Assignement introduction Florida_s Courts System Funding After.pdf

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The objective of this quantitative pretest/posttest impact evaluation was to analyze

the effect of Revision 7 of Article V of the Florida Constitution on fiscally constrained

counties using the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) to explain policy and budgetary

changes within the Florida courts system. Before Revision 7 was implemented, urban

counties had greater resources to fund their court system than their more rural

level that would fund the state courts system, state attorneys, public defenders, and court-

appointed counsel (Martinez, et. al, 1998). Another goal was to determine how judges at

the trial court level are selected via direct election or merit selection and retention. It was

also a goal of Revision 7 to change the term of office for county court judges from 4 to 6

years and to correct the number of years a member of the state’s Judicial Qualifications

Committee is allowed to serve.

I served as the Clerk of the Circuit Court and County Comptroller of St. Lucie

County, Florida for 12 years. During that time, I observed numerous fluctuations in the

amount of dollars available to fund the courts system. This research contributed to

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advancing current knowledge in academic literature regarding this issue. Evaluating the

courts system funding scheme in the state of Florida will help inform how state decisions

are made regarding courts system funding.

Seventeen years have passed since Revision 7 was implemented. However, a

dearth of academic research that examines funding for Florida’s courts system or any

other state courts system remains. One reason court systems funding is studied rarely is

Chapter 2.

In this chapter, I explain the quantitative research questions and hypotheses. The

research questions involve whether Revision 7 is a successful policy that achieved its

goal related to providing greater funding for fiscally-constrained counties. The

independent predictor variable of the proposed study is the implementation of Revision 7

of Article V in 2004. The dependent variable is the funding allocation for each county

court in Florida between 1998 and 2018. I propose to use a one group pretest/posttest

design to compare actual budget numbers before the intervention of Revision 7 to those

numbers after intervention had occurred. I explain general terms used in the study.

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Afterward, I provide study assumptions and scope and delimitations. As I have identified

my service in the courts system as a potential bias, I also provide an overview of any

additional biases that had the potential to affect the study, along with attempts to ensure

that these biases were addressed.

Chapter 1 concludes with my thoughts regarding additional research involving the

implementation of Revision 7 and its outcomes. I provide recommendations on how best

counties to the Florida State Legislature (Butterworth & Martinez, 1998). This change to

the courts system was substantial. Counties would pay less to fund their portion of the

judicial system. In the 1995-96 fiscal year, the state of Florida spent $101 million less to

fund the state courts system than counties did (Butterworth & Martinez, 1998). The cost

savings because of the financial burden shift to the state legislature meant that counties

would have additional revenue available to spend on other priorities. An additional

priority of Revision 7 meant that rural and urban counties had financial parity in local

courthouses.

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Revision 7 was implemented in 2004. The Great Recession of 2008 was a barrier

for counties to receive expected funding based on the approved 2004 model. The Florida

courts system experienced major reductions in funding. Issues involving appropriate

Article V Revision 7 funding were part of yearly state budgeting conversations. The

focus of this study was an impact evaluation of budgets passed by the Florida legislature

and 29 fiscally-constrained county governments. The goal of the research was to evaluate

Committee, 2005). It is important to know whether these projections were correct.

Each year, Florida’s legislature commits less than 1% of the total state budget to

fund the courts system. In the 2019/20 fiscal year, that amount was approximately $554

million (Florida Office of State Courts Administrator, 2020). The legislature is not alone

in this method of funding. According to Molvig (2016), many state and local

governments attempted to reap money from fines and fees from state courts without

allowing those courts to use those funds to operate. In Florida, the courts system

generated nearly one billion dollars in revenue for the state. Much of the revenue

flowed to programs and services that are not related to the courts. Since 2006, the courts

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system of the state experienced an erratic budgeting process. Florida Tax Watch (2004)

said funding for 2004-2005 would require “legislative fine-tuning—likely both increases

and decreases” (p. 17) in addition to emergency funds until funding issues were resolved.

Some departments within the courts system are running out of money to support

operations. A lack of planning may be to blame.

implementing Revision 7 was made in 2003 when legislation setting up the new court

structure was adopted. All implementing legislation, or bills to place Revision 7 into law,

was completed in 2004 (Carlson et al., 2008).

Results of this evaluation will benefit policymakers as they identify the funding

scheme used by Florida state courts. Term limits for Florida state legislators mean that

elected officials do not know as much about legislation compared to lobbyists

(Lemongello, 2019). This means few elected officials in the state capital understand the

purpose and use of Revision 7. Five years after Revision 7 implementation, the Florida

Bar commissioned a study to review the policy. Population growth and the Great

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Recession created case backlogs that required courts to reduce or eliminate services as a

result (Washington Economic Group, 2009).

Problem Statement

Equal justice under the law and access to justice are guiding principles of the US

judicial system (Albiston et al., 2017; Edenfield, 2014; Jawando & Wright, 2015; Prescott,

Current research on judicial funding in the United States, including courts system

funding in the state of Florida, revealed little information on funding models for modern

day courts systems. If left uncorrected, the executive and legislative branches of

government will lack appropriate information to identify and determine what is considered

proper funding for the judicial branch of state governments (Samuel, 2015). The stated

goals of Revision 7 as listed in Article V, Section 14(a) of the Florida Constitution that

pertained to this evaluation were to create a uniform funding mechanism at the state

appropriation level that would fund the following: the state courts system, state attorneys,

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public defenders, and court-appointed counsel. This change was approved by 57% of

Florida’s voters.

As an issue of transparency, legislators and members of the public require greater

knowledge of the funding process for Florida’s courts system.

However, the creation of a stable source of funding remains elusive.

Board of County Commissioners funding of the state courts system and allowing the state

government of Florida to fund the state courts system instead. (Butterworth & Martinez,

1998; Samuel, 2015).

I proposed using a quantitative research method involving archival data to

examine the funding differences between fiscally and nonfiscally constrained counties in

Florida by collecting data pre- and postintervention. The empirical study included all

counties but focused on 29 counties determined to be fiscally constrained according to

statute 218.67(1) of the Florida Legislature. It is important to focus on fiscally-

constrained counties because their unique financial challenges were a significant reason

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to support passage of Revision 7. I examined funding of Florida’s courts system before

and after implementation of Revision 7. Reviewing this policy intervention has the

potential to inform legislative and executive branch policies related to the judicial system

in Florida. The goal of my study was to add to academic literature while determining the

impact Revision 7 had on court funding among nonfiscally-constrained and fiscally-

constrained counties in Florida.

court funding received pre and postimplementation.

RQ2: Did Revision 7 have an impact on Article V in terms of court-related

revenues pre and postimplementation?

revenues pre and postimplementation.

and postimplementation.

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Theoretical Foundation

This research plan involved using the PET, as presented by Baumgartner and

Jones, to review the impacts of Revision 7 to Article V on the Florida courts system.

Funding for Florida’s courts system after Revision 7 was a significant departure in terms

of the incremental nature of the courts system before 2004 (Samuel, 2015; Butterworth &

Martinez, 1998). The PET is an appropriate theory to use when focused on longitudinal

quantitative archival-based impact evaluation and involved examining state and county

funding of the Florida courts system pre and post Revision 7 implementation in fiscally-

constrained counties. A quasi experimental one group pretest/posttest design indicated a

median increase of about $23.3 million for fiscally-constrained counties after Revision 7

implementation. The independent variable was the implementation of Revision 7 in that it

serves as a marker of time pre intervention versus post intervention. The dependent

variable was funding for each county before and after Revision 7 intervention. This study

involved using a quasi-experimental design with archival data that were longitudinal and

compiled between 1993 and 2018.

discussed how Article V Revision 7 was operationalized and presented my summary and

conclusions.

Literature Search Strategy

This literature review began in 2017. The keywords searched were as follows:

courts system, court funding, judicial funding, judicial independence, Article V, Revision

7, funding justice, financing courts, punctuated equilibrium, judicial finances, and fiscally

peer-related literature available regarding the topic of court funding. States choose

various paths to fund state courts. Zambrano (2019) believed expansion of judicial rule at

the federal level reduced political pressure on state legislatures to find adequate funding

for state courts. This literature review also includes court decisions, law journals,

government reports, nonpartisan nonprofit think tanks, and the Florida Constitution. The

focus of my review was how court systems are funded generally and in the state of

Florida specifically.

Theoretical Foundation

The PET is used to explain how and why issues are managed within institutions in

the United States (O’Neal, 2011; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). The PET involves

concepts such as bounded rationality, disproportionate attention, power, agenda setting,

framing, policy monopolies, and venue shopping (Cairney, 2013). Originally used in

geological studies, PET focuses on incremental changes that lead to larger change based

attention.

Policy venues for courts include courts, local government, state government,

attorneys, court system users, and elected officials (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The

PET involves how changes in policy results from a radical departure from agenda setting

in governing. The result is an entirely different policy (Cairney, 2013; Moershell, 2009).

An additional benefit of the PET is that it allows for “.an in-depth analysis across time

that can provide rich information to test the PET model” (Menefee, 2017, p. 76).

The PET involves how and why court funding policies go through periods of

stasis before periods of rapid change (Sanders, 2016). Political processes create changes

to policy equilibrium based on either negative or positive feedback. These changes

effected explosive changes that created a new equilibrium. Without a crisis event, it is

difficult for those in leadership to disrupt the status quo (Dickson & Mitchelson, 2007).

Judges set the agenda for judicial funding by presenting the public with

information about their responsibilities. These responsibilities include providing adult

education regarding the role of the judiciary, teaching children about the role of judges in

Revision 7 was intended to be a solution for those challenges. Challenges to the law

remain. Since passage in 1998, the effect of Revision 7 was. not scrutinized through a

lens of effectiveness in part because it was difficult for elected officials to want to review

the effectiveness of policy interventions. Institutional friction and disproportionate

information processing were identified in PET literature as the two reasons that policies

are punctuated (Frick, 2017; Jones, Epp, & Baumgartner, 2019). Where there were

punctuating events, it was believed that recent experiences are positively associated with

the probability of punctuation (Cho & Jung, 2018).

Policy change can happen rapidly, but an incremental component was also present

(Robinson et al., 2014). Their supposition was concordant with Revision 7

implementation. While the state courts system began preparations for the significant

change after Revision 7 was passed in 1998, Florida’s legislature had other plans

(Carlson et al., 2008). Near the 2004 funding deadline for Revision 7, six years after its

approval, an editorial in the St. Petersburg Times stated the goals of Revision 7 to create

funding (Carlson et al., 2008).

This study was a pretest-posttest quantitative study of the relationship between

fiscally constrained counties in the state of Florida and the financial results of the

implementation of Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution. Documents were

readily available for review from trusted websites at the state level. While preparing this

research, it became obvious that proper funding of the Third Branch of government

throughout the country remained a significant issue (Hartley, 2013; Ostrom & Hanson,

2010). Some states were not impacted by the Great Recession of 2008/2009. However,

court funding was reduced during the 2010—2011 legislative sessions in 80 percent of

the states, including Florida. This proposed dissertation evaluation and study builds upon

the different studies that investigated this area of courts system funding but did not tackle

this issue specifically. This study is different because it utilizes a PET framework to

delve into 25 years of data that contains budgetary information to answer the research

questions.

A former court administrator thought that the public would not believe the dire

either a shift in attitudes or a focus on how the misfortune of a few obtains the attention

of the masses and therefore, becomes an image worthy of governmental intervention

(Majone, 1989; Aikman, 2012).

McGovern and Greenberg (2014) believed the advantage of state courts being

funded by state dollars was the ability for all taxpayers to fund a constitutional right.

Under the scenario posited by the American Bar Association (ABA) at the time, only

court users would pay for the system and not all citizens. Baumgartner and Jones (2009)

identified a similar issue in their research related to class. The PET is often associated

with those who represent the masses of citizens who are not politically aware when

responding to policy changes initiated by political elites. In this way, the ABA comments

did not stand the test of time. The courts system had to admit a difficult truth. During the

2013-14 fiscal year, mortgage foreclosure filings fees were shifted from the State Courts

Revenue Trust Fund (SCRTF) to the state’s General Revenue fund. Foreclosures had a

precipitous drop in filings and as a result, the SCRTF was less reliable for revenue than

initially anticipated (Florida Office of State Courts Administrator, 2018). The courts

funding (“USA Today’s Debate: Public Spending”, 2011; Judicature, 1996).

The commentary from legislators regarding equal branches and adequate

funding is important. However, politicians often exult the concept of judicial

independence without adequate information to define it (Tiede, 2006). A difficult

challenge for the judiciary, it seems, is determining the difference between the soaring

platitudes offered by the other branches towards the judicial branch versus their follow-

through.

The use of evaluation as a tool in the government arena has increased in recent

years due to legislative edict (Davies et al., 2005). Impact evaluations are popular in the

field of policy evaluation (Burkholder et al., 2016). This study was a pretest-posttest

quantitative study of the relationship between fiscally constrained counties in the state of

Florida and the financial results of the implementation of Revision 7 to Article V of the

Florida Constitution. Documents were readily available for review from trusted websites

at the state level. While preparing this research, it became obvious that proper funding of

the Third Branch of government throughout the country remains a significant issue

of Revision 7, determined technical efficiency, and reviewed the literature regarding the

role of court systems funding on a nationwide scale. This study was different because it

utilized the PET framework to delve into more than 25 years of data that contained

budgetary information to answer the research questions.

Literature Review

The concept of a government stronger through its independence has served as a

formula for modern democracies (Tiede, 2006). Government is most effective when no

individual branch enjoys so much unrestrained power to make life difficult for either the

other branches or the wider community (Jackson, 1993; Rosenbloom, 1983; Madison,

1788). While co-equal branches were ideal, The Federalist Papers reminded the reader of

the challenge of the independent judiciary; for decisions of the courts to be upheld, the

Legislative and Executive branches were the only branches equipped to carry them out

separation of powers and a breakdown in that separation would destabilize our form of

1989 and 2009 seem to be the height of academic research into this issue. The National

Center for State Courts, a repository for courts systems related information, focused its

attention to the issue of judicial funding and independence during that time (Zambrano,

2019).

As mentioned previously, scant literature exists regarding state courts and their

funding schemes. As part of the study, the issue of adequate funding was identified as a

challenge. A finding of the study was that a better understanding of the court system

budget was necessary, as well as a keen understanding of the political and legislative

processes.

Hays (1975) also studied court reform focused on innovation and challenges to

reform. Both reviews looked at the aftereffects of a constitutional-based reorganization of

Florida’s judiciary. Samuel (2015) and Hays focused on the roles of the court

administrators and the role funding plays within the judicial system. Hays also included

perspectives from chief judges and court clerks. Samuel chose the administrative officers

of court as a group to gather knowledge from, Hays and contemporaries at the time in

Revision 7 implementation. Of note for this study, Ferrandino indicated that productivity

fell by nearly 3% in small and medium-sized circuits, which happen to encompass most

of the fiscally constrained counties that form the population for this study. The

determination of the study was that resource allocation decisions should include

efficiency analysis as well as additional judges do not increase, but rather decrease

efficiency.

Carlson et al. (2008) produced a study by the Justice Management Institute and

funded by the National Institute of Justice that reviewed Revision 7 as part of a three-

state review of court funding. The study was focused on the effectiveness of trial court

funding to include equity and accountability. Hamilton (2017) looked at revenues

generated from traffic citations and their impact on the court clerks and comptrollers in

Florida utilizing multiple linear regression analysis. I discovered that a large proportion

of the budget for this element of the courts system came from traffic citations. This

research attempted to inform future funding initiatives for Florida’s courts system during

challenging times. As we are entering into the third budget cycle while living with the

best practices and approaches.

Researchers observed that an unintended consequence of Revision 7 was reduced

innovation within the courthouse and that state funding limited the creation of best

practices.

Funding Around the World

Langbroek (2019) identified the way the judicial budget for the Netherlands

worked related to workload. Rates are determined based on the amount of work produced

by the different types of courts on an annual basis. If the case load is higher than the

budgeted amount, a distribution equal to 70% of the amount spent per case is provided. If

(juvenile court, mental health court, veterans court, etc.). They are most often a circuit

court doing business as these other courts. However, there are other actors who are part

of the courtroom and have a vital role to play. They include roles that are familiar to

citizens like the state attorney, public defender, court-appointed counsel, and clerks of the

circuit and county courts. Below, a short description of each office is provided for

context.

Administrative Commission (JAC), Clerk of Courts Operations Corporation (CCOC), the

Trial Court Budget Commission (TCBC), and the Boards of County Commissioners

(BOCC) (more information on the BOCC later) throughout the state of Florida.

Article VIII Section 1 of the Florida Constitution states the selection of the Clerk

of the Circuit Court and delineates how the responsibilities of the clerk of the circuit

court can be divided between two officers: one serving as the clerk and the other as the

clerk of the board of county commissioners, and custodian of county funds. Filing fees

based on judicial proceedings and charges for court services (Florida Constitution, Article

5: Section 16). There are also costs and fees that may be funded through filing fees for

proceedings of law and service charges and costs for court-related funding.

The Justice Administrative Commission (JAC) serves as an administrative arm to

nearly 50 entities that are part of the courts system. The state attorneys and public

defenders, Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Capital Collateral Regional

Counsel, and the Guardian ad Litem program. Most of the administrative services are

designee of the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court. The group is also responsible

for “Recommending to the Legislature changes in the amounts of the various court-

related fines, fees, service charges, and costs established by law to ensure reasonable and

adequate funding of the clerks of the court in the performance of their court-related

functions” in addition to “developing and certifying a uniform system of workload

measures and applicable workload standards. . .” (Florida Legislature Constitution and

Statutes, n.d.). Funds are provided to the Chief Financial Officer of the state for

distribution to the corporation as appropriated by general law. The Trial Court Budget

Commission (TCBC) has budget authority based on the goals of actors in the judicial

branch and their established policies. TCBC is a commission charged with advocacy for

additional budgeted funds. They also recommend to the Court funding allocation

formulas and establish funding and budgetary policies. Now that there is a baseline of

understanding regarding the main characters and supporting actors within the Florida

courts system, it is appropriate to discuss the push for unification of Florida’s Courts.

Unification of Florida’s Courts

(Flango, 1994).  As all state courts systems in the United States are funded differently,

Florida was not alone in making this shift (Hartmus & Walters, 2016). Alaska, Colorado,

Connecticut, Hawaii, and Nebraska moved toward court unification during a similar time

frame as well (Hays, 1975). The goal of court unification was to give judicial actors the

efficiency to promote dispensing justice (Hartmus & Walters, 2016; Grossi et al., 2012;

Durham & Becker, 2010). Unfortunately, while the issue of court funding was initially

dealt with as early as 1973, challenges remain. The longer that it takes to solve a

problem, the greater the policy punctuation required to solve that problem (Jones, Sulkin,

& Larsen, 2003; Jones &Baumgartner, 2005).

A two-tiered trial court system and a focus on unification were positive results in

the modern development of the courts (Carlson et al., 2008; Durham & Becker, 2010;

Graetz, 2014; Hartley, 2013; O’Conner, 2013). The move from local funding to state

funding is often viewed within the context of centralizing the Judicial Branch while

providing an additional layer of judicial independence from the Executive Branch

(Berkson & Carbon; 1978; Tobin, 1981). State economic outcomes and borrowing

& Greenberg (2014) said the advantage of state courts being funded by state dollars is

that all taxpayers are funding a constitutional right. However, state funding also involved

risk. The independence of the judiciary was at risk because the courts were forced to

suffer the whims of appropriators in the legislative branch (McGovern & McGovern,

2014). Unification led to more efficient use of retired judges, increased case

management, staffing efficiencies, improvements to record systems, and automations

because of administrative unification. As of 2010, there were 10 states that had a single

trial court. Seven more had advanced to a two-tier system like Florida (Durham &

Becker, 2010). Regardless of how many tiers a courts system has, all courts systems

require funding to operate. Next, I will review funding for the judicial system in Florida

before Revision 7.

Judicial Branch Funding Prior to Revision 7

McGovern and McGovern (2012) recognized that information regarding some

parts of the justice system were lacking, poor and of limited scope. It was also

acknowledged that attempts to compare court funding across states could be problematic

During fiscal year 1995-1996, Florida counties spent nearly $614 million on state

courts while the state of Florida spent $513 million (Butterworth & Martinez, 1998).

When voters decided in 1972 to amend Article V, the amendment was presented to and

approved by the public with the understanding that counties would be out of the funding

business for a state entity (Carlson et al., 2008; Florida Tax Watch, 2006; Martinez &

Butterworth, 1998). Just as civil rights issues moved from a localized venue to a federal

venue for enforcement, so too has the issue of courts system funding moved from a local

issue to a state issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).

Challenges of Insufficient Judicial Branch Funding

The judicial branch has the responsibility to solve disputes between citizens. It

has a greater responsibility to solve disputes between branches of government. Courts are

at a disadvantage as a branch of government because, while considered equal, they do not

have the same voice as the other two branches of government. However, they have a

responsibility to marshal the full resources of the judiciary to defend itself from the

lurching from one budget crisis to another due to factors both exogenous and self-

inflicted. In 2009, the state courts system received what it believed would solve any

additional funding problems; a dedicated source of funding through the State Courts

Revenue Trust. A decade later, the Justice Administrative Commission, part of the state

courts system, ran out of money and could not pay the fees on behalf of criminal

defendants to court reporters, expert witnesses, and private investigators for more than

two months (Orlando Sentinel, 2019). The friction, or levels of resistance between the

Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches mean that reaching solutions that satisfy all

three branches is more difficult the further into the legislative process the parties get

(Jones, Epp, & Baumgartner, 2019). As federal courts took more legal issues out of the

prevue of state courts, Zambrano (2019) posited businesses no longer needed to lobby for

“competent and well-funded courts” (p. 2109). Holyoke & Brown (2019) took a deeper

look at the issues surrounding what occurs post policy punctuation and whether the

impact was sustainable.

Additional challenges to the courts system since 2004, including the Great

Revision 7 was created to solve a social dilemma. The location of a court could determine

the type of justice a citizen would receive. The public reviewed the information and

determined that action should be taken. As a result, the citizens voted to spend resources

to effect a social change. Since implementation, no academic review of the impacts of

Revision 7 on the goals of the policy were undertaken. It is appropriate to identify

challenges with the current program and propose improvements and promote

accountability to the voters (Burkholder, Cox, & Crawford, 2016).

Article V Revision 7

Article V of the Florida Constitution focused on the Judicial Branch and its

funding. It also focused on key actors within the broader courts system. To understand

the funding needs of the system, it was important to understand the structure of the

Judicial Branch as delineated in the Constitution and state statutes.

Comprised of 20 sections, the first seven sections of Article V (1-7) focused on

Funding section, as explained previously. Sections 15 through 18 focused on Clerks of

the circuit courts, State attorneys, and Public defenders, respectively. Section 19 provides

for judicial officers to be conservators of the peace and Section 20 provides the detailed

schedule of Article V implementation from 1973 (Florida Legislature Constitution and

Statutes, n.d.).

When the 1997 Constitutional Revision Commission was formed, the issue of

funding Florida’s court system funding was a priority (Labrador & Copelan, 1997).

County funding for the courts system totaled more than the state’s financial contribution.

At the time, the courts system was in crisis mode, partly because 14 counties in the state

had reached the maximum allowable millage rate of 10 mills. The previous time the

constitution was reviewed, Article V was implemented to create a state system that was

uniform from Pensacola in the west to Key West in the south (Labrador & Copelan,

1997). A comprehensive state funding plan served as the cornerstone of the Article V

revision.

Boards of County Commissioners across the state passed resolutions in support of

The counties attempted to have the state pay for the full cost of funding the courts

system since Article V passage as part of the 1968 Constitution and then again with the

1972 revisions, but the state refused (Labrador & Copelan, 1997). When the opportunity

came to push the issue politically, counties embraced the opportunity. Floridians for

Fairness in Court Funding was the name of the political arm of the Florida Association of

Counties that spend $3.5 million to campaign to promote Revision 7 to shift funding to

the state (Krueger, 1998). In the ad, the supporters use a gruesome murder case where

after being tried, convicted, and sentenced to death; it was alleged that the murderer got

life because there were limited funds to adequately cover the costs of the sentencing

hearing (Nitkin, 2008). While there was room for interpretation, the state attorney

involved in the case at the time stated that the death sentence was not issued because the

murderer was in poor health and would not survive another prosecution (Orlando

Business Journal, 1998).

Article V Revision 7 intended to provide Justice for all Floridians; the catchphrase

used by the Judiciary in hopes of securing passage of Revision 7 (Harkness, 2004).

provided better funding than local municipalities and counties.

Florida’s Budgeting Process

The state budget for Florida is created after an extensive process. The state is required to

balance its budget each fiscal year (Fla. Const. Article VII, Section 1, n.d.). The budget has three

main categories of funding streams: general revenue, state trust funds, and federal funds. Each

fall, there is the long-range financial outlook that provides a model of potential funding for the

state by matching expected revenues with estimated expenditures. Section 216.133-138, Florida

Statutes provides the authority for this outlook to occur. Agencies of the state also play a role in

submitting their potential budget needs to the executive and legislative branches. One month

Circuit Court-Civil, Circuit Court-Criminal, Circuit Court-Family, Circuit Court-

Juvenile, Circuit Court-Probate, County Court-Civil, County Court-Criminal, and County

Court-Traffic.

Archival financial data were used that identified court-related revenues and

expenditures for each of the fiscally constrained counties under review in dollars as a

ratio variable. The outcome of the treatment (Revision 7) was based on the

which is an additional benefit of using archival data in addition to comprehensive data

that are available.

Sampling Procedure

Archival data were obtained from the state of Florida Department of Financial

Services. A strength of the internal validity of this research was my ability to observe

results that were close to results that were observed in randomized experiments. The

statistical processes I conducted on the data reduced possibilities for external validity

challenges and helped eliminate external validity concerns.

residents of communities for public services and debt (Florida Constitution, n.d.). In

Florida, the circuit is the court structure within a geographical area determined by the

Florida Legislature. Twenty judicial circuits exist based on geographical size, population

of the area, and amount of court cases generated within that area. Circuits in Florida are

either recognized as small, medium, or large (Ferrandino, 2010). Within each of the

judicial circuits, at least one county exists. While five counties are big enough to exist as

judicial circuits unto themselves, other judicial circuits include partnerships between two

and seven counties (Ferrandino, 2010). The dataset included the following revenue

streams germane to this research: court-related revenues and judgments, fines, and

forfeitures.

I employed a quasi-experimental one group pretest/posttest design. This design

allowed me to provide a population study of all counties in Florida. The cutoff for what

qualifies as fiscally-constrained was amount of total revenue received before treatment.

The pre-test group was 66 counties prior to treatment. The post-test group was 66

presented a paired-samples t-test to determine whether the mean difference between two

sets of observations is zero. Linear regression was also performed.

To determine the answer to RQ1, longitudinal budget data (1993–2004 and

2005—2018) from each Florida county was input into SPSS and analyzed using

descriptive statistics. To determine the answer to test RQ2, court revenue data was

measured between 1993 and 2004 and 2005 and 2018. Descriptive statistics measuring

mean difference between two sets of observations were analyzed using SPSS. Data were

downloaded to my private computer and retained for institutional review, if necessary,

via the Microsoft Cloud service. The following are the hypotheses and research questions

that informed my study:

Research Questions and Hypotheses

RQ1: Did Revision 7 to Article V create a significant difference in court funding

pre and postimplementation?

pre and postimplementation.

and postimplementation.

Threats to Validity

Validity threats are either internal or external. This evaluation utilizes the entire

population so generalization from population data is appropriate. It was also possible that

findings of this study could be used to determine the effects of other studies related to

courts system funding. The resulting hypotheses for this study tested the extent of

funding for the state courts system by county and circuit. There are 67 counties in Florida

and 20 judicial circuits. Various aspects and characteristics of funding between counties

and judicial circuits were evaluated based on the literature review in Chapter 2.

There were potential threats to internal validity. One was related to

instrumentation. There was a possibility that the method used to collect and store

financial information between 1998 and 2018 changed, which would create a change in

the data’s ability to be used longitudinally. History also served as a threat to internal

data not been available for this research, I would have burdened participant counties with

multiple requests for information. Since the data is aggregated, confidentiality regarding

each county’s financial situation was maintained. I was an elected official within

Florida’s courts system, but any potential conflicts on my part were limited using archival

data. None of the fiscally constrained counties included the county where I served. Data

files were stored according to protocol and Institutional Review Board approval was

obtained to conduct this study.

This chapter presented details of the quantitative methodology I employed in

examining the impacts of Revision 7 to Article V on funding for Florida’s counties. I

described the research design I employed as well as the basis of use for the design. My

use of archival data was explained. The methodology of the study was described with

additional attention provided to the proposed data collection for variables and the data

The issue of judicial system funding has had challenges for decades. The Florida

legislature made changes to the structure of the judicial branch of government to make it

more efficient and more trustworthy.

The purpose of this quantitative research study was to determine the impact of

Statute 218.67(1). It was important to focus on fiscally-constrained counties because their

unique financial challenges were used as a significant reason to support passage of

Revision 7. Funding of each county served as study variables and were analyzed via a

paired-samples t-test to determine significant differences, if any, in courts system funding

before and after Revision 7 implementation.

Through this research, I addressed the following research questions and

hypotheses:

RQ1: Did Revision 7 to Article V create a significant difference in court funding

pre and postimplementation?

funding pre and postimplementation.

and postimplementation.

RQ2: Did Revision 7 have on impact on Article V in terms of court-related

revenues pre and postimplementation?

Department of Financial Services (DFS) website. These data included courts system

financial data for 66 counties between 1998 and 2018. Data were input into SPSS.

Collected data between 2009 and 2018 remain available on the DFS website. For data

between 1998 and 2008, data were available from government analysts with the Florida

DFS Division of Accounting and Auditing.

The data collection process began after receiving approval from Walden

University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) on October 30, 2020 (#10-30-20-

0977266). To answer RQ1, a descriptive analysis of financial data before and after

Revision 7 was calculated and reported. This was accomplished by comparing the mean

amount of funding (i.e., how much a county received for funding) between 1998 and

2003 to the mean amount of funding between 2005 and 2018.

Statistical Assumptions

Prior to conducting the analysis, data screening was conducted regarding the

amount spent for courts funding. I sorted data regarding variables and scanned for

financial information available for 1999. Wakulla County had no financial information

available for 1999 and 2000. Washington County had no financial information available

for 1998, 1999, and 2000. A box and whiskers plot was used to detect outliers. There

were some nonfiscally-constrained counties that received an amount of financial support

that skewed the data set.

There are several requirements related to use of a paired-sample t-test. A

continuous dependent variable should be available and there should be independence of

observations. Independence of observations in inferential tests assumes that observations

from the sample are independent of each other and not influenced by any other

measurement in the test. The continuous dependent variable is the amount spent for

courts funding; the independent variable is categorical with two groups, one independent

group of financial data related to county funding of the courts system before the

implementation of Revision 7 and one independent group of financial data related to

county funding of the courts system after the implementation of Revision 7. Normal

distribution is a requirement of the paired-samples t-test, but the dependent variable was

inspection of a boxplot for values greater than 1.5 and 3 box lengths from the edge of the

box, respectively. In the budgets of Florida court system funding, the outlier during

budget years 1998—2003 was Volusia County and the extreme points existed for Miami-

Dade, Hillsborough, Broward, Osceola, and Pasco counties All those counties were

nonfinancially-constrained and removed. I ran the test again, and there were two

additional outliers in Brevard and Pinellas counties. One outlier, Pinellas, was removed

from the study. Afterwards, the population consisted of 58 counties.

For nonfiscally constrained-counties, I reviewed all values greater than 1.5 box

lengths from the edge of the box. Those values are considered extreme outliers, as

FY2018. Descriptive statistics show a larger mean during budget years 1998 – 2003 than

for budget years 2005 – 2018. There was more funding among non-fiscally constrained

counties during FY2005 - 2018 (M =171.0m, SD = $134.m) than non-fiscally constrained

counties during FY1998 - FY2003 (M =52.0m, SD =$36.3m).

Implementation

A paired-samples t-test was used to determine whether there was a statistically

significant mean difference between court system funding for non-fiscally constrained

counties pre and post Revision 7 intervention. Court system funding increased post

of Revision 7 on court system funding was found to be of a very large effect size (1.11)

according to Cohen’s d effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, we can reject the null

hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

Table 5

statistics show a larger mean during budget years 1998 – 2003 than for budget years 2005

– 2018. There was more funding among fiscally constrained counties during FY2005 -

2018 (M =28.6m, SD = $31.8.m) than fiscally constrained counties during FY1998 -

FY2003 (M =5.3m, SD =$5.0m).

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics of Fiscally-Constrained Counties Pre and Post Revision 7

Implementation

A paired-samples t-test was used to determine whether there was a statistically

alternative hypothesis.

Table 7

Paired Samples Test Among Fiscally-Constrained Counties Pre and Post Revision 7

Intervention

To examine RQ2, I identified what the impact of Revision 7 to Article V on court-

related revenues pre and post implementation was. I sorted the data and scanned it for

inconsistencies on each variable. No data errors or inconsistencies were identified. A

between 1993 - 1998 and 2005 – 2018 were analyzed. In Table 13, I present the

descriptive statistics. Among counties (n=66), the variables were courts system funding

between FY 1998 – FY 2003 and FY2005 – FY2018. Descriptive statistics show a larger

mean during budget years 1998 – 2003 than for budget years 2005 – 2018. There was

more funding among counties during FY2005 - 2018 (M =2.1b, SD = $323.m) than

during FY1998 - FY2003 (M =385k, SD =129m).

Table 8

Descriptive Statistics Related to Impact of Revision 7 on Courts System Funding

scatter plot. The assumption of bivariate normal distribution was met. See Figure 3 for

scatterplot.

between the independent variable, courts system funding between 1998 – 2003, and the

dependent variable, courts system funding between 2005 – 2018. In Table 9, the results

of the regression model summary indicated a correlation between funding of the Florida

courts system pre and post Revision 7.

Table 9

Court system funding between 1998 – 2003 accounted for 97% of the variation in

courts system funding with an adjusted R2= .941, a very large effect size according to

Cohen (1988). This indicated that approximately 94.1% of the variance of courts system

funding post Revision 7 can be explained by its linear relationship with courts system

funding pre-Revision 7. There was independence of residuals, as assessed by a Durbin-

Watson statistic of 1.527.

increased 2.398 for each dollar spent pre-Revision 7. See Table 10 for regression model

results.

Table 10

Regression Model Results

A superimposed regression line was plotted in Figure 3.

Figure 3

regression used to assess the impact of Revision 7 on court system funding between 2005

and 2018. A positive association was identified.

Table 11

Regression Coefficients of Court System Budgets for 1998-1993 on 1995-2018

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this quasi-experimental study was to address the gap in literature

and add to the body of knowledge in public policy analysis by examining the effects of

Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution on court system funding in Florida

counties. Public policies are meant to solve community issues and encourage citizen

exploring how Revision 7 affected financial outcomes of Florida’s courts system. The

implementation and funding of Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution had a

statistically significant relationship that increased funding for Florida’s courts system

when compared to courts system funding before the implementation and funding of

Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution in 2004. Public funds are used by the

judicial branch to enforce laws and ensure justice, which are components of a democratic

society (Viapiana, 2019). There is potential for this information to inform policy

decisions and public actions of the Florida government. Johnson (2004) claimed many

funding decisions in the judicial branch are made based upon political need, rather than