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Book Review
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Book Review: The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West by
David Kilcullen
David Kilcullen's "The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the
West" offers a compelling analysis of how state and non-state adversaries adapted to challenge
Western military dominance in the post-Cold War era. Kilcullen, a former Australian Army
officer and counterinsurgency advisor to the U.S. military brings a wealth of practical experience
and academic insight to this examination of evolving warfare. His central thesis argues that while
the West has focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency since 9/11, its adversaries have
studied Western strengths and weaknesses, developing new strategies and tactics to offset
conventional military superiority.
The book's title draws from a 1993 speech by then-CIA director James Woolsey, who
warned that while the U.S. had slain a giant "dragon" (the Soviet Union), it now faced a jungle
filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous "snakes" (non-state actors and regional threats).
Kilcullen contends that in the decades since, the "snakes" have learned to fight more effectively,
while the "dragons" (state actors like Russia and China) have learned to fight more like snakes,
blurring the lines between state and non-state warfare.
Kilcullen structures his argument around several key concepts and case studies. He
begins by examining the evolution of non-state actors, particularly Al-Qaeda and its offshoots,
demonstrating how these groups adapted to Western counterterrorism efforts through a process
of "combat Darwinism." He argues that the intense pressure of drone strikes and special
operations raids created a selection effect, eliminating weaker elements while allowing the most
adaptive to survive and proliferate their tactics.
A particularly insightful chapter focuses on the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah,
which Kilcullen presents as a case study of successful adaptation. He traces Hezbollah's
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evolution from a guerrilla force in the 1980s to a sophisticated hybrid organization combining
political, social, and military capabilities. Kilcullen argues that Hezbollah's ability to integrate
conventional and irregular warfare tactics, coupled with its deep roots in Lebanese society, make
it a formidable adversary that has successfully challenged both Israel and Western interests in the
region.
The author then turns his attention to state actors, particularly Russia and China,
examining how they have incorporated lessons from non-state actors and Western military
operations. Kilcullen introduces the concept of "liminal warfare" to describe Russia's approach,
which exploits ambiguity and operates just below the threshold of open conflict. He provides a
detailed analysis of Russian actions in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Syria, demonstrating how
Moscow has combined conventional military power with cyber-attacks, disinformation
campaigns, and covert operations to achieve its objectives while minimizing the risk of
confrontation with NATO.
China's strategy, which Kilcullen terms "conceptual envelopment," is portrayed as a more
comprehensive approach that seeks to outmanoeuvre the West across multiple domains
simultaneously. He argues that Beijing's military modernization, economic initiatives like the
Belt and Road Initiative, and technological advances in areas like artificial intelligence and 5G
networks represent a holistic challenge to Western primacy beyond traditional military
competition.
One of the book's strengths is Kilcullen's ability to draw on a wide range of historical
examples and theoretical concepts to support his arguments. He effectively weaves insights from
evolutionary biology, complexity theory, and military history to explain how adversaries adapt
and evolve. For instance, his discussion of "fitness landscapes" borrowed from evolutionary
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science provides a valuable framework for understanding how different actors navigate and
exploit their strategic environments.
Kilcullen's analysis is particularly compelling when he examines the unintended
consequences of Western military actions. He argues persuasively that the intense pressure
placed on terrorist networks through drone strikes and special operations raids, while tactically
effective, has driven an evolutionary process that has made these groups more resilient and
adaptive over time. Similarly, he contends that Western interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Syria
have created power vacuums and instability that both state and non-state actors have exploited to
their advantage.
The author's background as both a practitioner and scholar lends credibility to his
analysis, and he provides numerous firsthand anecdotes that bring his arguments to life. For
example, his description of observing Russian military exercises near the Norwegian border
offers valuable insight into Moscow's Arctic strategy and its implications for NATO.
However, the book has its limitations. At times, Kilcullen's broad scope means that some
topics receive only cursory treatment. For instance, his discussion of China's strategy, while
insightful, could benefit from a more in-depth examination of specific case studies or military
capabilities. Additionally, while he touches on the role of emerging technologies like artificial
intelligence and autonomous weapons, a more thorough exploration of how these might shape
future conflicts would have strengthened his analysis.
Another potential criticism is that Kilcullen's focus on adaptation by America's
adversaries sometimes overshadows discussion of how Western militaries have evolved. While
he acknowledges some changes, a more balanced examination of Western adaptation might have
provided a more complete picture of the current strategic landscape.
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Despite these minor shortcomings, "The Dragons and the Snakes" offers several valuable
contributions to our understanding of contemporary warfare. First, Kilcullen's emphasis on the
importance of adaptation and learning in military affairs is a crucial reminder that strategic
advantage is never permanent. His analysis underscores the need for Western militaries and
policymakers to remain agile and innovative in the face of evolving threats.
Second, the book highlights the increasingly blurred lines between state and non-state
actors, conventional and irregular warfare, and military and non-military domains. Kilcullen
argues that future conflicts will likely be characterized by this ambiguity, challenging traditional
Western warfare concepts and requiring new approaches to deterrence and conflict resolution.
Third, Kilcullen's examination of how adversaries have studied and learned from Western
strengths and weaknesses offers valuable insights for military planners and strategists. His
analysis suggests that Western militaries must not only prepare for the threats they currently face
but also anticipate how these threats might evolve in response to Western actions.
The book's implications for military leadership and strategy are significant. Kilcullen
argues that modern conflicts' complex, adaptive nature requires leaders who can think flexibly
and operate effectively across multiple domains. He suggests that military education and training
must evolve to develop leaders capable of understanding and responding to the full spectrum of
threats, from high-end conventional warfare to subtle political and economic coercion.
Furthermore, Kilcullen's analysis highlights the need for a more integrated approach to
national security that goes beyond traditional military capabilities. He argues convincingly that
addressing modern threats requires close coordination between military, diplomatic, economic,
and information efforts, challenging conventional organizational structures and decision-making
processes.
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Despite these limitations, the book's overall thesis is well-supported and provides
essential insights for military leaders grappling with the changing character of warfare. By
illuminating how adversaries have exploited Western vulnerabilities and adapted to new
operational environments, Kilcullen highlights the need for military leaders to be adaptable,
innovative, and willing to challenge traditional thinking about war.
In conclusion, The Dragons and the Snakes is a timely and incisive analysis of how
Western adversaries have evolved in the post-Cold War era, posing new challenges for military
leaders. Through a combination of historical analysis, theoretical insights, and personal
anecdotes, Kilcullen makes a compelling case for his central argument that the West must adapt
its approach to warfare if it hopes to maintain its military edge. While the book's prescriptions
for responding to these challenges could be more fully developed, its problem diagnosis is clear
and well-supported. Kilcullen's nuanced examination of the interplay between state and non-state
actors and the blurring of traditional boundaries between war and peace provides valuable
insights for military leaders seeking to understand the complex and rapidly evolving security
environment.
Ultimately, The Dragons and the Snakes serves as a wake-up call for Western military
leaders, highlighting the urgent need to adapt to new forms of warfare and develop more flexible
and resilient approaches to dealing with a wide range of threats. As Kilcullen makes clear, the
cost of failing to do so could be high as adversaries continue to exploit Western vulnerabilities
and challenge the international order. Military leaders who take the book's insights to heart will
be better equipped to navigate the challenges of the 21st century and ensure the continued
effectiveness of Western military power.
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Bibliographies
David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford
University Press, 2020.
