Understanding Law Enforcement Counterterrorism
Information Sharing in Homegrown Violent Extremism
Cases
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Since the terrorist attack that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001,
significant efforts have been devoted to terrorism prevention, including government
counterterrorism funding for agencies, programs, equipment, and training for law
enforcement at the federal, state and local levels. However, terrorist tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs) have adapted, and terrorist events have continued to occur on U.S.
soil. Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) are currently the most severe domestic
terrorist threat (Comey, 2014), and in order to reduce their threat, coordination and
communication between law enforcement agencies is fundamental. Based on studies of
significant terrorist events in the United States since 2005, it has been noted that a
primary gap in domestic terrorism prevention continues to be law enforcement
information sharing (Department of Homeland Security, 2016; Gunaratna & Haynal,
2013; House of Representatives, 2014; Peled, 2016; Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2013). Without suitable counterterrorism information
sharing, especially as it relates to HVEs, suspicious activities may not be disseminated in
a timely manner, emerging threat information may not be compiled, active case
information may not be represented properly, and terrorism likely will not be prevented
(DHS, 2015a, 2016; Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013).
A lack of focus on the organizational boundaries of law enforcement agencies, as it
applies to terrorism prevention information sharing with a focus on HVEs, is a key gap
in academic literature. In this study, I used a recent terrorist event that occurred within
the United States as a case study, the attack at the at the Boston Marathon in Boston,
Massachusetts on April 15, 2013, to explore the procedures of counterterrorism
information sharing for local law enforcement agencies. In this research, I highlight how
contingency theory can explain the organizational boundaries that may lead to a gap in
information sharing between law enforcement agencies as it relates to counterterrorism
information sharing with a HVE focus. The application of the results of this study can be
implemented to terrorism prevention policy and planning procedures. The results can be
used as a tool for decision makers to create actionable protocols for information sharing
and allocate resources to information sharing technology for local law enforcement
agencies, especially related to HVEs, as identified by the results.
Within this chapter, an overview of the background of the study will be provided
that will explain the evolution of HVEs and the importance of local law enforcement
agencies’ ability to identify them and prevent their attacks. The conceptual framework,
including research questions, scope, and methodology used to frame this study, is also
explained within this chapter. Additionally, a list of key definitions and assumptions is
provided.
Background of the Study
After 09/11 occurred, counterterrorism resources were devoted to government agencies
to detect, deter and respond to terrorists at a tremendous rate and new missions and
organizations were created (Department of Homeland Security, 2016; Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 2016). Local law enforcement agencies’
counterterrorism roles were recognized as extremely important to the greater homeland
security mission, and they were identified as the first line of defense for terrorism
prevention (Burruss, 2012; Haynes & Giblin, 2014; Peled; 2016). When the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 (Homeland Security Act,
2002) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created in 2004
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004), both in response to 09/11, one
of their primary roles was assisting the facilitation of information and relationships for
law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels so that they may work
together to prevent terrorism (Homeland Security Act, 2002; Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004). As information sharing still remained a primary
national security gap in 2011, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2015) outlined
the requirement for law enforcement agencies at all levels to increase their terrorism
prevention capabilities. The Strategy broke down five mission areas vital for national
counterterrorism preparedness, of which one was prevention (National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, 2015).
As terrorist TTPs continue to evolve overseas, U.S. foreign and immigration policy
shifted and has allowed for the capture and conviction of foreign-born individuals on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBIs) terrorism watch list (Executive Order 13780,
2018). However, domestically, terrorist event TTPs have evolved to include U.S. citizens
who learn about and are inspired by international terrorist group ideologies and are
considered HVEs (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
2016). These types of terrorist events are extremely difficult for local law enforcement
agencies to prevent due to the nature of the HVE not being affiliated with a terrorist
group or cell (FBI, 2013) and their use of technologies like social media and text
messaging (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2016).
Suspicious activity reporting (SAR) through government information systems is the
manner in which federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are required to report
certain potential indicators of behavior that are criminal in nature, and may indicate
something that leads to terrorism related activity (ISE-FS-200, v 1.5.5). Once an
individual has more than one instance of being reported in the SAR database, a pattern
may be detected and a law enforcement or intelligence agency will be able to use the
information in an active investigation (Bjelopera, 2014; DHS, 2015; FBI, 2013). This
type of information sharing is the most basic, but often the most vital and was noted as a
gap in the Boston Marathon Bombing attack that occurred in April 2013 (Peled, 2016).
An additional noteworthy information sharing gap identified in an Inspector General
(2017) report was that state and local law enforcement agencies might not have the
security clearances that they require to access the information systems to obtain certain
information.
As HVEs continue to be a threat and TTPs continue to evolve, one recommendation for
information sharing that is prevalent among academic literature and government
agencies is community policing (Mondal & Hurwitz, 2012; Randol, 2012; Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2016). Community
policing is the process where local law enforcement agencies educate local communities
about TTPs and ask to be informed about suspicious behavior of individuals (Mondak &
Hurwitz, 2012). An example of this is the DHS’s “If you See Something, Say
Something” campaign, whereby this statement was made to the public to report
suspicious terrorist related activities, persons or packages to their local law enforcement
agency (DHS, n.d.). This type of information sharing can produce real-time threat
information for law enforcement agencies (Bjelopera, 2014), but also can create the need
for additional personnel with an intelligence analysis skill set and funding that some
agencies do not have (RAND, 2016).
As domestic terrorist TTPs continue to evolve, it is vital that law enforcement agencies
develop or maintain the terrorism prevention capability of information sharing
(Ackerman, 2016; DHS, 2015; National Strategy for Counterrorism, 2011). This study
provides a better understanding of why law enforcement agencies continue to have gaps
in information sharing with domestic terrorism events (Ackerman, 2016; Bjelopera,
2014; House Homeland Security Committee, 2014;), specifically HVE events as
illustrated with the Boston Marathon Bombing.
Even though it has been noted that there is a gap in information sharing, there
remains to be a lack of academic literature surrounding the information sharing process
and what information should be shared that would be deemed actionable to law
enforcement agencies or counterterrorism HVE cases. This study expands upon those
gaps in literature and explains the barriers to law enforcement HVE information sharing,
exemplified by local law enforcement agencies leading up to and during the terrorist
attack that occurred at the Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts in April 2013.
Problem Statement
Information sharing remains a gap in the local law enforcement agency’s ability to
prevent HVE terrorism. Counterterrorism prevention measures begin at the local law
enforcement level and the capability to deter an attack is a collaborative effort among all
law enforcement agencies (DHS, 2015; National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011;
Randol, 2013; Zuckerman et al., 2013). Even after 09/11, a gap of terrorism related
information sharing has been highlighted across the nation, leaving the United States
vulnerable to further attacks (Flinn, 2016; House of Representatives, 2014; DHS, 2016).
Recent terrorist attacks in the United States, including the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing, were studied to determine what law enforcement and counterterrorism
shortfalls occurred leading up the event. The House Homeland Security Committee
(2014) found that the FBI and the local law enforcement agency in Boston,
Massachusetts did not share vital information prior to the attack, including tips that may
have helped to thwart the attack and there was a lack of ability of local police
departments to gain access to certain databases to retrieve case specific information.
Multiple studies have found an overlapping federal counterterrorism mission set (Foley,
2016; Inspector General, 2017; Peled, 2016) and a communication and political barrier to
interagency communications (Foley, 2016; Peled, 2016; Pelfrey, 2014).
As terrorist TTPs continue to change, to include the rising trend of HVEs (Ackerman,
2016; DHS, 2015), it is increasingly important for law enforcement agencies to share
case related information and suspicious activities in order to execute the terrorism
prevention mission (Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013). Previous research continues to highlight
gaps in law enforcement information sharing at an interfederalist level; however, they do
not identify what organizational shortfalls may lead to this barrier or how local
enforcement agencies obtain HVE threat information from federal and state agencies. In
this study, I explored how HVE information is obtained and shared in an interfederalist
law enforcement setting, especially with regard to a local jurisdiction that experienced a
terrorist attack in 2013.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how HVE terrorism prevention
information is shared among law enforcement agencies. This study helps fill a gap in the
body of research in the law enforcement HVE terrorism prevention information sharing
environment. This case study explored the procedures agencies take with HVE terrorism
information sharing and aimed to understand why local law enforcement agencies are not
able to obtain HVE case information in a timely manner
(Ackerman, 2016; Bjelopera, 2014; Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013; House Homeland
Security Committee, 2014).
Research Questions
The research questions that are addressed in this study include the following:
RQ1: What level of HVE information is shared by federal agencies to local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ2: What level of HVE information is shared by state agencies to local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ3: What level of HVE information is shared with other local law enforcement
agencies and law enforcement agencies?
Conceptual Framework
Contingency theory is the conceptual framework used for this study, as it seeks to
explain how an agency adapts to changing environmental factors (Donaldson, 2001;
Haynes & Giblin, 2014; Roberts et al., 2012). Donaldson (2001) indicated that
organizations adapt to agency change over time to deal with contingencies in order to be
effective. Effectiveness is a measure of performance or organizational success
(Donaldson, 2001), and is applicable to law enforcement agencies in a multitude of ways.
Roberts et al. (2012) explained that contingency theory can be applied to law
enforcement agencies as they implement organizational changes and environmental
factors to prepare for terrorism incidents, whereby terrorism prevention (in this context)
is understood as a measure of how law enforcement agencies implement policies (p. 722).
The use of contingency theory in this study forms the basis for explaining the relationship
between the terrorism prevention policy of information sharing within the jurisdiction of
the local law enforcement agency that responded to the Boston Marathon Bombing and
HVE terrorism prevention. Terrorism prevention in an interfederalist law enforcement
context is applied to contingency theory by illustrating a measure of performance. This is
further evident by answering the three research questions in this study, which were
designed to answer how HVE terrorism prevention information is shared at the level of
law enforcement between federal, state and local agencies.
Contingency theory and its components of organizational change and the environmental
factors are explained further in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
This qualitative study uses a case study design. The focus of this approach was
gaining in-depth knowledge of data in a natural setting (Hancock & Algozinne, 2015). A
case study analysis was conducted using a local law enforcement agency, which was
involved in responding to the HVE terrorism event at the Boston Marathon in 2013. Yin
(2012) indicated that a case study design is helpful in applying the elements of a theory to
a specific case. Additionally, case studies apply the analysis of a problem statement
(Hancock & Algozzine, 2015) and the theoretical framework (Yin, 2012). This study
pursues the understanding of HVE terrorism prevention information sharing at the local
law enforcement level through the lens of contingency theory. The concepts within
contingency theory, organization, and environment (Donaldson, 2001) are specifically
applicable to this case study. This study explores how a local law enforcement agency
applied the HVE terrorism prevention policy of information sharing to the specific case of
the HVE terrorism event that took place at the Boston Marathon (Haynes & Giblin, 2014;
Roberts et al., 2012; Yin, 2012).
I collected the data by conducting open-ended interviews with law enforcement
personnel at a local law enforcement agency, conducted a simplified content analysis of
documents within that agency, and also obtained finished reports from Congress related
to the terrorist event in Boston, Massachusetts (Yin, 2012). Analysis and coding of the
data followed with the development of themes and patterns (Yin, 2012). Finally, themes
that emerged from the sources of the data (interviews, documents, and reports) were
analyzed and merged in order to write cohesive descriptions in the final report.
Definitions
Counterterrorism: For purposes of this study, counterterrorism is the collective
goal of stopping an act of terrorism (DHS, 2015a).
Homegrown violent extremist (HVE): A HVE is a person living in the United
States who is inspired by and acting upon the ideology of a terrorist group outside of the
United States and is likely self-radicalized (FBI, 2013; Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2013).
Information sharing: Information sharing is the exchange of data or intelligence in an
actionable timeframe with mission partners (DHS, 2015a; RAND, 2016). Local law
enforcement: A local law enforcement agency is a police department, sheriff’s office, or
other municipality police agency that is charged with the prevention of crime.
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP): TTPs in terrorism research and
analysis is the approach to understanding the evolution to how a specific terrorist group
or threat actor behave, what they target(s), the resources they have to attack with,
weapons they have acquired or wish to acquire, and an approximate approach of attack
(Sullivan & Bauer, 2008).
Terrorism prevention: Terrorism prevention refers to the measures taken to stop
terrorism and terrorist attacks from occurring, including threat detection, information
sharing, and other prevention techniques mentioned within this study (DHS, 2015a).
Assumptions
Inherent in this qualitative approach are assumptions regarding the nature of reality and
how it is known. This study is an examination of the lack of an early warning or
communication system which provides the ability to inform law enforcement about the
Boston Marathon Bombing before it happened. Federal, state, and local law agencies
were operating in the area, and ideally, they should have synchronized operations and
provided preventative alerts to avert the HVE event that took place at the Boston
Marathon. However, it is assumed that the individuals involved in the information
sharing activities (through use of various communication systems explored in Chapter 2)
will give a strong indication as to why the failures occurred.
The reality, or the ontological assumption, is that the lack of information sharing
prior to the attack increased the vulnerability to a terrorist attack. The description of the
pattern of behavior relies on both the ontological reality and the epistemological one.
Equally important is how these patterns continue to prevail. If the information sharing
processes applicable to HVE notifications are going to be successful in field operations,
we must identify these patterns that are based on how reality is perceived and how
knowledge about them takes place.
These assumptions are embedded in an interpretive framework. The framework
used in this study is a social constructivist one (Creswell, 2012). This framework allows
the researcher to explore what the participants have idealized about the nature, forms and
expressions of HVE. Contingency theory is the theoretical framework used for this study,
as it is the best-suited approach to examine the outside influences on law enforcement
agencies, with various levels of political and other cogs, and how these impact the
performance of the organization (Donaldson, 2001; Haynes & Giblin, 2014).
Scope and Delimitations
This study focused on terrorism prevention and not terrorism preparedness.
Preparedness literature, in the scope of homeland security, typically adds two additional
steps to terrorism prevention, including responding to and recovery from a terrorism
event. Additionally, when law enforcement is mentioned within this study, the scope is
focused on a counterterrorism or terrorism prevention role within those agencies.
Study Limitations
One limitation of this study is that the data were collected in one jurisdiction in a high
profile HVE case. The police department jurisdiction in Boston, Massachusetts is a large
sized municipality, and the results can be learned from and applied to (Yin, 2012) other
jurisdictions. Data derived from a single case can be seen by some as a limitation
(Creswell, 2009).
Significance of the Study
Information sharing is continually highlighted as a major shortfall by policymakers and
researchers in law enforcement counterterrorism prevention capabilities (Gunaratna &
Haynal, 2013; House of Representatives, 2014; Inserra, 2015;
), but the additional step of providing recommendations on how to rectify the problem are
not made, especially as it relates to HVE events. This study is well-timed and can be
applied to the understanding of the HVE terrorism information sharing process, the
potential information sharing shortfalls and providing policy recommendations by closely
examining a case of a local law enforcement agency that recently responded to an HVE
event.
This study bridges the gap between identifying the need to improve information
sharing and determining the means to share the counterterrorism information through the
results of the qualitative data derived from case study. The implications for positive social
change to which this study can contribute include applying the results in an actionable
manner with law enforcement agencies so that they may see how to better exchange HVE
information with each other. Additionally, the results from this study can be used by
policymakers to fill gaps in national security by taking the next step in implementing
tools to better assist law enforcement agencies to share HVE information in order to
prevent terrorism.
Summary and Transition
This study highlights the prevalence of HVE terrorism information sharing gaps among
law enforcement agencies and the continued role it has on the United States’ national
security. Since 09/11, even though it has continually been identified as a gap,
information sharing between law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local
levels has continued to be a primary concern among Congressional committees and
academic researchers (Foley, 2016; Haynes and Giblin, 2014; House of Representatives,
2014; Randol, 2013). As identified by the FBI (2014), HVEs are the current greatest
threat to the homeland and are the hardest to track for law enforcement agencies at
every level, which makes information sharing even more vital (Ackerman, 2016;
Bjelopera, 2014; Comey, 2014; Gunaratna & Haynal, 2013).
This chapter provides an overview of this qualitative case study of the Boston
Marathon Bombing HVE attack in Boston, Massachusetts in 2013. The use of
contingency theory is used to answer the research questions about inter-federalist law
enforcement HVE terrorist information sharing. This study can assist policy makers by
providing policy recommendations and fill gaps in the HVE terrorism information
sharing academic literature.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Local law enforcement agencies are charged with responding to domestic terrorist
attacks and assisting state and federal agencies in preventing them through the process of
information sharing. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are guided
through counterterrorism policies that require them to share information for terrorism
prevention purposes (Davis, 2016). However, as identified by multiple noteworthy
domestic terrorism incidents that have occurred in the United States since September 11,
2001, information sharing continues to be a key gap in local law enforcement terrorism
prevention capabilities, especially as it relates to HVEs, (Randol, 2013; Roberts et al.,
2012; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2013;
Steinbach, 2016; Wormeli, 2014) and is explored in depth within this study. As indicated
within the following literature review, there is a gap in the scholarly literature regarding
law enforcement information sharing as it relates to homegrown violent extremism. This
chapter begins by providing a detailed account of the literature search strategy utilized,
followed by a synthesis of the academic literature and federal government publications
on the most recent domestic terrorist attacks. The literature review is organized into
sections that include an in-depth look at federal counterterrorism policy since 09/11 and
the language it instills on local law enforcement agencies. The timeline of policy
iterations and how they progress to include mention of HVEs is provided within this
section. Next, a synthesis of both academic and policy literature on information sharing is
detailed in this chapter. Even though information sharing is prescribed as a
counterterrorism prevention method within national policy documents, it also deems its
own section due the importance of the noted continued gap in law enforcement action. A
section on terrorism prevention is also detailed in this chapter, a synthesis of academic
literature as it relates to these topics is provided, and the theoretical foundation that this
study is based upon is included.
Literature Search Strategy
Many of the resources used in the literature review were derived through an
organizational approach that included partitioning subtopics. The process began by
searching the keywords law enforcement and terrorism prevention in the ABI/INFORM
database in order to gain a cursory understanding of the literature in the field. After
obtaining the peer-reviewed articles that were applicable to this study, I created a Google
Scholar search parameter that alerted me of any new scholarly publications with the same
keywords. Because the scholarly research that focused on local law enforcement and
terrorism prevention was mostly related to countries outside of the United States or were
more than 10 years old, additional keyword search terms were added. As I continued
through the literature review, I was able to narrow down the parameters of the importance
of law enforcement information sharing and HVEs in the current counterterrorism
climate. Therefore, I narrowed the literature review keyword combination search
parameters to law enforcement and HVEs and law enforcement and information sharing
while searching in the SAGE Journals and Criminal Justice databases.
The next step taken in the literature search strategy was obtaining all applicable federal
counterterrorism, terrorism prevention, and law enforcement information sharing policies
at the federal and interagency levels. This process was taken using the FindLaw, Federal
Register, and FDSys databases. Federal agency websites were also searched. I also
reviewed dissertations using ProQuest in order to ensure no other dissertations were
published on the same topic area. The databases were checked frequently to determine if
new material using this study’s keywords were published or updated policies were
released. This chapter includes the literature identified within this review. The keywords
used included terrorism, law enforcement, terrorism prevention, contingency theory,
homegrown violent extremism, and information sharing.
Disclosure of Researcher Bias
In order to adequately illustrate objectivity, a discussion about my professional
background as it relates to this research is important. I have worked for the U.S. federal
government in several capacities including writing intelligence policy, as an intelligence
analyst, assisting state and local agencies with complying with federal mandates, and as a
counterintelligence special agent, where I worked with federal, state, and local agencies.
Therefore, my professional experience with and passion for the topic matter of this study
has the ability to bias the way that I framed questions that I asked during the data
collection of the case study. However, I took specific note of this and was careful not to
allow my background to influence this study. Additionally, my professional background
could also frame my writing style and the way that I make assumptions about the topics
of interagency communication and information sharing. I have paid particular attention to
this potential bias and have made note to reflect only the words used by the participants
in this study and to keep an open mind when conducting the literature review and
analysis.
Counterterrorism Policy
In order to have a clear representation of the nuances in law enforcement
counterterrorism policy, the policy evolution since 09/11 is important to highlight. In
2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the creation of the DHS, which
streamlined several services and agencies and responded to a new level of threat as a
result of 09/11 (Homeland Security Act, 2002). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to
oversee the intelligence community and the sharing of terrorism related intelligence
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004). Among other requirements in
the Act, it outlined the need to share terrorism information with all levels of government
electronically, specifically in a way that can assist with investigations and analysis, and in
a manner that all levels of personnel can access no matter what security clearance they
maintain (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004). This policy was
published only 3 years after 09/11, but it clearly delineated requirements for information
sharing for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in a straightforward manner.
The Presidential Policy Directive – 8 (PPD-8) was created under the Obama
administration to provide policy guidance for the whole of government and private
citizens on how to respond to and recover from threats to the nation’s security, including
terrorism and natural disasters. DHS built upon PPD-8 and created the National
Preparedness Goal in 2011 and then the second edition in 2015, which superseded that
policy. The National Preparedness Goal (2015) is an implementation plan that provides
an overview of how the federal, state and local government and communities should
coordinate their efforts to achieve five core capabilities. One of the five core capabilities
highlighted within the National Preparedness Goal (2015) is terrorism prevention, where
collaboration and information sharing is stated as necessary to achieving the goal.
Executive Order 13780 (2018) is the subsequent administration’s legislation aimed at
countering foreign terrorists and focuses primarily on DHS and the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ’s) coordination and response to foreign terrorist entry to the United States.
This counterterrorism policy focuses primarily on keeping foreign nationals from certain
high-risk countries out of the United States and concludes with the request for
information sharing from states to DHS and DOJ (Executive Order No. 13780, 2018).
Unlike several other preceding policies, this one specifically provides a bottom-up
approach to counterterrorism information sharing, where federal agencies are designated
with the responsibility to lead terrorism investigations and response (Executive Order No.
13780, 2018).
Kassop (2013) argued that counterterrorism policies, at the national level, are created
based on political influences and executive branch appointees are an extension of that
political influence. Waxman (2012) noted that while federalism is attempted with these
counterterrorism policies, the implementation is mostly uneven across jurisdictions due
to various state and local laws that apply to law enforcement counterterrorism (i.e.,
surveillance, intelligence collection, etc.). The next iteration of counterterrorism policies
became focused more on countering violent extremism and less on counterterrorism, due
to political complexities and the evolution of the policy process (Heydemann, 2014).
Countering Violent Extremism
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011
and updated 2016) was created to provide a guideline for communities, local law
enforcement, and federal agencies to approach the goal of preventing violent extremism
in the United States. In his 2014 Congressional Research Report, Bjelopera explained
that the government’s CVE effort was essentially following a domestic terrorist
counterradicalization model, whereby a path from risky behavior or interactions, then
radicalization to terrorism is ultimately where it leads. The CVE policy includes
incorporating communities at-risk of being targeted by radical groups, training law
enforcement agencies to prevent violent extremism, and stopping radical propaganda
(Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 2016).
Bjelopera (2014) noted that the New York Police Department and the FBI both
maintained their own versions of a domestic CVE model, where they incorporate
community programs and specifically maintain engagement efforts in Muslim
communities, anticipating to be notified of any suspicious activities. The prevention of
HVEs is overseen by the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners
to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 2016 (SIP).
In 2015, there was a significant increase in domestic terrorism events and plots that
were either carried out by or inspired by radical extremist groups, thereby beginning the
conversation for counterterrorism policy reform and a more streamlined approach to
countering extremism (Inserra, 2015). The Heritage Group made several policy
recommendations to Congress including that a static office within DHS be created to
lead an interagency effort to coordinate the response to counter violent extremism
(Heritage Group, 2015). Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States (2015) is focused on local agencies and community groups, indicating
their importance in information sharing and preventing violent extremism (Strategic
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States, 2016). DHS, in turn, took action and created an agency-wide
Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (2016), in
coordination with the DOJ, to reach out to other federal agencies, communities,
academia, and local jurisdictions to counter violent extremism.
Information Sharing
Information sharing is pivotal to the process of terrorism prevention, and the continued
lack of actionable information sharing among law enforcement agencies related to
counterterrorism continues to be a national security risk (Carney, 2015; Foley, 2016;
Peled, 2016). Since 09/11, lawmakers have made information sharing a legislative
priority, leaving project managers to create several national-level programmatic, network,
or policy tools including: the Homeland Security Information Sharing Network, Fusion
Centers, and the Information Sharing Environment (Peled, 2016). The following federal
agencies have a domestic counterterrorism, CVE mission: the DOJ, the FBI, DHS, and
the Department of Defense. However, there is no lead agency responsible from an
operational perspective, which can add to the information sharing confusion (CRS, 2014;
Heritage Group, 2015). After a review of counterterrorism information sharing
breakdowns, the FBI and DHS reported that they have overlaps in their missions and both
feel that coordination and information sharing is conducted based on relationships
(Inspectors General, 2017).
A theoretical model was proposed in Dawes’s (1996) seminal empirical study on how
state program managers share information among agencies and the nuances involved in
such endeavors. Within this model, benefits and barriers to sharing information were
explored in three categories of information: technical, organizational, and political
(Dawes, 1996). Several policy focused recommendations from this study include the
following: a formal legal structure is needed for information sharing to be implemented
properly, information technology needs to be in place, and administrative protocols are
required for proper information sharing (Dawes, 1996, p. 392). In their summative paper,
which provides an overview of scholarly literature on information sharing in the public
sector, Yang and Maxwell (2011) identified three main types of information sharing: 1)
interpersonal, 2) intra-organizational, and 3) inter-organizational. Yang and Maxwell
noted that barriers to information sharing within and between agencies can be removed
by promoting an organizational culture that rewards information sharing and promotes
leadership that does the same. This article provides an excellent synopsis of
recommendations from timely studies related to information sharing. Yang and Maxwell
also posited a complex model that incorporates Dawes’s three categories of information
and the three types of information sharing they identified in their article.
Jackson et al. (2017) conducted a study aimed at creating a tool to measure the
effectiveness of interagency information sharing on criminal justice outcomes, where the
study notes the potential application to counterterrorism information sharing. This study
focused primarily on information sharing systems across jurisdictions and how they
impact specific cases and investigations but noted the complexity with measuring the
effectiveness of information sharing (Jackson et al., 2017). In their study, Roberts et al.
(2012) indicated that while sharing information between law enforcement agencies at the
federal, state, and local level is important to preventing terrorism, so is the proper
implementation of technology platforms and the interoperability among agencies
(Roberts et al., 2012, p. 739). Drake et al. (2004) expanded on Dawes’s (1996) study to
seek to understand the role of subcultures in federal agencies with regard to information
sharing. This study examined three federal agencies, exploring their use of various
sources of data, the interoperability of information systems, and different type of data that
subcultures develop within each agency (Drake et al., 2004). The subcultures identified
within Drake et al.’s study include: bureaucratic, political, and scientific, where they note
that sharing information between these subcultures can even be difficult in the same
government agency because of educational, cultural, or trust backgrounds. The 2013
Boston Marathon bombing highlights continued information sharing gaps between the
FBI and local law enforcement, as noted in The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism
Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings ,which indicates that the FBI did
not share relevant case related information with the local police department (House of
Representatives, 2014). The following is a list of information sharing mechanisms that
federal counterterrorism/CVE established:
Fusion Centers
In an effort to co-locate federal, state and local law enforcement agencies after
09/11 so that they could share information in one space and build upon each other’s
intelligence, fusion centers were created in several cities around the country (Chermak, et
al., 2013). Fusion Centers are sometimes physically located at a federal agency in an
effort to save operational budgets, and are staffed by several different federal, state and
local agencies on an ad-hoc basis (Inspectors General, 2017). Most personnel are required
to have a security clearance and training to obtain and synthesize information processed
through a fusion center (Bjelopera, 2014; Inspectors General, 2017). Among other tasks,
fusion center personnel are responsible for disseminating finished reports to relevant state
and local agencies. However, if there is a lack of knowledge regarding the correct person
who needs the relevant information or if there is no proper security clearance and/or
information technology infrastructure between the two agencies than an information
sharing gap exists (Bjelopera, 2014; Inspectors General, 2017).
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
HSIN is an information system network that DHS created to provide sensitive, but
unclassified information for homeland security or counterterrorism related topics (Peled,
2016). DHS currently operates HSIN at fusion centers, law enforcement agencies, and
DHS locations to provide cross-jurisdictional finished reports (DHS, n.d.).
Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
The ISE is both a policy and a program created as a result of the George W. Bush
administration’s mandate from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. The purpose of the ISE was to create an actionable capability plan to organize all
jurisdictional elements across the country with a counterterrorism mission (Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004). It included the creation of a working
group, which acts as a strategic think-tank and oversight element for information sharing
(ISE-FS-200).
Resistance to Sharing Information
Federalism has aided in the creation of multiple agencies at every level of
government with terrorism prevention responsibilities (Foley, 2016). The law
enforcement agencies in the United States were created purposely in a decentralized
structure so that there would not be large police organizations with jurisdiction over small
towns (Berkley, 1970). Additionally, a decentralized law enforcement structure ensures
that there is no single agency responsible for failure of a single law enforcement issue
(Berkley, 1970). However, today, law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and
local levels all maintain a counterterrorism and HVE prevention role which require the
need to share information (CRS, 2014; DHS, 2015b; SIP;).
It has been suggested that the gap in information sharing between law enforcement
agencies at each level continues due to mistrust, but it is necessary to continue to
strengthen the mechanisms of trust in order to develop a strategy to exchange structured
information (Carney, 2015). Dawes (1996) notes that a network of formal and informal
networks existing within agencies themselves can sometimes make them resist sharing
information in order to hold onto their power (p. 381). Bureaucracy within agencies and a
resistance to change procedures are two other notions that are put forth as continued
counterterrorism information sharing gaps after 09/11 (Foley, 2016;
Inspector’s General, 2017;). Peled (2016) adds that agencies sometimes resist sharing
counterterrorism information with each other because it can show that they have
overlapping missions and they may lose control of future distribution of their data and
access to budgets.
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)
Information Sharing Environment – Function Standard – Suspicious Activity
Reporting Version 1.5.5 (ISE-FS-200) is a policy document that provides guidelines for
the processes and procedures for agencies, with a counterterrorism mission, to report
suspicious behavior or warning information. There is a national SAR Data Repository
(SDR) where personnel submit their SAR reports and the information is only shared with
appropriate agencies (ISE-FS-200). A SAR is a standard report where law enforcement
agencies are required to submit terrorism-related suspicious activity, tip or warning
information. This suspicious information can include individuals taking photographs of
sensitive infrastructure, the purchase of certain chemicals or precursors to bombs,
receiving tips from communities about suspicious persons, etc. (Hewitt, 2014). The SDR
maintains the SAR in one central area in an effort to reduce privacy law and First
Amendment violation concerns (ISE-FS-200). SAR submissions increased by 96%
between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2015 (Inspector Generals, 2017).
In Foley’s (2016) study, he suggests that the overlap in counterterrorism responsibilities
in federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. has caused “informal
routines” (p. 159), where the work among agencies is conducted through interpersonal
relationships that are personality driven. In his research, Foley (2016) conversely presents
that the law enforcement counterterrorism information sharing roles in the United
Kingdom are more formal and structured, due to a more centralized government
structure. It is noted that the nature of the American government system, at each level, is
compartmentalized due to the built in checks and balances, making it inherently unnatural
to share information outside of an agency (Peled, 2016). Foley (2016, p. 155) discusses
agencies difficulty to adapt to a new organizational culture of information sharing and
equally difficult may be related to their responding to terrorism related information
sharing. In Peled’s (2016) research, he notes,
“counterterrorism agencies are designed to be reliable, consistent, and predictable rather
than change with the times” (p. 676).
Terrorism Prevention and HVEs
The terrorism literature has, in large part, discussed terrorism as one cumulative kind of
behavior. Terrorism is a tactic that comes in different forms, and it is both theoretically
and practically restrictive to treat all forms of terrorism as though they were the same
(Combs, 2017). Scholars have noted the benefits of examining specific targets and
tactics separately. Additionally, scholars have indicated that behaviors are not equal in
all circumstances, as some have created typologies within terrorist tactics (Perliger, et
al., 2016). It is important to disaggregate terrorism into specific behaviors yet target and
tactic selections are not made entirely independently of one another (Perliger at al.,
2016).
Counterterrorism measures that protect particular targets or prevent specific tactics
present obstacles to terrorist groups (FBI, 2013). Some targets have been hardened or
protected in such a way that specific tactics have been largely stopped, such as installing
metal detectors at airports and increased security at special events (Hewitt, 2014). In
response to information about security measures, a terrorist group may revise its targets
or learn a new way of attacking the same target (Miller, 2013).
Beyond protecting targets and preventing tactics, both scholars and policymakers have
directed their focus in determining how to counter radicalization before a terrorist act has
occurred. Davies (2016) argues that violent extremist behavior can be addressed prior to
inception through education in a community. An emerging field in international
academia called Preventing Violent Extremism – Education (PVE-E) is taught in
universities as a program (Davies, 2016) aimed at discovery for the cause and removal of
violent ideologies in neighborhoods (Davies, 2016; Heydemann, 2014). Fink (2014)
notes that the CVE field is rooted in both the counter radicalization and conflict
resolution fields, and also posits that it is the evolution of traditional counterterrorism.
As identified in the previous policy section, a White House level strategy was developed
to address a standardized approach for preventing violent extremism at the local level in
the U.S. (Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent
Violent Extremism in the United States, 2016). A federal level CVE Task Force was
created to execute this plan and was instructed to do the following:
Community collaboration with state and local law enforcement can address gang
violence, hate crimes, and other public safety issues, including violent extremism.
Federal departments and agencies, in partnership with state and local law enforcement,
will encourage and expand successful community policing models and increase their
scope to also address recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism (Strategic
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States, 2016, pg. 9).
Horgan (2014) argues that CVE efforts should never be seen as a “top-down” (p. 3)
issue, but a community driven matter to be addressed if one is to think they can actually
approach countering extremist behavior. Parker (2014) presents that the current research
in CVE is helpful in garnering “insights” (p. 3), but it should not be seen as applicable in
peacekeeping approaches or answers to the actual problems at hand. Academics seem to
agree that the field of CVE has much to explore before the application of research
principles should be implemented in the field (Davies, 2016; Horgan, 2014; Parker;
2014).
In 2015 alone, 57 HVE events or plots occurred in the U.S. (The Heritage
Foundation). HVEs are the current greatest threat to the homeland and one of the most
difficult to detect (Comey, 2014). Because HVEs are inspired by ideologies of terrorist
groups outside of the United States, the radicalization process is different than typical
terrorists; HVEs can be self-radicalized using the Internet (Cohen, 2016). The use of
social media is used as a recruitment tool to inspire HVEs, and as TTPs continue to
change, it is increasingly more difficult for law enforcement to detect and prevent attacks
(ISIL Online, 2016). HVEs can become radicalized in a short amount of time, and, in
most cases, are self-trained (Cohen, 2016). Much like intelligence agents target and
recruit spies, international terrorist groups are using social media tools to identify specific
people and recruit them to carry out attacks in the name of a terrorist ideology (Cohen,
2016; ISIL Online, 2016).
In an effort to determine if terrorism events can be predicted and prevented,
LaFree & Bersani (2014) studied domestic terrorist attacks from 1990 to 2011 using the
Global Terrorism Database data set. Their study found that these terrorist events were
planned primarily in non-urban locations and carried out in counties across the United
States with a high level of urbanization and foreign-born inhabitants with instability and a
high degree of language disparity (LaFree & Bersani, 2014). Pelfrey (2014) notes that as
HVEs have become an increasing threat, he builds on Lafree & Bersani’s (2014) work
and suggests that local law enforcement can work in their communities at events that
represent diversity in an effort to recognize and stop the radicalization process. LaFree &
Bersani’s (2014) work made note of the importance of local law enforcement’s ability to
impact the prevention of the radicalization process through community engagement and
information sharing. Wormeli (2014) suggests that the policy-level implications of
LaFree & Bersani’s (2014) work should take careful consideration to not apply
government resources to highly urbanized cities with a densely populated foreign-born,
multi-lingual residency. Instead, Wormeli (2014) suggests building on this research and
focusing on the community policing aspect that LaFree & Bersani’s (2014) research
posits and adds that information sharing regarding suspicious behaviors and incidents is
important. Finally, Wormeli (2014) underlines that this approach can assist in HVE
behavior identification also.
Community Policing
The previously mentioned research brings up community policing as a concept that is
gaining increasing popularity in both the scholarly and policy research areas in its
application to terrorism prevention. Thomas (2016) notes that as local law enforcement
officers are heavily involved in their community through community policing,
information is shared with them due to two-way trust that is developed. Learning about a
community, including its culture, languages, pockets of crime, and what is normal and
abnormal for the community can also be obtained from community policing and can also
be labeled community intelligence (Thomas, 2016). Chermak et al.’s (2013) study
emphasized the importance of the flow of information between a community and a local
law enforcement agency and the significance it has on the application of intelligence
collection on radicalizing individuals.
Local Law Enforcement
Local law enforcement agencies are in a unique position to obtain threat and
warning indicators about potential HVE attacks, which can assist in the prevention of
those attacks (Cohen, 2016; Hewitt, 2014; The Heritage Foundation, 2015; Pelfrey, 2014;
Randol, 2013). When it comes to domestic terrorism and obtaining HVE indicators,
Davis (2016) suggests that local law enforcement information sharing and partnerships
are the most important strategies. The use of fusion centers as a tool for terrorism related
information sharing was also found to be helpful for law enforcement in identifying
threats (Chermak et al., 2013). Cohen (2016) indicates that in the detection of
radicalization behavior, local law enforcement is best suited to use a community policing
approach. However, Cohen (2106) notes that local law enforcement should rely more
heavily on community leaders (i.e., religious, mental health and educators) to be more
hands-on prior to any law enforcement interventions.
In his study of law enforcement tactics and their effectiveness with 20 incidents of
domestic terrorism and 38 incidents of terrorism prevention, Hewitt (2014) identified the
following:
Table 1
Law Enforcement Tactics Used in Domestic Terrorism Incidents
Recent Domestic Attacks: Information Sharing Gaps A brief
account of three recent domestic HVE attacks are provided in the following section
Tactic Terrorism
Attacks
Lone
Wolves
Terrorist
Cells
Terrorism
Prevention
Surveillance X X
Informants X X X X
Routine
Policing
X
Information
from Public
X
Witness
Identification
X
with information derived from scholarly and government reports regarding the law
enforcement information sharing gaps that occurred leading up to the events.
Pulse Nightclub Attack
In June 2016, Omar Mateen open fired at the patrons of the Pulse Nightclub in
Orlando, Florida, resulting in the death of 49 people and the injury of approximately 50
additional more (Beydoun, 2018; Crawford, 2017). Omar Mateen was born into an
Afghan-American family, was a practicing Muslim, but was also known through his
social media postings to have views that were closely associated with foreign terrorist
organizations (Beydoun, 2018; Wilber, 2016). It was revealed that the FBI investigated
him between 2013 and 2014, and after surveilling him and interviewing him twice, they
closed his case (Wilber, 2016). After the Pulse Nightclub attack, an FBI gap analysis of
their investigation identified that Omar Mateen’s social media records were not reviewed,
which they assessed would have allowed them to determine that he had espoused
ideology or actual ties with the Islamic State (Beydoun, 2018; Wilber, 2016).
Fort Hood Attack
In 2009, a U.S. Army soldier, Nidal Malik Hasan, attacked the front entrance at a
U.S. Army base in Fort Hood, Texas where he injured approximately 30 and killed 13
people (Peled, 2016). This example of an HVE was difficult to detect prior to the event
because he was self-radicalized on the Internet, and although he made some comments
about not agreeing with the war in Afghanistan to his colleagues, he did not exhibit
extremist behavior to his fellow soldiers before his attack (Weimann, 2012). However,
his online behavior illustrated his extremist views, as Weimann (2012) notes, he
communicated with a known terrorist and created extremist propaganda material. In
2010, Hasan’s Fort Hood attack was found on a jihadist website as an example for
inspiration for other HVE attackers to commit terrorist attacks (Weimann, 2012).
San Bernardino Attack
In 2015, 14 people were killed and over 20 others were injured at the Inland
Regional Center (IRC) in San Bernardino, California by an HVE attack carried out by
U.S. citizen Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik (Lee, et al., 2016; Nowrasteh,
2016). The TTPs used included arriving in a rented vehicle, parking outside of the (IRC),
where Farook worked, and quickly firing more than 100 .233 caliber rounds around the
front room of the office building, before they exited and left in the vehicle (Braziel et al.,
2016). Three secondary homemade bombs were also found, that were left by Farook, and
later removed by a local bomb squad (Braziel et al., 2016). After Farook and Malik were
killed by local law enforcement officers, the detonators to the homemade bombs,
hundreds more .233 caliber rounds, first aid supplies and handguns were found in the
rented vehicle (Braziel et al., 2016).
Contingency Theory Overview
Contingency theory is used in this study as a basis for understanding and
explaining the way law enforcement agencies adapt and respond. “The theory’s logic is
evident in a number of ‘thought’ or prescriptive pieces arguing for the need for change in
law enforcement organizations in order to address homeland security matters,” (Burruss,
et al., 2010). Contingency theory is the basis for this study because it seeks to explain the
complex relationship of the external environment of government organizations (law
enforcement organizations at each level) and how it impacts the success of the
organization (Donaldson, 2001).
Contingency theory is rooted in leadership research and seeks to explain how
leaders are motivated to make decisions for an organization (Hoffman-Miller, 2013).
Fiedler (1964) developed the contingency model in response to his research surrounding
group behavior in the workplace in response to leadership styles. In his work, Fielder
(1964) found that work groups had similar goals to achieve a collective outcome and the
success of that group’s leader was contingent on the group’s performance. Further,
Fielder (1964) postulated that certain traits (i.e. personality, background, perception of
the group, etc.) of the leader impacted his/her success with the organizational group.
Donaldson (2001) is renowned as the researcher that added to Fiedler’s (1964)
contingency theory of leadership and applied it more heavily to the organization. In his
research, Donaldson (2001) put forward that there are many ways an organization can
become structurally successful, and there is not one model that is best for all
organizations. Donaldson (2001, 2006) added to his work and created the structural
contingency theory, which argues that organizations will adjust themselves to succeed as
new contingencies arise to arrange for the best structural fit. The new contingencies, in
the structural contingency theory, can be changes in organizational size, policies, budgets,
personnel, technology, and others. Donaldson’s (2001, 2006) theory posits that the
organization will adjust to fit with the new contingencies but delineates the difference in
organizational performance based on whether the contingencies originated inside or
outside of the organization. Further, Donaldson labeled his research, structural adaptation
to regain fit (SARFIT) model when an organization adjusts to external environmental
changes to increase performance (Donaldson, 2001, 2006; Haynes and Giblin 2014).
Zhao et al. (2010) used contingency theory in their empirical research to study local
police department organizational structures from 1990-2000. In their research, they
analyzed the impact that differences in technology, organizational size, and
environmental complexities had on police departments as an organization. One such
environmental complexity analyzed was the impact community oriented policing (COP)
activities had on municipalities, as a result of the 1994 Crime Control Act (Zhao et al.,
2010, p. 222). The initial additional intent of COP was to modify the control and
administration portion of a police department, replace the police department’s staff with
civilians in areas that are in the office and do not require police work, and also compress
the hierarchy system in the organization (Zhao et al., 2010). Their study, using
contingency theory, found that police department’s organizational structure remained
mostly unchanged, even after the principles of COP had been implemented. Roberts et
al. (2012) used contingency theory in their local law enforcement terrorism preparedness
study, where they sought to explain how large local enforcement agencies adjusted to
contingency factors like terrorism vulnerability, organizational elements and activities to
explain relationship aspects of terrorism preparedness. In this study, Roberts et al. (2012),
divided the elements of terrorism preparedness into prevention, response, and recovery.
Roberts et al. (2012) noted that contingency theory is an appropriate method to analyze
police agencies because of their organizational design, multiple policy changes that
occur, and external environmental factors (p. 722). Contingency theory illustrates the
importance of the contingencies external to the organizational design and the reaction it
creates internal to the agency (Donaldson, 2001;
Donaldson, 2006).
In this study, contingency theory was used as the basis to explore how law enforcement
agencies adapt to the changing terrorism prevention policy of information sharing in an
environment where HVEs are also adapting their TTPs. To further breakdown the
concept of contingency theory, as it relates to this study, the notion includes: when HVE
threat information is not shared between law enforcement agencies (i.e. the
counterterrorism prevention policy is not implemented properly), then the country is not
safe from terrorism. As for contingency theory, when a contingent is not followed
(information sharing), the organization is not “fit” and successful (Donaldson, 2001,
2006).
Summary
There is a significant gap in current academic literature surrounding law enforcement
HVE prevention information sharing. Counterterrorism policies have been implemented
and revised to address the issue of terrorism prevention information sharing since 09/11,
but the challenge remains for law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local
levels. This research seeks to fill the gap in literature by using a local law enforcement
agency and the Boston Marathon Bombing as a case study and explores contingency
theory to explain how the terrorism prevention policy of information sharing was
implemented prior to the Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013. The following chapter
three discusses the qualitative methodology in greater detail, including the case study
research design.
Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study is to develop an understanding of the
information sharing gap that takes place among law enforcement agencies in HVE cases,
as identified in the literature review. In this chapter, I provide a detailed overview of the
case study research design, the data collection and analysis procedures and how they are
addressed with this particular case, and how trustworthiness is accomplished. This
chapter outlines the methodology for the qualitative case study of the Boston Marathon
Bombing in Boston, Massachusetts in April 2013 and the procedures taken to accomplish
the study.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions
The research questions that are examined in this study include the following:
RQ1: What level of HVE information is shared by federal agencies with local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ2: What level of HVE information is shared by state agencies with local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ3: What level of HVE information is shared between local law enforcement agencies
and other law enforcement agencies?
Qualitative Research Methodology
This study uses a qualitative case study design to examine a relevant, recent HVE
case in an immersive setting by using the data set of a local law enforcement agency, that
responded to the Boston Marathon Bombing HVE attack in 2013 (Creswell, 2013).
Qualitative research is regarded as a methodology that results in detailed conclusions
from primary data analysis that may provide a tool for practitioners and add to the body
of scholarly literature (Creswell, 2013; Lewis, 2015; Yin, 2012) in the arena of law
enforcement information sharing in HVE cases. The focus of this case study design is
from the perspective of participants allowing me, as the researcher, to gain in-depth
knowledge of the data by speaking with them as the subject matter experts (i.e., the police
officers and administrators; Creswell, 2013; Lewis, 2015; Yin, 2012). With the use of this
qualitative methodology, researchers can combine rigorous information exploration and
provide personal results, revealing an explanation and a greater knowledge of the
occurrence (Creswell, 2013; Lewis, 2015; Yin, 2012). Researchers are regarded as key
instruments in data collection in a case study and they use their application of deductive
reasoning skills throughout the case study design, data collection, and data analysis
process (Lewis, 2015). In this case study, I explored what level of information sharing
occurred within the local law enforcement agency with regard to the Boston Marathon
Bombing HVE attack in 2013.
Case Study Design
Yin (2012) noted that there are three crucial steps to consider in case study
research, including the case definition, selection of case study design, and the application
of a theoretical framework in the design. In applying Yin’s guidelines, this study
addresses law enforcement information sharing gaps in HVE cases. The specific case
highlighted for studying this is the Boston Marathon Bombing in Boston, Massachusetts
that occurred on April 15, 2013. The second step in the case study approach is to decide
on the design of the case study itself. One may select the case study designs from holistic
single case, embedded single case, holistic multiple case, and embedded multiple case
(Yin, 2012). This study is an embedded, single case study because it examines the how
and why information is shared and the case study includes a single organization (Yin,
2012, pg. 7). The third step in designing a case study is the application of a theoretical
framework in the case study design (Yin, 2012). As noted in greater detail previously, in
Chapter 3, contingency theory is used as a manner to explain the theoretical framework of
this case.
Case study design has an explicit emphasis on a definite event, but the design is
open to the investigation of the process (Hancock & Algozzine, 2015). This research can
assist in (a) discovering causal relationships, (b) understanding how and why everything
has happened in a confident way, and (c) creating robust, interesting, and easily readable
descriptions, and rich understanding of occurrences in their typical settings (Yin, 2012).
A purposive sampling is the key to this case study design, which regards the participants
of this study as individuals and requires active participation by me, as the researcher, in
the data collection process (Yin, 2012). In this study, I collected the data by means of
interviews directed with open-ended questions (Malhotra, 2012). In addition, I conducted
document reviews on information sharing during the data collection phase (Yin, 2012).
Participant Selection and Research Site
One primary local law enforcement agency responsible for responding and follow-on
investigation for the Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013 was studied. Because of this,
participants of this case study were representatives from the law enforcement agency.
The planned research site was the headquarters office of the agency. However, due to
COVID-19 and the impact it had on the department, the interviews were conducted using
Zoom. A Letter of Cooperation was obtained stating that I had authorization to interview
the participants and gain access to documents, as appropriate, for research purposes.
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I was responsible for collecting the data by conducting the interviews,
reviewing documents and making observations. I do not have any personal or
professional relationships with the law enforcement agency, which was the focus of the
case study. While I have professional experience that has given me knowledge of law
enforcement counterterrorism policy and the information sharing process, I do not have
authority or ability to provide grants to the agency. Additionally, I do not currently work
for the federal government. Therefore, there were no ethical concerns with data
collection. It should also be noted that I do not have any research bias associated with this
particular case, especially as it relates to how the law enforcement agency responded to
the Boston Marathon Bombing. I made clear of this fact to all participants prior to and
during the interviews so that they did have their guards up when responding to my
interview questions. I ensured to delineate to the participants that I was interested in
learning about the information sharing procedures and I was not conducting my research
to determine errors that occurred in their response to the Boston Marathon Bombing.
Sampling Strategy and Size
Numerous purposeful sampling designs exist. Purposeful sampling is a method
that is commonly used as a sampling strategy when a researcher is aiming to obtain the
most information saturated cases while also making the best use of time and resources
(Patton, 2002). This process identifies those that are the most informed about the case or
occurrence that is being studied (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Saturation of the sample
size and quality is an important principle within a qualitative sampling strategy (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). The design chosen for this study is the interview of a selection of
participants involved in the management of the Boston Marathon Bombing case. The
sample began by my introduction of this study to a senior level officer at the law
enforcement agency who previously provided a counterterrorism briefing about the
bombing to a group of my peers. From this introduction, I determined how to obtain the
necessary approvals from the agency and also elicited names of officers that 1) responded
to the attack, 2) investigated the attack, and/or 3) handled counterterrorism prevention
policy for the agency. This was a purposive sampling strategy (Palinkas et al., 2015).
During the interviews, I also asked, “Who else do I need to speak to?” This was a
snowball effect to the sampling strategy (Palinkas et al., 2015). In the purposive sampling
strategy, from the data that I collected, I sought to obtain patterns and themes of
information (Yin, 2012). Sampling continued until saturation was achieved. The
saturation involved repetition of themes and information (Yin, 2012).
Data Collection
I followed a communication plan for recruitment of study participants. Once I
received the initial set of names from the senior officer that I previously mentioned, I
began by sending an individual introduction email to each person. This email included
the following:
▪A descriptive overview of the study;
▪An attachment of the consent form;
▪Information about the participant’s right within the study, including the right
to withdraw from the study, and information about confidentiality throughout
the entire study;
▪An estimated amount of time that the participant will likely spend at the
interview and follow-up; and
▪A request for a response and some suggested dates for interview availability.
I followed up each email with a phone call for potential participants that did
not respond within 1 week or for those respondents with questions. After all
interviews were scheduled, I confirmed them by sending an email with a
Zoom meeting link that included the date and time of their interview and
instructions for the Zoom meeting. I also had a communicating plan in place
that had the participant’s preferred method of communication (i.e. email,
phone call, text message). This ensured that I received a more rapid response
when communicating with participants. I made note of their preference in
their coded file.
Participants were not offered any stipends. I informed participants that their
interview transcripts were available to them within seven days of their interview for their
review. They were also provided with a detailed account of the data privacy procedures.
This study maintained a low amount of risk to the participants due to the many data
protection and privacy measures that were taken. After the data analysis was complete, I
provided the participants, via email, with a copy of the conclusions drawn from their
interview and collection of interviews as a whole.
Instrumentation
I developed an interview protocol to guide the interviews for this study, as there was not
an applicable one that I could replicate. I asked questions that began with
“describe how” and “explain” in order to elicit robust responses (Yin, 2012).
Additionally, even though I conducted open-ended interviews with potential follow-up
questions, my interview protocol formed the basis for each interview in order to guide the
interviews appropriately and follow a standard time parameter. The specific questions
were designed to gain an understanding of how information is shared in the law
enforcement agency and with other law enforcement agencies, specifically related to
HVE threats or other counterterrorism information. The interview protocol was
specifically developed to answer the research questions pertaining to this study and was
guided by a matrix format that outlined each research question and mapped it to
interview questions associated with that topic area (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). I ensured
that I included introductory questions, main questions, transitional questions, and closing
questions within the interview protocol so that the interview flowed like a conversation
(Creswell, 2007). While I did not conduct an official pilot phase of the interview
protocol, I practiced asking the questions out loud several times, as well as asking the
questions to my peers, so that I had the flow in place prior to conducting the interviews.
The procedures of mapping my research questions with interview questions in a matrix,
narrowing down the questions, and informally testing the interview protocol are all steps
to increase reliability of the interview protocol (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
Data Collection and Management
Data preservation and participant confidentiality was followed at all times during the
data collection phase of this study. While data management began during the literature
review phase, it was increasingly important as I began planning the data collection and
analysis processes. Both my home and laptop computers are password protected and
maintain firewall protection. I have passwords on all of my wireless Internet service
connections and also maintain a virtual private network on my computers and cell
phones. These security procedures ensure that no unauthorized access to participant
records were retrieved at any time or will be in the future. Additionally, my home has a
security system and video monitoring system.
I recorded the audio portion of the interviews through Zoom, downloaded the files
onto my computer, which was backed up to a cloud network, and transcribed the
interview into a Microsoft Word document. I maintained a file folder that locks, and I
placed the key in a different secure location. I kept the documents that I needed to store in
this locked folder. This type of file folder is one that the U.S. government uses to keep
classified documents safe. It is also important to note that I did not keep any files with
participants’ names or identifying information. Instead, I created a coding methodology
in a separate password-protected file that no one else had access to. These codes provided
the manner by which each interview was coded. During the interviews, I took field notes
and ensured the notes were coded for each participant and locked and stored properly.
The data that I collected will be stored for at least 5 years. In order to organize the data
obtained from the interviews, I used NVivo software. NVivo is qualitative data analysis
software that was used to transcribe the audio recordings, display data, assisted in
developing patterns and themes, and drawing conclusions (Miles et al., 2014).
Data Analysis
The initial stage in the data analysis process was to upload the interviews to NVivo and
examine the data for patterns and themes for the purpose of coding (Miles et al., 2014).
Data organization was achieved, and manual coding was done for supporting the
iteration process (Yin, 2012). As a first step, prior to using the NVivo software,
researchers can take a first attempt at coding, categorizing, and editing phase (Miles et
al., 2014). I explored the participant’s responses and made a first attempt at
patternrecognition with connections of distinctive-wording in explanations of vital
attributes of answers (Miles et al., 2014). I then used the NVivo software to analyze the
transcripts directly from the interviews. The software conducted a pattern analysis that
emphasized key themes corresponding to interview items that synchronized with the
research questions (Miles et al., 2014).
A database of the case study was created in NVivo, and included some of my field
notes, the organizational documents obtained, and was combined for consolidating. In
this study, triangulation was an important analysis technique (Bekhet & Zauszniewski,
2012). The triangulation of data gained support from more than a single source of
evidence such as documents, archival records, and open-ended interviews. A procedure
for tactically evaluating the case study may take the form of pattern matching that
encompasses correlating all data collected so far to the theoretical framework while
dealing with the responses to the research questions. Descriptions were derived from the
themes that were developed so that narratives could also be formed (Miles et al., 2014;
Yin, 2012).
Research Quality
In qualitative research, research quality is important as it pertains to the trustworthiness
of the results of the study (Korstjens and Moser, 2018). Lincoln and Guba (1985) indicate
that the main elements of trustworthiness for a qualitative study include credibility,
transferability, dependability, conformability, and reflexivity.
Credibility
The issue of trustworthiness is important for many reasons. First, it is important for the
internal validity of this study to establish credibility through the dataset (Lincoln & Guba,
1985). This includes ensuring that the sample is saturated (i.e., obtaining more
participants will not produce more data). It also means that I have recurring and
prolonged contact with the participants. Throughout the data collection and data analysis
phase, I was in contact with each participant on a recurring basis. Credibility is also
obtained in this study through the use of different methods of data triangulation (Miles et
al., 2014).
Dependability
As mentioned previously, to ensure reliability or dependability, I provided participants
with a copy of the interview transcripts so that they were able to validate the transcripts
and ensure accuracy (Creswell, 2007). Additionally, without causing any confidentiality
concerns, I provided a draft aggregate of the theme analysis results for a peer review
(Miles et al., 2014) to each participant, individually, via email. They had the ability to
comment through a simple Word document form and state if they had any feedback with
the preliminary results. This process of documenting and describing the records keeping
of this study is considered an audit trail (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and increases
dependability of the data.
Confirmability and Reflexivity
I maintained a research diary during the data collection and analysis phase that included
a review of my own potential biases that may arise and self-reflection (Korstjens &
Moser, 2018, p. 121; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). While conducting my research, I did not
foresee any biases. However, the use of a diary to explore the research thought process
while collecting data assists in reducing bias and allows a researcher to be critical of
oneself (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). Finally, the use of the NVivo software assisted with
confirmability, as it explored patterns and themes within the interviews and field notes,
and removed the potential for researcher’s preconceived notions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Ethical Considerations
Prior to speaking and interviewing anyone in the law enforcement agency, I let
each potential participant know that all aspects of the study would be aggregated and the
answers to their interview questions are completely confidential. Additionally, I informed
them that no other person within the law enforcement agency or outside of this study
would be able to obtain their identifying information. This step is important due to the
potential political or career concerns that participants may have had prior to participating.
Once a person tentatively agreed to participate in this study, I provided them with a
Consent Form and requested them to review it, sign it and provide it back to me. I let
participants know that they could withdraw from the study at any time. No participants
chose to withdraw from this study prior to completion.
It was especially important for me, as the researcher and data collector, to inform all
participants of the data storage procedures also. I let them know that their information
was password protected and that all notes would be stored as identified in the data
management section. The participants were informed that once their interviews were
transcribed and reviewed by them, the original audio recordings were then deleted to add
an additional layer of confidentiality. The only people that had access to the data within
the study were my dissertation committee and myself; however, my committee would
only have access to the data without participant’s personal identifying information.
Additionally, it is important to note that Institution Review Board approval was obtained
prior to reaching out any potential participant.
Summary
A case study design applies to the analysis of the problem statement (Yin, 2012).
This chapter highlights the case study research design and explores how with the use of
an interview guide protocol I cultivated a narrative through the analysis of the responses
to the questions and development of themes. In this chapter, elements of participant
recruitment and communication are discussed. A detailed discussion on instrumentation,
data analysis, trustworthiness, and ethical procedures was also established. In the
following chapter, I discuss the results of this case study research.
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter, I provide a background of the baseline investigative details of the
Boston Marathon Bombing. I also include the results of my case study where I used open-
ended questions to gain an understanding of law enforcement information sharing in a
homegrown violent extremism case. The participants were law enforcement professionals
who had a role in the response of the Boston Marathon Bombing and who have
knowledge of interagency counterterrorism law enforcement information sharing. The
case study design allowed qualitative data collection through open-ended interviews using
Zoom as a method for communication. In this chapter, I will explore the setting that was
used for the study, the demographics of the study participants, the data collection
procedures, a representation of the data analysis, an overview of the evidence of
trustworthiness, the research findings, and a summary of the study.
Boston Marathon Bombing Background
The Russian-born and Boston residents Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev used
simple, yet destructive TTPs by making improvised explosive devises that caused
approximately 260 injuries and three deaths at the Boston Marathon finish line in 2013
(Cohen, 2016; Peled, 2016). Prior to the bombing, in 2011, the FBI received information
from the Russian Federal Security Service regarding the possibility that Tamerlan
Tsarnaev was planning to travel to Russia for purposes of radicalization (House of
Representatives, 2014). At the time, both Tsarnaev brothers were living in the Boston
area and were questioned by the FBI, but local law enforcement was not notified of any
potential threat (House of Representatives, 2014; Peled, 2016). The FBI questioned
Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his parents but found them to have no terrorism connection
(House of Representatives, 2014; Peled, 2016). Tamerlan Tsarnaev eventually traveled to
Russia in 2012, despite being on a terrorism travel watch list (Peled, 2016). It is unknown
if Tamerlan Tsarnaev was radicalized through a friend that he met in the United States
and inspired him to travel to overseas for training or if he was radicalized while he was in
Russia (House of Representatives, 2014). In their investigative findings, the House of
Representatives (2014) determined that the FBI should have shared the potential threat
information with local law enforcement and Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel when
it was received from the Russian government.
Setting
Based on the Institutional Review Board (IRB) recommendation, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the participant interviews were completed using Zoom. This
method worked well for the participants due to their varied schedules in law enforcement.
Upon receiving IRB approval, I sent an email to a senior level representative in the law
enforcement agency, who then approved me to begin the study by providing a signed
Letter of Cooperation Form and Consent Form. All interviews were conducted in the
August 2021 – September 2021 timeframe. I requested in advance that all participants
hold their Zoom interview in a private location, and I verified at the beginning of their
interviews that they were alone where no one else were able to listen to their responses.
The purpose of the request for privacy was to ensure that there was no outside influence
or any extenuating factors that could have impacted how they provided their response.
Demographics
The eight study participants had direct knowledge of the Boston Marathon
Bombing based on their participation in planning for the event, participating in the Boston
Marathon in a law enforcement capacity, and responding to the aftermath. I coded each of
the participants by numbering them one through eight, which I also ensured that I coded
their interview transcript and field notes with their participant code. Three of the
participants have a master’s degree in homeland security studies, which they explained
provided them with a knowledge and understanding of counterterrorism issues as it
pertains to law enforcement. Two of the participants relayed that their spouse works in
law enforcement intelligence; one of them felt that gave him some additional benefit if
threat related information was needed because he could ask his spouse for assistance.
Participant demographics are included in the following Table 2.
Table 2
Participant Demographics
Participant ID Gender Rank during
Boston Marathon
Bombing
Education Military or
operational
counterterrorism
training
1 Male Lieutenant
detective
Master’s degree Yes
2 Female Officer Bachelor’s degree Yes
3 Male Lieutenant Master’s degree No
4 Male Lieutenant
detective
Master’s degree Yes
5 Male Deputy chief Bachelor’s degree No
6 Male Lieutenant
detective
Bachelor’s
Degree
N
o
7 Male Lieutenant High school Ye
s
8 Male Civilian Bachelor’s degree
Ye
s
While the rank of the participants is currently different because they had been
promoted, they provided what their rank was at the timeframe of the Boston Marathon
Bombing. One participant was in a senior administrative supervisory position, two were
supervisory detectives, one was a mid-level supervisor, one was a mid-level
nonsupervisor, one was a patrol officer, one was a public safety officer, and one was a
civilian in a supervisory logistics position. One participant held a security clearance.
Several years prior to the bombing, one of the supervisory detectives was detailed to the
NCTC in Washington, D.C., and while there, he created a law enforcement intelligence
product that was and is currently disseminated to fusion centers across the country.
Data Collection
This qualitative case study uses eight participants to examine their understanding of law
enforcement counterterrorism information sharing in homegrown violent extremism
cases using the Boston Marathon Bombing as the case study. The participants all had
direct knowledge of the case. One face-to-face interview using Zoom was conducted with
seven participants, and one participant interview was conducted through a Zoom voice
only call. It should be noted that the Zoom voice only interview yielded just as rich
responses as the face-to-face interviews. The interviews lasted between 33 and 55
minutes. At the beginning of each interview, I requested permission to record the
interviews with audio only, and I received verbal permission to record the audio
interview from all participants. The audio was recorded using the Zoom feature, and the
data file was stored in an encrypted folder on my computer. Upon completion of each
interview, I transcribed it into a Word file and then deleted the audio file from my
computer. Additionally, I ensured that there were no audio files maintained in Zoom. I
kept the coded Word file transcripts of each interview in an encrypted folder on my
computer. There was no identifying participant information stored at any time either
electronically or in hand-written notes associated with my interviews.
An interview protocol with 14 open-ended questions was used for each participant
interview. Additionally, I asked follow-up questions to elicit more detailed responses. For
example, when participants provided a short response to a question or appeared like they
had additional information related to a specific question, I asked the following:
▪“Can you explain that in more detail?”
▪“Do you have an example of that?”
Furthermore, if there was a response to a question that required clarification or that
needed additional explanation (Creswell & Creswell, 2018), I asked the following:
▪“Let me repeat this to you to ensure I understand correctly.”
▪When you say _____, are you referring to _____?”
During each interview, field notes were also taken. The field notes documented the
additional background information that the participants provided, such as their
experiences during the bombing itself, their educational background, and other
information that I observed while they were talking.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Throughout the data collection and analysis process, I maintained contact with the
participants through their preferred methods of communication. I also maintained
trustworthiness through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Credibility
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the data set was determined to be complete when
saturation was reached (Creswell, 2013). After the sixth interview, it was noted that the
participants were providing rich data, and by the eighth participant interview, nothing
new was being revealed. Therefore, after the eighth participant interview, it was clear that
this study had reached its saturation point (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). After each
interview, the audio transcripts were transcribed into Word documents, using only the
participant codes with no identifying information. Each participant was provided the
opportunity to review and edit their transcript to ensure accuracy.
Transferability
The data analysis included in this chapter includes rich descriptions which allows the
applicability of this study to be used by other researchers in future studies (Creswell,
2013). The participant responses were analyzed, coded, and developed into themes in an
effort to provide detailed findings that are applicable for future research. Additionally,
the participants’ demographics are provided and illustrate similar demographics of other
local law enforcement jurisdictions.
Dependability
I had no changes to the strategies in Chapter 3 regarding dependability.
Additionally, as mentioned in the previous data collection section, I ensured that during
the interviews, if the participants provided a response to a question that I had difficulty
interpreting, I repeated it back to them until I gained a full understanding. Dependability
was also achieved by reviewing and analyzing the audio interview transcripts with
handwritten field notes, and cross-checking those with the final transcripts.
Confirmability
I had no changes to the strategies that I included in Chapter 3 with regard to
confirmability. For example, I took field notes as a manner of self-auditing and reflection
of the study to ensure that I reduced the possibility of bias as I proceeded through the
study (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). Additionally, I maintained a research diary whereby I
analyzed the interviews and made a series of draft codes prior to entering the interview
transcripts into NVivo.
Data Analysis
In order to analyze the data, I first input the transcribed interviews into NVivo 12 for
Mac. Creswell and Creswell (2018) suggested that qualitative data analysis is best
completed using computer software because it stores and sorts the data into patterns and
themes. It is noted that while the researcher is still required to review, code, and develop
themes, qualitative analysis software assists with the process. Because of this, even after I
transcribed the interviews, each transcribed interview was reviewed three times. I created
a word cloud using NVivo that illustrated the words that were repeated more than six
times by each participant, which contained four letters or more. Figure 1 illustrates the
word cloud.
Figure 1
Word Cloud: Top 6 Most Repeated Words From Participant Interviews
I then developed first and second cycle codes (Saldana, 2016). The first cycle codes were
developed as a result of the interview questions. Second cycle coding (Saldana, 2016)
allowed me to reorganize the codes and provided a more descriptive picture of the data
by merging it into smaller groups.
Moving From Codes to Categories to Themes
The next step in the data analysis process was developing themes using NVivo.
The coded interviews were reviewed and re-coded (Saldana, 2016) using a “splitter
coding” method, which analyzed the social action within the data (pg. 24). I then
reviewed the codes for a third time and revised any codes that should be grouped together
(Saldana, 2016). I then moved to the process of inductive coding in order to develop
categories from the codes, which were identified utilizing NVivo (Saldana, 2016). From
the categories that were identified, I originally developed four themes. I eventually
divided one of the themes into two separate themes, as detailed in the narrative about
Theme 1. The following Table 3 illustrates the progression from Codes to Categories to
Themes.
Table 3
Codes, Categories, and Themes
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Community policing
Preparation meetings
Reports
disseminated from
BRIC Emails from
BRIC Interagency
working group
Threat briefing specific
to event
▪
Type of information
sharing
Methods of information
sharing leading to Boston
Marathon bombing
▪
▪
▪
▪
Police Radio
Command Center
Cell phone
Email
▪
▪
Interagency response
to bombing
Understanding of
bombers
Methods of information
sharing during and after
Boston Marathon
bombing
Code Category Theme
▪
▪
Printed Photo
Word of mouth
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Lack of security
clearance
Some do not check
their email State and
federal agencies do
not share with local
agencies Territorial
with case
information Power
struggle
▪
▪
▪
Examples of lack of
info sharing Limited
state information
sharing Limited
federal information
sharing
Barriers to information
sharing
▪
▪
▪
▪
BRIC will send
information
Federal agencies will
share if there is a
threat FBI will share
threats with fusions
centers if necessary
BRIC obtains
information and sends
it when there is a
threat
▪
Lack of
communication post
9/11
Trust/Reliance (that
information is or will
be shared)
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Not aware of any
policy changes
Social media
policy changes
Interagency
exercises
implemented and
funded
Intelligence Bulletins
sent weekly instead of
monthly
HVE education and
awareness across
department since
bombing Desired
written decision-
making policy
▪
▪
Increased local info
sharing
Policy changes desired
for improved
interagency info
sharing
Changes to information
sharing policy
(incorporated or desired)
for incident response
Creswell, J.W. and Creswell, J.D. (2018) suggests that five to seven themes are
the appropriate number to develop “major findings” for a qualitative study (pg. 194). The
codes holistically fit clearly within five themes. As Saldana (2016) illustrates, the themes
emerged from the coding into greater “concepts” due to their repetitive references or the
participants mentioning the same type of phrases. The themes with their definitions are
included in the following Table 4.
Table 4
Themes, Mentions/Participants, Definitions
Theme Mentions/Participants Definition
Methods Leading Up
to Bombing
11/P1-P7 This theme refers to the various
methods that information was shared
within the agency, from outside
agencies, and between other agencies
leading to the bombing.
Methods During and
After
16/P1-P8 This theme refers to the various
methods of information sharing within
the agency, from outside agencies, and
between other agencies during the
bombing and during the response to
the bombing.
Barriers 16/P1, P2, P6, P7 This theme refers to real or perceived
barriers to HVE and/or
counterterrorism information
sharing.
Trust/Reliance 18, P1-P8 This theme refers to the trust and
reliance that the participants have that
HVE/counterterrorism information is
shared.
Changes 18, P1-P4, P6-P8 This theme refers to changes made or
changes desired as a result of the
bombing.
Research Findings
This section provides a narrative of the results, exemplified by the themes that
were identified. The analysis includes the linkage to my research questions. The
participants’ responses, including direct quotes, are included as an explanation of how the
themes were developed. Chapter 5 will add to this notion and provide a linkage of how
the themes are associated with the theoretical framework of this study.
Overview of Research Questions
Each of the three research questions include a request to delineate the “level” of
information shared. The below quantifies the level of information sharing that occurred
from the participants based on their experience with local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies, specifically related to this case. For purposes of this study, the
following is provided, which explain the levels of information sharing:
▪1) As much as possible,
▪2) Some, and
▪3) None or unknown.
RQ1: What level of HVE information is shared by federal agencies to local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ2: What level of HVE information is shared by state agencies to local law
enforcement agencies?
RQ 3: What level of HVE information is shared with other local law enforcement
agencies and law enforcement agencies?
Theme 1: Methods of Information Sharing Leading up the Boston Marathon
As exemplified in Table 2, the first theme that emerged is related to the methods
of information sharing leading up to the Boston Marathon Bombing, were used as a
method to prepare for the potential threats related to the Boston Marathon, or to the
potential threats to the Boston area prior to the bombing. This theme was first coded and
grouped with theme 2, but it appeared obvious after further review that it should be
separated. In regards to how they received threat, HVE, or counterterrorism related
information prior to the bombing, Participant 2 said:
We have like an Intel unit that pushes out information to us whether it's local,
regional, nationwide, you know, other trends and throughout the world. You
know, if it has potential to affect around here you know like they'd come out and
say, you know, this is what's going on and, you know, so let's pay attention to,
you know, the consulate and things of that nature and here's where they're located
and stuff like that so I mean I think we're always kind of aware and if as long as
you're reading the materials that they're putting out there for us.
Participant 3 relayed, “We receive emails from the BRIC. I believe that DHS and FBI
also provide input at the BRIC when they send finished products to us through email.”
Participant 4 identified that prior to the bombing,
No, we did not have anyone provide any information about that. Prior to the
bombing, we had some items that if it was important that will be disseminated to
us. No, there was no alert, there was no one bring it to our attention that possibly
could happen, nothing, nothing like that.
A suggestion by Participant 5 about HVE or counterterrorism threat information prior to
the bombing was:
At that time, I think if there was threat information coming out, it would find its
way through the department, either through bulletins or through, you know, from
the FBI or through Homeland Security bulletins, or even through maybe our
intelligence unit.
Participant 6 shared that he believed the threat information was disseminated through a
“daily email.” Similarly, Participant 7 relayed that “we did get threat reports from the
BRIC. We got intelligence briefings beginning two weeks prior to the marathon.”
Participants 2, 3, and 5 relayed that they interacted with their community to share
information, which is also called community policing. This is a method where they had
casual conversations with neighborhood representatives, religious centers, and any large
groups within their jurisdictions to request that they remain vigilant. Participant 2 shared:
Casual conversations here and there with people in the community, whether it was at
calls or just passing people out and about. Do you think like a person in the community
would have approached an officer with a concern? I think so, yeah, I think if it was
serious enough. I went on two calls for people thinking, you know, that we should
investigat[e] persons for, you know, taking pictures…of a Jewish school in the
neighborhood. There was a guy taking pictures of the kids in the schoolyard. So, you
know, that type of stuff was happened prior to the marathon. People [were] definitely
vigilant.
Participant 3 participated in community policing in the following way prior to the
Boston Marathon: “Informally. To interact with the neighborhood as a whole in my
jurisdiction for public safety purposes. The specific goal was for crime reduction, but it
helps for many reasons.”
Additionally, Participant 5 explained that leading up to the Boston Marathon, he
participated in “Constant Meetings”; whereby he continually received crime data for
those neighborhood areas so that when he went on their community policing campaigns,
he knew who to talk to and what to look out for in advance of the Boston Marathon.
Participant 5 explained:
Everyone attended what they call Constant Meetings, and at the constant meeting
they use computer statistics to measure the crime using data that is taking place in
the neighborhood so everyone across the big part of the police command would
take part in “camp meetings.” And this comes out of Stanford University
community statistics. It’s, I think, it's crime statistics, which was started in New
York back in the 1990s. This helped police officers kind of use intelligence led
policing.
Participant 1 shared that those in supervisory positions received reports called
Roll Call Releases, which he described as finished law enforcement products that were
disseminated through the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC). Participant 3
echoed that sentiment by indicating that “key people receive emails from the BRIC.”
Participant 4 said, “The BRIC is a positive story. That is where we [would] get our
intelligence. We would get it by email every day leading up to the marathon.”
Participant 6 relayed that he was a member of a working group which planned for
the Boston Marathon. He highlighted that the working group consisted of key members
of law enforcement agencies, universities, private organizations, federal agencies, and
security personnel that were involved in the operations during the marathon.
Furthermore, Participant 6 shared:
We had an unclassified briefing that included possible threats to the marathon and
the general area. The whole working group received the brief from different
agency participants, including federal agencies that were traveling from out of
town. Threat information was verbally shared with the group if it was applicable.
The threat brief was given about two weeks before the marathon. No one talked
about the possibility that there could be a bombing.
None of the study participants stated that they had knowledge of the bombers
prior to the bombing from any method of information sharing. In fact, Participant 6
stated, “I did not hear the Tsarneav brothers’ names until after the bombing. Even then, I
heard their names from word of mouth.”
Theme 2: Methods of Information Sharing During and After the Bombing
The second theme that emerged from the participant interviews includes the
methods of information sharing during the Boston Marathon Bombing and throughout the
response to the bombing. These methods of information sharing include those between
the department, from outside agencies, and between other agencies. Most participants had
a vivid description of the methods of information sharing used in the response to the
bombing, but most of them did not have a clear understanding of the interagency
information sharing that occurred.
Participants 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 each shared that they initially heard the bombing
from their police radio transmission. Participant 1 mentioned that he heard the following
radio transmission: “I'm getting on a radio - stop the marathon there's been an explosion,
you know, stop the marathon there have been two explosions.” Additionally, during the
investigative phase after the bombing, he shared that:
The information was disseminated through press releases and that was how we
found out. All of the investigative work from the various agencies was how they
had the two pictures of the two brothers. The best way to get it out to the
Department was through the press release.
Participant 2 recalled:
It's hard to hear at a big event - to hear your radio even. Though, you know, we
have shoulder mics, and I just remember one of the Sergeant Detectives that was at
the finish line just yelling about secondary devices like any trash cans and things. I
thought it was like a generator or one of those blue electric boxes or something like
that…You don't ever think you're going to be in a situation like that, but you can
revert back to like the things that you're told when you're in training and the police
academy…It was eerie, but I just remember hearing the Sergeant Detective on the
radio yelling about secondary devices and then, you know…I remember one of the
bosses came down and was, you know, screaming at everybody because it's a
crime scene so as we're trying to still help people and get people loaded up still
trying to preserve a crime scene at the same time so it was just very chaotic. And
then they started using a bike unit to secure the crime scene.
Participant 7 explained that there was a Command Operations Center, which held a
representative from local, state, and federal agencies that managed the security for the
Boston Marathon. He further elaborated that he was the command center leader and
oversaw the Command Operations Center. He relayed that the operations center “shows
cameras [and] everything that's happening so I organized all the bureaus in the
department and a representative from other agencies that were needed.” Participant 7
shared:
I was the commander of the command center and I saw the explosion on the
screens in my command center. Luckily there was no sound. I remember someone
saying that there was an explosion, and I said, “No, that was a detonation.” I then
put out a call for all ambulances to come as quickly as possible. I also requested
that there was radio silence so that we can communicate with all officers. It was
my job to get my boss’s orders out to all officers in the department. My boss was
the Superintendent-In-Charge.
Participant 8 relayed:
I had an earpiece in my ear with the radio, and I was two blocks away from the
finish line. So, when I hear crazy talk on the radio, they were talking about the
finish line. And I knew that gentlemen personally. I knew he was calling up a help
on the radio, and that was how I heard. There was a real problem.
Participants 1, 3, 4, 6, and 8 explained that when they moved to a response role
after the bombing, they shared information through email. Participant 4 elaborated:
“Well, everyone has access to cell phones…The email would pop into your phone.” He
explained that all shift assignments were provided by email, and the information about
the Tsarneav brothers was also distributed by email. Participant 3 reiterated that during
the response to the bombing, law enforcement issued phones were used to share emails
about instructions and assignments.
Participant 7 stated that he learned about the Tsarnaev brothers by seeing a picture
of them “distributed by the FBI” on television the morning after the bombing. Participant
2 shared:
I remember they passed out pictures of the younger brother that I have. It was a
license picture, and I actually still have it on my phone to this day…So we could
see what it looked like and that's who you're looking for. And they just briefed us
on, you know, in a giant Roll Call of, you know, hundreds of officers.
Participant 1 explained:
The information was disseminated through press releases and that was how we
found out [about the bombers]. All of the investigative work from the various
agencies was how they had the two pictures of the two brothers. The best way to
get it out to the Department was through the press release… It turned into a joint
investigation. We had all of our detectives taking the leads, helping the FBI with
all the leads that will come in. All people had their phones, right, although we
didn't know if they captured anything. So anyone that said, hey, I was on Boylston
Street that date filming with my phone - that was a lead. And our detectives would
go out and capture that video and give it to the FBI.
Participants 2 and 6 explained similar experiences as each other, when they
responded to their squad leader’s request to arrive at Watertown to do a grid search along
residential streets for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Participant 2 shared: “There were two transit
guys in a car [and] I was on foot. And there was like a bomb squad nearby on like every
grid pattern that we did in Watertown to find them.” Participant 6 described:
In that situation I think it was, you know, word of mouth, like, you know, walking
and talking. So, I mean, at that point we’re divided up into blocks, right. It's like
walking down to the next block and the information - it was like that old game of
telephone used to play when you're a kid. Walking down to the next block and
getting it for me. What did you hear? What people thought. So and so went to the
hospital, you know, that kind of thing.
Both Participants 2 and 6 stated that they did not use any technology when they
searched in Watertown for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
Theme 3: Barriers to Information Sharing Between Law Enforcement Agencies
Real or perceived barriers to information sharing in HVE or counterterrorism
cases between law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal level were
identified by Participants 1, 2, 6, and 7. The reason that the terminology “real or
perceived” is used is due to some of the barriers that were identified can potentially be
rectified by the participants. For instance, one of the barriers that Participant 6 identified
is the fact that the BRIC sends law enforcement bulletins and other noteworthy
information through email. However, he also said that “many people don’t check their
email or read the bulletins.”
Participants 1 and 6 both mentioned that they felt state and federal agencies do not
“play well with others” and “share information.” Participant 1 shared that he felt federal
agencies, in particular, do not share information with local and state law enforcement
agencies because they worry about the misuse of the information. Participant 1 stated:
Federal agencies don't want to share with state and local because they're afraid it's going
to end up in the media on stuff that they could do more with because there are not
developed relationships. So, it's all about developing relationships and developing trust.
They want to know it’s okay that once you get the information that you're not going to
mismanage it.
Participant 6 mentioned that he felt law enforcement agencies are “territorial” and
prefer to handle the case information themselves without including other agencies.
Participant 2 shared that during emergencies the radio frequencies between local,
state, and federal law enforcement agencies do not sync; therefore, they are not able to
adequately communicate. She explained that during the bombing response:
We use different radios, so we didn't know what they were doing at Watertown.
They didn't know what we're doing. And the state and like the feds and, you
know, the National Guard guys that where with us, like, we're not all on the same
wavelength. So that was like interesting to deal with, you know, patching up radio
frequencies and things like that… I don't remember how that worked, but usually
like we'll have where I am, there's a command center, and for major events (like
the marathon) the command center will have different agencies like Boston
police, State police, National Guard, and somebody from the fire department. But
with the bombing - no one could communicate.
Participant 6 highlighted that a limited number of officers within his department
hold a security clearance. Because of this, they do not have access to the classified HVE
and counterterrorism threat reporting that is located at the BRIC. He explained that there
is one or a few department representatives that remain detailed at the BRIC who hold a
security clearance and are responsible for coordinating with all other law enforcement
agencies, obtaining the correct HVE and counterterrorism threat information, and
ensuring that it is disseminated to the correct person at the department.
Finally, Participant 6 explained that the detailed officer would then send it to a
limited number of people at the department, and those people are responsible for
determining who else needs to see it. Participant 1 added that an information sharing
barrier related to others in his department not having a security clearance is that they “did
not know about the information unless they were assigned to the unit or they did not have
a perceived reason to know.
Participant 7 explained that 24-36 hours after the bombing, federal agencies were
not sharing information with his department. He explained:
However, after that, Washington, D.C. eventually started forcing them to share
information through the Command Center. They provided a representative from
the FBI, the CIA, the ATF, and some other federal agencies at the command
center and at the BRIC. I guess it was because the case was moving fast, and there
was so much info to move through related to the bombers and the crime scene
data. In general, I think they don’t want to share information with local law
enforcement and other agencies. Other times, it may be the type of case.
Theme 4: Trust and Reliance that Information is Shared
Each participant reflected that they trusted that the HVE and counterterrorism
threat information was shared with them from their department, state law enforcement
agencies, and federal agencies. In fact, they learned to rely on their means of receiving
their information that they trusted.
Participant 1 reflected: “The BRIC tells me what I need to know and I trust that,
you know, that information is coming from a plethora of different agencies so that's kind
of how I view it.”
Participant 3 added:
Our command provided the intelligence information or threat information that we
needed for our area. I think that they received State and Federal agency input with
regard to threats. The BRIC also sent this information. If there were any barriers,
it would be known to senior level and command level folks.
Participant 4 echoed that “if there was any homegrown terrorist activity or a
suspicion that we should be aware of that the information would be disseminated through
the BRIC.”
Participant 5 explained his opinion:
I think if there was threat information coming out, it would find its way through
the department, either through bulletins or through, you know, from the FBI or
through Homeland Security bulletins, or even through maybe our intelligence
unit… And, if something happened across the country, say, if you had something
that took place in Oakland. There would normally be a quick study of whatever
that crime or that event that took place was. There would then be a briefing put
out, which one could read on different things and then if there was more specific
information, it would filter its way through the federal government, to [the] FBI,
and Homeland Security. These agencies would make us aware of specific threats.
But there's always concerning events, you know, there's always going to be events
that take place, which are always going to be in highly concerning areas.
Participant 1 shared: “I'm sure the Fed don't share as much with us. But I would
assume, you know, if it was a threat that we needed to be aware of, you know, I would
hope that we would be made aware.” Even as Participant 6 hesitated and assumed that the
federal government does not share as much information, he continued to “trust” that the
information would arrive if it was a threat. Participant 8 further stated that he did not feel
that the FBI shares as much information as other agencies do, but he thinks they would
share important threat information with the fusion center if it was “necessary.”
Participant 8 also stated:
When I need something in my everyday operations in logistics, I pick up the
phone and make calls to the right people. When everyone at the BRIC creates
their reports, they must be getting their information from the right people.
They must have the same type of system.
Theme 5: Changes to Information Sharing Policy as a Result of the Boston Marathon
Bombing
All of the participants except for one of them discussed some information sharing
policy changes or a desire for information sharing policy changes as a result of the
Boston Marathon Bombing. Participant 5 stated that he was “not aware of any” policy
changes. Participants 1 and 2 highlighted the use of social media. Participant 1 shared:
Social media use and social media policy changed. I know the commission wanted high
level ranking officers to have social media accounts, Twitter accounts, and stuff like that
to get stuff out. We developed a policy for media relations afterwards because we have
some examples of fake news getting out about incidents, arrests, or threats that were not
true.
Participant 2 shared that social media currently is used by intelligence officers at
the BRIC prior to large events to determine if there are any HVE or counterterrorism
threats being discussed. Participant 2 referred to it as an informal policy change.
Participant 2 elaborated:
There is someone who does strictly social media information “snooping” so, you
know, sometimes we'll hear of an event going on, it could be a potential for
violence and we'll ask her to snoop around on social media. Whether it's informal,
or, you know, just to be made aware of the numbers [of attendees], you know, at
the rallies, and protests, and marches and all that stuff. They're not sanctioned
with permits, you know, so it's, how do we find out on my end -- how do we find
out like how many officers we need for any given event? That's what I do for
work, and so in order to figure that out, it's like, go to social media where you
know everything's posted and that's how people are getting together. So, I don't
want to call it informal, it's funny that, that's how we're gaining information these
days.
Participants 1 and 3 explained that since the bombing, interagency planning
exercises have been implemented. Participant 3 said, “We participate in interagency
exercises for active shooter events, and other operational scenarios.” This policy change
includes an interagency agreement and funding with a federal agency, and incorporates a
scenario, such as a shooting, bombing, or a large-scale explosion.
Participant 3 highlighted that he felt that there has been “more community
outreach with the private sector, universities, [and] local government in the Boston area”
since the bombing. Participants 3 and 6 indicated that they received increased intelligence
bulletins from the BRIC since the bombing, noting that Special Bulletins are received
before special events. One reason that may have occurred is that since the bombing,
Participants 3 and 7 explained that the BRIC received additional funding and personnel
and the BRIC became its own Bureau within the department.
Participant 8 shared that he desired a “structured” decision-making policy change
to enact for use during incidence response. For instance, he explained that due to the level
of hierarchy in the department during the response phase after the Boston Marathon
Bombing, he still had several levels of seniority over him which he felt “got in the way”
to how he was able to do his job. He noted that the information sharing between his role
and other agencies was cut-off because he was not receiving information about the
decision-making process and how to go forward. Because his role was related to crime
scene preservation, he said the FBI “took control quickly” and he did not know who to
listen to. He offered that an internal policy change was needed prior to another incident
occurring. Further, he said:
I guess I've learned to be more interactive with the commands, with the higher up
command in the department as opposed to the lower level. Like, getting
information from them or giving information to them. Getting front information
from them has been more effective for me and has been something that I have
personally implemented since the marathon. This has helped me in operational
times for the whole department because I can directly implement what is
instructed instead of waiting around. I think this should be changed officially in
writing for emergency scenarios.
Participant 7 shared that as a result of the changes made since the bombing, more
threat information is shared within the department, weekly intelligence bulletins are
received “instead of monthly bulletins” and many in the department have an “awareness”
of what HVEs are now that did not know prior to the bombing.
Summary
The purpose of this qualitative study was to gain an understanding of the level of
law enforcement information sharing in homegrown violent extremism cases using the
Boston Marathon Bombing as a case study. Eight study participants were interviewed
one-on-one using Zoom as a platform. An interview protocol with open ended questions
was used to guide each interview and addressed the three research questions. Five themes
resulted from the analysis of the data.
This study illustrates how contingency theory explains the counterterrorism law
enforcement information sharing process for HVE cases. Donaldson’s (2001) concepts of
examining the organization and environment through the lens of contingency theory with
this case study was applied. As aligned with the literature review, (Bersani 2014; Pelfrey,
2014; Thomas, 2016) study participants identified several information sharing methods
that were used while planning for the Boston Marathon within Theme 1. Within Theme 2,
additional information sharing methods were identified that the participants used during
or after the Boston Marathon Bombing. Themes 1 and 2 exemplify the environmental
factors of contingency theory as they illustrate how counterrorism information is shared
between law enforcement agencies (Roberts, et al., 2012).
The study participants identified contingencies, or barriers, to the information
sharing process within Theme 3. The barriers that participants recognized were clearly
aligned with previous literature (Carney; 2015; Dawes; 1996; Peled, 2016; Roberts, et al.,
2012) and are an integral part of contingency theory. Donaldson (2001, 2006) indicates
that the contingencies (or barriers) to information sharing will reduce the level of success
of the law enforcement agency. To apply this premise of contingency theory, the barriers
that the participants identified can be seen as reducing the level of counterterrorism law
enforcement information sharing (Donaldson 2001, 2006).
Theme 4 relates to the fact that all of the participants trusted and relied that the
right threat information would be shared with them because resources, such as the BRIC,
were put in place. The notion identified within Theme 4 is considered a contingent
(Donaldson 2001, 2006) because it can be seen as reducing the law enforcement agency’s
success if information sharing is not actively being implemented to reduce HVEs.
Instead, the participants expressed that they were relying on the threat information to be
shared with them. As Donaldson (2001, 2006) identified, and which aligned with the
findings that were evident in this study within Theme 5, the participants explained that
after the bombing, organizational changes and information sharing changes were
implemented. Theme 5 specifically aligns with contingency theory as it shows how the
law enforcement agency sought to increase its terrorism and/or HVE prevention success
by implementing policy changes, adding education and training programs, and other
desired changes for the future (Donaldson 2001, 2006; Roberts, et al., 2012; Zhao et al.,
2010).
In Chapter 4, the study’s setting, research questions, demographics of the
participants, data collection and analysis procedures, evidence of trustworthiness, the
results, and a summary was provided. In Chapter 5, I will interpret these findings and
incorporate them into my conceptual framework. I will also include the limitations of my
study, describe recommendations for future research, the potential impact for social
change, and a conclusion.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Summary
The purpose of this qualitative study was to gain an understanding of law
enforcement counterterrorism information sharing in HVE cases. The Boston Marathon
Bombing was used as a case study in order to examine how information was shared
between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. HVEs are difficult to detect
and predict; therefore, understanding the information sharing process among law
enforcement agencies with these cases is of the utmost importance. This study yielded
five major themes related to information sharing in this HVE case at the local, state, and
federal law enforcement levels. The first theme includes the methods of information
sharing used prior the Boston Marathon Bombing. Theme 2 includes the methods of
information sharing both during and after the bombing. The third theme encompasses the
real and perceived barriers to information sharing in HVE cases. Within the fourth theme,
participants identified that there is a trust or reliance that information is or will be shared
if there is a HVE or counterterrorism related threat within their jurisdiction. The fifth
theme incorporates the information sharing policy changes or desired policy changes as a
result of the Boston Marathon Bombing.
In this chapter, I review the theoretical framework of contingency theory and how
it relates to the themes identified in my study. An overview of one additional potential
limitation to the study is provided that was not already identified in Chapter 1. A
discussion on recommendations for future research is offered as well as a discussion on
how they relate to the current literature on the topic of HVE information sharing in law
enforcement agencies. Implications for positive social change are described in an effort
for actionable takeaways to be a result of this study. Finally, a conclusion is provided.
Interpretation of Findings
This study offers insight into the procedures that law enforcement agencies take to
share information related to counterterrorism and HVE related threats with each other at
the same agency and with outside agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. The
literature review highlighted that methods of detecting violent extremist behavior in
HVEs can likely be done through policing activities like community policing, the use of
information sharing among agencies in fusion centers, and though use of various forms of
technology (Cohen 2016; Davies, 2016; LaFree & Bersani, 2014) within Themes 1 and 2.
This study identified that community policing was utilized prior to the bombing by some
participants. As Thomas (2016) presented in his research, local law enforcement agency’s
relationships with their community, which includes academia, local businesses, religious
groups, and private citizens, can have tremendous importance in obtaining terrorist threat
information from suspicious behaviors that may not otherwise be achieved (Chermak et
al., 2013).
The use of fusion centers, such as the BRIC, was used as an information sharing
mechanism before, during, and after the bombing by most study participants and was
identified as a “unique” information sharing tool in the literature (Peled, 2016). In fact,
prior to the bombing several participants highlighted that the BRIC disseminated reports
and sent emails in preparation for the Boston Marathon, after the bombing, and it is
continually used as a method of reliance for threat information dissemination. It is
notable that if the participants were relying on their information from the BRIC prior to
the Boston Marathon and continue to rely on information too heavily from one source,
but state and federal agencies are not adequately sharing terrorism or HVE information
than an information sharing gap will remain (Bjelopera, 2014; Foley, 2016; Inspectors
General, 2017). Based on the participants’ reported understanding, they identified that
federal, state, and other local law enforcement agencies shared HVE information through
the BRIC.
While Theme 2 highlighted methods of information sharing during and after the
Boston Marathon Bombing, it illustrated another finding. A noteworthy finding in Theme
2 was that communications equipment, specifically police radios, used for information
sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies had a lack of
interoperability. This notion was not addressed within the literature review but is
highlighted in Dawes’s (1996) study as “incompatible technologies” (pg. 378) and is
explained as a barrier to interagency information sharing. In Dawes’s study, this
information sharing barrier referenced computer hardware and software, but it presents
the same type of implication.
As illustrated within Theme 3, barriers to information sharing, participants
identified four barriers to information sharing that align with the literature review. These
include lack of a security clearance that makes classified threat information unable to
access by those at the agencies without a security clearance. Additionally, participants
relayed that they felt state and federal law enforcement agencies were less likely to share
HVE threat information with local law enforcement agencies. This belief was aligned
with findings that were highlighted in the literature review. Carney (2015) suggested that
strengthening trust among federal, state, and law enforcement agencies may bridge the
gap in information sharing (Peled, 2016). Another barrier found was that agencies are
territorial with any case related information and do not like to share specific details of
cases with each other. Furthermore, it was determined that a “power struggle” exist
between federal law enforcement agencies about sharing their information with local law
enforcement agencies. A resistance to share case related information and a bureaucratic
power struggle were determined to be counterterrorism information sharing gaps in the
Inspector General’s (2017) study. The resistance to change organizational procedures of
information sharing (Peled, 2016) by sharing counterterrorism or HVE information on an
interagency level will only continue to increase the risk of future attacks (DHS, 2015b).
One barrier found in this case study that was not highlighted in the literature
review was that police officers in the participating agency may not be opening their
emails that contain the threat information from the BRIC, even though it is sent to them.
This barrier provides an opportunity for further exploration given that the participants
shared that they rely on the information disseminated by the BRIC as their threat
information shared by federal and state law enforcement agencies.
Contingency Theory Applied
An additional purpose of this study was to build upon previous literature which
identified that there was a gap in information sharing with HVE cases and provide
recommendations on how to reduce the barriers to share information among law
enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. As identified in contingency
theory, when an agency is faced with an external contingent such as a terrorist attack, it
will adapt and determine a resolution to increase its performance (Donaldson, 2001,
2006). Based on the theoretical principals of contingency theory, this law enforcement
agency reacted and adapted to the barriers that they identified and implemented policy
changes (Roberts, 2012).
The local law enforcement agency realized gaps based on the HVE attack, the
Boston Marathon Bombing, whereby there was no previous knowledge inside the local
law enforcement agency of the bombers themselves. Within Theme 5, the participants
indicated that they presently conduct interagency training exercises whereby they
simulate a terrorism event and respond to it using their equipment, communication
technology, and other means to practice their capabilities to respond to an event with
interagency law enforcement partners. They also said that additional funding was
provided to the BRIC. Additionally, the participants relayed that they receive department
wide HVE specific education and training. It was noteworthy that several of the
participants had never heard the term homegrown violent extremist or HVE prior this
study, even though they specialized in counterterrorism law enforcement, and they were
involved in the response to the Boston Marathon Bombing.
An additional recommendation was made by a participant to implement a formal
policy for a decision-making protocol in the event that a future HVE or terrorism related
incident occurs. This participant highlighted that during the Boston Marathon Bombing,
there was a breakdown in interagency communication and a lack of understanding of
which agency had the right to the make the decisions and give the orders. This
recommendation aligns with Horgan’s (2014) suggestions regarding creating HVE law
enforcement information sharing policies that can be implemented in an operational
capacity. However, it is highlighted that because the issue of HVE and counterterrorism is
an operational issue with multiple law enforcement agencies that have similar missions
that the best approach is to share information using relationships (Inspectors General,
2017). Finally, it was noted that social media policy changes were implemented as a
result of the bombing. For instance, this policy was made such that only those in a
leadership position are authorized to make social media posts related to agency business.
Limitations of the Study
A limitation of the study can be seen as the lack of gender diversity of study
participants. Specifically, there was one female participant that responded. Hill et al.
(2022) illustrated that since 1980, even though police departments across the country
have maintained a goal to increase the number of female police officers, there is a gender
gap in policing as a whole, promotion rates, and those that represent specialized units.
Within their study on wage and gender in law enforcement agencies, Lou et al. (2019)
found that even in those agencies where women are represented at a more statistically
equal level as men, there remains a pay disparity among women. These two reasons
highlight that because there is a gender gap in the law enforcement profession that having
one female study participant is a meaningful addition to the study.
Another potential limitation to the study is that it was focused on one specific
case, which was the Boston Marathon Bombing and included participants who prepared
for the Boston Marathon and responded to the Boston Marathon Bombing. However, it
should be noted that this type of limitation is inherently common in qualitative studies.
This study offers a deep understanding of the knowledge of the information sharing
process as it pertains to HVE cases, which can be applied to the understanding of those
processes in other law enforcement jurisdictions. Finally, a potential limitation to the
study can be seen as the number of study participants. While there were eight study
participants, as noted in Chapter 1, saturation was reached when no new data elements
were being identified (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In their discussion on qualitative study
sample size saturation, Fusch and Ness (2015) indicated that it is not the number of study
participants, but when there is enough information collected to “replicate the study” that
saturation is complete.
Recommendations
Three recommendations were identified as a result of this case study. The first is
to replicate this study by completing a similar case study to confirm the themes and
determine if additional themes would be identified. As continually highlighted by Wray
(2020), HVEs are difficult to detect prior to an attack, and without information
coordination among law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels, they
will remain undetected. A future study designed to replicate the themes and determine if
additional themes are identified, will assist in improving the coordination efforts among
law enforcement agencies. It is vital to continue this research, and in doing so, it can help
detect and prevent future HVE attacks.
A second recommendation is to build upon the fourth theme of trust and reliance
that was identified by the study participants for future research. Examining the theme of
trust and reliance that counterterrorism and HVE threat information is shared among law
enforcement agencies as identified in this case study can be a topic for future research.
While HVE information sharing was previously identified as a gap among law
enforcement agencies in the literature review (Carney, 2015; Foley, 2016; Peled, 2016), if
those agencies are trusting and relying that the information will be shared with them
when the threat becomes realized, without any action taken on their part, that is an
additional gap identified in the information sharing process.
A third recommendation is to conduct a case study using participants at a fusion
center. According to the DHS, a fusion center is owned and operated by states for the
purpose of “the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information
between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal and private sector partners”
(DHS, 2022). This study illustrated that the participants used the bulletins and read the
emails before the Boston Marathon Bombing that they received from the BRIC. They
recurrently mentioned the BRIC as where they received their threat information, and that
is also where the information sharing occurs from interagency law enforcement personnel
with or without a security clearance. Finally, the participants indicated that they trusted
that if there was a threat, that they would receive it from someone at the BRIC.
Therefore, a study using participants from a fusion center similar to the BRIC would be
extremely useful in determining how information is shared and disseminated to various
law enforcement agencies as it pertains to HVE cases.
Implications
Preventing domestic terrorism remains the highest domestic priority for the FBI
(Wray, 2020). It is because of this that the identification of HVEs and sharing the
information with the correct law enforcement jurisdiction is vital to ensuring the
homeland security of the United States. Peled (2016) identified that one of the tools that
was created by legislators as a result of interagency information sharing gaps post 09/11
was fusions centers. Chermak et al. (2013) explained that the purpose of fusion centers,
such as the BRIC, is to share information among federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies in order for those agencies to disseminate the information to their respective
personnel. The participants in this study repeatedly mentioned their reliance on the BRIC
to provide them with HVE and terrorism threat information. In their review of the
“lessons learned” from the Boston Marathon Bombing, the House of Representatives
(2014) found that there were information sharing gaps between the FBI and the local
police department. They further explained that when the Russian government provided
the FBI with potential information about a U.S. citizen radicalizing overseas and traveling
back to the United States, specifically in Boston, the FBI did not share that information
with the local law enforcement agency (House of Representatives, 2014). This
study illustrated that information sharing gaps remain that were identified in the literature
review, specifically related to the participants that did not feel that information was
shared with them from federal law enforcement agencies because of a lack of trust
(Carney, 2015) and a power struggle (Dawes, 1996; Peled, 2016). The participants shared
that what continued to be information sharing gaps for the study participants occurred
both during the 2013 timeframe at the Boston Marathon Bombing and during their
interviews in 2021. Establishing an increased community policing program at the federal,
state, and local level without a targeted population in mind is a method to build trust in
the community (Thomas, 2016) and can build a positive social change in the jurisdiction
(Davies, 2016). Because HVEs are difficult to detect, implementing a community driven
approach to learn what behaviors stand out from typical behaviors is both an academic
field of study and a federal level plan to reduce violent extremism (Davies, 2016;
Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States, 2016). This community policing process can also lead to
working group discussions with academia and private organizations and provide access to
build relationships with the community in an effort to ensure that if a threat was identified
that one of these partners would report it to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Building on community policing and extending the approach to educating the community
(Combs, 2017) to report back to the law enforcement agency if they see suspicious
behaviors, builds on the literature and the DHS campaign, If You See Something, Say
Something (Davies, 2016).
Information sharing recommendations like this at its most basic level can be
provided to decision makers at local and state law enforcement jurisdictions. Working
toward approaches that offer trust between agencies will build communities that may rely
on their networks to share information if violent extremist views are identified (Davies,
2016; Heydemann, 2014). The participants indicated that after the Boston Marathon
Bombing, their local law enforcement agency implemented HVE education and exercise
scenarios geared toward the response of an attack. As Foley (2016) notes, agencies that
have a counterrorism response role experience challenges when they are confronted with
new contingencies. As contingency theory explains, in order to be successful at
information sharing, agency behavior and policy also needs to change related to
information sharing (Davison, 2001). The FBI identified that HVEs are the “single
greatest threat to the homeland,” (Wray, 2020) and it is because of that threat that each
level of law enforcement maintains a continued mission of sharing potential threats with
each other.
Conclusion
This study provided a further inquiry into public policy issue of law enforcement
interagency sharing post 09/11. It confirmed the previous academic research on law
enforcement information sharing in HVE cases. It also illustrated how contingency theory
is relevant and how the law enforcement agency adapted when the external factor of the
Boston Marathon Bombing caused it to adapt through implementing changes (Donaldson,
2006). This study also provides an addition to the body of research by illustrating that the
participants may not be actively engaging in information sharing or seeking threat
information from outside law enforcement agencies because they trust or rely that it will
be shared with them.
