THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS WESTERN TECHNOLOGY FROM 1600 TO 1910

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THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS WESTERN

TECHNOLOGY FROM 1600 TO 1910

Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2

Kangxi Emperor's interest in European timepieces and automata ............................ 10

Qianlong's patronage of Western scientific instruments at court ............................. 13

Restricted technology transfers through Beijing's Jesuit astronomers ...................... 15

Post-Opium War realization of China's technological lag (1839-1860) ....................... 18

Shocking defeat by British steamships and advanced artillery ................................. 18

Wei Yuan's advocacy for "learning Western technology to control barbarians" ...... 19

Establishment of Jiangnan Arsenal for Western arms production ............................ 22

Self-Strengthening Movement's push for industrialization (1861-1895) ..................... 24

Li Hongzhang's promotion of Western-style factories and shipyards ...................... 24

Rong Hong's pioneering educational mission sending students to America ............ 26

China's journey from technological isolation to active modernization efforts ......... 39

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Introduction

Shifting Chinese perspectives on Western technology from Ming to late Qing

Chinese perceptions of western technology before and after the Ming dynasty, say the

late Qing dynasty, differ a lot. During the Ming dynasty of China, which lasted from 1368 to

1644, the Chinese reacted in such a way that they had curiosity, if not an element of contempt,

for Western science and technology, according to Smith (2018). The Chinese scholars had no

respect for western learning and believed that China had nothing to learn from the West (Chan,

2020). But the Opium War and other emerging imperialism of the West in the nineteenth century

majority of the Chinese officials as well as the Chinese intellectuals as being irrelevant and

inferior to those of the Chinese inventions. For instance, after the Macartney Embassy in 1793,

the Qianlong Emperor pompously told the British envoy that the Western exotic was not

something that China would require, as the Celestial Empire possessed everything in a state of

abundance (Chen, 2016, p. 63). As for most of the Chinese scholars, they had Sinocentric

perceptions up to the nineteenth century; they did not acknowledge Western science, and they

regarded the steamships as childish gadgets (Chan, 2020, p. 216). This stereotype was

consequently brought into reality, especially when China was comprehensively defeated in the

First Opium War (1839–1842). War also exposed the successes of even a small British army to

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overpower the huge and well-equipped Qing’s war machinery. This statement was made by one

cannot even fire at the enemy; our ships are useless for pursuit’ (Smith, 2018, p. 85). The painful

experience led to very healthy discussion within China on how to narrow the technological gap

with the industrialized western world.

even more so for Wei Yuan, a reformist scholar who wrote in the Illustrated Treatise on the

Maritime Kingdoms published in 1843, “Nothing is superior to western technology.” Wei called

not only for buying Western weapons but also for translating Western scientific books so as to

get to know the real essence that the West possessed and to cultivate what Wei referred to as

‘Shixue’ knowledge of practical utility in the industrial field (Chen, 2016). This, as you may

know, was a drastic change from the old conventional Chinese scholarly style, which was mostly

based on Confucianism and included things such as rejection of trade. Wei’s works inspired such

spirited youngsters as Xu Shou, who lived in Europe in the 1860s and, when he returned,

established China’s first modern shipbuilding yards as well as the telegraph line conduits (Zhang,

2021). According to Zhang (2021), towards the end of the Qing Dynasty, other Chinese

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practical learning (Shixue) in sector after sector of shipbuilding, mining, rail road and electricity,

Therefore, the starting reaction of China toward the Western technological innovation

shifting from suspicion or disapproval to extraordinary acquisition of foreign technology in the

last phase of imperialism. This was not entirely the breakup, though conservatism remained

towards the outside world. But the irony of the situation was that the reactionary imports of the

latter with western military armories and industrial technologies to save the latter’s Qing empire

laid the seed for China’s indigenous modernity in the twentieth century.

The Chinese Ming dynasty of the second half of the sixteenth century and the beginning

of the seventeenth century experienced a conservative attitude towards the acceptance of foreign

know-how. This was a conservative policy of strict non-intercourse with the Portuguese and the

Dutch traders involved in the coastal areas of South China, thus regulating the import and export

of Chinese goods and products on the one hand and the import of foreign goods and goods

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aspect of Christianity since the Europeans introduced the religion through the pearl industry

missionaries and merchants into China for business and religious purposes was singled out as a

deadly blow towards the collapse of Confucianism, its principles, and even the very Chinese

societies. Second, most of this period, the Ming dynasty was internally stable and relatively

Chinese internal matters (Liu, 2019). This xenophobia was clearly seen in the seven maritime

voyages ban set by the Ming court in the 15th century, through which China closed itself off to

the rest of the world and its knowledge and inventions for over two centuries. Finally, one might

assume that the imperial court intended to contain the roles of the Chinese merchants and traders

in the south that greatly profited from trade as well as piracy related to smuggling networks that

were working in cooperation with the Portuguese and Dutch merchants.

In order for the Ming court to regulate this trade, it ensured that the only legal interaction

with the west could only be done out of Guangzhou, with a lot of regulation on the items that

could be exchanged as well as the quantities (Wills, 2020). The Portuguese and Dutch traders

also had to trade intermediary Chinese who reported directly to the court (Wade, 2015). It made

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This meant that, despite the entrance of Jesuit missionaries and traders who were pressing

knowledge, technologies, and ideas from the west is still prohibited. Access to such ideas as the

Europeans shipbuilding, mechanical clocks, medical knowledge, or geometry was little and

restrictive to the Astronomical Bureau, Beijing, and occasional meetings between the western

philosophy, Sinophobia, and the anti-merchant policy in China. As the Portuguese and the Dutch

started to venture into the China trade, imperial measures of limited contact considerably slowed

the influx of foreign thought and technology into China as to the later centuries. This timidity

was only changed with the advent of Jesuit scholars into the early Qing dynasty after 1644.

The previous ruling Yuan dynasty of Mongolian origin had patronized Buddhism, while

the Ming pursued Confucian learning. Once again, Confucian scholars were rather parochial in

the sense that they valued stability and order as opposed to change and in the betterment of

intellectuality inclusive of philosophy rather than labor work (Liu, 2018). When mechanical

objects, including clocks, firearms, and astronomical instruments, were introduced to China by

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some scholar-officials went so far as to extol the European clocks and astronomical instruments

examination system also preferred generalists over specialists; hence, there was readiness for

cross-learning from the Jesuits, who were as knowledgeable as the Chinese regarding

Confucianism as they were good in mathematics, sciences, arts, etc. (Jami, 2012). But the literati

155). Other such officials, like the Grand Secretary, such as Nan Juyi, dismissed the ‘trifling

functions’ of European devices that served very little social utility to people (Zou, 2015, p. 22).

The skepticism was directed most towards those innovations that threatened the Confucian

paradigms in one way or another, such as European cartography challenging Chinese

geocentrism in the case that Jami (2012) describes.

The literati took a paradoxical position; while accepting the practicality, like the making

of the calendar, they rejected the ideas that threatened Confucianism. In the Ming state, the

government began an ‘Office for Interpreting Western Learning’ precisely to evaluate the foreign

knowledge that the Jesuits brought in (Liu, 2018). In this way, literati scholars attempted the

directions of the Western changes according to Chinese order, only those Jesuits who were

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pragmatic and ideological consideration were not always two polar opposites inextricably

adopting useful innovations corresponding to the Chinese logic of cognition. This was not a

narrow WASP mentality at all but a cerebral approach that could be characterized even as

philosophical.

dynasty. The late Ming state sparingly employed swords instead of guns and cannons to

strengthen coastal defense against the growing threat of wokou Japanese pirates starting from the

mid-1550s. From the same source, Lee (2018: 78, 86) only argues that the founder of the Ming

dynasty, the Hongwu Emperor, had prohibited the possession of firearms, and he even halted the

construction of cannons, although this policy started to gradually be reversed due to rising sea

pirates. While private ownership of guns was prohibited, the Ming leaders, on a selective basis,

embraced Jesuit metallurgical as well as gunnery knowledge in an effort to improve modern

manufacturing arsenals, as pointed out by Andrade (2016). This included establishing the

Firearms Commandery to sustainly manufacture the western-style cannons in front of the Jesuit

consultants and then distribute the products at the southeast coasts of China (Waley-Cohen,

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Asia further means that there was a need to strengthen coastal defense to avert maritime

social axle could thus be retained through a regulated introduction and usage of tactically

pragmatic foreign guns. However, Ming authorities remained cautious and suspicious of the

Jesuit motivation and remained wary of the power that Han Chinese had to control people by

court etiquette, the calendar, and the state philosophy. Unlike weapons, a new idea was an

instrument that questioned and disrupted the paradigmatic relationship of knowledge and power.

The organization of certain concepts of Christianity in the figure of an omnipotent deity appeared

to clash with the Ming emperor’s mandate of Heaven to rule over earthly realms (Lee, 2018). As

a result, at some point, Catholicism and heterodox ideas were suppressed in order to preserve

ideological tendencies. For instance, Matteo Ricci’s corrected world map and Johann Schreck’s

predictive calendars looked to decry court astronomers and were thus dismissed (Waley-Cohen,

1993).

Therefore, the analysis of the Ming selective adoption showcased the state’s concerns in

using the foreign objects to respond to growing maritime threats while refusing the ideas that

exchange lightly as such influences threatened their autocracy, thus putting restraints on the

bolstering the regime via an infusion of foreign human resources at the same time as it shunned

the social transformations that would rile up the Qings out of their kingdom.

Perhaps the most well-known of all was the visit of the western astronomers in the Qing

authority to reign their empire, it was necessary to predict events such as eclipses. In a similar

light, Spence (1990) says, “If the Jesuits assisted the emperor in predicting and announcing these

signs better than the Chinese astrologers, they are worth their weight in gold (p. 21). Such

knowledge was, thus, directed toward the fulfillment of the needs of the court.

However, it is important to point out that the Qing’s contact with Western science had its

limitations. The mathematical part of the work carried out by Jesuit astronomers was supported

by imperial patronage, while the religious one was ignored. From the previous discussion, one

can state that even in the nineteenth century, as described by Wills (2011), the Confucian state

still regarded Roman Catholicism as heretical. However, the Qings also restricted the Jesuits

from moving within China or observing the country through surveying as well as mapping. As

reflected the overarching Qing approach: acquire only that portion of western knowledge that

importing ideas or politics that were considered potentially perilous.

As a matter of fact, this pragmatic policy view determined the whole attitude of the Qing

dynasty toward foreign technology during this period. For example, the court showed interest in

accepted what was beneficial from the West, to a certain extent, and did not wish for China to be

swallowed up (p. 293). Therefore, it is clear that only the preservation of imperial power and

Sinocentric identity defined how Qing embraced some aspects of Western science. In conclusion,

the early Qing approach toward Jewish learning was to pragmatically adopt as well as use it, but

at the same time be wary of some of the social changes that may arise from it. Therefore, while

the regime maintained Jesuit astronomers at court, it restricted their astronomical investigating or

their push for Christianity in China, thus meaning the regime was only partially open to the

introduction of western technology. This was typical of the realism that characterized much of

the early Qing dynasty in the way it mobilized and co-opted Western expatriate expertise to

serve the cause of empire while navigating real political and philosophical threats originating

Post-Opium War realization of China's technological lag (1839-1860)

Shocking defeat by British steamships and advanced artillery

The first of these shocks was the defeat of China by Britain in the First Opium War that

occurred between 1839 and 1842. Civilization was regarded in China for centuries as something

inherent in China and other exotic places, and people were regarded as being inferior to Chinese

the officials and literati as to why China was so much weaker. The shock that China had to

endure was to have passionate discussions with the literati and officials as to why the country

was weaker as compared to the west. Ig. Drawing on different sources, traditional Manchu

literati attributed the loss of virtue and the ‘warfighting spirit’ of local commanders instead of

any deficiencies of Chinese civilization (Wu, 2019). However, there were more progressive

scholar-officials such as Wei Yuan who studied the effectiveness of the Western types of

warships and weapons, trainings, and drills with lessons learned and imploring on how the

strength of China could be enhanced using the best of the Western knowledge and advanced

tactics. Wei backed the reformist's self-strengthening’ movement to obtain modern technology

through buying in the treaty port. Some other officers accused China of getting culturally

national level like the Taiping Rebellion exposed the societal weaknesses China’s rulers sought

The sudden realization of the decay of China’s technology gap led to a more

confrontational round of introspection and debate on changes. The conservatives stuck to their

line and protested against the purchase of technologies from the barbarian nations, as it was

emerged was reformist and aimed at a gradual approach to modernizing the Chinese education

system, military, economy, and technology with a view to combating the intrusion of western

powers. Thus, the repeated experience of China’s humiliation in the hands of the West over the

course of centuries of colonial and post-colonial experience shook the Sinocentric arrogance of

the Middle Kingdom and its perception of invulnerability to external threats; promoted heated

debates in Chinese society and polity on the causes of China’s emerging technological

inferiority; and called for much-needed societal efforts to rejuvenate the decadent Middle

Kingdom.

Wei Yuan's advocacy for "learning Western technology to control barbarians"

The first one was the First Opium War, which took place in the time period of 1839–

force exposed the technological decadence of China, having been closed off from the rest of the

the Chinese scholars and politicians as to how to meet this challenge posed by foreigners.

Wei Yuan, a scholar who served the Daoguang and Xianfeng emperors (1794-1856), was

the major participant of this debate. Closely related to Wei Yuan are the recommendations that

knowledge of the foreign countries, which implies that China has to accept the superior

technology of the west in the fields of science, industry, and military.

While justifying this necessity to his contemporaries, Wei Yuan outlined various

arguments. First, he proposed that the case of several recent battles of China’s military against

the British demonstrated that Chinese weapons and boats were less effective than the contingents

of other great western powers, such as artillery, steamships, and firearms. He dismissed the

argument, claiming that the West was privileged in some way because, well, China was

culturally debauched and not technologically crude. Second, Wei Yuan pointed out that the

Japans and India copied advanced Britain’s armaments through the reverse method of

engineering and set up independently owned factories, and these factories possessed import

Third, Wei Yuan only supported assimilation of scientific and technical knowledge

western culture, philosophy, and values is lethal to the Chinese social structure. To him, any

random importation of electrical devices from other countries harbors great dangers of

destruction of properties or fueling social revolution. That moderate position of advocating

economic, and educational systems in accordance with the western prototype. Namely, it is

important to switch from the economy of rural post-Black death conservativism to the promotion

of the manufacturing, machines, factories, and practical science that troubles the social order of

many contemporaries would not. Huang (2021) stated that Wei Yuan was able to clearly depict

that despite these prices to tradition, the modernization reforms were necessary for the

sustenance of the Chinese nation.

According to Huang (2021), the Opium War defeats, thus, created an important discourse

as to China’s strategy that is still relevant in today’s debate on the conflict between

westernization/modernization and the resurgence of Chinese civilization. Despite the fact that

Wei Yuan did not get a chance to see his proposals put into practice, his rhetoric postures

or avoiding further defeat; hence, the way was opened to the more extreme what was to be

explained the utilitarian application of overseas learning for China’s development and protection

against the imperialism of international society.

Establishment of Jiangnan Arsenal for Western arms production

British in the First Opium War (1839-1842) and the second one (1856-1860) exposed China to

the fact that they have not modernized their weapons and they did not possess the knowledge and

force required to confront the new age warfare, which made them comprehend that the

technological thing of their country has regressed (Zhang, 2020).

The Jiangnan Arsenal was founded with the blessing of the statesman and military man

Zeng Guofan, who grasped that China needed to narrow the technological gap with the West as

the outcomes of two Opium Wars sent China into the cycle of being exploited by the foreign

powers (Chan, 2018). Jiangnan Arsenal was one of the few state-run arsenals that started

constructing ‘new generation’ firearms inspired by the Western models, which signifies that the

institution was interested in the foreign knowledge in order to strengthen the country. Initially, it

Such changes provided the impetus for the Self-Strengthening Movement in China

importing western scientific advancement, technology, and institutions in the form of the

Jiangnan Arsenal. This meant that the supplantation of Chinese civilization was no longer

accepted as a given by the ruling imperial Qing dynasty, especially given the different setbacks

In the early 1890s, it developed as one of the biggest industrial centers of China, and it

employed several thousand Chinese workers with few foreign skills (Lee, 2021). This technical

knowledge, the production capability, and the weaponry were useful during the Sino-French War

of 1884–1885, and the Chinese military remained deficient in terms of capability to face the

industrialized nations of the west. However, Jiangnan Arsenal is an example of the first

experiment with independent weapons manufacturing within China through the technology

acquisition from the industrialized West. Though it started the civilization process of China,

industrial and modernization experiences have gone through several transformations in the

period after the Opium Wars.

The setting up of the Jiangnan Arsenal after China had suffered from the disastrous

hundred years of decline to the fact that revolutionary improvements were essential for the

change of thoughts at that time contributed toward the following Self-Strengthening Movement

and China’s modernization up to the present.

Self-Strengthening Movement's push for industrialization (1861-1895)

style factories, shipbuilding yards, and weapon depots. Li Hongzhang is well known for

supporting this industrial promotion with several government-backed enterprises under what

became known as the Li System. Such pressure proved to have raised the early upturn but only

proved counterproductive to promote more sustainable modernization. On this one, one could

say that there could have been three—the lack of proper supporting structures, the antipathy of

the Imperial Court, or the inability to continue growing once the West started the industrial

revolution for real.

Li Hongzhang established the massive industrial facilities mostly engaged in the military

production with steamships and rifles and artillery rank among the chief products; the most

notable of all was the Jiangnan arsenal, which incorporated imported machinery used in

costly imports. However, the success achieved in this regard was not very impressive, and by

pointed out by Chan (2013). Some are financial in that some states lack adequate capital

investment, some are technical due to the absence of structures and qualified personnel, while

there is ambivalence about the value of factories to the tradition of states.

within the context of an environment where the officials whom you are dealing with have their

minds set within certain perimeters while being sensitive to change. This ‘uncertain synthesis of

the Chinese and the Western’ bred a lot of confusion as to the quality that industrialization was

going to give to China (Wright, 2011). Contemporary manufacturing industries emerged when

imperial power, which was founded in the Sinocentric world order, was gradually waning.

In fact, the West industrialized 10 times more in the mid-1800s, when China was only

beginning its non-threatening opening up (Chan, 2013). Technical knowledge became enhanced,

raising the development bar unbelievably fast and pushing China into hopelessness even with

pioneers like Li as he displayed simple feats at the beginning. The outcome was, as evidenced by

the event in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895, a period of stagnation was still evident, and the

With such ideas, Kang rose to leadership of the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898, which

structures with references to the reformist experience of Japan of the Meiji period (Elman, 2014).

Kang contended that although the local Confucian education system might have its advantages, it

could not provide the mechanical and scientific knowledge China needed to sustain itself and to

Minister Kang’s ideology can be seen in the imperial edicts of the Hundred Days’

Reforms by stressing scientific education. The decrees issued a call for provincial colleges

wherein more modern subjects can be taught to the students; students exchange for scientific

learning from the west; western books; and application of some of this modern knowledge for

the upliftment of society and also the military forces (Wright, 2011). Although the reform

movement was put to a stop, the campaign for modern science education continued in terms of

an agenda. Kang also told the public, stating that “if we do not advance, if we do not progress,

then the nation will become weaker and weaker” (Ma, 2022). He opined that China needs to

accustom herself to western learning or else she will be overtaken.

Kang also endorsed constitutionalism, where the emperor became a co-ruler, as copying

not stop defending the imperial system, saying that just like the Prussian Enlightenment

However, what made Kang different from radicals was that he supported gradualism that was led

by the emperor and not revolutionary change. While the later revolutionaries questioned the

imperial system per se, Kang was a pioneer of one who demanded an immediate transformation

compromising on the Chineseness of China. The demand for modern science to serve as an

antidote to imperialism continued to be fired even past the Hundred Days Reforms. Education

reform with the support of Confucianism and imperialism can be seen in Kang’s position as the

moderate modernity who wanted to reinforce China against the westernization and cope with the

political realities. Kang’s ideas provided the premises for accepting technological progress as

well as political evolution entering the twentieth century in the interest of the Chinese nation in

globalization.

Rapid expansion of telegraph lines and railway networks

The history of China’s modernization process can be divided into two parts followed by

two different dynasties; the last Qing dynasty (1644–1911) tried to modernize in the last decade

pointing to China’s lack of modern-assistance technology. Nonetheless, due to limitations of

the degree of modernization, had to be limited at some point.

The central authorities in Qing and certain provincial governments were quite early on

able to understand that modern transport and communication technology was actually a strength

favorable east coastal area; moreover, lines developed areas in the interior with relatively inferior

development (Alder, 2014). Alder (2014) assert that they also played a role in improving trade,

transporting essential commodities over long distances more effectively, and also in establishing

control from the central authority.

The Qing also endeavored the swift increase of the telegraph while reconstructing

communication. During this period, telegraph cables laid down doubled from 15000 kilometers

before the Boxer rebellion in 1900 to nearly 150000 kilometers in 1911 (Chang, 1969). The

communicative lines extend to all provinces where the previously isolated provincial authorities

became linked to the central authority. According to Chang (1969), these improved contacts

improved the bureaucracy’s authority, and data was crucial for leading the modernization. In this

The problem of equipping these costly infrastructure projects, which was evidenced by

costs were financed by borrowings, which came from the foreigners and the provincial revenues

rather than the national funds. Some of the world powers and banks were more than willing to

lend money to China on the condition that they would be privileged to construct railroads in

would be economically justified, some budget deficits grew (Brandt et al., 2014). However, there

was further development of the necessary material and communication networks, but there was

no extension of these aspects to the far western provinces to any considerable extent. Thus, the

penetration of modernization remained in fact highly diverse. The central government did not

function as a planner, and it also did not function as a controller; it created several lines of

overlapping and competition that weakened the national system of communication. The political

rationales for the decentralization could have encouraged the development of rail structures at

the local scale, but they would have prevented or negatively impacted the overall nation-scale

rail structure optimality.

In the countdown of deterioration, crisis, and TestLoader in the Qing bureaucracy, the

failings and procure the technology for the new industrial age. Although the actualization of the

future economic and political development of China, the late Qing inability to harness them led

to the continuation of the dynasty’s decline. Its modernization thus circumscribed possibility but

got not very far.

the early years of the Republican period, as a result of the infrastructure built up. And it was

useful for successors more in the connections and transportation to be provided. This pronounced

but differentiated structure was retained as an institution and a possibility for gradual and

episodic modernization of the country during the next hundred years.

The Self-Strengthening Movement of the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing from 1895–

1910, had a policy of the overall modernization of China and the effects toward China's

industrialization in the technological/global market place. One of the prominent personalities of

the period was Zhang Jian; he was an industrialist and an entity with superb and unique

entrepreneurship who helped China to develop its industrial sectors, especially textiles and

foreigners, Zhang realized that for China to have any chances of standing up to imperialism, it

Mill in Nantong in 1891, becoming China’s first mechanized textile industry. It was a very

remunerative mill as the technologies, new machines, and working techniques were implemented

for the production of splendid yarns and textiles to fulfill the domestic as well as export market

(1894–95), reformist scholars such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao insisted on the total

acceptance of all things Western, including science, technology, and political systems. That is

why such high officials as Zhang Zhidong promoted what he called ‘learning from China to get

the fundamental principles and learning from the West to get the utilitarian application.’ The

Qing dynasty encouraged the appearance of private industries such as the textile industries of

Zhang Jian, thus contributing to the building up of China’s power in order to resist imperialism.

Zhang (2021) went to other more contemporary fields of operations, including match

factories, silk factories, tea plantations, and shipping. In 1897, he started the Nantong Navigation

Company to modernize and institutionalize a stylish flotilla of steamboats in the Yangzi River

and banishe the British monopoly in the shipping industry. Employment policies of his

donated for education causes and the local self-government under the policy of the Qing

The historians of the subject have considered Zhang Jian one of the ‘bureaucrat

entrepreneurs’ of the nineteenth-century Chinese administrative class who transitioned into

private industrialism. Like most of his contemporaries, Zhang realized that China had to civilize

As far as these pioneers of Chinese industrialization like Zhang Jian, one could witness

great entrepreneurial spirits, which tremendously advanced the process of China’s modernization

in the later part of the Qing dynasty. Although the political rule of the dynasty would come to a

halt soon in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, what was initiated here for the first time was to lay

the initial foundations for a more civilian-led economy and technology transfer that was to turn

out to be beneficial for the new Republic of China. The strategy of transferring the knowledge

originating from overseas for domestic industries was expounded and implemented by such

officials as Zhang with the aim of reformists; hence, it became an organizational principle of

China in the twentieth century through various reconstruction projects during the Nanjing decade

in the 1930s and the post-Maoist's reform and opening up’ since the 1980s. Further investigation

China's journey from technological isolation to active modernization efforts

The most fascinating transformation of the technological development of China from a

technological desert has been seen in a technological revolution. China had invented most of the

things, such as gun powder, compass, paper, and most of the printing technologies, nearing the

middle of the 19th century longer than any other country did. But this was not the case in the

19th century, when western countries started pulling ahead during the industrial revolution while

China lingered behind due to its policy of non-interaction with other countries and hence could

model in the early 1950s with the help of Soviet experts and aid. However, due to political

changes like the Sino-Soviet split and disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, the pace at which

this was accomplished was hampered, and by the early 1970s, China was still regarded as

lacking some of the most fundamental of the modern technologies (Jia & Liang, 2017).

Forgetting the fact that they would be left very far behind, policymakers began the process of

reforming and opening up and issuing invitations to foreign firms and technologies in 1978. The

localization process was continued in this phase through mergers with many of the western

firms, but China was still relying on the foreign technology.

As a result, the 21st century saw a change in the Chinese approach to creating its new

Liang (2017), the 16 Goals of “Made in China 2025” set goals that China should be 70%

dependent on local industries for key technologies, which include information technology,

robotics, renewable energy, aerospace, and many others, by the year 2025 through indigenous

commerce, and many more. China now lays down the benchmark internationally in such areas as

telecommunications that improve the competitive nature of Chinese companies.

Kennedy (2022) says that people still remain skeptical of the continuous expansion of

China’s technological industry. Chinese competition is greatly boosted by state aid, lockout of

foreign companies, theft, and pressure on partners for technology transfer, which they consider to

be unfair, Kennedy (2022). China’s tech vision is also congruent with the CCP goals like

repression, social control, and military strength, especially in the South China Sea, which create

tensions in the region. According to the current growing trend, the analysts have stated that

China’s technological development and influence on international technology in the 2020’s will

go up further. The facts presented by this research demonstrate that China has emerged out of

international innovation regime. Despite its devises, the challenge of technological

geopolitical stories of this century in the case of China.