck

249).

Gentile’s definition is an improvement to the “fascist minimum,” however, more concepts must

be added for it to be more widely applicable. Fascists are often drawn to new and different forms

of organization and political action. This progressiveness and fluidity are included in Juan Linz’s

multi-dimensional definition:

‘We define fascism as a hyper-nationalist, often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary,

antiliberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore anti-proletarian, partly anti-capitalist

and anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, or at least, non-clerical movement, with the aim of

nationalsocial integration through a single party and corporative representation not

always equally emphasised; with a distinctive style and rhetoric, it relied on activist

cadres ready for violent action combined with electoral participation to gain power with

totalitarian goals by a combination of legal and violent tactics’ (Scholtyseck 250).

This definition, however, still does not satisfy the universality that fascism demands. The most

current and widely accepted definitions of fascism are brought forth by Robert Paxton and Roger

Eatwell. These definitions cover a wide range of fascists movements, include multiple European

phenomena, and act as a guideline for universal fascism. Robert Paxton states:

‘Fascism may be defined as a political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation

with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity,

energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed national militants, working

in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties

and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraint goals of

internal cleansing and external expansion’ (Scholtyseck 259).

Roger Eatwell adds:

‘An ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical third

way, though in practice fascism has stressed style, especially action and the charismatic

leader, more than detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichean demonisation of its

enemies’ (Scholtyseck 259).

These two final definitions best serve as the basis for fascism and the “fascist minimum” that will

be used to analyze current movements in the next chapters. However, it is important to note that

these definitions, although presently accepted, are subject to change. The study of fascism is a

turbulent one, with much internal debate on what it precisely is. In MacGregor Knox’s words, the

debate on fascism resembles "a deserted battlefield littered with the burnt-out, rusting hulls of

failed theories” (Scholtyseck 259).

In summation, the “fascist minimum” that I have arrived at is best illustrated by the

following checklist. A party or movement can be considered fascist if it consists of:

1. A disdain for and abandonment of democratic and liberal values.

2. Establishment of a “mythic” past that stresses the protection of a desired

race/culture.

3. Demonization of a particular group to take action against.

4. Employs violence at will and abandons ethical and legal restraints.

5. Presence of a charismatic leader.

6. Views themselves as anti-establishment and an alternative to mainstream politics.

7. Against mainstream media, anti-clerical, and anti-communist.

This checklist will serve as the litmus test to decide whether a party or movement can be

considered fascist or not. Some parties may only embody a few of these characteristics and will

then need an alternative classification. The most important of these characteristics is undoubtedly

point number one: the abandonment of democratic and liberal values. A party or movement is

most dangerous if it has no regard for the rules of democracy or liberal values. This is the most

essential aspect of fascist ideology.

Alternative Classifications

The “fascist minimum,” which I have come to define in the previous section, can be

considered more of a “lumper” approach to classifying fascism and similar movements. Other

scholars, such as Takis Pappas, would disagree with my broader definition and champion

multiple, more precise definitions in the place of mine. Takis Pappas, and those like him, are

considered “splitters.”

Pappas distinguishes democracy's current challengers into three categories:

antidemocrats, nativists, and populists. He defines antidemocrats as parties that “may take part in

elections, but they do so as “antisystem” formations—they comply with some of the outward

rules of parliamentarism, but they disdain its principles and spirit and would happily jettison

them if given the chance” (24). Antidemocrats exist both on the right and the left. Leftist

antidemocrats tend to “promote proletarian dictatorship, condemn European unification as the

brainchild of a nefarious capitalism, and are ideologically committed to internationalism for all

working people, including immigrants and refugees” (25). Antidemocrats on the right, however,

“typically advocate ultranationalist—even racist—ideologies, focus on security issues, are hostile

to the EU, and take a strong stand against immigration” (25).

Nativists, as described by Pappas, fear immigration and European Union multiculturalism

above all else. Nativists see both of these as “grave threats to well-ordered, ethnoculturally

coherent societies, to their established liberal-democratic values, and, perhaps most crucially, to

the sustainability of the welfare states that these societies have inherited from the days before

mass immigration” (27). To define populism, Pappas simply uses the term “democratic

illiberalism” (28). A party that fits this category “must harbor an allegiance to democracy, and it

also must endorse illiberal tactics” (29).

These three alternative classifications for distinguishing the radical-right in contemporary

European politics are useful. However, they do not aid in identifying and specifying fascism. The

“fascist minimum” that I outlined previously, in line with Joachim Scholtyseck’s analysis, uses

Robert Paxton’s and Roger Eatwell’s definitions for fascism as its foundation. Paxton and

Eatwell’s definitions can easily bleed into each of the three categories that Pappas describes.

Fascists can embody elements of antidemocrats, nativists, and populists all at once. Therefore,

my established “fascist minimum,” although it may favor “lumper” ideology in its breadth, is the

most appropriate form of classification going forward.

CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Now that a theoretical foundation has been established on the meanings and variations of

fascism itself, I will examine three current radical-right parties in contemporary Europe. I will

analyze the National Rally in France, the League in Italy, and Fidesz in Hungary. Each party

holds a different amount of power within its government. The National Rally has never held any

substantial power and has long existed on the periphery of politics. The League has been in

control of Italy’s government, but only as a part of a coalition. Fidesz, however, has maintained

complete control of Hungary’s government since 2014. In each case study, I will give a brief

historical account of the party and analyze the party’s demographic, leadership, various tactics to

horde power, and behavior towards democratic and liberal values. I will then finally ascertain

where each party lands on the political spectrum and determine the appropriate label for them,

whether fascist or another more fitting term.

National Rally

History

The National Rally, or Rassemblement National, was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le

Pen, who was the party’s leader until 2011. Until June 2018, the party was known as the National

Front for French Unity or National Front for short. Since its conception, the party has strongly

advocated for French nationalism, immigration control and has often exhibited xenophobic and

anti-Semitic behavior. Before founding the National Front, Le Pen served as a paratrooper in

Algeria and French Indochina and was highly critical of Charles de Gaulle’s decision to concede

Algeria. Upon returning to France, he was elected to the National Assembly as its youngest

deputy in 1956. After his failure to be reelected in 1962, he founded a society that peddled Nazi

speeches and German military songs. He then founded the National Front 10 years later

(Britannica).

In its early years, the party was seen as the French take on western Europe’s burgeoning

neofascist movement. The National Front resurrected fascist slogans from the 1930s to attract

support from right-wing populist citizens, including veterans of the Algerian War and supporters

of the Poujadisme movement of the 1950s. However, the party struggled with electoral success

with the emergence of Le Pen’s alleged involvement in torture during the Algerian War, causing

right-wing voters to support other candidates (The French Report). Le Pen later failed to secure

the mere 500 signatures needed to appear on the 1981 presidential ballot (Britannica).

The early 1980s saw a turning point for the National Front, however, with success in the

Paris and Dreux mayoral elections and the winning of 10 seats in the European Parliament. This

was largely due to the softening of party policies by Le Pen, leading to increased support from

other right-wing and center-right parties. By 1984 the party had a 17% approval rating and had

much success in the 1986 legislative elections, securing 35 seats in the National Assembly,

roughly 10% of the vote. In the 1988 presidential election, Le Pen accounted for an

unprecedented 14.4% of the vote (The French Report). Despite his increasing success and

support, Le Pen was consistently a divisive personality, with his comments leading to fines and

widespread criticism. One such comment being the dismission of the impact and scale of the

Holocaust (Britannica).

By the 1990s, the National Front was an established force in French politics. In the 1995

presidential election, Le Pen won more than 15% of the vote, with the party also having

successful mayoral elections in Toulon, Orange, and Marignane. Despite now finding itself amid

the French political scene, the party still identified itself as an organization that existed outside of

the French establishment. It opposed mainstream politics and any party that it included, from the

French Communist Party to the neo-Gaullist Rally for the Republic (Britannica).

The 2002 presidential election saw Le Pen’s greatest showing yet, after his surprising

first-round victory over Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. He was then pitted against

incumbent President Jacques Chirac in a runoff election, the first of which since 1969 where

neither candidate belonged to a left-wing party. Despite his unexpected win in the first round, Le

Pen was soundly defeated in what is the largest margin of victory in the history of the French

presidency. Le Pen’s divisive tactics led many disparate parties to shift support behind Chirac,

allowing him to win more than 82% of the vote, with polls showing that 71% of that was simply

to prevent a Le Pen victory (The French Report).

Le Pen’s performance in the 2007 presidential election was far less successful with his

failure to advance past the first round of balloting. The next year Jean-Marie was sentenced to a

three-month suspension and 10,000 Euro fine for his comments that violated France’s statute on

Holocaust denial. It soon became clear that Jean-Marie was no longer fit to lead the party, and he

resigned as president of the National Front in 2008. In 2011, after three years of campaigning,

Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine Le Pen won an overwhelming majority to succeed him as the

National Front leader (Britannica).

Upon taking the reins of the National Front, Marine Le Pen began shifting the party away

from its radical-right roots to become more acceptable by the mainstream public and media. This

process was dubbed “dediabolisation” by Marine due to the description of the National Front as

“diabolical” that was popular in political discourse. Jean-Marie was famous for making

extremely racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic comments that limited the party’s success.

Marine’s strategy to exercise the party of her father's extreme sentiments has been successful, as

68% of French people now consider the National Rally to be a mainstream party (Magnificat).

Marine still embodies many right-wing values, however, the most important of which being

immigration control, especially from Islamic countries.

In the first round of the 2012 presidential election, Marine finished third behind Socialist

candidate Francois Hollande. She secured 18% of the vote, the highest ever for a candidate from

the National Front. The party continued to garner increasing support, finishing first in the 2014

elections for the European Parliament with one-fourth of the vote. The National Front, now the

National Rally, has continued to gain support since the success of the 2014 elections, despite a

disappointing outcome of the 2017 presidential election (Britannica). Marine Le Pen is poised to

be a front-runner for the 2022 presidential election with rising xenophobia and euro-skepticism.

Transition of Power

To orchestrate the ideological shift of the National Rally, Marine used a variety of tactics.

Her use of identity politics helped to shield the party from its criticisms. Identity politics is

defined as “political positions based on the interests and perspectives of social groups with which

people identify. Moreover, identity politics includes the ways in which politics are shaped by

aspects of their identity through loosely correlated social organizations” (Magnificat). To combat

the criticism that the National Rally was racist and homophobic, Marine appointed several gay

and minority members to the party in 2012. Although this move angered the party's Catholic and

regionalist factions, it made the National Rally more appealing to the mainstream public. As a

result, the rhetoric of the party underwent a fundamental change as well. In dealing with the issue

of immigration, the party no longer demonized immigrants and showed disdain for certain

groups of people but rather expressed that they simply cannot assimilate successfully into

France’s society based on their vastly different upbringing. The same message of antiimmigration

was still being sent; however, the wording was now much more widely acceptable (Magnificat).

Marine also distanced herself from her father as much as possible in an attempt to clear

her name, and the name of the party, of his past transgressions. In 2013, she announced that Jean-

Marie no longer had an official role within the party but remained as an advisor. In reference to

Jean-Marie’s past controversial comments, Marine remarked they were

“unacceptable” and “from a past era” (Magnificat). In an attempt to save his reputation,

JeanMarie stated his support of the shift occurring in the party and denounced his past comments

and decisions. This was all for not, however, when Jean-Marie implied that the gas chambers

used during the Holocaust were a detail of a much larger war and that the “white world” is under

attack in an interview (Magnificat). Marine quickly rejected Jean-Marie’s comments and

suspended him from the party. In reaction to his suspension, Jean-Marie publicly disowned

Marine, and on April 10th, 2015, he announced his retirement from politics (Magnificat).

The falling out between Marine and her father Jean-Marie is symbolic of the greater

schism that Marine created within the party. Old members and supporters of Jean-Marie have

found themselves at odds with the younger members who support Marine. To further cleanse the

party image and rid it of the old regime, Marine banned several militants from the party she

considered to be too neo-fascist. She also called the Holocaust an “abomination,” which is a

drastic improvement to anything her father said on the subject. Jean Yves Camus speaks on this

move, saying:

‘Its sincere rejection of Holocaust denial and Nazism also limits the persistence within

the FN of radical militant nuclei whose vision of the world is based on necessity to

repudiate all the founding ideas of liberal democracy, with a particular fixation against

anti-racism, egalitarianism and universalism’ (Magnificat).

Marine’s stance on the Holocaust is in direct opposition to her father's ideals and the party’s older

members. This was a significant step for the party to move further away from the far-right and to

the center. In 2012, Marine also detached the party from significant far-right “alliances” such as

the European Alliance for Freedom (Magnificat).

Identity and Policy

The shift away from Jean-Marie’s National Front to Marine’s National Rally has been

methodical and carefully planned so as to not alienate its base. The party’s continued move to

mainstream politics and the center risks the support of its members who liked that the party

existed in protest to the political establishment. Regardless of this risk, the National Rally has

remained an “anti-establishment” party. France’s system of presidential elections often leads

voters to choose the lesser of two evils in its second round. This typically results in very low

approval ratings for presidents, as they were not most of the voter’s first choice. In this sense, the

National Rally has enjoyed the luxury of avoiding this scrutiny, having never won a presidency.

The party remains on the periphery, and it is here that it holds some degree of immunity. It is also

able to hold on to its historical base due to the multiple scandals within the conservative right,

one such scandal being when Nicolas Sarkozy took money from Colonel Ghaddafi

(Magnificat).

The National Rally is not only split between old and young, but also by North and South.

Each region holds its own political views and priorities. The party’s supporters in Northern

France identify more with the new era of the National Rally led by Marine and want a more

social party. The South, alternatively, leans more to the right. Both regions, however, agree on

the party’s central issue of immigration. According to the National Institute of French Public

Opinion, both north and south electorates voted over 90% yes when asked if there were too many

immigrants in France (Magnificat). To remedy the divide between the North and South, Marine

has made the issue of immigration the central focus of the party.

According to the National Rally, immigration is the root of all evil, and the issue is a tool

used by Marine Le Pen to unite those who would have disagreements over her policies.

According to Marine, the first step to solving all issues in France is to increase border security.

To accomplish this, she proposed using 50,000 military personnel, 15,000 policemen, and the

construction of 40,000 prison cells during her 2017 presidential campaign (Magnificat). Marine

also hopes to limit France’s total legal and illegal immigration to 10,000 people per year. To

accomplish this, Marine has proposed the abolishment of the Schengen zone, effectively

blocking Europeans from immigrating freely to France. She also wishes to end the right of soil

for children born in France of foreign parents (Magnificat).

The disdain felt for immigrants within the National Rally is especially focused towards

Islamic countries. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the party has used the heightened

Islamophobia within France to attract more support. More recently, a French middle school

teacher was beheaded by a Muslim extremist after showing cartoons depicting the Prophet

Muhammad in October of 2020. Marine Le Pen has used such horrible acts of violence to spread

fear of Muslims. Marine Le Pen has recently proposed a law to ban Islamist ideologies, which

she describes as “totalitarian and murderous” (Ya Libnan).

Marine Le Pen is also fiercely against the European Union. She was elected to the EU

parliament in 2014 while being openly anti-EU and was a roadblock for many pieces of

legislation. She vehemently advocates for France’s exit of the European Union, stressing the

importance of sovereignty and control of borders and currency. Marine believes that economic

decisions should be made by the French themselves and wants to escape the controls of the Euro

and the European Central Bank. According to Marine, France is being treated unfairly compared

to other members of the EU, and the open borders of the EU result in a loss of jobs for the

French people. She has also proposed a tax on companies that hire outside of France.

(Magnificat).

Marine Le Pen has also been highly critical of NATO, believing that it is a strain on

French sovereignty. It is believed that she would like to instead align France with Russia as she

was a supporter of the annexation of Crimea. The National Rally was also given a hefty loan of

11 million Euros from Russia in 2014 which many political entities have highly criticized. Both

the National Rally and Russia are anti-NATO and anti-EU (Magnificat).

Gay marriage is an issue that has become somewhat divisive within the National Rally.

Christians and traditional Catholics that are opposed to gay marriage make up a large part of the

party’s base and still hold significant power within the party. In 2017, however, Marine promised

the protection of the LGBTQ community from the threat of Islamism. This is in direct opposition

to the anti-LGBTQ stance that most of her party adheres to, yet it seems that the threat of

Muslim immigration has trumped that view. Marine still officially opposes same-sex marriage,

however, it is unclear if this position may change in the future to further solidify her rejection of

Islamism (Magnificat). However, it is doubtful that she would do this, as Catholics contribute a

significant amount to the party’s support, as seen in the graph below.

Although Christians and Catholics make up a significant amount of the party’s base, the

National Rally is a large proponent of secularism. France is a hyper-secular country and has

greatly limited the impact of religion on daily life. For instance, French schools have banned any

and all religious objects or symbolism, including Muslim hijabs, Christian veils and signs, the

Jewish kippa and more. The National Rally is a proponent of this secularism, especially when it

comes to its defense against Islamism. In 2016, Marine Le Pen vowed to “protect the French

family and the traditions of secularity” (Magnificat). The union of family values and secularism

is altogether something different than what is seen in other countries, especially the United

States, where conservative family traditions and religious values typically exist in unison.

A New Generation

Marine and Jean-Marie are not the only Le Pens worth mentioning, however. Marion

Maréchal-Le Pen, the granddaughter of Jean-Marie and niece of Marine, represents the newest

generation of young conservatives in France. Marion seems to be the guiding figurehead leading

an “evolving right-wing Popular Front” (Lilla 1). This new generation of conservatives believes

in an organic conception of society, one that:

‘...sees Europe as a single Christian civilization composed of different nations with

distinct languages and customs. These nations are composed of families, which are

organisms, too, with differing but complementary roles and duties for mothers, fathers,

and children. On this view, the fundamental task of society is to transmit knowledge,

morality, and culture to future generations, perpetuating the life of the civilizational

organism. It is not to serve an agglomeration of autonomous individuals bearing rights’

(Lilla 4).

These young conservatives denounce France’s involvement in the European Union because of its

focus on individuals' economic self-interest and its rejection of the cultural-religious foundation

of Europe. To them, the EU has also allowed for the immigration of Muslims, who are from a

different and incompatible civilization. The EU has also ignored France’s most vulnerable

citizens through its consolidation of economic power in Brussels. In their eyes, the economy

should be subordinate to social needs (Lilla 4).

Environmental conservation is also an important issue for this new generation, who

criticize the severe impacts of neoliberal economics and environmental degradation. They

denounce agribusiness, genetically modified crops, and suburbanization (Lilla 4).

In terms of family and sexuality, these young conservatives hold a traditionalist Catholic

view, however, they argue this view purely through secularity. The increase of radical

individualism has resulted in many problems for the family, including dropping rates of family

formation, delayed child-bearing, rising numbers of single-parents, and pornography addiction.

They argue that a return to more traditional values, ones that support strong, stable families, will

solve these problems (Lilla 4).

The women of this new movement have adopted a new form of feminism called

“alterfeminism” in rejection of the “career fetishism” of contemporary feminism (Lilla 4). They

oppose the capitalist view that slaving for a boss is freedom, however, they do not only advocate

for the traditional stay-at-home-mother role. They believe that women instead need a more

realistic image for themselves, one that embraces the traditional role of motherhood and

reproduction but also embodies individual accomplishment in the workplace. Marianne Durano

speaks on the harmfulness of contemporary feminism, saying:

‘We are the victims of a worldview in which we are supposed to live it up until the age of

25, then work like fiends from 25 to 40 (the age when you’re at the bottom of the

professional scrap heap), avoid commitments and having children before 30. All of this

goes completely against the rhythm of women’s lives’ (Lilla 4).

This “alter-feminism” praises the efforts of feminists in the past; however, it questions the new

wave that has rejected the traditional role and values of women.

Marion is not her grandfather, nor is she her aunt. She embodies a new form of

conservatism and has the stage and personality to unite it. She has the potential to lead a

moderate conservative movement that is not primarily motivated by xenophobia and anti-elitism

but rather one that wishes for a more stable and less fluid world, both economically and

culturally. This new classical, organic conservatism could oppose the alt-right by simply stressing

tradition, solidarity, and care for the earth (Lilla 7). Marion could also, however, use the

traditional, organic view of this new generation to foster a new wave of Christian nationalism,

one that can span Europe and lead to joint political action between many right-wing populist

parties (Lilla 7). Either way, Marion will undoubtedly be a significant player in not only French

conservatism but also European conservatism in the near future.

Assessment

Now that the party has been fully analyzed, is it reasonable to consider the National Rally

a fascist party? The National Rally is a long-standing party that has undergone copious amounts

of change over its history. It was most certainly fascist in its early years under Jean-Marie Le

Pen's leadership; however, in recent years, it has shifted away from its founding ideals. Under

Marine Le Pen's leadership, the party has adopted more progressive forms of thinking and

rhetoric. Marine’s break with her overtly fascist father and her full recognition of the Holocaust’s

horrors have helped her cause immensely. Even the name change of “National Front,” which has

aggressive and militaristic undertones, has been a step away from the party’s fascist history. The

National Rally, however, still has undoubtedly remained on the radical-right end of the political

spectrum. Xenophobia, Euroscepticism, distrust of the media, islamophobia, and homophobia all

remain as central motivators of the party. In this initial analysis, however, I would not call the

National Rally fascist. It does not currently meet the qualifications of my previously mentioned

“fascist minimum.” Rather, I believe it to be a right-wing populist party.

The League

History

Lega, or “League” in English, formerly known as the “Northern League,” was founded in

1991 by Umberto Bossi. It is the oldest existing party in Italy. Bossi was a northern-regionalist

politician who created the League by uniting the various autonomous movements across the Po

River valley. The League was founded to lead a movement of northern secession from the Italian

state in favor of a new “Federal Republic of Padania.” The League was also founded as a

populist party, with its rhetoric denouncing the central government, referring to it as “Roma

ladrona” (Rome the Thief). The government was seen as “a nest of corrupt elites allegedly bent

on exploiting hardworking northerners for the benefit of lazy, profligate southerners”

(D'Alimonte 122).

The League soon took the national stage in the 1992 general elections, where it won

8.7% of the votes, 56 deputies and 26 senators. In 1994 the party won only 8.4% of the votes.

However, it increased its deputies to 117 and senators to 56 for greater parliamentary

representation. Also in 1994, the League joined Forza Italia, Alleanza Nationale, and the Centro

Cristiano Democratico to form a coalition government under Silvio Berlusconi. The League

obtained five ministries in this government. In the 1996 general elections, the party won 10.1%

of the votes (Life in Italy).

However, the League shifted from secessionism to federalism in 2000, following its

second alliance with Silvio Berlusconi. Alongside Forza Italia, the League governed Italy from

2001-2006. Despite this change, the party still upholds its pledge to free its regional home from

the Italian Republic (D'Alimonte 121-122). In 2008, spurred by Romano Prodi’s government's

fall, the League secured 8.3% of the votes in the early general elections (Life in Italy).

In 2013, Matteo Salvini became the leader of the League. For the next few years the

League remained largely on the periphery of the political landscape until the 2018 parliamentary

election. In this election, Italy became the only country in Western Europe with a populist

majority. The League, in conjunction with the Five Star Movement, won a combined 50.3% of

the popular vote and 56% of the seats in the lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies

(D'Alimonte 114). The Five Star Movement was by far the single largest party with 227 seats in

the 630-seat Chamber and 122 seats in the 315-seat senate. The League, by contrast, was the

second-largest single party in the house with 125 seats. In the Senate, the League captured 58

seats, the third-largest amount by a single party (D'Alimonte 114). The League also overtook

Forza Italia as the country’s top party in the center-right bloc. The party system has therefore

shifted, with components of the right becoming increasingly more radical. The coined

“Government of Change” currently had Salvini as Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime

Minister, along with Luigi Di Maio of the Five Star Movement.

Roberto D'Alimonte (116)

The Five Star Movement’s dominance declined in the 2019 European Parliament election,

only securing 17%. The League, however, accounted for 34% of the vote. This was an almost

exact inversion of the 2018 results (CNBC). This result marked a clear shift of support from the

left-leaning Five Star Movement to the far-right League. Following the 2019 elections, the

League joined the political group of European Parliament “Identity and Democracy,” formerly

known as the “European Alliance for People and Nations” (Deutsche Welle). The group consists

of Italy’s League, France’s National Rally, and Germany’s Alternative for Germany as member

parties (Politico).

In July of 2019, Salvini and the League were accused of corruption linked to Russia, as

recordings leaked of party members meeting with Russian agents in Moscow. The meeting

centered around Russia funding the party with an illegal $65 million (BuzzFeed). Italian

authorities are currently investigating this case and other instances of Russian-linked corruption

by the League. It is also important to note that the League is an official cooperation party of

United Russia, Russia's governing party (Financial Times).

In August 2019 the coalition government of the Five Star Movement and the League

crumbled, allowing for a new government led by Guiseppe Conte to take power. This new

coalition consisted of the Five Star Movement, the Democratic Party, the Free and Equal

parliamentary group, and Italia Viva. The League was forced into the opposition once again;

however, it still continued to gain support across Italy. Conte’s government fell in January 2021

after losing support from Italia Viva (CNBC). President Mattarella has appointed Mario Draghi

to form a cabinet, consisting of the League, the Five Star Movement, the Democratic Party, and

Forza Italia.

Transforming the League

Under Matteo Salvini’s leadership since 2013, the party has shifted its focus from

regionalism to nationalism. The unofficial name change from “Northern League” to simply

“League” reflects this shift, as the latter is undoubtedly more inclusive and universal. “Northern

League” still exists as the official name in the party statute, however. Salvini’s strategy for party

success has been aided by the lack of a national right-wing party in Italy. Bossi’s Northern

League was right-wing but regionally based. Salvini’s League has evolved into a national rightist

party, as was seen by his slogan for the 2018 election, “Italians First.” Patriotism has taken the

place of regionalism, and Italy has replaced Padania. The European Union and immigrants have

replaced Rome and southerners as the party’s primary enemy. (D'Alimonte 122).

Salvini has become synonymous with the League, readily embodying the role of a

charismatic leader. Like Marine with the National Rally and Viktor Orbán with Fidesz, the

success of the party is closely linked to Salvini and his personal success. This symbiotic

relationship is visible in the evolution of the party logo, as shown below. The official logo

remains highly regionalistic, with references to Padania. The electoral logo, however, brandishes

Salvini’s name instead.

Official logo (1994-1999) Official logo (1999-present) Electoral logo (2018-present)

leganord.org

The European Union, immigrants, and refugees must exist as a threat to Italy and its

national identity in the eyes of the League. These threats affect all of Italy, not just the north, and

allows Salvini to appeal to a wider range of voters. A large swath of the electorate in Italy already

views immigrants and refugees as a threat, and Salvini has taken advantage of this. Of Italy’s

population of 61 million, immigrants only account for about 8%. One 2018 study, however,

shows that many Italians estimate that immigrants make up 25% of the entire population. This is

the largest gap between real and perceived immigrant share in all of Europe

(D'Alimonte 122).

Salvini’s xenophobic rhetoric and actions against immigration has successfully

nationalized his party. His actions against NGOs that rescued and brought migrants from sea to

Italy as Interior Minister were praised among voters. The rising distrust of elites and the political class has

voters viewing Salvini as a rare leader, one who actually accomplishes what he promised. Salvini has also

received much criticism from the EU on his immigration policy, but this has only aided his effort. Criticism

from the EU has only polished his image as the leader Italy needs to oppose EU interests.

The rapid decline of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia has also helped the League break from its

regionalist roots. Silvio Berlusconi is now 84, and his legal “imbroglios” paired with a crisis at

the political center has allowed the League to cannibalize Forza Italia’s voters. The League

entered central and southern Italy under the banner “Us with Salvini” to rebrand the party to

voters outside the north. Forza Italia now polls at a mere 7% compared to the League’s 32%,

with the League polling 22% in the south (Broder 13).

The League’s increasing popularity and nationalism may soon come back to haunt the

party, however. Salvini has done a strategic job of rebranding the party to appear more

nationalist, however he has yet to totally abandon its regionalist roots. This issue has yet to be

appropriately addressed by Salvini, who, so far, has chosen simply to delay dealing with this

issue. Roberto D'Alimonte speaks on the League’s paradoxical nature, saying:

‘Yet there is lingering ambiguity regarding how regional or national it is— just weeks

after running in the 2018 general election as Lega, it ran as the Northern League in a

northern regional election and as Lega in a southern regional election—but so far this has

not damaged Salvini. It is a League `a la carte. Sooner or later, however, the coexistence

of the old Northern League with the new Lega will have to be addressed’ (123).

Luckily for Salvini, his electoral success has thus far silenced public criticism on the issue.

Despite this, Salvini must ask himself how long this will last. How long will regional party

leaders sit by idly while Salvini panders to the Five Star Movement and the southern voter base?

Currently, the party exists in a state of limbo, torn between its regionalist roots and Salvini’s

increasing nationalism. Only time will tell if Salvini can navigate this situation successfully and

satisfy the constituents of both sides.

Identity and Policy

The League’s mission today is nationalism. Salvini cares most about regaining control of

national borders and national policies. Restoring sovereignty, specifically through the lens of

eurocriticism and fear of technocracies, has become a primary issue of importance of the League.

A party that champions nationalism and direct democracy cannot accept the legitimacy of

decisions made by non-elected European institutions. In a 2019 rally, Salvini stated, “There are

no extremists, racists or fascists in this square…the extremists are those who have governed

Europe for 20 years in the names of poverty and precarity (The Guardian). Although the League

challenges the idea of European integration, it has yet to reject the idea of a Union outright

(D'Alimonte 124).

The party gains a significant amount of support from employers who struggle to compete

with the European Union’s single market. However, it does poorly with young professionals. But

Salvini cannot withdraw from the eurozone to aid these employers, as doing so would default on

Italy’s national debt and eviscerate wealthier voter’s savings. Salvini has ruled it out due to the

backlash that would occur from such an action (Broder 14).

Salvini has attempted to tip-toe around the true confrontation with the EU, acting in

opposition against it without totally committing to the struggle. When the League was in

coalition with the Five Star Movement, they instituted a 2.4% budget deficit designed to oppose

Brussels. This deficit was three times larger than the previous administration’s. This allowed

Salvini to “posture as a defender of Italian economic interests, even without risking an all-out

confrontation with the EU” (Broder 14).

The League is strongly against immigration. In October of 2019, Salvini had Domenico

Lucano, the antiracist mayor of Riace, Calabria arrested over allegations of “aiding and abetting

illegal immigration” (Broder 14). During this time, Salvini also suggested that “ethnic shops”

should close at 9 pm. Party loyalist and mayor of Lodi, Lombardi also cut funding for migrant

pupils’ right to free school meals. The party, much like other far-right parties in Europe, strongly

opposes Islam and Muslim immigrants. Salvini sees himself as a defender of “Judeo-Christian”

values and has slammed left-wing governments’ immigration policy that is “transforming the

Mediterranean into an open-air cemetery” (Euronews).

The League is in favor of the environment, supporting public green areas, natural parks,

and recycling. The party also has a strong agricultural backing and likewise supports the

protection of traditional food and opposes GMOs. It has also campaigned for a revision of the

quota system of the Common Agricultural Policy (Chamber of Deputies). The party also

typically takes socially conservative stances on social issues, opposing abortion, euthanasia, stem

cell research, artificial insemination, same-sex marriage, and drug use.

Assessment

The League is currently the most successful far-right party in Western Europe. Although

they underwent a significant transformation from regionalism to nationalism, they never altered

any rhetoric or actions that may label them fascist, unlike the National Rally. Italy’s democratic

system is much more vulnerable than France’s, leading the League to have much more electoral

success. The League embodies many things a fascist would: it is xenophobic, racist,

islamophobic, hyper-nationalist, Euroskeptic, and has a charismatic leader. The party has,

however, observed and obeyed democratic rules, even when in power. Thus, the party does not

meet my “fascist minimum.” Because of this, I do not find it appropriate to label Salvini’s league

fascist, but rather a far-right populist party, similar to the National Rally.

Fidesz

History

Fidesz was founded in 1988, with its full name being “Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége,”

meaning “Alliance of Young Democrats” in English. The party grew from a liberal underground

student activist movement that opposed the ruling communist party (Vox). After the fall of

communism in Hungary, the country adopted a democratic system. Fidesz was started as a

moderate centrist liberal party and found success early after its creation. In 1990, the party

gained entry to the National Assembly after attaining 6% of the vote, winning 22 seats. In 1997

the party gained members in the National Assembly from a dismantled Christain Democratic

group, effectively becoming the largest bloc. Fidesz became the single largest party in 1998,

winning 148 seats. The party formed a coalition government with the Hungarian Democratic

Forum and the Independent Smallholders’ Party (Britannica). Viktor Orbán of Fidesz was

appointed prime minister. Under Orbán’s rule, the party was considered conventionally

conservative by European standards (Vox). It continued an austerity program, cut taxes and

social insurance fees, and fought for Hungary’s European Union membership (Britannica).

Fidesz narrowly lost the 2002 elections to the Hungarian Socialist Party. In 2005, Fidesz’s

nominee László Sólyom was elected President of Hungary and acted with a largely centrist

mindset (index). In 2006, Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party formed a coalition

for that year’s elections. They won 42% of the vote and 164 representatives out of 386, yet still

lost to the social-democratic and liberal coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the

Alliance of Free Democrats (BBC). Later that year, however, Fidesz won the municipal

elections, 15 of 23 mayoralties in the largest Hungarian cities, and the majority in 18 of 20

regional assemblies (Taipei Times). Fidesz regained full control of the government in 2010,

winning more than two-thirds of the seats. The landslide victory was spurred on by economic

issues, especially Hungary’s economic collapse in 2008.

In the 2010 parliamentary elections, Fidesz won 53% of the popular vote in the first

round, leading to a supermajority of 68% of the seats. With this newfound power, Fidesz adopted

an entirely new constitution, which has been harshly criticized by the Venice Commission for

Democracy through Law, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the United States.

The new constitution has received such criticism for concentrating far too much power in the

hands of the ruling party, limiting oversight by the Constitutional Court of Hungary, and

removing forms of democratic checks and balances, such as the media, supervision of elections,

and the ordinary judiciary (The New York Times).

In 2014, Fidesz won a supermajority again in the nationwide parliamentary election.

However, this supermajority was lost when Fidesz’s own Tibor Navracsics was appointed to the

European Commission. His seat was taken by an independent candidate in a by-election (The

Wall Street Journal). In 2018, Fidesz won its third supermajority in the nationwide parliamentary

elections, running primarily on a platform of anti-immigration and foreign meddling

(EUobserver). Fidesz remains in power today as one of Europe’s leading and most powerful

right-wing populist parties.

Changes in Government

In 1989-1990, Hungary underwent a significant turning point. The fall of communism

liberated Hungary and other members of the Soviet Bloc to pursue other systems of governance,

many following the zeitgeist of democracy and liberalism. Until 2010, Hungary was seen as a

model of this transition as the country pursued a market economy based on the dominance of the

rule of law and of private ownership. The 2010 victory of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz changed the

course of Hungary’s progress, beginning the dismemberment of the country’s fundamental

institutions of democracy (Kornai 280).

Under Orbán, the executive and legislative branches have essentially become one. Orbán

and Fidesz control both and have effectively turned parliament into a “law factory” (Kornai 281).

Between 2010 and 2014, no less than 88 bills were introduced and passed within the same week,

with 13 of these being introduced and passed within the same or following day. Any investigation

into potential fraud or corruption within Orbán’s government has, without exception, been

dismissed. Fidesz has power over organizations that are not legally controlled by the executive

branch, which would provide a form of security to check the executive and legislative branches

in real democracies. Such organizations are the constitutional court, the state audit office, the

fiscal council, the competition authority, the ombudsman's office, and the central statistical office

(Kornai 281).

Fidesz’s government has done all it can to dismantle the institutions of the rule of law that

had been established by 2010. One of the most important steps to undermine the rule of law was

seen in the aforementioned new Hungarian constitution. The new constitution was drafted by a

small group within Fidesz and passed quickly through the “law factory” of the executive and

legislative branches (Kornai 281). The new constitution was riddled with shortcomings that

many local and foreign legal experts criticized. This document, officially called “Fundamental

Law,” was amended five times due to the number of clauses it contained that served the political

agenda of those in power (Kornai 281).

One major aspect of the rule of law, according to János Kornai, is that “no-one, not even

those who hold the most power, should be above the law. The law must be respected” (281).

Fidesz has completely ignored this idea by using legal tricks to pass laws that ensure favoritism.

The current government also has taken control of the Prosecution Service, a centralized

organization that, in theory, operates independently from the rest of the government. In any given

case of the Prosecution Service, however, the chief prosecutor is chosen by the holder of

supreme power and then formally appointed by parliament. From then on, the chief prosecutor is

effectively no longer under the control of parliament. When the Prosecution Service has

investigated cases of corruption and scandals pertaining to members of the current government,

barring a few exceptions, the cases have never progressed past the investigative or prosecution

phases. However, this is not the case when pertaining to members of the opposition, who the

Prosecution Service often persecutes to the utmost degree (Kornai 282).

Fidesz has also worked to gain control over the courts. The President of the Supreme

Court was dismissed early once Fidesz took power in 2010, and a new institution emerged, called

the National Office for the Judiciary. This new organization was gifted with a wide array of

powers, including the ability to appoint judges and decide which cases should be heard by which

courts. The retirement age for judges was reduced from 70 to 62, resulting in the expulsion of the

older, more liberal generation. An international court ultimately annulled this change; however,

most judges that were ousted did not return to their previous positions (Kornai

282).

Fidesz has also targeted private property through legal, ideological, and economic

attacks. The party has nationalized private pension funds financed from the obligatory

contributions, severely hurting the principle of private property. The shift to state-owned rather

than privately owned has spread to banking, energy, public works, transportation, the media and

advertising. In these areas, property rights were bought by the state, oftentimes well below

market value and leaving little to no say for the previous owner. To further centralize things in

Hungary, Fidesz greatly increased the powers of local government. Schools and hospitals, for

instance, no longer belong to local authorities. Now, they are controlled by the bureaus of the

central government (Kornai 283).

The methods of centralization enacted by Orbán and his party has put him in a position of

supreme authority in government. Everything has become tied to the hierarchy he has created,

with him alone at the top. János Kornai examines this system, stating:

‘A pyramid-like vertical hierarchy has emerged and solidified, with the supreme leader at

its summit. Below him, ready to obey his every command, stand his hand-picked

henchmen, who owe him unconditional loyalty. Moving on down, we find the next level

of the pyramid, and the next: for each position people are chosen for their loyalty to the

regime. Commands which take obedience for granted tightly bind each subordinate to his

or her superiors. It is only the leader at the top who does not depend on his superior, only

those at the very lowest level do not give orders to anyone. Everyone else incorporated

into the levels in-between is simultaneously servant and master. It is in their interests to

hang on in there, to move further up in the pyramid. Their position is not decided at

elections, but depends on winning the trust of their superior by services and flattery, or at

least by uncritical obedience. Hundreds of thousands of public employees, including

those who work in the state-run educational and health sectors, feel defenseless: few dare

to speak up, to protest, because they fear for their jobs. The regime is robust, partly

because it can surely count on the fear of the majority of people dependent on it, as well

as on the "keep a low profile and obey" mentality’ (283).

Civil society has long acted as an important mechanism for decentralization. Fidesz, in pursuit of

total centralization, has neglected this mechanism. No relevant trade unions or organizations

outside of government control are consulted when parliamentary bills are drafted. Likewise,

declarations and demonstrations by people expressing their concerns are largely ignored (Kornai

283).

Orbán and Fidesz, even with all their tampering within the government, still exist within

a democracy, albeit an illiberal one. However, Orbán employs propaganda to convince

Hungarians and outsiders that the majority of the people want his leadership. Fidesz routinely

boasted that they won a supermajority of two-thirds for two parliamentary cycles in a row, yet

this is very misleading. In the 2014 election, pictured below, one-fourth of voters expressed

support for Fidesz.

János Kornai (290)

Identity and Policy

Viktor Orbán and other Fidesz officials have openly described Hungary's current

government as an “illiberal democracy.” Orbán and Fidesz have been transforming Hungary into

a Christian democracy, which according to Orbán, “...is not liberal...It is illiberal, if you like”

(Reuters). Orbán explains why Christian democracy must be illiberal, adding that it rejects

multiculturalism and immigration while being anti-communist and defending Christian values

(Reuters). To Orbán, liberal democracy is inherently undemocratic because it is “intolerable of

alternative views” (Reuters). He identifies China, Turkey, Russia, and Singapore as successful

illiberal states (Politico).

Fidesz’s economic policy is typical of a far-right party in its skepticism of neoliberal

economic values. As seen with its centralization of the Hungarian government, Fidesz supports

more interventionist economic policies (Todosijević 421). However, Fidesz has implemented

some more liberal policies, such as a flat income tax, reductions in the corporate tax rate,

restrictions on unemployment benefits, and privatization of state-owned land (The Budapest

Beacon). Fidesz’s more populist economic policies include a public works job program, pension

hikes, utility bill cuts, a minimum wage increase, and cash gifts for retirees (Politico). The party

has also instituted a national public works program that helps rural communities in need (The

New York Times).

Fidesz has long been in conflict with the European Union. Orbán views the EU “...as a

declining economic power with a questionable foreign policy, and sees its Western member states

as having shaky democratic legitimacy” (Végh 72). Under Orbán, Hungary has significantly

improved its relations with Russia, however it has also become increasingly dependent on

Russia’s energy and financial support. This has led Orbán to openly question Europe’s treatment

of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Orbán has also stood against the EU by informally leading a

coalition, consisting of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, that opposes the

European Commission and Germany’s immigration policies Willkommenskultur

(Végh 72-73).

Orbán opposes the EU and instead supports the idea of a “Europe of nation states,”

arguing against further European inclusion. Although Orbán is firm in this stance, Hungary still

greatly benefits from its EU membership. The EU Cohesion Monitor, pictured below, supports

this, showing Hungary’s increased structural cohesion paired with its decline of individual

cohesion (Végh 73).

Zsuzsanna Végh (73)

Orbán’s strong anti-immigration policies and rhetoric have been a staple of his

government. Orbán has presented himself as the last protector of a Europe in which “Christianity

and the nation-state are sacred succeeded both domestically and internationally” (Müller 4). In

the spring of 2015, the Hungarian government built a fence along its border to keep out refugees

from Serbia. Orbán employed many conspiracy theories to justify this action, calling the refugees

economic migrants or Muslim terrorists (Müller 4).

To support his stance on immigration, Orbán has adopted a strong support of nativism. In

a 2018 address, he stated,

‘We must state that we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not

want our own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of others. We

do not want this. We do not want that at all. We do not want to be a diverse country’

(Ministry of Hungary).

Orbán supports a racially homogeneous society in Hungary, and his government has made

changes in the constitution that have made it illegal to “settle foreign populations in Hungary”

(The New York Times).

Assessment

Fidesz is one of the most influential far-right parties in all of Europe, but can it be

considered fascist? The party is clearly the most radical thus far. It is openly against liberal and

democratic institutions, xenophobic, racist, strongly against European integration, and has made

immense changes to the democratic institutions and the rule of law in Hungary. Viktor Orbán is

undoubtedly a charismatic leader, not only of the party but for the radical-right across the globe.

Paul Lendvai, an Austrian-Hungarian journalist, describes Orbán’s regime as a “Führer

Democracy” due to its extreme centralization of power. Lendvai does not believe it to be fascist

because the government does not seek to mobilize people, encourage massive violence, or

demand total ideological conformity (Müller 6). I agree with Lendvai’s label. According to my

established “fascist minimum,” Fidesz fits many of the requirements, but not all. Hungary still

operates within a democracy, albeit an “illiberal” one, as described by Orbán himself. Fidesz

does not advocate for violence and the mobilization of the masses. Even when it lost power in

2002, Fidesz conceded to the winning socialist party, obeying democratic rules. The party is also

not the least bit anti-clerical as it constantly emphasizes the need for a Christian democracy.

Orbán and his party’s transition to the radical right cannot be ignored, however. Fidesz and Orbán

started out in support of democracy and liberal values, yet they have progressively moved further

to the right, especially since regaining power in 2010. Fidesz has made monumental changes to

its government to ensure it stays in power. It is possible that they may resort to violence in the

future to keep this power if they should stray further to the right, but only time will tell.

Therefore, it is best to describe Fidesz as an illiberal, far-right populist party. Fidesz does,

however, embody the most defining characteristic of fascism, that being the abandonment of

democratic and liberal values. Hungary was once a burgeoning young democracy and a model of

communist transition. Since 2010, Orbán and Fidesz have turned it into a beacon of populism

and far-right ideologies but has yet to reach outright fascism.

CONCLUSION

The far-right in Europe today has reached a level of legitimacy that has not been seen

since the Second World War. Spurred on by intensifying Islamophobia, the success of Donald

Trump and other right-wing politicians across the globe, and the escalating war on migrants, the

far-right has enjoyed a substantial surge in public support and electoral success. However, is it

fair to compare these contemporary movements to the “classical” fascism that rose during the

interwar period? My analysis of such popular movements (National Rally, the League, and

Fidesz), compared with my established “fascist minimum,” has not resulted in any meeting the

requirements to be called fascist.

Today, we see a new mold of the radical right; many of these movements were conceived

with fascist roots; however, they have since changed in favor of electoral success. Italian scholar

Enzo Traverso suggests that this is “post-fascism.” These post-fascist parties had ties with

historical fascism but have “mutated” and are currently “moving in a direction whose ultimate

outcome remains unpredictable.” The National Rally is the best example of this mutation with

the transition of power from Jean-Marie to Marine. The National Rally and other similar parties

in Europe have strictly accepted a parliamentary strategy and now plan to change the system

from within. This is unlike classical fascism, which sought to change everything and did not

hesitate to use violence to do so (International Socialism).

Fascism today, then, has become somewhat antiquated. We are quick to call someone

fascist who exhibits fascist characteristics. Oftentimes, as is seen in my case study analysis, they

merely exist within the radical right or are fascist pretenders. Those who live and participate in

democratic societies have a knee-jerk reaction when seeing these pretenders, excitedly and

incorrectly, characterizing them as fascists. It seems the wounds inflicted by the original fascists

have not yet fully healed. However, we cannot liberally throw this term around at any far-right

party or movement, lest we forget what fascism truly is.

Fascist parties and movements, ones that fully embody the characteristics of classical

fascism, still exist within Europe today. One such part is the National Radical Camp in Poland.

The National Radical Camp was originally founded in 1934 as an ultranationalist, antisemitic,

and anti-communist party. The party today was reincarnated in 1993 and considers itself an

ideological descendant of the original (The Guardian). This party has traditionally been a

paramilitary and street fighting organization, but it has participated in elections under the

National Movement Coalition. The party has enjoyed little electoral success yet has, on many

occasions, drawn crowds of over 200,000 to their marches (dream deferred). The United Nations

Committee for Elimination of Racial Discrimination considers the National Radical Camp a

fascist party that promotes racial and national hatred and has called on Poland to enforce a

constitutional ban on the party and similar groups (Poland In).

Many parties like the National Radical Camp exist throughout Europe. Most of these

parties, however, do not achieve enough popular support to have electoral success. Radical right

parties recognize this and have adopted a softer electoral periphery to enter mainstream politics.

Fascism, as it existed in the interwar period, simply does not have an active base large enough to

translate into electoral success (International Socialism). Thus, major parties that may have once

been fascist have adapted to the contemporary political climate, changing their core beliefs and

rhetoric to acquire more votes.

The recent accommodation of radical right into mainstream politics has fundamentally

changed the political system. Rising support for the radical right has led the center-right and

center-left to adapt their positions on certain issues, such as immigration and integration. These

adapted stances often mirror those that were initially held by the radical right. This is known as

the “contagion effect,” where mainstream parties react to the threat of the radical right by

adopting their positions (Wagner and Meyer 87). This strategy is used “...to contest the

ownership of the immigration issue by the radical right and thereby to reduce their policy-based

appeal” (Wagner and Meyer 87). The adoption of radical right positions is done to “...maximise

their vote share and close down the issue space occupied by the radical right” (Wagner and

Meyer 87).

An example of this strategy is seen in the recent actions of current French president

Emmanuel Macron. The French government announced in February 2021 that it would launch an

investigation into academic research that supposedly feeds “Islamo-leftist” tendencies that

“corrupt society” (The New York Times). This attack on academic freedoms is in direct response

to the burgeoning threat that Marine Le Pen poses in the upcoming presidential election. Le Pen

was Macron’s main rival in the last election, and recent polls show that his lead is shrinking.

Macron has adopted much of Le Pen’s xenophobic rhetoric in recent months, cracking down on

“certain social science theories entirely imported from the United States’’ that would threaten

France. Macron’s shift to the right is an attempt to draw support from Le Pen, who will likely be

his main challenger in next year’s election (The New York Times).

The radical right has also changed the political system through its emphasis on certain

issues. Typically, mainstream parties tend to focus more on economic issues, whereas the radical

right has focused on liberal-authoritarian topics, such as immigration. The radical right’s

emphasis on liberal-authoritarian topics leaves mainstream parties two options: either they ignore

these issues and, in turn, ignore the radical right, or they adopt stances on these issues and

address them, therefore indirectly including the radical right into mainstream politics. According

to Markus Wagner and Thomas M Meyer, mainstream parties have chosen the latter strategy.

They state:

‘Radical right parties may have been successful in their strategy of making immigration

and related topics more important to political debate. By acting as such ‘issue

entrepreneurs’, radical right parties change the issue content of party competition and

therefore become more mainstream, less unusual competitors’ (88).

Although the radical right may have trouble entering mainstream politics directly through

electoral means, they can affect the political landscape ideologically and create an environment

that no longer sees them as extreme outsiders. The table below from Wagner and Meyer shows in

detail how countries in Western Europe have accommodated for the radical right. 40 of 53

mainstream parties have shifted to the right on liberal-authoritarian issues, which dominates 10

of the 17 listed countries. Parties in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden reacted

differently, and only in Ireland and Portugal were the changes of mainstream parties not to the

right (Wagner and Meyer 93).

Wagner and Meyer (94)

With the radical right threatening the very institutions of democracy, much of Europe is

unsure how to address the inclusion of such parties. Democracy calls for a voice for all people,

but if certain people seek to undermine democracy, how should they be treated? Germany’s

domestic intelligence agency has recently taken this matter into its own hands by placing the

farright Alternative for Germany under surveillance for extremism. The agency views the party

as a potential threat to Germany’s democracy, and no party has received such scrutiny in all of

Germany’s postwar history (The New York Times).

Germany, after all, is familiar with its own history, and it is no surprise that they would

take these measures to ensure another Nazi party doesn’t come to power, even at the expense of

democracy. Their fears are warranted; one only needs to look at how Fidesz transformed

Hungary’s government to become wary of radical right parties. The best way to combat the

radical right is to subdue them within democratic institutions. It is against democracy’s very

nature to ignore its citizens' voices, even if they are considered extreme. A party that obeys the

rules of democracy should not be barred from democratic participation. Should such a party gain

power, it is up to the government and the system of checks and balances within it to control it.

Therefore, countries in Western Europe are better equipped to defend their democracies because

their institutions are strong and long-established. Eastern Europe, however, contains many young

democracies with weak institutions, most of which are flawed or have succumbed to

authoritarian rule.

Democracy in Europe is currently in more peril than it has been in decades. Democracy in

Eastern Europe is significantly worse off compared to the West. The Economist’s 2020

Democracy Index states that not one “full” democracy exists within Eastern Europe. The average

regional score of Eastern Europe dropped from 5.42 in 2019 to 5.36 in 2020. This is especially

alarming considering the region’s core was 5.76 in 2006 when the index was first published.

Eastern Europe’s democratic descent in recent years “...indicates the fragility of democracy in

times of crisis and the willingness of governments to sacrifice civil liberties and exercise

unchecked authority in an emergency situation” (The Economist). The region’s poorly

functioning institutions and weak political culture are persistent issues, with its average political

culture score of 4.67 being the worst of any region. This indicative of Eastern Europe’s current

attitudes towards democracy, as many have a “deep democratic malaise and popular

disenchantment with the political status quo in the region,” coupled with “increasing support for

military rule and strongman leaders” (The Economist). The table below provides a breakdown of

Eastern Europe’s democracy by country.

Western Europe, alternatively, has the highest regional score in the world. However, the

region’s long-established democracies harbor strong institutions even though they are trending

downwards on the democracy index. The region’s average score declined from 8.35 in 2019 to

8.29 in 2020, with most of this due to a decrease in civil liberties and the functioning of

government. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has also led to a weakening trust in government,

with citizens doubting its ability to handle such situations. This distrust, coupled with the overall

trend of disillusionment in democratic institutions, explains the recent downturn in Western

Europe’s democracies (The Economist). Nevertheless, Western Europe, especially the

Scandinavian countries, remains the best region for democracy. The table below illustrates each

individual country’s score.

Overall, Europe's democracy is in a state of decline. Spurred on by rising Islamophobia,

xenophobia, racism, economic decline, and widespread distrust in government, radical right

parties have acquired significant power and support across the continent. The defeat of Donald

Trump in the 2020 American presidential election is promising for the future of European

democracy. In many cases, especially in the ones examined in this paper, the radical right is

poised to achieve unprecedented amounts of power. The study of these movements is imperative

to understand the nature of this new mold of conservatism in Europe and its followers. European

democracy is currently at a crossroads, and although the future seems grim, it is unknown

whether it will choose those who would protect it or those who would destroy it.

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