Introduction Narrative representations of place

Introduction Narrative representations of place

The state is invisible: it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it

can be loved, imagined before it can be perceived—Michael Walzer (see Denison,

2009, 1170).

Narrative representations of place are a precondition of geographic

knowledge. The above quotation encapsulates a complex process by which we

ascribe meaning onto socially and politically bound space. Space only becomes

meaningful when we become aware of its presence. The process of transforming

empty space into a meaningful construct necessitates first visualizing in the mind’s

This thesis examines how Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in

northwest China, is represented in tourism and geographic education literature. The

research demonstrates the limited and distorted place narratives of Xinjiang that are

promoted by the government-backed tourist enterprise in China for consumption by

English language speakers; as well as, the inadequate and uncritical representations

of the region currently available to students in the United States. Qualitative content

analysis methodology is employed to investigate the narrative representations of

Xinjiang contained within tourist brochures, geography textbooks, and regionally

appropriate curricular guides as well as to gathering data from teacher members of

the Montana Geographic Alliance. Informed by the research results, I have created a

that have, and continue to, shape our interdependent world. Xinjiang, as a focal

point of academic inquiry, offers a point of introduction to influential historic trends,

ideologies, and events that have shaped our world. Importantly, knowledge of

Xinjiang’s incredible diversity and position on the periphery of current

representations of China will help students contextualize China as a dynamic

nationstate that faces challenges related to its size, heterogeneous population, and

political history.

Contributions to Geography and Research Questions:

This thesis makes three substantive contributions to the body of knowledge

thus informed, I create a body of lesson plans and teaching resources pertaining to

Xinjiang that are available to educators via the Xinjiang Geographic Education

Curriculum website.

My research has been driven by a series of questions that have guided my

inquiry throughout the different stages of this thesis. These are divided into four

parts: initial framing questions; questions pertaining to tourism texts, and

geographic education texts; and finally questions that guided the creation of

geographic lesson plans.

worth pursuing?

Part 2: During the analysis of Xinjiang tourist literature I tried to answer:

How are textual and graphic representations of Xinjiang used to create

currently available to American teachers about Xinjiang? And, what is taught

Arrangement of Thesis

This section provides a brief synopsis of each chapter’s content. Chapter II

presents a review of the literature in the fields of cultural geography and geography

education. The chapter outlines the theoretical position of this thesis within the

geographic discussion of space and place. The discussion theoretically links the core

continues by discussing the role of geography education in the reproduction of

narratives of place.

Chapter III is dedicated to the methodological approach used during

The chapter introduces the data sources and lays out the analytical procedure.

survey of scholarly databases. The results of extensive database searches for

cultural geography literature show that very little research on Xinjiang has been

published in the academic field.

Chapter VI is dedicated to exploring the construction and contested nature of

space in Xinjiang through a qualitative content analysis of tourism literature. The

chapter reviews the ethnic tourism economy in China and tourism in Xinjiang before

launching into the qualitative discourse analysis of a series of Xinjiang tourism

brochures published by a Chinese government tourism authority. The research

illustrates the extent to which representations of place are controlled and

manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party apparatus to reinforce real and

little recognition of the region among teachers. While increased content on Xinjiang

in college level geography textbooks is promising, the quality of coverage at all levels

is questionable. Finally, I compare representations of Xinjiang and Tibet in

geographic education materials and media, and attempt to answer why Tibet is

comparatively well covered while Xinjiang remains a terra incognita in the popular

mind.

plans I developed that are devoted to Xinjiang. At least two lesson plans were

line with the content standards and benchmarks set forth in the Geography For Life:

National Geography Standards (1994).

Chapter II

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This chapter reviews the bodies of cultural and education geography

literature in order to situate this thesis within the broad field of geographic

knowledge. The opening section is dedicated to the considerable body of literature

on space and place in cultural geography. The discussion links the concepts of space,

place, representation, discourse, power, imagined geographies, identity, and

current geographic literacy about China among young Americans.

The geographic literature on space and place provides the foundation for

cultural geography as it informs my research. Informed by Marxist critiques of

capitalist spaces, feminist concepts of performance and positionality, and

postmodern understandings of the subjective nature of knowledge, cultural

geographers have problematized the epistemology of absolute space as an inert

container. Neil Smith built upon the work of David Harvey to articulate a

conventionalization of space, which holds that space, far from being fixed and

available while disregarding other potential meanings (Davis, 2005).

rendering something intelligible or identifiable. According to Saussure (1966; see

Johnston 2000), representations do not describe a pre-existing reality, but constitute

“what counts and is valued as reality.” As Martin Heidegger (1962; see Johnston

2000) puts it, “the world is never that which stands before us and can be seen,”

meaning our perception of the world is always mediated through apriori

representations that inform our worldview. Accordingly, multiple competing

interpretations of place are always possible.

stabilized over time they are understood to attain a degree of fixedness known as

discourse (Butler 1993). Discursive knowledge has particular influence over how

the world (Johnston 2000).

Concentrating on the image of the Middle East, as created in European

literature and art; Edward Said demonstrated the discursive link between the

attitudes of another. Here we can also understand power to mean a set of strategies,

his seminal work Orientalism, Said (1978) revealed the images and knowledge of the

narratives of place, created far from the physical territory they described. As Said

employed it, the term ‘Orientalism’ refers to the totalizing essentialism,

ethnocentrism and racism imbedded in the West’s ‘knowledge’ of the Orient. Said

asserted that political and economic dominance of West over East relies on the

constant maintenance and reproduction of discursive narrative knowledge, or

‘imagined geographies’ of the East (Hubbard 2009). In this sense, control of the

production of space, real or imagined, is instrumental in the exercise of authority.

According to Benedict Anderson (1983), ‘imagined geographies’ are made

real through the controlled representation of spaces crafted to reinforce political

geographies are the invention of equally powerful symbolism in the form of flags,

anthems, and emblems that demarcate national space that draws together feelings

of belonging, solidarity, and identification between citizens. “From this perspective,

(Johnston 2000, 364). Thus conceived state power and space are co-constructed

through ongoing narrative performance of ‘imagined geographies.’

The links between the production of knowledge, exercise of power, and

education have long been recognized and much has been written about the nexus

between ideology, the state, nation building, and education (Zajde 2009, Vanhulle

2009, Merrett 1999, Myers 2001). According to Merrett (1999, 598), “Public schools

are one of the most important institutions of socialization and social reproduction in

the United States.” It follows then that school textbooks, as the primary curricular

Nationalistic points of view have long influenced how regional social studies

of an event or phenomena (Vanhulle 2009). Given the audience, the epistemological

character of most textbooks is drastically different than those of journals of

academic readership. The author may not be compelled to justify the knowledge

presented through citation and footnotes. The impact instead is the presentation of

knowledge contained in the text as indisputable fact and the author as an omniscient

history, whether intentional or not.

The uncritical reputation of these narratives may have the effect of creating

‘homogenized knowledge’ (Mirsky 1973) or “discipline defined mythologies that

versions of self, society, and the world” (Bell 2009, 5). The intrenchedness of

2001 analysis of representations of Africa in introductory human geography

Myers (2001) notes that textbook authors place surprisingly little emphasis

on the current research findings by geographers that may refute or contest the

prevailing negative, ahistorical, and geographic simplifications that characterize our

While it is recognized that geographic literacy is imperative to preparing

http://www.indiana.edu/~iaunrc/outreach/teaching_resources.shtml.

My search of curriculum guides and web-based lesson plans was delimited by

concentrating on content sponsored or recommended by major universities with

reputations for strong Central and East Asian Studies programs. I allowed my search

to snowball by investigating the bibliographies and suggested resources on

university department websites that I knew to have research interests in Xinjiang. I

continued to search curricular resources until my results were saturated. From the

vast quantity of curricular resources available I selected lesson plans for content

relevant to Xinjiang.

and represented in the text. After a cursory reading of the texts I divided the

brochures into conceptually similar categories to be analyzed together; however, an

series, the Hui and Han brochures stood out as modern and cosmopolitan in contrast

Mongolian, and Daur. Similarly, the city brochures were divided into two categories

of Urumqi, Shihezi, and Karamay were represented differently then the Uyghur cities

of the southern Tarim Basin.

information, and blaring omissions. I then wrote a brief summary of my impression

of each text in which I began the process of teasing-out prominent themes. Initially I

more heterogeneous body of literature. Analysis of these diverse resources led to

the emergence of new themes. This was followed by the review of introductory level

world regional geography texts. Finally I analyzed introductory college level world

themes that had emerged later.

Having read all the texts, I created a table of the themes that had emerged and

the texts. I examined the themes for contextual redundancy and went about

together. Likewise, if there was discussion of other religions these were similarly

comfortable combining Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism into one category

catchall category entitled “Other Religions.” However, given this project’s focus on

Xinjiang, I maintained yet a third religious theme, “Islam,” reserved for any

discussion of Islam, Muslims, or Islamic traditions. Subsequently, I divided the

results into two graphs: one pertaining to Xinjiang themes and the other pertaining

to representations of China more generally (See Appendix A).

given category. After several iterations I finally determined the most objective way

was to utilize the most basic unit of meaning, a single word. For example, texts that

to visualize the general state of knowledge about Xinjiang. Given the rather

superficial criteria, the persistence of sparse representation, particularly among

secondary school textbooks, is perhaps the most meaningful finding of this exercise.

thorough examination of prominent themes supported by textual evidence. In the

process of writing up my findings the salience of certain themes became more

in decisions made and textual evidence. In this sense, conclusions are clearly and

replicable (Patterson 1998).

Summary

As the opening section of this chapter demonstrates, there is little published

cultural geography research available concerning the region of Xinjiang, China. To

date there are no sources available that focus on the cultural geography of Xinjiang

regional geography, and geographic education. The dearth of attention paid to

Xinjiang in qualitative cultural geography research presents a significant

opportunity to contribute to the field of geographic knowledge and to contribute to

the diversity of ideas, knowledge, and skills available in geography education.

This chapter reviewed the methodological approach utilized in the research

for this thesis. The research involved qualitative content analysis of tourism

brochures and geography education textbooks and curricular guides. Research

involved an iterative process that required movement between data collection,

Chapter IV

Background Information:

Xinjiang’s Geography and History

vast, ethnically diverse, western regions that have developed differently through

time and space. These regions differ from eastern China significantly in terms of

ethnicity, religion, language, economy, landscape, topography, and history.

Among the western regions of China is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region (XUAR), the geographic representations of which are the focus of this thesis.

in China where Han Chinese do not constitute an ethnic majority. In Xinjiang Han

Chinese are outnumbered by a population that is predominantly Turkic and Muslim.

Often referred to as ‘Chinese Central Asia’, Xinjiang is liminal space

characterized by what Bhabha (cited in Hubbard 2004) has referred to as the

‘cultural translation’ through which meaning is ascribed to space across contesting

legitimize their respective claims to the land and its people. The persistence of

contested narratives of place has contributed to the politically charged climate in the

region in which knowledge and representation are of vital significance. In this

task of providing background information on the region is made difficult as each

statement is open for political interpretation and must be considered for its bias and

political rhetoric that pervades secondary literature. I have done my best to relay

Xinjiang, which borders Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region of

China, comprises roughly one sixth of China’s total area (See Figure 1.). Being at the

heart of the Eurasian landmass, within Xinjiang is the ‘continental pole of

inaccessibility’—the point on earth furthest from open water—about two hundred

miles north of Urumchi (Garcia-Castellanos 2007). Furthermore, Xinjiang is home to

both the second highest and second lowest points on the earth—K2 at 8,611 meters

Figure 1. Xinjiang’s Location in Eurasia (Source:

http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/04/growing-up-han-reflections-

stratification of oasis population centers.

Figure 1. Multilingual Map of Xinjiang (Source:

http://johomaps.com/as/china/xinjiang/xinjiang1.html)

Human Geography

The complexities of Xinjiang’s human geography can be illustrated well by the

multiple titles used variously to refer to this region. The name ‘Xinjiang’ literally

translates into “New Frontier” and came into use in 1888 when the Qing Dynasty

conquered and colonized northern Xinjiang in the area of the Dzungar Basin

the relationship between the region and the rest of China. First, the region was

located to the west of the rest of China. And second, the region was part of a frontier

zone that Chinese territory expanded into and occupied.

parts of Central Asia dominated by Turkic speaking nomads—as opposed to

the nineteenth century European writers continued to refer to the region as

‘Chinese Turkistan’ and ‘Russian Turkistan’ (Millward 2007). The origins of the

name ‘East Turkistan’ are quite obvious; however, contemporarily the term is

associated with two short-lived independent republics from the first half of the

twentieth century, as well as more recent Uyghur separatist groups. Referring to the

politically charged term ‘Turkistan’ Millward (2007, ix) states rather mildly, “Since

the PRC officially maintains that Xinjiang has been part of China since the first

century C.E., any allusion to the region’s other past political and ethnic identities is

unwelcome.”

Southern Xinjiang is occasionally referred to as ‘Uyghuristan,’ a reference to

geopolitical arrangements. Empires, dynasties, and kingdoms were rapidly

transformed into modern nation-states with discrete political boarders and

republican governments. Just as reform minded politicians in China orchestrated

independent nation-state. During the first half of the twentieth century, when the

government of China was weak, the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang twice declared the

independence of ‘East Turkistan.’ However both efforts were short lived, suffering

from poor organization, lack of unity, and military weakness at a time when the rise

of the Soviet Union and Communist China, the decline of the British Empire in South

Asia, and both World Wars profoundly changed the world.

Xinjiang still use the name “East Turkistan.” However, as Millward (2007, ix) states

since the first century C.E., any allusion to the region’s other past political and ethnic

identities is unwelcome.” Groups that use the name “East Turkistan” are accused by

the Chinese government of the “three evils”; separatism, terrorism, and religious

extremism. The extent and intensity of Chinese claims of terrorist activity has been

discredited by many scholars and human rights groups who contend that the danger

is exaggerated in order to justify harsh suppression of local nationalism.

who speak a Turkic dialect closely related to Uzbek, and who have traditionally

inhabited oases around the Tarim basin. Irrigated agriculture has been the mainstay

The term name Uyghur is derived from the powerful Uyghur Empire that

been treated as dissident, since they undermined Communist hegemony. According

to Gladney (1999, 88), “the contradiction between a policy that promotes both

autonomy and assimilation is an irony that continues to plague China’s nationality

policy.”

The Chinese Communist Party and the government of the Peoples Republic of

China have reinterpreted the meaning of China’s ethnic-minority spaces throughout

its history, skillfully producing and manipulating narrative representations to suit

the needs of the party-state. The process of defining “autonomous” areas for

minority nationalities replaced the indigenous cultural landscape with imposed

spatial constructions. Land reforms and communes transformed socio-spatial land

uses, while new place names, Communist generic catch phrases such as “Red Flag,”

replaced traditional place names. Communes and production brigades of the

narrative place. Schoolchildren were taught new place names, and new local

histories were invented that celebrated the People’s Liberation Army and the

Communist victory. Chinese textbooks and media have suggested that before

liberation minority places such as Xinjiang were feudal slave states ruled by despotic

Begs and Khans. ‘Backwardness’ of minority people of Xinjiang and other minorities

are constantly contrasted with the ‘modernity’ of the Han. This falls in line with the

basic tenets of Chinese Marxist ideology, that of evolutionary stages of social forms,

quote from China’s Minority Nationalities, distributed by Party publisher Beijing

Foreign Press, illustrates this point:

In the past, many poor Uyghur peasants lived on a diet of narrow-leaved

oleaster and dried apricot and peach, mulberry and grain porridge. Now

[since liberation], wheat flower, rice and maize are the staple foods…. Some

like to wear Western-style suits and skirts… the Women’s favorite

decorations include earrings, bracelets and necklaces…. Male chauvinism was

practiced in the family, and Uyghur women, humiliated with no one to turn

to, often retreated to prayer…. After liberation, feudal religious privileges

were abolished, and religion was taken out of the control of the reactionary

ruling class, and became a matter of individual conscience. As science and

(Ma Yin 1989).

Reading the passage Uyghur’s are understood as static and child-like, fundamentally

incapable of progress without Chinese intervention. Dru Gladney (1994, 98)

Communist government’s administration of the region, claiming that government

policies there are designed to erase Tibetan culture and religion, and benefit Han

infrastructure as tangible evidence that government policies are creating economic

numbers of demobilized military personnel on newly formed collectives charged

with transforming barren desert lands into huge state farms directed by the Xinjiang

Production and Construction Corps, or bing tuan. Since the late 1990’s the Chinese

economic opportunities.

forty-one percent today (Toops 2004, Millward 2007). However the official census

statistics only include those with official residency. Military personal and a

significant floating population—both assumed to be predominately Han Chinese—

are not included in Xinjiang’s census figures. Although it is impossible to determine

the exact number, Toops (2004) estimates China’s floating population to account for

ten to fifteen percent of the population of many cities (Toops 2004) and Millward

estimates them to have comprised approximately two and a half percent of

the well being of all people in China. They point to Xinjiang’s comparatively high

GDP and rapid urbanization as signs of the regions prosperity. However many

Uyghurs complain that they are left out when it comes to the region’s new wealth,

complaining that companies prefer to employ newly arrived Han workers rather

then the local population. Companies may prefer to hire Han workers for several

reasons. Uyghur workers may not speak Chinese well and they may have special

needs such as hala foods and require breaks to pray. Mean while migrant workers

may be more willing to move to onsite dormitories, work longer for less, or work

on their distinct culture and ethnic heritage and traditional ways of life. Commonly

cited policy grievances include: the prohibition of Uyghur youth from entering

mosque until they are 18, thereby inhibiting their participation in the religious

community; government control and censorship of Imams; the systematic reduction

of native language in schools; difficult Chinese proficiency tests minority students

must pass in order to be admitted into higher education; strict censored of native

language newspapers and media by the party-state security apparatus; forced

censorship, disruption of traditional communities, the massive influx of Han Chinese

immigrants, and the negative ecological consequences that dirty industries have had

on local people as programs designed to destroy traditional community life and

under mind the viability of native cultures (Rudelson 1997, Gladney 2004, Starr

2004, Smith 2006).

The rapid increase in the Han population of Xinjiang has caused Uyghurs to

(Gladney 2004). Sporadic acts of ethnic violence, most recently in July 2009, are

ethnoterritorial conflict.

is an account of Xinjiang’s history that is focused on the historic legacies that inform

the human geography of contemporary Xinjiang. Next is a discussion of the rise of

Chinese nationalism in the context of China’s transition from dynastic empire to

modern nation state. The epistemological and ideological shifts of identity are

tracked from the Qing dynasty that ended in 1911, through Republican China, and

finally into China’s present Communist period, 1949 onward. A section is devoted to

the Chinese-Marxist ethnic identity discourse that has come to define ethnic identity

politics since the 1950’s, and which is fundamental to the production of narratives of

Chapter VI

Xinjiang’s Tourism Space: Narratives of Place

illustrate the pervasive, consummate, bias, and political reproduction of ethnic space

in Xinjiang that is deployed by the Chinese government inline with the Chinese-

Marxist ethnic identity discourse. To successfully demonstrate this I employ

qualitative discourse analysis of Xinjiang tourist information brochures published by

a state controlled tourism organization.

narratives foreground representations of an ethnic landscape ready for the tourists

gaze. Presented as unchanging, traditional, gendered, and authentic, these

pejorative narratives of place reinforce real and perceived boundaries between

China’s ethnic minority periphery and the Han-Chinese core.

during excursions to ethnic tourism attractions in China, is “living fossil.” This place-

permanently within a natural history landscape that is beyond contemporary

the tourist gaze directed toward objects that are marked and interpreted so well that

they leave little room for the imagination.” Through these strategies the Chinese

authorities suppress any attempt to question the political and ethnographic order of

things as represented by the state.

narrative of representation. The tourist, predisposed by the state-sponsored

narratives within tourism literature, un-wittingly performs the state’s narrative by

The pervasive reach of the tourism destination, effecting social, economic,

cultural, and spatial spaces around the narrowly defined connotation moves the

representation from place-image to acknowledged place-myth (Davis 2003). Among

naturalized and taken as more real than reality itself” (Murkami 2008, 65).

Reconstruction of ancient mosques as ethicized museum sites obscures their

religious and social significance, transforming them from focal points of possible

narrative, or the tourism landscape. The experience of discrimination of local ethnic

not likely to be reproduced on the tourist landscape.

Tourism on the Silk Roads

nationalities, in regions such as Xinjiang, as well as assimilate them. “When the

‘nationalities identification project’ defined the ethnic groups of China,” writes Kolas

practices, arts and crafts, and dress.” Kolas continues:

Roads have captured popular imagination with romantic associations of exotic,

aromatic, mystery, primitive, solitude, remoteness, bazaar towns, Asiatic despots,

place that do not arise from a particular place as much as are applied to it. The term

domestic tourists’ expectations of Xinjiang.

selfOrientalism (Levine 2008).

Urbanized Han Chinese idealize the ethnic minorities and their landscapes as

unspoiled reserves of nature, religiosity, and simple life styles of the past. Chinese

language newspaper that is an organ of the Communist Party. It concerns an affluent

Han Chinese “exploration” tourist who had recently participated on a state

sponsored “expedition to Xinjiang.” The trip included crossing the desert to the

folklore, understand the society and get acquainted with the history” (Zhiping 1997,

16). The quotation illustrates how readily the prevailing narrative is accepted. It

also demonstrates the emergence of domestic Chinese tourists who are emulating

exploration and adventure tourism, trends, which have hitherto been associated

with foreign visitors. Finally, terming the trip “exploration tourism” implies that the

local people and culture have existed beyond the veil of the known and need to be

discovered…by tourists.

In the political climate of liberalization and marketization local officials,

just as planners, but also as ‘cultural brokers’ and entrepreneurs in tourist-related

industries. A lucrative practice among local governments has been to set up private

companies, paid for with public funds, to develop tourist destinations. Thus, the

regulatory agencies have a vested interest in the unhindered success of tourist

destinations, while the government enjoys continued revenue through charging of

entrance fees to every tourist attraction (Kolas 2008).

extent to which local people’s interests are disregarded wholesale in favor of profit

and power of Han entrepreneurs and Party elite. The article details the construction