1
CHAPTER
1
I
NTRODUCTION
Ever since the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, there has been considerable
speculation and debate among scholars that as improved social, economic and political
opportunities expanded for African Americans they would assimilate into the mainstream
United States population like white ethnics that preceded them.
1
Most importantly, they
were expected to hold more diverse political party preferences. The subsequent
emergence of a larger black middle class accompanied by the appearance of greater
economic diversity (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989) during the post-civil rights era
furthered suppositions that African Americans would become more conservative in their
ideological orientations and partisan predispositions. Despite noticeable improvements in
black economic class standing, African Americans emerged as a politically distinctive
and cohesive group with a strong Democratic bias (Black and Black 2002; Stanley and
Niemi 1991). Consequently, scholars raised questions about the extent to which
improved economic standings could compete meaningfully with racial group identities,
and thereby prompt changes in African American decisions about the two main political
parties.
1. In Who Governs (1963), Robert Dahl developed the political assimilation
theory referenced.
2
To investigate this long-term relationship between the African American
electorate and the Democratic Party, the present study draws from Michael C. Dawson’s
general theory of African American racial group interests as advanced in Behind the Mule
(1994). Specifically, this dissertation focuses on his study of “African American
Partisanship and the American Party System,”
2
and the supposed lack of political
diversity within the black community. Dawson’s empirical research on the importance of
race and class develops a systematic framework—the Black Utility Heuristic—that
assumes race has a profound impact on African American political decisions. This
includes decisions about which political party better addresses issues of most importance
to African Americans. Thus far, no other study has applied Dawson’s theory of African
American racial group interests and his Black Utility Heuristic paradigm to measure the
relative degree of racial group solidarity and political cohesion beyond his own research
using the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (Jackson 1984; 1988). I test a
modification of Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic using the 1996 National Black Election
Study (Tate 1997), and extend his model to test the extent to which such heuristics apply
to both racial and ethnic groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et
al. 2009).
In keeping with Dawson’s theory, I agree that the Black Utility Heuristic is
applicable and reliable as long as race continues to determine prospects of life in the
United States. This is true as long as historical as well as contemporary social and
demographic structures shape perceptions of circumstances within the African American
2. See: Michael C. Dawson, “African American Partisanship and the American
Party System” (Chapter 5) in Behind the Mule (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1994), 96-129.
3
community, particularly with regard to black life chances.
3
While race is considered the
prime factor explaining African Americans’ overwhelming and consistent political
choices, their Democratic partisanship reflects a rational decision calculus that only one
political party of the limited U.S. two-party system meets median racial group policy
preferences. Besides, decisions about which political party is more responsive to African
American racial group interests denotes a rational assessment of how each governing
party fares in promoting the well-being of the racial group (Fiorina 1981). In this regard
race, rather than class and/or other social demography typically shown to influence
partisanship, is central to judgments about policy congruence, or the lack thereof,
between each political party and the African American racial group. Hence, the group
rationale for making political choices is easily transmittable to individual members. This
is primarily because of the continuing significance of race in American society, and
because of the political parties either ignoring or overlooking race-based issues.
Both theoretical and practical political reasons reinforce the basis for this on-
going relationship. For instance, African Americans perceive the Democrats as having
the best over-time record of addressing wrongs against the race; of having a better
approach to dealing with issues of most importance to them; and, of elevating their status
in the economic, social, and political order (Bositis 2002; Tate 1994). So, their long-term
assessments of the policies and performance of the two governing parties (Fiorina 1989)
3. Originally, Max Weber used the term, life chances to describe social class
differences. See: Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). The distinctions in
access to material goods like food and housing also included differences in access to
services like public education and health care. All of these goods and services are
available in the market, according to: A.G. Johnson, Power, Privilege, and Difference
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
4
should point them to the Democratic, not the Republican, Party. Moreover, affiliation
with the Democratic Party is important for practical political reasons as well. Through
this association African Americans have access to the party organization, to institutions
of government, and to both appointive and elective offices. In short, the meaningful
long-term political clout realized by African Americans derives from association with the
Democrats. Hence, this association is efficient in that voting for Democrats allows
African Americans to maintain a sense of group position while engaging the political
system. Correspondingly, Democratic control or “capture” of the black vote is a crucial
factor in securing electoral success (Frymer 1999).
This study contributes to the larger body of literature investigating how social
group identifications shape individual political orientations toward the two main political
parties, as well as to studies of African American politics. Explicitly, the primary focus
of this dissertation is African American political partisanship, and the extent to which
race versus class or other social demography explain their seemingly stable Democratic
Party preferences. In other words: why do African Americans think the way they do
politically, and what induces them to change? To investigate this question I test
Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic (1994) using data collected for analysis of African
American politics.
4
Secondarily, the research aim is to assess the extent to which the
African American form of group-based identity politics influences politically emerging
racial and pan-ethnic minority groups. Important to this examination are individual
perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, but is this merely a
4. Specifically, data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate
1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009).
5
“black” phenomenon or does Dawson’s heuristic provide a viable (and similar)
explanation for party choice among other racial and ethnic minority groups as well? To
investigate this question I include comparison populations of African Americans, White
Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks. Typically, mainstream
research of American party identifications include only a cursory statement about African
American partisanship
5
or apply the traditional black-white dichotomy in explanations of
party identifications (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Although this standard relationship is
important, understanding how race and ethnicity matters overall is just as important. This
dissertation fills this gap.
In the 1970s tension between race and class as factors determining black life
chances erupted into intense debate primarily among sociologists from two competing
theoretical perspectives. The “class” perspective, proposed by William J. Wilson in The
Declining Significance of Race (1978; 1980), claims that since the mid-1960s economic
class
6
has become the most important factor determining the personal life styles and
external living conditions of African Americans. On the other hand, the “race”
perspective, articulated by Charles V. Willie (1978) holds that integration and affirmative
action programs, implemented after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, place middle-
5. African Americans are the most loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, i.e.
in relation to other socio-demographic constituent groups. They are, therefore, often
dismissed as highly predictable and virtually resistant to partisan change.
6. Wilson’s (1980) thesis, that improved economic class situations within the
African American community account for the declining significance of race, is based on the
notion that money is the principle reason for black-white racial inequities. Hence, the
opportunity to make money increases economic (class) standings and life prospects. Note:
W. J. Wilson, The Declining Significance Of Race: Blacks And Changing American Institutions,
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
6
class blacks in direct contact with whites where extensive interactions make the
resurgence of race quite evident. However, Wilson’s (1980) thesis fueled speculations
about the increasing importance of class interests versus racial group interests in African
American politics, and raised expectations that improved economic class situations would
create greater political diversity within the racial group.
Michael C. Dawson (1994) responded explicitly to these two competing
theoretical arguments and to social scholars’ persistent query about the single most
important determinant of African-American politics. Furthermore, in response to
Wilson’s declining significance of race hypothesis, Dawson contends that race interests
supersede class interests primarily because of the continuing significance of race in the
United States. Moreover, the historical circumstances of race shape perceptions of
common interests and racial group solidarity among African Americans producing a
sense of common/linked fate. From Dawson’s perspective, African-American politics as
subsumed within cognitive processes, presupposes that the structure of group perceptions
is on a psychological level where the degree of distinctive actions by individuals depends
on the presence of certain group characteristics. The most notable variables are racial
group identification, a black consciousness, group cohesiveness, and the salience of one’s
racial identity. A relatively high degree of salience means that there is sufficient
information about one’s identity and about “the fit of that identity with social reality”
(Dawson 1994, 11). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the reality is that race
remains a major force in African American lives.
First, with regard to those prominent racial group characteristics noted above, the
origin of the concept of “linked fate” is closely related to that of group consciousness
7
(McClain et al. 2009), and to the idea that there is an intimate association between
individual and group life chances (Simien 2005). This common or linked fate results
when members of a racial grouping face common experiences such as economic
exploitation, social subordination, and psychological oppression (Dawson 1994). It is for
this reason that ascriptive characteristics of race, like the identity of “blackness” and the
African phenotype, have a significant influence on life chance opportunities or the
opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life rather than one’s knowledge, skills and/or
abilities. Being “black” is a visible stereotypical differentiation from those who
determine accessibility to social, political, and economic power in the United States.
Dawson attributes linked fate primarily to perceptions when “economic domination of
blacks by whites became inter-twined with a sense of political domination as well”
(Dawson, 55).
Second, a resulting group political cohesion becomes rational as individual
members follow race-group cues to evaluate and interpret the political world of objects
like parties, issues, candidates, and events. According to Dawson, group political
cohesion is also efficient because individual members can rely on their perceptions of
racial group interests to make the appropriate political choices. Dawson’s theory of
African-American racial group interests employs the economic theory of administrative
decision-making as advanced by Herbert Simon in Administrative Behavior (1947).
Simon argues that multiple factors, including psychological influences, can explain
rational human choice or bounded rationality whereby an individual opts for a satisfying
or “satisficing” solution (Simon 1955). In this regard, the African-American outlook, or
black worldview, provides a sense of “community” where individual members identify
8
self with the racial group, and with the relative position of the race—predominantly
within the bottom tiers of a stratified social hierarchy. As individuals become more
politically aware of their group’s social class position, they develop a racial group or
“black” consciousness and commit to collective action (Miller, Gurin, Gurin and
Malanchuk 1981).
Here Dawson agrees with seminal studies of political participation (Verba and
Nie 1972; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Shingles 1981) that what
distinguishes African Americans from their White counterparts are “the development of
self-conscious awareness of group membership” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150). There is,
therefore, a sense of “belongingness” or identification with the racial grouping revealed
in such self-identifications, as “I am an African American,” “I am a Liberal,” or “I am a
Democrat” (Sherif and Sherif 1961; Verba and Nie 1972). Herein lies the difference
between blacks and whites, a racial group or black consciousness and a perception of
linked racial fate—us versus them—that serves as a mechanism for political cohesion and
mobilization, and guarantees solidarity in attitudes about appropriate decisions and
behavior. Linked fate insulates individual members against the changing effects of other
structures of attitudes, such as economic class. Most importantly, Dawson (1994) finds
that race continues to be the most powerful explanatory variable for predicting African
American politics because of its continued, profound influence on black life chances,
particularly within the social and economic arenas of life.
According to Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) politicization of the
racial group produces a sense of black consciousness that occurs when an individual
becomes aware of the relative position of her or his racial group in society. The concepts
9
of group identification and race consciousness based on perceptions of linked fate
confirm the highly distinctive attitudes and behaviors produced by race (Miller, Gurin,
Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981) as previously reported in The American Voter
7
(Campbell et
al. 1960). In this regard, identification is a causal factor that, once politicized, determines
individual decisions that adhere to the group political standard. For African Americans
that position tends to be disproportionately at the lower end of the socio-economic scale
(Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). This, coupled with the reality of their struggle for
basic civic inclusion, serves as a catalyst for consensus and solidarity among individuals
who perceive their similarly situated class status. Such individuals respond politically by
forming a stable and cohesive bloc to advance African American racial group interests in
partisan politics and within the electoral arena.
Finally, Dawson’s empirically grounded political research demonstrates how
linked racial fate and/or the Black Utility Heuristic influence contemporary African
American orientations toward the two main political parties. He employs his theoretical
framework to analyze African American group political cohesion on this wise: a (black)
racial group consciousness shapes individual perceptions of self-interests and links them
to perceptions of race group interests, both economic and political. Henceforth,
individual perceptions of linked fate stimulate solidarity and direct political orientations.
This is important because there are considerable differences in individual perceptions of
the political world; however, it is imperative for the member to develop a sense of
“community” with the racial group. In so doing, there is a greater likelihood that one will
deem significant the attitudes and behaviors expected by the race, and assume the group
7. Reference: Angus Campbell, et al. “Membership in Social Groupings” (Chapter
12) in The American Voter (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 295-332.
10
partisan standard. This is what Dawson refers to as the Black Utility Heuristic, a
mechanism employed to determine which political decisions to make in advancing racial
group goals. It is a reliable shortcut for accurate political preference attitudes, voting
decisions, and public opinions.
Race is most significant in determining party identifications. If the Black Utility
Heuristic serves as the primary factor used to decipher political messages, and as a
strategic causal factor within the African American decision calculus, as Dawson
contends, then individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most
responsive to [black] racial group interests in accordance with the current racial group
political standard, the Democratic Party. Such a finding for this research study would
support the “race” perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate
the significance of linked racial fate and Dawson’s (1994) model, the Black Utility
Heuristic.
This dissertation addresses an important and timely topic in contemporary
American politics. The current chapter introduces the basis for my theoretical framework,
the Black Utility Heuristic as formulated by Michael C. Dawson (1994) in his theory of
African American racial group interests. Additionally, this chapter establishes the focus
of the present research study, and introduces briefly scholarly debates about the single
most important factor that best explains African American life chances: race or class.
Dawson’s response to the race versus class sociological debates is essential to
understanding key variables employed in explaining his theory of African American
racial group interests: racial group identification, a black consciousness, group
cohesiveness, and the salience of racial identity. These factors serve to clarify distinctive
11
African American politics, and the rational and efficient African American decision
calculus.
Chapter 2 provides the principle theoretical goal for this dissertation. I begin with
a discussion of the traditional conceptualization of party identification using classic
literature formulated in the Michigan School. I also present literature regarding
alternative explanations of partisanship from rational theorists and the revisionists. In
addition, later approaches returning to the “Michigan” tradition are included in the
discussion, as well as explanations of partisan change based primarily on Carmines and
Stimson’s (1989) issue evolution. It is, therefore, within the context of this general body
of literature on American party identifications that I review explanations of African
American partisan identifications. The value of the Black Utility Heuristic model, for
comparison among racial and pan-ethnic minority groups, is also considered within the
frame of the theoretical goal.
A core theme of this dissertation is the reality or perception of policy congruence
between African Americans and the two main political parties, and how the parties
responded to secure the black vote. This idea is considered in the historical perspective
discussed in Chapter 3, which covers historical periods from the Reconstruction era to the
Post-New Deal era. Additionally, Chapter 3 sets a background discussion leading up to
the 1860 presidential election of Abraham Lincoln. This historical perspective continues
with a discussion of strategies employed by African Americans to demand that the
political parties provide attention and action to issues that address racial group interests.
African American strategies, the emergence of race to the national political agenda, and
responses from the political parties are further discussed in Chapter 4 during historical
12
periods representing the Civil Rights and Post-Civil Rights eras. The methodological
approach and model construction used to test research hypotheses explored in this study
are covered in Chapter 5, while reports of statistical analyses and study findings are
presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses both study results and conclusions,
and proffers recommendations for future research endeavors.
13
CHAPTER 2
T
OWARD
A
T
HEORETICAL
F
RAMEWORK FOR
A
FRICAN
A
MERICAN
P
ARTISANSHIP
Of extreme importance to this investigation of African Americans’ partisanship is the
conceptualization of party identification. Hence, reviews of some major orientations that
have most influenced explanations of citizens’ attitudes toward the two main political
parties, and changes thereto, are enumerated in this chapter. In addition, I attempt to
identify particularly important theoretical issues that underlie different orientations that
contribute to our understanding of African Americans’ decisions about the Democratic
and Republican parties. Lastly, the theoretical framework guiding this dissertation is
formulated.
The relationship between American citizens’ social identifications and their
orientations toward the two main political parties has received considerable attention
from political scientists. Key questions guiding this extensive body of research are: What
is party identification, and what causes partisan change? Some scholars contend that
party identification is a deeply rooted psychological attachment (Campbell, Converse,
Miller, and Stokes 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996) or social identity (Green, Palmquist,
and Schickler 2002) that shapes political preferences. Others suggest that partisanship is
largely an informational short cut (Downs 1957) comprised of a “running tally” of other
political attitudes and evaluations (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981). This on-going debate,
primarily regarding the conceptualization of partisan identification in keeping with the
14
social-psychological prototype and critical challenges from rational choice theorists and
the revisionists, has spanned half a century and includes a number of pivotal research
studies.
2.1 FROM CLASSIC CONCEPTUALIZATION TO REVISIONIST CRITIQUES
The predominant view of party identification in classic voting behavior research
is advanced in the “Michigan” model of electoral decision-making. Formulated by
Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in their seminal
study of The American Voter, this social-psychological paradigm emphasizes “the role of
enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects” (Campbell
et al. 1960, 135). According to Campbell, et al. and subsequent scholarship that has
adopted this perspective (Goldberg 1966; Kelley and Mirer 1974; Miller and Shanks
1996), party identification is as an “unmoved mover” (Johnston 2006); a deeply held
long-term psychological and/or group attachment that is largely unchanging even as
events and other political objects change. This is primarily because candidates and issues
are election specific whereas citizens’ orientations toward the two main political parties
endure since the parties themselves remain relatively stable. Furthermore, party
identification is framed as a conceptual screen through which citizens view and interpret
new political information. While shaping policy preferences and other political attitudes,
party identification remains largely unchanged by them.
On the other hand, revisionist scholars contest strongly the concept of Party
identification as formulated in the social-psychological perspective. Instead, revisionists
contend that party identification is not unmoved; it is shaped by political attitudes and
evaluations. This critique is developed most fully in Retrospective Voting in American
15
Elections (1981), in which Morris Fiorina frames party identification as a “running tally”
of citizen evaluations of other political objects and events. Christopher Achen (1992)
further articulates the revisionist conceptualization of partisanship as a Bayesian
updating, or learning process model.
Revisionists build their theoretical perspective on the rational approach employed
by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), and V.O. Key‘s
treatment of partisan preference, in The Responsible Electorate (1966), as an information
shortcut based on which political party’s ideological and policy positions are relatively
closer to those held by the citizen. Thus, in the revisionists’ perception party
identification is not considered a psychological or group attachment independent of
citizens’ evaluations of contemporary politics. Rather, partisanship represents a summary
of the political evaluations individuals have formed over time. So, while party
identification might be quite stable from one election to the next, it also may change over
time in response to policy preferences, candidate evaluations, evaluations of party
performance, and vote decisions (Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and
Converse 1979; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984).
The revisionist view clearly supports the idea that individuals might change their
party loyalties in response to their attitudes on policy issues, particularly those salient,
emotional, and polarizing issues commonly associated with periods of partisan change.
Yet, similar to the social-psychological argument, revisionist scholarship acknowledges
the possibility of a long-term component to party identification stemming from childhood
socialization (Fiorina 1981; Achen 2002). Revisionists further purport that partisanship
may shape expectations of future party performance (Fiorina 1981), or that party
16
identification may cause policy preferences as well as be caused by them (Franklin 1984;
Jackson 1975); Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979). Most importantly, the
general position of revisionists is that partisanship is more a summary of other political
attitudes than a shaper of them. Fiorina characterizes the revisionist view of party
identification as “an evolving indicator of an individual’s relationship to the parties”
(Fiorina 2002, 98).
2.2 BACK TO THE BASICS? THE DEBATE CONTINUES
Responding to the revisionist case, Warren Miller (1991) initiates defense of the
social-psychological paradigm that he and J. Merrill Shanks further articulate in The New
American Voter (1996). Suggesting that party identification may not be far from the
theoretical framework constructed in The American Voter (1960), Miller and Shanks
indicate that party identification is primarily an attitude of preference that provides a
meaningful explanation for candidate and policy preferences, especially when uncertainty
is present. In addition, Donald Green and his colleagues fully develop a critique of the
revisionist perspective on party identification. They show that when random
measurement error is corrected party identification is almost entirely exogenous in the
short-run to issues, candidates, and performance evaluations (Green and Palmquist 1990;
1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Furthermore, Alan Gerber and Donald
Green (1998) reject Christopher Achen’s (1992) conceptualization of party identification
as a Bayesian updating process suggesting instead that it is incompatible with the reality
of partisan stability. Green, et al. argues that party ties represent an attachment to a group
similar to religious identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). “People
maintain their partisan identities as long as their image of the partisan groups remains
17
intact. But when secular realignment is afoot, the public image of the partisan groups
shifts, which in turn produces a shift in party identifications and perhaps further alters
perceptions of partisan groups” (Green et al. 2002, 816). In short, the works of Green
and his colleagues reaffirms the view of partisanship as a deeply rooted social identity
independent of other political evaluations that is firmly held by most citizens.
In spite of this reaffirmation, Green et al. depart from one very important
component of the traditional American Voter model. They argue against the idea of
selective perception, and hold instead that Democratic and Republican identifiers update
their political evaluations in similar ways. In doing so Green and his colleagues reject the
idea that party identification serves as a perceptual screen that shapes the evaluation of
new political information (Gerber and Green 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002). Additional scholars contend that partisanship causes change in other political
evaluations. For example, Zaller (1992) suggests that partisan predispositions regulate
the flow of information from political elites to the mass public; thusly, individuals tend to
bring their own policy attitudes into line with those of their party’s leaders. Bartels
(2002) provides even stronger support for the American Voter model with his evidence of
the effect of party identification in shaping political evaluations. He argues that Gerber
and Green’s (1999) unbiased updating actually confirms that there is a partisan bias.
Both Bartels (2000) and Hetherington (2001) provide further support for the role of party
identification as a causal force based on evidence of the strengthening of party
identification and its impact on vote choice.
Finally, while the American Voter model emphasizes the idea that party
identification is a “durable attachment not readily disturbed by passing events and
18
personalities” (Campbell et al. 1960, 151), it does not rule out the possibility of some
issue-based change in party loyalties. Here Campbell et al. acknowledge the possibility
of party realignment, suggesting that when individuals hold particularly strong feelings
about issues on which they differ with their party, “this pressure is intense enough, [that]
a stable partisan identification may actually be changed” (Campbell et al. 1960, 135).
The political attitudes most likely to create enough pressure that individuals may shift
their party loyalties are deeply held attitudes on the emotional and polarizing issues
associated with partisan change, such as racial and economic issues (Carmines and
Stimson 1989). Therefore, while party identification may be the causal force in its
relationship with most policy preferences, attitudes toward certain issues that structure
party conflict may lead to shifts in party ties for some citizens. In short, this body of
research revalidates party identification as a principle mover of other political attitudes;
however, it is not an unmoved mover in every situation.
2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION
In order for individuals to change either their party identifications or their issue
preferences they must first recognize that there are differences in the policy positions of
the two main political parties. Research has established the relationship between issues
and party change (Carmines and Stimson 1989; MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987;
Sundquist 1983) when parties and candidates assume distinct positions on important
issues, and when citizens are aware of the parties’ differences. Citizens that do not
recognize partisan conflict based on divergent policy stands should have no cause for
change. On the other hand, for individuals that are aware of party differences on
particularly polarizing and emotion-laden issues, the salience of those issues is critical.
19
Therefore, when considering the centrality and stability of party identification, the only
individuals that should change their political party preferences on the basis of their issue
attitudes are those that find the issues to be particularly salient. Conversely, citizens that
are not aware of polarizing partisan policy stands on particularly powerful easily
understood, emotional, or symbolic issues have no reason to change their partisanship.
2.4 A BROADER ACCOUNT OF PARTY CHANGE: ISSUE EVOLUTION
A prominent position relegated to issues, especially between the 1964 and 1972
presidential elections, is attributed to the polarizing policy positions of the two main
political parties and their candidates (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black
1987). Carmines and Stimson’s predominant explanation of partisan change during this
decisive election period is articulated in Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of
American Politics (1989). They argue that major changes in the policy stands of the two
main political parties occur in response to the type of issues that command center stage in
American politics. Certain economic, foreign, racial, and social policies that dominate
electoral campaigns evoke powerful emotional responses from the parties and candidates,
and cut across traditional party cleavages such as the New Deal coalition, causing
conflict. According to their theory of issue evolution race is the prime factor explaining
post-New Deal transformations in the partisan balance of identification in the American
electorate (Pomper 1989); and, changes in the doctrinal stances of the political parties
where the Democratic Party emerges as racially liberal and actively pro-civil rights
(Feinstein and Schickler 2008).
Subsequently, defections among white southerners from the New Deal coalition
(Petrocik 1987), who were “going Republican,” (Black and Black 1987) correspond to
20
ideological transformations of Democratic, and Republican, Party policies with regard to
racial issues (Feinstein and Schickler 2008). Apart from white southerners, the most
noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among other social groupings within the
electorate include whites, self-designated conservatives, and both younger and older
cohorts (Norpoth 1987, Petrocik 1987, Black and Black 1989; Gurin, Hatchett, and
Jackson 1989). Social status group factors, especially differences in educational
background, are also prominent forces explaining increased preferences for the
Republican Party among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s and
extending into the late 1980s (Miller 1992). Carmines and Stimson (1989) further
contend that party-based changes reflect attitudes toward race-related policies regarding
integration, black civil rights, and voting rights for the disenfranchised.
By the mid-1960s African Americans, seemingly impervious to change, culminate
their realignment that began with the 1936 presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Weiss 1989). This attachment to the Democratic Party continues to intensify into the late
1980s. Thereafter, most African Americans perceive the Democrats as having the best
over-time record of giving attention to, and taking action to address issues of most
importance to the African American racial group. Moreover, African Americans’
distinctive and enduring Democratic partisanship appears to confirm the significance of
race, or of particular issues that focus on racial group interests, when making decisions
between the two main political parties. Even though important demographic
differentiations are also present within the African American community, variables
commonly associated with predicting political partisanship do not typically provide
meaningful explanations of persistent racial distinctiveness in political partisanship.
21
Because of persistent racial group solidarity Democratic, not Republican
partisanship appears rational, at least from the perspective of procedural rationality
(Simon 1955). While the Democrats may not be the best choice, they may be the “lesser
of two evils.” Still, the extent to which political distinctiveness and durable partisan
predispositions persist at any point in time depends upon continued perceptions of the
Democratic Party as best capable of addressing racial group interests. Nevertheless,
Bositis (2002) shows evidence of increased conservative ideological preferences among
African Americans in the 1980s Reagan era that furthered speculation of increased
preferences for the Republican Party. Luks and Elms (2005) contend that Democratic
attachments have declined since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, particularly among
younger cohorts. Correspondingly, Lee and Hajnal (2007) reveal a discernible pattern of
fluctuations in African American party affiliation. In spite of such empirical evidence
African Americans continue to prefer the Democrats.
2.5 AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Therefore, in formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying partisanship
among African Americans the theory of African-American racial group interests provides
a more useful paradigm than the traditional prototypes. This is mainly because “to
understand black politics one needs to draw on many methodologies, and one clearly
needs to pay more attention to the boundaries between society and the individual, with
the group as the intermediary phenomenon” (Dawson 1994, 13). Of particular value to
the development of this theoretical framework is the Black Utility Heuristic that provides
a parsimonious explanation for the group-based decision calculus of individual African
Americans. The present model of partisanship endeavors to construct a conceptual
22
framework based on Michael C. Dawson’s synthesis of “psychological theories of the
social group” with “Simonesque approaches to rational decision-making” (Dawson, 12).
In so doing, Dawson “provides a rational choice foundation for the formation of group
identity [where] rationality is procedural, based on assessments of what works as opposed
to what is best [which is useful] to gain insight into the decision-making processes of
African Americans both as individuals and as part of a politically active group within the
American polity” (Dawson, 12).
The theoretical background of African American racial group interests is a group
process perspective of the relationship between the individual and the group, where the
racial grouping is construed as a psychological group. According to John C. Turner
(1987) such groups, descriptively speaking, are psychologically relevant to individual
members subjectively for social comparison. Psychological groups influence individual
members since it is from the group that the individual acquires norms, values, and beliefs.
Herein lies the utility of group membership for such persons. Individuals can accept
membership in, and identification with the group (privately) based on a view of
themselves in relation to those persons that constitute the group (Turner 1987, 1-2). This
makes the group relevant to the establishment of their own socio-political reality.
Henceforth, the psychological group becomes an important frame of reference that shapes
the individuals’ own attitudes, orientations and ideas. In this way, a deference to group
interests as opposed to individual interests is located within the individual. Therefore, the
individual decision is consistent with the notion of procedural rationality, an important
component of the Black Utility Heuristic (Dawson 1994). Moreover, recognition of the
23
individual by others as a group member reinforces the perception of us versus them and
enhances the importance of identification with the group.
Instrumental to this theoretical approach, and consistent with the theory of
African-American racial group interests, is the idea that individuals are social beings
Fundamentally, the influence of individuals on one another, particularly in relation to
change is inherent in the political motives of African Americans. Any change among a
substantial proportion of individual members or within subgroups is potentially
detrimental to the group as a whole. Movement in opposition to the political standard
could threaten the African American racial group position within the polity. As a
psychological group this collectivity of individuals exerts powerful influence on
individual attitudes toward the two main political parties in the United States. This is
denoted in the seemingly habitual, stable, and enduring relationship between the
Democratic Party and the African Americans. Perceptions of interconnectedness explain
the presence of an “interdependence of fate,” a perceptual realization that one’s fate
depends on the fate of the group as a whole, and “task interdependence” or the
dependence of individual group members on each other for goal achievement (Lewin
1946).
Kurt Lewin (1946, 165-166) explains his principle of interdependence of fate in
relation to the position of Jews in 1939 thusly:
[I]t is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but
rather interdependence of fate. Any normal group, and certainly any developed
and organized one contain and should contain individuals of very different
character…. It is easy enough to see that the common fate of all Jews makes them
a group in reality…. What is more, a person who has learned to see how much his
own fate depends upon the fate of his entire group will ready and even eager to
take over a fair share of responsibility for its welfare
.
24
The historical case of African Americans is most applicable to this concept. As a
psychological construct, linked fate measures the degree to which an individual’s own
self interests are tied to the interests of the entire group. Nonetheless, the perception of
relationship with the group waxes or wanes depending upon the extent to which self
becomes less, and group becomes more important. Hence,
Hypothesis 1: African Americans with stronger (black) linked fates are likely to
support a political party whose policy preferences are perceived as consistent with
(black) racial group interests.
The case of African American women suggests distinct historical and
contemporary life situations that make even more significant the role of interdependence
of fate (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien 2005). This is coupled with making decisions in the
face of multiple identities, such as race and gender. So, to further investigate this
underlying dimension of African American racial group partisanship, the following
proposition is formulated.
Hypothesis 2: African American women are more likely to support the
Democratic Party than African American men or women of other ethnicities.
Of further significance to this theoretical perspective is the concept of task
interdependence that sheds light on the inducing influence of certain group attributes.
Understandably, individuals choose membership with the group based on their
perceptions of a common purpose, and on their interest in achieving a common goal.
Bound by perceptions of interconnectedness, individuals often view group goals as more
important than their own. This is because they consider that their goals are interrelated
with the goals of the individuals that compose the group and with whom they share
ascriptive characteristics, an important component of the black utility heuristic. Even
though group strategies and outcomes may not produce the best possible (optimizing)
25
solution for the individual, the decision to align oneself with a collectivity of individuals
similarly situated is both procedurally rational and efficient. In so doing individuals
satisfactorily assess the pursuit, and accomplishment, of racial group goals as fulfilling
their own aspirations.
Hypothesis 3: African Americans are more likely to identify with the political
party that they perceive best helps their racial group.
Interdependence plays a significant role in understanding the dynamic processes
of the African American racial group. Using the framework of the black utility heuristic,
Dawson demonstrates how linked racial fate affects political attitudes and decisions of
group cohesion. Additionally, the concept of linked fate guides Dawson’s later work on
the root of contemporary African American politics in Black Visions (2002). In this
regard, his interpretations and systematic findings confirm the race perspective (Willie
1979). Nonetheless, Dawson also finds “limited evidence” confirming the declining
significance of race hypothesis or class perspective (Wilson 1979; 1980) in determining
life chance opportunities (Dawson, 38). Recent relevant research studies that also
employ the concept of linked fate and the black politics model demonstrate its profound
effect on explanations of the political attitudes and behavior of ethnic minority population
groups representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2008; Nicholson,
Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asian Americans (Junn & Masuoka 2008), Afro-Caribbeans
(Watt 2009), and West Indians (Rogers, 2001). Correspondingly, the concept of linked
fate also provides a meaningful explanation for predictors of pan-ethnic group
consciousness and the use of group identity cues among Asian Americans and Latinos
(Masuoka 2006). Then,
26
Hypothesis 4: The more a person views that the fate of their racial/ethnic group
affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the political party
perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests.
Explaining the theory of African-American racial group interests, Dawson
considers the following variables: Individual perceptions of racial group interests,
Individual socioeconomic status, Evaluations of the economy, Liberalism, Local black
economic conditions, Approval of Reagan’s presidential performance, and Demographic
characteristics—age, gender, and region (Dawson, 113 – 115). Using data from the 1984
and 1988 National Black Election Studies (NBES) panel series (Jackson 1984; 1988),
Dawson tests his model to assess the strength of interrelationships. He shows that “a key
to African-American partisanship is the economic status of the race.” Moreover, “any
party that wants to attract and hold African-American political support must be seen as
more effective than its rivals in improving the economic health of the black community”
(Dawson, 116-117).
This research study is a modification of Dawson’s (1994) empirical test,
employing data feasible for such analysis: the 1996 National Black Election Stud and the
2004 National Politics Study.
8
The focus is African American partisanship. In the
theoretical framework, an influence on decisions about which political party is most
responsive to racial group interests is largely a factor of race, class, and gender (Figure
2.1 below). In addition, race structures individual orientations and determines the extent
8. Katherine Tate, National Black Election Study, 1996 [Computer file]. ICPSR
Version. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University [producer] 1997. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004).
James S. Jackson, et al., National Politics Study, 2004. ICPSR24483-V1. Ann
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor],
2009-03-23. DOI: 10.3886/ICPSR24483.v1.
27
to which ideological predispositions influence partisanship, and frames perceptions of
how the parties perform when in control of government. Moreover, race has a profound
effect on individual perceptions about historical experiences, and on contemporary
encounters with White, and other Americans that have resulted in confinement of the
racial group along the perimeter of the social, economic, and political order. In short,
race matters.
What then is race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for
the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of
life.
W.E.B. DuBois
9
According to DuBois racial classifications tend to follow physical traits, but
ascriptive characteristics do not, and cannot, explain such group features as cohesiveness
and continuity. In this he sees that differences transcend race and represent more fully
“spiritual, psychical,” distinctions that bind people together. The group is therefore
composed of individuals that share “first, their race identity and common blood;
secondly, and more important, a common striving together for certain ideals of life”
(DuBois 2003, 159). For this purpose African Americans work for race solidarity in that
they acknowledge their interconnectedness and interdependency. Then perceptions and
real-life experiences most often lead to the development of a sense of interdependence or
linked fate, identification with one’s social group, as well as a black consciousness that
results in solidarity and collective action to advance racial group goals.
9. W.E.B. DuBois. “The Conservation of Races.” (1897) In Social Theory: Roots and
Branches, 157-161. Edited by Peter Kivisto. (Los Angeles, California: Roxbury
Publishing Company (2003).
28
Gender
Party &
Presidential
Performance
Linked Fate Race/Ethnicity Party
Liberalism
Class
(Independent) (Dependent)
Variables Variable
Figure 2.1 Determinants of African-American Partisanship: 1996, 2004
In the diagram above, perceptions of linked fate influence African American (race)
evaluations and affective attitudes, as well as individual decisions about which of the two
main political parties works harder to promote racial group interests. Most importantly,
the model shows three focal effects on partisanship: race, class, and gender. As can be
29
seen, race has a direct influence on partisanship; race also influences class and gender
effects on partisanship, where class denotes a strong relationship that influences party
choice in different ways for the racial group.
Race matters for African Americans as a group. Nonetheless, what may be a
valid account of the centrality of race to partisanship within the African American racial
group may not necessarily depict the relationship between race/ethnicity and political
partisanship for other groups of minority status. Therefore, an important element of this
extension of Dawson’s (1994) study is looking across other groups to see how the effects
specified above apply particularly to African Americans and broadly to other
racial/ethnic groups included in this examination. A comparative population of African
Americans, White Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans are also
included in the analysis. Even though perceptions of linked racial fate tend to be more
explicit among individuals constituting the African American racial group, such
perceptions may also be inferred from the political attitudes and actions of other
population groups. My position is that a “sense” of linked fate is important to individuals
in all groups represented, but in different ways. To this degree the investigation will
further explore that phenomenon.
Additionally, the present research study takes into account the integral role of
race, class, and gender in structuring political partisanship. Race, economic class
position, and gender are sociopolitical constructs that determine individual life chances,
or the opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life. They form the basis for imposing
inequalities resulting from structures of superior-subordinate relationships, that include
white-black or men-women, and signify sociopolitical conflict and interests that
30
differentiate the two main political parties’ platform agendas, and their administrative
agenda when in control of the Executive and Legislative departments of government. As
such race, class, and gender tend to serve as the basis for divisions, and for the allocation
of resources (Kendall 1997). For African Americans race, class, and gender are
sociopolitical factors that play an integral part in explaining their positions relative to
second-class citizenship; denial of the American promise of life, liberty, property and of
the protections thereof; and confinement along the periphery of the social, economic, and
political order.
Among African Americans I expect to see an interaction between race and class
in which a decreasing effect of race corresponds to the increasing effect of economic
class, if the importance of race has declined, as Wilson supposes. This would then
decrease psychological Democratic partisan identifications and thereby yield weakened
political preference attitudes, or stronger political independence. Such a finding would
support the “class” perspective advanced by Wilson (1980), and might also offer a
relevant explanation for the pattern of partisan fluctuations that began in the post 1960s
(Hajnal and Lee 2007; Luks and Elms 2005). On the other hand, if the Black Utility
Heuristic serves as the principle factor for deciphering political messages, and as a
strategic causal component within the decision calculus of African Americans, then
individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most responsive to racial
group interests in accordance with the racial group standard. This finding would support
the race perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate the
significance of linked racial fate as applied by Dawson (1994) in his study.
31
Furthermore, I expect African-American women to demonstrate a keen sense of
linked fate based on both race and gender that prompts them to support the racial group
political standard—the Democratic Party. Because of their unique historical and
contemporary status disadvantages, particularly regarding income, African American
women are expected to more closely affiliate with the political party viewed as best
addressing issues of most importance to the racial group. They are expected to more
closely affiliate with the Democratic Party than African American men and women of
other racial/ethnic groupings within the United States. The distinctive plight of African
American women and men is reviewed in the historical chapters that follow.
32
CHAPTER 3
B
ACKGROUND AND
H
ISTORICAL
O
VERVIEW OF
A
FRICAN
A
MERICAN
P
ARTISANSHIP
,
1863
-
1964
The Democrat won’t have us, and the Republicans don’t want us. Is there
anything to do but impotently wring our empty hands? ... May God write
us down as asses if ever again we are found putting our trust in either the
Republican or Democratic Parties.
W. E. B. Du Bois
10
Historically, most African Americans consider themselves Democrats, and anecdotal
evidence further substantiates this claim. Nonetheless, their partisan roots lay in the
Republican Party, and from “Emancipation in 1863 up until 1912 Negroes voted the
Republican ticket as a matter of religion” (DuBois 1922). This chapter bears historical
evidence for the conceptual framework laid out in the previous chapter. While race,
class, and gender are integrated factors explaining African American ties to the
Republican Party initially, and then subsequently to the Democratic Party,
interdependence of fate and task interdependence makes race the prime factor explaining
African American partisan preferences. In what follows I review African American
political partisanship over the course of three historical periods, which I identify as the
Radical Reconstruction Period from 1863 to 1877; the Post-Reconstruction Period from
1877 to 1936; and the New Deal Coalition Period from 1936 to 1964.
9. W.E.B. DuBois, “Kicking Us Out,” in The Crisis: A Record of the Darker
Races 24, no. 1 (May 1922): 11. New York: National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People.
33
3.1 OVERVIEW
In spite of his denunciation of the two main political parties W.E.B. DuBois,
editor of Crisis from 1910 to 1934—a publication dealing with “Negro” life (Rudwick
1958), along with a contingency of other prominent black leaders urged a mass exodus
from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. Still, majority of African Americans
continued to identify with the Republicans as late as 1928 (Nowlin 1931; Brisbane 1970).
For others, particularly the northern contingency that heeded this call, attachment to the
Party of Lincoln began to wane as early as 1920 when they made a notable shift to the
Democratic Party. This shift was a response to the Democrats’ decision to allow African
Americans to attend their 1924 Democratic National Convention. African Americans
were also allowed to hold offices at the convention (Jackson 2008). In addition, this
partisan shift rejoins various strategies embraced by the Republicans to distance
themselves from black constituents. These included the “lily-white” movement, a
political faction whose aim was to exclude blacks and “black and tan” societies;
reduction of black patronage; relegation of blacks to only token partisan roles; and
support of policies resulting in political subjugation of the race (Brisbane 1970). By the
mid-1930s the African American racial group began a partisan realignment from the
Republicans to the Democrats, which culminated in the mid-1960s.
African Americans’ views about the two main political parties typically point to
established patterns of racial group solidarity. According to Dawson (1994) racial group
solidarity is predicated on perceptions of shared historical experiences, a linked racial
fate and adversity with respect to black life chances or the likelihood of obtaining
important goals in life. More than perceptions of a shared or common history of
oppression and subordination, Shelby (2005) insists that solidarity relies on a shared
34
commitment to resist racism and the negative aspects of such experiences. In short, group
solidarity is grounded in fundamental principles of how things should be done by
institutions of government, and by the political parties when in control of said
government. In what follows African Americans’ commitment to withstand racial
injustices by appealing to both governmental and linkage institutions are examined.
3.2 BACKGROUND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY STRATEGIES
Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans engaged the polity for
basic civic values—liberty, justice, equality, and civil rights. Toward this endeavor they
employed numerous conventional strategies including legal actions; petitions, various
other forms of protest—boycotts, sit-ins, lobbying, marches, and conventions; the
independent Black Church; and, the independent Black press. At times they sought
recourse by calling for resistance through the use of unconventional methods as well.
Whether by way of conventional or unconventional means, African Americans looked for
ways to elevate their station in life, to gain practical relief, and to secure full recognition
of their right to American citizenship and the protections thereof. Prior to the American
Revolutionary War and subsequent ratification of the United States Constitution, African
Americans sought emancipation and full rights and privileges of citizenship. In a number
of court cases individuals challenged the practice of slavery in the colonies. Of
interesting note are three related cases filed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on
behalf of Quock Walker (1781-1783); the Mum Bett (1781)
11
case; and, Ned Griffin’s
appeal to the North Carolina General Assembly (1784). The Quock Walker case reached
10. The Massachusetts Constitution, Judicial Review and Slavery, The Mum Bett
Case. Accessed May 1, 2012. http://www.mass.gov.
35
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1783. The initial issue before the court
presented in 1781 was a promise of emancipation upon reaching age twenty-five prior to
the death of Walker’s owner, but violated by his mistress’ second husband. Judgment
delivered by Chief Justice William Cushing applied the principle of judicial review to
render the practice of slavery a violation of the 1780 state constitution. Cushing’s
reasoning held [in part]:
…These sentiments [that are favorable to the natural rights of mankind]
led the framers of our constitution of government - by which the people of
this commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves to each other – to
declare – that all men are born free and equal; and that every subject is
entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws as well as his life and
property. In short, without resorting to implication in constructing the
constitution, slavery is in my judgment as effectively abolished as it can
be by the granting of rights and privileges wholly incompatible and
repugnant to its existence. The court are therefore fully of the opinion that
perpetual servitude can no longer be tolerated in our government, and that
liberty can only be forfeited by some criminal conduct or relinquished by
personal consent or contract. And it is therefore unnecessary to consider
whether the promises of freedom to Quako, on the part of his master and
mistress, amounted to a manumission or not.
Chief Justice William Cushing
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts
The Quock Walker Case, 1783
12
The Massachusetts case of Brom and Bett v. Ashley (1781) also tackled the
practice of slavery within the Commonwealth. Bett fled after sustaining permanent injury
to her face at the hands of her master’s wife, and solicited legal assistance from Attorney
Theodore Sedgwick to file her freedom suit. The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Bett
and Brom awarding them freedom and a just compensation of 30 shillings in damages.
11. John Cushing, “The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in
Massachusetts: More Notes on the ‘Quock Walker Case,’” 5 The American Journal of
Legal History 118 (1961).
36
The Mum Bett (Elizabeth Freeman) and Quock Walker cases shed light on the injustices
of servitude by testing the Massachusetts State Constitution (1780); subsequently as a
result, in part, of these cases the slave trade ended in the Commonwealth in 1788.
Correspondingly, African Americans’ commitment to freedom was shown in their
response to the revolutionary cause. They fought on both sides in the American
Revolution as each promised freedom for their service. Ned Griffin, the slave of William
Kitchen, was promised freedom to fight in his master’s stead; however, upon Ned’s
return Kitchen refused to honor his pledge. Griffin petitioned the state legislative body
and was granted his freedom: Ned Griffin Freedom by the North Carolina General
Assembly, 4 April 1784,
13
and the right to vote, An Act for Enfranchising Ned Griffin,
Late the Property of William Kitchen (17 April 1784).
14
Besides appealing to institutions of government, African Americans demonstrated
their self-determination from the pulpit. With the 1816 establishment of the African
Methodist Episcopal (AME) church by Richard Allen, Absalom Jones, and others in
Philadelphia “an autonomous black religious movement” began.
15
The independent
Black Church gave African Americans a new forum for political expression. Though not
every church allowed the conveying of such thought, the colonial era marked the
beginning of using the pulpit to propagate a message of hope that reminded African
12. NC Archives GASR, April-June 1784 (Box 3, location 3A-464).
13. An Act for Enfranchising Ned Griffin, Late the Property of William Kitchen
Colonial Records, Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1784 (April 19, 1784 -
June 03, 1784; Volume 24), 543-649.
14. Lockard, Joe, Antislavery Literature Teaching Guide: Early African
American Antislavery Sermons (Arizona State University, December 2006), 4. Accessed
May 1, 2012. http://antislavery.eserver.org/antislavery-teaching-guides/early-african-
american-antislavery-sermons.
37
Americans of their interconnectedness, whether bound or free, because of their race.
Pastor Richard Allen actively protested against any new form of government that would
not extend that freedom won in the American Revolution to all. As delegates to the 1787
Constitutional Convention deliberated in Philadelphia, Allen, Jones and others staged a
prayer protest. However, when the framers of the Constitution of the United States failed
to take the more honorable course of freedom and justice for all, the black religious
movement spread and the independent Black Church became a haven for civil rights
protest.
African Americans also utilized the press to circulate, for example, the Freedom
Petition of New Hampshire Slaves, an appeal for freedom to the New Hampshire state
legislature from Nero Brewster and other natives of Africa forcibly enslaved.
16
In
addition, the press brought attention to racial inequality and provided a means to
articulate grievances and wrongs against the race, to seek redress, and to report news and
information about African Americans’ vital statistics and achievements. Freedom’s
Journal, the first African American owned and operated newspaper, challenged editorials
and other attacks against the race published in the mainstream press. A weekly New
York publication from 1827 to 1829, the Freedom’s Journal, was “circulated in eleven
states, the District of Columbia, Haiti, Europe, and Canada” (Danky and Hady 1996-
2012). The independent Black press, like the Black Church, grew tremendously calling
on African Americans to work together for relief from their common plight. In 1829 the
newspaper published four articles by David Walker, a free black activist, to promote his
anti-slavery message in which he urged slaves to use resistance. Pamphlets of his appeal,
16. Printed in the New Hampshire Gazette, State Journal, and General Advertiser
24, no. 1233 (15 July 1780).
38
often smuggled into Southern ports by black sailors, were to be read primarily by slaves;
however, slave owners read them as well. Some states responded by enacting legislation
banning both blacks from learning to read, and the distribution of anti-slavery
propaganda. Some states also offered a bounty for Walker’s capture and/or death (Danky
and Hady 1996-2012).
During the 1830s abolitionist organizations also increased. Though often headed
by white males like the American Anti-Slavery Society founded in 1833 by William
Lloyd Garrison, the Female Anti-Slavery Society, founded by Lucretia Mott, also joined
the movement in that same year and included African American and White women.
17
Since the colonial period women used numerous tactics such as protests, boycotts,
meetings, conventions to give voice to anti-slavery and pro-women’s suffrage sentiments.
In 1833 black and white women also joined to found the Boston Female Anti-Slavery
Society. Similarly, interracial and mixed (female and male) associations were established
in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Interracial women societies
formed to address common experiences, including discrimination, disenfranchisement,
and second-class status.
African American women were primarily concerned about the abolition of slavery
and about the state of the racial group. They agreed that women’s suffrage was
important; however, black women wanted freedom first then suffrage. Many white
women, on the other hand, just wanted the right to vote like their male counterparts.
17. Women also joined male-dominated anti-slavery associations after passage of
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law to serve and promote their common cause. [Wilbur H.
Siebert, The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts (Worchester, Massachusetts:
American Antiquarian Society, 1935), 50.]
39
Some of the suffragists did not know how they felt about the abolition of slavery, while
others like the Grimke sisters, Sarah and Angelina, of South Carolina (later Rhode
Island); Lucretia Mott of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth Cady Stanton of New York were
both abolitionists and suffragists. Differences also emerged over the order of priority
given to these two issues, abolition and suffrage. The resulting conflict between black
and white women, and between men and women or abolition versus suffrage, included
women’s rights advocates Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony with Sojourner
Truth against “former allies like Lucy Stone, Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Wendell
Phillips, and Frederick Douglass”
18
who favored abolition first and foremost.
Correspondingly, divergence among white women surfaced over which factor held the
greatest significance: race or gender. This conflict inevitably led African American
women to establish separate associations in the fight against racial and gender
discrimination. For instance, in 1913 Ida B. Wells-Barnett founded the Alpha Suffrage
Club in Chicago, the first suffrage club for black women.
19
Nevertheless, women took
tremendous risks on behalf of both the abolition and suffrage movements, especially
during historical periods when it was socially unacceptable for a woman to speak in
public, or to serve on committees, for example, having equal status with men. Oftentimes
women, particularly African Americans, were violating societal taboos for the sake of
civil liberties and equal rights.
17. Nancy A. Hewitt, “Abolition & Suffrage,” Public Broadcasting Service.
Accessed May 17, 2012.
http://www.pbs.org/stantonanthony/resources/index.html?body=abolitionists.html.
18. “Ida B. Wells-Barnett,” U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park
Service. Accessed May 4, 2012. http://www.nps.gov.
40
Some African Americans claimed independent leadership in the abolitionist
fraternity as shown in the National Negro Convention Movement, which operated from
1830 to 1864. The National Negro Convention Movement brought attention to issues of
particular importance to the race such as purchasing land and securing passage for the
relocation of African Americans. Since all did not desire colonization, the movement also
sought improvement of black livelihood in the United States.
20
While a great number of
local, state, and national conventions were spawned by the movement during this period,
of particular note is A National Convention of Colored Citizens in the United States
(1843) that convened in Buffalo, New York to consider issues of civil rights and the
security of American citizenship. Read during the course of this conference, An Address
to the Slaves of the United States of America authored by David Walker (cited above)
was rejected by a small majority of delegates “on these grounds:
1. That the document was war-like, and encouraged insurrection;
2. That if the Convention should adopt it, that those delegates who lived near the
borders of the slave states, would not dare to return to their homes.”
21
In his Preface to Walker’s appeal Henry Highland Garnet (1843) stated: “and
now in compliance with the earnest request of many who heard it and in conformity to
the wishes of numerous friends who are anxious to see it, the author now gives it to the
public praying God that this little book may be borne on the four winds of heaven, until
20. Libraries at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Electronic Texts in
American Studies, Accessed May 4, 2012. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu.
21. Garnet, Henry Highland, "An Address to the Slaves of the United States of
America, Buffalo, N.Y., 1843" Electronic Texts in American Studies, Paper 8 (Libraries
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1843). Accessed 4 May 2012.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/8.
41
the principles it contains shall be understood and adopted by every slave in the Union.”
22
Then in his own 1848 address to the Female Benevolent Society of Troy, New York
entitled The Past and Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race,
23
Henry
Highland Garnet demonstrated just how well-informed African Americans were of their
situation. Garnet reviewed a myriad of contributions by Africans to the western world;
surveyed the origin and expansion of the slave trade; discussed the end of slavery in the
British empire, Haiti, Mexico, French and Swedish possessions; and, warned of the
expansion of slavery into Texas as a result of the Mexican War. Most importantly, Garnet
called for racial solidarity despite differences over colonization (Africa or Canada), and
over whether to call themselves: “Africans,” “colored,” “African-American,” or “black.”
Instead, Henry Highland Garnet advocated an alternative strategy to overthrow the
shackles of bondage, education (Garnet 1848).
Subsequently, an immediate reaction to passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law
prompted a proliferation of abolitionist societies like the Boston Vigilance Committee of
Massachusetts, composed of blacks and whites, men and women, whose principle aim
was to provide medical and legal aid, passage to Canada, transitory housing/hiding,
citizen petitions to government, and/or public notice of the arrival of slave hunters
(Jackson 1850: 6-32).
24
The Committee further advocated state laws that would prohibit
22. David Walker was found dead in his home in 1830.
23. "The Past and the Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race
(1848)." In Electronic Texts in American Studies, Paper 13. Edited by Henry Highland
Garnet and Paul Royster. (Libraries at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1848).
Accessed May 4, 2012. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/13.
24. Francis Jackson, The Treasurers Accounts. (Boston, Massachusetts: The
Boston Vigilance Committee, 1850, 6-32.)
42
public officials from assisting in the recapturing of fugitive slaves. Classified in this
fugitive slave status were prominent abolitionists, Frederick Douglass and William Wells
Brown
25
who propagated their message of emancipation both in the United States and
abroad. Accordingly, Martin R. Delany advanced his message of Black Nationalism in
The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United
States, Politically Considered (1852). He advocated colonization in the Caribbean,
Central or South America, or East Africa; and toward this goal, Delany helped organize
the National Emigration Convention of Colored People that convened in August of 1854
in Cleveland, Ohio. Delany, a pre-Civil War abolitionist and the first African American
to reach the rank of Major in the Union Army, led an expedition to Liberia and the Niger
River Valley in West Africa in 1859 where he negotiated treaties with local tribes on
behalf of the emigration movement.
26
3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY SCHEME AND SLAVERY
On the contrary, the Democratic Party, favored predominantly in the South, repeatedly
pledged to maintain the social, cultural, economic status quo, and particularly the perpetuation of
slavery. Democrats supported the Fugitive Slave Law passed by the United States Congress in
1850 (9 Stat. 462). This law gave Southern slave owners the right to recapture escaped slaves,
even if they had relocated to Northern states. So, European supporters of William Wells
Brown paid for his freedom before allowing him to return to the United States fearing
that his former slave owner would reclaim him (Wesley 1944: 39). Accordingly, after
25. According to Charles H. Wesley "The Participation of Negroes in Anti-
Slavery Parties" Journal of Negro History 29, no. 1, (January 1944): 39, William Wells
Brown was a member of the Liberty Party that advocated the abolition of slavery and
equal rights to black citizens.
26. Mark Roth, “Martin Delany, ‘Father of Black Nationalism,’” Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, February 6, 2011). Accessed May 10, 2012. [post-gazette.com]
43
publication of his autobiography The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An
American Slave (1845) Frederick Douglass found sanctuary in London, England, and
returned to the United States after friends raised the purchase price for his manumission
from Thomas Auld.
27
Often tracing their roots back to the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison, the Democratic Party emerged from various factions
united by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren during the campaign period of the 1828
presidential election (Silbey 2002). Like Jefferson, Jackson viewed government
interference with citizens’ rights as an encroachment on liberty itself. This is the basis
for the Democrats’ formal statement on chattel slavery.
The liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence, and sanctioned in the constitution, which makes ours the
land of liberty, and the asylum of the oppressed of every nation, have ever
been cardinal principles in the democratic faith; and every attempt to
abridge the present privilege of becoming citizens, and the owners of soil
among us, ought to be resisted with the same spirit…
28
The Party’s most cherished values of liberty and property form their basis for citizenship
(Locke 1689). Yet, because enslaved African Americans were classified as human chattel
their official status as a species of property meant they had no legal claim to the liberal
values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (or property). Democrats repeated
27. Frances E. Ruffin, Frederick Douglass: Rising Up from Slavery (New York:
Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 2008), 59.
28. Excerpt taken from the “1840 Democratic Party Platform,” (6 May 1840) in
Gerhard Woolley and John T. Peters, The American Presidency Project [online], (Santa
Barbara, California, 1999 – 2011. Accessed May 3, 2012.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
44
their position on slavery [and states’ rights] in each platform from 1840 to 1856 (Woolley
and Peters 1999-2011).
Resolved, That we reiterate with renewed energy of purpose the well
considered declarations of former Conventions upon the sectional issue of
Domestic slavery, and concerning the reserved rights of the States…That
Congress has no power under the Constitution, to interfere with or control
the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the
sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not
prohibited by the Constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists, or others,
made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take
incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming
and dangerous consequences; and that all such efforts have an inevitable
tendency to diminish the happiness of the people and endanger the stability
and permanency of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any
friend of our political institutions.
Democratic Party Platform of 1856
June 2, 1856
Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln’s Democratic opponent in the 1860 presidential
election, advocated a philosophy of popular sovereignty that espoused states’ rights, and
the right to own slaves as a natural part of ordered society. For Lincoln and Douglas, both
from Illinois, this campaign pit the two in a rematch after having faced each other in the
1856 state congressional election, won by Douglas. Differences over the institution of
Slavery and the powers and duties of Congress persisted. The 1860 Democratic Party
Platform called on the U.S. Supreme Court to settle party differences over constitutional
issues. The Party platform further “Resolved, that the enactments of the State
45
Legislatures to defeat the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, are hostile in
character, subversive of the Constitution
29
, and revolutionary in their effect.”
30
Formed in 1854, the Republican Party emerged as the Democratic Party opponent
in the U.S. two-party political scheme. Republicans distinguished themselves from both
Abolitionists that supported immediate freedom and racial equality for the slave
population, and Democrats that supported the indefinite continuation of slavery and its
expansion into newly acquired territory. Even though tension between separate wings of
the Republican Party emerged over questions about the dissolution of domestic slavery as
an American institution, the Party seemed to prefer its gradual extinction. Drawing from
natural rights philosophy as espoused by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence (1776), the 1856 Republican Party doctrine stated:
[W]ith our Republican fathers, we hold it to be a self-evident truth, that all
men are endowed with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior design of our Federal
Government were to secure these rights to all persons under its exclusive
jurisdiction; that, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished
Slavery in all our National Territory, ordained that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it
becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all
attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the
Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its
existence or extension therein. That we deny the authority of Congress, of
a Territorial Legislation, of any individual, or association of individuals, to
29. Because the U.S. Constitution was silent on the issue, by virtue of the
principle of federalism, the states were left responsible for governing their own domestic
affairs, which included decisions about the practice of slavery.
30. Excerpt taken from the “1860 Democratic Party Platform,” in Woolley and
Peters, 1999-2012. Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
46
give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States, while
the present Constitution shall be maintained.
31
Republican 1856 Party Platform
June 18, 1856
While Republicans used natural rights philosophy to advance an anti-slavery campaign;
they also stated their belief that the “due process” provision of the U.S. Constitution,
Amendment 5 (1789), granted legal protection for all persons in the United States. They
further recognized sovereign powers conferred on Congress to prohibit the territories
from engaging in “those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy and Slavery.”
32
In 1860 the Republican Party slated Abraham Lincoln as their presidential
candidate. A moderate, Lincoln personally opposed slavery as wrong morally because he
believed that it was improper for one human being to own another. However, he
supported the notion that slavery had a right to exist where the U.S. Constitution was
silent, and allowed its existence originally (Basler 1858). So, he did not have to
compromise his personal beliefs when advancing a Republican Party platform that
favored states’ rights to control “domestic institutions” such as slavery. The 1860
Republican platform further reaffirmed their philosophical roots, the right and duty of
Congress to thwart the extension of slavery into territories procured from Mexico during
the war, and opposition to reopening the slave trade under the flag of the United States of
America (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).
Despite advancing an anti-slavery platform the Republican Party won the 1860
election. Nonetheless, regional conflicts and mounting tensions over slavery ended in the
31. Woolley and Peters, “1856 Republican Party Platform,” (June 18, 1856).
Accessed May 4, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
32. Woolley and Peters, “1856 Republican Party Platform,” (June 18, 1856). Ibid.
47
American Civil War, fought from 1861 to 1865 (Franklin and Moss 1988). In the midst
of the War Between the States, President Abraham Lincoln issued Executive Order:
“Proclamation 93 – Declaring the Objective of the War Including Emancipation of Slaves
in Rebellious States on January 1, 1863” on September 22, 1862. According to Lincoln,
this Order was rendered in accordance with constitutional powers of the President,
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution as duly noted:
33
And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and
declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and
parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and naval
authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said
persons.
Abraham Lincoln
The Emancipation Proclamation
September 22, 1862
This strategic move by President Lincoln not only clarified the objective of quelling the
confederate rebellion to preserve the Union, it also established slavery as an important
goal connected to the war, provided a legal basis for manumission, and set the stage for
future abolition of the institution of Slavery.
Now the fate of slaves was directly linked to salvation of the Union.
Keenly aware of this, Frederick Douglass approached the administration to renew
his call for the conscription of black troops into the Union Army.
34
In January
1863 Massachusetts Governor John Andrew was given authority to amass a
33. Excerpt from Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation in Woolley
and Peters. (September 22, 1862).
34. Douglass called for the use of “colored” troops to fight against the southern
confederacy as early as 1861; however, they were not recruited until after Lincoln’s
executive order, the Emancipation Proclamation, was issued.
48
contingency of black soldiers for the war effort. Recruiting soldiers for service,
Frederick Douglass enlisted two of his own sons to the Massachusetts 54
th
Regiment of Colored Troops. Later that year he met President Lincoln beginning
“an unusual friendship” that gave Douglass direct access to the President of the
United States. In spite of unequal treatment of black soldiers versus white
soldiers regarding pay, promotions, and punishment (often death or enslavement)
when captured by the Confederates, Douglass urged African Americans to enlist.
“Only through black participation in the war, he believed, could abolition and full
citizenship for Negroes be established” (Connery 2005). Upon visiting the White
House in July of 1863 Douglass shared his sentiments about the maltreatment of
black troops fighting for the country.
35
After this meeting the War Department
drafted an “Order of Retaliation” General Orders No. 252 dated July 30, 1863 to
which President Lincoln affixed his signature,
36
and on which the imprint of
Frederick Douglass is clearly seen.
ORDER OF RETALIATION
It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of
whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly
organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the
usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers, permit no
distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public
enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color,
and for no offence against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and
a crime against the civilization of the age.
35. Douglass’ concern stems from the November 1862 capture of four black
Union troops in South Carolina who were summarily executed as approved by
Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon and President Jefferson Davis.
36. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Edited by Roy P. Basler, et al.
(New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953-55), 6:357.
49
The government of the United States will give the same protection to all
its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his
color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's
prisoners in our possession.
It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in
violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for
every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall
be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor
until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner
of war.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
3.4 PERIOD OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1863 – 1877
Neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States…
The Thirteenth Amendment
Signed by Abraham Lincoln
February 1, 1865
The period of Radical Reconstruction is distinguished by conflicting policies
about the proper resolution of emancipated citizens in the United States. On the one
hand, Radical Republicans, dominant in the U.S. Congress and sometimes critical of
President Lincoln, advocated policies to abolish slavery; establish civil rights and
liberties for emancipated citizens; and efforts to assist them in acclimating to life in a free
society. Frederick Douglass, adviser to the President, favored these Radical Republican
policies. On the other hand, Southern Democrats preferred their pre-Civil War status
quo. Slavery was viewed as a mechanism for both controlling the “Negro” population,
and maintaining order. Once the bonds were removed many in the South believed that
the states needed to enact legislation with the sole purpose of keeping blacks in check
(Franklin and Moss 1988). While Abolitionists supported the immediate manumission of
slaves, others promoted either a gradual termination of the institution of Slavery, or its
50
continuation indefinitely. These various positions led to conflicting policies during the
period of Radical Reconstruction.
Inasmuch as Lincoln’s Executive Order – Proclamation 93 ensured the
emancipation of slaves in the rebellious states of the confederacy, provided the Union
won the war, but it did not abolish the institution of Slavery in the United States. Hence,
some eight hundred thousand persons of color remained enslaved (Franklin and Moss
1988). Moreover, after the American Civil War ended President Lincoln faced a myriad
of questions about the legal status of emancipated citizens, and “Negro” suffrage. He
hoped that once freed the former slave population would choose to leave the United
States; however, their substantial presence, especially in the South, meant that he had to
resolve the “Negro problem” (Franklin and Moss 1988). Even though Lincoln’s
administration and a number of benevolent societies provided relief services for fugitive
slaves during the Civil War (DuBois 1901), after the war full emancipation came in the
form of legislative and constitutional initiatives championed by the Radical Republicans.
In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment (13 Stat. 744-775) abolished slavery in the
United States. Following ratification of the Amendment, Congress created The Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (13 Stat. 507-509). The Freedmen’s Bureau
was tasked with the responsibility of helping Southern blacks and whites make the
transition from a slave, to a free society. Among other things, the Bureau was charged
with providing temporary relief services such as food rations, health care, assistance with
labor contracts, and educational opportunities for formal schooling.
37
W.E.B. DuBois,
great-grandson of Elizabeth Freeman (Mum Bett) and a spokesman for African
37. “Freedmen's Bureau Act (1865),” U.S. Congress, U.S. Statutes at Large, 38th
Congress, Session II, chapter 90, (1865): 507-509.
Americans’ rights,
wrote an historical account of the Bureau’s efforts to assist
emancipated slaves for the
Atlantic Monthly
on major societal issues. In his assessment DuBois (1901) noted that the Freedmen’s
Bureau was patterned af
ter a Port Royal, South Carolina (sea island) experiment that was
known for successfully turning slaves into free workingmen; however, in the Bureau’s
case it was perhaps, destined for failure from the onset in view of the times. Nonetheless,
he credited
the Bureau with some success in starting “the black peasant proprietor, and it
secured the recognition of black freemen befor
success came
in establishing 4,000 free public black schools in the South including Fisk
University in Nashville, Tennessee and Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia
assistance of benevolent societies like the American Missionary Association and
ind
ividuals primarily in the North
Americans were critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as reported in the following press
article.
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of
his employer. If he goes to the Bureau's agent, he finds there an officer
who r
ides with his employer, who dines with him and who drinks
champagne with him. He is not likely to receive impartial justice at the
hands of such a prejudiced officer. Most of the agents think their particular
business is to furnish the planters with cheap
cost the laborers on the plantations. They are in fact the planter's
guards.
It is therefore perfectly useles
the Freedmen's Bureau for relief. He knows in advance that the Bureau
will send him
back to his unjust or exacting employer. He will not be
assisted to get his pay or to get redress but will be told to go back to his
master and do his work.
38.
W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Freedmen's Bureau."
354-365
. Quote found on page 363.
51
wrote an historical account of the Bureau’s efforts to assist
Atlantic Monthly
(1901), a Boston publication of commentary
on major societal issues. In his assessment DuBois (1901) noted that the Freedmen’s
ter a Port Royal, South Carolina (sea island) experiment that was
known for successfully turning slaves into free workingmen; however, in the Bureau’s
case it was perhaps, destined for failure from the onset in view of the times. Nonetheless,
the Bureau with some success in starting “the black peasant proprietor, and it
secured the recognition of black freemen befor
e courts of law.”
38
The Bureau’s greatest
in establishing 4,000 free public black schools in the South including Fisk
University in Nashville, Tennessee and Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia
assistance of benevolent societies like the American Missionary Association and
ividuals primarily in the North
. Still, when local agents failed to deliver, African
Americans were critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as reported in the following press
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of
his employer. If he goes to the Bureau's agent, he finds there an officer
ides with his employer, who dines with him and who drinks
champagne with him. He is not likely to receive impartial justice at the
hands of such a prejudiced officer. Most of the agents think their particular
business is to furnish the planters with cheap
hands and to retain at any
cost the laborers on the plantations. They are in fact the planter's
It is therefore perfectly useles
s for the poor laborer to
look at
the Freedmen's Bureau for relief. He knows in advance that the Bureau
back to his unjust or exacting employer. He will not be
assisted to get his pay or to get redress but will be told to go back to his
master and do his work.
The New Orleans Tribune
October 31, 1866
W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Freedmen's Bureau."
Atlantic Monthly
87 (1901):
. Quote found on page 363.
wrote an historical account of the Bureau’s efforts to assist
(1901), a Boston publication of commentary
on major societal issues. In his assessment DuBois (1901) noted that the Freedmen’s
ter a Port Royal, South Carolina (sea island) experiment that was
known for successfully turning slaves into free workingmen; however, in the Bureau’s
case it was perhaps, destined for failure from the onset in view of the times. Nonetheless,
the Bureau with some success in starting “the black peasant proprietor, and it
The Bureau’s greatest
in establishing 4,000 free public black schools in the South including Fisk
University in Nashville, Tennessee and Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia
, with the
assistance of benevolent societies like the American Missionary Association and
. Still, when local agents failed to deliver, African
Americans were critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as reported in the following press
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of
his employer. If he goes to the Bureau's agent, he finds there an officer
ides with his employer, who dines with him and who drinks
champagne with him. He is not likely to receive impartial justice at the
hands of such a prejudiced officer. Most of the agents think their particular
hands and to retain at any
cost the laborers on the plantations. They are in fact the planter's
look at
the Freedmen's Bureau for relief. He knows in advance that the Bureau
back to his unjust or exacting employer. He will not be
assisted to get his pay or to get redress but will be told to go back to his
The New Orleans Tribune
October 31, 1866
87 (1901):
52
On April 9, 1866, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27-30), over
President Andrew Johnson’s veto. It was intended to protect citizens from Black Codes.
The first such code passed in Mississippi in 1865 imposed restrictions on “all free men,
freed Negroes and mulattos” from voting, sitting on juries, testifying against white men,
carrying weapons in public places, and working in certain occupations.
39
The 1866 Civil
Rights Act stated that all persons born in the United States were citizens “without regard
to race, color, or previous condition.” Under the Act African Americans could:
Make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Persons
who denied these rights to former slaves were guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction faced a fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both. 1866 Civil Rights Act
14 Stat. 27-30
Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 (14 Stat. 358-359) gave
citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” The Amendment
further provided legal protections, and made applicable to the states provisions of the
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 (1789), that prohibited the national government from
depriving any person of “life, liberty, and property without due process of law.” Further
protection of citizens’ rights came in the form of the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870 (16
Stat. 40-41), when all male citizens were thereby enfranchised without regard to “race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” Correspondingly, the Civil Rights Act of 1875
(18 Stat. 336), intended to strengthen the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited denial to
any person “the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
39. Laws of the State of Mississippi, Passed at a Regular Session of the
Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October, November and December, (1865): 82-
93; Jackson, (1866): 165-167.
53
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of
public amusement.”
40
The Act adjudged unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1883 Civil Rights Cases
41
that addressed consolidated lawsuits filed on behalf of
African Americans. The Court ruled that Congress overstepped its authority in banning
the practice of racial segregation by individual citizens; Congress had no power to
regulate private rights.
In addition, Radical Republican reconstruction policy required confederate states
to create new constitutions that granted equal legal protections for black and white
citizens alike. African Americans’ responded to both passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and these new southern reconstruction governments. According to Eric
Foner, “former slaves flocked to the ballot boxes and the more ambitious sought political
office. By 1877 about 2,000 black men had won local, state, and federal offices in the
former Confederate states” (1993: xi). Nevertheless, African American politicians were
neither accorded substantive power within the Republican Party organization, nor
executive control over any governments despite a majority population in several states of
the former Confederacy. Still the Fifteenth Amendment opened the way for seventeen
African Americans, known as “the Symbolic Generation,” to serve in the U.S. Congress
between 1870 and 1887 as shown in Table 3.1 that follows.
42
40. “Civil Rights Act” (1875) 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41. Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 3; 3 S. Ct. 18; 27 L. Ed. 835) were consolidated
to challenge the practice of racial segregation: United States v. Stanley, United States v.
Ryan, United States v. Nichols, and United States v. Singleton.
42. The symbolic generation of African Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870–
1887, Accessed May 3, 2012 from: Black Americans in Congress. http://baic.house.gov.
54
Black congressional members experienced racial discrimination, a lack of
political power to advance their legislative agenda, isolation from Republican Party
leadership, and low-ranking committee assignments. Often at odds with the South
Carolina state Republican Party, Robert C. De Large, a wealthy resident from Charleston,
was elected to the 42
nd
Congress (1871 – 1873). De Large drew sharp criticism over
remarks made in response to accusations of corruption levied against black South
Carolina politicians by Democrat Samuel Cox of New York. In his response De Large
insisted that the only fault of the black politicians was trusting white Republicans. “While
there may have been extravagance and corruption resulting from the placing of improper
men in official positions, these evils have been brought about by the men identified with
the race to which the gentleman from New York belongs, and not by our race.”
43
De
Large also raised speculations about advocating a partisan shift among African
Americans because of his affiliation with Martin R. Delany, a member of the Democratic
Party, and because of an 1870 campaign speech in which he stated, “I hold that my race
has always been Republican for necessity only”
44
(McCarthy 1999).
43. Quoted in the Congressional Globe, 6 April 1871, Appendix, 42nd Cong., 1st
session, A230–231.
44 . Williamson, Joel. After Slavery: the Negro in South Carolina During
Reconstruction, 1861–1877 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965, 359).
55
Table 3.1 The Symbolic Generation: African Americans in the U. S. Congress, 1870-1887
MEMBER POSITION STATE TERM
Blanche Kelso Bruce Senator Mississippi 1875-1881
Richard Harvey Cain Representative South Carolina 1873-1875; 1877-1879
Robert Carlos De Large Representative South Carolina 1871-1873
Robert Brown Elliott Representative South Carolina 1871-1874
Jeremiah Haralson Representative Alabama 1875-1877
John Adams Hyman Representative North Carolina 1875-1877
Jefferson Franklin Long Representative Georgia 1871-1871
John Roy Lynch Representative Mississippi 1873-1877; 1882-1883
Charles Edmund Nash Representative Louisiana 1875-1877
James Edward O’Hara Representative North Carolina 1883-1885
Joseph Hayne Rainey Representative South Carolina 1870-1879
Alonzo Jacob Ransier Representative South Carolina 1873-1875
James Thomas Rapier Representative Alabama 1873-1875
Hiram Rhodes Revels Senator Mississippi 1870-1871
Robert Smalls Representative South Carolina 1875-1879; 1882-1883;
1884-1887
Source: Black Americans in Congress, Member Profiles. Accessed May 11, 2012.
[http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=34]
56
In the 1874 congressional election Democrats gained control of the U.S. House of
Representatives. Their victory was possible partly because of a split in the Republican
Party along racial lines between the Lily White, and the Black and Tan Republicans
(Pohlmann 2008) regarding the “Negro” question. The split gave rise to a new breed of
Republicans in the late 1870s that were weary of the racial justice agenda of the radical
element of the Party. This new breed of Republicans mostly represented the interests of
northern industrialists who promoted national unity and economic progress (Silbey
2002). Their emergence marked the beginning of the end for Radical Republicans as
southern states were readmitted with full privileges of citizenship for all white citizens
(Brisbane 1970). State constitutions were promptly revised. Throughout the South
policies known as Jim Crow laws were enacted to strip African Americans of all civil and
political rights.
In 1876 Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes faced Democratic candidate,
Samuel J. Tilden, governors of Ohio and New York respectively, in one of the most
controversial contests in American electoral history. African Americans feared a win by
Tilden would mean a reversal of their status, and the return of domestic slavery. Once
the votes were tallied, Governor Tilden had won the popular vote; however, the final
decision left to the Electoral College resulted in neither candidate winning a majority, so
the House of Representatives did not select the president in accordance with the U.S.
Constitution (Article II, Section 1). Conflict erupted between the Democrats and the
Republicans and a compromise solution, perhaps corrupt, gave Governor Hayes the
presidency (Pohlmann 2008; Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Once inaugurated
President Hayes promptly ended Reconstruction of the South, terminated military
57
occupation, and returned complete governmental control to the states, thereby fulfilling
the 1876 Republican/Democratic compromise agreement (Franklin and Moss 1988).
After this election the Radical Republicans’ domination of Congress ended and white
supremacy resumed.
3.5 PERIOD OF POST-RECONSTRUCTION, 1877 – 1936
“There is no discrimination in the state’s requirements for voters to pass a
literacy test and pay poll taxes, as these were applied to all voters.”
Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi
170 U.S. 213 (1898)
The questionable compromise of the 1876 presidential election, settled in favor of
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes appeared, at first glance, to be a win for African
Americans as well. Unfortunately, return of self-governance to the South proved to be
most problematic. Democrats in the South immediately addressed their focal “Negro”
problem with illegal, extralegal and systemic methods that served “to nullify the political
strength of Negroes or to disfranchise them altogether.”
45
Other tactics involved
intimidation, violence, and acts of terrorism. Post-Reconstruction unraveled the civil and
political rights and liberties promised by Radical Republican initiatives, and relegated to
the African-American population a status of second-class citizenship. Regrettably, as
Marcus D. Pohlmann (2008) contends, the U.S. Supreme Court played a substantial role
in legitimizing a number of southern strategies intended to disenfranchise both black and
poor white citizens.
46
45. Franklin, John Hope and Alfred A. Moss, Jr. From Slavery to Freedom: A
History of African Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1988), 231.
46. The most notable cases included: the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
58
Just prior to the end of the period of Radical Reconstruction, the Mississippi Plan
(1875) legally recognized intimidation as a means to prevent African-American
participation in the political process. In addition, the State created a new constitution,
thereby replacing the Reconstruction document that required full rights of citizenship to
freed persons of color. In so doing, Mississippi disenfranchised most African Americans
and established its own legal basis for voter registrations, electoral requirements,
participation in the political process, serving on juries, and running for political offices
(Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Mississippi resident Henry Williams, an
African American, brought suit in the case of Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898) [cited above] to contest both the 1890 state constitution and state code of
1892 in which passage of a literacy test served as the qualifying condition for voting.
Williams contested on grounds that these state provisions violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection of the law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling
upheld Mississippi’s use of the device; discrimination did not constitute grounds for
invalidating provisions of the state law.
Other southern states followed Mississippi’s lead by creating new constitutions
and adopting similar strategies like the requirement of property qualifications for voting
eligibility, Louisiana’s Grandfather Clause, the Poll Tax, the Literacy Test for voter
registrations, and the White Primary system (Brisbane, 1970). Each was developed with
the express intent of disenfranchising African Americans. Southern states’ tactics to deny
black political participation further hindered the election of African Americans to local,
state, and federal offices. Without federal intervention southern states rolled back the
214 (1875); and, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). Accessed May 3, 2012.
Black Americans in Congress, http://baic.house.gov/historical-essays/
59
clock on African Americans’ civil rights accomplishments. George W. Murray of South
Carolina, a U.S. Congress Member from 1893–1895 and from 1896–1897, entreated
legislators thusly: “I beg all true men to forget party and partisanship and right the great
wrongs perpetuated upon humble and unoffending American citizens…I declare that no
class of people has ever been more misrepresented, slandered, and traduced than the
black people of the South.”
47
After 1901 African Americans were systematically
eliminated from the United States Congress.
With the onset of the Twentieth Century African Americans faced the problem of
how to respond to discrimination, disenfranchisement, and disparity. Some migrated
from the South to the North some made the exodus to western states like Kansas and
Nebraska. Still, others remained in the South. Regardless of their location African
Americans encountered racial oppression. Moreover, controversy emerged in the form of
three ideological perspectives of how to improve the livelihood of African Americans.
These included Booker T. Washington’s economic self-reliance through industrial
education, W.E.B. DuBois’ organized determination and aggressive action, and Marcus
Garvey’s black nationalism. Although they differed in approach, each theory advanced
the importance of African American racial group solidarity. Booker T. Washington
pushed for equality through academic and vocational education, as provided by his
Tuskegee Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama. While Washington espoused openly an
accommodationist philosophy of racial separation with reconciliation as articulated in his
Atlanta Compromise Speech of 1895,
48
he also advocated surreptitiously racial equality
47. Congressional Record, 5 October 1893 (House, 53rd Cong., 1st sess.): 2161.
48. Booker T. Washington, “Atlanta Exposition Speech” (18 September 1895). In
60
and integration by financing litigation challenging disenfranchisement and segregation.
49
Controversy erupted when other black leaders like Frederick Douglass and W.E.B.
DuBois, suspicious of Washington’s motives, suggested the speech represented instead
his terms to surrender on behalf of the Black race: political power, civil rights, and a
higher “liberal arts” education for the race.
On the contrary, Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey believed that the U.S. white
citizenry would never accept African Americans as equal socially. So, Garvey promoted
a kinship with their ancestral homeland—Africa, and return of the African diaspora.
Establishing the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and hosting its first
convention in 1920, Garvey urged blacks to go “back to Africa.” With massive support
within the black community for his separatist movement:
Garvey established the Black Star Steamship Line in 1919 to encourage
trade among black communities in North America, the Caribbean, and
Africa, and promote immigration to the West Indies, Central America, and
Africa. Shares of the Black Star Line were sold to supporters, and three
months after the company was incorporated, Garvey bought the first of
three ships, which were to sail under the command of a black captain with
an all-black crew. But the Black Star Line turned out to be a disastrous
business venture and closed down in 1922. Although it did not accomplish
any of its objectives, the steamship company was a potent symbol for the
masses of dispossessed black men and women who had invested their
money, hope, and pride in it. "Oh! ye of little faith. The Eternal has
happened. The Negro incorporated a steamship enterprise by the name of
the Black Star Line; he placed $500,000 of common stock on the market at
$5 a share, and in ten weeks he sold so many shares to his own people that
African American Odyssey: Booker T. Washington Era. Accessed May 1, 2012.
http://memory.loc.gov/)
49. August Meier, "Toward a Reinterpretation of Booker T. Washington." The
Journal of Southern History 23, no. 2 (May 1957): 220–227.
61
he was able on the 31st of October to take over the first steamship ever
owned by the race in modern times."
50
The Negro World
December 6, 1919
On February 12, 1909 Mary White Ovington with Oswald Garrison Villard and
William English Walling established the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) to promote racial integration.
51
W.E.B. Dubois was the only
African American to serve on the NAACP Executive Committee when established in
1910. DuBois was named Director of Publications and Research with the primary
responsibility of editor of the association’s Crisis magazine, and used his position to
condemn lynching, promote racial integration, and demand equality and justice for
African Americans.
52
It is not surprising then that one of the first NAACP initiatives was
to lobby Congress to pass anti-lynching legislation. The association also employed
various strategies such as lobbying and protesting to pressure the polity on behalf of the
racial group; to petition for equal rights for blacks in employment, and in the armed
services; and to raise public awareness of the plight of African Americans. Like Quock
Walker, Mum Bett and other prior efforts to seek redress for wrongs against the race
50. Marcus Garvey, "Negroes of the World, The Eternal Has Happened." The
Negro World, 6 December 1919 [editorial].
51. Originally, Mary White Ovington named the organization The National
Committee for the Advancement of the Negro People. Amanda Wiesenhofer suggests
that Ovington’s motivation was William English Walling’s coverage of the 1908 race riot
in Springfield, Illinois, birthplace of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator. Amanda
Wiesenhofer, "Springfield Race Riot of 1908: Preserving a Memory," Constructing the
Past 2 no. 1 (2001): Article 7. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol2/iss1/7
52. Ida B. Wells-Barnett, an abolitionist and suffragist who helped develop a
number of African American women and reform organizations, previously called for
legislative reforms with her Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases (1892) and A
Red Record (1895) of lynching statistics.
62
through the judiciary, the NAACP accessed the courts to test cases that infringed on the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. A number of landmark Supreme Court cases
resulted in NAACP victories. They included Guinn v. United States 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
in which the Court ruled the Oklahoma grandfather clause a constitutional violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment; Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ruled local
governments’ racial zoning unconstitutional; Moore v. Dempsey 261 U.S. 86 (1923) in
which the Court considered that mob-dominated trials held in Arkansas violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Republican Party prevailed from the end of Reconstruction until the
beginning of the New Deal coalition era of the 1930s when Democrat Franklin D.
Roosevelt defeated Republican Herbert Hoover in 1932. Notable exceptions during this
period of Republican Party dominance were Republican President Theodore Roosevelt’s
(1901–1909) “Square Deal” and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913–1921)
“New Freedom” administrations. Roosevelt and Wilson were each distinguished, not as
partisans but as Progressive reformers; they ushered in the political philosophy of
American Liberalism or Progressivism. They also used similar tactics by befriending and
courting black voters during their election campaigns, and then by betraying their
loyalties during their terms in office. Neither Roosevelt nor Wilson offered genuine
assurances to advance black livelihood like that provided their white counterparts.
Instead, African Americans either lagged behind in, or were excluded from, improved
economic situations, employment opportunities, housing conditions, and recreational
facilities.
63
Moreover, African Americans were also often in jeopardy of violence and
victimized without the assurance of federal protection (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane
1970). President Wilson required the re-segregation of federal facilities and the civil
service after about fifty years of integration (Pohlmann 2008); segregation of the armed
forces, which according to Wilson was for the safety and security of African Americans;
and systematic exclusion of the African American population from the benefits and
privileges of full citizenship (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Nonetheless, the
28-year absence of African Americans from the United States Congress ended with the
election of Oscar S. De Priest, a Republican from the state of Illinois, whose term
spanned from 1929 to 1935 with the aid of Ida B. Wells-Barnett of Chicago. His loss to
Democrat Arthur Mitchell in the 1934 congressional election
53
reflected a “larger
political trend occurring in Chicago and many other northern cities; African Americans
were changing their allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.”
Serving from 1935 to 1943, Arthur Mitchell was the first African American Democrat
elected to Congress.
54
Succeeded by Democrat William L. Dawson (1943 – 1970),
Chicago sent the third African American to Congress in the twentieth century. As
Democrats, Mitchell and Dawson were considered heirs of the New Deal legacy.
3.6 PERIOD OF THE NEW DEAL COALITION, 1936 – 1964
Partisan realignment that began in the 1920s gained momentum during President
Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection bid. Notable shifts in political party identifications within
the African-American community emerged as allegiance to the Republican Party of
53. “Negro Opposes De Priest.” New York Times, 29 October 1934, 2.
54. Black Americans in Congress: Member Profiles. Republican Representative
Oscar S. De Priest, and Democratic Representatives Arthur Mitchell and William
Dawson. Accessed May 4, 2012. http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles.
64
Lincoln began to wane (Weiss 1983). A number of factors contributed to these
defections. They included: Herbert Hoover’s failure to address substantive issues of
importance to the race,
55
and to grant much needed federal emergency assistance;
African-American perceptions of policy congruence with Roosevelt as a consequence of
his first term in office; Roosevelt’s handling of relief efforts in response to the
devastating economic crisis brought on by the stock market crash of 1929. Additionally,
the arrival of African Americans migrating from the South to Northern slums necessitated
relief that was provided only since Roosevelt took office. Finally, the emergence of a
“new black electorate,” consisting of coming-of-age and first-time voters in 1936, joined
the ranks of the Democratic coalition to support the reelection of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Franklin and Moss 1988; Weiss 1983; Brisbane, 1970; Campbell, et al. 1960).
However, not everyone was convinced that leaving the Republican Party for the
Democratic Party was in the best interest of the race. According to Nancy Weiss (1983)
the first national survey documenting African American political party identifications
reported that some citizens were still reluctant to embrace the Democratic Party in 1937.
Moreover, 71 percent of the “Black elite” made up primarily of professionals, business
and civic leaders still maintained attachments to the Republican Party.
Democratic dominance of the presidency prevailed during the New Deal era.
African Americans increased their support for the Democratic Party and for the Roosevelt
administration, mainly because they paid at least a modicum of attention to racial group
55. In 1929 the NAACP, under the leadership of Walter White, successfully
blocked President Herbert Hoover’s nomination of Judge John J. Parker to the U.S.
Supreme Court for his “past racist rhetoric and vocal opposition to black suffrage.” See:
John Kirk, “The Long Road to Equality for African-Americans” History Today 59, no. 2
(February 2009). Accessed May 4, 2012.
http://www.historytoday.com/john-kirk/long-road-equality-african-americans
65
concerns. New Deal programs provided African Americans the opportunity to escape
their captured status within the Republican Party, even though Roosevelt sought to
appease the southern wing of the Party by not pushing Congress to move forward with
anti-lynching and other civil rights legislation (Frymer 1999). Roosevelt also
strategically encouraged black loyalty for the Democrats when he enlisted their advice
and assistance in various departments of the federal bureaucracy. According to Franklin
and Moss (1988) Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” consisted of leaders within the community
who were highly skilled and qualified for federal service. These notable leaders
included: Robert L. Vann, Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General; William H.
Hastie, Assistant Solicitor, Department of the Interior; Robert C. Weaver, racial advisor,
Department of the Interior; Eugene Kinckle Jones, advisor on Negro affairs, Department
of Commerce; Mary McLeod Bethune, Director, Negro Affairs of the National Youth
Administration; Edgar Brown, advisor on Negro affairs, Civilian Conservation Corps;
Frank S. Horne who worked with federal housing programs; and, William J. Trent, Racial
Relations Officer, Federal Works Agency.
56
In addition, a number of other African
Americans served in various capacities within the federal bureaucracy. This relationship
allowed the administration to entertain issues of most importance to the race like housing,
employment, trade skills and education, as well as relief assistance and benefits in
exchange for African Americans’ loyal support at the polls.
While the NAACP, particularly its Legal Defense Fund (LDF), continued legal
strategies to represent African Americans against injustices during the New Deal era, Asa
Philip Randolph, labor organizer and president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
56. Franklin, John Hope and Alfred A. Moss, Jr. From Slavery to Freedom: A
History of African Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988, 349-350).
66
Porters that he founded in 1925, proposed a new strategy to improve African Americans’
conditions, the March on Washington Movement. Randolph’s plan entailed a show of
racial solidarity among African Americans, along with sympathetic whites, as they
converged on the nation’s capitol to demand an end to racial discrimination in the armed
forces and in civilian employment, to include the federal service. However, this proposal
was not well received by President Roosevelt, primarily because it would draw
international attention to the plight of African Americans.
57
Bowing to the pressure of a
massive march on the District of Columbia, Roosevelt solicited a meeting with Randolph
to address his demands. In exchange for calling off the march, President Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 8802 – Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense Industry on
June 25, 1941. The Order stated, “…I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States
that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries
or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin,” (Roosevelt 1941). The
Order, in requiring the federal bureaucracy and all defense-related contracting agents to
employ nondiscriminatory hiring practices, provided opportunities for employment
within the federal service among African Americans, and a temporary Fair Employment
Practices Committee (FEPC) to enforce the Order.
58
African Americans persisted in their fight for full citizenship and the protection
thereof. In 1942 the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was founded on the campus of
57. The Roosevelt administration solicited support against Adolph Hitler’s ethnic
cleansing and mistreatment of the Jews in Europe during WWII; publicity about
discrimination against African Americans would dilute their cause and bring shame and
embarrassment upon the United States.
58. The FEPC disbanded after the end of WWII during President Truman’s
administration.
67
the University of Chicago by an interracial group of students. Initially membership was
mostly northern and white, but eventually became mostly African American. Its
inception marked the beginning of a mass movement for civil rights in the United States,
and the organization spread throughout the country. Distinguished by their use of bold
new strategies and methods, CORE pioneered non-violent civil disobedience to combat
racism and to dismantle Jim Crow racial segregation, primarily in the South. They helped
organize the 1956 Montgomery Bus boycott and the 1963 March on Washington; they
orchestrated lunch counter sit-ins, served as Freedom Riders, and as Foot Soldiers
bearing the brunt of violent opposition against firemen’s hoses, police officer’s Billy
clubs and attack dogs; violence in response to CORE’s peaceful protests for justice and
equality.
59
During the New Deal era the civil rights movement gained momentum with
increased support from white liberals, and a realization among Democrats that they needed
support from the African American electorate, who typically mobilized as a voting bloc, to
win elections. The 1940 Democratic Party Platform only alluded to support for African
Americans (Frymer 1999). Nonetheless, on July 19, 1944 the national Democratic Party
Platform included a plank addressing racial equality. “We believe that racial and religious
minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the
rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional
powers to protect those rights,” (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011). Accordingly, the 1948
59. Congress of Racial Equality. Accessed May 5, 2012. http://www.core-
online.org
68
Democratic Party Platform spelled out the Party’s civil rights agenda and support of
President Harry S. Truman’s efforts to promote equality for all citizens.
60
The Democratic Party is responsible for the great civil rights gains made
in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on
race, creed or color…The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing
its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic
discrimination…We again state our belief that racial and religious
minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote,
the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all
citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution…We highly commend
President Harry S. Truman for his courageous stand on the issue of civil
rights…We call upon the Congress to support our President in
guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American Principles: (1) the
right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal
opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) and the
right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation.
Democratic Party Platform
July 12, 1948
At the 1948 Democratic National Convention held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Hubert Humphrey [D, MN] spoke in favor of the Party’s civil rights plank, sparking
controversy among southerners.
Mr. Chairman, fellow Democrats, fellow Americans:
I realize that in speaking in behalf of the minority report on civil rights as
presented by Congressman De Miller of Wisconsin that I'm dealing with a
charged issue -- with an issue which has been confused by emotionalism
on all sides of the fence… Now let me say this at the outset that this
proposal is made for no single region. Our proposal is made for no single
class, for no single racial or religious group in mind. All of the regions of
this country, all of the states have shared in our precious heritage of
American freedom. All the states and all the regions have seen at least
some of the infringements of that freedom -- all people -- get this -- all
people, white and black, all groups, all racial groups have been the victims
at time[s] in this nation of -- let me say -- vicious discrimination… Oh,
yes, I know, other political parties may have talked more about civil
rights, but the Democratic Party has surely done more about civil rights…
60. See: the “1848 Democratic Party Platform” (July 12, 1948) in Woolley and
Peters (1999-2011). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
69
This convention must set out more specifically the direction in which our
Party efforts are to go… My friends, to those who say that we are rushing
this issue of civil rights, I say to them we are 172 years late. To those who
say that this civil-rights program is an infringement on states’ rights, I say
this: The time has arrived in America for the Democratic Party to get out
of the shadow of states' rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright
sunshine of human rights…My good friends, I ask my Party, I ask the
Democratic Party, to march down the high road of progressive democracy.
I ask this convention to say in unmistakable terms that we proudly hail,
and we courageously support, our President and
leader Harry Truman in his great fight for civil rights in America!
61
Herbert Humphrey
July 14, 1948
On July 26, 1948 President Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981.
Executive Order 9980 - Regulations Governing Fair Employment Practices within the
Federal Establishment - prohibited discrimination in employment practices on the basis
of race, color, religion, or national origin in executive departments. To enforce this
order, Truman required each department to appoint a Fair Employment Officer to
implement fair employment policies. In addition, he ordered the U.S. Civil Service
Commission to establish a Fair Employment Board, and provide administrative remedies
for persons seeking relief because of discrimination arising from employment within the
executive branch of the federal government. Moreover, at the insistence of A. Philip
Randolph, Truman signed Executive Order 9981 - Establishing the President's Committee
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (Truman 1948). The
Order stated: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard
61. Herbert Humphrey made this speech at the Democratic Party Convention
(July 12, 1948), in Woolley and Peters (1999-2011). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
70
to race, color, religion, or national origin.”
62
Harry S. Truman became the first twentieth
century president to effect legislation for black civil rights, even though he faced strong
congressional opposition. With these actions a large percentage of African Americans
shifted allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. In the 1948
presidential election 77 percent of African American voters supported Truman; “a
majority of Blacks reported that they thought of themselves as Democrats.”
63
So, when the Republicans won the 1952 election they had an opportunity to make
good on twenty years of pledged commitment to remedy the plight of African Americans.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, retired U.S. Army General and World War II hero, won the bid
for the Republicans in their presidential election against Democrat Adlai Stevenson.
When the Republican Party met for their 1952 national convention in Chicago, Illinois,
they berated the Democrats for using prejudice based on class, race, and religion as
grounds for their argument against discrimination, for non-enforcement of Federal
legislation, and for not fulfilling campaign promises, especially after having held the
executive for such an extensive period. Denouncing Democrats as bigots, the
Republicans vowed to make appointments to federal positions without regard to race,
religion, or national origin. They also pledged both federal action to abolish lynching,
62. However, according to Marcus D. Pohlmann, Black Politics in Conservative
America, (New York: Sloan Publishing, 2008) the Order was not actually enforced until
July 26, 1951 when the U.S. Army implemented a policy of desegregated forces.
63. Brooks Jackson. “Blacks and the Democratic Party,” in FactCheck.Org: A
Project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania. Posted:
Friday, April 18, 2008. Accessed May 29, 2012.
http://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/blacks-and-the-democratic-party/
71
poll taxes, and segregation in the District of Columbia, and federal legislation to enforce
“just and equitable treatment in the area of discriminatory employment practices.”
64
President Eisenhower, who won 39 percent of the African American vote
(Jackson 2008), executed a number of the 1952 Republican platform planks. For
instance, upon assuming the presidency, Eisenhower enforced Truman’s Executive Order
9981, which desegregated the U.S. armed forces, (Pohlmann, 2008). Beginning in 1953
the District of Columbia had begun desegregating hospitals, hotels, movie theaters and
other entertainment venues, recreational facilities, restaurants, and public schools.
According to Franklin and Moss, the President hoped that Washington, D.C. would serve
as a “model” for the nation. In addition, high profile appointments of African Americans
to federal positions included J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, E. Frederic
Morrow, Administrative Assistant, Executive Office of the President, and Scovel
Richardson, Chairman, United States Parole Board, as well as a number of staff
appointments within the House of Representatives and the federal bureaucracy, and the
appointment of Governor of the Virgin Islands.
65
Then again, when the landmark decision handed down by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) held that segregated public
school systems were an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Eisenhower, while promising to obey the Court’s judgment, did not use his executive
authority to enforce a policy of immediate desegregation. Even after the Court’s ruling in
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) that desegregation should be implemented with “all
64. Excerpt from the “1952 Republican Party Platform,” in Woolley and Peters
1999-2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
65. Franklin and Moss 1988, 414, 415.
72
deliberate speed,” the President remained somewhat passive. Nevertheless, in 1957
Eisenhower federalized Arkansas National Guard troops and deployed additional U.S.
Army soldiers
66
to ensure the safety of the “Little Rock Nine” as they desegregated
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas (Pohlmann 2008).
President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10590 “Establishing the President's
Committee on Government Employment Policy,”
67
on January 18, 1955. The Order
replaced Truman’s Executive Order 9980 (1951) regarding fair employment practices in
the federal service, as amended. Then on January 26, 1955 Eisenhower’s cabinet was
presented with a Report of the Attorney General on the Administration’s Efforts in the
Field of Racial Discrimination.
68
U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. submitted
this background report of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to eliminate
segregation and discrimination in education; transportation; the armed forces; hospitals;
employment practices; facilities operated by or under the jurisdiction of the Department
of the Interior; airport facilities; the District of Columbia; and, housing. Subsequently, in
66. In accordance with Executive Order 10730 – Providing Assistance for the
Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas, signed by President
Eisenhower on September 24, 1957, and granting authority to the Secretary of Defense
“to order into active military service any and all units of the national guard.”
Additionally, the Order authorized the Secretary to “delegate authority to the Secretary of
the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred on him
by this Order” to enforce the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.
67. Issued in the Federal Register (20 FR 409, January 19, 1955), and later
amended by Executive Orders: 10772 (August 5, 1957); 10773 (July 1, 1958).
68. Memorandum to the Honorable Sherman Adams, June 4, 1957, from E.
Frederic Morrow regarding President Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with African-
American leaders (Woolley & Peters, 1999 – 2011, The American Presidency Project,
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum [link]).
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower
_administration/1957_06_04_Morrow_to_Adams
73
personal communiqués
69
with the Reverend Billy Graham, Eisenhower mulled over the
civil rights issue, as seen below in a portion of his March 22, 1956 letter:
I have urgently been thinking about the matters we discussed in our
conversation…I refer particularly to that part of our talk that dealt
with…ministers…promoting both tolerance and progress in our race
relations problems…they could discuss the mounting evidence toward
elimination of racial difficulties, even all reasonable men appreciate that
eventual and complete success will not be attained for some years…As I
told you, my mind constantly turns to the ease with which effective steps
might be taken in the adult as compared to the juvenile field. Of course
the kind of evidence that we should like to see pile up is the kind that
would convince Federal District judges in the several localities that
progress is real. All of us realize, I think, that success through conciliation
will be more lasting and stronger than could be attained through force and
conflict.
Eisenhower went on to suggest to Graham a gradual desegregation plan in which “a few
well-qualified” African Americans could begin to run for local elected offices like school
boards, city and county commissioners; and to seek entrance into public university
graduate programs.
Despite the President’s expressions of concern to Reverend Graham about how to
address the problems of American race relations, Eisenhower would not confer with
African American leaders. On June 4, 1957 E. Frederic Morrow, Administrative
Assistant in the Executive Office of the President, sent a memorandum to L. Sherman
Adams, Chief of Staff, at his request. In this memo Morrow notes that African-American
69. President Eisenhower and Reverend Graham exchange ideas about how the
problem of race relations could be resolved. The letters begin on March 22, 1956
following a meeting between the two men, and provide additional opinions about how to
they might work to gradually settle the issue given Eisenhower’s impending bid for
reelection. Correspondence from the President to Graham are dated March 22 and 30,
1956 with Graham responding on March 27 and June 4, 1956
74
leaders like A. Philip Randolph and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. had come to the
White House to see President Eisenhower; other leaders had sent requests, but all were
denied. Morrow detailed the impact of Eisenhower’s refusal, to talk to the Black leaders,
on African-American citizens.
I can state categorically that the rank and file of Negroes in the country
feel that the President has deserted them in their current fight to achieve
first-class citizenship via Civil Rights legislation, etc. Despite the
unprecedented record of this Administration in the field of human rights,
Negroes are so emotionally involved in this struggle that they are unable
to estimate what gains have been made…I can understand this feeling, and
it is only because I am a staff member of the Administration and have
been an eye witness to its efforts that I can look at these protests
objectively rather than emotionally. There is tremendous unrest among the
Negro population. Tensions are great, emotions are at high pitch…I feel
the time is ripe for the President to see two or three Negro leaders, and to
let them get off their chests the things that seem to be giving them great
concern. I feel…the President seeing these men will have a great effect
upon the morale, sentiments, and attitudes of Negro citizens. Their
present feeling is that their acknowledged leadership is being ignored,
snubbed, and belittled by the President and his staff.
…Even in the predominantly white audience in Minneapolis at the
Republican Workshop three weeks ago, the questions from the floor were
on the matter of the President’s refusal to see the Negro leaders and to
assure them of his interest in their problem…
70
Morrow further recommended that President Eisenhower give audience to A.
Philip Randolph, Martin L. King, Jr., and Roy Wilkins. If agreed, Morrow would prepare
these leaders on proper protocol for this meeting. The proposed meeting with President
70. Memorandum to the Honorable Sherman Adams, June 4, 1957, from E.
Frederic Morrow regarding President Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with African-
American leaders (Woolley & Peters, 1999 – 2011 American Presidency Project, The
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum [link]). Available from
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower
_administration/1957_06_04_Morrow_to_Adams
75
Eisenhower took place on June 23, 1958.
71
In attendance were: Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); A. Philip
Randolph, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins,
President, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and,
Lester B. Granger, Executive Secretary, National Urban League. These leaders
acknowledged that the 1957 Civil Rights Act (CRA) (Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634)
signed by Eisenhower was a positive step to protect voting rights, and the first such
enactment since passage of the 1866 and 1875 Civil Rights legislation during the
Reconstruction era (Pohlmann 2008).
However, King, Randolph, Wilkins, and Granger wanted the President to actively
enforce the 1957 CRA. They also made a number of civil rights recommendations to the
President which included: convening of a White House Conference on compliance with
the Court’s decision to end school segregation; requesting a Civil Rights law to
strengthen the 1957 CRA and to extend the Civil Rights Commission beyond its
expiration date; instructing the Department of Justice to actively protect citizens’ rights to
register for the vote, and against acts of terrorism; and, executing a principle prohibiting
use of federal aid to promote segregation in “education, hospitals, housing, or other
71. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of Negro Leaders with the President
on June 23, 1958, Memo dated June 24, 1958 (66 pages).
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower
_administration/1958_06_23_Meeting_of_Negro_Leaders
76
grants-in-aid to state and local governments.”
72
Subsequently, Eisenhower signed the
Civil Rights Act (Pub. L. 86-449) on May 6, 1960. This legislation penalized
obstructions to citizens’ rights to register and to vote; required preservation of registration
and voting records; extended duration of the Civil Rights Commission; and, criminalized
the use of explosives.
73
In spite of efforts toward gradual racial conciliation, African American
perceptions of President Eisenhower and the Republican Party were that they did not
offer immediate resolutions to eliminate terrorist activities and civil rights violations that
they faced daily. They clamored for: Justice and Equality NOW! They could not wait
any longer; they increasingly sought redress for wrongs against the race. On the eve of
the 1960s novelist and playwright, James Baldwin declared, “To be a Negro in this
country and to be relatively conscious is to be in a rage all the time.”
74
This is what
President Eisenhower could not understand; he thought the anger of the African
American population was aimed at him personally. Upon meeting with King, Randolph,
Wilkins, and Granger he learned that African Americans impatiently longed to cast off
the shackles of second-class citizenship. Henceforth, African Americans continued to
press forward for full rights of citizenship, for justice and equality, and for redress of
wrongs against the race.
72. Quoted in Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of Negro Leaders with the
President on June 23, 1958, Memo dated June 24, 1958 “A Statement to President
Dwight D. Eisenhower.”
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower
_administration/1958_06_23_Meeting_of_Negro_Leaders
73. Reference: Marcus D. Pohlmann (2008), and the Dirksen Congressional
Center. http://www.dirksencenter.org.
74. Quoted in James T. Patterson. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-
74 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 468.
77
Hereafter race was thrust into the forefront of national American politics. During
the presidential contest between Senator John F. Kennedy [D, MA] and Vice President
Richard M. Nixon in 1960 the Democratic Party vowed to “seek to create an affirmative
new atmosphere in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities which threaten
both the integrity of our democratic faith and the proposition on which our nation was
founded—that all men are created equal.” Democrats pledged to work for full
employment of all citizens, especially those “over 40, minority groups, young people, and
women.” To accomplish this, the Party would work to “remove artificial and arbitrary
barriers to employment” as well as to other notable areas, such as housing, education, and
transportation, in which blatant discrimination occurred. In addition, the Democratic
Party promised to establish a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, and to use
executive orders, legislation, and legal actions from the Attorney General to terminate
racial discrimination. They further promised to: enforce the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights
laws signed by Eisenhower to secure voting rights; establish a Fair Employment Practices
Commission; prohibit discrimination based on race, color, creed, or national origin in
every state and locality; and, secure equal access to voting, housing, education,
employment, and public facilities.
75
Similarly, the Republicans vowed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, and national origin. They held that:
This nation was created to give expression, validity and purpose to our
spiritual heritage—the supreme worth of the individual. In such a nation—
a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal—racial
75. Found in the “1960 Democratic Party Platform,” in Woolley and Peters,
1999-2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
78
discrimination has no place. It can hardly be reconciled with a
Constitution that guarantees equal protection under law to all persons. In a
deeper sense, too, it is immoral and unjust. As to those matters within
reach of political action and leadership, we pledge ourselves unreservedly
to its eradication.
76
Republicans focused on the removal of injustices and the enforcement of legislation and
Supreme Court rulings, and continued progress in advancing civil rights for all. They
further asserted that their platform did not consist of mere promises; instead, they vowed
to resolve problem areas of a practical nature that could be accomplished realistically.
These included voting, public schools, employment, housing, as well as public facilities
and services.
Despite Republican Party promises of progress, Kennedy defeated Nixon in the
general election by a slim margin. It was during this 1960 election that the Democratic
Party began to grasp the importance of both African American support at the polls, and
solidarity of the racial group in the electoral arena. For instance, African Americans
voted as a bloc; which was reported as the “black” vote. In addition, the struggle for civil
and economic rights tended to unite disparate elements of the civil rights movement.
Regardless of class, gender, age or region, African Americans were determined to
achieve the goals of the movement. Perhaps two key gestures may have played a
significant role in the black swing vote for Kennedy rather than Nixon during the 1960
general election. First, when Dr. King was sentenced to four months of hard labor in the
Georgia State Penitentiary at Reidsville, a pregnant Coretta Scott King appealed to both
Vice President Richard Nixon, a proponent of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and Senator
John Kennedy, an opponent of the Act for any aid they could provide. Neither Nixon nor
76. Excerpt taken from the 1960 Republican Party Platform, “Civil Rights,” in
Woolley & Peters, 1999-2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
79
Kennedy wanted to estrange Southern whites, and each was courting Northern blacks.
Nixon was nonresponsive to her plea, while Kennedy, under advice, telephoned to offer
his assistance. At his request Kennedy’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy intervened and King
was released. It was this one gesture of concern that prompted African Americans to
support the Democratic Party. Their expectation was that the Democrats/Kennedy would
also support their cause for civil and economic rights. Nixon garnered only 32 percent of
the black vote in 1960 (Jackson 2008).
Initially, President Kennedy and U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy seemed
more receptive when African-American leaders broached the issue of civil rights;
however, the President’s hesitation to take a stand on the issue early in his administration
drew mixed perceptions. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy was quite cautious about becoming
an activist president, especially with regard to advancing a civil rights agenda. On March
6, 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 to establish the President’s
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; a policy of nondiscrimination in
government employment; and compliance responsibilities of government contractors and
subcontractors, including labor unions and representatives of workers. Most importantly
the Order required sanctions and penalties for noncompliance. The Order also granted
powers and stipulated duties of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity as well as federal contracting agencies (Kennedy, 1961). It was not until
November 20, 1962, however, that Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063 to establish
equal opportunity in housing. The Order required executive bureaucratic involvement in
the “provision, rehabilitation, or operation of housing and related facilities” to prevent
discrimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin, and “to use their good
80
offices and to take other appropriate action permitted by law, including the institution of
appropriate litigation, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory
practices with respect to residential property and related facilities heretofore provided
with Federal financial assistance” (Kennedy, 1962).
Consequently as the black civil rights movement continued to gain momentum,
three events in the early 1960s played a pivotal role in forcing the President’s hand: the
1960 Greensborough, North Carolina lunch counter sit-ins; the 1961 Freedom Rides
organized by the Congress for Racial Equality; and the 1963 protests in Birmingham,
Alabama (McAdam 1982). On June 11, 1963 President Kennedy finally took a position
and delivered his now historic speech on civil rights, at the insistence of his Attorney
General. In his speech, Kennedy vowed to ask the U.S. Congress to enact “necessary
measures…giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the
public--hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar establishments.”
77
Most
importantly, Kennedy broadened the issue of race to incorporate all Americans, and
asked them to grant to African Americans the kind of equality and justice they enjoyed,
and expected for themselves (Pohlmann 2008).
My fellow Americans, this is a problem which faces us all--in every city
of the North as well as the South. Today there are Negroes unemployed,
two or three times as many compared to whites, inadequate in education,
moving into the large cities, unable to find work, young people
particularly out of work without hope, denied equal rights, denied the
opportunity to eat at a restaurant or lunch counter or go to a movie theater,
denied the right to a decent education, denied almost today the right to
attend a State university even though qualified. It seems to me that these
77. John F. Kennedy Library and Museum, Selected Speeches, in Woolley and
Peters. Accessed May 3, 2012]. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-
Reference/JFK-Speeches/Radio-and-Television-Report-to-the-American-People-on-
Civil-Rights-June-11-1963.aspx
81
are matters [that] concern us all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or
Governors, but every citizen of the United States.
78
President John F. Kennedy
June 11, 1963
Subsequently, Kennedy sent a proposed Civil Rights Act
79
to Congress in the summer of
1963; however, he was assassinated before its passage. On September 10, 1963,
Kennedy issued his Executive Order 11118 – Providing Assistance for the Unlawful
Obstruction of Justice in the State of Alabama. Herein the President authorized the
Secretary of Defense to utilize the armed services to enforce the laws of the United
States, court orders regarding desegregation of public schools, and “to suppress unlawful
assemblies, combinations, conspiracies, and domestic violence which oppose, obstruct, or
hinder the execution of the law or impede the course of justice under the law within that
State” (Kennedy 1963).
As U.S. Attorney General, Robert Kennedy also exercised the authority of his
office to address the problem of racial segregation and to protect demonstrators. In 1961
Freedom Riders initiated a campaign to test compliance with the Supreme Court ruling in
Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company, 64 MCC 769 (1955) which banned segregated
interstate travel by bus.
80
Dr. King and the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, pastor of First
Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, supported the Freedom Riders who defied the
78. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on Civil Rights, June 11, 1963. Ibid.
79. Portions of this proposal included legislative drafts prepared by Democratic
Party Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York. Accessed May 3, 2012. Black
Americans in Congress: http://www.baic.house.gov/
80. The NAACP initially tested this Supreme Court ruling in 1955 when Rosa
Parks refused to surrender her seat in accordance with Jim Crow laws. The test resulted
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1956.
82
Jim Crow segregated interstate transit system. King, Abernathy, the 1500 member
congregation of First Baptist Church, the Freedom Riders, and other civil rights
demonstrators required protection from angry white mobs. Kennedy was forced to send
federal marshals and troops to quell the mobs on May 21, 1961. Afterward, on May 29,
1961, Robert Kennedy issued a petition for the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
to implement and enforce ICC rulings prohibiting Jim Crow in interstate travel.
81
On August 28, 1963 the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was held.
Organized by A. Philip Randolph and a coalition of six civil rights organizations, the
event had a massive response with more than 200,000 in attendance. This civil rights
coalition included: the Congress of Racial Equality (James Farmer), the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (Martin Luther King, Jr.), the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (John Lewis), A. Philip Randolph (Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Roy Wilkins)
and the National Urban League (Whitney Young, Jr.). They demanded passage of a
meaningful civil rights legislation, unlike the 1957 and 1960 laws enacted during the
Eisenhower administration; the end of racial discrimination in public schools, and in
public and private employment. They further demanded a set hourly minimum wage,
protection against police brutality for demonstrators, and self-governance for
Washington, D.C.
81 . Supreme Court cases and Interstate Commerce Commission rulings
addressed desegregation of interstate travel and public facilities. Sarah Keys v. Carolina
Coach Company, 64 MCC 769 (1955) challenged segregated bus travel; NAACP v. St.
Louis-Santa Fe Railway Company, 298 ICC 355 (1955) confronted segregated public
transportation via railroads and train terminals; and, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 US 454
(1960) banned segregated terminals, restaurants, and restrooms (See also: Marcus D.
Pohlmann 2008).
83
While initially opposing the march, President Kennedy relented and voiced his
support for the march when he realized that it would proceed over his objection. A
number of labor unions also supported the jobs march, but the Congress of Industrial
Organization (CIO) was not in support, and white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux
Klan opposed the march because it promoted racial equality. Clearly, the March on
Washington demonstrated massive support from various segments of American society
regardless of race, class, gender or region for black civil rights, as well as a number of
disparate African American associations. At the March John Lewis, much like W.E.B.
Du Bois, warned African Americans against relying on either of the political parties to
accomplish their goals.
The revolution is at hand, and we must free ourselves of the chains of
political and economic slavery. The nonviolent revolution is saying, "We
will not wait for the courts to act, for we have been waiting hundreds of
years. We will not wait for the President, nor the Justice Department, nor
Congress, but we will take matters into our own hands, and create a great
source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would
assure us victory." For those who have said, "Be patient and wait!" we
must say, "Patience is a dirty and nasty word." We cannot be patient, we
do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it
now. We cannot depend on any political party, for the Democrats and the
Republicans have betrayed the basic principles of the Declaration of
Independence.
82
John Lewis
August 28, 1963
Lewis summed up the sentiment of so many lifetimes of struggle; patience was no longer
an option. According to King “The hundreds of thousands who marched on Washington
marched to level barriers. They summed up everything in a word—NOW. What is the
content of NOW? Everything, not some things, in the President’s civil rights bill is part
82. John Lewis, “Text of Speech to be delivered at Lincoln Memorial.” August
28, 1963. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers, Martin Luther King, Jr.
Library and Archives. http://www.thekingcenter.org/king-library-archive.
84
of NOW.”
83
Finally, Congress enacted substantive legislation to protect the rights of
citizens in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On July
2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law.
3.7 CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans demonstrated,
regardless of their economic class or social status—bound or free, men or women, a full
awareness of their interconnectedness because of race. This consciousness was further
reinforced by perceptions of their interdependence of both fate and task. At each twist
and turn on the road to justice and equality, and whenever racism raised its ugly head,
African Americans rose to the challenge. They persistently pressed forward to advance
racial group interests in accordance with the American promise of democratic
principles—life, liberty, and property, which they valued. Their tenacity was seen in
efforts to invoke the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government to act
on their behalf. Likewise, they appealed to linkage institutions—the press, advocacy
groups, and the political parties—to influence favorably public opinions and policies. At
times, when the establishment did not heed their cry for justice and equality, they
launched their own platforms to advance the African American racial group agenda. For
instance, the Black Church, from its inception, was a consistent haven from which they
advanced political discourse, and frontal attacks against oppression, subjugation, and
discrimination.
83. King, Martin L. “In a Word—Now,” New York Times Magazine, September
29, 1963.
85
Although historically a majority of African Americans identified themselves as
Democrats, this allegiance evolved over time because of their single-mindedness and
firmness of purpose to remedy both the inequality of segregation, and injustices they
incurred because of both political parties’ failures to adequately address African
American racial group interests. Often black partisanship signaled a racial group
determination to participate within the polity, and their partisan identifications reflected a
practical and rational decision to support “the lesser of two great evils.” Still, from the
onset African Americans sought recognition from the two main political parties, and to
function within them. Originally, African Americans identified with the Republican
Party, a consequence of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. However, this party
affiliation began to diminish as Republicans failed to act upon the entitlements of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to protect African Americans’ inalienable rights to life,
liberty, and property in accordance with the United States Constitution. While
Republicans supported and implemented a number of devices to distance themselves
from their “captured” African American constituents, Democrats schemed to lure them
into Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition. Subsequently, the Democratic Party emerged as the
political party that not only discussed civil rights, the Party also enacted legislation in a
feeble attempt to reverse some cruelties of racial inequality in the United States. Even
though Franklin Roosevelt failed to advance policies to protect against Southern horrors,
like lynching, bureaucratic actions that included relief for the black population during
Roosevelt’s administration proved detrimental to the Republican Party. This caused some
African Americans to realign with the Democratic Party, which was especially apparent
during the 1936 presidential election.
86
Over time, realignment of the African American electorate seemed to cause even
the most reluctant Democrats to realize that the link between race and party garnered
electoral victory. Democrats at least considered requests and demands made by African
American leaders, and provided at least a modicum of relief. With the emergence of the
civil rights protest movement African Americans pushed for immediate legislation to
grant them the basic democratic values to which all citizens were entitled, and the
protections thereof. As a result, because of bipartisan efforts, Congress passed and
Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Among those members in Congress striving for substantive civil rights legislation was a
new generation of African Americans that used their political clout to keep civil rights on
the governmental agenda, and to support legislation that addressed issues of most
importance to the African American racial group. Most of these Congress Members
served in an official capacity within their national party organization, received validation
and support during their campaigns as Democrats, and were duly elected on the basis of
their Democratic partisan associations.
As the next chapter makes clear, African Americans’ support for the Democratic
Party continued and became more intense during the historical periods covered from
1965 to 2008. The impact of major legislation like the 1965 Voting Rights Act also
transformed voter registration and turnout within the African American community.
Devotion to passage of major civil rights legislation as well as the extension of civil
rights and implementation of voting rights policies, mainly under the Democratic Party
label, added strength to a sense of linked fate weaved into African American racial group
Democratic partisan identifications.
87
CHAPTER 4
F
ROM
P
ROLONGED
P
ROTEST TO
F
ULL
P
OLITICAL
P
ARTICIPATION
,
1964-2008
The principal value of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the value above
all things, is the recognition finally—by the Congress of the
United States—that the Negro is a constitutional citizen…
Roy Wilkins
June 23, 1964
Ever since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act there has been considerable cohesion and
solidarity among African Americans relative to partisanship. The mid-1960s culminated
their realignment, from the Republican Party of Lincoln to the Democratic Party, a shift
that began during the New Deal coalition era. This chapter continues the review, begun
previously in Chapter 3, of tactics employed by African Americans to secure and enjoy
basic democratic values, and the protections thereof. Moreover, this chapter examines
partisan policy outcomes, particularly issues that were of most importance to African, and
other oppressed, Americans such as decent housing, civil and voting rights, equal
employment and fair wages; and, how such policies ultimately established African
American attachments to the Democratic Party. Most importantly, the present chapter
considers the force of race, or racial group influence, on individual political party
identifications. Here the significance of race, and the relationship between race, class,
and gender are essential to understanding both the sense of attachment to, and the
magnitude of African Americans’ relationship with, the Democratic
88
Party. Toward this endeavor two historical periods delineate African Americans’ passage
from prolonged political protest to full political participation, Civil Rights: 1964–1980,
and Post-Civil Rights: 1981–2008.
4.1 BACKGROUND
By the 1960s the issue of race had gained national attention. African Americans
garnered that attention primarily by virtue of persistent peaceful opposition to racial
oppression (civil disobedience) using conventional protest methods: marches, sit-ins,
lobbying, petitions, and boycotts. Nonetheless, when they took to the streets they were
often met with violent confrontation, like the 1963 encounter between Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., the Freedom Riders, civil rights anti-segregation demonstrators, and Eugene
“Bull” Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety for the city of Birmingham, Alabama
(McAdams 1982). Oftentimes televised news reports captured events as they unfolded,
and commentators styled peaceful protesters as victims. Cameras showed police
brutality, vicious attacks by police dogs or by powerful currents of water from fire hoses.
Still, protesters offered no resistance against such cruelty as they were handcuffed;
thrown into paddy wagons; and, hauled off to jail where the abuse continued. Through
this they gained the world’s attention.
While imprisoned in Alabama Martin Luther King, Jr. penned his 1963 Letter
from Birmingham Jail in which he stated his case for the use of civil disobedience thusly:
Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom
will eventually come. This is what has happened to the American Negro.
Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom;
something without has reminded him that he can gain it… Recognizing
this vital urge that has engulfed the Negro community, one should readily
understand public demonstrations. The Negro has many pent-up
resentments and latent frustrations. He has to get them out. So let him
89
march sometime; let him have his prayer pilgrimages to the city hall;
understand why he must have sit-ins and freedom rides. If his repressed
emotions do not come out in these nonviolent ways, they will come out in
ominous expressions of violence. This is not a threat; it is a fact of history.
So I have not said to my people, "Get rid of your discontent." But I have
tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled
through the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action. Now this approach
is being dismissed as extremist… (82).
84
Martin Luther King, Jr.
City of Birmingham Jail
Birmingham, Alabama
The subsequent August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Dowd Hall
2005) demonstrated what King referred to as “the creative outlet of nonviolent direct
action” to release “pent-up resentments and latent frustrations” (King 1963).
The March on Washington was a massive political rally that provided a national
platform for people from different social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the injustices of society, and the unmet promises of
American democracy. In his “I Have a Dream” speech, Dr. King made a clarion call for
equality for every oppressed segment of society. This included inequality based on race,
class, gender and religion regardless of region. Protesters demanded reforms of
governmental policies that helped to perpetuate racism, classism, and sexism. In “The
Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past” Jacquelyn Dowd Hall
(2005) tells the story of how race, class, gender, and region were intricately tied together
throughout the movement. Most importantly she “emphasizes the gordian knot that ties
race to class and civil rights to workers’ rights” (1239). Women marched also bearing
placards that demanded decent housing, equal rights, jobs for all, and decent pay,
84. Martin Luther King, Jr. “The Negro Is Your Brother,” The Atlantic Monthly
212, no. 2 (August 1963): 78-88.
90
“NOW!” According to Hall these women protesters were “…thus asserting both their
racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers and thereby as equals of
men” (1252).
By 1964 continued discontent with the status quo and unfulfilled demands for
change were ultimately expressed through an unconventional method of violent civil
disobedience: the urban race riot. A desperate reaction to repressive political, economic,
and social conditions magnified by urban blight, severe poverty, racial discrimination,
injustices, and unmet expectations of the promises of democracy erupted into full-fledged
violence. Not quite a year after King’s message from jail in the city of Birmingham,
Alabama, inner city rioters also faced police violence and brutality. Racially charged
mob activity engendered criminal behavior, including physical and/or verbal attacks,
pillaging, and destruction. Tragically, inner city blacks assaulted a number of major U.S.
urban centers like Harlem, Brooklyn, Rochester, New York; and, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, (summer, 1964); Los Angeles (Watts), California (summer, 1965);
Chicago, Illinois (summer, 1966); Newark, New Jersey; Detroit, Michigan (summer,
1967). Accordingly, Doug McAdams (1982) purported that “the level of open defiance
of the established economic and political order was as great during this period [1966-
1968] as during any other in this country’s history, save the Civil War” (182).
85
4.2 PERIOD OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1964 - 1980
On July 2, 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the landmark Civil Rights
Act (Public Law, 88-352), and followed with additional measures to eliminate many
85. Doug McAdams, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,
1930–1970 (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 182.
91
forms of discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, and national origin (Whalen and
Whalen 1985). Additional steps to strengthen civil rights came when the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified on January 23, 1964, which eliminated
the poll tax. One year after the Civil Rights Act (CRA) was signed into law, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created (July 2, 1965) in accordance
with provisions of the 1964 CRA. The EEOC was charged with enforcing laws against
workplace discrimination and investigating complaints of discriminatory treatment, filing
suits of employment discrimination, and adjudicating cases brought by employees of
federal agencies.
86
With this momentous legislation Congress strengthened the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby recognizing African Americans’ constitutional right to full
citizenship with the privileges, immunities, and protections thereof, as stated by Roy
Wilkins (cited above) in his 1964 address to delegates to the 55
th
Annual Convention of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Whalen and Whalen
1985). During this period African American pioneers in Congress, namely Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr. of New York, Charles C. Diggs, Jr. of Michigan, and Augustus
Hawkins of California participated in the congressional civil rights debates, and helped
shape fundamental laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964. “For the first time, African
Americans made substantive, not merely symbolic, gains within the institution.”
87
Subsequently, in the November 1964 election in which the President faced Republican
86. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Accessed May 11, 2012.
http://www.eeoc.gov.
87. Keeping the Faith: African Americans Return to Congress, 1929 – 1970,
Black Americans in Congress. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://baic.house.gov/historical-
essays
92
opponent Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Johnson garnered 94 percent of the
African American vote (Jackson 2008) to win his first elected term as president.
Ever pressing forward, 600 demonstrators left Selma, Alabama on Sunday, March
7, 1965 to protest voting discrimination throughout the state. However, the march quickly
ceased when protesters confronted Alabama police on the Edmund Pettus Bridge.
Televised broadcasts of police brutality and violence against peaceful participants in the
Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March shocked the American conscience (Baldwin
2011). About six months thereafter, President Johnson received from Congress an
extension of Title I, the voting rights provision, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which he
signed into law. The most comprehensive legislation since the Fifteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, the 1965 Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6)
outlawed voting discrimination and gave the U.S. Attorney General authority to bring suit
on behalf of victims of voting discrimination.
Most importantly, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “suspended literacy tests,
authorized the appointment of federal voting examiners, and created federal machinery to
supervise voter registration,” which led to an extraordinary increase in the number of
African Americans elected to public offices (Fisher 2001: 1096). In the Act, Congress
granted broad sweeping powers to the federal government to combat the
disenfranchisement of African Americans. This was challenged in the case of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) on grounds that the VRA violated the Fifth
and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and states’ rights. Five southern
states joined South Carolina in opposition to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its
prerequisite that changes to state voting laws required prescreening by the U.S. Attorney
93
General. In an 8-1 decision the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the powers of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which banned denial of the right to vote based on
race (Fisher 2001). Ever since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act no Republican
presidential candidate captured more than 15 percent of the African American vote
(Apple, Jr. 1996).
“Yet race riots in Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965) reminded people of the sage
insights of World War II activists: it was one thing to sit at the counter but another to be
able to afford a meal. Racism had excluded black people from the accumulation of wealth
and resources, a historical reality that could not be addressed by legal protection in the
present” (Baldwin 2011: 7). Concurrently, in his remarks at the White House Conference
on Equal Employment Opportunities regarding the riots in south central Los Angeles
(Watts), California that occurred five days following passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, President Johnson noted the overwhelming tie that bound race, class, and gender.
88
If there is one thing I think we have learned from the civil rights struggle,
it is that the problem of bringing the Negro American into an equal role in
our society is more complex, and is more urgent, and is much more critical
than any of us have ever known. Who of you could have predicted 10
years ago, that in this last, sweltering, August week thousands upon
thousands of disenfranchised Negro men and women would suddenly take
part in self government, and that thousands more in that same week would
strike out in an unparalleled act of violence in this Nation?
It is our duty - and it is our desire - to open our hearts to humanity's cry for
help. It is our obligation to seek to understand what could lie beneath the
flames that scarred that great city. So let us equip the poor and the
oppressed - let us equip them for the long march to dignity and to
wellbeing. But let us never confuse the need for decent work and fair
treatment with an excuse to destroy and to uproot.
88. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the White House Conference on Equal
Employment Opportunities," August 20, 1965. Accessed May 16, 2012.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27170.
94
Yet beneath the discord we hear another theme. That theme speaks of a
day when Americans of every color, and every creed, and every religion,
and every region, and every sex can be trained for decent employment, can
find it, can secure it, can have it preserved, and can support their families
in an enriching and a rewarding environment....
President Lyndon B. Johnson
August 20, 1965
Subsequently, on September 24, 1965 Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 -
Equal Employment Opportunity requiring nondiscrimination by federal contractors,
unless otherwise exempted by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with said Order. The
Order further established the policy of Affirmative Action or positive steps to remove
discrimination against individuals because of their race, color, creed, or national origin
(Johnson, 1965).
89
With this Executive Order Johnson proposed “a moral and policy
response to the losses, both material and psychological, suffered by African Americans
during and after the time of slavery” (Chace 2011, 1). Then, on June 13, 1967 the
President nominated Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Supreme Court, making him the first
African American and civil rights advocate,
90
to serve in that capacity (Pohlmann 2008).
Nevertheless, violent civil disobedience continued in American urban centers. In
response, Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on
July 28, 1967 under the direction of Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois. He authorized the
Commission to investigate reasons for the urban violence, and to recommend steps to
89. “Sex” was added to this list in 1967 with Johnson’s Executive Order 11375.
90. Justice Marshall served as Director-Counsel of the NAACP-Legal Defense
Fund from 1940 to 1961. He was a civil rights advocate who successfully argued cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944),
which gained African Americans the right to vote in a Democratic primary election, a
Texas law was found in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accessed June 2, 2012.
http://www.naacpldf.org/
95
effectively remedy the situation. Also known as the Kerner Commission, studies of racial
disorders to American cities showed that 164 civil disorders occurred during the first nine
months of 1967, of which there were about 130 separate race riots during the ‘long hot’
summer of 1967, alone (Kerner Report 1967). The Kerner Commission Report indicated
that racial disorders to American cities reflected the profound frustrations and bitterness
of living in the ghetto.
91
In its basic conclusion the Report further indicated that:
Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate
and unequal. Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the
movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation
have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future
of every American. This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The
movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal
task is to define that choice and to press for a national resolution. To
pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the
American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic
values. The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to
lawlessness. It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a
single society. This alternative will require a commitment to national
action--compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of
the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every
American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all,
new will. The vital needs of the nation must be met; hard choices must be
made, and, if necessary, new taxes enacted. Violence cannot build a better
society. Disruption and disorder nourish repression, not justice. They
strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community cannot--it will not--
-tolerate coercion and mob rule. Violence and destruction must be ended--
in the streets of the ghetto and in the lives of people. Segregation and
poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally
unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans have never
fully understood but what the Negro can never forget--is that white society
is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
91. In The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders the
term ghetto” refers to “an area within a city characterized by poverty and acute social
disorganization, and inhabited by members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of
involuntary segregation (New York: Bantam Books, 1968). Accessed May 16, 2012.
PrimaryDocuments.http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/documents_us/Kerner%20Repo
rt.htm
96
It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major
unfinished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action
that will produce quick and visible progress. It is time to make good the
promises of American democracy to all citizens-urban and rural, white and
black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every minority group…
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
The Kerner Report (1967)
Moreover, the Report found that economic, political, social, as well as psychological
factors had devastating affects on black livelihood; the United States government had to
remedy the state of African Americans for the sake of all Americans. To a certain
degree, the federal government had begun to address the repressive state of African
Americans, and of other minorities that were similarly situated with passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Affirmative Action Policy, and Johnson’s Great Society “War on Poverty”
programs, many of which resulted from the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public
Law 88-452).
92
Even though some attention was given to problems ailing the American society,
Michael Harrington (1962) focused primarily on the impact of poverty on about 25
percent of the United States population in The Other America: Poverty in the United
States.
93
Racial discrimination was quite prevalent, but poverty did not discriminate on
92. Programs included: VISTA, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps,
Head Start, Community Health Centers, Legal Services, Upward Bound and others.
Hyman Bookbinder, Did the War on Poverty Fail? The New York Times, August 20,
1989. Accessed June 4, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/20/opinion/did-the-war-
on-poverty-fail.html?src=pm
93 . Reference is to Michael Harrington’s publication about the seemingly
invisible poor in America. (Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the
United States (New York: Touchstone; Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1962; 1997, 63). Dr..
Martin Luther King, Jr. also gave a speech about the plight of African Americans
97
the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, religion or creed. Nonetheless, poverty
had a distinctive hold on African American livelihood, particularly those in the inner
cities. According to Michael Harrington “Negro poverty is unique in every way. It
grows out of a long American history, and it expresses itself in subculture that is built up
on an interlocking base of economic and racial injustice. It is in fact imposed from
without, from white America.” This link between race and class in the 1960s, according
to Davarian Baldwin (2011), “could not be severed, especially during a Vietnam War that
sent largely poor people of color to its bloody front lines.”
94
In the midst of heightened domestic chaos in American urban centers, Johnson
made another effort to extend the 1964 CRA by signing the 1968 Civil Rights Act (82
Stat. 73) into law on April 11, 1968. Of particular note was Title VII, or the Fair Housing
Act, which banned discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race,
color, creed, or national origin; prohibited advertisement of preference in the sale or
rental of a dwelling; and promoted the enjoyment of fair housing rights. However, no
federal enforcement provisions were given. So, to strengthen Title VII, the 1968 Fair
Housing Act, (82 Stat. 81) was enacted by Congress to prohibit discrimination based on
“race, color, religion, or national origin in the sale or rental of most housing” (Fisher
entitled, The Other America. The event, sponsored by the Grosse Pointe Human
Relations Council, was held at Grosse Pointe High School in Grosse Pointe Farm,
Michigan on March 14, 1968. Accessed June 2, 2012.
http://www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/index.htm.
94 . Davarian L. Baldwin, Africana Age: African & African Diasporan
Transformations in the 20
th
Century (A project of the Schomberg-Mellon Humanities
Summer Institute) (New York: Schomberg Center for Research in Black Culture, The
New York Public Library, The Civil Rights Movement, 2011), 8. Accessed June 2, 2012.
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-civil-rights.html
98
2001) under the authority of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for
enforcement and compliance responsibilities. Unfortunately, Dr. King’s assassination
preceded passage of the Fair Housing Act, and urban unrest continued. Still, litigation
ensued as civil rights advocates proceeded to push for enforcement of the 1968 Fair
Housing Act;
95
as well as the integration of public accommodations provided in the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which were upheld in the Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Nevertheless, massive political, economic, and social discontent resulting from
escalating the war in Vietnam while reportedly de-escalating; racially related civil
disorder and racial tensions; anti-war, students’, women’s, and civil rights protests;
migrant workers’ demonstrations; and, broad-based multi-racial political coalitions of
disgruntled and activist groups (and gangs)
96
spelled the end. After his first elected term
as president, Johnson would not seek the Democratic Party nomination for the 1968
presidential campaign. Despite such turmoil during his administration, Lyndon Johnson
was the first president since the American Civil War to alleviate problems based on race,
class, and gender. His “Great Society” administrative agenda demonstrated a
commitment to address both questions and issues of particular importance to African
Americans. Johnson’s principal aim was to transform American society by integrating
racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and other citizens traditionally confined to the
95. Rights of minorities cannot be delegated to voters for approval, Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); “Private social clubs” may not prohibit white owners
from leasing homes to African Americans, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229
(1969); Segregation in public housing projects prohibited, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284 (1976).
96. Reference is to the original “Rainbow Coalition.” Amy Sonnie and James
Tracy, Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels and Black Power: Community
Organizing in Radical Times (Melville House Publishing, 2011).
99
periphery of U.S. society. His efforts resulted in increased expenditures of federal
monies to improve housing, healthcare, early childcare education, libraries, hospitals,
sanitation, transportation services, recreational facilities, and the general welfare of all
such citizens. Subsequently, the issue of black civil rights subsided and black insurgency
declined (McAdams 1982). Neither party’s platform offered a civil rights plank in 1968,
even though they each mentioned continued efforts to promote equality and to prohibit
discrimination. Many conservative Republicans and white southern Democrats who
opposed major civil rights legislation had grown weary of Johnson’s ‘governmental
schemes’ to promote equality of outcome, rather than equality of opportunity.
This helped the Republican Party regain control of the presidency with Richard
M. Nixon’s 1968 victory over vice President Hubert Humphrey (and Governor George
Wallace of Alabama), and his 1972 victory over Senator George McGovern of South
Dakota. Like his Republican predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nixon’s domestic
policy agenda, New Federalism, sent mixed signals regarding black civil rights. His was
a balancing act in which he furthered equal opportunities for African Americans, in
accordance with Johnson’s vision, in his “Philadelphia Plan.” He also requested the U.S.
Supreme Court to delay school desegregation, even though he ultimately did more to
desegregate public schools in the South than any predecessor since the 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education ruling. Furthermore, he seemed bent on appeasing the South while
placating African Americans. Nonetheless, Nixon’s domestic programs came at a time
when racially related civil disorders in American urban centers were on the decline.
Nixon’s efforts to alleviate discriminatory practices came in the form of his move
to advance black enterprise through Executive Order 11458 – Prescribing Arrangements
100
for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority Business Enterprise
(March 5, 1969). The Order called for use of the Small Business Development Center
model to establish Minority Business Development Centers (Nixon 1969). In addition,
on October 13, 1971, Nixon issued Executive Order 11625 – Prescribing Additional
Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority
Business Enterprise. He required the Secretary of Commerce, and federal departments
and agencies, to provide the opportunity for socially and economically disadvantaged
persons to own and operate a business enterprise. Furthermore, Nixon’s order of
participation in the Minority Business Enterprise federal contracting program was
intended for, but not limited to, “Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking Americans,
American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts” (Nixon 1971).
Moreover, after completing a comprehensive assessment of employment and
union membership rates of nonwhite workforces within certain cities during Nixon’s
administration, the Department of Labor found evidence of blatant discrimination within
the industrial and craft unions. This review paved the way for the controversial
Philadelphia Plan [Order]. First applied to workers in the City of Philadelphia, the Plan
was extended to other cities in which similar discriminatory practices were obvious.
According to Paul Marcus (1970) the purpose of the Plan was to extend Johnson’s 1965
Executive Order 11246 which prohibited employment discrimination. The Philadelphia
Order also included a policy of affirmative action and required compliance
responsibilities in adherence to goals and timetables reported on all personnel actions:
recruitment, selections, promotions, demotions, discipline, reductions, terminations,
training and development for each covered class—race, color, creed, sex, national origin.
101
Concurrently, on August 8, 1969, Nixon signed Executive Order 11478 – Equal
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, to prohibit workplace
discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, national origin, handicap, or age. The
Order further promoted equal employment opportunity through a “continuing affirmative
action program in each executive department and agency.” This affirmative action policy
was applied to, and required to be, “an integral part of every aspect of personnel policy
and practice in the employment, development, advancement, and treatment of civilian
employees of the Federal Government” (Nixon 1969). Henceforth, affirmative action
meant civil rights (Hoff 2009). Yet, African Americans continued their support for the
Democrats.
When race emerged to the forefront of American politics during the 1960s its
effects produced enduring changes in the partisan alignment of identifications (Carmines
and Stimson 1989). The most noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among population
groups within the electorate were whites, Southerners, self designated conservatives, and
both younger and older cohorts (Norpoth 1987; Petrocik 1987; Black and Black 1989;
Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989). Social status group factors, especially differences in
educational background, were also prominent forces in explaining increased Republican
Party preferences among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s (Miller
1992). On the other hand, despite bipartisan support required for passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Nixon’s affirmative action plan, since the mid-1960s African
Americans identified overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party (Stanley and Niemi
1991).
102
4.3 FROM CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS TO CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATORS
Primarily because of favorable governmental action (McAdams 1982), African
Americans became increasingly attached to the Democratic Party. Civil rights legislation
opened access to electoral office, which African Americans realized predominately
through their association with the Democrats. With the elections of Chicago
representatives Oscar De Priest (1929-1935), a Republican, and his successors,
Democrats Arthur Mitchell (1935-1943) and William Dawson (1943-1970), African
Americans returned to Congress. They did not see themselves as civil rights leaders; they
saw themselves as legislators (Singh 1998: 51). Members of the House of
Representatives included: Charles Diggs of Detroit (1955-1980), John Conyers, Jr., of
Detroit (1965-Present), Louis Stokes of Cleveland (1969-1999), William L. Clay, Sr., of
St. Louis (1969-2001), Shirley Chisholm of Brooklyn, the first African American woman
elected to Congress (1969-1983), George W. Collins of Chicago (1970-1972) who, after
his untimely death, was succeeded by his wife Cardiss Collins (1973-1997), the first
African American widow to succeed her husband in Congress, and Yvonne Brathwaite
Burke of California (1973-1979), the first woman to apply for, and receive maternity
leave while serving in Congress. Edward W. Brooke, III was elected to the U.S. Senate
in 1966 (1967-1979). His election ended an eighty-five year absence of African
American Senators.
97
With the exception of Representative Oscar De Priest of Illinois
and Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, these newly elected Members of Congress
were all Democrats.
97. The two previous black Senators, Hiram Revels and Blanche K. Bruce (both
of Mississippi), were elected by state legislatures. John H. Fenton, “Brooke, A Negro,
Wins Senate Seat,” New York Times, November 9, 1966: 1. Accessed May 11, 2012.
http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles
103
This new generation of legislators demonstrated their intent to participate fully in
the business of Congress. In 1971 thirteen Members of the House of Representatives,
shown in Table 4.1 below, founded the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). “The central
function of caucuses is to bring together legislators with shared interests, backgrounds,
and policy goals” (Singh 1998: 58). According to Robert Singh formation of the CBC, as
well as other caucuses in Congress, served to provide internal cohesion while employing
a strategy of “strength in numbers” to advance their legislative agenda. The CBC
confined to African Americans has been under attack for not opening its membership.
The issue of maintaining this race-based congressional caucus emerged when white
Fortney (Pete) Stark, representing a substantial African American district, asked to join
the CBC in 1975. Then Chair Charles Rangel rendered the decision as follows, “The
caucus symbolizes black political development in this country. We feel that maintaining
this symbolism is critical at this juncture in our development” (Houston 1975: B18).
Still, the question of having racial caucuses continued. Some Republicans viewed the
Democratic African American and Hispanic caucuses as promoting racial divisions, and
therefore inconsistent with promoting policies to achieve a “colorblind” society.
98
98. Most recently Representative Tom Tancredo[R, CO] challenged the existence
of the Democratic CBC and Congressional Hispanic Caucus, even though the
Republicans have similar counterparts.
104
Table 4.1 Founding Members of the Congressional Black Caucus
MEMBER POSITION STATE TERM
Shirley A. Chisholm Representative New York 1969-1983
William Lacy (Bill) Clay, Sr. Representative Missouri 1969-2001
George Washington Collins Representative Illinois 1970-1972
John Conyers, Jr. Representative Michigan 1965-Present
Ronald V. Dellums Representative California 1971-1998
Charles Coles Diggs, Jr. Representative Michigan 1955-1980
Walter Edward Fauntroy Delegate District of
Columbia
1971-1991
Augustus Freeman (Gus) Hawkins Representative California 1963-1991
Ralph Harold Metcalfe Representative Illinois 1971-1978
Parren James Mitchell Representative Maryland 1971-1987
Robert Nelson Cornelius Nix, Sr. Representative Pennsylvania 1958-1979
Charles B. Rangel Representative New York 1971-Present
Louis Stokes Representative Ohio 1969-1999
Source: Black Americans in Congress, Member Profiles. Retrieved 7 June 2012.
[http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=34]
4.2 POST-1970: TRANSITION FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS
Protests that reached a feverish pitch in the mid- to late-1960s began to subside in
the early 1970s (McAdams 1982) as African American legislators took up the cause for
justice and equality in Congress while civil rights advocates, especially the NAACP-
105
Legal Defense Fund, continued to focus their challenges within the courts. Likewise,
African American political participation became noticeable as they began serving in an
official capacity within Democratic Party conventions, and within national, state, and
local party organizations. They obtained appointments to various political positions; and,
they campaigned for elected offices at every level of government. These were
opportunities and political clout available to them only since their association with the
Democratic Party. In 1970 there were 1,469 African American elected officials. These
consisted of 10 Federal; 169 State; 92 County; 623 Municipal; 213 Judicial/Law
Enforcement; and, 362 Education elected officeholders. The number of African
Americans elected to public office increased steadily; in 1975 there were 3,503 black
elected officials (Fisher, 2001, 1094).
By 1976 the Republican Party platform called for “vigorous enforcement of laws
to assure equal treatment in job recruitment, hiring, promotion, pay, credit, mortgage
access and housing.” This, they asserted, could be accomplished without the use of
quotas. Instead, the Republicans offered to “provide alternative means of assisting the
victims of past discrimination to realize their full worth as American citizens. Wiping out
past discrimination requires continued emphasis on providing educational opportunities
for minority citizens, increasing direct and guaranteed loans to minority business
enterprises, and affording qualified minority persons equal opportunities for government
positions at all levels.”
99
This aided the continued shift to the right among conservatives
and white southerners who increasingly identified with the Republican Party, and rejected
concentrated efforts to enforce equality based on the use of governmental schemes, such
99. Excerpt taken from the “1976 Republican Party Platform,” in Woolley and
Peters, 1999-2011. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
106
as affirmative action, preferential treatment, and quotas; however, what the Republicans
failed to recall was that Richard Nixon ordered these set-asides.
Even though the Democratic Party platform was devoid of a civil rights plank,
Governor Jimmy Carter of Alabama won the 1976 presidential election with more than
90 percent support from African American voters. Carter initiated some gestures to
retain this African American base. He appointed Patricia Harris as Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, and Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
Carter also appointed African Americans to a number of ambassadorships, and to
undersecretary and assistant secretary positions within the federal bureaucracy (Franklin
& Moss, 1988). Unlike Eisenhower, Carter maintained an open door policy with respect
to the African American community, and leaders. On August 8, 1980 President Carter
issued Executive Order 12232 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs).
He ordered steps for increased participation of HBCUs in the federally sponsored
programs (Carter 1980). Yet, despite such efforts, African-American perceptions held
that the President had not done enough to address issues of particular interest to them.
They called for the Carter administration to provide more attention to, and appropriations
for, day-to-day concerns like housing, relief and assistance for the poor, the employed
and unemployed, and for the disparate impact of federal policies on persons of color.
One major concern within the community was the economic state of African
Americans. For instance, they were less likely to narrow the extensive income gap
between themselves and White Americans. In his “Economic Perspectives” column on
“Income in the Black Community,” a report for Black Enterprise, Andrew Brimmer
(1978) cited a number of indicators explaining the black-white income gap based on 1976
107
– 1978 income data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The first indicator showed that
“blacks’ actual income was about 61.2 percent of the level that would have been recorded
if they shared fully and proportionately in the nation’s economy” (62). Furthermore,
there was a disproportionate median income level between blacks and whites. “The
median income of the 7.8 million black households was $7,902, and for whites it was
$13,289…the median income of black households was 59.9 percent of that for units
headed by whites” (62). Brimmer attributed this income gap to restrictions placed on
African Americans that denied them access (education, occupation, training) and, hence,
the ability to acquire marketable skills.
Moreover, African Americans perceived their economic disadvantages as
vestiges of past discrimination and deprivation. Inequities in the distribution of wealth
based on household economy further provoked unequal black-white employment patterns
and unemployment rates during the Carter administration. Likewise, the U.S. economy
was sluggish in the 1970s, and this allowed for perceptions of historical hardships as a
primary contributing factor explaining the lack of progress in narrowing black-white
income gaps (Brimmer 1978). According to Franklin and Moss (1988), “so many black
families within the decade of the 1970s were unemployed and on welfare that it was quite
likely that the nation would spawn an entire generation of blacks who had simply never
worked to support themselves. The implications of such a possibility were almost too
frightening to contemplate.”
100
Still, the number of middle class and affluent African Americans increased
noticeably giving way to what William J. Wilson (1980) viewed as a widening economic
gap within the African American community. Years of discrimination and oppression
100. Franklin and Moss 1988, 468.
108
had produced a large underclass that could neither keep up with, nor compete in, an
increasingly technologically advanced society. Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) also
noted that the civil rights period produced a larger middle class, but found that a much
larger under-class also emerged. In addition, this period paved the way for speculations
about how the income gap among middle- and under-class African Americans would
affect racial group solidarity, and about how the significance of race would decline
perhaps as class became more important in shaping black life prospects. This was the
condition of Black America as delegates gathered for the national Republican and
Democratic conventions of 1980. The Republican Platform response held:
Our fundamental answer to the economic problems of black Americans is
the same answer we make to all Americans—full employment without
inflation through economic growth. First and foremost, we are committed
to a policy of economic expansion through tax-rate reductions, spending
restraint, regulatory reform, and other incentives…During the next four
years we are committed to policies that will: Encourage local governments
to designate specific enterprise zones within depressed areas that will
promote new jobs, new and expanded businesses, and new economic
vitality; Open new opportunities for black men and women to begin small
businesses of their own by, among other steps, removing excessive
regulations, disincentives for venture capital, and other barriers erected by
the government; Bring strong, effective enforcement of federal civil rights
statutes, especially those dealing with threats to physical safety and
security which have recently been increasing…
101
The Republican Party Platform of 1980
July 15, 1980
Similarly, the 1980 Democratic Party platform pledged to ensure justice and equality
under the law for all citizens; and advanced an extensive civil rights plank in which they
vowed to address the “economic inequities facing minorities.” The Party further
expressed support for a national holiday to commemorate the birthday of slain civil rights
101. Excerpt from “The 1980 Republican Party Platform,” in Woolley and Peters
1999-2011. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
109
leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK).
102
Even so, Jimmy Carter lost his reelection
bid for the presidency; this was primarily a consequence of the national economy.
Nonetheless, he still garnered over 90 percent support from African American voters
(Franklin and Moss, 1988). His Republican opponent, Governor Ronald Reagan of
California, won the 1980 election and was soundly reelected in his 1984 campaign
against Carter’s former vice president Democrat Walter Mondale.
4.3 POST-CIVIL RIGHTS, 1981 – 2008
Ronald Reagan, a pronounced conservative, opposed major civil rights legislation,
especially the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act because he saw
these enactments as an encroachment on states’ rights, a doctrine he fully supported.
103
Reagan also opposed the MLK national holiday, even though he signed the legislation
once presented to him by the U.S. Congress. Moreover, Reagan supported tax exemption
status for Bob Jones University in South Carolina, and other private schools openly
practicing racial segregation. He revoked Carter’s Executive Order 12232 that called for
increased participation of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in
federally sponsored programs. With his Executive Order 12320 – Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (September 15, 1981), Reagan instead ordered the Secretary of
Education to develop federal plans to assist HBCUs. The Order also required the
102. Taken from “The 1980 Democratic Party Platform,” Ibid.
103. Governor Reagan’s campaign began with a speech delivered at the Neshoba
County Fair. Prior to Reagan’s appearance, the Mississippi County was most noted for
the 1964 lynching of three civil rights workers: James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and
Michael Schwerner. Reagan used this platform to make his declaration, “I believe in
states’ rights.” This was a code appealing to many southern white voters (Bob Herbert.
“Righting Reagan’s Wrongs?” The New York Times, 13 November 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/opinion/13herbert.html.)
110
Secretary to encourage private sector institutions to strengthen and improve HBCUs
management, financial structure and research, rather than the federal bureaucracy
(Reagan, 1981). Additionally, apart from his appointment of Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. to a
Cabinet post, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Reagan primarily
held to naming African Americans to traditional federal appointments. For instance,
HUD had become a standard “black” position since Robert C. Weaver was first chosen
by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, and Patricia R. Harris was later selected by
President Jimmy Carter in 1977 (Franklin & Moss, 1988). Intent on pressing his agenda,
African American Reagan appointees were held to a minimum perhaps because Reagan
was determined to fill his ‘New Federalism’ administration with persons that espoused
his brand of conservative philosophy.
Reagan’s presidential platform agenda demonstrated that he was just so out of
touch with the African American citizenry. During his first term, Reagan established an
administration whose policies were perceived to threaten the legal and socio-economic
gains made by African Americans during the civil rights era (Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson
1989). In Michael Dawson’s (1994) perception “having consistently bypassed and
denounced the recognized leadership of the black community, [Reagan] was viewed as
extraordinarily hostile to black aspirations” (117). Julian Bond, former chair of the
NAACP, also noted that Ronald Reagan “was a polarizing figure in black America. He
was hostile to the generally accepted remedies for discrimination. His appointments were
of people as equally hostile. I can't think of any Reagan policy that African Americans
would embrace" (Pianin and Edsall 2004, A01). Still, at the time of his presidency
Reaganonmics was expected to improve the economic class situations of all Americans
111
without regard to race. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12432 – Minority
Business Enterprise Development on July 14 1983 that called for federal agencies to
develop plans requiring contractors and grantees to employ minority business enterprises
(Reagan 1983).
Using data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1986) Franklin and
Moss (1988) gave an account of black economic situations in 1985, during the era of
Reaganomics. They reported that unemployment rates among blacks fell short of those
among whites 16.2 percent to 6.2 percent. Even more startling was unemployment
among black youths, ages 16 to 19, which increased to an all-time high of 50 percent.
African Americans also trailed White Americans “in every meaningful classification,
whether by age, education, sex, or occupation” (1988: 477). Hence, reports of economic
improvements resulting in an emerging and increasing entrepreneurial and middle-class
group were only diminished by the correspondingly significant growth of the under-class
among African Americans (Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson 1989; Pinkney 1986; Wilson,
1980).
It is, therefore, no small wonder then that Democratic attachment among African
Americans had increased in intensity by Reagan’s 1984 election. He made clear in his
Republican—conservative—position that African Americans were not welcome. The late
1980s produced even stronger identifications with the Democratic Party. Using 1988
data collected by the Center for Political Studies, Beck and Sorauf (1992) confirmed the
distinctive political partisan preferences of the African-American electorate. They were
more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (64 percent), than their white
counterparts (31 percent). Moreover, the strength of African American Democratic Party
112
identifications was 40 percent greater than identifications among White Americans at
only 14 percent. Beck and Sorauf (1992) attributed the direction and strength of African
American partisan attachments to the importance of race. They argued that race
continued to be the primary factor explaining political preference attitudes among
African Americans regardless of the presence of any other sociological variables
generally associated with the formation of party identifications.
Concurrently, in his Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America
(1999), Paul Frymer held that:
Race, nonetheless, remains an overriding issue for African Americans in
ways not comparable to most other Americans’ ethnicity or occupational
group. Racial discrimination and residential segregation continue to
plague African Americans regardless of social and economic class,
severely affecting the quality of education and social services available to
the black community (1999: 147).
104
Frymer’s explanation of “electoral capture,” occurred whenever a group remained with
the political party because there was no other choice. The relationship between the
African-American racial group and the two main U.S. political parties was seen as one of
tenancy or possession. Their capture resulted from the African American racial group’s
lack of resources necessary to make themselves a viable force within the competitive
two-party system. First captured by the Republican Party of Lincoln, the race group
eventually became a static component of the Democratic Party. Frymer argued that while
chief African American racial group concerns were removed from the national party
agenda, such issues remained of critical importance. In this regard the Democratic Party
failed to engage substantive policy initiatives to bring African Americans in parity, and to
104. Frymer, Paul Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).
113
safeguard their civil rights and liberties. Since they had no feasible alternative, they
therefore remained Democratic Party captives. Often viewed as the most loyal
constituents, mass black political choices favoring Democrats also suggests their
application of procedural rationality, which was greatly influenced by the significance of
race and its impact on the personal lives and economic well being of African Americans
particularly, and of the racial group when considering other population groups’ status in
the United States.
The significance of race was also quite noticeable in the 1988 presidential
campaign that set Reagan’s vice president George H.W. Bush against former
Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis. Neither party platform included a plank
pledging civil rights protections for African, or other, Americans. In his address
accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention (August 18,
1988), George Bush stated, “I want a kinder and gentler nation” (Woolley and Peters,
1999 - 2011). Interestingly, during his run for election Bush employed Republican
political strategist Lee Atwater as his campaign manager. Known for his uncouth tactics,
Atwater devised a plan to discredit Dukakis as a soft on crime liberal as opposed to Bush,
a tough on crime conservative. At the forefront of this attack was Dukakis’ support for a
prison furlough program that went horribly wrong when Willie Horton, a black man
imprisoned for murder, raped a white woman and stabbed her white male companion
while on his weekend leave (Tucker 2008). In an attack ad Horton was demonized; his
mug shot was altered to portray him as very dark and foreboding (McAndrews 2001).
Horton’s published image was perceived as an assault against African-American men,
and validation of White Americans’ fears of the big, black ‘Boogie Man.’ While Bush
114
and Atwater denied any association with this political attack against Dukakis; they were
nonetheless viewed as the main culprits. Bush, unable to cast off the Willie Horton
debacle, would not gain confidence among African Americans.
In the 1988 general election nearly 90 percent of African Americans voted for
Dukakis (Roper Center, 1988); however, Bush won the election. Perceptions of the Bush
administration among African Americans remained cautious. For instance, Bush issued
Executive Order 12677 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (April 28, 1989)
that established an Advisory Commission within the Department of Education whose aim
was to increase participation of HBCUs in federally sponsored programs (Bush 1989). In
addition, the President appointed Morehouse College President Dr. Louis Sullivan to the
cabinet post of Secretary of Health and Human Services. Contrarily, Bush designated
David Souter for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. Souter was an opponent of
affirmative action policy, which continued to be an important issue within the African
American community (McAndrews 2001). Likewise, Bush selected African American
conservative Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court.
He then refused to recall Thomas’ nomination despite allegations of sexual harassment.
Moreover, Bush vetoed the 1990 Civil Rights Act calling it a quota bill, and then signed a
similar legislation, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, thereby allowing the use of de facto racial
quotas if derived from "business necessity." Yet, he refused a recommendation to outlaw
race-based scholarships. While Bush seemed to have sent mixed signals, in the
perceptions of African Americans he just got it wrong in word and in deed (McAndrews
2001).
115
In spite of a faltering economy, increasing tension and unrest in major cities, high
unemployment, and a rising deficit, President George H.W. Bush ran for reelection in
1992 against former Governor William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton of Arkansas. The
Republicans held firm to their conservative philosophy of minimal action to redress racial
discrimination while applauding the President.
Asserting equal rights for all, we support the Bush Administration's
vigorous enforcement of statutes to prevent illegal discrimination on
account of sex, race, creed, or national origin. Promoting opportunity, we
reject efforts to replace equal rights with quotas or other preferential
treatment.
Republican Party Platform of 1992
August 17, 1992
The 1992 Democratic Party platform rebuffed President Bush with the following:
We don't have an American to waste. Democrats will continue to lead the
fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of
rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age,
disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to ability.
We support … affirmative action; stronger protection of voting rights for
racial and ethnic minorities, including language access to voting; and
continued resistance to discriminatory English-only pressure groups. We
will reverse the Bush Administration's assault on civil rights enforcement,
and instead work to rebuild and vigorously use machinery for civil rights
enforcement…
Democrat Party Platform of 1992
July 13, 1992
Bill Clinton won the 1992 election and went on to win the 1996 campaign against
Senator Robert “Bob” Dole [R, Kansas]. One of Clinton’s core ideas was opportunity
and responsibility, or his plan to force welfare recipients to work. Opportunity and
responsibility, as described by Clinton, was the "idea that government should both help
those willing to help themselves and enforce common standards of behavior… We will
116
do with you. We will not do for you.”
105
This platform doctrine appealed to both
centrists and conservatives alike because it promised workfare instead of welfare.
Similarly, Dole promised to advance a conservative philosophy if he won the presidency,
and the Republican platform agreed with his position: "When I am president, only
conservative judges need apply," Dole stated.
106
During the 1996 election conservative
philosophy regarding civil rights was also clearly expressed in Republican platform
doctrine. “We scorn Bill Clinton's notion that any person should be denied a job,
promotion, contract or a chance at higher education because of their race or gender.
Instead, we endorse the Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act to end discrimination by the
federal government. We likewise endorse this year's Proposition 209, the California
Civil Rights Initiative, to restore to law the original meaning of civil rights” (Woolley
and Peters 1999-2011).
The Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 (H.R. 2128/S. 1085) was
introduced as a bill to eliminate race- and gender-based preferences in federal
employment; admissions practices by institutions of higher education; and, the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures practiced by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The term ‘preferences’ was a reference to goals, quotas,
timetables, set-asides, and other such practices in accordance with affirmative action
policy. Instead, Dole countered that his 1995 legislation proposed to enforce equal
105. Quoted by Bill Clinton in Philip A. Klinkner, Bill Clinton and the New
Liberalism, Adolph Reed Jr. ed. Without Justice for All (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1999), 15.
106. Bob Dole made this statement in Aurora, Colorado (May 28, 1996). It is
referenced in the Republican Party Platform of August 12, 1996. (See: Woolley and
Peters, 1999-2011).
117
treatment under the law in accordance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Similarly, the
1996 California Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209, amended the state
constitution to prohibit discrimination and ban preferential treatment based on race, color,
ethnicity, gender or national origin in state and local government employment, education,
and contracts (Lehrer and Hicks, 2010). While congressional Republican leadership
backed away from the Dole-Canady Act (1995), the state of California passed its Civil
Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 in 1996. The intent of each of these legislations was to
eliminate affirmative action programs and practices, which were viewed as
discrimination in the reverse by many Republican conservatives. Contrarily, because
affirmative action was still important to many African Americans neither Dole nor the
Republican Party was perceived favorably.
On the other hand, most African Americans held a highly favorable perception of
the Democratic Party, particularly Bill Clinton. By 1996 electoral support reached an all-
time high of 96 percent (Newport, et al., 2009). It seemed as though he could do no
wrong, even when confronted with scandals, investigations, and impeachment. This is
partly due to his congeniality; he neither avoided African American leaders nor the
community. Additionally, he incorporated greater diversity within his administration
(Shull, 1999). In 1993 Bill Clinton attended the Convocation of the Church of God in
Christ (COGIC) in Memphis, Tennessee.
107
The President’s address stated as follows:
107. During his remarks President Clinton noted that he had also attended the
Convocation of the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) when they met in Arkansas the
previous year (1992). Further, he acknowledged some of the COGIC bishops in
attendance by name along with his bishops: Bishop Walker and Bishop Lindsey. Clinton
further stated, “Now, if you haven't had Bishop Lindsey's barbecue, you haven't had
barbecue. And if you haven't heard Bishop Walker attack one of my opponents, you have
never heard a political speech. [Laughter]” (Miller Center’s Bill Clinton Speech
118
I have worked hard to keep faith with our common efforts: to restore the
economy, to reverse the politics of helping only those at the top of our
totem pole and not the hard-working middle class or the poor; to bring our
people together across racial and regional and political lines, to make a
strength out of our diversity instead of letting it tear us apart; to reward
work and family and community and try to move us forward into the 21st
century. Thirteen percent of all my Presidential appointments are African-
Americans, and there are five African-Americans in the Cabinet of the
United States, 2 1/2 times as many as have ever served in the history of
this great land.
108
Bill Clinton
November 13. 1993
Those appointees included Hazel O'Leary as Secretary of Energy, Democratic national
chairman Ronald H. Brown as Secretary of Commerce;
109
former Mississippi
congressman Mike Espy as Secretary of Agriculture; Jesse Brown, a disabled Marine
veteran, as Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Arkansas health director Dr. Joycelyn Elders as
U.S. Surgeon General, and Clifton Wharton, Jr., chairman of TIAA-CREF, as Deputy
Secretary of State.
Clinton targeted issues central to African American interests—crime, violence,
and drugs. Most importantly, Clinton did not racialize such issues like his predecessor
George H.W. Bush and the right wing of the Republican Party. Furthermore, Clinton
issued Executive Order 12876—Historically Black Colleges and Universities on
November 1, 1993 “to advance the development of human potential, to strengthen the
capacity of HBCUs to provide quality education, and to increase opportunity to
Collection, November 13, 1993—Remarks to the Convocation of the Church of God in
Christ in Memphis, Tennessee). http://millercenter.org/president/clinton.
108. Presidential Speeches retrieved from the Miller Center’s Bill Clinton Speech
Collection, November 13, 1993—Remarks to the Convocation of the Church of God in
Christ in Memphis, Tennessee; available from http://millercenter.org/president/clinton.
109. Ronald H. Brown was the first African American leader of a major political
party when named Chair of the Democratic National Committee in 1988 (Ebony 1993).
119
participate in and benefit from Federal programs.” The Order also established the
President’s Board of Advisors within the Department of Education (Clinton 1993). He
followed with Executive Order 12892—Leadership and Coordination of Fair Housing in
Federal Programs: Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (January 17, 1994), to apply to
all programs and activities under the authority of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Clinton 1994).
In addition, President Clinton seemed to identify with, and understand, the
African American plight. A son of the South, he spoke in a manner that was familiar and
used expressions to which they could relate. For instance, in his remarks before those
assembled at the COGIC convocation referenced above, Clinton invoked the name of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. to assess how the community had performed since his death.
If Martin Luther King… were to reappear by my side today and give us a
report card on the last 25 years, what would he say? You did a good job,
he would say, voting and electing people who formerly were not electable
because of the color of their skin. You have more political power, and that
is good. You did a good job, he would say, letting people who have the
ability to do so live wherever they want to live, go wherever they want to
go in this great country. You did a good job, he would say, elevating
people of color into the ranks of the United States Armed Forces to the
very top or into the very top of our Government. You did a very good job,
he would say. He would say, you did a good job creating a black middle
class of people who really are doing well, and the middle class is growing
more among African-Americans than among non-African-Americans. You
did a good job; you did a good job in opening opportunity.
But he would say, I did not live and die to see the American family
destroyed. I did not live and die to see 13-year-old boys get automatic
weapons and gun down 9-year-olds just for the kick of it. I did not live and
die to see young people destroy their own lives with drugs and then build
fortunes destroying the lives of others. That is not what I came here to do.
I fought for freedom, he would say, but not for the freedom of people to
kill each other with reckless abandon, not for the freedom of children to
have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and
abandon them as if they don't amount to anything. I fought for people to
120
have the right to work but not to have whole communities and people
abandoned. This is not what I lived and died for.
My fellow Americans, he would say, I fought to stop white people from
being so filled with hate that they would wreak violence on black people. I
did not fight for the right of black people to murder other black people
with reckless abandon.
President Bill Clinton
By the end of his first term, Clinton’s cabinet and court appointments consisted of
about 20 percent African-American men and women. He promoted diversity through
presidential appointments (Shull 1999). By the same token, when considering both
terms, Clinton’s civil rights record was scant. He distanced himself from the issue, and
when the right wing countered his appointment of Lani Guinier as head of the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, he withdrew his nomination. Similarly,
Clinton retreated from his pro-affirmative action position with, “mend it, but don’t end
it,” in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling Adarand Constructors v. Pena 515. U.S.
200 (1995), which ended federal affirmative action programs.
110
Moreover, Clinton’s
commitment to move from welfare to workfare was a policy consistent with George W.
Bush’s compassionate conservatism. Clinton’s welfare reform had a more adverse affect
on African Americans than any other minority grouping because a greater number within
the race group had economic situations that placed them below the poverty line or among
the working poor.
110. In 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515
U.S. 200 that all affirmative action programs must meet a "strict scrutiny” standard, even
those approved by the U.S. Congress. This case was a challenge to the Department of
Transportation’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program established to assist
minority contractors in getting contracts for federally funded highway projects.
121
Despite withdrawals from issues central to African American race group interests,
President Clinton moved to promote an open dialogue on race and reconciliation with
Executive Order 13050—President’s Advisory Board on Race (June 13, 1997) during his
second term. He selected renowned African American historian Dr. John Hope Franklin
as chair of a seven-member multi-ethnic board which consisted of: Linda Chavez-
Thompson, Suzan Johnson Cook, Governor Tom Kean, Angela Oh, Robert Thomas, and
Governor William Winter, with Christopher Edley, who served as senior adviser (Clinton
1997). According to Dr. Franklin this Race Initiative was the first time that a national
conversation on race was held in the United States. Furthermore, the intent was not just
dialogue; there was sincere hope that action would proceed to improve life situations, and
the general climate in American communities; to eliminate discrimination in various
areas, such as education, housing, and employment; and, to improve policies with regard
to U.S. race relations (Clinton 1997).
Typically, such conversations either dwelled solely on black-white relations to the
exclusion of other minorities and white ethnics, or they focused exclusively on the issue
of African American slavery.
111
The Board aimed to address race as discrimination and
disparities within all American communities, including immigrant communities (Clinton
1997). When during a July 14, 1997 press conference Dr. Franklin was told that
Congressman Newt Gingrich [R, Georgia] opposed issuing an official apology to African
Americans for slavery,
112
he responded thusly:
111. Unfortunately, according to John Goering (2001) the President’s Advisory
Board on Race did not include a representative for Native Americans.
112. President Bill Clinton announced his Initiative on Race in accordance with
Executive Order 13050 (July 13, 1997) at the Rimac Arena in San Diego, California on
July 14, 1997. Members of the President’s Advisory Board on Race were introduced and
122
I think that, whether we do it as a nation or whether we do it as individuals
or whether Mr. Gingrich will undertake this himself, we are all to
acknowledge that there is some serious contradiction between the policies
of this country with respect to race and the fundamental documents and
sacred statements with respect to our nation -- that is, the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution of the United States -- and they are not
consonant with the policies that have been pursued by this country with
respect to race.
Whether this will bring anyone out to issue a formal apology, I don't
know. But anyone who looks at the history of race in this country and
looks at the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence will know --
if they can read and write, they will know -- that there is a very serious
contradiction, and we have been derelict and responsible for a whole
history of miscreant activities, not unlike those which we condemned
England for committing in the 17th and 18th centuries.
The President’s Advisory Board on Race was to convene for a yearlong dialogue
scheduled to terminate on September 30 1998. This was such a massive undertaking and
the President’s principle goal of racial reconciliation seemed elusive. As specified in
Executive Order 13050 (1997) the official goals of the Race Initiative were to:
1. Promote a constructive national dialogue to confront and work through
challenging issues that surround race;
2. Increase the Nation’s understanding of our recent history of race
relations;
3. Bridge racial divides by encouraging leaders…to develop and
implement innovative approaches to calming racial tensions;
4. Identify, develop, and implement solutions to problems in areas in
which race has a substantial impact…
113
allowed to receive questions from the press. (Woolley and Peters, “William J. Clinton:
Press Briefing by Presidential Advisory Board on Race”
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48648#ixzz1gOPDRUnp
113. Goering, John “An Assessment of President Clinton’s Initiative on Race”
Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 no. 3 (May 3, 2001), 473.
123
Nevertheless, John Goering, in the first analysis of the goals of Clinton’s Race
Initiative, notes the Board made some accomplishments. Initiating open national
dialogues on race was a major feat, primarily because it “took the issue ‘out the closet’
where Republicans had intentionally stashed it decades earlier” (2001: 482). If nothing
else Clinton’s Initiative on Race further exposed economic racial disadvantages that
remained unresolved. The issue of race in America runs deep in hearts and minds;
government cannot mandate reconciliation for the sake of equality and justice. In spite of
Clinton’s poor record on civil rights issues, Goering notes that Bill Clinton’s Race
Initiative was a brave first try; however, American society has a long road to travel to
achieve racial reconciliation. By the end of the Clinton administration most African
Americans held persistent Democratic Party identifications and electoral support. This
was seen in the near universal backing for subsequent Democratic presidential nominees:
vice President Al Gore (95%) in 2000, Senator John Kerry [D, Massachusetts] (93%) in
2004, and Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois] (99%) in 2008 (Newport, et al. 2009).
The 2000 Democratic Party Platform repeated rhetoric promising to act in
response to discriminatory practices because of race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, or
sexual orientations. Democrats pledged again to enforce civil rights laws; fight for
inclusion; support fair administration of justice; oppose racial profiling; and, support
continuation of affirmative action to ensure opportunity. These planks were reiterated in
the 2004 presidential campaign with the inclusion of a promise of political equality in
which each vote cast would be counted.
114
Accordingly, the Republican Party Platform of
114. Political equality (one person, one vote) was a major issue in the 2000
election campaign between Democrat vice President Al Gore and Republican Governor
George W. Bush of Texas, particularly in the state of Florida. Candidate Bush claimed
that his brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, promised he would win the state. This was
124
2000 committed to uphold the rights of all citizens, and to oppose discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, creed, age, disability, or national origin, but African American
distrust for the Republican Party was firmly established as was their capture by the
Democratic Party.
In their 2004 National Convention the Republican Party applauded President
Bush for making education more affordable for students of Historically Black Colleges
and Universities, and of Hispanic Serving Institutions. They further claimed support for
“aggressive, proactive measures to ensure that no individual is discriminated against on
the basis of race, national origin, gender, or other characteristics covered by our civil
rights laws.”
115
While opposing affirmative action, which they equated to goals,
timetables, set-asides, and quotas, George W. Bush and the Republican Party promoted
instead “affirmative access.” This was defined as “taking steps to ensure that
disadvantaged individuals of all colors and ethnic backgrounds have the opportunity to
compete economically and that no child is left behind educationally.”
116
Republicans
knew they had to address the election 2000 debacle that occurred in the state of Florida.
Many within the African American electorate, as well as other minorities and some white
complicated by problems with the voting process, which included both citizens receiving
incorrect instructions regarding their voting precincts, and accusations of incorrect vote
counts due to problems with the official state ballot.
115. Quote is taken from the 2004 Republican Party Platform, August 30, 2004,
in Woolley and Peters, 1999-2011.
116. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107-10, 20 U.S.C. 6301),
signed by President George W. Bush on January 8, 2002 reauthorized the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ch.70) that was
signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson as part of his “War on Poverty.”
125
ethnics perceived that they were denied the right to vote. The 2004 Republican platform
supported election reform by the states to ensure voting rights.
117
During his presidency, Bush’s domestic agenda advanced a philosophy of
compassionate conservatism, which according to Myron Magnet (1999), aimed to bring
problems facing the poor to the forefront of national politics. This included: supporting
workfare;
118
active neighborhood policing to attack crime; educating urban under-class
students; implementing test standards in schools; engaging private organizations and
faith-based institutions for health care and social services. Even though the Bush policy
agenda supported issues of particular interest to African Americans as a group, and he
appointed African Americans to key executive department posts, he could not garner
significant increases in support for himself and the Republican Party. His appointees
included high profile individuals, like retired U.S. Army General Colin Powell as
Secretary of State, Alphonso Jackson as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
and Roderick Paige as Secretary of Education. In addition, Condoleezza Rice served as
Bush’s National Security Adviser before replacing Powell as Secretary of State during his
second term. On February 12, 2002 President G.W. Bush issued Executive Order
13256—White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities. The
117. The Help America Vote Act (Pub. L. 107-252, 42 U.S.C. 15301 et seq.),
signed into law on October 29, 2002 by President George W. Bush, required states to
implement election reform to improve the voting process for all citizens.
118. Workfare, an important factor in President Clinton’s welfare reform agenda,
resulted in passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) (PL 104-193), also known as the 1996 Welfare Reform
Act. The legislation was signed into law on August 22, 1996.
126
Order transferred the White House Initiative from the Office of Postsecondary Education
to the Office of the Secretary within the U.S. Department of Education (Bush 2002).
While neither political party offered a civil rights plank, per se, each party’s 2008
platform rhetoric promised voting rights protections, and to ban discrimination based on a
litany of traditionally covered classifications. The Republican Party endorsed equal
treatment for all, invoking its Lincoln legacy, but reiterated its conservative opposition to
affirmative action preferences, timetables, set-asides, and quotas. The Democratic Party
platform pledged full benefits of citizenship to residents within the District of Columbia,
which included some 600,000 African Americans. Additionally, the Party vowed to
address and resolve matters related to poverty, the housing crisis; and, to promote
historically Black, Hispanic, and other minority-serving institutions of higher education.
Election 2008 was historically significant because it ushered in a number of
“firsts.” This election represented the first time one of the two main political parties
nominated an African American for president. Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois]
defeated Senator John McCain [R, Arizona] to become the first U.S. president of mixed
race descent who identified himself as “black.” His message of hope and change
resonated in the hearts of many who, like African Americans, struggled to recover from
the recession and its disproportionate impact on people of color or just wanted to see a
change in the Washington, D.C. establishment. Moreover, African Americans were
hopeful that this chief executive, unlike any that previously held the office of president,
would not only address the issue of race in America, but would also initiate substantive
steps to settle the disparate economic, social, and political experiences of those within the
racial group.
127
Likewise, when the Democratic Party held commanding leads in the 2008 election
and captured a majority in both houses of Congress, it seemed reasonable that these most
loyal of Democratic supporters could expect genuine attention to race group concerns.
On the contrary, talk of racial reconciliation and restitution ceased. Since an African
American captured the U.S. presidency, there seemed no justification to continue such
dialogue because obtaining the highest political office was seen as demonstrated
improvements. People were weary of talking about race, again; they felt African
Americans should just get over it. Yet, in a real sense race became even more significant
because it became a measure of Barack Obama’s presidential performance. Media posts
caused racially offensive and stereotypical images of African Americans to resurface.
119
Like Clinton, Obama selected a record number of African Americans, as well as
other minorities, to various senior executive posts, and promoted diversity through his
appointment power. A majority of the President’s appointees were minorities and
women, many of whom were the first to serve, particularly those appointed to federal
courts. Accordingly, many of Obama’s African American appointees were the first to
assume their assigned executive positions. Nominees with Senate confirmation included
119
.
On 18 February 2009 the New York Post (nypost.com) published a cartoon
depicting the shooting of a pet chimpanzee in Connecticut after it viciously attacked a
friend of its owner. The image of the pet shot by police was accompanied with this
caption: “They’ll have to find someone else to write the next stimulus bill.” A picture of
President Barack Obama signing the bill appeared on the preceding page (pp. 11-12) of
the Post’s printed edition. In addition, tee shirts bearing Obama’s image as the children’s
book character, Curious George, were also seen at Republican rallies during the 2008
election campaign. While many may see these as merely exaggerated cartoon images
often presented by political cartoonists, such references of blacks synonymous to
monkeys or apes bring up historical implications that deny African Americans “their
basic humanity” (Lucy Madison, “GOP Official Apologizes For Sending Obama Chimp
Image, Refuses To Step Down” CBS News Political Hot Sheet, 19 April 2011).
128
Eric H. Holder, Jr. as U.S. Attorney General; Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; Susan P. Rice, United States Ambassador to the
United Nations; and, Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (whitehouse.gov). Also, following in the footsteps of each of
his presidential predecessors since Carter, President Obama issued his White House
Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities on February 26, 2010.
Executive Order 13532, Promoting Excellence, Innovation, and Sustainability at
Historically Black Colleges and Universities “in order to advance the development of the
Nation's full human potential and to advance equal opportunity in higher education,
strengthen the capacity of historically black colleges and universities to provide the
highest quality education, increase opportunities for these institutions to participate in and
benefit from Federal programs, and ensure that our Nation has the highest proportion of
college graduates in the world by the year 2020” (Obama 2010).
Nonetheless, when the housing bubble burst sending the economy into a tailspin
accompanied by rising unemployment and the lack of job creation, enthusiasm for
President Obama and the democratically controlled Congress soured within the African
American community. As maintained by Dillahunt, et al. (2010) the President provided
neither a job strategy nor wealth strategy to relieve the economic pains of Black America.
Obama also committed a major policy blunder, when he failed to heed the Congressional
Black Caucus, by not targeting economically-disadvantaged communities to receive
much needed job creation projects in accordance with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-5) also known as the Stimulus Bill. Furthermore,
the foreclosure crisis revealed that a disproportionate share of African Americans and
129
other people of color had been “systematically targeted by the financial industry for
predatory, subprime loans. In fact, over half of the mortgages to African Americans in
recent years were high-cost subprime loans” even though many may have qualified for
regular loans (Dillahunt, et al. 2010: 4). In addressing the foreclosure crisis President
Obama and Congress did not stand up to the Republicans or to the financial industry.
This resulted in either failure to enact substantive legislation, or passing legislation that
was weak and ineffective.
Obama continued to scramble to advance substantive policies for U.S. economic
recovery. However, after the mid-term congressional elections the Republican Party
gained control of the House of Representatives, while the Senate retained only a slight
majority for the Democratic Party. To make matters worse, the Tea Party also emerged
with electoral successes that made them a force to be reckoned within the Republican
Party. This further complicated any hope of bringing remedy to the most economically-
disadvantaged citizens as Republicans and Tea Party advocates alike focused their efforts
on tax cuts that would virtually eliminate many federally-funded benefits programs (Ali,
et al., 2011). Economic inequality continued, and income and employment gaps
remained. As President Obama and the Democratic Party focused their attentions
elsewhere, his hold on the African American community began to slip. Nonetheless,
even though things appeared bleak within their community, the African American
electorate would remain loyal supporters of the Democratic Party.
4.4 CONCLUSION
African-American attachments to the two main political parties remain tenuous at
best. The U.S. two-party system leaves them little-to-no leverage to make demands on
130
the Democratic Party, or on the Republican Party. They find themselves once again cast
in DuBois’ (1922) dilemma or Frymer’s (1999) state of “electoral capture.” African
Americans, well aware that the Republican Party neither wants nor needs them to win
elections, perceive that the Democratic Party also maintains a suitable distance from
racial group interests. This enables the Democrats to widen their appeal to other political
constituent groups. Once in power neither Democrats nor Republicans enforce civil
rights measures and protections or other policies of particular interest to African
Americans even if promised in their parties’ platforms. Hence, historical socio-economic
and political disparities persist, and the Democratic Party maintains its grip on the
African American electorate.
If one were to draw a conclusion from the historical relationship between African
Americans and the two main political parties, as examined in this chapter, it should be
that race is important. The presence of pro-active and effective African-American
leadership provides cues as to appropriate and inappropriate political choices. Civil rights
leaders communicated a cohesive message that produced uniformity in partisanship,
given their options in the U.S. two-party system. As the prolonged political protest
movement subsided it gave way to political participation. Newly elected African
American politicians were accorded substantive power within the Democratic Party
organization, and within executive, legislative, and judicial offices at every level of
government in the United States. Nonetheless, when issues of most importance to
African Americans no longer commanded center stage, and the parties became silent on
matters of most concern to the racial group, shared social, economic, and political
situations made them keenly aware that their interconnectedness was founded on the
131
basis of race, regardless of class, gender, or other factors typically associated with
partisanship. It was the predominant factor explaining their rationality in Democratic
partisanship, and in African American perceptions of interdependence of fate, and of an
interdependence of task. Race, alone, became a dependable measure with which to gauge
political situations, to unite disparate elements of the racial group, to mobilize as a voting
bloc, and to engage African American racial group solidarity.
In the subsequent chapter the methodological approach for obtaining and
analyzing the data in accordance with the theoretical framework constructed in the
second chapter is explained. The aim of the fifth chapter is to show the appropriateness
of the research design for investigating African American partisanship in accordance with
the Black Utility Heuristic and the concept of linked racial fate. Several hypotheses are
examined to test the relationship between race and partisanship in the African American
case.
132
CHAPTER 5
M
ETHODOLOGICAL
A
PPROACH
This dissertation revisits a long-standing controversy about the single most important
determinant of African American partisan predispositions. In so doing the present
research study utilizes a modification of the Black Utility Heuristic paradigm advanced in
the theory of African American racial group interests (Dawson 1994), which addresses
this question. The principle aim of this research study is to test the reliability of racial
group cues in framing perceptions about the efforts of the two main political parties to
address issues of most importance to African Americans. The study topic is identified in
the first chapter; relevant literature is explored and the conceptual model is formulated in
the second chapter; while a survey of essential background and historical details are
covered in chapters three and four. The current chapter focuses on research methods used
to conduct this study. Specifically, this chapter explains the methodological approach
employed to test the extent to which distinctive racial group solidarity and political
cohesion persist among African Americans in their political party identifications, and as
compared to other racial and ethnic populations.
In addition, this chapter includes the following: study procedures, sample
populations, instrumentations, specifications and definitions of the variables, reiteration
133
of the hypotheses, model specifications, and the statistical analytical approach.
Quantitative research using statistical methods, national survey studies, and individual-
level analysis are used to attain the study goals. Data gathered from national survey
research studies are then computed for interpretation of the effect of perceptions of linked
fate on contemporary political proclivities among African Americans.
Because race is modeled, in this study, as having a profound impact on African
Americans’ decisions regarding the two main political parties, it is important to explore
the extent to which partisan preference attitudes might differ from the African American
racial group political standard. Essential to this examination of party as a function of race
are individual perceptions identifying the political party that better serves African
American racial group interests, which may also apply to other minority racial and ethnic
group populations. Still, other social forces also impact decisions about partisanship. So,
another component of this investigation of African American political partisanship is the
integration of race, class, and gender, where race is modeled as the central organizing
factor. Nonetheless, it is the amalgamation of these factors in the historical case of
African Americans that explain how the concept of linked fate influences individual
attitude formation. The interconnectedness and interdependence of fate as well as task
interdependence among African Americans signify the properties, and determinants, of
racial group preference attitudes toward the major U.S. political parties.
5.1 DATA AND METHODS: STUDY PROCEDURES
In the present research study I utilize data collected for the 1996 National Black
Election Study series (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et
al. 2009). Most importantly, this dissertation is a modification of Michael C. Dawson’s
134
(1994) black utility heuristic model which was based on data collected for both the 1984
and 1988 National Black Election Study panel series (Jackson, Gurin, and Hatchett 1984;
Jackson 1988). I incorporate the 1996 National Black Election Study in this research
because it provides continuity in that it updates data for the National Black Election
Study panel series. The National Black Election Study (NBES), developed by the
Program for Research on Black Americans, began in 1984 by the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan (Jackson 1984; 1988). The 1996 NBES was
produced by Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio and distributed by the University
of Michigan Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Like the 1984 and 1988 studies in the series, the 1996 National Black Election
Study is a large-scale systematic survey that has the feasibility of in-depth investigations
of political attitudes, perceptions, and electoral behaviors within the African American
population. Additionally, the 1996 NBES data provides a large, representative national
sample of adult African Americans. Prior to collection of the National Black Election
Study series no other national surveys made possible such comprehensive examination of
African American politics (Tate 1997).
Moreover, this investigation employs the 2004 National Politics Study because of
significant advantages offered by its examination of “individual attitudes, beliefs,
aspirations and behavior at the beginning of the [twenty-first] century” from a
comparative perspective (Jackson, et al. 2009, ii). The Program for Research on Black
Americans in the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan, developed the National Politics Study (NPS). The Study was
conducted in conjunction with DataStat Inc., a survey research organization located in
135
Ann Arbor, Michigan (Jackson, et al. 2009). The NPS builds upon methodologies used
successfully by James S. Jackson in both the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election
Study panel series. In addition, the 2004 NPS was developed from work completed for
the National Survey of American Life (NSAL), 2001 – 2003, (Jackson, et al. 2007), and
for the National Latino and Asian American Survey (NLAAS), 2001 - 2003 (Alegria, et
al. 2007) in the Program for Research on Black Americans with the Center for Political
Studies at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. While providing a
large, representative national sample of adult African Americans, the 2004 National
Politics Study was perhaps the first nationally representative, explicitly comparative,
simultaneous study that surveyed the politics, participation, and preferences of both racial
and ethnic populations within the United States (Jackson, et al. 2009). Each of these
selected survey studies contain comparable questions that are consistent with questions
included by James S. Jackson in the National Black Election Study panel series for 1984
and 1988 (See: Appendix A).
5.2 SAMPLE POPULATIONS
Sample populations are drawn from national survey data collected for the 1996
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study
(Jackson, et al. 2009). Of 1,074 adult African American survey observations read in the
1996 NBES, a sample of 824 observations are used in the current study. In addition, of
3,087 American adult observations from racial and ethnic population groupings in the
2004 NPS, there are 706 African-Americans, 868 Non-Hispanic Whites, 676 Hispanics,
466 Asians, and 371 of Black Caribbean descent included in the subsequent analysis.
136
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION
Survey questions developed for both the 1996 National Black Election Study
(Tate 1997, Appendix B) and the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009,
Appendix C) were extracted for the present investigation. The 1996 NBES questionnaire
asks African American citizens to report partisanship; voting preferences; political
interests; evaluations of presidential, congressional candidates and groups; opinions of
various issues; values, and a myriad of other attitudes toward the social, economic, and
political order. Additionally, the 1996 NBES collected data relative to social
demography that includes gender, age, education, marital status, income, and occupation
(Tate, 1997). Likewise, the 2004 NPS survey contains questions that solicit responses
about voting preferences, partisanship, organizational membership, immigration, racial
group consciousness, and governmental policies (Jackson, et al., 2009).
The 1996 NBES consists of two components during the 1996 presidential election
cycle: a pre-election component, and a post-election component. The survey was
administered using a random-digit dialing telephone interview from which a stratified
random sample of all African American households in the United States with telephones
was drawn. The pre-election population contains 1,216 respondents. Eight hundred
fifty-four of those respondents also completed interviews during the post-election
component (Tate, 1997). Besides, 3,339 respondents completed computer-assisted
telephone interviews (CATI) for the 2004 NPS (Jackson, et al., 2009). Respondents to
questions from the 1996 NBES, pre-election surveys, and from the CATI queries
solicited for the 2004 NPS make up the sample population for this study. Data from
137
these national surveys are computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation
1989, 2011).
5.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE SPECIFICATIONS
African American political partisanship is modeled as a sequential decision
problem. The decision entails either identification with one of the two main political
parties or an identification of political independence. The following alternatives are
presented in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) based on the following survey question,
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?”
120
The decision problem is identifying individual partisan
preference attitudes given this polychotomous response. The goal is to capture one’s
party identification, the dependent variable under study in this investigation, or an
individual’s affective attitude of preference for a particular political party. Such
identification with a preferred political party further denotes a psychological attachment
or sense of belonging to that party exclusively, as opposed to official party membership
and/or ties to another political party. These attachments typically explain differences in
the decision calculus of individuals, and population groups, when choosing from an array
of alternatives within the political world (Campbell, et al. 1960). In this study partisan
identifications reflect either respondents’ self-report of preferences for one of the two
main political parties, or respondents’ preferences for political independence.
Given the problem presented by the dependent ‘response’ variable, the
individual’s task appears to require a decision between alternatives specified in the
120. Similarly, the question posed to survey respondents in the 2004 National
Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) asks: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of
yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or something else?”
above-
referenced survey question. Furthermore, this problem entails deciding b
two principle alternatives: a political party preference versus a no
independence preference, where decisions resulting in an indication of party preference
further leads to an indication of which party is preferred, the Republican P
Democratic Party, or perhaps another political party.
is preferred then the decision may yield an Independent identification.
stemming from this decision situation is illustrated in Figure 5.1 be
Figure 5.1
The Sequential Party Decision
Identification Survey Questions for 1996 and 2004
121.
For further information about the sequential decision in logistic regression
analysis refer to: Hans van Orphem and Arthur Schram “Sequential and Multinomial
Logit: A Nested Model”
Empirical Economics
122. Of cour
se this is a simplification of the partisan decision
purposes of illustration. Additionally, the sequential decision
continue in order to determine the degree of political independence, for instance, a ‘pure’
or Independent-
Independent versus an Independent Leaner. Independent
Independent-
Democrat are party leaners who according to Keith, et al. (1986) and
Campbell, et al. (1960,
esp
behavior.
P
I ?
138
referenced survey question. Furthermore, this problem entails deciding b
two principle alternatives: a political party preference versus a no
-
party political
independence preference, where decisions resulting in an indication of party preference
further leads to an indication of which party is preferred, the Republican P
Democratic Party, or perhaps another political party.
121
Nonetheless, if no political party
is preferred then the decision may yield an Independent identification.
122
stemming from this decision situation is illustrated in Figure 5.1 be
low.
The Sequential Party Decision
-Makin
g Process Based on the Party
Identification Survey Questions for 1996 and 2004
For further information about the sequential decision in logistic regression
analysis refer to: Hans van Orphem and Arthur Schram “Sequential and Multinomial
Empirical Economics
22 (1997): 131-152.
se this is a simplification of the partisan decision
-
making process for
purposes of illustration. Additionally, the sequential decision
-
making process may
continue in order to determine the degree of political independence, for instance, a ‘pure’
Independent versus an Independent Leaner. Independent
-
Republican and
Democrat are party leaners who according to Keith, et al. (1986) and
esp
. 143-
144) are more like weak partisans in their political
P ?
R lican
P ty
D cratic
P ty
N P ?
I ndent
referenced survey question. Furthermore, this problem entails deciding b
etween
party political
independence preference, where decisions resulting in an indication of party preference
further leads to an indication of which party is preferred, the Republican P
arty, the
Nonetheless, if no political party
The problem
g Process Based on the Party
For further information about the sequential decision in logistic regression
analysis refer to: Hans van Orphem and Arthur Schram “Sequential and Multinomial
making process for
making process may
continue in order to determine the degree of political independence, for instance, a ‘pure’
Republican and
Democrat are party leaners who according to Keith, et al. (1986) and
144) are more like weak partisans in their political
Repu
Pa
Demo
Pa
Indep
Contrarily, when the race-
of
likely sequential order is
as depicted in Figure 5.2 below.
Figure 5.2 The Sequential Party Decision
This sequential decision
‘bounded’ rationality (Simon 1947) as an explanation of the way Af
individually and collectively as members of the racial group, makes decisions about
political partisanship. Much of what we have learned about the race
points to the policy positions of the two major political parties r
importance to African Americans. Since there is a long
African Americans and the Democratic Party, it is reasonable to expect the Democratic
Party to be a first consideration when African Americans face su
In the analysis each party option
D ic
P
139
of
-respondent is African A
merican I surmise that the most
as depicted in Figure 5.2 below.
Figure 5.2 The Sequential Party Decision
-
Making Process for African Americans
This sequential decision
-
making order supports the utility of procedural or
‘bounded’ rationality (Simon 1947) as an explanation of the way Af
rican Americans,
individually and collectively as members of the racial group, makes decisions about
political partisanship. Much of what we have learned about the race
-
party relationship
points to the policy positions of the two major political parties r
egarding issues of most
importance to African Americans. Since there is a long
-
term relationship between
African Americans and the Democratic Party, it is reasonable to expect the Democratic
Party to be a first consideration when African Americans face su
ch decision situations.
In the analysis each party option
—Republican, Democrat, or Independent
—
Democra
• If "No"
then
what?
I • If "No"
then
what?
R
P
• If "No"
then
what?
merican I surmise that the most
Making Process for African Americans
making order supports the utility of procedural or
rican Americans,
individually and collectively as members of the racial group, makes decisions about
party relationship
egarding issues of most
term relationship between
African Americans and the Democratic Party, it is reasonable to expect the Democratic
ch decision situations.
—
is assigned a
140
value to estimate the probability of a decision to identify with a particular political party
versus a decision to identify with political independence.
123
5.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SPECIFICATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Variables that influence African Americans’ political partisanship, extracted from
the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 1997) and from the 2004 National Politics
Study (Jackson, et al. 2009), appear in Table 6.1 below.
124
In this study individual perceptions of racial group interests play “a more general
role in shaping African Americans’ political, economic, and social judgments” (Dawson
1994, 84). A major component of these individual perceptions deemed crucial to African
American racial group politics in this research study is Linked Fate, a measure of racial
group consciousness or perceptions that what happens to people’s racial group has a lot to
do with them, where responses are coded as follows: Strongly Agree=1.00, Somewhat
Agree=0.66, Somewhat Disagree=0.33, and Strongly Disagree=0.00. In addition, the
significance of social and economic demography in predicting African Americans’
political partisanship is examined. Race, economic class, and gender are modeled as
indicators of social and economic status. For purposes of investigation status represents,
in a social context, the location of a population group within the socio-economic
hierarchy based on economic class affiliations and/or status assignments beyond one’s
control like race and/or ethnicity, gender, and age. These status assignments typically
result from ascriptive characteristics where race, gender, and age often determine
economic class positions.
123. All models exclude any responses to the ‘or what’ and ‘or something else’
decision options of the 1996 and 2004 survey questions.
124. See also: Appendix A for survey question wording of variables used in this
study.
141
In what follows designations of status variables included in this investigation are
specified. Class is a measure of economic assets like earned household income calculated
in dollars. The 1996 NBES specifies income categories as: ≤ $10,000; $14,999; $19,999;
$24,999; $29,999; $39,999; $49,999; $74,999; $89,999; $104,999; or $105,000 and
more. Income data from the 2004 NPS is imputed with monetary values considered based
on respondents’ indications of annual family earnings. In addition, status variables
include: Race (Black) based on responses from adult African Americans to the 1996
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), or based on comparative responses from
population groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study and dummy coded as
African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, and Black Caribbean (Jackson,
et al. 2009). Respondent sex (Gender) is a dichotomous variable coded as Women=1 and
Men=0. Age represents a respondent’s actual age, measured in years.
Analogous to party identification ideology is viewed as a philosophical guide that
helps adult Americans’ reasoning and choices about objects in the political world
(Campbell, et al. 1960); it is one’s political outlook. So, included in the analysis is an
Ideology variable or summary political ideology scale that appraises the degree of
individual preferences for liberalism. The decision options are arranged as Liberal=1.00,
Moderate (Middle-of-the-Road)=0.50, and Conservative=0.00. Using the 1996 survey
data to determine the extent to which appraisal of the political parties’ efforts to work on
behalf of the African American racial group influences the direction of partisanship, a
measure of perceptions of how hard the Democratic Party works to represent African
American racial group interests is added, ‘Democrats work on issues Blacks care about’
(Dems Work) with corresponding responses: Very Hard=1.00, Fairly Hard=0.66, Not Too
142
Hard=0.33, or Not Hard At All=0.00. Likewise, a dummy measure for political climate
is added to examine presidential performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996
NBES) and Bush (2004 NPS) administrations, where Approve=1.0, and Disapprove=0.0
in 1996, and Strongly Approve=1.00, Somewhat Approve=0.66, Somewhat
Disapprove=0.33, and Strongly Disapprove=0.00 in 2004. Finally, a “sense of well-
being” assesses the nation’s Economy over the past year. The variable is coded as
follows: Gotten Better=1.0, Stayed the same=0.5, Gotten Worse=0.0. All of the variables
used in the analyses for this study appear in Table 6.1; survey questions are presented in
Appendix A.
Table 5.1 Determinants of African American Political Partisanship
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Party
Linked
Fate
Class
Race
Gender
Age
Ideology
Dems Work
Best to Help
Blacks
Political
Climate
Nation’s
Economy
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Sense
of Race
or
Ethnic
Group
Fate
Family
Income
in
Dollars
Blk.
White
Women
Men
Actual
Age in
Years
17-29
30-49
50-74
75+
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very Hard,
Fairly Hard,
Not too
Hard,
Not Hard at
All
Approval
Ratings:
Clinton
(1996),
Bush
(2004)
Gotten
Better,
Stayed the
Same,
Gotten
Worse
Outcome
Variable
Independent (Predictor) Variables
5.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The primary question guiding this research study is: Why do African Americans
think the way they do politically, and what induces them to change? The implication is
that individual African Americans’ attitudes toward the two main political parties are
143
related to racial group political orientations. In this study the relationship between
individual and group is predicated on the principle of linked, or the interdependence of,
fate and perceptions of similar life experiences and situations. African Americans’
interconnectedness based on the reality of their common fate is typically accompanied by
an interdependence of task or shared interests that yield racial group solidarity and
political cohesion. There is, therefore, an expectation that “African Americans with
stronger (black) linked fates are likely to support a political party whose policy
preferences are perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests.” This is the
analytical objective of the first hypothesis.
While the African American racial group is noted for distinctive political
party identifications, African American women are unique in their own right. Their
contemporary and historical experiences and life situations point to the impact of
race, class, and gender on their livelihood. It is therefore important to investigate
how the interaction of multiple identities, particularly race and gender, influence an
African American woman’s partisanship. Hence, hypothesis 2 suggests that, “African
American women are more likely to support the Democratic Party than African
American men or women of other ethnicities.”
Also important to this examination of African American partisanship are
perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, hence the third
hypothesis states that “African Americans are more likely to identify with the political
party that they perceive best helps their racial group.” Again, the significance of
perceptions of their interconnectedness suggests that the Democratic, not the Republican,
Party should be the most rational and efficient choice even in times of political obscurity.
144
The party best serving the interests of the racial group should also best fulfill individual
goals as well, thereby increasing political cohesion regarding party choice. At this point
another important question emerges: Is this merely a “black” phenomenon or does
Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic provide a viable (and similar) explanation for political
partisanship among other U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups? This is the focus of the
fourth hypothesis, i.e. similarities and/or differences between African Americans and the
comparative populations included in this study composed of Non-Hispanic Whites,
Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks. In the analysis the impact of linked fate is
examined by the fourth hypothesis thusly: “The more a person views that the fate of their
racial/ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the
political party perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests.”
5.7 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Certain socio-demographic attributes like race and class produce significant and
distinctive political effects; however, only race typically provides a relevant explanation
for partisanship within the African American community. Beginning with the 1936
presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and particularly since the 1944
presidential election of Harry S. Truman, most African Americans have indicated
preferences for, or identifications with, the Democratic Party. Figure 5.3 illustrates the
relationship between the dependent variable Party Identification, an attitude of preference
for a particular political party, and the independent variables included in the statistical
analytic technique that follows.
145
Gender
Party &
Presidential
Performance
Linked Fate Race/Ethnicity Party
Liberalism
Class
(Independent) (Dependent)
Variables Variable
Figure 5.3 Arrow Diagram: Determinants of African-American Partisanship: 1996, 2004
The main effects are estimated as race (being black), class (income), and gender
(being a woman). This determines the most important factor predicting African
American partisanship, where race because of the influence of perceptions of linked fate
is expected to yield greater significance in explaining African Americans’ relationship
146
with the Democratic Party. In addition, the integration of race, class, and gender in the
present research study suggests that other factors may compete meaningfully with race in
determining African American racial group politics. In the arrow diagram (Figure 5.3)
presented above seven factors figure directly in the explanation of African Americans’
distinctive preference attitudes toward the Democratic Party. The relationships are tested
in the subsequent analysis.
5.7.1 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE
Relevant research studies employ multivariate statistical methods to measure the
impact of group-based determinants on people’s political preferences as found in the
works of Miller, Wlezen and Hildreth (1999), and Koch (1994). Multivariate analysis
consists of appropriate techniques to examine data sets of more than one variable (Abdi,
2003). This includes general linear models (GLM) like multiple linear regression
analysis (MLR) using a least square approach as found in works like Bejarano (2005) and
Conover (1984). Whereas other researchers such as Luks and Elms (2005) and Manza
and Brooks (1999) construct models using special cases of GLM, logistic regression
analysis. In Dawson’s (1994, 125) research study of African American political
partisanship multiple regression analysis was employed, while a probit regression
technique estimated “individual level data with a binary dependent variable.”
In this study multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical method
employed. This regression technique is required for several reasons. First, a logistic
regression procedure is deemed necessary to identify which independent variable, from
among the combination of political, economic, and social factors specified herein, best
predicts party or no-party preferences within the African-American community, and
147
among the other racial and ethnic citizenry (Mertler and Vannatta, 2005). Further, the
logistic regression model as represented in this study is a special case whereby a single
outcome party identification comprises more than two categories; hence, it is a
polychotomous variable, and therefore violates the assumption of linearity required for
normal regression analysis (Kennedy 1998). Finally, even though commonly constructed
as a continuous multi-point summary scale, the party identification variable does not
clearly fit specifications for continuous classification, as provided in the 1996 National
Black election Study (Tate 1997) and in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al.
2009). Based on the survey question wording for each national study, respondents are
asked to decide their partisanship preferences from an array of alternatives that constitute
the party identification variable. Hence, multinomial logistic regression is appropriate to
handle the case of African Americans facing discrete alternatives on a scale, or among
categories, of preference attitudes; and, to rank the influences of racial group factors on
personal partisan preferences; such is the case in this investigation.
5.8 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Identifying two contrasting outcomes in the sequential decision-making process
solves the multinomial logistic regression problem. In the subsequent logistic regression
equations, log is the logit or log odds that the dependent (outcome) variable party
identification—PartyID, equals one while “a” is the constant or intercept. The β terms
are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for the X predictor
variables, where β
1
, β
2
, … β
k
represent the partial association between each predictor and
party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in this model, log
Pr | | is equal to the constant a
plus the β coefficient times the value of the X
predictors. Two logit models are computed in the analysis. One model contrasts a
148
decision to choose an Independent (no party) political identification with that of a
Democratic Party preference, the reference category; it is specified as:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a
+
β
1
X
1
++
+
β
2
X
2
+…
+
β
k
X
k
The second model contrasts a decision to identify with the Republican Party rather than
with the Democratic Party. Hence the form of that multinomial logistic regression
equation becomes:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a
+
β
1
X
1
++
+
β
2
X
2
+…
+
β
k
X
k
The logistic regression models test the effect of each of the independent “factors”
Race [African Americans (1996)] and/or ethnicity [African American, White Non-
Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, Black Caribbean (2004)], Gender [Women/Men], linked Fate
[“Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me” (1996) or “Extent of Respondent’s race fate
affecting Respondent” (2004)], political Ideology [Liberal/Moderate/Conservative],
assessments of the Democratic Party’s efforts to address African American interests
Dems Work [“Democrats work on issues Blacks care about” (1996)], presidential
performance evaluations for Clinton in 1996 [approve/disapprove] and Bush in 2004
[strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove],
appraisal of the nation’s Economy [gotten better/stayed the same/gotten worse] over the
past year. These variables predict political partisanship among African Americans in the
1996 NBES (Tate 1997), and when compared to other population groups, as specified
above, in the 2004 NPS (Jackson et al. 2004). A control for “covariates” representing the
actual age (Age) of respondents, and annual family income [Class] are also included in
the analyses.
149
Data collected for the 1996 NBES is utilized to construct models for testing the
first and third hypotheses, while the second and fourth hypotheses are tested using 2004
NPS data. Model specifications follow.
5.8.1 MODEL ONE: THE INFLUENCE OF LINKED FATE ON PARTISANSHIP
In Model 1 five predictors determine the outcome (party identification). They
measure perceptions of linked racial fate, class based on annual family income earnings,
gender (Women=1, Men=0), political ideology, and a respondent’s actual age. In the
analysis that follows this model is used to test the first hypothesis that African Americans
with stronger (black) linked fates are more likely to support the political party whose
policies are viewed as consistent with the policy interests of the racial group. An
important assumption is that the Democratic Party is the first preferable alternative.
Using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the logistic
equations that estimate these relationships assume the following form:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
150
5.8.2 MODEL TWO: THE IMPACT OF RACE ON PARTISAN ASSESSMENTS
This model explores the extent to which African Americans’ partisan
identifications reflect a view that Democrats best help the racial group. This is the goal of
the third hypothesis. Using data from the 1996 NBES for Model 2, the estimated
equation becomes:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
The two regression output models contrast the influence of the predictor variables:
income, a class measure; gender; political ideology; Clinton’s presidential performance;
assessments of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to
African Americans; and age. The results yield contrasts when an Independent
identification is preferred as opposed to an indication of preference for the Democratic
Party, or when one opts to identify with the Republican Party rather than with the
Democratic Party.
5.8.3 MODEL THREE: TEST OF GENDER DISTINCTIONS BY RACE
The third model estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the
2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009). This model includes a dummy
coding to create separate categories for African American women and men, where
BlackW=1 and BlackM=0. Also, a dummy coding is utilized to distinguish African
American women from all other racial/ethnic women under study (EthnicW=1,
BlackW=0). The output generated for this model renders the following equations when
151
estimating the proposition that African American women have greater feelings of affinity for
the Democratic Party than women of other ethnicities, and their male counterparts, which
is the aim of the second hypothesis in this research study.
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class + β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class+ β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
The independent variables in the overall model include: African American women
(BlackW), African American men (BlackM), all other racial/ethnic women specified as
EthnicW, annual family income (Class), the degree of liberalism (Ideology), and a sense
of well-being based on evaluations of whether the state of the national economy over the
past year has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse (Economy). A control for the
actual age of respondents (Age) is also included in the model. The preceding equations
are used to assess the predicted probability of a party decision outcome for each of the
two possible categories (Democrat/Independent) as specified above, as opposed to a
decision to identify with the Republican Party. The intercept a represents the probability
of personal political party identifications when variable gender assumes a value of “0” or
when the respondent is a man, and the gender variable assumes a value of “1” or the
probability that “being a woman” means being a Democrat. Likewise, among women
when the race of respondent is African American the variable assumes a value of “0”
whereas when a woman indicates membership in another racial/ethnic category the
variable, Race, assumes a value of “1” in the analysis.
152
5.8.4 MODEL FOUR: FACTORS THAT DETERMINE PARTISANSHIP
Model 4 also estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the
2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009). The model includes a measure of
linked fate perceptions [‘Extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting Respondent’]; and
adds a race dummy specified as White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean. A class
variable is also included in the model indicating annual family income. The outcome
variable, party identification (PartyID) represents a decision situation based on partisan
alternatives of Republican Party, Independent (no party), or Democratic Party personal
preferences. This fourth model examines factors that determine political independence or
partisanship (Democratic) when compared to a self-report of Republican Party
affiliations. Most importantly, the model explains the unique contribution of each
predictor variable in prefiguring the probability of personal partisan preferences among
population samples represented in the 2004 NPS dataset. Considering the effects of each
factor in this multinomial logistic regression model, the full equation predicting
partisanship is as follows:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
153
Assumptions for each model are tested in the subsequent analyses. If race
continues to be the most important determinant of African American political
partisanship the equation is expected to yield a negative relationship between Class and
PartyID. On the other hand, if the significance of race declines in determining African
American orientations toward the two main political parties, the equation should yield a
positive coefficient to denote the impact of economic class position on African American
preference attitudes toward the political parties. Using data collected for the 2004 NPS,
the impact of race (Black) and income (Class) is measured on party identifications of
Americans, focusing on black-white distinctions, to test the fourth hypothesis that there is
a “sense of interconnectedness” and interdependence of fate among individuals
comprising the racial/ethnic population groupings included in this study.
Multinomial logistic regression analyses and other appropriate statistical
techniques examine interaction effects and significance. Unless otherwise specified the
.05 level of significance is applicable throughout the study. Findings obtained from the
data analyses are reported in the subsequent chapter. The final chapter discusses
research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research. As much
as possible I will address each hypothesis in the order in which they appear in this
chapter.
154
CHAPTER 6
F
INDINGS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptive and inferential findings from
statistical analyses conducted to explain the relationships among variables employed to
predict African American political partisanship. Selected social attributes and
demography are taken from data obtained for the 1996 National Black Election Study
(Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009). The
statistical software system used to calculate descriptive and inferential statistics of the
variables under study is IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation 1989, 2011).
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
This investigation is guided by four hypotheses designed to elicit specific
information pertinent to the research study. The first hypothesis assesses the strength of
linked racial fate on African Americans’ partisan preferences given the influence of other
socio-economic and political forces. The second hypothesis looks at whether multiple
identities will predict distinctive partisan identifications among African American women
based on gender, or whether race, alone, determines their partisan preferences.
Hypothesis three explores the effect of individual perceptions of the two main political
parties and their performance when in government on African American racial group
partisan preference attitudes, while the fourth hypothesis suggests that this may not be a
155
purely Black phenomenon. Hence, a comparative population is included in the analysis.
6.1.1 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS
Data shows a distinctive pattern of Democratic Party identifications within the
African American population that is unrelentingly strong. On average, among African
Americans included in the 1996 National Black Election Study [NBES] (Tate 1997)
preference for the Democratic Party (68.7%) clearly precedes reports of self-identified
Republicans (3.9%) and Independents (19.7%). Moreover, no less than 69.8 percent of
African Americans indicated preference for the Democratic Party in the 2004 National
Politics Study [NPS] (Jackson, et al. 2009), while only 3.8 percent or about 27 out of 706
African Americans identified with the Republican Party, and 26.3 percent identified
themselves as political Independents, a marked increase from 1996.
Similar to African Americans, Black Caribbeans’ feelings of affinity with the
Democratic Party (65.8%) is obviously distinctive from self-reports of identifications
with the Republican Party (7.5%). Correspondingly, 26.7 percent of Black Caribbeans
claim political independence, a percentage virtually identical to that of African
Americans. On the other hand, political party identifications of other comparable
population groups included in the 2004 NPS present a clearly discernable contrast from
their African American counterparts. On the average there is greater variability in the
political partisan preferences of Non-Hispanic White respondents with 35.8 percent
Democratic Party identifications, 34.8 percent identification with the Republican Party,
and 29.4 percent self-reports of political independence. The distribution of political party
identifications among Asians yields similar variability; 37.3 percent favor the Democratic
Party, 23.6 percent prefer the Republican Party, and 39.1 percent identify themselves as
156
Independent. Likewise, Hispanics’ preference for the Democratic Party (43.6%) was
significantly higher than Republican Party preferences (20.4%), and closely followed by
Independent identifiers (35.9%). Table 6.1 and associated graphics (Figure 6.1) present
percentages of party identifications among samples from the 1996 NBES and 2004 NPS
survey respondents.
Table 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications by Race and Study
PERCENTAGES OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Study Race Democrat Independent Republican N
1996
NBES
Black
68.7
19.7
3.9
1121
Total:
1121
2004 NPS Black 69.8 26.3 3.8 706
White 35.8 29.4 34.8 868
Hispanic 43.6 35.9 20.4 676
Asian 37.3 39.1 23.6 466
Caribbean 65.8 26.7 7.5 371
Total:
3087
The analysis, to this point, presents the average political partisan identifications of
citizens by race per national study. As is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1 below,
regardless of the survey examined, the political preferences of African Americans are
consistently more Democratic and much less Republican than their racial/ethnic
counterparts with the exception of Black Caribbeans. When African American
preferences average about 69 percent for the Democratic Party, less than 4 percent for the
Republi
can Party, and 23 percent for Independent identifications (1996 and 2004).
Figure 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications, 1996 and 2004
Interestingly, distinctive preference attitudes toward the two main political parties
emerge between
African American women and men. While they demonstrate similar
reports regarding identifications with the Republican Party of 4.3 percent men and 4.2
percent women, their preferences for the Democratic Party and Independent
identifications reveal marked ge
greater preferences for the Democratic Party (78.0%) than their male counterparts
(68.2%). In sharp contrast 27.6 percent of African American men are Independent
identifiers while only 17.9 percent of women
examination of Independent identifiers suggests they are closer to the Democratic Party
157
consistently more Democratic and much less Republican than their racial/ethnic
counterparts with the exception of Black Caribbeans. When African American
preferences average about 69 percent for the Democratic Party, less than 4 percent for the
can Party, and 23 percent for Independent identifications (1996 and 2004).
Figure 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications, 1996 and 2004
Interestingly, distinctive preference attitudes toward the two main political parties
African American women and men. While they demonstrate similar
reports regarding identifications with the Republican Party of 4.3 percent men and 4.2
percent women, their preferences for the Democratic Party and Independent
identifications reveal marked ge
nder differences. African American women report
greater preferences for the Democratic Party (78.0%) than their male counterparts
(68.2%). In sharp contrast 27.6 percent of African American men are Independent
identifiers while only 17.9 percent of women
claim political independence. Further
examination of Independent identifiers suggests they are closer to the Democratic Party
consistently more Democratic and much less Republican than their racial/ethnic
counterparts with the exception of Black Caribbeans. When African American
preferences average about 69 percent for the Democratic Party, less than 4 percent for the
can Party, and 23 percent for Independent identifications (1996 and 2004).
Interestingly, distinctive preference attitudes toward the two main political parties
African American women and men. While they demonstrate similar
reports regarding identifications with the Republican Party of 4.3 percent men and 4.2
percent women, their preferences for the Democratic Party and Independent
nder differences. African American women report
greater preferences for the Democratic Party (78.0%) than their male counterparts
(68.2%). In sharp contrast 27.6 percent of African American men are Independent
claim political independence. Further
examination of Independent identifiers suggests they are closer to the Democratic Party
158
(60.6% men and 57.7% women) than to the Republican Party (14.1% and 14.3%,
respectively), thereby suggesting that they are actually “weak” Democratic partisans.
Still, 28.0 percent of women and 25.4 percent of men indicate that they are “pure”
Independents.
When compared to other population groupings African American women are like
other women in their preferences for the Democratic Party. Again, with the exception of
Black Caribbean respondents, their Democratic partisanship far exceeds that of African
American men. Slightly more than 75 percent of African American women on average
identify with the Democratic Party, as observed in the 2004 data, compared to roughly 60
percent of African American men. Contrarily, political independence among the men is
about 35 percent on average to only about 22 percent among the women, whereas only
5.4 percent men and 2.9 percent women prefer the Republicans. Likewise, nearly 71
percent of Black Caribbean women identify with the Democratic Party, while Democratic
partisans among Caribbean men follow distantly at about 57 percent on average.
No other racial/ethnic population group yields this degree of differences between
women and men with regard to identifications with the two main political parties.
Results of the data analyses from cross tabulations of party identifications by gender,
race, and survey samples are reported in Table 6.2, and associated graphics follow in
Figure 6.2 for women and Figure 6.3 for men. The analyses of partisanship present the
average party identifications by gender and race. A graphical summary of African
American partisanship and political independence for each study period is presented in
Figure 6.4 below. Clearly African American women are more Democratic, but less
Independent, than men.
Table 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications by Race and Gender, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS
Race
African American
Gender Women
Democrat 75.5
Republican 2.9
Independent 21.6
N:
449
TOTAL:
706
Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004
159
Table 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications by Race and Gender, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS
African American
Non-Hispanic
White
Hispanic Asian
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
59.9 41.0 29.0 49.3 36.3
41.6 34.4
5.4 33.1 37.0 17.3 24.4
23.7 23.6
34.6 25.9 34.0 33.3 39.3
42.0 34.7
257 495 373 381 295 190 276
868 676 466
Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004
PERCENTAGES OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS
Black Caribbean
Women Men
70.6 57.4
8.1 7.2
22.1 34.6
235 136
371
Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004
Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004
Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender
160
Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004
Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender
Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004
Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender
161
6.1.2 DISTRIBUTION OF LINKED FATE BY GENDER, RACE, AND PARTY
Distributions of linked racial fate reveal distinct gender differences in the way that
women and men perceive that what “happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me.” Of 1182
survey responses to the linked fate measure in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) 752 (63.3%)
are women and 430 (36.4%) are men. Results of cross tabulation analyses appear in
Table 6.3. On average, among African Americans that ‘strongly disagree’ with this
survey question 63.4 percent or 109 of 752 respondents are women, while about 37
percent or 63 of 430 respondents are men. On average women (63% or 313 of 752), and
men (37% or 186 of 430) ‘somewhat disagree’ with the statement regarding race fate
differ significantly. Moreover, among respondents reporting agreement with the
statement about 63 percent of women and only 37 percent of men ‘somewhat agree’
while 67.4 percent of women and about 32.6 percent of men strongly agree, on average.
In the table below (Table 6.3) category ‘somewhat disagree’ represents close to
50 percent of responses to this measure of linked racial fate with 499 or about 42 percent
of total responses. On the other hand, the ‘somewhat agree’ category represented 333 or
an average of only 28.2 percent of total responses to the linked fate measure (See: Figure
6.5 below). Nonetheless, while African American women and men appear to have
clearly different views about the degree to which linked racial fate is relevant in their
lives, within-gender groups show little to no variations across categories of the linked fate
measure.
Table 6
.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996
PERCENTAGES OF PERCEPTIONS OF LINKED FATE
Survey
Question
“Happens to
Blacks has a lot
to do with me”
Strongly
Disagree
Women
63.4
(109)
Men
36.6
(63)
TOTAL (N):
100.0
(172)
Figure 6.5 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender among Samples of Adult
African Americans, 1996
162
.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996
PERCENTAGES OF PERCEPTIONS OF LINKED FATE
Response Categories
Somewhat
Disagree
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly Agree
62.7
(313)
63.1
(210)
67.4
(120)
37.3
(186)
36.9
(123)
32.6
(58)
100.0
(499)
100.0
(333)
100.0
(178)
Figure 6.5 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender among Samples of Adult
African Americans, 1996
.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996
TOTAL
(N)
63.6
(752)
36.4
(430)
100.0
(1182)
163
Likewise, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) survey
respondents are asked to consider the “extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting
Respondent.” Cross tabulation analyses point to similarities in perceptions of linked fate
by gender with only a few significant differences when considering race of respondent.
Results are reported in Table 6.4. On average no less than 50.8 percent of women and
50.3 percent of men report ‘Not Very Much’ linked fate affecting them. On the contrary
only an average of about 12 percent of women and 14 percent of men perceive that race
fate affects them to ‘Some’ extent. Whereas both women (37%) and men (36.1%)
similarly indicate that the extent to which race fate affects them is ‘A Lot.’
Notable variations emerge in results of the impact of race fate on African
American women, where the analysis yields 17.4 percent (Not Very Much), 18.4 percent
(Some), with no less than 35.4 percent indicating ‘A Lot,’ as the extent to which race fate
affects them, on average (See: Table 6.4). Still, similarities persist when looking at
gender per racial/ethnic group population where only a couple of exceptions surface.
These similarities appear in average race fate affects (‘Some’ plus ‘A Lot’) among
women and men of African American (54% to 59%, respectively), Hispanic (36% to
34%, respectively), and Caribbean (21% to 29%, respectively) descent. Interestingly,
Non-Hispanic White men (57%) and women (44%) show marked differences in the
extent to which race fate affects them. Contrarily, about 45 percent of Asian women
indicate some/a lot of race fate affects; Asian men follow distantly at about 21 percent, on
average. Table 6.4 presents results of the cross tabulation analyses for linked fate by race
and gender, while Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 illustrate this relationship among women and
men by racial and ethnic groups.
164
Table 6.4 Percentages of Linked Fate Perceptions by Race and Gender, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF THE EXTENT OF LINKED FATE
Race African American Non-Hispanic
White
Hispanic Asian Black Caribbean
Gender Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Men
Not
Very
Much
17.4
25.2
30.2
31.1
17.6
16.9
26.7
13.7
8.1
13.0
Some 18.4 22.9 25.2 35.4 16.5 13.2 27.2 13.2 12.6 15.3
A Lot 35.4 36.0 19.1 21.3 19.4 21.0 18.2 7.9 8.0 13.9
N:
205
24.2%
304 28.8%
216
25.5%
297
28.1%
154
18.2%
189
17.9%
200
23.6%
122
11.6%
73
8.6%
144
13.6%
Total:
509
(26.7%)
513
(26.9%)
343
(18.0%)
322 (16.9%)
217
(11.4%)
Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race among Samples of Women, 2004
Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004
165
Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race among Samples of Women, 2004
Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004
Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race among Samples of Women, 2004
Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004
166
6.1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY RACE AND GENDER
Annual family income is analyzed based on earnings per household in thousands
of dollars. Results of descriptive statistics show profound differences within income
levels of African Americans and other representative population groups. Figure 6.8
illustrates within-group income differences among African American respondents to the
1996 NBES, where 66.5 percent of household incomes are below $50,000 per annum.
Only 24.9 percent of earned incomes are $75,000 and over among African American
households represented. On the contrary, no gender gaps emerge in observations across
categories of household income using the 1996 NBES data. Annual income for African
American women either equal or exceed the income levels of African American men as
demonstrated in Table 6.5 below.
Drawing from data collected for the 2004 NPS African Americans (30.8%),
Hispanics (40.8%), and Black Caribbeans (31.5%) dominate the lowest annual income
range of below $25,000, as can be seen below in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.9 that follows.
This is in sharp contrast to Asian (7.6%) and White (16.2%) reports of household income.
Asian households also report the highest income of all population groups represented,
where 48.6 percent have earnings of $75,000 and over. White family income follows
with 35.3 percent. Again, Black Caribbeans’ (22.8%) average household income is
similar to that of African Americans (22.6%), but Hispanics follow distantly with only an
average annual income of 18.1 percent at the $75,000 and over range. Results of these
descriptive statistics point to a distinct pattern in which the relative household income of
African Americans, Black Caribbeans, and Hispanics are clearly lower than that of White
Non-Hispanics and Asians. This denotes their relatively low position within the social
status hierarchy. Tests and results with associated
follow.
Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996
2.2
11.4 10.8
9.4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Up to $10,000
$24,999
$49,999
$104,999
167
status hierarchy. Tests and results with associated
graphics and
tabular presentations
Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996
9.4
9.1
10.4
13.2
8.6
10.9
4
1.4
$14,999 $19,999
$29,999 $39,999
$74,999
$89,999
$105,000 AND MORE
tabular presentations
Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996
168
Table 6.5 Distribution of Household Income for African Americans by Gender
PERCENTAGES OF ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME, 1996
Family Income Men Women Total: Black
Up to $10,000 2.2 2.5 2.4
$14,999 12.9 12.3 12.5
$19,999 9.7 13.0 11.8
$24,999 10.4 10.1 10.2
$29,999 10.2 9.9 10.0
$39,999 15.4 13.9 14.5
$49,999 15.4 13.9 14.5
$74,999 8.4 10.0 9.4
$89,999 11.7 12.1 11.9
$104,999 4.2 4.5 4.4
$105,000+ 1.5 1.5 1.5
N 403 710 1113
Table 6.6 Percentages of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME
RACE <$25,000
Black
30.8
White Non-
Hispanic
16.2
Hispanic
40.8
Asian
7.6
Caribbean
31.5
TOTAL: 3339
Figure 6.9 Distribution of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
169
Table 6.6 Percentages of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME
$25,000-
$49,999 $50,000-
$74,999 $75,000
AND
MORE
24.0
22.6
22.6
23.5
25.0
35.3
24.6
16.6
18.1
16.9
26.9
48.6
21.6
24.1
22.8
Figure 6.9 Distribution of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
N
751
912
753
498
403
170
6.2 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS
At this point in the investigation multinomial logistic regression is used to
estimate the effect of race on decisions about the two main political parties, and to
explore changes in such effects based on class (income) or perhaps, gender, and other
sociopolitical factors included in this study using data collected for the 1996 National
Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et
al. 2009). The logistic regression models assume the following formulations.
125
Model 1:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
Model 2:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
Model 3:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class + β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class+ β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
125. Explanations for each regression model are given in Chapter 5.
171
Model 4:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
Results of the statistical analyses solve the multinomial logistic regression
problem presumed by the party sequential decision-making situations. In the logistic
regression models specified above, log is the logit or log odds that the dependent
(outcome) variable party identification—PartyID, equals one while a is the constant or
intercept. The β terms are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for
the X predictor variables, where β
1
, β
2
, … β
k
represent the partial association between
each predictor and party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in
each model, log Pr | | is equal to the constant a
plus the β coefficient times the
value of the X predictors. Two logit models are computed in the analysis. Model 1 and
Model 2 contrast decisions to choose Republican partisanship or political independence
with Democratic Party decisions, the reference category. They estimate possible changes
in African American partisanship. Model 3 and Model 4 contrast decisions to choose
Democratic partisanship or Independent (no party) political identification with that of
Republican partisanship, the reference category among comparison population groupings.
172
6.2.1 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL ONE
The analysis estimates the association between a polychotomous outcome and
five predictors using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate,
1997). Model 1 assesses the odds that “being Black” mean being a Democrat. The
logistic regression notation to express this model is:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Class + β
3
Gender + β
4
Ideology + β
5
Age
In Model 1 the outcome variable, PartyID (Republican, Independent, Democrat), is a
function of five predictor variables: (black) linked fate, family income (class), gender,
political ideology, and age. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical
technique used to determine the extent to which this model improves our ability to predict
accurately the influence of linked racial fate on African American political partisanship.
Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood are reported in Table 6.7
below.
The initial log likelihood value is 817.720 (intercept/constant-only model). The
final log likelihood value 758.110 is the computed measure with all of the independent
variables (predictors) entered into the logistic regression. The difference between these
two measures is the model Chi-Square statistic, where χ
2
= 59.611 = 817.720 – 758.110.
The model Chi-Square value of 59.611 has a significance level of 0.000, concluding that
there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable, party identification,
and the set of predictors.
173
The strength of the relationship is tested using the Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox
and Snell (R
2
= .070), and Nagelkerke (R
2
= .096). So, based on the interpretive criteria
for the Nagelkerke R
2
, I would characterize the relationship as weak.
126
Still, the
classification matrix in the multinomial logistic regression output, which is used to
evaluate the accuracy of this model, predicts accurately 75.7 percent of predicted and
observed cases of party identifications. In addition, likelihood ratio test results show that
the variables linked fate (.032), gender (.041), and political ideology (.000) are all
significant contributors explaining differences among African Americans in decisions
about political partisanship. The output showing the contribution of each variable
specified in the model to the reduction in error measured by the -2 log likelihood statistic
is presented in Table 6.8 below.
Table 6.7 Model 1: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood
Model Fitting Information
Model Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept Only 817.720
Final 758.110
59.611
16
.000
The number of observations used in the logistic regression analysis consisted of
824 adults of some African American background, of which 624 or 75.7 percent
126. With the Cox and Snell measure higher values indicate greater model fit. A
problem lies in the inability of this R-Square statistic to reach a maximum value of one
(1). Nagelkerke’s R-Square is a modification of the Cox and Snell measure that ranges
from zero (0) to one (1), making this a more reliable indicator of the strength of the
relationship.
174
preferred the Democratic Party, 28 or 3.4 percent indicated a preference for the
Republican Party, and 172 or 20.9 percent considered themselves politically Independent.
Output for the logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.9 shows that when all
covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an African American
reporting Republican partisanship in contrast to reports of Democratic partisanship are:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = –3.706 + 0.700Fate
.00
- 0.534Fate
.33
+ 0.110Fate
.66
– 0.058Class + 0.270Gender
.00
+ 1.617Ideology
.00
– 0.250Ideology
.50
+ 0.112Age
Table 6.8 Model 1: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Effect Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model
Chi-Square
127
df
Sig.
Intercept 758.110
128
.000
0 .
Family Income 759.487 1.378
2 .502
AGE 758.247 .137
2 .934
Linked Fate 771.893 13.784
6 .032
Gender 764.521 6.412
2 .041
Political Ideology 795.343 37.234
4 .000
127. The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the
final model and a reduced model. Omitting an effect from the final model forms the
reduced model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are zero.
128. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
175
Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Republican
Partisanship for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ2
df p
Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
Linked Fate=0.00
Linked Fate=0.33
Linked Fate=0.66
Linked Fate=1.00
Family Income
Gender= 0.00
Gender=1.00
Ideology=0.00
Ideology=0.50
Ideology=1.00
Age
-3.706
.700
-.534
-.100
0
b
-.058
.270
0
b
1.617
- .250
0
b
.112
.879
.647
.650
.626
.
.076
.403
.
.518
.680
.
.788
17.760
1.171
.674
.031
.
.583
.449
.
9.763
.136
.
.020
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
.000
.279
.412
.860
.
.445
.503
.
.002
.713
.
.887
2.013
.586
.116
.
.944
1.310
.
5.040
.778
.
1.118
Note: a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT. b. This parameter is set to zero
because it is redundant.
The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable
(PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p <
.05), show that only Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant effect on the
probability of Republican Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those
that identify with the Democratic Party (Table 6.9). Hence, a person’s decision to
identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological
orientations contrasts significantly from partisan preferences of persons reporting liberal
proclivities. After controlling for the other covariates in the model, the likelihood of
176
being a Democrat among persons reporting conservative ideology decreases by a factor
of 1.617 compared to liberals. In other words, looking at the odds ratio (Exp
β
), this
model predicts that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Republican is 5.040 times
higher for a conservative than for a liberal.
Table 6.10 Model 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Political
Independence for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df
p Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
Linked Fate=0.00
Linked Fate=0.33
Linked Fate=0.66
Linked Fate=1.00
Family Income
Gender=0.00
Gender=1.00
Ideology=0.00
Ideology=0.50
Ideology=1.00
Age
-.746
-.612
-.167
-.606
0
b
-.033
.452
0
b
-.245
-.938
0
b
.126
.364
.338
.250
.279
.
.034
.180
.
.206
.226
.
.354
4.203
3.270
.447
4.702
.
.920
6.295
.
1.408
17.216
.
.126
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
.040
.071
.504
.030
.
.337
.012
.
.235
.000
.
.723
.543
.846
.546
.
.968
1.571
.
.783
.391
.
1.134
Note: a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT. b. This parameter is set to zero
because it is redundant.
Contrarily, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Independent
(no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.10, assumes the following formulation:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = – 0.746 – 0.612Fate
.00
– 0.167Fate
.33
– 0.606Fate
.66
– 0.033Class + 0.452Gender
.00
– 0.245Ideology
.00
– 0.938Ideology
.50
+ 0.126Age
177
According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications
(Pr | | [.50]) is positively related to gender (Men) at p < .05. On
the other hand, the log odds of preference for political independence are negatively
related to linked fate, and to ideology (p < .05). These variables reveal a statistically
significant relationship that clearly distinguishes political independence from Democratic
partisanship among African Americans. Linked Fate=0.66, representing respondents who
‘Somewhat Agree’ that what ‘Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me’ yields a
significance value of 0.030; Gender=0.00 ‘Men’ is significant at 0.012; Ideology=0.05
‘Moderate’ results in a significance level of 0.000.
Moreover, political ideology yields the highest effect on independent
identifications. A person reporting ‘Moderate’ ideology is 0.938 times less likely to
decide to consider oneself as an Independent than to decide to identify oneself as a
Democrat, while controlling all other covariates in the model. Perceptions of linked
racial fate among persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens
to African Americans are 0.606 times less likely to decide on political independence than
to decide on Democratic partisanship, holding all other predictors constant. Whereas
after controlling for the other covariates in the model, a man is only 0.452 as likely to
decide to identify as an Independent as he is to decide to identify with the Democratic
Party. The Exp
β
or odds ratio, reveal that this model predicts the odds of deciding to
consider oneself as an Independent are only 0.391 times higher for moderates than
liberals, while for persons who somewhat agree that their individual fates are linked to
the racial group, as opposed to those that strongly agree, the predicted odds are 0.546
178
times higher. In addition, the odds of Independent identification are 1.571 times higher
for African American men than they are for African American women.
6.22 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL TWO
Using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the
second model tests the extent to which presidential approval ratings and assessments of
work of the parties in government influence African American political partisanship.
Several variables are added to the model previously tested. The logistic regression
notation utilized to express the second model is:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Class + β
2
Gender + β
3
Ideology + β
4
Clinton
+ β
5
Dems Work + β
6
Age
In the second model the outcome variable, PartyID, consists of three decision
alternatives: Republican (0.00), Independent (0.50), or Democrat (1.00). Party
identification is a function of six variables: family income (class), gender, political
ideology, approval of Clinton’s job as president, assessments of how hard the Democrats
work to address racial group issues (Dems Work), and age. Of 548 respondents included
in the analysis 415 (75.7%) are Democrats, 17 (3.1%) are Republican, and 116 (21.2%)
are Independent. Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood follows.
179
Table 6.11 Model 2: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood
Model Fitting Information
Model Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept Only 601.880
Final 520.437
81.443
18
.000
The intercept-only model yields a -2 log likelihood value of 601.880. Once the
computed measure with all of the predictors entered the logistic regression the final log
likelihood value is 520.437; the model Chi-Square statistic (χ
2
) is 81.443 with a
significance level of 0.000, a significant relationship between the dependent variable and
this set of predictors. The Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox and Snell (R
2
= 0.138), and
Nagelkerke (R
2
= 0.190) assess the strength of the relationship, which I would
characterize as weak. Nonetheless, the classification matrix in the multinomial logistic
regression output predicts accurately 77.7 percent of actual and predicted cases of party
identifications. Table 6.12 presents the logistic regression output of the contribution of
each variable specified in the model. Likelihood ratio tests show that variables political
ideology (0.000), Clinton job performance (0.000), and assessments of how hard (Dems
Work) to address racial group interests (0.003) are all significant contributors explaining
African Americans decisions about political partisanship. Further, The SPSS 20 output
shows that the reduced (intercept only) model result of 520.437 is equivalent to the final
model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
180
Table 6.12 Model 2: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Variable
Effect Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept 520.437
.000
0
.
Family Income 520.449
.012
2
.994
AGE 521.020
.583
2
.747
Gender 525.134
4.697
2
.096
Political Ideology 544.493
24.056
4
.000
Clinton Performance 545.919
25.482
2
.000
Dems Work 540.511
20.074
6
.003
The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable
(PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p <
.05), show that Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant decreasing effect on the
probability of Democratic Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those
that identify with the Republican Party (Table 6.13). Hence, a person’s decision to
identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological
orientations contrasts significantly from partisanship among persons reporting liberal
preferences. After controlling for the other covariates in the model the likelihood of
being a Democrat, among persons reporting conservative ideology, decreases by a factor
of 1.376 compared to liberals. Still, looking at the odds ratio (Exp
β
), this model predicts
that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Democrat are only 0.252 times higher
for a conservative than for a liberal.
In addition, decisions to support the Democratic Party are more likely among
persons approving Clinton’s job as president, whereas support of the Democrats
181
decreased by a factor of 2.359 among those disapproving Clinton’s presidential
performance, after taking into account all other covariates. In short, African Americans
disapproving of Clinton’s job were merely 0.095 times more likely to choose the
Democratic Party than those indicating favorable job ratings. Interestingly, assessments
of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to the African
American racial group show that both ‘fairly hard’ and ‘not too hard’ (centrist) views
yielded similar results of a 2.304 (fairly hard) and a 2.244 (not too hard) increase in
Democratic identifications, after accounting for all other variables in the model. When
looking at the odds ratio (Exp
β
) for each response, the probability of deciding to identify
with the Democratic Party is 10.009 times more likely for fairly hard judgments and
9.430 times more likely among persons with feelings that the Democrats do not work too
hard on behalf of African American racial group interests.
Output for the multinomial logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.13
shows that when all covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an
African American reporting Democratic partisanship in contrast to reporting Republican
partisanship is:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = 2.605 – 0.004Class – 0.257Gender
.00
– 1.376Ideology
.00
+ 0.763Ideology
.50
– 2.359Clinton
.00
+ 0.805Dems Work
.00
+ 2.244Dems Work
.33
+ 2.304Dems Work
.66
– 0.077Age
182
Table 6.13 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Republican
Partisanship for 548 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df
p Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
Family Income
Age
Gender= 0.00
Gender=1.00
Ideology=0.00
Ideology=0.50
Ideology=1.00
Clinton=0.00
Clinton=1.00
Dems Work=0.00
Dems Work=0.33
Dems Work=0.66
Dems Work=1.00
2.605
-.004
-.077
-.257
0
b
-1.376
-.763
0
b
-2.359
0
b
.805
2.244
2.304
0
b
1.114
.105
1.003
.538
.
.646
.911
.
.581
.
810
.894
.786
.
5.468
.001
.006
.228
.
4.537
.702
.
16.462
.
.988
6.293
8.598
.
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
.019
.971
.939
.633
.
.033
.402
.
.000
.
.320
.012
.003
.
.996
.926
.773
.
.252
2.144
.
.095
.
2.237
9.430
10.009
.
Note: a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero
because it is redundant.
On the contrary, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting
Independent (no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.13 above, assumes the
following formulation:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = 1.854 – 0.008Class + 0.231Gender
.00
– 1.656Ideology
.00
– 0.276Ideology
.50
– 0.920Clinton
.00
+ 0.502Dems Work
.00
+ 0.844Dems Work
.33
+ 1.609Dems Work
.66
+ 0.262Age
183
Table 6.14 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of
Independent Identifications for 548 Adult African Americans 1996
by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df
p Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
Family Income
Age
Gender= 0.00
Gender=1.00
Ideology=0.00
Ideology=0.50
Ideology=1.00
Clinton=0.00
Clinton=1.00
Dems Work=0.00
Dems Work=0.33
Dems Work=0.66
Dems Work=1.00
-.752
-.004
.339
.488
0
b
-.279
-1.039
0
b
1.439
0
b
-.303
-1.400
-.694
0
b
.541
.043
.446
.225
.
.262
.286
.
.351
.
.477
.513
.441
.
1.932
.010
.580
4.707
.
1.133
13.203
.
16.840
.
.404
7.453
2.481
.
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
.165
.920
.446
.030
.
.287
.000
.
.000
.
.738
.247
.115
.
.915
.586
1.048
.
.452
.202
.
2.120
.
.290
.090
.211
.
a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT. b. This parameter is set to zero because it
is redundant.
According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications
(Pr | |) is positively related to Dems Work=0.66 (fairly hard) on
issues of most importance to African Americans at p < .05. The probability of
Democratic Party affiliations among persons whose assessments of Democrats working
‘Fairly Hard’ to help African Americans is 1.609 times more likely than among persons
whose assessments are that the Democrats work ‘Very Hard’ to address African
American issues, holding all other predictors constant. The Exp
β
or odds ratio, reveal that
184
this model predicts the odds of an assessment that Democrats work fairly hard deciding to
consider oneself as an Independent is 4.999 times higher than a view that the Democrats
work very hard on racial group issues. On the other hand, the log odds of preference for
political independence is negatively related to Ideology=0.00 with a significance value of
0.012 (p < .05). The probability that conservative political ideology yields decisions
favoring Independent identification is 1.656 times less likely than Republican
partisanship when holding constant all other covariates in the model. Based on results of
the odds ratio, the probability of political independence among conservatives is only
0.191 times more likely than among liberals.
6.2.3 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL THREE
Using data collected for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009),
Model 3 considers the extent to which African American women are distinctive in their
decisions about the two main political parties when compared to African American men
and women of other ethnicities. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is employed for
the purpose of examining respondents’ decisions about partisanship preferences. Party
identification, a polychotomous outcome variable (Democrat=1, Independent=0.5,
Republican=0), is the function of seven predictor variables: Black Women (African
American women=1, All others=0), Black Men (African American men=1, and 0
otherwise), Ethnic Women (females of Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Asian, and
Caribbean descent=1, African Americans and males of all ethnic groupings=0), political
Ideology (Liberal=1, Moderate=0.5, Conservative=0), Class (annual family income
earnings measured in dollars), the Nation’s Economy appraised over the previous year
(Better=1, About the Same=0.5, Worse=0), and respondent’s Age is measured in years.
185
The logistic regression model is predicting the natural log of the odds of making a
decision favoring the Democratic Party, not the Republican Party, or of making a
decision electing political independence rather than Republican partisanship. That is,
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class + β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
BlackW + β
2
BlackM + β
3
EthnicW + β
4
Ideology
+ β
5
Class+ β
6
Economy + β
7
Age
Where log Pr| | and log Pr| | represent the
predicted probability of a Democratic or an Independent decision, each coded as 1. The
statistical output reveals that of 2,553 survey respondents in the sample 1259 (49.3%) are
Democrat, 761 (29.8%) are Independent, and 533 (20.9%) are Republican. The model
that includes only the intercept yields a large -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 2348.477
(Table 6.15); the model that includes the set of predictors also produces a large -2 Log
Likelihood value of 1371.408, suggesting how poorly Model 3 predicts partisan
decisions. The model Chi-Square statistic is 977.069, with a 0.000 level of significance.
In addition, the model yields only a 59.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of
partisan identification decisions.
Table 6.15 Model 3: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood
Model Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept Only 2348.477
Final 1371.408
977.069
18
.000
186
With a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.318 and a Nagelkerke R-Square of 0.364 the
strength of the relationship between the variables is slightly moderate. All variables in
the logistic regression model are significant (p < .05) as demonstrated by the Likelihood
Ratio Tests displayed in Table 6.16 below.
129
The analysis produces a contrast between determinants of Democratic and
Republican partisans, where the resulting logistic regression equation is:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = 9.984 − 1.616BlackW − 2.615BlackM − 0.138EthnicW
– 0.303Class – 0.049Age − 2.531Ideology
.00
– 1.601Ideology
.50
+ 0.607Economy
.00
+ 1.872Economy
.50
Table 6.16 Model 3: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Effect Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept 1371.408
a
.000
0
.
BLACK WOMEN 1402.670
31.262
2
.000
BLACK MEN 1481.340
109.932
2
.000
ETHNIC WOMEN 1381.855
10.447
2
.005
INCOME (CLASS) 1408.063
36.655
2
.000
AGE 1411.262
39.854
2
.000
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1717.323
345.915
4
.000
NATIONAL ECONOMY 1537.657
166.249
4
.000
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does
not increase the degrees of freedom.
129. According to the SPSS output (IBM version 20) for the Likelihood Ratio
Tests “the chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final
model and a reduced model.” Omitting an effect from the final model forms the reduced
model. “The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.”
187
Table 6.17 below shows the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds
ratio for each of the predictor variables. As can be seen the Wald Chi-Square statistic
shows test results of the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis.
Using a .05 criterion of statistical significance, all predictor variables have significant
partial effects except the variables Ethnic Women and age. The odds ratio (Exp
β
) for
African American women indicates that the likelihood of a decision favoring Democratic
partisanship, rather than Republican partisanship, increases by 0.199, whereas the
increase is merely 0.073 for an African American man when holding all other predictors
constant. However, women of other ethnicities do not contribute significantly to
predictions of identification with the Democratic Party. Likewise, a person’s actual age
is of no consequence when predicting the odds of Democratic partisan identifications in
contrast to predicting the odds of Republican partisan identifications.
On the other hand, class, measured by annual family income, increases the odds
of choosing the Democratic Party rather than the Republican Party by 0.739, holding
constant all predictor variables in the analysis. Democratic preferences among
conservatives are only 0.080 times higher, while the odds of Democratic Party
preferences for moderate (middle-of-the-road) ideology increase to 0.202 times higher
than the odds of Republican Party preferences. The largest effect on decisions to identify
with the Democratic Party in Model 3 is attributed to evaluations of whether the Nation’s
economy is Better, About the Same, or Worse over the previous year. Among persons
specifying a ‘Worse’ as opposed to a ‘Better’ evaluation the odds of being a Democrat is
1.836 times higher than being a Republican. Whereas when holding constant all other
predictor variables in the analysis, an evaluation of ‘About the Same,’ when compared to
188
an evaluation of ‘Better,’ the odds of a decision to identify with the Democratic Party
increases to 6.500 times higher than the odds of a decision to identify with the
Republican Party.
Variables in the second equation yield logistic regression results when
respondents decide to indicate an Independent identification. Output is displayed below
in Table 6.18. Decisions to identify oneself as a political Independent rather than a
Republican partisan yield the following equation:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = 8.619 − 1.508BlackW − 1.769BlackM + 0.218EthnicW
− 0.320Class − 0.356Age – 1.937Ideology
.00
− 1.518Ideology
.50
+ 0.686Economy
.00
+ 1.303Economy
.50
This model is used to predict the odds that a respondent makes an Independent (no party)
identification decision. As can be seen in the above table, the variable Ethnic Women is
not significant at p < .05 in the model output. In the odds prediction equation, as specified
above, all predictors yield negative factors with the exception of assessments about the
state of the national economy, which yields positive significant factors; all are significant
at p < .05. The table displays the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio
for each of the predictor variables in the second equation. The Wald χ
2
statistic of test
results for the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis, using a .05
criterion of statistical significance, shows that all of the independent variables have
significant partial effects with the exception of the variable ethnic women.
189
Table 6.17 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence
Decisions for 2553 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df p Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
BLACK WOMEN
BLACK MEN
ETHNIC WOMEN
INCOME (CLASS)
AGE
IDEOLOGY=0.00
IDEOLOGY=0.50
IDEOLOGY=1.00
ECONOMY=0.00
ECONOMY=0.50
ECONOMY=1.00
8.617
1.508
1.769
.218
-.320
-.356
-1.937
-1.518
0
b
.686
1.303
0
b
1.030
.340
.357
.135
.056
.157
.090
.578
.
.161
.165
.
70.025
19.629
24.603
2.613
32.115
151.774
15.674
6.890
.
18.096
62.419
.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
.000
.000
.000
.106
.000
.000
.000
.000
.
.000
.000
.
.221
.171
1.244
.726
.700
.144
.219
.
1.987
3.681
.
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because
it is redundant.
Furthermore, the output of the odds ratios (Exp
β
) indicates that when holding all
other variables constant for each unit increase on the party identification scale ranging
from 0=Republican through 0.5=Independent to 1=Democrat an African American
woman is only 0.221 times more likely, while African American men are only 0.171
times more likely, to decide in favor of an independent identification than all other
respondents. Even though political ideology is significant, the effect of conservative
ideology is much smaller than the effect of African American women and men. As
decisions on the party identification scale increase from Republican to Independent,
190
holding all other variables constant, so too the effect of conservative ideology increases
by a factor of 0.144. On the other hand, Moderate/middle-of-the-road ideology increases
the likelihood of political independence by a factor of 0.219. The odds ratios for income,
a measure for the effect of class on partisan identification decisions, and for age, holding
all other variables constant, indicate that the probability of political independence is
0.726 times higher for class, and 0.700 times higher for age. Only assessments of the
national economy (‘Worse’=0; ‘About the Same’=0.5) yield a larger effect, with a unit
increase on the party identification scale associated with an increase in the odds of
deciding Independent identification by a factor of 1.987 for ‘Worse’ economic
assessments compared to ‘Better’ economic assessments. When appraisals of the state of
the national economy change to ‘About the Same’ the odds of an Independent decision
increases 3.681 times higher when compared to an appraisal of ‘Better’ than the previous
year.
6.2.4 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL FOUR
This final model explores the unique contribution of determinants expected to
predict Democratic partisanship. In Model 4 party identification, a polychotomous
outcome variable (1=Democrat, 0.5=Independent, 0=Republican), is a function of the
following predictor variables: linked fate, race/ethnicity, household income or class,
gender, political ideology, approval of Bush’s presidential performance, the Nation’s
economy, and age. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical technique
used to determine the extent to which these variables predict political partisanship among
comparative populations taken from the 2004 NPS survey data. The logistic regression
model predicting the natural log of the odds of making a decision favoring the
191
Democratic, rather than the Republican, Party, or of making a decision electing political
independence rather than Republican partisanship assumes the following form:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
log Pr| |
Pr| | = a + β
1
Fate + β
2
Black + β
3
Hispanic + β
4
Asian + β
5
Caribbean
+ β
5
Caribbean +
β
6
Income
2
+ β
7
Income
3
+ β
8
Income
4
+ β
9
Gender + β
10
Ideology + β
11
Bush + β
12
Economy
+ β
13
Age
Output shows that of 854 survey respondents included in the analysis there are
300 (35.1%) Democrats, 265 (31.0%) Independents, and 289 (33.8%) Republicans. The
intercept-only model yields a -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 1772.853 (Table 6.20) while
the model that includes the set of predictors produces a -2 Log Likelihood value of
1244.385. The model Chi-Square statistic is 528.468, with a 0.000 level of significance.
In addition, this model yields a 61.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of
partisan identification decisions. Further review of the Pseudo R-Square table in the
regression output renders a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.461 and a Nagelkerke R-Square
of 0.519. The strength of the relationship between the variables is moderate.
Table 6.19 Model 4: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood
Model Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept Only 1772.853
Final 1244.385
528.468
30
.000
192
With the exception of the variable gender all other predictors in the logistic
regression model are significant (p < .05). As displayed in Table 6.20, when respondents
decide to consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans, the equation takes on
the following formulation:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = -2.571 – 0.214Fate
.00
– 0.742Fate
.50
+ 3.025Black
+ 1.869Hispanic + 0.733Asian + 2.271Caribbean
–
0.339Income + 0.149Gender – 1.857Ideology
.00
− 1.657Ideology
.50
+ 3.761Bush
.00
+ 2.151Bush
.66
+ 0.710Economy
.00
+ 0.925Economy
.50
+ 0.198Age
Table 6.20 Model 4: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable
Effect Model Fitting
Criteria
Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log
Likelihood of
Reduced Model
Chi-Square
df
Sig.
Intercept 1244.385
a
.000
0
.
BLACK 1314.798
70.413
2
.000
HISPANIC 1277.188
32.802
2
.000
ASIAN 1250.075
5.690
2
.058
CARIBBEAN 1270.794
26.409
2
.000
GENDER 1246.979
2.594
2
.273
INCOME 1255.493
11.107
2
.004
AGE 1253.516
9.131
2
.010
EXTENT LINKED
FATE 1259.875
15.490
4
.004
POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY 1295.980
51.595
4
.000
APPROVE BUSH 1360.308
115.923
4
.000
NATIONAL
ECONOMY 1258.838
14.453
4
.006
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.
193
The logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the
predictor variables in the equation as specified above are presented in Table 6.22. Using a
.05 criterion of statistical significance, the Wald χ
2
statistic of test results for the unique
contribution of each predictor included in the analysis shows that gender, age, linked
fate=0.00, political ideology=0.50, and national economy=0.50 do not have significant
partial effects. On the other hand, the variables that do have a statistically significant
relationship with deciding to identify with the Democratic Party in this logistic regression
equation are Black, Hispanic, Asian, Caribbean, Class (Income), extent of affect of
Linked Fate (‘Some’), conservative Ideology, ‘Strongly Disapprove’ and ‘Somewhat
Disapprove’ of Bush’s job as president, and appraisals that the state of the national
economy over the previous year is ‘Worse.’
Reportedly, holding all other variables constant, for every unit change in the
President’s job ratings when one strongly disapproves of Bush’s performance a 3.781
increase in the log odds of decisions to identify with the Democratic Party is expected
than when one approves of his job as president. Furthermore, high odds ratios (Exp
β
)
observed in the regression output indicate Democratic Party, not Republican Party,
preferences among survey respondents that ‘Strongly Disapprove’ George W. Bush’s job
as president in 2004 when compared to those that ‘Strongly Approve.’ The odds of
predicting who will decide to identify with the Democratic Party are 42.997 times higher
when responses indicate a strong disapproval of the job performance of President Bush.
Likewise, when respondents somewhat disapprove of Bush’s job as president there is a
2.151 increase in the log odds of Democratic partisanship after controlling for other
covariates in the model. In other words, the likelihood of Democratic Party identifications
194
is 8.597 times higher than when responses approve of Bush’s job as president. Race and
ethnicity also yield significant (p < .05) high odds of decisions to identify with the
Democratic Party, rather than with the Republican Party.
Table 6.21 Model 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Democratic Partisan
Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df p
Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
BLACK
HISPANIC
ASIAN
CARIBBEAN
GENDER
INCOME
AGE
LINKED FATE=0.00
LINKED FATE=0.50
LINKED FATE=1.00
IDEOLOGY=0.00
IDEOLOGY=0.50
IDEOLOGY=1.00
BUSH=0.00
BUSH=0.66
BUSH=1.00
ECONOMY=0.00
ECONOMY=0.50
ECONOMY=1.00
-2.571
3.025
1.869
.733
2.271
.149
-.339
.198
-.214
-.742
0
b
-1.857
-1.657
0
b
3.761
2.151
0
b
.710
.925
0
b
.757
.417
.336
.350
.471
.232
.109
.161
.269
.364
.
.274
.993
.
.412
.343
.
311
.309
.
11.545
52.644
30.867
4.370
23.233
.411
9.620
1.500
.631
4.158
.
45.922
2.787
.
83.490
39.320
.
5.206
8.953
.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
.001
.000
.000
.037
.000
.521
.002
.221
.427
.041
.
.000
.095
.
.000
.000
.
.023
.003
.
20.589
6.482
2.081
9.689
1.161
.713
1.219
.807
.476
.
.156
.191
.
42.997
8.597
.
2.035
2.521
.
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because it
is redundant.
Further for every unit change in decisions of partisanship the likelihood of
identifying with the Democratic Party increases by a factor of 3.025 when African
195
American, by about 2.3 times when Black Caribbean, nearly doubles when Hispanic, and
yields 0.733 when Asian compared to White Non-Hispanic respondents, after holding
constant all other covariates in the model. Examination of the odds ratios (Exp
β
) for
party preferences by race and ethnicity show that African American decisions to select
the Democratic Party are 20.589 times higher than White Non-Hispanics, holding the
other predictor variables constant. Among other population groups included in this study
preferences for the Democratic Party are 9.689 times higher when Black Caribbean,
6.482 times higher when Hispanic, and 2.081 times higher when Asian compared to
White Non-Hispanics, after controlling all other variables included in the analysis. In
addition, increases in Democratic partisanship relates to evaluations of the state of the
national economy. Those who evaluated the Nation’s economy as worse than the
previous year are 0.710 more likely to prefer the Democratic Party than those who
indicated the economy is better than the previous year. Additionally, among those who
indicate that the Nation’s economy is about the same as the previous year are 0.925 times
more likely to make decisions favoring the holding Democratic Party as opposed to those
who indicate the economy is better, when holding constant the other predictor variables.
On the other hand, perceptions of the extent to which linked fate affects
respondents (Some=0.50) and the probability of decisions favoring the Democratic Party
differs significantly (at p < .05) from the probability of favorable Democratic Party
decisions among respondents with perceptions that linked fate affects them ‘A Lot’
(=1.00). Results show that for every unit change in linked fate affecting respondents
‘Some’ there is a 1.308 decrease in the log odds of Democratic partisanship expected,
after holding constant all other predictor variables. In short, the odds of deciding to
196
identify with the Democratic Party among persons who perceive that to some extent
linked fate affects them is only 0.270 times higher than persons who perceive that the
extent to which linked fate affects them is a lot. Similarly, for every unit increase in
conservative political ideology a decrease in the log odds of Democratic Party
identification is expected, holding all other predictors constant. So, the odds ratio of
preferring the Democratic Party among conservatives is only 0.271 times more likely
than among liberals. Moreover, the independent effects of class, measured as annual
household income, show that as income increases the likelihood of Democratic
partisanship decreases by a factor of 0.339. Hence the odds of being a Democrat, rather
than a Republican, based on class of respondent as measured by annual household
income, are only 0.713 times more likely.
Contrarily, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) when
respondent’s decisions indicate preferences for political independence, rather than
identification with the Republican Party, the equation produced in the regression output
(Table 6.23) assumes the following formulation:
log Pr| |
Pr| | = 0.532 – 0.246Fate
.00
– 1.308Fate
.50
+ 1.489Black
+ 0.938Hispanic + 0.591Asian + 1.311Caribbean
–
0.277Income – 0.153Gender – 1.304Ideology
.00
− 1.152Ideology
.50
+ 2.253Bush
.00
+ 1.143Bush
.66
+ 0.607Economy
.00
+ 0.371Economy
.50
− 0.195Age
As shown in Table 6.23 below, predictor variables race (Black, Hispanic, Asian,
Caribbean), Bush=0.00, Bush=0.66, and Economy=0.00 yield positive coefficients that
are significant using the .05 criteria of statistical significance. Whereas income (class),
the extent of respondent’s race affecting respondent or linked fate=0.50 (‘Some’), and
197
political ideology=0.00 (Conservative) produce negative coefficients that yield a
significant p-value in accordance with a .05 criterion. While gender, age, linked
fate=0.00 (‘Not Very Much’), political ideology=0.50 (Moderate/Middle-of-the-Road),
and state of the national economy=0.50 (‘About the Same’) are not statistically
significant at the p < .05 level. These predictors are not included in the subsequent
interpretation.
Table 6.22 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence
Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Predictor
β SE β
Wald’s χ
2
df
p
Exp
β
(odds ratio)
Intercept
BLACK
HISPANIC
ASIAN
CARIBBEAN
GENDER
INCOME
AGE
LINKED FATE=0.00
LINKED FATE=0.50
LINKED FATE=1.00
IDEOLOGY=0.00
IDEOLOGY=0.50
IDEOLOGY=1.00
BUSH=0.00
BUSH=0.66
BUSH=1.00
ECONOMY=0.00
ECONOMY=0.50
ECONOMY=1.00
.532
1.489
.938
.591
1.311
-.153
-.277
-.195
-.246
1.308
0
b
-1.304
-1.152
0
b
2.253
1.143
0
b
.607
.371
0
b
.632
.401
.285
.285
.439
.206
.097
.145
.235
.351
.
.260
.941
.
.340
.241
.
.252
.266
.
.709
13.791
10.863
4.311
8.910
.549
8.103
1.823
1.090
13.856
.
25.146
1.501
.
43.887
22.524
.
5.794
1.940
.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
.400
.000
.001
.038
.003
.459
.004
.177
.296
.000
.
.000
.221
.
.000
.000
.
.016
.164
.
4.432
2.556
1.806
3.709
.858
.758
.823
.782
.270
.
.271
.316
.
9.512
3.137
.
1.834
1.448
.
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN. b. This parameter is set to zero because it
is redundant.
198
The coefficients for each of the predictor variables, which are statistically
significant, indicate the amount of change in political party identifications to expect given
a one-unit change in the value of a particular independent variable, given all other
predictors in the model are held constant. Coefficients for the race variables (Black
1.489; Hispanic 0.938; Asian 0.591; and Caribbean 1.311) are positive and significant
indicators of partisan identifications. So, when race of respondent is Black predicted
party identifications are expected to yield about a 1.489-unit increase in Independent
political identifications above that of White Non-Hispanics, based on an estimate of
about a 0.532-unit increase (Intercept), when all other variables in the model are held
constant. This produces an odds ratio predicting that Independent identifications among
African Americans are 4.432 times higher than Independent identifications among their
White counterparts. As race of respondent shifts from African American to Hispanic,
Asian, and Black Caribbean predicted preferences for political independence increase to
approximately a 0.938-unit, a 0.591-unit, and a 1.311-unit above those of White Non-
Hispanics. So, the odds ratios of preference for political independence rather than
Republican partisanship is 2.556 times higher among Hispanics, 1.806 times higher
among Asians, and 3.709 times higher among Black Caribbeans when compared to White
Non-Hispanics.
Additionally, respondents that strongly disapproved, and somewhat disapproved,
of Bush’s presidential performance compared to respondents that strongly approved of
Bush’s job as president yield positive, significant (at p < .05) coefficients. When
respondents disapprove strongly a 2.253-unit increase in predicted political independence
is expected, while for respondents that disapprove somewhat there is an expected 1.143
199
unit increase in predicted political independence, after holding all other variables
constant. As approval of Bush’s presidential performance changes from ‘Strongly
Disapprove’ to ‘Strongly Approve’ predicted political independence increases by 2.253
units, or an odds ratio of 9.512 times higher. Likewise, as approval of Bush’s presidential
job performance ratings change from ‘Somewhat Disapprove to ‘Strongly Approve’ there
is a 1.143-unit increase in political independence, yielding an odds ratio of 3.137 times
higher. Additionally, as assessments of the national economy increase by one unit from
“Worse” to “Better” a 0.607-unit increase is expected in Independent identifications. An
appraisal of the state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Worse’ than the previous year means a
decision to favor political independence is 1.832 times higher than an appraisal of the
state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Better’.
Moreover, the log of the odds of decisions favoring political independence are
negatively related to class or annual earned income; the extent to which linked fate=0.50
(‘Some’) affects respondents; and, political ideology=0.00 (Conservative). So, holding
constant all other covariates, as income increases there is a 0.277-unit decrease in the
odds of political independence. A review of the odds ratio shows that Independent
identification is 0.758 times higher than a Republican identification. Further, as
perceptions that to some extent linked racial fate affects respondents increase there is a
log-odds parameter estimate of 1.308-unit decrease in decisions favoring political
independence, after controlling for the other variables in the model. The odds ratio (Exp
β
)
shows that when respondents’ hold perceptions that linked fate has some affect on them
the probability of an Independent identification is 0.270 times higher than the probability
of identification with the Republican Party. Additionally, when holding all other
200
predictor variables constant in the analysis, as conservative political ideology increases
the odds of decisions of Independent preferences, instead of Republican Party
preferences, decrease by 1.152. In other words, the likelihood of Independent political
identifications for a conservative, rather than liberal, political ideology is only 0.271
times higher than the likelihood of Republican Party identifications among respondents to
the 2004 NPS.
6.3 STUDY FINDINGS
The multinomial logistic regression analyses undertaken in this chapter explore
factors that explain African American racial group partisanship. Results suggest that the
contributing effects of race (and ethnicity) on party identifications are significant
independent effects when holding constant the influence of all other predictors included
in this research study. Most notable among African-Americans composing the 1996
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) is the dynamics of linked racial fate where
persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens to the African
American racial group are more likely to decide on Democratic partisanship than on
political independence. In comparative analyses consisting of African American, White
Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans taken from the 2004 National
Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) African American women are more likely to identify
with the Democratic Party than both African American men and women of other
racial/ethnic identifications. Whites, Asians, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Hispanics
are typically more varied in their political party identifications, and are also influenced by
more social factors than African Americans and Black Caribbeans. Differences in class
based on income, gender, the extent of the affect of linked fate, political ideology, and
evaluations of Bush’s presidential performance make important contributions to the
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model. Nonetheless, all groups hold important, in their perceptions of the two main
political parties, assessments of the state of the national economy over the previous year.
Finally, findings support at least two conclusions: (1) The observed pattern of
very strong sustained identification with the Democratic Party among black (both African
American and Black Caribbean) citizens substantially rejects any prediction of the
diminishing effect of race because of an increasing effect of economic class. This is
particularly so in structuring political preference attitudes toward the two main political
parties, or political partisanship; and (2) Differential bases of party identifications
continue to structure black-white political orientations of citizens in the United States.
Given the continued prevalence of contemporary racial tensions, inequities, and
discrimination a sense of interconnectedness with the racial group as well as perceptions
of the interdependence of fate and task interdependence are expected to persist and
predict political proclivities within the African American racial group. A discussion of
research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research are
presented in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
S
UMMARY
,
C
ONCLUSIONS
,
AND
R
ECOMMENDATIONS
The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the study, presents general conclusions
and recommendations for further research based on results of this investigation of African
American partisanship.
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY
The principle aim of this dissertation was to identify and further understand the
extent to which linked racial fate and the black utility heuristic paradigm explained
African American decisions about the two main political parties, particularly their
overwhelming support for the Democratic Party. Building on the scholarship of Michael
C. Dawson (1994) this research tested empirically a modification of his study of “African
American Partisanship and the American Party System,” Chapter Five in Behind the
Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics. Additionally, this research extended
Dawson’s work beyond his study period, and included a comparative population
comprised of racial and ethnic groups. The methodological approach for Dawson’s
examination involved data collected for the National Black Election Study panel series
during 1984 and 1988 (Jackson 1984; 1988). Whereas this study tested four hypotheses
using national survey research data compiled for the National Black Election Study
(NBES) panel series for 1996 (Tate 1997), and from the National Politics Study (NPS)
for 2004 (Jackson, et al. 2009). The sample population consisted of 824 adult African
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American survey respondents from the 1996 NBES, and 3,087 racial and ethnic
respondents from the 2004 NPS. The 2004 population sample included 706 (22.9%)
African Americans, 868 (28.1%) White Non-Hispanics, 676 (21.9%) Hispanics, 466
(15.1%) Asians, and 371 (12.0%) Black Caribbeans. Questions germane to this research
study as posed to survey respondents addressed decisions about partisan preference
attitudes; ideas about individuals’ connectedness to, and interdependence with, their
racial and/or ethnic grouping; evaluations of the political parties, national economy and
presidential performance; and the influence of social demography on partisanship.
Seminal studies conducted by Michigan School researchers suggested that party
identification, a psychological predisposition of preference, was preceded only by
sociological background characteristics like race or ethnicity, economic class affiliation,
gender, age, and other related social demography, which was also accepted by revisionist
perspectives (Campbell, et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981). In the Michigan model partisan
identifications were modeled as affective, stable, and persistent attitudes not often subject
to change or to the influence of other factors. Further scholarly investigations revealed
the more dynamic, rather than stable, nature of partisan preference attitudes (Brody 1991;
Franklin and Jackson 1983; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979 Jackson
1975). Empirical evidence showed that party identifications were susceptible to change,
particularly in response to the influence of short-term forces like issues and candidates,
the electoral setting, and the political context. Nonetheless, such shifts in the partisan
balance of party identifications in the American electorate did not explain African
American attachments, which were notably distinctive attitudes of preference for the
Democratic Party. Instead of a psychological group (party) attachment, African
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Americans’ partisanship appeared more consistent with revisionist explanations of party
identification as a summary judgment or “running tally” of individual evaluations of the
two main political parties. Hence, their preferences for the Democratic Party reflected an
information shortcut based on ideological and policy congruence between the Democrats
and the race (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Downs 1957), procedurally more rational in
accordance with the Simonesque perspective (Simon 1946).
Historical evidence pointed to the long-term force of race in shaping individual
perceptions about the two main political parties. Still, the question remained: How did
individual African Americans’ arrive at virtually the same decisions when faced with
multiple options in a political world of objects? Linked fate emerged as a concept in
political science scholarship to identify and explain African American political behavior
(Shingles 1981; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1991). The concept was first employed by
Kurt Lewin (1947) in social psychology to further understand the interconnectedness and
interdependence of a post-World War II Jewish population. Michael C. Dawson’s (1994)
application of the linked fate construct was advanced in his Theory of African American
Racial Group Interests. In Dawson’s theory “linked racial fate” referred to perceptions
that individual interests were shaped by the collective interests of the racial group. The
resulting interdependence among individuals explained group solidarity and political
cohesion within the African American community. Here “community” relied on
perceptions—a neurological process of observations and interpretations—of
connectedness among individuals who became keenly aware of their common historical
and contemporary experiences, disparate treatment of their racial group within the social,
political, and economic order, and differential black life chance opportunities or the lack
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thereof in comparison to the majority population. This linked fate construct grew
increasingly important when used to explore the group behavior of other racial and ethnic
(or pan-ethnic) collectivities representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez
2008; Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asians (Junn & Masuoka 2008), and Black
Caribbeans (Watt 2009), and was found to be significant.
Reliance on the centrality of race was essential to Dawson’s theory, primarily
because his “black utility heuristic” paradigm was reinforced by the continued
significance of race in shaping African American experiences and assessments of life
prospects. This was because, in Dawson’s perspective, individual African Americans
used their perceptions of racial group interests as a substitute for their own interests. In
short, the linchpin in the concept of linked fate was an individual’s identification with the
race; a black consciousness that grasped the significant consequences of “being black;” as
well as a belief that what happened to the racial group was relevant to one’s own life.
The black utility heuristic, instrumental racial (black) cues, which provided a meaningful
explanation for uniformity of individual preference attitudes like partisan identifications
ensured adherence to African American racial group interests. This study investigated
these claims.
7.2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY
Four hypotheses were formulated for the research study. Predicted measures
included: linked fate, which quantified perceptions that what happens to people’s racial
group affects them; race and/or ethnicity, based on self-reports of identification;
economic class, computed as annual family income; gender; age; ideology, a summary
scale that appraised the degree of individual preferences for liberalism; judgments about
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the extent to which the Democratic Party worked hard to address issues of most
importance to African Americans; political climate, determined by presidential job
performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996) and Bush (2004) administrations; and,
assessments of the Nation’s economy over the past year. Each of these predictors
analyzed the polychotomous outcome, party identification—Republican, Independent,
and Democrat. Variables used in the multinomial logistic regression analyses came from
adult African American respondents to the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate
1997), while variables taken from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2004)
analyzed survey responses from comparative racial and ethnic adult populations
composed of African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, or Black
Caribbean respondents. Details on the manner in which each variable was
operationalized and measured can be found in Chapter 5. In what follows the main
findings for each hypothesis are reviewed and discussed in the order in which they
appeared in Chapter 2.
7.2.1 LINKED FATE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP
The first hypothesis argued that African Americans with stronger (black) linked
fates were more likely to support a political party whose policy preferences were
perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests. This hypothesis is not
confirmed in the analysis. Results showed that a sense of linked racial fate was only
significant among those who somewhat agreed that what happened to the African
American racial group affected them, but they preferred political independence rather
than Democratic partisanship, as anticipated. The weak performance of linked fate in this
study may have implied that while race continues to be an important force, African
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Americans made party choices based on other factors. Socio-demographic attributes
added to the equation seemed to have mitigated the expected power of linked fate. For
instance, independence or no-party preferences was more likely chosen by African
American men than by women, suggesting a gender gap. Furthermore, the one
consistently distinguishing factor between Republican partisanship and Democratic
partisanship in 1996 was preferred ideological orientations. Conservative ideology
predicted accurately preferences for the Republican Party, whereas, moderate ideology
decreased the likelihood of political independence. The finding that linked fate does not
explain political partisanship is consistent with previous findings that strong (black)
racial group connection did not provide an explanation for political participation within
the African American community once other factors were taken into consideration
(Verba et al 1995; Tate 1991; Bobo and Gilliam, Jr. 1990; Shingles 1981).
7.2.2 GENDERED PERSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP
The finding of gender distinctions relative to political partisanship was further
explored in the second hypothesis, which stated that African American women were
more likely to support the Democratic Party than African American men or women of
other ethnicities. Results from analysis of data from the 2004 National Politics Study
(Jackson et al 2009) indicated that African American women were more likely to
consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans. They were also slightly more
likely to prefer political independence, instead of Republican partisanship, than African
American men. However, results measuring partisanship for ethnic women were not
statistically significant. This finding suggested that African American women were
politically distinctive, especially in view of gender differences relative to Democratic
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Party attachments. There was a tendency for African American women to be more
supportive of the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, and more likely to
identify as Democrats than women of other ethnicities. Since the 1980 presidential
election when more men supported Republican Ronald Reagan, the noticeable gender gap
attracted scholarly attention. Research suggested that women were more likely to vote,
and to identify with the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, which included
African Americans (Cassese, et al 2007). The findings in this study supported the notion
of a gender gap within the African American community.
7.2.3 EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATS’ WORK ON BLACK ISSUES
This study further assessed the premise that African Americans were more likely
to identify with the political party that they perceived best helped their racial group using
data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997). Here preferences for the
Democrats indicated influence of the black utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). When
compared to assessments that the Democrats work very hard to address African American
racial group issues all remaining categories increased the probability of identification
with the Democratic Party. Greatest support came from those that decided the Democrats
work fairly hard, which was followed closely by responses that they worked not too hard.
Still, Democratic partisanship was also likely among persons that thought Democrats
worked not hard at all. This finding confirmed that individual perceptions of the
Democratic Party working harder (than the Republican Party) contributed to their support
for the party, even when differences in evaluation of the efforts made by the Democratic
Party to advance issues of most importance to African Americans were present.
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7.2.4 RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY CUES AND DEMOCRATIC
PARTISANSHIP
Pan-ethnic group consciousness and the use of group identity cues explored in
political scholarship suggested the applicability of the Theory of African American Racial
Group Interests to other collectivities. Even though African Americans remain the most
loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, the fourth hypothesis sought to explore factors
that were most likely to predict the desired outcome among comparison population
groups. Specifically, the proposition indicated that the more a person viewed that the
fate of their racial and/or ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of
support for the political party perceived as addressing racial and/or ethnic group interests.
In essence, this hypothesis returned to the question of linked fate and the use of a group
utility heuristic to make decisions about the two main political parties in 2004.
The largest indicator of preferences for the Democratic Party was disapproval of
George W. Bush’s presidential performance. Democratic partisanship increased among
those that strongly, and somewhat, disapproved of his job as president. Nonetheless, race
and ethnicity also accounted for decisions to identify with the Democrats. As expected,
African Americans’ choice of the Democratic Party, when compared to White Non-
Hispanics, far outweighed those of the other population groups. Black Caribbeans,
Hispanics, and Asians, when also compared to White Non-Hispanics distantly followed
preferences of African Americans, but also expressed their preferences for the
Democrats. On the other hand, Democratic Party preferences decreased slightly among
respondents with perceptions that to some extent linked fate affected them. This was in
comparison to people who thought that the extent to which what happened to their
racial/ethnic group affected them a lot, an indication that the degree of racial and/or
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ethnic group consciousness did influence partisanship, but not in the expected direction.
Furthermore, Democratic identifications within this comparison population suggested
some reliance on a racial (black) or ethnic group heuristic when faced with decisions
about the two main political parties.
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This dissertation set out to determine why African Americans think the way they
do politically and what induces them to change, supposing that the explanation was
bound in the concept of linked fate. Instead, the distribution of survey responses among
African Americans in 1996, revealing a gender gap in such perceptions, showed virtually
no variations across categories of the linked fate measure. In addition, linked fate was not
significantly shown to impact decisions about Democratic Party identifications in the
inferential statistics measuring survey responses in both 1996 and 2004. Further
investigation into the concept of linked fate is necessary because survey questions may
not tap into the psychological impact of shared racial experiences and adverse historical
and contemporary encounters between the races on partisanship. National survey data is
most often used to explore the influence of psychological attitudes like party
identifications or constructs such as linked fate. Nonetheless, to assess the political
effects of linked fate may necessitate an alternative research design. Experiments on the
influence of linked fate could prove beneficial in understanding the way people think
about the two main political parties. Perhaps with the aid of “confederates” who would
work with the experimenter, research could identify and further our understanding of the
affect of such interconnectedness and the interdependence of fate on thoughts about the
two main political parties. Political science research experiments using confederates
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have demonstrated their usefulness in investigations of racial tolerance (Hutchings and
Jardina 2009), and the political effects of racial prejudice (Huddy and Feldman 2009).
Additionally, marked gender differences emerged in political party preference
attitudes. Survey responses divulged distinctive preference attitudes toward the
Democratic Party, which was also seen as the effective work of the black utility heuristic
guiding individuals to choose the party that best addressed the interests of the racial
group (Dawson 1994). There was a consistent disposition for the Democratic Party. Even
when individuals perceived that the Democrats’ only worked ‘fairly hard’ or ‘not hard at
all’ on issues of most importance to African Americans, most still decided to identify
themselves as Democrats. This may suggest that in the political arena there is an
interdependence of fate and task that links them to the Democratic Party “group” more so
than to the African American racial group. Hence, electoral capture may actually reflect
a kind of “linked fate” since no other rational alternative is available to the racial group
besides the Democratic Party (Frymer 1999).
African Americans are the most cohesive electoral group, believing almost
unanimously that the racial group’s primary goals are best advanced via political action.
Therefore, close proximity to political objects that give them relevance is vital, as well as
the transmission of group political standards or norms to ensure consistency. According
to Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in The American
Voter (1960) when a group standard is “self evident,” like race, important political
objects of orientation, like the political party, “embody” group cues, “so that the course
of behavior characteristic of [a] ‘good’ group member cannot be held in doubt” (p. 317).
They further indicate the following:
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Now issues and candidates are transient political objects; the entity that
endures is the party. If group influence leads the identified member to take
on identification with the party, then little renewal of influence is needed.
The individual has, as it were, acceded to a self-steering mechanism, that
will keep him politically “safe” from the point of view of group standards.
He will respond to new stimuli as a party member and code them properly.
As time passes, his identification with the party will increase of its own
accord, because the individual will find that event after event
demonstrates—in non-group matters as well as group matters now—the
rectitude of his own party and the obnoxiousness of its opponent (p. 328).
Further study is therefore needed to assess whether group cues in partisan decisions
reflect perceptions of linked racial fate or a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of
the Democratic Party.
