The Politics of Decentralizing Criminal Justice Systems in
Postconflict Societies Insights From Liberia (2011-2017)
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new
model that makes the existing model obsolete.
R. Buckminster Fuller
Introduction
After the end of Liberia’s brutal 14 year civil war, the process of rebuilding Liberia has
focused on a number of interventions including reforming the criminal justice system (Bacon,
2015; Fyanka, 2014; & Nyei, 2014). One of the goals of the reforms is to make the criminal
justice system accessible, particularly to the vulnerable (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014; & Nyei,
2014). Most citizens in this category live outside the large cities and have been marginalized
since Liberia’s independence in 1847 (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014). Liberia’s international
partners have devoted attention and resources to the reform process to ensure that the
peacebuilding process results in enduring peace (Bacon, 2015; Fyanka, 2014). The focus of the
international community on reforming Liberia’s criminal justice system has become even more
urgent following the coming into force of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on 1
January 2016.
Goal 16 of the SDGs seeks to provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels of society (Jackson, 2017). These institutions
include criminal justice system institutions. For criminal justice institutions to be accessible,
inclusive and accountable they must, among others, be decentralized. This will enable citizens
across various geographical locations to access the system’s services without discrimination
and/or hindrance. This holds true for every country, including Liberia, the site for this research.
The SDGs have two targets that relate to local government and decentralization and stress the
importance of decentralization for meeting the SDG Goal 16 (Jackson, 2017).
The importance of decentralization in development has been affirmed by global
institutions and frameworks such as the Global Alliance for Urban Crises, the Paris Agreement
on Aid Effectiveness, and Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (Jackson, 2017).
The Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness have made local ownership a key ingredient of
effective development assistance (Jackson, 2017). In this regard, Liberians across the various
geographical, social, economic and political spheres must be actively involved in identifying how
international aid earmarked for reforming their criminal justice system is used.
Accordingly, in this dissertation, I ascertained the approaches used to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system and investigated the extent to which national ownership
influenced decision making and implementation of interventions, supported by the international
community, to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. I also assessed how the
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system has been enhanced through the varied efforts to
make the system’s services accessible.
Problem Statement
A major task in postconflict reconstruction is reforming the criminal justice system
(Dursun-Özkanca, 2017; Nyei, 2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). The objectives of these
reforms are to reestablish the supremacy of the rule of law and extend the presence of the
state’s authority to all parts of the country, thus increasing the likelihood of postconflict
countries not returning to conflict (Dursun-Özkanca, 2017 & Westernman, 2017). Many
reform processes are set in motion to achieve these objectives (Nyei, 2014). They include
(re)establishing and/or reforming institutions (Denney, 2014 & Nyei, 2014). Other examples
are enacting legislation, developing and implementing new policies and developing the human
resource capacity of criminal justice institutions (Gordon, 2014). According to Dursun-
Özkanca (2017), reforms of the criminal justice system must benefit the population. However,
the criminal justice system must be accessible for the population to benefit from its services
(Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia, and Alzate (2016) asserted that, in
postconflict settings, a decentralized criminal justice system has the potential of engendering
public confidence in the justice system and contributing to enduring peace and stability. The
criminal justice system should also be functional (Dandurand, 2014). Local ownership of the
reforms and its processes are essential condition precedents to achieving accessibility and
functionality (Dursun-Özkanca, 2017; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014).
Despite the case made for local ownership in international development assistance, there
is a paucity of literature on the extent to which the approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system was mindful of Liberia’s uniqueness and was championed by Liberians.
There is also a gap in the literature on how decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system has
affected the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability. For effective
decentralization of criminal justice systems, several considerations must influence the process.
They include the need to ensure that the approach toward decentralization suits the
distinctiveness of the context where decentralization is being implemented. Reference to
distinctiveness of the context, in this case, Liberia include the resources available to reform the
criminal justice system, triggers of Liberia’s civil war, Liberia’s history, and the culture of the
Liberian people and institutions of the criminal justice system.
Purpose of the Study
My purpose in this qualitative study was to identify the approaches used in decentralizing
services provided by Liberia’s criminal justice system, to ascertain whether these approaches
were suitable for Liberia’s unique context and; how nationally owned and inclusive the
decentralization process was. Second was to determine how international support could
contribute to making the decentralization process nationally owned and inclusive. Another
objective of this study is to establish the impact of decentralization on the criminal justice
system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability as well as how to improve the
functionality of the criminal justice system. The grounded theory approach and the case study
research design were used to answer this study’s research questions.
Research Questions
The central questions that guided this qualitative research study were (a) RQ1: What
approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?;
(b) RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system? (c) RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system? (d) RQ3: How has decentralizing
Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and
stability?; and RQ.3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be
improved?
Theoretical Frameworks
Structural functionalism and realism are the theoretical frameworks used for this study.
Ryan (2005) indicated that proponents of structural functionalism include Merton, Durkheim,
Comte, and Parsons. The theory’s proponents asserted that social entities, whether they are
communities, organizations, or other social groupings are organisms that are made up of different
parts with each part playing a unique and important role that collectively contribute to keeping
the organism alive and functional (Babbie, 2015). Babbie (2015) pointed out that should a part of
the organism malfunction, the ability of the organism to function in the desired manner is
negatively affected.
Realism is a theory used in international relations to analyze the behavior of states in
international affairs. Proponents of the realist theory indicated that states act in their national
interest and power is used to back their actions aimed at furthering the pursuit of national interest
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001), a state’s power
is backed by varied capabilities some of which are economic in nature. Morgenthau is one of the
foremost proponents of realist theory. Indeed, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001) asserted that
“[No] twentieth-century writer has had a greater impact on the development of realist theory than
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980)” (p. 75). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001), the
following assumptions underpin the realist theory: first, that the international system is state
centric; second, that conflict is an essential feature of the conduct of international politics, and
this makes international politics anarchic hence requires states to deploy their capabilities in
navigating their way through the international system; third, that though it recognizes that states
are sovereign, they have varied capabilities and sizes; fourth, that in their pursuit of national
interest, states are rational and unitary actors; and last, a state’s power is the predominate concept
for explaining and predicting its conduct.
Structural functionalism is appropriate for investigating decentralization of the criminal
justice system and the effects of decentralization on the system’s functionality because, as
previously noted, the criminal justice system is made up of various parts, including the judiciary,
police, lawyers (prosecutors, defense lawyers and public defenders), and corrections officials. All
these parts have unique roles to play to keep the system (i.e., the organism alive [Babbie, 2015]).
Where any of the parts fails to effectively play its individual role(s), the system becomes
dysfunctional and the system’s purpose may be defeated, particularly when remedial measures
are not taken timeously.
With respect to realism, efforts to support reforms of the criminal justice system in
postconflict societies, which include making criminal justice system services accessible, are
often, if not always, supported and/or spearheaded by the international community. The
international community is made up of states who do not always support such reform processes
out of altruism. That is to say quite often there is a motivation (i.e. the pursuit of their national
interest) that drives their actions. This is manifested, in part, in deliberate efforts to promote
and/or replicate institutions and cultures that are akin to those that exist in the countries aiding
the reforms in the postconflict society (Denney, 2014). These approaches usually ignore time
honored practices in these war ravaged societies (Denney, 2014). Nationals of the countries
supporting the reforms are employed by their governments to aid the implementation of the
reforms (Denney, 2014). All these create the dominance and influence of the countries
supporting reforms in postconflict settings.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was a qualitative method; the research approach was the
grounded theory and the research design was a case study. Crawford (2016) asserted that
qualitative research incorporates the voice of its participants in its findings and describes the
experiences of individuals or groups. Researchers use this qualitative method to examine the
partnership between the researcher(s) and the participants in generating knowledge, and
qualitative researchers recognize the fact that knowledge is created through social interaction
(Patton, 2015). The grounded theory approach to research results in the study’s report being the
product of a collection of the perspectives of the participants (Patton, 2015). I used the case study
format for this study because case studies are an effective tool to examine, in an in-depth manner,
“persons, decisions, programs, or other entities that have a unique characteristic of interest”
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017, p. 43).
Case studies are preferred for investigating contemporary issues because there is
relatively easier access to information sources to conduct the study (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner,
& Taliaferro, 2017). All the issues that investigated in this qualitative study to answer the
phenomenon of interest are contemporary issues. (O’Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017
informed readers that a case study research design is appropriate when conducting qualitative
research where the phenomenon of interest is of a contemporary nature. As earlier stated, the
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system partly depends on the decentralization of
criminal justice services and the approach to decentralization being tailored to suit the local
context. Three research questions and two subresearch questions were answered in this study
aided by the views of persons who are/were involved in policy making and implementation to
make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible.
Definitions
In this study, the following terms mean:
Criminal justice services: Traditionally, these are services provided by the prosecution
and defense, the police (i.e. law enforcement), the judiciary (i.e. adjudication), and corrections.
For purposes of this study, mechanisms for oversight and accountability over prosecution,
defense, adjudication, corrections, and law enforcement are part of criminal justice
services/system.
Decentralization: Rechts-Lexikon (n.d.) defined decentralization as the process of
moving powers from government, at the central level, to lower levels of a country’s governance
structure (Hamann, 2012).
Nonstate actor: “Non-state justice and security (NSJS) systems [actors] refer to all
systems that exercise some form of nonstate authority in providing safety, security and access to
justice. This includes a range of traditional, customary, religious and informal mechanisms that
deal with disputes and/or security matters” (United Kingdom’s Department of International
Development (2000), cited in Denney, 2014)
Local ownership in the context of criminal justice system reform in postconflict settings
is the term used to describe a situation/process where international efforts to support processes to
reform the criminal justice system adopt an approach that is tailored for the local context and
consults the local community when shaping the reform interventions and their implementation
(Ansorg, 2017; Denney, 2013, 2014; Detzner, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gal, 2016; Gordon,
2014; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; Westernman, 2017).
Significance
In this study, I identified the approaches used to decentralize criminal justice services in
Liberia, the extent to which the approaches suited the Liberian context, the effects of
decentralization on the functionality of the criminal justice system, and Liberia’s peace and
stability. I also ascertained the extent to which the decentralization process was inclusive and
nationally driven and how international efforts to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system
could support inclusive and nationally owned/driven processes.
Decentralizing criminal justice services, in a postconflict country such as Liberia, is an
opportunity for the state to show its presence beyond the capital and the major cities (Edwards &
Yilmaz, 2016; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; & Dursun-Özkanca, 2017). It provides an opportunity for
citizens to seek redress from the justice system as opposed to taking the law into their own hands
(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014; Dursun-Özkanca, 2017; Hamann,
2012; & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). A decentralized criminal justice system engenders public
confidence in the justice system thus promoting the supremacy of law (Escobar-Lemmon &
Ross, 2014; Hamann, 2012). It also contributes to enduring peace in postconflict societies
(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Jackson, 2016). There is a gap in the literature on whether the
officials/actors who championed the approaches used to decentralize criminal justice services in
Liberia were cognizant of the Liberian context.
The site for this study is a country that is more than 170 years old and has practiced a
centralized system of government for most of its existence (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). As a
result of this, the formal criminal justice institutions, though expected to have jurisdiction across
the entire country, were practically, partially functional in the capital and one or two major cities
and absent in the rest of the country (Nyei, 2014). However, after 14 years of a brutal civil war,
peacebuilding efforts have prioritized decentralization of public services in general and criminal
justice services in particular (Bacon, 2015 & Fyanka, 2014). The uniqueness of the research site
provided a rich source to study how criminal justice services have been decentralized and the
extent to which the approaches used were suited to Liberia. It also provided an opportunity to
know how the criminal justice system’s functionality has been affected by the decentralization of
its services. Therefore, this study is contributing to filling the gap identified in the literature on
the phenomenon of interest and gives academics, practitioners, policy makers, donors and other
actors the opportunity to learn from my findings.
Most important, the results of this study have the potential to inform the ongoing efforts
to decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia and in similar efforts in other postconflict
societies. These should lead to a better and more efficient decentralization of criminal justice
services and the judicious use of resources. Also, citizens and civil society organizations will be
empowered by the findings emerging from this study to engage with, and/or hold the government
and other actors accountable for, their demands for the provision of criminal justice services
(Callahan et al., 2012). An enhancement in the decentralization of criminal justice services will
create an environment for enduring peace in Liberia. This is aligned to this study’s problem
statement, in which I asserted that decentralization of criminal justice services contributes to
making the criminal justice system accessible and functional. Both attributes are conditions
precedent for enduring peace and respect for the rule of law in Liberia.
Positive Social Change
This study has the potential to effect social change. First, I ascertained the extent to
which, if any, decentralization of criminal justice services in Liberia was tailored to fit the
Liberian context and found that little consideration was to local ownership in decentralizing
Liberia’s criminal justice system. This partly explains why the criminal justice system is
dysfunctional. Both findings provide an opportunity for informed corrective measures to be
taken to make the criminal justice system accessible and functional thus contributing to
engendering peace in Liberia and other postconflict countries. Also, because decentralization is a
process and not an event, my findings and recommendations will inform the process going
forward and aid the process of building enduring peace (national reconciliation and social
cohesion), foster public confidence in the criminal justice system, ensure the adherence to the
rule of law, and making the world, in general, and Liberia, in particular, a better place. This is
because an effective criminal justice system will extend the legitimate authority of the state to all
parts of Liberia and ordinary citizens will feel the positive presence of the government in their
lives. The logical consequence of this is that citizens, no matter their age, gender, socioeconomic
status, or sexual orientation will be able to engage in their normal business in freedom.
Further, private business operators will have confidence in Liberia and so will invest in
the economy; this will generate employment and income for citizens and taxes for the
government and, ideally, bring equity and development to Liberia. Most important, the outcome
of this research empowers various actors including citizens, civil society organizations, the
Government of Liberia, and the international community involved in the enterprise of
peacebuilding in Liberia, with information to aid their policy choices. This is because in the case
of citizens and civil society, this study’s findings arms them with information/data for their
advocacy and in their efforts to hold the government accountable (Callahan et al., 2012). Policy
choices of the Government of Liberia will be informed by scientific research, thus strengthening
the its bargaining strength in its engagement with its international partners hence increasing the
chances of Liberia and its citizens maximizing the benefits of the resources that are being
channeled into peacebuilding particularly from international sources. These will all increase the
chances of promoting national ownership. Finally, international partners stand to be informed, by
my findings. Consequently, in theory, they should improve in balancing their quest for designing
and implementing interventions that suit the Liberian context vis-a-vis promoting their national
interests/agenda. All these will cause positive social change in Liberia for Liberians and the
international community with respect to international development assistance thus making the
planet a better place for all.
Summary
In Chapter 1, I presented the importance of access to justice, particularly in postconflict
countries, and the emphasis placed on access to justice by the United Nations in Goal 16 of the
SDGs. I also presented the importance of national ownership in efforts to decentralize criminal
justice services in postconflict countries and identified the paucity of literature with respect to
national ownership in decentralization of criminal justice services in Liberia as a gap in the
literature related to the problem statement that this qualitative study will contribute to fill. I have
introduced structural functionalism and realist theory as the theoretical frameworks for this
study. I identified three research questions, two subresearch questions for this study and provided
definitions of some words or phrases used in this study. I have also indicated what positive social
change can be created, in Liberia and more broadly the world, by undertaking this research. In
the next chapter i.e., Chapter 2, I identified the literature that I used to illuminate my
phenomenon of interest.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
“Promoting a rule of law culture is a work in progress all over the world”
Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu
Introduction
The criminal justice system is made up of several connected parts that collectively make
up the criminal justice chain. Traditionally, these services are the police, the judiciary,
prosecutions/defense, and the corrections service (Denney, 2014). The police are responsible for
investigating alleged criminal conduct and for law enforcement (Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš,
2017). Generally, the judiciary is charged with adjudicating cases/disputes and, in the case of
criminal justice, which is my focus in this study, the judiciary is responsible for determining the
guilty or otherwise of an accused person. The judiciary is aided by the prosecutions and/or
defense lawyers. The corrections part of the chain is mandated to keep, in safe and humane
environments, persons whose right to free movement has been curtailed by a competent
authority, either through the imposition of a custodial sentence or a temporary detention order
pending the completion of investigations or some other conditions that are lawfully set out by
that competent authority and/or the applicable law (Denney, 2014). Rehabilitation of those
serving custodial sentenced is a key component of a corrections part of the criminal justice chain.
In addition, a number of oversight mechanisms, both external and internal, including
courts, are established to ensure that the criminal justice system and its officials do not abuse the
rights of the citizens that they are required to protect, while performing its fundamental role of
being a tool for positive social control (Bangura, 2018). These oversight mechanisms include
national human rights commissions, anticorruption bodies (Denney, 2014; Nall & Mamayek,
2013; & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014), parliament (Bangura, 2018), and civil society
networks/organizations (Denney, 2013; Nall & Mamayek, 2013).
Reforming the justice sector and, for that matter, the criminal justice system, is often
deemed to be contributing to reforming the security sector (Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake,
2013; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; 2016 & Swenson, 2018). Therefore,
in the literature, reference to security sector reform frequently includes reform of the criminal
justice system/sector (Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder
& Chappuis, 2014; 2016 & Swenson, 2018). Accordingly, in this dissertation, unless the context
suggests the contrary, phrases such as security sector reform, reform of the justice and security
sectors, criminal justice system reform, and any other similar phrases are used interchangeably to
refer to, and include, reforming the criminal justice system. I used the ensuing review of the
existing literature on the phenomenon of interest of this dissertation to illuminate the stated
objectives of this study.
Criminal Justice Reform in Postconflict Societies
Rationale for security sector reform in postconflict countries
Security sector reform has become a visible part of external aid particularly in
postconflict reconstruction (Corradi, 2010; Nyei, 2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Schroeder
and Chappuis (2014) stressed the point that security sector reform takes various forms including
strengthening oversight of the security sector and professionalizing the various institutions of the
sector. This has made the security sector reform in general, and criminal justice system reform in
particular, one of the foremost, if not the foremost, issue to be addressed in postconflict settings
by various international actors supporting the recovery of war ravaged countries (Denney, 2014;
Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Homel & Masson, 2016; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; 2016 & Swenson,
2018). This is because the failure of the criminal justice system to impartially discharge its
mandate contributes to the breakdown of law and order which, in some cases, degenerates into a
full-blown civil war (Nyei, 2014). Therefore, in postconflict environments justice sector, reform
is also seen as a tool for stabilization (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014).
Chappuis and Heiner (2009) observed that within Western liberalism, security sector
reform seeks to provide the basis for statehood as a means of creating a “people-centered
security” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p. 134). As part of the postconflict reconstruction phase,
the justice system in general, and the criminal justice system in particular, have a fundamental
role to play in assuring citizens and other actors, including the private sector, that peace will
endure, hence encouraging investment of resources to develop the country (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). The World Bank (2011) asserted that reforming the criminal justice system also
encourages citizens to resort to the appropriate institutions of the country to seek redress for their
grievances as opposed to resorting to self-help to address disputes that arise among them
(Denney, 2014).
Resolving disputes without recourse to recognized/official institutions or actors becomes
an entrenched culture prior to a civil war and gets more entrenched during the period of the war
(Denney, 2014). The negative aspects of this culture need to be reversed to build enduring peace
and a culture where the rule of law is upheld (Denney, 2014).
Conditions for a viable approach to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict
settings
Organizations such as the United Nations have asserted that reforming the criminal
justice system contributes to sustainable peace and development (Gordon, 2014). For this to
happen, the criminal justice system and the services it provides must be accessible (Dinnen &
Peake, 2013). In this context, access includes physical location (i.e. geographical accessibly),
affordability, and an adherence to and/or adoption of processes that are not alien to the users of
the system’s services (Denney, 2014). For instance, the language of communication within the
criminal justice system should not alienate persons who have come into conflict or contact with
the law (Denney, 2014 & Dinnen & Peake, 2013), particularly in postconflict settings where
discrimination and social cleavages prior to the war may have left people without formal
education. Moreover, Jackson (2013) stressed that expanding formal justice across a country
does not necessarily mean that the services that the system provides will be of a high standard or
similar in terms of reach and quality across the country. The services may vary; hence, questions
of quality and access will arise in the process of reforming the criminal justice system (Jackson,
2013).
Outcome of security sector reform in postconflict settings
Prominence has been given to security sector reform in postconflict reconstruction. This
is because of the logic associated with making security sector reform the center of postconflict
reconstruction. However, Schroder and Chappuis (2014) citing Schroeder (2010) assert that the
success of security sector reform programming has not been encouraging, particularly in
postconflict settings. Schroeder (2010) attributes this to the fact that, in some cases, security
sector reform programming has rather created conditions for the country to slide back into war
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Other authors affirm this view. For instance, according to Gbla
(2007), security sector reform processes in Liberia produced mixed outcomes (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). Sedra (2006) highlighted that, in contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan, the
outcome of security sector reform interventions has raised the question of the viability of security
sector reform as a postconflict peacebuilding intervention (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). As a
general point, Jackson (2013) indicated that reforming the legal system takes time and a lot of
investment hence those spearheading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries must be
measured in their expectations.
Decentralization of Criminal Justice Services in Postconflict settings
Decentralization of the criminal justice system and its services is part of the reforms
and/or processes undertaken in postconflict countries (Dinnen & Peake, 2013 & Nyei, 2014). It is
one way of making the criminal justice system accessible, particularly with respect to
geographical accessibility. In this regard, criminal justice reform in postconflict settings has
emphasized decentralization of criminal justice services (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Nyei,
2014). To maximize the benefits of decentralization, the approach to decentralization must be
sustainable (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018 & Nyei, 2014). There are several ways of ensuring that
criminal justice system reform is sustainable. These include ensuring that they are nationally
owned/driven and tailored to fit the context within which they are being implemented (Bacon,
2015 & Dinnen & Peake, 2013) and that the necessary resources are dedicated to the
decentralization process (Nyei, 2014).
Advantages of decentralizing the criminal justice system
Effective decentralization of the criminal justice system has a number of potential
advantages, especially in postconflict countries, where, for example, it results in the
government’s authority being extended to parts of the country where, hitherto, they were absent
(Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Dinnen and Peake (2013) note that the absence of such services
makes citizens feel marginalized by the government, thus decentralization provides an
opportunity for citizens to begin to feel the presence of the government in their lives.
Consequently, when criminal justice services are decentralized, there is a potential for
engendering peace, reconciliation and respect for the rule of law and human rights (Edwards &
Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014; Hamann, 2012 & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).
Importantly, decentralization of the criminal justice system also promotes accountability in
government and results in the citizenry taking an active part in making decisions on issues that
affect their lives (Dinnen & Peake, 2013).
Search Criteria
The literature presented in this review is drawn from the following database: Political
Science Complete, SocINDEX, GreenFILE, SAGE Journals (formerly SAGE premier), Social
Sciences Citation Index, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center,
Complementary Index, Academic Search Complete and Taylor and Francis Online. Keywords
used individually or conjunctively include decentralization, criminal, justice services,
postconflict, security sector reform, justice sector reform, police reform, judicial reform, access
to justice, criminal justice system reform, national ownership, local ownership, justice planning,
justice administration, community policing and access to rule of law.
Theoretical Frameworks
Structural Functionalism and Realism are the Theoretical Frameworks that were used for
this study. Ryan (2005) indicated that proponents of the Structural Functionalism theory include
Robert Merton, Émile Durkheim, Auguste Comte and Talcott Parsons. The Theory’s proponents
assert that social entities, whether they are communities, organizations or other social groupings,
are organisms which are made up of different parts with each part playing a unique and important
role that collectively contribute to keeping the organism alive and functional (Babbie, 2015).
Babbie (2015) pointed out that should a part of the organism malfunction, the ability of the
organism to function in the desired manner is negatively affected.
Realism is a theory used in international relations to analyze the behavior of states on the
international plain. According to Realist theory, states act in their national interest and power is
used to back actions aimed at furthering the pursuit of this national interest (Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001) a state’s power is backed by
varied capabilities. Some of the power available to a state is economic in nature. Hans J.
Morgenthau is one of the foremost proponents of the realist theory. Indeed Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff, (2001) assert that “[No] twentieth-century writer has had a greater impact on the
development of realist theory than Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980)” (p. 75). Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff (2001) inform their readers that the following assumptions underpin the realist theory:
- first, that the international system is state centric, and second, that conflict is an essential
feature of the conduct of international politics, which makes international politics anarchic and
requires states to deploy their capabilities to navigate the international system. The third
assumption is that states are sovereign and have varied capabilities and sizes. Realism takes the
position that, in their pursuit of national interest, states are rational and unitary actors. The final
assumption is that a state’s power is the predominant concept for explaining and predicting its
conduct.
Structural Functionalism it is appropriate for investigating decentralization of the criminal
justice system and its effect on the system’s functionality because, as previously noted, the
criminal justice system in made up of various parts who have unique roles to play to keep the
criminal justice system alive (Babbie, 2015). Where any of the parts fails to effectively play their
individual role(s), the system becomes dysfunctional and its purpose will potentially be defeated,
particularly when effective remedial action is not taken. With respect to Realism, efforts to
support reforms of the criminal justice system in postconflict societies, which include making
criminal justice system services accessible, are often, if not always, supported and/or
spearheaded by the international community, comprised of states who do not support such reform
processes as philanthropic acts. That is to say, there is always a motivation (i.e. the pursuit of
their national interest aspirations) that drives their actions. This is manifested, in part, in
deliberate efforts to promote and/or replicate institutions and cultures that are akin to those that
exist in the countries driving the reforms in postconflict societies (Denny, 2013 & Denney 2014).
These approaches usually ignore time-honored practices in these war-ravaged societies (Ansorg,
2017). Undertaking such reforms also serves as a source of employment for nationals of the
countries supporting the reforms. All these factors create the dominance and influence of the
countries supporting the reforms.
Principles of Security Sector Reform
Certain principles influence the approach adopted towards reforming the security sector,
particularly in postconflict settings. The following are the applicable principles:
First, actively engaging with local actors. Nathan (2007) asserted that where the approach
adopted to reform the justice and security sectors is deficient in its engagement with local actors,
the chances that this results in local actors resisting or resenting the reform intervention(s) are
high and this will affect the pace of peacebuilding efforts and potentially prolong aid dependency
by the country who is receiving international development assistance to reform its security sector
(Gordon, 2014). To yield the desired results, engagement with the community should be
“anchored on a nationwide security transformation process” (Homel & Masson, 2016, p. 323).
The natural tendency by designers and implementers of security sector reform programs to
consult only persons with expertise on security issues must be resisted. As Donais (2009) pointed
out, the fact they are experts is not a sufficient indicator that they have a firm grasp of the
peculiar challenges of the setting for which the program is being designed and implemented
(Gordon, 2014).
Closely related to this point is the need to ensure that security sector reform priorities cut
across all levels of the society’s structures (Gordon, 2014). A similar point is made by Jackson
(2013) as the researcher found, that in Sierra Leone, the absence of such an approach resulted in
an uneven development of the criminal justice chain. This is because where the priorities are
limited only to the central level, there is the tendency to ignore priorities of members of the
community who belong to the marginalized and/or vulnerable sections of the society, particularly
women (Gordon, 2014). It must be recognized that security sector reform processes are interest
driven. This is typified in comments made by Narten (2009) who asserted that the willingness of
actors at the national level to agree to commitments to reform the justice and security sectors is
not a sufficient condition precedent to enhance the governance of these sectors (Gordon, 2014).
As Narten (2009) puts it, such commitments could be out of a desire to keep such actors at the
national level in office (Gordon, 2014).
Most importantly, as acknowledged in the literature, reforms within the justice and
security sectors must be tailored to fit the context, in other words, the reforms must be
contextspecific and not a replication of blueprints that have been applied in other contexts
(Ansorg, 2017; Bacon, 2015; Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017; Denney, 2013; Dinnen & Peake,
2013;
Gordon, 2014; Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014 & Westernman, 2017). Bacon (2015) and Fyanka
(2014) both asserted that in order to have an effective postconflict peacebuilding process, the
interventions to build peace and the associated processes must be structured to suit the context.
To illustrate this principle, Fyanka (2014), studying Liberia, asserted that the lack of democratic
civilian oversight is one area that has to be addressed, hence efforts to reform the security sector
should be tailored to establish and operationalize effective civilian oversight over the sector.
Other challenges identified by Fyanka (2014) in Liberia are a lack of effective policing, a
disconnect between efforts to reform the police in particular and the criminal justice system in
general, inadequate human resources to support the operations of the criminal justice chain and
the absence of the criminal justice system across Liberia especially in the rural parts of the
country. Fyanka (2014) makes the point that these challenges should influence programming to
reform Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is only when the local challenges are correctly
identified, and appropriate measures put in place to address them, that there is an enhanced
chance of sustainable peacebuilding (Fyanka, 2014)
Related to the need for reforms to be designed to suit the context is the apparent
unanimity in the literature that reform must not be imposed by external actors since in many
instances, the direction of the reforms pushed by external actors often seek to further their
national interests (Ansorg, 2017: Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon, 2014; & Westernman, 2017).
Nyei (2014) also observed that there are cases where “… policy prescriptions from donor
organizations in exchange for development aid have driven some of the reform programs”.
Where reform processes do not take on board the local context but are spearheaded by
Western/donor priorities, some reforms have died a natural death after donor support ended
(Ansorg, 2017 & Bacon, 2015). Gordon (2014) supports this position as the author stated that
“Efforts focusing on building state institutions and structures, without sufficiently paying
attention to developing relations between the state and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit
peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126). To further buttress this point, Gordon (2011) argues that
without interventions to reform the security sector being locally owned, the likelihood that the
reforms will be capable of responding to local needs is slim and this will compromise the
outcome and/or quality of the results of the programmatic interventions (Gordon, 2014).
Oosterveld and Galand (2012), in illustrating the effect of not carrying the population along in
the design and implementation of reforms of the justice and security sectors, cited the example of
the failure of a project to reform the formal court system in Timor-Leste. Another example is
provided by Blease and Qehajia (2013) who informed their readers that in the preparation of
Kosovo’s National Security Strategy the need to uphold the virtues of national ownership was
ignored and this affected the process and eventual product that was designed (Gordon, 2014). A
third example is provided by Jackson (2010) who indicated that the United States support to
reform the security sector in Iraq resulted in the formation of institutions that were considered
alien by the local population and unreflective of the history and culture of the context, these
interventions had very minimal impact on the reform process (Gordon, 2014).
The common thread that runs through the principles cited above is the need for
national/local ownership to influence programming to reform the justice and security sectors in
all settings including postconflict countries.
National Ownership and Reform of the Criminal Justice System
Benefits of national/local ownership in reforming the justice and security sectors
The process of reforming the justice and security sectors, particularly in postconflict
settings is an interest driven enterprise between and amongst donors and recipients of donor
support (Gordon, 2014 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). As a result of this, local ownership
has been identified as a pillar around which security sector reform should be delivered in
postconflict settings (Homel & Masson, 2016 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). Homel and
Masson (2016) cited documents like the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to
buttress this assertion. Adhering to the principles of local ownership in justice and security
sector reform aids the process of making the respective institutions accountable and engenders
public trust and confidence in the sectors institutions and the State (Gordon, 2014; Homel &
Masson, 2016).
What is national/local ownership?
National ownership, within the context of criminal justice system reform in postconflict
settings, is the term used to describe a situation/process where international efforts to support
reform of the criminal justice system adopt a methodology that involves consultation of the local
community when shaping the reform interventions and how to implement them (Ansorg, 2017;
Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014; Detzner, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gal, 2016; Gordon, 2014;
Schroder & Chappuis, 2014; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018 & Westernman, 2017). There is
consensus among international actors that national ownership should be the pivot around which
international assistance revolves (Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon,
2014; Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). However, this consensus may only be because it is
politically expedient to be publicly associated with such a commitment. The reality is often the
complete opposite. It is worth emphasizing that sometimes the desire by international donors to
uphold national ownership may be genuine, just imperfectly implemented, or for other reasons
other than being political expediency. Who or what constitute(s) “local?”
Unsurprising, there are divergent views on the answer to this question. For instance, Gordon
(2014) posited that the wider public and civil society should constitute what “local” means and
they should jointly own the reform process. Nathan (2008) posits that local ownership,
particularly in the context of security sector reform, implies that recipients of international
development assistance in this case national actors must be responsible for designing, managing
and implementing interventions to reform the security sector and not external actors (Homel &
Masson, 2016). Donais (2008) augured that the acknowledgment of local ownership as a
cornerstone of security sector reform creates challenges as it assumes that who or what is “local”,
and what constitutes “ownership”, are known by the external partners (Schroder & Chappuis,
2014). To support this view, Schroder and Chappuis (2014) emphasized the vagueness associated
with these concepts because of the lack of clarity on whose interests should influence the
analysis. Krogstad (2013) shares Schroder and Chappuis (2014) opinion as the researcher
indicated that there is still an absence of consensus on what constitutes local ownership (Gordon,
2014).
The United Nations (2008) stated that national ownership should involve “nationally led
and inclusive processes in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society,
including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others, are actively engaged” (Gordon, 2014,
p. 128). However, authors like Krogstad (2013), argued that local ownership has been reduced to
the consultations that occur after a few likeminded members of the society’s political elite have
accepted the priorities for reform of the justice and security sectors determined by external actors
(Gordon, 2014). Mobekk (2010) stressed the point that it is important to note that what
constitutes local actors is not a homogenous group and common security concerns are therefore
not necessarily shared. Accordingly, limiting the scope of consultations may defeat the
imperative of making security sector reform processes inclusive to make them effective (Gordon,
2014). Gordon (2014) argued that such an approach will undermine the principle of local
ownership and the ensuing benefits (Gordon, 2014).
Gordon (2014) further suggested a broadening of the definition of what constitutes local
ownership in order to increase the pool of champions of the reform process. This point is
supported by Krogstad (2013), who asserted that this is even more important in postconflict
societies where the political elite may have been discredited and/or lack the will to reform the
security sector because the reforms may result in a circumscription of their power (Gordon,
2014). It is worth stating that the approach advocated by Krogstad (2013) has the potential of
neutralizing or reducing the efficacy of the activities of spoilers of the reforms (Gordon, 2014).
From the foregoing, it is submitted that, in postconflict settings, an amalgamation of the
definitions provided by Gordon (2014), Krogstad (2013) and the United Nations provide the
basis for identifying a wide range of actors across a society to aid the process of identifying and
implementing interventions to reform the criminal justice system.
Challenges associated with operationalizing local ownership as a concept
A number of challenges arise when conceptualizing local ownership to broaden the
number and categories of actors to be involved in deciding the nature of the required reforms and
their mode of implementation. These include a lack of consensus on the impact of civil society
engagement on security sector reforms processes in postconflict countries. The reason being that
there is a view that empowering civil society to be involved in security sector reform activities
could have a destabilization impact on the reform process (Gordon, 2014), although Cubitt
(2013) holds a contrary view, asserting that involving civil society serves as a check on possible
abuses of power on the part of the state and its agents (Gordon, 2014).
Coordinating civil society is another challenge. As pointed out by Donais (2009), it is
important to be mindful of the fact that an increase in the number of actors involved in security
sector reform processes comes with challenges arising from the need to coordinate them
(Gordon, 2014). Again Cubitt (2013), sees no problem with this as the author noted that this is
part of the process of building a democratic society where conflicting views are heard and
consensus forged (Gordon, 2014). Gordon (2014) cautioned against not involving civil society in
security sector reform processes, arguing that it is shortsighted and may fuel a prolongation of
the reform process.
Challenges associated with making security sector reform context specific
For reasons already cited, tailoring security sector reform interventions to suit the context in
which they are to be implemented has proved to be a challenge and this has resulted in a situation
where implementation of security sector reform programming has been hindered (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). Chanaa (2002) referred to this challenge as the “conceptual-contextual divide”
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135). The apparent inability to tailor security sector reform
processes to be context specific has been seen, in some cases, as seeking to satisfy parochial
objectives (Ansorg, 2017; Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Gordon, 2014 & Westernman, 2017). The
neglect, failure and or refusal to tailor security sector reform interventions to suit the context is
often the norm, that has led Ginty (2010) to assert that security sector reform is an imposition of
Western ideas (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014).
It must be noted that tailoring peacebuilding interventions to suit a particular context
requires that each part of the geographical area affected by the conflict is treated as distinct, in
other words the application of a “one size fits all” approach to peacebuilding may defeat the
quest to adopt a context specific approach (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). This is the
reason why the parties to Colombia’s armed conflict adopted the territorial peacebuilding
approach (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Inherent in the territorial peacebuilding
approach is a recognition that peacebuilding efforts must be context specific and that this
requires, inter alia, that the entire geographical location which is affected by armed conflict is not
seen as the same with a uniform peacebuilding approach adopted to address the challenges
identified (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Put differently, each region within the
geographical area where peacebuilding activities are being designed and implemented must be
evaluated and peacebuilding interventions tailored to suit that specific area (Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia & Alzate, 2016).
Secondly, blueprints designed to address challenges in a particular postconflict context
are often blindly replicated across other postconflict contexts whether their implementation was
successful or not (Denney, 2014). Denney (2014) made the point that one of the reasons why
there appears to be a standardized approach adopted by donors towards reforming the justice and
security sectors is that there is a small pool of experts, (e.g., former police officers and lawyers)
whose services are engaged to undertake these reforms and these experts are more at home with
how Western justice and security systems are designed and function. Furthermore, Baker and
Scheye (2007) indicated that international approaches to justice sector reform mistakenly assume
that the absence of a formal justice system necessarily means a lack of access to justice; that
citizens in postconflict settings prefer the formal justice system rather than the customary justice
system and that the formal justice system is more sustainable compared to the customary justice
system (Jackson, 2013).
Other reasons have been advanced for the imposition of externally driven models for
security sector reform in developing countries. These include perceived and actual limitations in
human resources and institutional capacity and a lack of credibility on the part of the leaders in
developing countries (Gordon, 2014). Also, Nathan (2007) stated that funds used to implement
reforms are from sources external to the settings whose justice and security systems are being
reformed (Gordon, 2014). Further, Oosterveld and Galand (2012) stated that the urgency
associated with implementing such reforms makes it difficult to engage in extensive public
consultation (Gordon, 2014).
Another reason cited by Heupel (2012) is the fact that, in some cases, local actors may
lack the political will to implement reforms (Gordon, 2014). It is worthy of note that the lack of
political will on the part of national actors extends to the possibility that local actors may refuse
to accept fundamental principles of security sector reform such as the need for affordability
(Gordon, 2014).
Gordon (2014) indicated that the events of 9/11 have also had an impact on the
willingness to engage with nonstate actors in reforming the security sector, with civil society
organizations being viewed with suspicion. Afghanistan is one postconflict context where it is
perceived that the international community has disregarded civil society in the reform process
(Gordon, 2014). The fact that civil society is also perceived as weak in postconflict environments
has resulted in the preference for a top-down state-centric approach to reform the justice and
security sectors (Gordon, 2014). This approach deprives countries who are benefiting from
security sector reform processes from taking advantage of the wisdom from the larger
community. As found by Homel and Masson (2016), with respect to the Jenin Community
Project in Palestine, using a bottom-up community approach yields a number of benefits
including effective mapping of the community’s needs and involving the community in
decisionmaking on their security.
The limited nature of the resources to reform the justice and security sectors also hinders
the ability of relevant actors, particularly local actors, to insist on local ownership (Fyanka,
2014). For instance, in Liberia, Fyanka (2014) noted that the challenges and solutions to
reforming the justice and security sectors were correctly identified however, there were no funds
available to reform the police. As a result, the Liberia National Police was restructured and
police officers deployed outside the capital with very limited or, in most cases, no resources to
work (Fyanka, 2014). Fyanka (2014) also found that there was a disconnect between the reform
of the police, which is an essential part of the criminal justice system, and the justice system as a
whole, and this created challenges for peacebuilding efforts. It is instructive to note that these
and other factors led Denney (2014) to conclude that a focus on reforming only the state police
will not result in an improvement of the justice and security situation in any society. In Liberia,
the lack of human resources (i.e. lawyers, judges, corrections officers) is affecting the
peacebuilding process and limiting access to justice for the citizenry (Fyanka, 2014). Related to
this, Fyanka (2014) also found that the lack of access to the criminal justice system had resulted
in a surge in violence arising from the activities of informal policing and community justice
processes and actors.
Whereas the challenges of the Liberian context were correctly identified, it is clear from
Fyanka (2014) that conducting a correct situational diagnosis is not sufficient for successful
reforms of a criminal justice system. To reap the desired benefits, it is equally important that
resources are available to undertake the reforms and that the process of implementing the reforms
is holistic and well-coordinated to ensure that the entire criminal justice chain is evenly
strengthened. Jackson (2013) noted that in Sierra Leone the postconflict reconstruction focused
more on security (i.e., the police) and less on justice and this has negatively affected reforms of
the justice part of the criminal justice chain at both the local level (e.g. the local courts and
prisons) and at the central level (e.g., the development of the Ministry of Justice) a situation
Howlett-Bolton (2008) noted has made the Sierra Leonean police ineffective (Jackson, 2013).
This reality highlights the need for a holistic and well-coordinated approach to reforming the
criminal justice system.
Finally, there is overwhelming evidence that almost all donors drive reforms of the
criminal justice system in a manner that seeks to replicate Western justice and security systems
and institutions (Gordon, 2014). However, Denney (2014) made the point that it is not the case
that the attempt to build or rebuild the criminal justice system in war-shattered settings is the sole
prerogative of donors (i.e., local actors have an immeasurable contribution to make).
Consequently, Denney (2014) noted that, in some cases, the leaders of countries receiving donor
support opt for the Western model and the donors have no option other than to support the host
government’s wishes. The truth, however, is that decision makers in countries that receive donor
support are often the elite who have been socialized in Western culture and have little or no
regard for processes and structures that are specific to their context (Denney, 2014). To support
this assertion, Collier (1970) noted, about Sierra Leone, that the elite in Freetown treated the
traditional justice system with contempt as in their view it was backward (Denney, 2014).
Alternative Approaches to operationalizing Local Ownership
As evidenced from the foregoing, there is a wide gap between the consensus to have local
ownership principles inform efforts to reform the justice and security sectors and what happens
in practice. Therefore, Murdoch (2015) advocated for a middle path that upholds the practice of
allowing programming to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict settings to embrace
local ownership, while, at the same time, imbibing standards, principles and practices from the
West. The reason being that this approach enhances the impact of the reforms. Donais (2009)
also indicated that whereas there is a strong case to be made for upholding the principle of local
ownership when reforming the security sector, it need not be total and immediate (Gordon,
2014). This means that, for the benefits of local ownership to be manifested, local actors need
not, and may not, own the process from the beginning and/or overnight. Put differently,
operationalizing local ownership may be delayed; hence all actors must be cognizant about this
and this reality should influence their expectations.
Dursun-Özkanca (2018) evaluated the extent to which local ownership considerations
influenced programming from resources provided by the international community to create a rule
of law culture in Kosovo. The researcher found that the European Union and United Nations
used a top down approach and focused on addressing only serious crimes and that this resulted in
the local community being overlooked. Local ownership was restricted to certain aspects of the
reform process. This is not to suggest that adopting a top-down approach is necessarily bad.
Jackson (2011) and Caparini (2010) are of the opinion that a hybrid between the top-down
approach and the bottom-up approach is critical to operationalize security sector reform in a
substantive and inclusive manner (Gordon, 2014). Mac Ginty (2011) is of the view that the
hybrid approach fulfills other imperatives of security and justice reform in postconflict settings
such as “local ownership” “participation” and “sustainability” (Gordon, 2014, p. 133). Therefore,
there should be an intersection between the top-bottom approach and the bottom-top approach,
and this can be found in the legal and institutional change processes that ensue during the
peacebuilding phase (Homel & Masson, 2016). For instance, according to Homel and Masson
(2016), a partnership arising from the need for external capacity to support such processes and
local decision-making and implementation of community security needs could be forged. The
quest for a middle path on the approach to reforming the security sector in postconflict settings is
sustainable and has the potential of minimizing the negative impact of a clash between the
interests of security sector reform actors. Donors would be able to push their national interests
and at the same time accommodate the needs and concerns of the recipients of their assistance.
National Ownership in postconflict Criminal Justice System Reform
Since national and/or local ownership have been identified as the fundamental principle
to guide security sector reform, this part of the chapter devotes attention to how national
ownership can be, or has been, made an essential part of undertakings to reform the criminal
justice system particularly in postconflict environments. This is not to discount suggestions of
alternative approaches advocated by Murdoch (2015), Donais (2009) and Dursun-Özkanca
(2018). All the alternative approaches identified above make the point that local/national
ownership should influence security sector reform programming. The only point of departure
between the advocates of making national ownership central to criminal justice system reform
and those for the middle path is the extent to which local ownership should influence the
program as well as at what stage (i.e. timing of the reform process) should local ownership
influence decision making.
There are several approaches that could be used to promote national or local ownership in
postconflict reform of the criminal justice system. These include -
Engagement with Nonstate Actors
Background
Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016), highlighted the fact that there is an
increasing trend for recognizing that involving local actors in postconflict reconstruction is a
condition precedent to building enduring peace. Mac Ginty and Richmond referred to this
phenomenon as the “local turn in peace building” (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016, p.
840). The objective of actively engaging nonstate actors in peacebuilding efforts in postconflict
environments is to promote national ownership and legitimacy of the work of the international
community in that setting (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Security sector reform
programming, particularly in postconflict environments, is part of state-building (Gordon, 2014
& Homel & Masson, 2016). Kostovicova (2008) opined that this process is both a technical
exercise and creating relationships between the governed and the government (Gordon, 2014).
Consequently, “it relies on the governed having a stake in the reform process by having a “say”
in it” (Gordon, 2014 p. 132). Peake, Scheye & Hills (2007) posited that in spite of the fact that
the literature is awash with knowledge that points to the fact that implementing security sector
reform is a political process, programs are drafted in purely technical terms without attention
being paid to the political context in which they are to be implemented (Schroder & Chappuis,
2014). Jackson (2013) informed readers that, at the local level, there is a complex network of
actors in the justice sector who have an influence over decentralized structures. The researcher
therefore concluded that persons with resources are in a better position to negotiate their way
through this maze of actors and power whereas those without resources are incapacitated.
Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008), made the point that in postconflict countries
like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, state and nonstate actors work together to provide public
goods and services under a framework, described “as hybrid or non-Weberian political
formations” (Podder, 2014, p. 215). Jackson (2017) shared this stance, stating that “… in
postconflict environments the relationship between these formal local government organizations
and nonstate providers – that may include armed actors - is critical in terms of providing services
like security” (p.751). Where the state is absent, nonstate actors may fill the existing lacuna,
therefore engaging them in efforts to reform the security sector is logical, as opposed to avoiding
them and trying to create Weberian-style security arrangements (Denney, 2014; Homel &
Masson, 2016 & Podder, 2014). As previously noted, the question of whether the Weberian
model of security sector reform should be applied in areas where the state is not present has yet
to find prominence in the debate over implementing security sector reform in postconflict
settings (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). The point must be made that the involvement of nonstate
actors in providing justice and security services in postconflict societies is not without
difficulties. For instance, Bangura (2018) noted that in Sierra Leone, the lack of access to
services provided by the criminal justice system resulted in a surge in violence perpetrated by the
activities of informal policing and community justice processes.
Involving nonstate actors in reforming the criminal justice sector
Nonstate actors are prominent actors in almost, if not all, facets of life in postconflict
settings (Ansorg, 2017; Denney, 2014; Jackson, 2013 & Podder, 2014). Several researchers and
development organizations such as the United Nations have hailed the use of nonstate actors to
support and/or implement interventions to reform the justice and security sectors (Denney, 2013;
Dinnen & Peake, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). However, it is worth emphasizing from the onset, that
authors like Migdal (1988) hold a contrary view (Swenson, 2018). Migdal (1988) observed that
the quest to build a country bound by the rule of law whilst at the same time engaging nonstate
actors to implement the needed reforms appears to be a contradiction, the reason being that
nonstate actors are bound by separate values (Swenson, 2018). Baker (2008) made the point that
it is widely accepted that the presence of multiple justice and security actors is a common feature
in the global South in general, and particularly in conflict-affected countries (Denney, 2014).
Though this view is held by many, Denney (2014) lamented over the fact that the greater
majority of donors who are supporting efforts to reform the justice and security system engage
only with state actors as they base their programming on liberal peacebuilding models and the
strong desire to reform institutional structures in fragile settings to conform to the Weberian
notions of the state (Denney, 2014).
Additionally, Denney (2014) asserted that where there are efforts not to engage with
nonstate actors, security sector reform programs are designed in a manner that fails to recognize
the interconnectedness between the state and nonstate actors/systems but rather affirms the
notions that they are distinct. To facilitate the process of acknowledging the interconnectedness
of both state and nonstate actors, Byres (1995) advocated for a reconceptualization of how these
actors are seen in the services they deliver (Denney, 2014). When a deliberate decision is taken
not to involve nonstate actors in processes to reform the justice and corrections sectors in
postconflict countries it is an indication of an unwillingness to recognize the dynamics in such
settings, a desire not to find interventions that are sustainable, and an intention to prop up the
ruling elite to the neglect of ordinary citizens. It also signifies a desire to defy all principles of
good governance and democracy which recognizes civil society as an important factor in
political governance.
Nonstate Actors and Postconflict Criminal Justice System
The prominent role of nonstate actors in the justice and security sphere is evidenced by
statistics provided by Albrecht and Kyed (2011) who informed their readers that “80 per cent of
disputes in the global South are resolved by nonstate means'' (Denney, 2014, p. 253). Only 2% of
cases in Liberia go to its formal justice system while 45% are resolved through the customary
justice system (Bacon, 2015). Furthermore, Isser et al, assert that in Liberia, with respect to
sexual related offenses, only 50% are reported, of which more than half i.e.28%, are reported to
informal settings (e.g., family heads, traditional leaders, elders and secret societies [Bacon,
2015]). In Sierra Leone chiefs are responsible for providing justice and security services to over
80% of Sierra Leoneans and 85% of crimes and conflicts in Sierra Leone are first reported to
traditional authorities (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013).
Scheye and Andersen (2007) posited that the presence of a plurality of nonstate actors in
the justice and security space is due to the state’s weakness (Denney, 2014). Scheye and
Andersen (2007) further asserted that as the state gets stronger nonstate actors will fade away
(Denney, 2014). Whereas there is some truth in the view that the presence of a plurality of
nonstate actors in the justice and security space is due to the state’s weakness, the same cannot
be said about the fact that, in developing countries, nonstate actors will become extinct when the
state’s capacity to provide justice and security services increases (Denney, 2014 & Jackson,
2013).
Denney (2014) posited that efforts by development partners to support reforms of the
justice and security system in fragile settings have been geared towards building institutions and
systems that are a replica of Western institutions and exclude nonstate actors. Examples of these
reforms are building courthouses, police stations and prisons and training personnel to work in
these agencies (Denney, 2014). Egnell & Halden (2009) suggested that this approach prevents
any other practical and potentially more effective possibilities of reforming the justice and
security sectors in postconflict settings (Denney, 2014). Explaining this, Denney (2014) indicated
that the strongly held ideological view in the West, that the role of the Weberian state model in
the lives of its citizens is ideal for every state, is what is fueling the natural willingness of donors
to focus on supporting state actors to the neglect of nonstate actors. This view about the role of
the state can be equated to transplanting cultural practices from one context into another and
expecting it to flourish in the new context as well as it does in its previous setting.
Denney (2013) found that in Sierra Leone, despite the prominent role played by chiefs in
providing justice and security, British Government funded programs to reform the security sector
failed to actively engage chiefs. The researcher ascribed this state of affairs to the fact that the
United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID) did not deal with nonstate
or informal state actors. Other reasons advanced by Denny (2013) for DIFD’s approach in Sierra
Leone include the organization’s “political, bureaucratic and statist nature” (p.15), the impact of
Western values on programming and the nationality of technical staff hired to implement such
programs.
The point must be made that this view held by donors and persons who are socialized in
Western values of the state fails to recognize the fact that developing countries in general, and
postconflict countries in particular, are unique contexts, different from the West. A fundamental
feature of their uniqueness is the involvement of multiple actors, including nonstate actors, in
providing justice and security services (Podder, 2014). Nonstate actors are steeped in the culture
and religion of the people and often the formal state structures are alien and not trustworthy by
the citizenry (Denney, 2014). Scheye (2009) opined that the legitimacy that nonstate actors enjoy
when providing justice and security services in developing countries is essentially because they
are sanctioned by culture and tradition (Denney, 2014), an attribute that interventions supported
by external actors’ lack.
Other reasons given for the prominent role of nonstate actors in the lives of citizens in the
developing world is their geographical accessibility, cost and other intangible attributes like the
language of communication used in such forums (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013). The issue of
cost does not only relate to how much those accessing the services pay but also, in the case of
state services, the expense to the taxpayer maintaining the system.
Further, under investment in state provided justice and security services, which is a
common situation, limits their effectiveness. Koroma, Turay and Saddiqi (2012), found that in
Sierra Leone, the justice sector was allocated 1% of the national budget (Denney, 2014). This is
woefully inadequate given the total national budget and the needs of Sierra Leone’s justice and
security sectors (Denney, 2014).
Denney (2014) suggested that the inability of the formal justice system to deliver the
“locally valued currency of justice” (p. 254) is another reason for the popularity of the nonstate
actors who provide justice and security services. To support this assertion, the author refers to
excerpts from an interview conducted during a survey in two districts in Sierra Leone, which
indicated that women who were victims of domestic violence preferred compensation from their
predators as opposed to incarcerating them. One reason for this is because jailing the perpetuator
results in a loss of family income which has negative consequences for the entire family
(Denney, 2014). The sentencing processes in the local courts is another feature of the processes
of nonstate actors in the criminal justice sector that makes them popular. Jackson (2013) in
describing the processes of local courts in Sierra Leone explains that local courts are governed by
the Local Courts Act and apply customary law which varies across chiefdoms. They hear family
matters, debt, land and petty fraud issues and the sentencing processes are open to negotiation.
This makes them attractive to a population whose primary objective can be seen as obtaining
restorative rather than retributive justice.
Partnering Nonstate Actors in Justice and Security Sector Reform
Due to their prominent role in the criminal justice system in postconflict settings, nonstate
actors cannot be ignored when reforming the justice and security sectors. Consequently, authors
like Homel and Masson (2016), van Tongeren (2013) and Whitman (2013) advocated for
mechanisms at the community level which serve as forums for information sharing about
security and safety at the local level, address security challenges and build the relationship
between the citizenry and public officials including those working in the criminal justice system
and the local government (Gordon, 2014). Denney (2014) argued that even where there is
evidence that donor programs to reform the justice and security system in postconflict settings
target nonstate actors such as customary justice providers, the programs drew a dichotomy
between state and nonstate actors thus neglecting to recognize how nonstate justice and security
actors operate on the ground (Denney, 2014). Interestingly, in practice, the distinction between
state and nonstate actors is not as neat as it is made to look (Denney, 2014). In the justice and
security sectors there is a lot of overlap between state and nonstate actors and citizens oscillate
from one category of actors to another seeking justice and security services either on their own
or upon the direction of persons responsible for providing a particular service (Denney, 2014).
For instance, a judge may refer a matter to the customary justice system for arbitration whilst a
chief may refer an electoral related matter, which may have come before him or her, to the
police (Denney, 2014). Consequently, Denney (2014) and Jackson (2013) campaigned for
abandoning the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors in terms of who should be engaged
in reforming the justice and security sectors in postconflict settings.
Jackson (2013) observed that, on the ground, the situation is more complex than having a
dual system of justice. Therefore, Denny (2014) advocated for an approach that focuses on the
end user of justice and security services. This approach acknowledges the interconnectedness of
the various justice and security service providers (Denney, 2014). Similarly, Knight (2009)
advocated for security sector reform processes to have a Social Contract element where they
provide legitimacy to the state (Gordon, 2014). According to Knight (2009) this will result in a
situation where there is a shift in focus from structures created by the state and formal civil
society organizations to a relationship between the citizens and the state, thus increasing the
chances for a successful security sector reform program (Gordon, 2014). Denney (2014)
indicated that the first step towards seeing that all actors are interconnected is to use the justice
and security mapping approach to identify all actors (both state and nonstate) providing justice
and security services. Homel and Masson (2016) associated themselves with this view.
Denney (2014) opined that adopting this approach will also help move the discussion
away from the current approach where academics and practitioners slavishly adhered to a
dichotomy between state and nonstate actors to one that encourages an integrated approach to
justice and security sector reform. The end user approach to security sector reform is akin to
advocating for a people centered approach to security sector reform which Gordon (2014)
suggested results in a bottom-up approach to security sector reform. It also deals with the
challenges associated with the concentration of power in the hands of the elite and the associated
criminal conduct such as corruption and organized crime that ensues (Gordon, 2014). The call for
the abandonment of the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors in security sector reform
programming is a step in the right direction; it is a practical approach to dealing with what
actually exists on the ground as opposed to the current approach that is grounded in theory and
immersed in Western liberal ideology. When the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors is
forsaken, it will provide a better opportunity for relevant stakeholders in the justice and security
sector reform processes, even in postconflict settings, to work in the interest of citizens who are
the primary beneficiaries of their programming. Also, it will engender interest amongst the
citizenry and garner the desired support to implement programmatic interventions as well as
demonstrate a true sense of partnership.
Swenson (2018) highlighted the importance of engaging nonstate actors in reforming the
security sector in postconflict settings and the ensuing benefits of such engagement. Swenson
(2018) cited Kyed (2011), who asserted that nonstate actors who are connected to the population
by custom, religion, ethnicity or tribe are very effective in dispute resolution in developing
countries. Swenson (2018) also cited Menkhaus (2007) to strengthen the author’s advocacy for
making nonstate actors prominent in security sector reform. Menkhaus (2007) indicated that
nonstate actors have a vital role to play in dispute resolution in conflict prone settings where
formal state institutions have proved to lack the requisite legitimacy (Swenson, 2018). Swenson
(2018) noted that the progress made by nonstate actors in dispute resolution has resulted in some
experts calling for the formation of coalitions with actors that are beyond the formal institutions
to implement justice sector reform activities. Bacon (2015) shared this view in the context of
Liberia. Dinnen and Peake (2013) indicated that, in Sierra Leone, policing services and other
formal government institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and citizens in the
rural areas rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve their disputes.
Denney (2013) further explained that the neglect and/or refusal of international actors,
like DFID, to engage with nonstate actors is because they are interested in building security
systems/institutions that promote equality, justice and human rights according to Western
standards. Denney (2013) noted that, unfortunately, the state of the chieftaincy institution makes
Western development agencies conclude that chiefs fall short of the standards that the
development partners are promoting. Baker (2010) made the point that involving national actors
in security sector reform interventions in postconflict settings would naturally result in the
involvement of actors like traditional authorities whose processes and activities offend
international principles and standards like human rights (Homel & Masson, 2016). It is worthy of
note that the institution of chieftaincy is undergoing significant reforms, and this is resulting in a
situation where their role as partners in reform efforts cannot be ignored (Jackson, 2013). Denney
(2013) observed that the closeness of chiefs to the community makes them natural partners for
development. Baker (2005) supported this stance and advocated for engaging with chiefs as a
condition precedent to comprehensive reform of policing and justice services in Sierra Leone
(Denney, 2013). Jackson (2013) shares this view positing that, in Sierra Leone, chiefs are
entrenched in local politics and that this makes them important players. However, Jackson (2013)
advocated for development actors to resist any temptation, during their efforts to promote access
to justice, to support initiatives that have the potential of resulting in an unintended consequence
of entrenching the power of chiefs. The point is also made by Denney (2013) that finding the
values that are propagated by institutions from the West in formal state institutions is relatively
easier hence the preference, by donors, to deal with them. Denney (2013) however, questioned
the sincerity of external development assistance actors when they insist on working with national
actors who uphold and/or espouse values like international human rights standards and
principles. According to Denney (2013) there is evidence to suggest that DFID has engaged with
actors with questionable human rights records. This apparent double standard led Denney
(2013) to observe that:
“The distinction made between the human rights abuses committed by states and
those committed by informal actors is further indicative of the prism of political
liberalism and bureaucracy through which DFID understands the world and
models its development assistance. Justice, security, democracy and human rights
thus, become most effectively served by a centralized state authority, properly
structured and rule-bound by legal-rationalism. Chiefs, conversely, represent
unaccountability and a lack of oversight, rendering them unmanageable forces”
(p.20).
Denney (2013) also quotes Anderson (2007) who notes that:
“The donor’s choice is not between supporting a human-rights-respecting state
system and an illiberal nonstate system. If only that were the case, the choice
would be simple. The complexity and the predicament arise when faced with a
state system that provides very few services and a nonstate system that proves
some - albeit in a less than perfect manner” (p.20).
Researchers like Golooba-Mutebi (2011) pointed out that in some societies, chiefs are the
primary service providers in rural communities and Fanthorpe (2005) asserted that in some
contexts the community is very loyal to the institution of chieftaincy (Denney, 2013). Sawyer
(2008) affirmed this view, informing readers that chiefs play various leadership and governance
roles (Denney, 2013). Despite these positive and important roles played by chiefs in the African
context, the illiberal nature of the chieftaincy institution runs contrary to the liberal principles
that development agencies, like DIFD, promote, hence their refusal to engage chiefs when
undertaking critical reforms. This attitude, according to Denney (2013) is an application of
Western principles that do not suit the African context and is yet to yield the desired results.
International actors like DFID neglect and/or refusal to design programmatic interventions to suit
the context for which they are designed and implemented runs contrary to Kelsall (2008), who
advocated for “going with the grain” of African development (Denney, 2013 p.7) and concludes
that the imposition of externally driven approaches for Africa’s development has yet to yield the
desired results (Denney, 2013). These conclusions arrived at by Kelsall (2008) are confirmed by
Denney (2013) who concluded that, as a result of DFID’s approach to security sector reform in
Sierra Leone, the outcome of the reform interventions is limited.
This is not to suggest that the institution of chieftaincy is perfect and not blameworthy.
To illustrate the potential downsides associated with chieftaincy, Denney (2013) posited that, in
Sierra Leone, chiefs contributed to the state of affairs that eventually took the country into the
civil war. Conteh (2014) shared this view, asserting that the nature of Sierra Leone’s chieftaincy
institution made the institution a conflict driver. This assertion is supported by Homel and
Masson (2016) who made the point that in some cases the conduct of nonstate actors who
provide justice and security services was itself a conflict trigger. Denney (2013) informed
readers that in adhering to the concept of “going with the grain” (p.7), it is important to bear in
mind that there are several practical implications associated with this decision. These include
having to deal with oppressive and discriminatory security, justice and governance actors
(Denney, 2013). Therefore, Leonard noted that “The challenge is not to terminate existing local
and informal social contracts for the sake of Western models of security, but instead to make
local governance more responsive and effective in a manner that accommodates the legitimacy
of local institutions” (Ansorg, 2017 p. 141).
Cubitt (2013) advocated for a more prominent role for national actors in justice and
security sector reform processes, asserting that the West does not have a monopoly over
understanding how to build peace. Therefore, whilst principles such as equal treatment of
citizens by security institutions are useful, they are not of sufficient strategic importance to delay
the transfer of decision making to national actors (Gordon, 2014). Fortunately, the passage of
time has resulted in DIFD recognizing the place of chiefs in Sierra Leonean society and this has,
in turn, resulted in a shift in approach so that DFID is working with chiefs to design and
implement its programmatic interventions (Denney, 2013; Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013).
It is evident that the reluctance by international development actors to engage with local
nonstate actors like chiefs is borne out of a number of factors. These include the overemphasis of
Western solutions for development challenges in contexts that are totally different from the West
and the fact that dealing with only state actors is relatively easier and has relatively fewer
practical challenges for them. It is also clear that there is a deliberate effort to promote Western
values, with development assistance to recipients of donor funding being used as a tool for
achieving a particular foreign policy or national interest objective. These factors point to the
politics that influence the decision-making processes of implementing programmatic
interventions to reform the justice and security sectors in postconflict countries. As long as the
standards/ideology that the international development community uses is not contextualized, the
possibility of success is limited, and this is evidenced by the outcome of most development
programming in Africa.
The stance taken by Denney (2013) of getting nonstate actors involved in security sector
reform in postconflict societies is supported by Ansorg (2017). Ansorg (2017), cited authors like
Bagayoko, Hutchful & Luckham (2016), points out that as a result of implementing reform
programs that are not context specific, security sector reform approaches are at odds with the
realities in Africa where state authority and governance is, and can be, exercised by nonstate
actors such as traditional leaders. In Africa, nonstate actors are often external to the formal state
institutions, so the reform efforts exclude them (Ansorg, 2017). A 2007 report by the
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative holds a similar view. In the report, the Commonwealth
Human Rights Initiative indicated that, in spite of the fact that policing by nonstate actors (e.g.
traditional authorities) is provided by some ethnic/local communities in Ghana, police reform
interventions, which are mostly foreign supported, have never involved non state actors in the
reform process (Ansorg, 2017).
Ansorg (2017) also pointed out that in most postconflict environments non state actors
are not actively involved in security sector reform processes, the reason being that such processes
are often elite undertakings. This view is shared by Ansorg and Haastrup (2016) who indicated
that the Western approach to security sector reform in Africa’s postconflict settings are elite and
male driven and neglects females and organizations that champion female rights
(Ansorg, 2017). Interestingly, Angola and Rwanda are two postconflict settings that Ansorg
(2017) cited as exceptions to the general view and practice that security sector reform is an elite
driven endeavor. Ansorg (2017) also lamented over the refusal by international development
agencies to recognize local/traditional institutions as partners in their programming. According to
the researchers, this is negatively affecting efforts to create security in postconflict settings.
Ansorg (2017) also argued that local institutions may have the potential of securing the peace
and stability (i.e., the ultimate object of security sector reform programming in postconflict
settings. Westernman (2017) shared this view, positing that the goal of security sector reform in
postconflict situations is to create a workable and sustainable security system that has a
democratic relationship with the legitimate authorities of the country charged with creating a safe
and secure environment.
Mac Ginty (2015) pointed out that focusing on the local community to serve as the source
of justice and security in the absence of strong state institutions is not a solution to address the
root causes of conflict, arguing that in most cases, the conduct of these local structures fueled the
conflict. Hence, resorting to local structures should be seen as an interim measure (Homel &
Masson, 2016). Gordon (2014) counseled that in the long term both local and state centered
approaches should be used to provide mutually reinforcing solutions to justice and security
challenges in postconflict settings (Homel & Masson, 2016). Interestingly, Homel and Fuller
(2015) made the point that the approach advocated by Gordon (2014) is already being
implemented as there is an emerging phenomenon where interventions to reform the security
sector are increasingly being built around local government structures (Homel & Masson, 2016).
Mac Ginty (2010) is realist in commenting on the debate on local ownership and the
place of traditional authorities in operationalizing it, as the researcher observed that, donor
assistance creates a patron-client relationship, a situation that hinders efforts to promote local
ownership in international development assistance programs (Homel & Masson, 2016). To
address this, Mac Ginty (2010) advocated for an approach adopted by the Australian Institute of
Criminology, where interventions for crime prevention and community safety were implemented
within the framework of partnerships between donors and the local community (Homel &
Masson, 2016). Mac Ginty (2010) cited the Jenin Community project, in Palestine, as an example
where all actors, formal and informal, local and international, women and youth groups, were
brought together to work in partnership to improve community safety (Homel & Masson,
2016).
Nonstate Actors implementing Security Sector Reforms in postconflict societies
Traditional and religious leaders
From the foregoing, it is obvious that traditional leaders have a crucial role to play in
postconflict reform of the criminal justice system. Dinnen and Peake (2013), reported on the
approach and outcome of New Zealand supported police reforms in Bougainville, a postconflict
autonomous region of Papua New Guinea and informed their readers that the agreement that
brought peace to Bougainville gave the region an autonomous status and an opportunity to
establish its own public services including courts, police, criminal law and human rights
protection. The researchers further noted that Bougainville’s constitution calls for the inclusion
of traditional leaders in governance, stating that “the clan structure and customary leadership of
Bougainvillean communities shall be recognized and strengthened and the roles, responsibilities
and authority of traditional leaders shall be recognized at all levels of government” (p. 575).
Dinnen and Peake (2013), asserted that the criminal justice reform project in
Bougainville has two distinct approaches which produced fundamentally opposite results.
According to the researchers, one approach supports the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP),
which operates in Bougainville rural areas (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The CAP is made up of 350
sworn police officers of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) who in addition to performing
policing duties, offer services such as mediation and work with traditional authorities to support
community/traditional governance structures (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The second approach
supports about 200 BPS officers based in the urban centers (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The CAP
uses local concepts of authority to resolve disputes and Bougainville’s young local government
system to discharge their functions. Dinnen and Peake (2013) asserted that this is an example of
a hybrid policing approach that connects central authority to local authority. The village chief
nominates potential officers of the CAP and the Council of Elders, comprised of traditional
leaders, approve these nominees (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Following this, the BPS conducts
background checks on the approved nominees (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Social and local
structures are actively involved in the recruitment process as they determine who serves in the
CAP (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Dinnen and Peake (2013) posited this approach gives the CAP
credibility.
Dinnen and Peake (2013) concluded that the second approach follows the orthodox
methodology to reforming the justice and security systems in postconflict settings. As previously
noted, an essential feature of the orthodox approach is that the services of international experts
are engaged to build the capacity of criminal justice institutions (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). These
experts’ mentor the national actors/institutions, develop handbooks, transfer skills, and train them
on intelligence gathering and investigations (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Dinnen and Peake (2013)
indicated that in Bougainville, the orthodox approach is limited to officers of the BPS operating
in the capital. Dinnen and Peake (2013) also noted that instead of just blindly building the public
services, the Bougainvilles incorporated the positive aspects of their customary system of
government to create hybrid institutions, policies and laws. For instance, chiefs were given roles
in dispute resolution (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The peacebuilding efforts created local
government structures including a Council of Elders, which is responsible for maintaining
security, dispute resolution and facilitating reconciliation (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). For Dinnen
and Peake (2013), the new political architecture, which gave traditional leaders a prominent role,
was designed to have a socially embedded approach towards policing and justice. The
researchers further opined that the reform of the justice system in Bougainville is a deliberate
effort in the area of policing to depart from the discredited policing approach that predated the
conflict (Dinnen & Peake, 2013).
To operationalize this new approach, the report of the Bougainville Constitutional
Commission enjoined the police to work closely with the Council of Elders, village courts, chiefs
and other traditional leaders with the ultimate objective of the police becoming an integral part of
the justice system which is made up of traditional leaders (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). The justice
system was to be administered based on kastomary (perhaps a vernacular spelling to
“customary” in local Bougainville language) practices of restorative justice (Dinnen & Peake,
2013). Is it instructive to observe that although focused on the rural community and local culture,
international assistance was solicited to support the CAP, and New Zealand developed a syllabus
to train the CAP in local conflict resolution methods. As noted earlier, in evaluating the outcome
of both policing approaches, Dinnen and Peake, (2013) found results that fundamentally differed
from each other. The researchers found that the approach adopted in connection with building
the CAP yielded positive results in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy as opposed to the
approach adopted to reform the BPS. Dinnen and Peake, (2013) also found that issues such as
lack of professionalism, effective management, accountability and resources plagued the BPS,
and these negatively affected the public’s perception about them. Interestingly, Dinnen and
Peake, (2013) found the direct opposite in the case of the CAP. The researchers found that the
CAP has multiple layers of accountability including the Council of Elders and the community
members, which the authors referred to as horizontal oversight. Dinnen and Peake, (2013) also
found that there is also a noncommissioned officer within the CAP who exercises vertical
oversight in conjunction with an expatriate staff. Involving expatriates in oversight and
accountability has some benefits as they are insulated from local social life and hence generally
not susceptible to the local influences that nationals will ordinarily be susceptible to (Dinnen &
Peake, 2013).
Dinnen and Peake, (2013) found that CAP is the source of 86% of crime statistics. It is
worth mentioning that since the CAP operates in the rural areas, where the population is higher,
its contribution to the national crime statistics is natural. The fact that the CAP is present in the
community contributes to the support that they enjoy (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). On the other
hand, Dinnen and Peake (2013) found that the BPS is seen as foreign and is associated with the
old order. A very significant finding made by Dinnen and Peake (2013) is that the CAP has
evolved over time and in the process, has been aligned to local structures. Significantly, Dinnen
and Peake (2013) found that the CAP is also an early warning mechanism to prevent crisis in the
community. Dinnen and Peake (2013) also found that, in some cases, the legitimacy of the CAP
officers has been used to reinforce the work of other local justice actors. For instance, the
presence of a CAP officer in the village court boosts the magistrate’s authority. CAP officers are
members of other local committees and this enhanced local governance structures.
Dinnen and Peake (2013) also highlighted the importance of building on local strengths
as opposed to using conventional approaches that are preoccupied with identifying local
deficiencies and fixing them. Secondly, the authors indicated that reforms should not follow
orthodox approaches that have no bearing on the context and that where the intervention is
tailored to suit the context there is a higher chance of it being successful and sustained. It is
refreshing to note that Dinnen and Peake (2013) commended New Zealand for their
nonprescriptive approach to police reform in Bougainville and asserted that New Zealand should
take part of the credit for the success of the project.
Challenges associated with involving traditional structures in providing security and
justice sector services
Dinnen and Peake (2013) reported that during their study, they answered the question:
whether in the light of the pluralistic policing approaches and the justice system in Bougainville,
the BPS was fit for the context. To this question the researchers made the point that while a case
can arguably be made for strengthening the formal justice system to deal with serious offences,
this cannot be done without strengthening informal justice systems operated by nonstate actors.
Dinnen and Peake (2013) asserted that in spite of all the strengths of the CAP approach
towards reforming the justice system, there is the need for a professional police service to deal
with urban related crime and the impact of socio economic development in Bougainville. The
CAP, according to Dinnen and Peake (2013), can be an effective link between the central
government and the local community. This approach affirms earlier suggestions by Mac Ginty
(2011) for an approach that involves both state and nonstate actors in justice and security sector
reform in postconflict settings (Gordon, 2014).
Paralegals
Paralegals are another category of nonstate actors that can aid the justice and security
sector reform in postconflict countries. Swenson (2018) referred to paralegals as barefoot
lawyers and observed that the United Nations has endorsed interventions that involve paralegals
in enhancing access to justice and that this is demonstrating a lot of success. For instance, in
Sierra Leone, several nongovernmental organizations, led by lawyers with the support of
paralegals, offer advice, mediation services and representation in court at the national level
(Jackson, 2013). Denney (2014) found a rise in the number of actors providing paralegal services
in Sierra Leone and the prominent role they were playing in dispute resolution. Golub (2003)
informed readers that paralegals provide a wide range of services including providing
information and advice through representing their clients in administrative forums (Swenson,
2018). Maru (2006) asserted that paralegals provide cost effective and sustainable services
(Swenson, 2018). This is a view shared by Jackson (2013). Additionally, paralegals offer legal
literacy skills (Jackson, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). Baker (2010) asserted that in postconflict
settings paralegals play several important roles including bringing state and nonstate justice
together (Swenson, 2018).
Condition precedents to effective paralegal schemes
For paralegals to be effective in supporting efforts to reform the criminal justice system a
number of conditions must exist. These include adequate training. This position is shared by van
Rooij (2012), who indicates that paralegals need adequate training (Swenson, 2018). van Rooij
(2012) also asserted that paralegals need to maintain an effective relationship with the
community, the state and donors (Swenson, 2018). Thirdly, Swenson (2018) indicated that, to
enhance national ownership, funders of paralegals programs must align their programs to that of
the national government (Swenson, 2018). Maru (2006) added that paralegals must be connected
to lawyers and must have the goal of providing concrete solutions to the justice related
challenges confronting their clients (Swenson, 2018).
Swenson (2018) conducts a study of two paralegal programs in Timor-Leste; the
Advocates Sans Frontiers (ASF) Grassroots Justice Project 2005-2007 and the Asia Foundation’s
Access to justice program 2008-2012. For both programs, paralegals were selected from within
the community they served, from respected village youth, women, church and traditional leaders.
Whereas all the paralegals in both programs were described as neutral and independent, the truth
is that they drew their influence from being strongly rooted in their community (Swenson, 2018).
That is, they used their social capital to discharge their duties as paralegals. Consequently,
Swenson (2018) argued that the fact that the paralegals in both programs were deeply rooted in
their community facilitated their work as paralegals and their role as paralegals bolstered their
standing in the society. These findings suggest that the dual roles played by the paralegals i.e., as
paralegals and their respective roles/positions in their various social networks in the community
are mutually reinforcing. This makes a case that to be effective, paralegals must be firmly rooted
in the communities in which they serve (i.e., paralegals should have some authority within the
community where they provide their services).
Challenges of running a paralegal scheme
Despite the positive views held about paralegal schemes, Swenson (2018) found
challenges confronting the paralegal programs evaluated, challenges which may plague any
paralegal scheme. These include the blurred lines of accountability (e.g., donor, local/traditional
authorities and state authorities). Related to this challenge is the multiplicity of potential lines of
accountability. Also, decisions of the paralegals were not binding, hence unenforceable, which
could result in delayed justice particularly for the vulnerable in society, like women (Swenson,
2018). This defeats one of the principal objectives of a modern justice system, upholding the
rights of women (Swenson, 2018). Related to this is the fact that Swenson (2018) also observed
that paralegal programs provide another forum for dispute resolution, however the presence of
multiple forums for dispute resolution could lead to forum shopping which arguably is
detrimental to less powerful disputants.
Further, there are human resource challenges associated with running any paralegal
program, particularly in postconflict settings, the reason being that, many of the roles or services
in paralegal schemes are performed or provided by lawyers, so they cannot be provided by
paralegals (Jackson, 2013 & Swenson, 2018). This is because most of the services that people
seek from paralegal programs are those provided by lawyers and are inaccessible due to the cost
of engaging the services of a lawyer and the financial status of beneficiaries of paralegal
schemes. There is also the challenge of sustaining the project/program when donor funding has
run out (Swenson, 2018). There is also the challenge of the quality of the services provided by
paralegals. While it is widely accepted that paralegals are a cost effective, culturally acceptable
and sustainable way of enhancing access to justice in developing countries, Swenson (2018) was
unable to confirm from the study that the quality of the services provided by the paralegals,
especially in remote locations, was high, thus questioning the quality of the paralegal services
provided by the schemes studied as well as making a case for effective oversight over paralegal
schemes. It must be noted that Castillejo (2009) argued that, in Sierra Leone, the presence of
non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations who were providing access to
justice services at the local level served to enhance oversight over paralegals (Jackson, 2013).
Swenson (2018) also made the point that whether or not paralegal programs will make an impact
in enhancing access to justice depends on how the scheme is perceived by powerful actors in the
society. Importantly, whereas Swenson (2018) found that the paralegal programs the author
studied were human rights friendly, there was no evidence that the programs succeeded in
reforming the customary justice system to make it meet international human rights standards.
It is worthy of mention that paralegals are not the solution to addressing challenges
associated with access to justice, but they have the potential to make a significant impact in the
quest to enhance access to justice particularly in postconflict settings (Swenson, 2018). The rate
of success in using paralegals is attributable to a number of factors. According to Stomseth,
Wippman and Brooks (2006) one of them is that “Paralegal assistance seems to offer that
everelusive commodity: a do-no-harm intervention with capacity to improve both the state and
nonstate justice sectors in almost any setting, including post-conflict societies” (Swenson, 2018,
p. 52).
Women and Postconflict Criminal Justice System Reforms
When involving non state actors in reforming the justice and security sectors it is important that
all sections of the society are represented (i.e., vulnerable or marginalized parts of the
population particularly women and youth) must be actively involved in deciding the direction
and approach of implementing the reforms (Gordon, 2014). Actors in the postconflict
reconstruction process must ensure that they do not perpetuate discriminatory practices that
existed prior to and during the conflict (Jackson, 2013). For instance, Dinnen and Peake (2013)
found while studying the reform of the police in Bougainville, that recruitment drives to fill
positions in the CAP gave priority to females. This resulted in an increase in the number of
women working within the CAP (i.e., from 5% in 2008 to 21% in 2012 [Dinnen & Peake,
2013]). Dinnen and Peake (2013) argued that the presence of a higher number of women in the
CAP is aiding the reporting of sensitive gender related criminal conduct perpetuated against
women and that this is strengthening the rule of law.
However, it is important to situate the progress made in Bougainville within context as in
Bougainville, women played a very active role in peace efforts (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). It is
instructive to note that Dinnen and Peake (2013) posited that the CAP project has been, and can
be, a social change agent, as including women is changing the notion that justice and security
institutions in postconflict settings are the preserve of men. Involving women also addresses
human rights concerns and promotes inclusiveness (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). As this is helping to
address discriminatory practices against them and making them feel a part of the security and
justice systems.
Involving women in efforts to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system
Numerous initiatives were put in place in Liberia to make the criminal justice system
gender friendly (Bacon, 2015). These interventions include increasing the number of females in
the Liberia National Police to 20% by 2014 and decentralizing the criminal justice system to
make it accessible to rural communities where women are in the majority (Bacon, 2015). There
were also efforts to improve the criminal justice system’s responsiveness to sexual and
genderbased offences (Bacon, 2015). In 2005, a Women and Children Protection Section
(WACPS), dedicated to respond to sexual and gender related offenses, was established within the
national police and the roll out of establishing WACPS units across the country commenced
immediately (Bacon, 2015). The creation of these specialized units contributed to public
education on sexual and gender related crimes (Bacon, 2015). However, Bacon (2015) noted that
as at 2011, out of
71 female officers of the WACPS, only 5 (7%) were in rural communities.
Liberia’s criminal justice system’s response to gender related criminal conduct
Generally, according to Bacon (2015), Liberia’s approach to gender-sensitive police
reform to enhance responsiveness and representation was an innovation with positive outcomes.
However, Bacon (2015) noted that the overall impact of these interventions was hindered by the
broken justice system, poor infrastructure, weak technical capacity, the police’s poor reputation
and low reportage of sexual and gender related crimes. According to Bacon (2015), in most cases
sexual and gender based criminal conduct are resolved out of court (i.e., privately, through
traditional or customary structures).
Another factor leading to the limited outcome of the interventions to improve the
responsiveness and representation of women in the criminal justice system in Liberia is that these
projects were donor driven and donors supported only ‘pet projects’ and adopted approaches that
did not consider the local context (Bacon, 2015). For instance, donors were unwilling to work
with the customary justice system and concentrated their interventions in the capital even though
most of the citizens lived in villages outside the capital (Bacon, 2015). Jackson (2017) echoes
this point when noting that the international community working in postconflict countries fails to
think beyond the capital for several reasons including being unwilling to work in parts of the
country where the state lacked legitimacy. In Liberia, these locations were difficult to reach,
particularly during the raining season when it takes long hours and in some cases days, often on
foot, for some communities to reach representatives of the formal justice system (Bacon, 2015).
Bacon (2015) observed further that all these factors had an impact on the sustaining the reforms
as well as local ownership. On the issue of sustainability, Nyei (2014) informed readers that “…
that most of the reform programs have been financed through foreign aid, and in most cases,
government has proved incapable of assuming financial responsibilities when donors withdraw”
(p. 11).
Community safety mechanism
Incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector programming is another
approach towards security and justice sector reform (Gordon, 2014). As the name suggests,
community safety mechanisms are mechanisms at the local level that are established by or in
consultation with local actors to promote safety and security in the community. Various
jurisdictions label these mechanisms differently (Gordon, 2014). For instance, Gordon (2014)
citing various authors, informed readers that in Sierra Leone they are referred to as provincial
and district-level security committees (Kunz & Valasek, 2012), and in Afghanistan they are
referred to as security and justice subcommittees (Stabilization Unit, 2014). In Kenya, an
independent international organization known as Saferworld supported communities to
participate in decision making processes on issues related to their security such as community
policing (Gordon, 2014). Conteh (2007) informed readers that in Sierra Leone the district and
provincial security committees participated in community level reform processes (Gordon,
2014).
Benefits of incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector reform
programming
Community safety mechanisms must be designed to suit the context within which they
are to operate (Gordon, 2014). Local ownership of reforming justice and security institutions in
postconflict societies can be enhanced through establishing community safety. Effectively
implementing this approach has the potential of addressing one of the challenges of the
topbottom approach to security sector reform (i.e., the lack of inclusion) which was absent in
donor led security sector reform interventions in countries like Kosovo and Timor Leste
(Gordon, 2014 & Homel & Masson, 2016). When community structures are incorporated into
security sector reform processes there is a chance of getting members of the community,
including marginalized groups, taking part in decisions relating to their security needs and
priorities, which has the advantage that the resulting policy choices reflects the will of the people
for whom they are designed and implemented (Gordon, 2014). Additionally, Gordon (2010)
made the point that adopting a community safety approach towards security sector reform
promotes efficient, transparent, effective and accountable security sector institutions and
improves the relationship between the government and the governed (Gordon, 2014).
However, Gordon (2014) noted that despite the strengths of this approach, community
structures are rarely incorporated into security sector reform programming. According to Gordon
(2014), not incorporating persons at the community level into security sector reform processes
could have the result of turning potential champions of security sector processes into spoilers, as
Arnusch (2010) warned would have happened in Liberia (Gordon, 2014). According to Arnusch
(2010), in Liberia, community safety mechanisms, which had filled the void in the absence of
state justice and security institutions, were not incorporated into the processes seeking to reform
the justice and security sectors (Gordon, 2014).
Challenges incorporating community safety mechanisms in security sector reform
processes
Gordon (2014) pointed out that there are limitations associated with using this approach
to make security services accessible to the community. Hence electing to incorporate this
approach in reform programs should be done with caution. For instance, the author pointed out
that incorporating community safety structures into security sector reform programming may
result in an institutionalization of these community structures and has the potential of resulting in
the structures losing their very essence and character (i.e., a wide range of community concerns
that community safety mechanisms are designed to address risk being securitized [Gordon,
2014]). Another limitation identified by Gordon (2010) relates to the bottom up approach to
security sector reform that community safety structures facilitate. According to the researcher,
incorporating these structures into security sector reform programming may result in these
structures supporting the state centric approach towards security sector reform, thus defeating the
purpose for which they were established (Gordon, 2014). Donais (2008) argued that when
community safety structures actively support state centric approaches the result is that they end
up implementing externally driven agendas (Gordon, 2014).
Donais (2008) also indicated that when community structures are incorporated into
security sector programming, donor support for the operations of the structures may undermine
the quest for the activities of these structures to be locally owned (Gordon, 2014). This negates
the very reason for establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Most importantly, Donais and Knorr
(2013) citing Campbell (2011) stressed the point that the power differentials between community
actors and those at the state/national level may result in a cooptation of community level actors
(Gordon, 2014). Homel and Masson (2016) shared similar views. This reality led Gordon (2014)
to argue that the unequal power relations will transform the bottom top approach to security
sector reform associated with involving community structures in security sector programming
into a top-down approach. Williams (2018) made similar observations with respect to the African
Union Mission approach in Somalia.
Jackson (2010) argued that sight should not be lost over the fact that community safety
structures may affirm the power dynamics in the community, hence this may marginalize
vulnerable groups in the community (Gordon, 2014). Consequently, their activities may not
reflect the concerns of all the demographic groupings within the society (Gordon, 2014). Where
this is the case, using them to implement security sector reform processes may not translate into
improving the lives of all sections of the community (Gordon, 2014). To buttress this point,
Jackson (2011) asserted that being labeled a community based organization does not
automatically mean that the group is inclusive, more legitimate or accountable (Gordon, 2014).
To illustrate this Gordon (2010) further stated that in Kosovo women were underrepresented in
community safety structures (Gordon, 2014). This meant that security challenges that were
peculiar to women like domestic violence were rarely discussed in such forums (Gordon, 2014).
Also, the dominance of males in these community safety structures made it almost impossible to
discuss organized crime and corruption as these crimes were mainly perpetuated by men
(Gordon, 2014). These realities led Salahub and Nerland (2010) to admonish persons engaged in
justice and security sector reform in postconflict settings to ensure that their programming
considers these realities (Gordon, 2014).
The prospects of ordinary citizens actively influencing the direction of the security sector
reform agenda may be the reason why the elite, who dominate affairs in postconflict settings,
resist efforts to incorporate community structures into security sector reform processes (Gordon,
2014). It is worthy of note that where incorporating community structures is insisted upon, the
elite may disengage from the process and this creates new challenges, including the possibility of
sacrificing engaging at the community level to keep the elite at the state level involved in the
reform processes (Gordon, 2014). Donasis and Knoor (2013) identified the huge resources
required to roll out community safety structures as another limitation associated with this
approach particularly in postconflict environments (Gordon, 2014).
Lawrence (2012) also identified the cultural and security concerns in postconflict settings
that officials of international organizations have to deal with, particularly in the initial phase of
their engagement with community safety organizations, as a challenge (Gordon, 2014).
Furthermore, community level dwellers may be unwilling to engage in security sector reform
processes that are externally driven (Gordon, 2014). Donnelly, Nikolla, Poudel and Chakraborty
(2013), posited that a limitation associated with incorporating community safety structures in
security sector reform processes is the expectation that these processes may create in the
community (Gordon, 2014). According to Donnelly, Nikolla, Poudel and Chakraborty (2013)
members of the community may conclude that, by incorporating community safety mechanisms
into justice and security sector reform programming, all their challenges will be or have been
addressed, a fact that the authors point out may not be the case, at least in the short term
(Gordon, 2014).
Kunz and Valadek (2012) asserted that incorporating community safety structures into
security sector reform processes increases the chances of giving a voice to different sections of
the society (Gordon, 2014). However, this creates many voices which may be conflicting, hence
Kunz and Valadek (2012) pointed out that a challenge that emerges in such a situation is
determining which voice reflects the reality on the ground and should matter (Gordon, 2014). To
address this challenge, Kunz and Valadek (2012) emphasized the importance of capturing
heterogeneous voices in security sector reform programming as a necessary condition for a
successful security sector reform program (Gordon, 2014). Gordon (2014) is of the view that
these conflicting views can subsequently be negotiated amongst relevant actors at the community
level to arrive at a collective determination of the community’s priorities. It must be noted
though that, taking on board the interests and concerns of all actors is time consuming and costs a
lot of money (Gordon, 2014). It may also hinder the pace of carrying out the needed reforms
which quite often is urgent, a situation Hendrickson and Kasongo (2010) noted obtained in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (Gordon, 2014).
Lawrence (2012) observed that, in postconflict societies, finding civil society
organizations is challenging and this is further worsened by the fact that where such
organizations are identified, they may feel incapable and/or unwilling to engage in security sector
reform programs and this reduces the opportunity for incorporating community safety
organizations in security sector reform processes (Gordon, 2014). Additionally, in postconflict
settings, the persistence of grievances and animosities from the conflict may make the
development and implementation of an inclusive community safety structure an illusion
(Gordon, 2014).
The limitations identified above illustrate the point that incorporating community safety
mechanisms in security sector reform processes is an extremely political process. Schroder and
Chappuis (2014) indicated that from the perspectives of donors and recipients of external
support, there are many interests at stake in security sector reform interventions. This makes
security sector reform a highly contested issue between the actors involved (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). Authors like Cubitt (2013) and Caparini (2010) surmised that these limitations
account for why designers and implementers of security sector reform processes appear not to be
enthusiastic about incorporating community level structures into security sector reform processes
(Gordon, 2014), a fact that leads Gordon (2014) to conclude that the focus of security sector
reform processes will remain at the state level for the foreseeable future as this is relatively easier
to operationalize.
Adopting a local needs approach to policing
Ansorg (2017) asserted that there is the need for institutions to be reformed as part of the
peacebuilding process in African countries affected by violent conflict. However, this cannot be
effectively undertaken when international reform efforts ignore the local needs of the population
(Ansorg, 2017). Ansorg (2017) also noted that to ensure the acceptance and sustainability of
reforms initiatives in postconflict settings, the needs of the local population should inform the
reforms. This obvious and logical suggestion notwithstanding, Ansorg (2017) noted that security
sector reform processes, especially in postconflict settings, are externally/foreign driven, laced
with heavy doses of Western ideology and follow generalized blueprints that are or were
implemented in other settings. Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan and Liberia are some of the
postconflict countries cited as having suffered from this approach to security sector reform
(Ansorg, 2017). Consequently, the reforms in these countries lack local participation and so were
not accepted by the local community (Ansorg, 2017). Lack of local ownership creates issues of
trust between the local population on one side and the police and the judiciary on the other
(Ansorg, 2017).
Westernman (2017) called for the development of a democratic relationship between the
legitimate authority of state and the forces of state as a means of securing the buy-in of citizens
into interventions to reform the security sector in postconflict settings. Westernman (2017)
referred to this relationship as civil-military relations. The concept of civil military relations is
steeped in Western liberal thinking which shapes security sector reform programs in postconflict
settings (Westernman, 2017).
In Sierra Leone, a Local Needs Policing approach was used to reform the police
(Bangura, 2018). Bangura (2018) noted that this approach sought to enhance the interaction
between the police and the community; its objective was to ensure that the security needs of the
community were addressed whilst the community took an active part in matters that related to
their security (Ansorg, 2017 & Bangura, 2018). A similar approach was adopted in South Africa
after the end of the Apartheid era (Ansorg, 2017).
Benefits of adopting a local needs approach toward policing
Ansorg (2017) highlighted the benefits of the Local Needs Approach to policing and how
it works. The researcher stressed the point that this approach takes into cognizance local actors; it
promotes national ownership and increases trust between the population and their institutions. It
also takes on board the history of the institutions that are undergoing reform
(Ansorg, 2017).
Operationalizing the local needs approach
In order to operationalize the Local Need Approach to policing, Bangura (2018) asserted
that in Sierra Leone a number of structures were established. These include Local Police
Partnership Boards and Community Policing Partnerships Committees (Bangura, 2018). External
and internal oversight mechanisms like the Police Council, the parliamentary committee, the
National Security Council and the Complaints, Disciple and Internal Investigation Department of
the Police were also established (Bangura, 2018). Bangura (2018) studied the impact of adopting
the Local Needs Approach towards policing and other interventions to reform Sierra Leone’s
police. The researcher found that an overwhelming majority of the interviewees acknowledged
the improvement in the attitude and practice of policing by the Sierra Leonean police. Various
reasons, including the capacity building received by the police, the oversight mechanisms
established, and the system of government in place in Sierra Leone, were given for the change
(Bangura, 2018). Almost 70% of respondents held the view that the involvement of the
community in policing made the community feel the police were interested in addressing their
needs (Bangura, 2018).
Situations where International efforts to Reform Postconflict Criminal Justice System
upheld National Ownership
As demonstrated above, the literature is replete with instances where the international
actors did not follow the principles of local or national ownership in crafting interventions to
reform criminal justice systems (Gordon, 2014). However, there are a few exceptions; for
instance, Dinnen and Peake (2013) commended New Zealand for not being overly prescriptive in
its support to police reform efforts in Bougainville. This willingness to depart from the
orthodoxy of postconflict criminal justice system reform in which international experts, while
adopting a top-bottom approach, impose reforms from textbooks and blueprints that they have
implemented in other jurisdictions, often with little or no success, is positively unique and
worthy of commendation.
Why less attention is paid to the Local Context in Programming
Ansorg (2017) and Westernman (2017) inform their readers that the local context
includes the history of the postconflict setting. Ignoring the local culture and history in security
sector programming especially in postconflict settings results in the design and implementation
of flawed interventions (Westernman, 2017). Therefore, in designing programmatic interventions
to reform institutions in the criminal justice system, all actors, particularly external ones have to
ensure that they are well versed in the history of the institutions that they are reforming and this
should influence the nature of the interventions they develop (Dinnen & Peake, 2013). Ansorg
(2017) found that in Sierra Leone, internal approaches towards security sector reform failed to
consider the local context. Ansorg (2017) asserted that reform efforts in Sierra Leone continue to
promote the Weberian paradigm as well as generalized blueprints and approaches.
Ansorg (2017) also made the point that Western institutions provided a considerable
amount of funding for security sector reform programs in postconflict African settings and that
this had an impact on the approach adopted towards institutional reforms and the outcome of the
reforms. For various reasons, including the fact that Western approaches to security sector
reform seem blind to traditional approaches and institutions which might work better for Africa,
Ansorg (2017) and Samuels (2006) asserted that the Western approach results in a focus being
placed on building Western inspired institutions, enacting unenforceable legislation and
appointing criminal justice officials who have little or no commitment to protecting the rights of
the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). Ansorg (2017) concluded that relying on the West to fund security
sector reform processes creates dependency and defeats the need for local context to influence
programming. Ansorg (2017) identified a number of practical challenges that may hinder
factoring in the imperatives of the local context, particularly in the initial phase of postconflict
reconstruction. One such challenge is the urgent need to provide security in postconflict societies
(Ansorg, 2017). Ansorg (2017) made the point that a quick and easy approach is usually adopted
to reform the justice and security sectors in postconflict countries. However, as institutions are
the product of their local context, a phenomenon referred to as the path dependent nature of
institutions, this approach produces short-lived outcomes (Ansorg, 2017). Pierson (2004)
supporting this point, indicates that reforming the security sector without factoring in the local
context is New Institutionalism (Ansorg, 2017).
An interesting reason for international interventions ignoring the local context when
designing security sector reform programs in postconflict settings is the absence of literature on
non-Western approaches to security sector reform (Westernman, 2017). Hence, there is no
incentive to warrant a gravitation away from prowestern solutions. Except for the Economic
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) intervention force in Liberia and perhaps in
Guinea Bissau the closest examples of the few quasi non Western military operations to bring
peace, the international community established a peacekeeping operation in Somalia led by
troops from selected Africa countries with funding and other logistical support from the West
(Williams, 2018). However, this operation in many respects adopted the classical approach
towards bringing peace for this and other reasons Williams (2018) discouraged this model for
peacekeeping.
Decentralization of Public Services
Rechts-Lexikon (n.d.) defines decentralization as the process of moving powers from
government, at the central level, to lower levels of a country’s governance structure (Hamann,
2012). From this definition, decentralization seeks to create access to government and its
services. Through decentralization, the state’s presence, represented by the central government,
in the affairs of the citizenry at the local level is increased and it provides opportunities for
ordinary citizens, particularly those at the local level, to contribute to policy making on matters
that affect them (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Woodward (2002) makes the point that there is significant
politics associated with decentralization (Jackson, 2017). There are various types of
decentralization; these include fiscal, administrative and political decentralization (Krawczyk &
Muhula, 2018 & Tang & Huhe, 2016). The World Bank claims that administrative
decentralization results in local government authorities being given the discretion to satisfy the
needs of citizens at the local level and concurrently making local government accountable for
how the discretion is exercised (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). This led Krawczyk and Muhula
(2018) to describe administrative decentralization and the ensuing discretion as being two sides
of the same coin. Jackson (2017) asserted that, in contemporary times, decentralization has a
prominent place in many peacebuilding interventions across the globe (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia
& Alzate, 2016). Local government structures are directly and indirectly affected by postconflict
reconstruction interventions (Jackson, 2017). Decentralizing public services is a common feature
of many peace agreements (Jackson, 2017 & Nyei, 2014) This is in spite of the fact that, in
countries ravaged by war, local government structures are hardly prepared to actively champion
decentralization efforts (Jackson, 2017). The result of this reality is that decentralization is often
discounted in postconflict settings (Jackson, 2017). Moreover, the role local government must
play in decentralizing public services in postconflict communities is hardly discussed and the
same can be said about involving local government in discussions to decentralize services in
postconflict settings (Jackson, 2017). This is partly because local government is seldom in the
right position to be actively involved in such discussions (Jackson, 2017). Decentralization is a
double-edged sword. This is because, according to Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel, Qian and
Yao (2011), it can enhance democratic local governance (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018) or as per
Khemani (2010), it can hinder it (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). In postconflict countries,
depending on what triggered the conflict, decentralization can be a tool for stabilization thus
engendering peace and reconciliation or it can be the reason why a postconflict country slides
back into conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Jackson, 2016). The “quality, scope and pace of
implementing a decentralization program usually depends on the history and experiences of the
state involved (Nyei, 2014, p.4). For the purposes of this study, decentralization should result in
criminal justice services being extended from the central (i.e., national) level to the local (i.e.,
subnational) level. It should result in the extension of state authority and an enhancement of
access to justice and security across the country.
There are several reasons for embarking on decentralization in postconflict environments.
These include using decentralization to address systemic/structural challenges in the
communities where peace agreements are unable to alter (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate,
2016). Mac Ginty and Richmond contended that decentralization provides an opportunity for
inclusive peacebuilding efforts (i.e., a bottom up approach) to peacebuilding (Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia & Alzate, 2016).
Decentralization as a Peacebuilding Intervention
There is no consensus on the nature of the link between conflict and decentralization
however, there is unanimity on a strong connection between the two variables (i.e.,
decentralization and conflict [Jackson, 2017]). Bigdon and Hettige (2003) make the point that
decentralization can mitigate conflict as it provides a peaceful approach “to manage inter-group
tensions, increases representation and participation, and improves service delivery, all of which
reduce the likelihood of conflict” (Jackson, 2017, p. 751). On the other hand, Schultze-Kraft,
Markus and Morina (2014), posited that in spite of the fact that decentralization is a vehicle
through which peacebuilding interventions are implemented in war ravaged countries, there is
little evidence to suggest a positive correlation between decentralization and development, even
in stable environments (Nyei, 2014 & Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Jackson (2017)
supported this assertion, arguing that it is unfathomable to think that such a relationship exists in
postconflict environments (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia
and Alzate (2016) asserted that there is a focus on involving actors at the local and subnational
level in peacebuilding efforts as opposed to relying on decentralization as the peacebuilding
approach. It will be demonstrated later on that there is a case for adopting a decentralization
approach towards peacebuilding. Therefore, it is useful to mention that Jackson, (2017)
highlighted an important caveat which must influence decision making as to which side of the
debate one stands, on the utility or otherwise of decentralization in peacebuilding. Jackson,
(2017) noted that there is no formula for a successful decentralization program in postconflict
settings. Therefore, since Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) posited that actively
engaging actors at the local and subnational level will result in creating access to public and
social services and increase the state’s presence and Tang and Huhe (2016) asserted that there
will be opportunities for ordinary citizens to contribute to policy making, there is a meeting of
minds on the objective for making public services accessible.
Decentralization engenders public trust
Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2011) informed their readers that there is a link between
decentralization and trust in public institutions (Esteller-More´, 2013). Dahl and Tufte (1973)
support this position as they posited that citizens in a decentralized system actively contribute to
policy making as they know the local context, a factor that enhances public trust in government
(Tang & Huhe, 2016). Oates (1972) shared this view, asserting that the decentralization of public
services is an acknowledgment of the preferences of the governed (i.e., the governed prefer a
decentralization of governance structures [Esteller-More´, 2013]). Blind (2006), supported this
assertion, indicating that decentralization is one way to build citizens’ trust in public institutions
(Tang & Huhe, 2016). Hetheringoton and Husser (2012) acknowledged the importance of public
trust for regime stability and Blind (2006) asserted that, because of this important link, various
interventions have been introduced to either build or rebuild the public’s confidence in public
systems and institutions (Tang & Huhe, 2016). According to Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel,
Qian and Yao (2011) decentralization can enhance the participation of the citizenry in policy and
decision-making. (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018) and Linder (2009) indicated that decentralization
enhances civic participation in government (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Escobar-Lemmon and Ross
(2014), shared this view and concluded that decentralization is one of the surest ways of bringing
government back to the people and building their confidence in government.
Tang and Huhe (2016) conducted a multilevel analysis quantitative study with data from
the World Values Survey and found that, generally, there is neither a direct nor uniform effect of
decentralization on political trust. These researchers found that the impact of decentralization on
public trust was dependent on what form the decentralization process took. For instance, fiscal
and administrative decentralization has a positive impact on the public’s trust in the government
while no positive impact was associated with political decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016).
Also, Tang and Huhe (2016) found that decentralization could help indirectly shape the views of
citizens on political institutions. Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) asserted that for a
positive relationship between decentralization and trust by the citizenry to exist, decentralization
should result in an efficient delivery of decentralized public services as this will enhance the
wellbeing of the citizenry (Esteller-More´, 2013).
Decentralization engenders distribution of resources
Nyei (2014) claimed that some academics and activists have asserted that
decentralization results in increasing the number of persons who benefit from economic
resources and creates opportunities for them. For persons who hold this view, Liberia, will
witness socioeconomic development when “political, fiscal and administrative powers are
decentralized” (Nyei, 2014, p. 4).
Decentralization promotes oversight and accountability
Seabright (1996) highlighting the benefits of decentralization, informed readers that
decentralization contributes to political accountability (Esteller-More´, 2013). Manor (2006)
affirmed this view (Jackson, 2017). Tang and Huhe (2016) posited that citizens in decentralized
systems are more likely to believe that they can exercise oversight over government officials in
the decentralized structure compared to those in a centralized system. Martinez-Bravo, Padró i
Miquel, Qian and Yao (2011) asserted that decentralization can increase accountability
(Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Brancati (2006) and Sambanis and Milanovic (2014) affirmed this
view as they suggested that decentralization results in political accountability and brings
government closer to the people (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). de Mello and Barenstein (2002)
argued that decentralization reduces corruption. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) confirmed this
view as they asserted that one of the causes of political mistrust is corruption and that this can be
countered by decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016). According to Tiebout (1956),
decentralization enhances information flow between providers and recipients of public services
(Tang & Huhe, 2016). Weingast (1997) also drew a link between decentralization and
accountability by indicating that decentralization promotes more accountability, inclusiveness
and public institutions pay attention to the interest of the public (Tang & Huhe, 2016).
Decentralization promotes democracy
Colino (2008) indicated that decentralization is institutional reform that takes place in a
democracy (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Weingast (1997) noted that decentralization, as a democratic
arrangement, is more likely to have a positive impact on political trust amongst democratically
minded people (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Tang and Huhe (2016) supported this view as they found
that the views people hold about their political establishment are dependent on their level of
democratic orientation. People with a higher democratic orientation are more critical. Tang and
Huhe (2016) investigated how decentralization affects the perception of ordinary citizens
towards government and public institutions and asserts that decentralization has an indirect
benefit (i.e., it has an impact on other democratic values). The fact that devolution of power from
the center improves the relationship between citizens and government and makes government
visible is an advantage of decentralization (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Consequently, Edwards and
Yilmaz (2016) opined that effective decentralization results in organizing politics between the
central and periphery. Furthermore, Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, (2016) asserted that, in
Colombia, though factors like the conflict, corruption, organized crime and weak institutions
across the structures of the state negatively affected the positive impact of decentralization,
decentralization still proved to be an important catalyst for the development and democratization
of Colombia’s state and political system.
Decentralization promotes competition and efficiency
Weingast (1997) argued that decentralization promotes competition amongst
decentralized structures and that this positively influences policy design and implementation
(Tang & Huhe, 2016). The reason being that the policies seek to attract investment (Tang &
Huhe, 2016). Additionally, Barankay, Lockwood (2007) posited that effective decentralization
promotes efficiency in government (Tang & Huhe, 2016). Martinez-Bravo, Padró i Miquel, Qian
and Yao (2011) associated themselves with this point as they argued that decentralization can
result in improved service delivery and enhanced development (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).
Schou and Haug (2006) challenged this correlation by asserting that there is no consistent
evidence to support the existence of a relationship between decentralization and efficiency in
public service delivery (Jackson, 2017). Although the views held by Schou and Haug (2006)
cannot be disputed, it can be argued that the researchers do not totally discount the link between
decentralization and efficiency in public services delivery (Jackson, 2017). This is because at the
heart of their contestation is the fact that the evidence supporting this link is not consistent, thus
suggesting that there is some evidence, but their case lies in the inconsistency of the evidence
(Jackson, 2017). From the literature, there is evidence to justify the presence of a linkage
between decentralization and efficiency in public service delivery, but such evidence does not
always manifest itself as the context has an impact on the extent to which such a linkage can be
empirically proved (Jackson, 2017).
Decentralization engenders local ownership
Local governments are considered partners of international actors in implementing
peacebuilding interventions in postconflict environments (Jackson, 2017).
Decentralization is a tool or process to institutionalize and/or build peace
Gutiérrez (2010) made the point that it is inconceivable to ignore “the structure of the
state’s territorial power”, (p. 838) when engaging in peacebuilding exercises (Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Brancati (2009) asserted that in war shattered countries, where the
nature of the war is internal, decentralization has been used for peacebuilding. This is because it
offers a chance for sections of the community, particularly those outside the big cities, who were
marginalized under a centralized system of government, to feel that they are being given an
opportunity to participate in making decisions on issues that affect them. Romeo (2002) shared
the view about the importance of decentralization in peace processes as the author posited that
decentralization is a way of “demilitarizing politics in divided societies” (Jackson, 2017, p. 752).
Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) believe that in postconflict settings there is, at best,
very little of government structures remaining at the local level to prosecute an agenda that
builds peace through decentralization. The reason being that local government is often among the
first casualties of civil strife because they are easy targets for the government and/or nonstate
actors involved in the conflict (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).
The inability of the state to exercise effective control over its entire geographical territory
is one of the root causes of Colombia’s armed conflict (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate,
2016). It is for this reason that the warring factions in Colombia adopted a novel approach
referred to as “territorial peace” to build peace in Colombia (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate,
2016). This is in spite of the conceptual and practical implementation challenges Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia and Alzate (2016) found to be associated with operationalizing this concept in
postconflict Colombia. Territorial peace is a peacebuilding approach that fuses elements of
decentralization, access to justice and security as well as rural development (Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) inform their readers that
rural development is at the center of the territorial peace approach to peacebuilding.
SchultzeKraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) draw a distinction between decentralization and
territorial peacebuilding in Colombia, as they posited that the former aids the democratization
process while the later seeks to foster social cohesion and create conditions for development
across the entire country.
Conditions Precedent for effective Decentralization
The following are some of the conditions precedent for effective decentralization: First,
as previously noted, Tang and Huhe (2016) identified the level of democracy practiced in the
context where decentralization is taking place as an important precondition for enjoying the
maximum benefits associated with decentralization. There is a strong link between the overall
political structure in a country and the extent to which political arrangements are decentralized
(Jackson, 2016; Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016 & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Therefore,
the political structure in a context desirous of decentralizing must be designed to facilitate
decentralization. Jackson (2017) puts this point in different terms when asserting that the political
framework in which local government operates is very important for the success or otherwise of
peacebuilding efforts. Secondly, the public needs to be educated on the benefits of
decentralization and which tier of the governance structure i.e., central or local level, is
responsible for providing a particular service. The reason being that, Esteller-More´ (2013) found
that in Spain, the absence of knowledge by interviewees of who was responsible within the
country’s governance structure for providing a particular public service may have contributed to
why the researcher found a weakness in the impact of decentralization on the criminal justice
sector. Thirdly, Hamann (2012) stressed the importance of national ownership, including the
active participation of the local population in determining the targets of decentralization. It is
worth underscoring the point that the peculiarities of the setting in which decentralization
initiatives are being implemented should determine the approach to decentralization (Bacon,
2015; Hamann, 2012 & Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Most importantly, resources must be
allocated to implement decentralization programs (Jackson, 2017). Closely linked to this is what
Fontana (2017) referred to as the need for political will, especially support from the elite to
devolve power (Jackson, 2017). Jackson (2017) stressed that the effectiveness of local
government structures in decentralization efforts can be hindered by the activities of the elite.
Further, there must exist, at the local level, a structure that the decentralization process devolves
power to (Jackson, 2017). This structure could be the city or municipal council or a traditional
authority (Jackson, 2017). Chemouni (2017) pointed out that putting in place a bottom up
mechanism for decision making in postconflict societies was essential for successful
decentralization process in Rwanda (Jackson, 2017).
Hamann (2012) emphasizes the fact that “decentralization will contribute to establishing
rule of law structures if the population is given a genuine possibility of participating in
decentralization and if it contributes to strengthening the accountability” (p. 37/569). However,
for this to happen, those in power must be willing to relinquish power from the central level and
the population must be willing to take the responsibility handed over to them and build the
desired structures at the local level (Hamann, 2012). This point is amplified by Krawczyk and
Muhula (2018) who found that, in spite of strong demands among Liberians for decentralization,
the reluctance of the central government to cede power to the local level has stalled the
enactment of legislation seeking to decentralize public services. CMI (2004) argued that although
decentralization seeks to extend public services across a country, it requires a strong central
government to be effective (Jackson, 2017). Smoke (2015) argued that the design of the reforms
that seek to decentralize public services and their implementation have an impact on the success
or failure of decentralization efforts (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Cognizant of this reality,
Brinkerhoff and Mayfield (2005) admonished the international community to resist the
imperatives of the pressures of time in decentralizing public services in postconflict settings and
ensure that they do not recreate the local government structures that existed prior to the conflict
(Jackson, 2017).
Decentralization and the Criminal Justice System
Esteller-More´ (2013) investigated determinants of trust in public institutions in
administering justice in Spain, from the perspectives of the economy and decentralized public
service. Esteller-More´ (2013) found that there is no positive relationship between
decentralization of public services and public trust in the administration of justice. The author
attributes this to either citizens not expecting authorities responsible for decentralized public
services to perform better or that the citizens are unsure about which tier of government is
responsible for delivering which services. However, Esteller-More´ (2013), found indirect
evidence suggesting that the speedy resolution of disputes will result in enhanced public trust in
the administration of justice civil matters more (i.e., by 25%) than in criminal matters. From the
Esteller-More´ (2013) study, there appears to be a consensus on the positive effect of
decentralization on public trust in government. However, the public should be educated on who
(i.e., central authority or decentralized authority) is responsible for delivering which services
(Esteller-More´, 2013). Support to reform the justice system should result in empowering local
people to access justice within the existing legal and institutional framework (Jackson, 2013). In
Liberia, the regional justice and security hubs were designed to provide an “opportunity for
decentralization and efficient service in the security and justice sectors (Nyei, 2014, p. 9).
Decentralizing Public Services in Postconflict Settings
Over centralization of criminal justice processes results in inefficiencies in the criminal
justice system (Dandurand, 2014 & Nyei, 2014). Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) supported this
assertion, by highlighting the benefits of decentralization, particularly in postconflict settings.
This position is echoed by Jackson (2017) who argued that actively supporting local government
in postconflict settings engenders lasting peace. Manor (2006) shared similar views, suggesting
that in adopting a decentralization approach in postconflict reconstruction there is the potential of
reaching out to the poor, making public services accessible, governance inclusive and promoting
national ownership and accountability (Jackson, 2017). Notwithstanding the views held by
Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) on the benefits of decentralization in postconflict reconstruction, the
researchers point out that there is no consensus on the benefits of decentralization in postconflict
stabilization, with one theory positing that decentralization often deepens internal conflicts and
another suggesting that decentralization mitigates conflict. Brinkerhoff (2005) affirmed this
assertion, noting that there is a divergence in opinion over the benefits of an improved public
service delivery system as a tool for forging lasting peace (Jackson, 2017). On the other hand,
Siegle and O’Mahoney (2007) emphasized the point that factors like incompetence, corruption
and partisanship, at local government level and amongst officials, defeat the purpose of
decentralization and results in frustrations and exclusion thereby increasing the chances of
conflict arising (Jackson, 2017). Schou and Haug (2006) argued that the evidence supporting the
assertion that decentralization improves service delivery is inconsistent (Jackson, 2017).
However, Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) asserted that between both schools of thought is the fact
that the capacity of decentralization to prevent conflict depends upon the nature or reasons for
the conflict. That is, where the conflict is driven by ethnic considerations, decentralization only
exacerbates it (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) cited a study by Bertrand
(2004) who found that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia resulted in violence as the local elite
were in conflict over control of resources. The contrary is the case where the cause of the conflict
is due to regional inequality (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Generally, expanding participation of
citizens in political processes aids in mitigating future conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
Walter (2004) asserted that access to political processes by citizens increases the chances of them
not resorting to violence to addressing conflict (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
This stance is disputed by Bigdon and Hettige (2003) who claimed that almost all
empirical studies indicate that where decentralization takes place amid political rivalry, conflict
is exacerbated (Jackson, 2017). To buttress this point, the researchers cited the situation in Sri
Lanka as an example of a postconflict setting where decentralization is yielding unintended
negative consequences (Jackson, 2017).
The need to be mindful of the potential impact of decentralization on peace in
postconflict societies is justified. This is because postconflict reform processes must not
perpetuate the conditions that triggered the conflict. As pointed out by Edwards and Yilmaz
(2016), decentralization does not, on its own, result in conflict mitigation. It serves as a tool that
signifies moderation on the part of the majority towards the minority (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
Lustick (2004) argues that decentralization provides an opportunity to give a voice to disgruntled
groups in postconflict settings (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). To support this assertion, Edwards
and Yilmaz (2016) in a study conducted in Sierra Leone, found that this postconflict society has
progressed in its recovery partly due to the implementation of a decentralization strategy as a
stabilization tool. Jackson (2017) also noted the positive impact of decentralization in Sierra
Leone's stabilization. Sack and Larizza, (2011) informed their readers that decentralization in
Sierra Leone is contributing to citizen participation in government (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
Progress in Sierra Leone confirms the assertion that, where the conflict was not ignited by ethnic
tensions, decentralization is effective in building peace (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). This is
because, as noted by Jackson (2007), in Sierra Leone the highly centralized system of
government neglected other parts of the country outside the capital, Freetown, and this was one
of the conflict drivers (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). In spite of the progress made, Edwards and
Yilmaz (2016) made bleak projections about Sierra Leone’s future, noting that it is unlikely that
decentralization in Sierra Leone will enhance the delivery of services.
Conditions for effective Decentralization of the Criminal Justice System
There must be a collective and consultative diagnosis, by all stakeholders, of the
challenges within the context for which the strategy is being designed and consensus reached on
an approach towards reform (Kasali & Odetola, 2016; Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). Put
differently, the design of crime prevention policies must take a form that suits the context and
local actors must be actively involved in making policy choices. Homel and Masson (2016)
affirmed this claim as the authors indicated that there is a case for justice and security challenges
to be dealt with at the local level. According to them, this is in conformity with the United
Nations’ principle of subsidiarity, which indicates that issues should be dealt with at the lowest
level at which they can be dealt with. Since crime prevention policies have an impact on the
design, form and operations of the criminal justice system in every country, it can be argued by
extension that the criminal justice system in every country must be designed to suit the context
where the system is expected to operate.
Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) indicated that there is a case for decentralization of
policing particularly by using the community policing model. To be effective, the
decentralization of criminal justice services requires the allocation of resources (Farris &
Holman, 2017) and these resources must be efficiently used (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016).
Farris and Holman, (2017) opined that successful decentralization of law enforcement powers
depends on national laws. Recognizing and respecting the various interests at play when
designing and implementing security related policy in every context in an imperative. In this
regard, Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) stressed the point that security policymaking and
implementation involves a lot of power hence more difficult to implement.
Decentralization in Postconflict Liberia
Liberia is divided into 15 counties (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Each county is headed
by a County Superintendent, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Legislature
(Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) suggested that the County
Superintendent has little autonomy. Nyei (2014) shares this view. Krawczyk and Muhula, (2018)
asserted that as part of Liberia’s post war reconstruction, all stakeholders have decided to use
decentralization as a tool to rebuild the country and reduce the gap between Monrovia (i.e., the
capital) and the rest of the country. As a result of this, Liberians are increasingly demanding
better service delivery and accountability from their government (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) asserted that the demands for better public services by Liberians is
a demand to improve the effectiveness of the state and decentralization is one way of achieving
administrative decentralization as it gives citizens the opportunity to participate in governance.
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) indicated that the draft Local Government Act seeking to
restructure Liberia’s governance architecture to among others enhance accountability and
improve service delivery is yet to be enacted into law (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).
To meet these demands and achieve the stated objectives, Krawczyk and Muhula (2018)
observed that decentralization in Liberia has focused on “rudimentary activities” (p. 372) like
rebuilding infrastructure at the county level. A lot of time has been spent on developing plans,
policies, legislation and projects to set the stage for Liberia’s decentralization (Krawczyk &
Muhula, 2018). Within the justice and security sectors, these interventions include the
establishment of a specialized court, with jurisdiction across the entire country to try sexual and
gender based violence related cases, and the decision to establish units of the Women and
Children Protection Section across Liberia (Bacon, 2015) and the program to create the regional
justice and security hubs (Nyei, 2014). Another intervention is the creation of a specialized
prosecution unit, the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Unit, dedicated to prosecuting sexual
and gender related cases (Bacon, 2015). Also, additional police officers were recruited, trained
and deployed outside the capital, although with almost no resources to work (Fyanka, 2014).
These interventions are yet to yield the desired results as Krawczyk and Muhula (2018)
observed that the results of decentralization remain weak. This is a view shared by Bacon (2015)
who noted that between February 2009, when the specialized court was established, and July
2011, only 34 out of the 200 reported sexual and gender based related cases had been prosecuted.
The researcher also found that out of the cases prosecuted, only 16 convictions were secured.
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) made negative prognosis about prospects of the local government
bill being enacted as drafted because Liberia’s central government is reluctant to cede power.
Challenges hindering Decentralization in Liberia
Several challenges are affecting Liberia’s quest to decentralize (Krawczyk & Muhula,
2018 & Nyei, 2014). These include weak human resource capacity (Nyei, 2014). According to
Bacon (2015) one of the reasons for the poor performance of the specialized court is because,
although the law establishing it makes provision for the appointment of two judges to sit
concurrently, only one judge was appointed (Bacon, 2015). This illustrates the point that
decentralization of services must be accompanied by the requisite capacity/resources without
which the prospects of yielding the desired fruits are almost non-existent. Low resource levels,
poor infrastructure, the expansive geographical area to be covered by the decentralized services
and Liberia being a unitary country with a highly centralized bureaucracy are challenges
confronting decentralization in Liberia (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Nyei (2014) shared similar
views. Weak coordination capacity amongst frontline ministries responsible for decentralization
is also a challenge (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Most importantly, the elite is opposed to
decentralization of political power and this elite capture may affect other types of
decentralization in Liberia, as they are interlinked (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018).
Way Forward for Decentralization in Liberia
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) recommended that in view of the long history and practice
of a centralized system of Government in Liberia, an incremental approach that builds on
existing structures should be adopted while bearing in mind the absorptive capacity of the
system. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) advocated for the position of County Superintendent to be
the “future hub of development” (p. 383) where he/she has more administrative authority for
planning, budgeting and other relevant processes. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) also
recommended that line ministries in the counties must have dual reporting lines to the Country
Superintendent to deliver on agreed targets and to their respective head offices, in Monrovia, on
substantive/technical issues. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) maintain that this approach will
ensure service delivery. Another recommendation made by Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) is that
accountability should be built at the local level. The researchers argued that this can be achieved
by strengthening existing county structures by allowing them to make decisions at the local level.
They will strengthen the county’s ability to deliver services and enhance the citizen’s demand
and support for decentralization (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). Thirdly, Krawczyk and Muhula
(2018) recommended that a coordination mechanism for decentralization, that is supported with
the requisite technical and political authority to spearhead the decentralization process, should be
established. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the research questions of my
dissertation, Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) recommended the adoption of a bottom up approach
towards accountability to engender citizen participation in local government and
decisionmaking, in Liberia. Nyei (2014) recommended that “Decentralizing an overly centralized
state which is built on premises of patrimonial politics, as is the case in Liberia, requires a
comprehensive and radical political reform process” (p.3). Nyei (2014) further noted, on Liberia,
that: -
… a strong ‘political will’ in support of decentralization as an integral element of
postwar governance reform remains missing. Strong political will requires
presidential or executive ownership and leadership of the process, including
instructing government officials to drive the process from their various ministries
and agencies.
Some Approaches used to make Criminal Justice Services Accessible
The following actors and approaches have been used in various settings to make criminal
justice services accessible. Although not all examples relate to postconflict settings, I am of the
considered opinion that, with modifications, the actors and approaches can be successfully used
in postconflict settings.
Local/municipal authorities enhance access to criminal justice services
The existence of local or municipal authorities in a particular society is an indication of
an intention, even if in theory, to make public services accessible. Access to the legal system is
critical in every democracy (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). According to the United Nations,
effective crime prevention and a humane criminal justice system are essential elements of the
rule of law and they play a role in state building and sustainable development (Homel & Masson,
2016). Homel and Masson (2016) asserted that communities that enjoy socio-economic progress
and supremacy of the rule of law have lower crime rates and are therefore safer. Also, Sedra
(2013), citing Van Dijk and De Waard (1991), claimed that there are indications that effective
crime prevention can promote social cohesion in communities and development (Homel &
Masson, 2016). Goal 11 of the United Nations’ SDGs targets making cities and human
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). Gribanova
and Vulfovich (2017) conducted a study of New York and St Petersburg and pointed out that the
concentration of large populations and power in both cities contributes to creating conditions for
the spread of criminal activity and the emergence of new urban crime. The types of crime in an
urban context is different from rural areas (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). It is important to
design policies that are geared towards creating safe, inclusive and just cities (Gribanova &
Vulfovich, 2017). Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) indicated that these policies require an
efficient and nonviolent approach to achieving their objectives which should preoccupy city
administrators. Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) also informed their readers that, given the
proximity of city authorities to the citizenry and their familiarity with the local context, city
authorities are in a better position to develop crime prevention solutions. Accordingly, crime
prevention policies must adopt a decentralized approach, because they require proximity of
actors to implement them (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017).
Forging partnerships between police, community and local authorities
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) conducted a review of the strategy for
crime prevention and crime fighting in Lithuania. Whereas the authors acknowledged the fact
that fighting crime is within the jurisdiction of the police (i.e., the state), they made the point that
the police, and the state, cannot combat/prevent crime without the society. Tumalavičius,
Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) noted that the principles that guided the implementation of
the crime prevention strategy in Lithuanian included respecting the rights and freedoms of each
legal entity, a systematic approach towards combating and preventing crime and the involvement
of all members of the society. Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy and Endziņš (2017) found that this
resulted in a number of gains including a reduction in the crime rate and an enhancement of the
population’s trust, in law enforcement institutions. The researchers also found that the approach
has enhanced the opportunities for involving Lithuania’s municipalities in combating crime and
making the society safe.
In spite of the fact that the authors do not expressly use the term decentralization, the fact
that the crime prevention strategy adopted a systemic approach, that involved the citizenry,
municipalities and coordinating the activities of relevant institutions, there are sufficient pointers
to the fact that decentralization was an essential part of Lithuania’s crime fighting strategy.
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, (2017) argued that using an inter-institutional
approach is important to enhance decentralization of criminal justice services and to make
society safe. This is because the local government is an important ally and actor in combatting or
preventing crime. Partnerships are important for creating access to the criminal justice system.
These can be formed either through creating new ones or exploring existing ones. Consequently,
criminal justice institutions can take advantage of an existing relationship between one part of the
criminal justice chain and the public to carry out its operations. Such partnerships occurred in
Liberia where the Women and Children Protection Section of the Liberia National Police (LNP)
collaborated with the community policing unit of the LNP to undertake public outreach on issues
related to their mandate (Bacon, 2015).
Establish a community policing program
Another means of enhancing access to the criminal justice system is through community
policing. This is a means through which the community and the police forge a partnership to
combat crime. When properly designed, and effectively managed, community policing enhances
the population’s access to the criminal justice system. The concept of community policing is
practiced in postconflict settings like Sierra Leone and this led to the decentralization of security
structures (Bangura, 2018). Malochet (2007) describes community policing as “decentralized
police, accepted by the population, which intervenes under a mandate in order to better deal with
the plurality of security demands” (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016, p. 336).
Despite this definition, Kasali and Odetola (2016) acknowledged the conceptual
challenges associated with defining community policing. The authors attribute this challenge,
partly to the fact that, conceptually, community policing continues to evolve. This led Kasali and
Odetola (2016) to conclude that defining what community policing should depend on the context.
Community policing must solve the problems for which it is designed and implemented (Kasali
& Odetola, 2016). Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) asserted that community policing is the
form of policing that the citizens can easily evaluate. Governments around the world are
recognizing the fact that they cannot monopolize security hence the need to collaborate with
local communities to deliver security (Gibbs & Ahlin, 2013; Kasali & Odetola, 2016 &
Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, 2017).
Mac Ginty (2015) observed that increasingly, international interventions are using
community safety initiatives to bring safety to unstable contexts (Homel & Masson, 2016).
Examples of such interventions are: - the decentralized multi-stakeholder public consultations in
Tunisia, the promotion of local peace agreements between municipal actors in Libya, local
security councils in Kosovo, Bangladesh and Nepal, and various mediation initiatives between
local government bodies and gangs in Latin and Central America (Homel & Masson, 2016).
As is evidenced below, community-policing strategies have been used in many
jurisdictions to combat crime, including Liberia (Bacon, 2015), South Africa (Super, 2014),
Nigeria (Kasali & Odetola, 2016), Lithuania (Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy & Endziņš, 2017)
and in the United States (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017).
Community policing in South Africa
The Government of South Africa involved the community, through community policing
forums to address overcrowding in prisons (Super, 2014). Through this approach, the community
has a say in what happens to a person accused of a crime (e.g., whether to grant bail or banish the
accused person from the community and even the duration of a jail sentence [Super, 2014]).
Super (2014) indicated that the partnership between the community and the police in crime
prevention goes as far as the community mobilizing to oppose the granting of bail. An
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act in 1997 gave the victim and the community in which
the crime occurred a say in bail decisions (Super, 2014). The South African police considers the
communities as so important that they (i.e. the police) measure the impact of their social crime
prevention strategy in terms of the number of crime awareness programs they have held and the
number of street communities or neighborhood watch groups it has established. This role given
to the community led Super (2014) to predict that the community is going to get active in the
recruitment of police officers in South Africa.
The involvement of the community in crime related issues has resulted in a vengeful
community playing a major role in the criminal justice system (Super, 2014). However, this takes
away the neutrality that the community is ordinarily required to exhibit (Super, 2014).
Super (2014) acknowledged the fact that, in South Africa, the involvement of the community in
criminal issues is historically associated with marginalized communities. The researcher insisted
that this historical fact coincided with the transition from minority rule in South Africa, which
also coincided with a peak in crime and the need for the government to combat the crime wave.
Super (2014) cited Lacey and Zedner (1995) who asserted that using the community in
crime prevention is attractive not because it reduces crimes but because it gives an indication the
government is combating crime. A contrary view is held by De Klerk who, according to Super
(2014), argued that engaging in the ideology of collectivism results in vigilantism. This is
because the partnership between the community and the police do not result in the desired
results. Super (2014) cited a number of examples from South Africa that demonstrates the role of
the community in making pronouncements on the fate of suspects, including banishing them and
pulling their houses down, without the victims or their relatives questioning this. However, Super
(2014) noted that in spite of the perceived partnership with the police the fact that the police are
under resourced will result in situations where they cannot intervene and this leaves the
community to act on their own, thus creating a situation where community watch forums
members sometimes take part in mob violence. De Klerk and Lacey and Zedner (1995) views in
Super (2014) on the pros and cons of an active involvement of the community in policing are
justified, hence designers and implementers of community policing programs must bear this in
mind and adopt a model of community policing that addresses the said concerns.
Community policing in Nigeria
Kasali and Odetola (2016) affirmed the utility of adopting a community policing
approach to policing. The researchers insisted that community policing is a viable alternative
approach to policing in Nigeria that can address the country’s security challenges. Kasali and
Odetola (2016) evaluated the impact of community policing in Nigeria and found a negative
image of the relationship between the police and the community. Oversight and accountability
within the Nigerian police were lacking (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). There was also a lack of trust
between the police and the community and this was affecting the performance of the police
(Kasali & Odetola, 2016).
Kasali and Odetola (2016) found that, in Nigeria, the impact of community policing as an
alternative policing approach has been poor. This is in spite of the fact that a Community Safety
Partnership Forum, bringing together the community, the police and local government officials,
to work together on community policing, had been piloted in Lagos. Nigeria, Kasali and Odetola
(2016) found that several reforms had been implemented to orient the police in Nigeria on
community policing. However, in spite of the resources committed, the impact is yet to be felt
(i.e., police officers remain steeped in traditional policing strategies [Kasali & Odetola, 2016]).
Several factors including a misapplication of the concept of community policing and poor
implementation account for this (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and Odetola (2016)
recommended decentralizing the structure of the police department to allow better police
deployment in the community to respond to citizens needs and build a trustful relationship.
Kasali & Odetola (2016) also recommended that civilians should be deployed into auxiliary
positions to perform liaison functions as this will generate closer ties between civilians and the
police. These recommendations of the researchers are insightful as they point to the fact that
putting in place a community policing program does not, in itself, result in decentralization of the
criminal justice system or access to criminal justice services. It also points to the important role
of civilians in ensuring a successful community policing program.
Community policing in the United States
Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) advocated for community policing as a law enforcement
tool. Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) encouraged designers of community policing programs to
tailor community policing initiatives to suit the context in which it will be implemented. Kasali
and Odetola (2016) shared this view. Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) conducted a study on
community policing within the framework of Afro centrism. Afro centrism is rooted in equity
and justice with interconnectedness of the policy and the community, language, self reliance, oral
tradition, communalism, fundamental goodness, and spirituality as some of its elements
(BentGoodley & Smith, 2017). Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017) are convinced that applying
these elements to community policing increase the chances of combating crime and improving
the relationship between the police and the black community in the United States. This is because
factors like race and economic status affect the citizen’s perception of police legitimacy (Gibbs
& Ahlin, 2013), a fact which has led researchers such as Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) to advocate for
the police to improve their relationships with minority groups.
Conditions for effective community policing
As previously noted, partnership between the police and the community does not
automatically guarantee successful community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and
Odetola (2016) argued that the success of community policing depends on the effectiveness of
the engagement between the police and the community. Flynn (2004) supported this point
asserting that trust is important for a positive outcome of an engagement between the police and
the community on community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). Kasali and Odetola (2016)
stressed the fact that community policing alters the power dynamics in police institutions hence
requires acceptance at all levels of the organization and the orientation of police officers to
understand the community policing philosophy (Kasali & Odetola, 2016). This means that the
philosophy of community policing must be incorporated even into recruitment processes for the
police. Most importantly, police departments have to reform their relationships with local
communities and the community’s views must be solicited in making policies that impact on
their security and safety. Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) subscribed to this view. As previously noted,
Super (2014) cautions against the over involvement of the community in the criminal justice
process, as their over involvement in combating crime takes away the neutrality that should
characterize the criminal justice system.
As previously pointed out, community policing must involve the community and be
designed to suit the context. This point is supported by the findings of Bent-Goodley and Smith
(2017) who, while, recognizing the challenges in the relationship between the police and the
African American community in the United States of America, advocated for a community
policing approach that is African centric. By this approach, the community and the family are
involved, and efforts should be made to understand the culture of the people (Bent-Goodley &
Smith, 2017). This suggests a partnership between the private citizens and public institutions, in
this case a partnership between the police and members of the community. This partnership is an
important condition precedent for effective decentralization of criminal justice services. Another
condition identified by Kasali and Odetola (2016) is that policing institutions must be structured
in a manner that supports the implementation of community policing. Finally, oversight and
accountability are key elements for successful community policing (Kasali & Odetola, 2016).
Impact of community policing on the legitimacy of the police institution
Gibbs and Ahlin (2013) asserted that there is a direct relationship between the citizen’s
perception of the legitimacy of the police and the degree of cooperation they accord the police.
This means that a police officer/agency that is perceived by the public as legitimate, including
being fair and consistent in discharging his/her/its functions, will receive the public’s
cooperation and this will positively impact their work (Gibbs & Ahlin, 2013). In other words, in
spite of the case made for decentralization of criminal justice services, in this case the police, if
citizens question the legitimacy of the police, their presence across the community is of little or
no significance.
Implement the proximity concept of internal security
Access to the criminal justice system can be enhanced through the implementation of the
Proximity Concept of Internal Security (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). This is an approach
to security adopted in Switzerland and manifests itself by the police maintaining close contact
with the population at the local level (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). This results in the
police gaining a proper understanding of local security challenges (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus,
2016). This enables security policies to be formulated according to the preferences of the local
community (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016).
From its description, the proximity concept of internal security is in many respects like
community policing, though Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) made no such reference to
these similarities. Being likened to community policing suggests that the merits and demerits
associated with community policing can arguably be said to apply to policing approaches that
involve the Proximity Concept of Internal Security. However, Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus
(2016) highlighted the fact that the Proximity Concept of Internal Security has limited
application, as even in Switzerland it is not applied to all crimes. For instance, new security
challenges like cybercrime are not dealt with at the local level hence the concept does not apply.
The disadvantages associated with the Proximity Concept of Internal Security coupled with the
financial pressures confronting Switzerland and the duplication of efforts and wastage of
resources arising from using this concept have resulted in police reforms (Jacot-Descombes &
Niklaus, 2016). According to Sheffeler (2012), the reorganization of the police has resulted in a
policing approach that tilts towards recentralization (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016).
Whereas the challenges associated with implementing the Proximity Concept of Internal
Security have resulted in reforms that have led to a near recentralization of the police in
Switzerland, it is inappropriate to conclude that implementing the Proximity Concept of Internal
Security is inappropriate for Liberia. This is because the challenges associated with this concept
are peculiar to Switzerland (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). In this regard, it could be
argued with some success that the findings may be applicable to contexts that practice a federal
system of government. Therefore, for a context like Liberia, which is a unitary state, there is a
higher probability that the results of applying the Proximity Concept to Internal Security will
yield the desired positive results of enhancing access of the citizenry to the criminal justice
system.
Third party policing
Third Party Policing is another approach that can be used to enhance access to the
criminal justice system (Mazerolle, 2014). Consequently, Mazerolle (2014) asserted that, “Good
policing requires the police to foster and sustain collaboration in ways that galvanize social
action against crime without either extending the reach of police or overriding
the purposes of other agencies” (p. 361). Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) indicated that Third
Party Policing involves a partnership between the police and an external entity (the third party)
in which the legal powers of the third party, which may ordinarily not be available to the police,
are used to prevent or control crime (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle (2014) claimed that policing in
general requires a partnership between the police and third parties. Furthermore, Mazerolle
(2014) indicated that there is increasingly a shift from encouraging relevant actors to establish
such partnerships to making such partnerships a requirement in policing models. The Police and
Fire Reform (Scotland) Act (2012) is one example cited by the author as evidencing this shift.
Mazerolle (2014) informed readers that in operationalizing Third Party Policing the
police indirectly target problems associated with crime through partnerships with third parties.
Mazerolle (2014) observed that, in Third Party Policing, partnerships are formed for enhanced
capacity to control crime. Third Party Policing focuses on individuals, groups and locations that
are crime prone (Mazerolle, 2014). Third Party Policing can occur within single or multiple
partnerships (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle (2014) asserted that where there are multiple partners
the partnership may be complex. However, the multifaceted approach that ensues from the
presence of various partners increases the chances of a successful approach to control or prevent
crime (Mazerolle, 2014).
Conditions for effective third party policing
Mazerolle (2014) made the point that, although it is not the preferred approach, there are
instances where the partnership is forced as the third party is unwilling or less willing to enter a
Third Party Policing relationship. Where there is collaboration or a willing partner, there is a
potential for sustained and positive impact (Mazerolle, 2014). Effective communication and
mutual respect amongst the partners are important conditions precedent for successful Third
Party Policing (Mazerolle, 2014). For Third Party Policing to be effective the third party must
have a legislative mandate granting them the powers required to control or prevent crime
(Mazerolle, 2014). It is worth emphasizing that these powers should not be designed only for
Third Party Policing purposes (i.e., there should be other reasons for granting these powers to the
third party, such as licensing or regulation [Mazerolle, 2014]). Mazerolle (2014) asserted that
third parties are better crime control partners. In Third Party Policing, these powers are referred
to as legal levers (Mazerolle, 2014). Mazerolle & Ransley (2005) define legal levers as “legal
powers possessed by third parties that create a crime control or crime prevention capacity that is
otherwise dormant, under-utilized, or unavailable to police” (Mazerolle, 2014, p. 351).
Mazerolle (2014) observes that in Third Party Policing, the existence of partnerships is
not enough to generate the desired result (s) especially over the long term. However, such
partnerships backed by the third-party with access to clearly articulated legal levers (i.e. by law)
will increase the chances of achieving the desired results of the Third Party Policing (Mazerolle,
2014). The ability and willingness of third parties to initiate and escalate sanctions is another
conditions precedent for effective Third Party Policing (Mazerolle, 2014). Bond and Gittell
(2010) stated that the lack of formal systems for fostering partnerships is a possible reason for
Third Party Policing to fail (Mazerolle, 2014). Lastly, Third Party Policing partnerships must be
sustained to create the desired impact. To support this position, Mazerolle (2014) conducted a
longitudinal study of the ABILITY Truancy Trial in Australia, a Third Party Policing between
the police and schools, and concluded that, when sustained over a long period of time, Third
Party Policing is a cost effective approach to crime control.
Design and implementation of paralegal programs
Implementing paralegal schemes is another way to enhance access to the criminal justice
system. Swenson (2018) studied two paralegal schemes in Timor-Leste and found that the
paralegals helped resolve disputes in a relatively shorter time compared to the state justice
system. This is partly because the paralegals accessed parts of the country where the state system
was unable to access (Swenson, 2018). For instance, Graydon (2011) claimed that, in the
Oeccussee District, the paralegal scheme was the only link between the local population and the
formal justice system (Swenson, 2018). Paralegal programs are also a relatively cheaper way of
providing access to justice. Swenson (2018) also found that even when the state used paralegals
to enhance its capacity and bore the cost, it was relatively cheaper for the state compared to the
state using its legal aid lawyers.
Legal aid schemes
Legal aid schemes are a variant of paralegal programs. Swenson (2018) indicated that
running legal aid programs is an effective way to decentralize criminal justice services,
particularly to rural communities. Mayo (2013) asserted that the right to justice is a fundamental
right in the modern state. However, poverty and other challenges make assessing this right a
challenge for a section of the population (Mayo, 2013). Given the place of the right to justice in
the governance of the modern state, governments have in place social interventions like legal aid
schemes for persons who are unable to afford professional legal advice to enjoy their right to
justice (Dandurand, 2014; Mayo, 2013 & Watson, Rukundakuvuga & Matevosyan, 2017).
Dandurand (2014) indicated that a report of a public commission on legal aid in British
Columbia captured the importance of legal aid schemes for the criminal justice process in a
modern state. The report notes that timely and appropriate criminal legal aid results in a
significant cost savings to the criminal justice system. Dandurand (2014) indicated that the
authors of the Commission’s report noted that “inadequate criminal legal aid costs society in
addition to court appearance, longer trials, extended jail times and increased recidivism, all of
which can be minimized through the provision of timely and effective legal aid” (p. 416).
Mayo (2013) however laments over the fact that the rise in neo liberal ideology has
resulted in dwindling public funding allocated for legal aid services. Lippman (2014) shared
similar sentiments as the author expressed worry over the lack of adequate public funding to
support legal aid services for the poor. Davies and Worden (2017) made a similar assertion to the
effect that there is consensus amongst scholars that public defender programs for indigent
persons are underfunded. This development is creating ethical challenges for legal aid service
providers as in some cases they have to do the bidding of their funders which may not
necessarily be how they (i.e., the service providers) would ordinarily want to conduct the affairs
of their indigent clients (Mayo, 2013). Mayo (2013) also found that this and other factors had
resulted in a reduction in morale amongst persons working to enhance access to justice for the
indigent. This, according to Lippman (2014) is compounded by the absence of an adequate
number of lawyers. Mayo (2013) expressed the conviction that without an increase in public
funding for legal aid schemes, they have little chances of survival. Whereas Mayo (2013)
expressed no aversion for securing funding from private sources to fund legal aid programs, the
author maintained that this should not replace public funding, as the availability of public
funding to support legal aid schemes is important for sustaining the schemes.
Public defender programs
Davies and Worden (2017) conducted a study on funding for public defender programs
in the United States of America. The researchers found that funding for public defense programs
is linked to their ability to raise tax revenue. In the United States, counties are directed to fund
legal aid services for indigent members of society in four different ways: - a public defender
office, a conflict defender office, a legal aid society or assigned counsel (Davies & Worden,
2017). This suggests that in the United States, funding for the right to counsel is highly
decentralized. Despite this, Davies and Worden (2017) found that counties with more
disadvantaged persons spent less per capita on public defense and that the greater the need for
public defense services, the lesser counties spent on each case.
Lippman (2014) stressed the point that providing legal aid services yields generous
results for public revenue mobilization. This is evidenced in the researcher’s assertion that for
every dollar spent on legal services the return was up to 5 dollars to the public purse. Public
defender programs are a form of legal aid service. Davies and Worden (2017) posited that the
adequacy or otherwise of funding for public defense programs has had a direct impact on a
number of indicators. For instance, Campbell and Christopher (2015) noted that: … in
Houston, Brooklyn and Washington enhanced funding for public defenders’ programs have
resulted in improved service delivery, reduction of the caseloads of public defenders, speedy
progression of cases, reductions in uncounseled guilty pleas, improved trial outcomes and an
improvement in the reputation of public defenders amongst local judges (Davies & Worden,
2017, p. 314).
Davies and Worden (2017) noted that public defender programs fall into the category of
redistributive policies (i.e., a policy that draws from public resources to support disadvantaged
members of the community) and criminal justice policy. Davies and Worden (2017) also argued
that even though the right to counsel is a constitutional right, it is a policy problem that is subject
to organizational, administrative and allocation decisions.
Collaboration between the bench and the bar
Lippman (2014) identifies other interventions that have enhanced access to the criminal
justice system. The researcher asserted that the legal profession should support the judiciary in
promoting access to justice for the poor. To buttress this point, Lippman (2014) cited a number
of interventions of the New York State judiciary to provide legal services for the poor. These
included convincing the Governor and the Legislature to allocate funds to provide legal services
to the indigent in society, and this has grown over time. Interventions used by New York’s
judiciary include pro bono work by in house counsel, which allows lawyers who are in house
counsel to employers in New York but licensed in other states, to appear in court in New York to
represent clients in pro bono cases (Lippman, 2014). This intervention seeks to increase the pool
of lawyers to increase the chances of poor members of society obtaining representation by
counsel.
Another intervention is the 50 hour pro bono bar association requirement (Lippman,
2014). This seeks to build a culture of service amongst law students prior to becoming lawyers
(Lippman, 2014). Law students are required to devote 50 hours of their time to provide pro bono
legal services prior to being admitted to the New York Bar (Lippman, 2014). The pro bono
scholars’ program is another intervention identified by Lippman (2014). This intervention
requires law students to devote their last semester of law school to offer pro bono services
(Lippman, 2014). Law students work under the supervision of a law firm or some other legal
service provider in cooperation with the law school (Lippman, 2014). The students have the
opportunity to sit for their bar exams and are admitted earlier than usual, as a reward for their
services (Lippman, 2014). Lippman (2014) also mentioned the use of non-lawyers to provide
legal services as another intervention. This intervention uses persons without formal legal
training to provide poor people with legal advice and supporting them through the legal process
(Lippman, 2014). Lippman (2014) argued that this is already done in the medical profession
where midwives and nurses provide certain medical services for a lower fee. Persons providing
such services may be referred to as paralegals in the legal profession. Lippman (2014) observed
that granting poor members of society legal representation is the surest way to adhere to the
constitutional requirement of equal access to justice for all.
Conditions to foster such collaboration
Lippman (2014) highlighted the importance of baseline data in order to determine the
nature of the interventions and the opportunity to track implementation and progress of the said
interventions. It is also evident from Lippman (2014) that for interventions seeking to give the
poor access to legal services to be successful, a collaborative effort amongst multiple actors
including the executive, legislature, judiciary, arms of government, the bar, citizens and the
private sector is required. There must also be a culture of voluntary service amongst lawyers.
Consequently, Lippman (2014) made the point that notwithstanding the various interventions to
promote a culture of providing pro bono services, the potential impact of volunteerism in
providing legal services for the poor is yet to be appreciated and harnessed.
Using technology to aid decentralization of the criminal justice system
Parkin and Wedeking (2016) argued that the prominent role of the internet and
information communication technology (ICT) in the 21st Century is vital to enhance access to
justice. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) advocated for using technology to
enhance access to justice in postconflict settings, highlighting the processes, approach, benefits
and impact of putting in place an electronic case management system for the justice system in
Rwanda. According to Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017), the Government of
Rwanda, aided by ICT, adopted a nationally owned, sector wide approach, which is centralized
at the national level, to manage cases in the justice system. This capacity is extended across the
country in partnership with the private sector, who have created e-kiosks across Rwanda, and the
youth have been trained to use the software to help ICT illiterate persons use the ekiosk facilities
for a fee (Watson, Rukundakuvuga & Matevosyan, 2017). Watson, Rukundakuvuga and
Matevosyan (2017) noted that there are automated reminders that are sent to all actors including
litigants and the case management system is the only entry into the justice system.
Advantages of using technology in case management in the justice system
Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) found that Rwanda’s technology based case
management system is also used as an oversight and accountability tool. This has helped improve
justice delivery. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) attributed the success of the
program to the fact that it is national owned and has a centralized management approach.
Rwanda’s approach has several features and advantages that transcend the criminal justice sector
and, with the necessary modifications, could be replicated in other postconflict settings. These
features and advantages include a partnership between the private sector and the government to
enhance access to justice which creates jobs, especially for the youth. Also, it is nationally
owned.
Other criminal justice system services that can be provided with the aid of technology
Technology can be used to provide the following criminal justice services: -
(a) Policing: - Holmberg (2014) and Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016)
advocated for policing functions that can be performed with the aid of technology to be
taken over by technology to free human resources to perform policing duties that require
human beings.
(b) Incarceration: - Technology can also be used to incarcerate persons found
guilty of criminal conduct (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf
(2017) advocated for a fundamental but gradual shift from traditional forms of
incarceration to using technology to incarcerate persons convicted of certain categories of
crime, noting that incarceration, particularly for long periods, does not necessarily
prevent persons from reoffending (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Technological
incarceration entails electronic monitoring of the location of the offenders, conducting
electronic surveillance of offender’s actions and remote immobilization of the offender
(Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) noted the growth in
using technology for incarceration and attributed this development to the confidence that
courts and legislators have developed in this means of incarceration.
Advantages of technological incarceration
Technological incarceration has the potential of being more effective in fulfilling all the
objectives that sentencing seeks to achieve (i.e., specific and general deterrence, incapacitation
and proportionality [Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017]). Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) also
asserted that it is cost effective, so having the potential of reducing the cost of incarceration by
one half or one third. Another advantage is that it increases the chances of persons being
rehabilitated as they can take advantage of rehabilitation services that may not be available in
prison but are accessible within the community where they are incarcerated (Bagaric, Hunter &
Wolf, 2017).
Disadvantages of technological incarceration
As in the case of physical incarceration, technological incarceration does not completely
prevent an incarcerated person from escaping (Bagaric, Hunter & Wolf, 2017). Consequently,
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) suggested a number of interventions to reduce the possibility of
this occurring. These include limiting the movement of persons subject to this form of
incarceration (i.e., limiting or concentrating movement to locations where there is the
infrastructure to support this method of incarceration). Another potential disadvantage, although
debunked by Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017), is the assertion that there is a possibility of
technological incarceration breaching the human rights of convicts. The researchers argued that
the potential of such rights being abused is higher in conventional prisons. It should be noted that
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) advocated for limited use of the physical form of incarceration
(i.e., it should not be used to imprison persons accused and convicted of serious crimes such as
sexual related offences).
Whereas the use of technological incarceration may have advantages, it is clear that the
infrastructure required to implement this form of incarceration is not well developed, even in the
developed world. It must also be noted that to effectively deploy this method of incarceration
there is the need for effective oversight. Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) do not equate the use
of technological incarceration to decentralization of prisons, however, using technology to
incarcerate has the effect of decentralizing prisons/corrections services and making this criminal
justice service more accessible.
Access to the judiciary
Another part of the criminal justice chain that can be decentralized by using technology
is some aspects of the work of the judiciary (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking
(2016) asserted that embedded within the phrase “equal justice under the law” is an
acknowledgement and an expectation that access to the law and legal system must be equal and
sufficient for all citizens. Open access to the legal system in the United States is a feature of the
United States’ legal system, hence for the courts to enhance their legitimacy they should aspire to
making transparency and providing information their hallmark (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Well
organized and better managed judiciaries promote access to online information (Parkin &
Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking (2016) focused on expanding the discussion on access
to justice by looking at access to justice through the websites of 50 judiciaries in the United
States. According to the researchers, the role of the internet in the current age has resulted in a
phenomenon where people are visiting websites to get information. Parkin and Wedeking (2016)
made the point that a critical link for citizens in the 21st Century is to connect them with their
court system via the internet. Hence, provision must be made for this to happen.
Benefits of making the judiciary accessible via the internet
Some benefits in the policymaking arena occur when the judiciary becomes accessible
through the internet (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking (2016) referred to
Lawrence (1990), who indicated that where poor people have access to the courts, the judiciary’s
agenda is influenced, and this influences policymaking. Reviewing the said websites, Parkin and
Wedeking (2016) found varied information on them. The researchers attributed the variance in
information to factors like the complex nature of the court system and, to a lesser degree, internet
penetration. Partisan political control of state institutions also accounted for the varied nature of
the content on the websites (Parkin & Wedeking, 2016). Parkin and Wedeking (2016) explained
that partisan forces may influence the content and design of websites and this may result in the
information on websites being skewed towards a particular group of individuals, such as lawyers,
hence defeating or reducing the impact of websites on access to justice. Internet connectivity,
penetration and sophistication have an impact on accessing information on websites (i.e., when
there is the probability that citizens will access a judiciary’s website, more information will be
provided online [Parkin & Wedeking, 2016]).
Constructing buildings to deliver criminal justice services
The most widely used approach to make the criminal justice system accessible is to
construct buildings to house the various parts of the criminal justice system. Examples of these
buildings are prisons, courthouses and police stations. Criminal justice services will then be
provided in or from these buildings.
Positive consequences of building additional prisons in Brazil
Silvestre (2016) investigated the consequences of the Brazilian Government to construct
prisons across the country to deal with overcrowded prisons. The benefits of this include
employment for the residents of the localities where the prisons were built, frequent visits by
relatives of inmates to the prisons and by extension the communities where the prisons were
located, which in turn boosted the local economy in areas such as transportation, accommodation
and trading (Silvestre, 2016). Silvestre (2016) informed readers that due to this approach, an
entire industry was built around prisons in Brazil. Silvestre (2016) findings highlighted the
positive unintended consequences of decentralization on the community.
Limitations associated with building additional prisons in Brazil
Silvestre (2016) found that despite the positive impact of the prisons, there was a general
dissatisfaction amongst residents with the prison projects. For instance, there was a feeling of
insecurity amongst residents because of the presence of strangers in their midst and prisoners
being allowed out of prison periodically to interact with the local population (Silvestre, 2016). Of
significant note is the finding by Silvestre (2016) that the construction of additional prisons did
not reduce the prison population but rather resulted in a surge in the prison population. It is
evident from Silvestre (2016) that the efforts to decentralize prisons in Brazil created new
demographics and new social, cultural and political challenges. The researcher asserted that the
feeling of insecurity was because of the absence of adequate numbers of police officers in the
communities where the prisons were located. The presence of prisoners and members of their
families and their friends in the communities where the prisons were built changed the social
profile of the cities and created additional demands on the police to provide security. This
drama’s home the point that a holistic approach must be adopted towards decentralization,
especially of the criminal justice system. Silvestre (2016) informed readers that the decision to
decentralize prisons was not to deal with a criminal justice issue but to address unemployment
(i.e., political and economic issues). This points to the fact that there may be other motives for
packaging a policy as decentralization, thus highlighting the politics involved. Packaging an
intervention in the clothes of decentralization may be relatively easier to sell to the public as the
general benefits of decentralization are indicators that the ordinary citizen can readily identify
with.
Involve the customary justice system
Ubink and Weeks (2017) conducted a comparative review of how South Africa and
Malawi adopted different approaches to use their customary justice systems to enhance access to
justice for rural communities. The harmonization of Liberia’s statutory and traditional justice
systems was identified in the National Plan of Action for Gender Based Violence as one way to
enhance access to justice particularly for women (Bamidele, 2017). Dandurand (2014) also
advocated for increasing the use of mediation as a dispute resolution approach. Whereas a
reference to mediation is not conterminous with using customary justice mechanisms, in practice,
mediation is an approach for resolving disputes within the customary justice system.
Advantages of using the customary justice system
Customary justice systems are effective mechanisms for enhancing access to justice in
rural communities in Africa (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). This is because they are accessible,
cheaper, use fewer formal procedures and speak languages that the local community speak and
understand (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). Jackson (2013) asserted that the formal justice system lacks
geographical hegemony hence the informal justice system will be the source of justice for a
while.
Challenges associated with using the customary justice system
A number of challenges arise from using the customary justice system to enhance access
to justice. For instance, human rights like the right to legal representation are violated, (Ubink &
Weeks, 2017). There is a need for oversight over these mechanisms to check these violations.
Customary justice systems must be subject to the constitution and other fundamental human
rights norms and standards (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). Bacon (2015) observed that to get Liberia’s
customary justice system to uphold human rights a number of unintended consequences have
occurred. These include the informal justice system being prohibited from hearing certain cases,
so victims of those cases have no justice wherever the formal justice system is inaccessible.
Ubink and Weeks (2017) found that, in Malawi, the issue of who appoints persons responsible
for adjudicating in customary justice processes, and how this impacts the doctrine of separation
of powers, was highlighted. According to Ubink and Weeks (2017) at a certain time in Malawi’s
history, people presiding in customary justice processes were appointed by the Executive even
though they were performing judicial functions.
Dealing with the associated challenges
To address the abuse that may occur in customary justice resolution forums, there is the
need to create oversight and accountability structures to oversee customary justice processes and
mechanisms (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). The need to make these forums subject to the constitution
and the imperatives of upholding the doctrine of separation of powers translates into the
regulating customary courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). However, Ubink and Weeks (2017)
asserted that trying to regulate customary justice processes results in formalizing them and this
waters down some of the advantages associated with the system. Ubink and Weeks (2017) also
found that the jurisdiction of traditional courts in both Malawi and South Africa were
circumscribed. The Malawian traditional courts dealt with a limited number of civil cases with
the formal courts dealing with criminal cases and certain civil cases (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).
Furthermore, persons aggrieved by decisions of the customary courts could appeal against them
in the formal courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). According to Ubink and Weeks (2017), South
Africa has similar measures in place (i.e. customary courts deal with civil cases and minor
criminal offences). It is obvious from the foregoing that these arrangements are intended to
provide some degree of oversight over the customary justice system in Malawi and South Africa.
Considerations for determining how customary justice systems should operate alongside
the formal justice system
Ubink and Weeks (2017) opined that deciding on which model is adopted by a country
when formalizing customary justice processes as part of justice system reform is a political and
sovereign decision influenced by factors like the country’s history. This reality is evident in
Malawi where, because the influence of traditional authorities was eroded due to the abuse of
traditional courts by a previous dictatorial regime, a hybrid system, in which lay persons are
made chairs of local courts and assisted by persons versed in customary law, has been established
(Ubink & Weeks, 2017). On the other hand, in South Africa, because of efforts by the Apartheid
regime to weaken the chieftaincy institution and the role of chiefs in the local community, the
post Apartheid government tried to consolidate the place of chiefs in the customary justice
system (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).
Impact of legal pluralism on decentralization
The coexistence of traditional and statutory justice systems at the local level reinforces
the power structures and entrenches the position of the local elite while depriving the nonelite
from having access to justice (Jackson, 2013). Consequently, depending on whose views are
sought, legal pluralism is offering multiple forums for seeking justice or is seen as problematic,
resulting in forum shopping and abuse of human rights (Jackson, 2013). The reason being that
the elite manipulate the system for their benefit (Jackson, 2013). The political dynamics at the
local level makes it very possible for chiefs, as the political elite at the local level, to influence
local political institutions (Jackson, 2013). This creates varied negative consequences including
making local political institutions maintain their biases against women and the youth (Jackson,
2013).
Sierra Leone, like many other postconflict settings, has a pluralistic legal system (i.e., a
customary and formal justice system [Jackson, 2013]). Jackson (2013) investigated the political
dynamics of legal pluralism in Sierra Leone to understand the interaction between both systems
of justice and the significance of power relations at the local level as a result of decentralization.
Jackson (2013) observed that there is a failure to see the link between reforms in the area of
decentralization and those of the justice and security sectors, with issues relating to justice and
security being deemed separate from those associated with political power. Jackson (2013)
illustrates this point by noting that, in Sierra Leone, chiefs appoint the chairs and the four
members of the traditional court. This according to Castillejo (2009) resulted in a situation where
the courts become instruments of the chief (Jackson, 2013). The situation becomes worse
because appeals are rare in the local courts since they have to be heard by the magistrate courts at
the district level and there is almost no opportunity, in practice, to seek redress for decisions of a
traditional court (Jackson, 2013).
Use restorative justice processes
Restorative justice processes are similar to customary justice processes. They are another
approach that can enhance access to the criminal justice system. Nnam (2016) investigated how
overcrowding in prisons in Nigeria can be addressed. The researcher argued that using restorative
justice processes is the surest way to reduce overcrowding in Nigeria’s prisons and to ensure that
lawbreakers are reformed and live as responsible members of the society after being punished.
Countries whose criminal justice systems lack personnel and a presence across the country can
use community leaders to employ restorative justice processes to maintain harmony in the
society. Gal (2016) also advocated for involving the community in restorative justice programs.
Nnam (2016) expressed concern over the overconcentration of the criminal justice system
on keeping lawbreakers away from society as opposed to getting their victims and the
community at large, actively participating in determining the punishment for offenders. Nnam
(2016) grounds the research in the Reintegrative Shaming Theory. According to this theory, a
way to maintain law and order in the community is to have lawbreakers to admit their guilt, show
remorse and engage in attitudinal change (Nnam, 2016). This theory has a strong rehabilitation
component (Nnam, 2016).
Advantages of using restorative justice processes
Nnam (2016) made the point that restorative justice has advantages for the victim, the
offender, the community and the country. It has the potential to reduce overcrowding in prisons
and relieve the formal criminal justice system of some of the burden it carries (Nnam, 2016). The
challenge of congested prisons is not limited to Nigeria. Congested prisons come along with a
burden on the public purse to care for inmates. Nnam (2016) found that in Nigeria, a significant
number of inmates in the prisons are pretrial detainees. Their long periods of incarceration and
the conditions in which they lived violate their fundamental human rights (Nnam, 2016). Also,
prisons are known to be places where people often get exposed to more serious criminal conduct
and, in today’s world, prisons have become places for radicalization (Nnam, 2016). The nature of
the design and workings of the classical criminal justice system ignores the victim, a situation
that may negatively affect the ability of victims to bring closure to the effect of a particular
criminal conduct (Nnam, 2016). Since there is an increase in the chances of offenders being
reformed under the restorative system of justice is instructive, the reason being that it makes a
case for turning to restorative justice to promote public safety and access to justice.
Disadvantages of using restorative justice processes to decongest prisons
Nnam (2016) advocated for using restorative justice in Nigeria’s criminal justice system.
However, the researcher appeared to have advocated for restorative justice to be applied in all
criminal cases. This creates challenges, particularly for a society that is yet to accept this form of
justice. There are certain crimes that are too serious and complex so should be dealt with by a
modern democratic state’s retributive criminal justice system and offenders incarcerated.
Conditions precedents to maximize benefits of restorative justice processes
To operationalize restorative justice processes a number of condition precedents must be
met (Nnam, 2016). These include political will to implement this system of justice, that society is
reoriented and accepts restorative justice as an effective and necessary crime fighting approach,
that there are structures in place to ensure oversight and accountability and that negative
unintended consequences of practicing restorative justice are identified and mitigated (Nnam,
2016). Gal (2016), in a study of a restorative justice program in Israel, found that members of the
community were active in the program’s success. It must however be noted that active
involvement of the community cannot occur without the presence of structures and systems that
are capable and provide restorative justice services. These structures therefore need to be
decentralized to make restorative justice programs successful.
Improve communication and collaboration between criminal justice actors at the local level
Dandurand (2014) acknowledged the fact that the criminal justice system is a complex
system made up of many actors/parts that rely on each other to function. Where the various parts
are not working effectively, it negatively affects the efficiency of the criminal justice system and
creates doubts in the minds of the citizenry about the system’s ability to keep them safe
(Dandurand, 2014). Dandurand (2014) argued that the lack of public confidence in the criminal
justice system results in a situation where individual citizens resort to private security
arrangements to protect themselves. Dandurand (2014) lamented over the inefficiencies in the
criminal justice system in multiple countries and the impact of this on the capacity of the system.
The researcher advocated for an improvement in how local criminal justice actors work and
recommended that they work in a collaborative manner as this will positively affect the system’s
functionality.
Increase the use of diversionary programs and pretrial processes
Dandurand (2014) noted that trials should not be the only place where disputes are
resolved. The researcher advocated for the creation of pretrial processes in the criminal justice
system. Dandurand (2014) also encouraged the use of diversion strategies to facilitate an early
disposal of cases and the number of cases that the criminal justice system has to deal with. These
recommendations can be implemented in postconflict settings, in concert with traditional
authorities. For instance, traditional leaders or institutions can be responsible for supervising
persons participating in diversionary programs. Dandurand (2014) further noted that mediation in
the criminal justice process and various restorative justice programs have the potential of
offering pointers on how diversion programs can be structured.
Create and use specialized criminal justice institutions
According to Dandurand (2014), creating specialized or problem solving courts,
specialized prosecutors and police investigation squads are some measures that can be taken to
make the criminal justice system efficient. Dandurand (2014) does not package this
recommendation as decentralization, however, creating specialized parts of the criminal justice
chain should enhance access to these institutions and, depending on the mandate of these
specialized institutions, they will result in a decentralization of the criminal justice system. For
instance, the creation of a specialized court to deal with sexual crimes in a postconflict setting
may result in establishing this court in a geographical location where sexual and gender-based
crimes are prevalent. All things being equal, this would immediately result in the decentralization
of the courts. This will affect other parts of the criminal justice chain and, in theory, create access
to justice for victims and perpetrators. As previously noted, in Liberia, a
Sexual Offences Court, a Woman and Children Protection Section (WACPS) and a Sexual and
Gender Based Violence Unit were established (Bacon, 2015). Units of the WACPS were to be
established in all police stations across the country to improve the responsiveness of the police to
deal with sexual and gender related offenses (Bacon, 2015).
Augment police strength with a volunteer police reserve force
This approach was used in Kenya, where the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) was
established and operated in Kenya’s Turkana County, a county rich in hydrocarbon deposits
(Agade, 2015). According to Agade (2015), the KPR was a state approved, poorly resourced and
not well trained voluntary police force who augmented the Kenyan police and performed some
law enforcement and policing duties. Agade (2015) noted that oversight and accountability
within the KPR was weak and their mandate fluid. The KPR sometimes stood side by side with
the Kenya police and discharged the same duties, but the police were better compensated (Agade,
2015). Agade (2015) found that the KPR were also involved in providing private security
services for private individuals at a fee. Agade (2015) claimed that this is against the rationale for
setting up the KPR. The researcher also found that the KPR are a source of criminal activity
because they lacked oversight, accountability, adequate training, resources and remuneration
(Agade, 2015). Agade (2015) also found that the KPR could be a source of conflict given the
context in which it operates, namely ongoing oil exploration in the county and the potential for
loss of land and livelihoods.
Another significant finding Agade (2015) made is that the KPR is a potentially strong
complement to the regular police if effectively organized. The researcher noted efforts to
formalize the KPR and recent legislation has incorporated the KPR into the regular Kenyan
police. In seeking to create access to criminal justice services by privatizing decentralized
services, caution should be exercised to ensure that the purpose for decentralizing them is not
defeated. Therefore, attention should be paid to management, accountability, resource allocation
and equity in remuneration for all actors, (i.e., private or public), involved in providing criminal
justice services. It is also important that such private arrangements are periodically reviewed.
Switzerland also engaged the services of private security companies to perform certain
policing tasks (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). In Switzerland, reforms of security
arrangements between the cantons and the municipalities have resulted in the design and
implementation of a model of policing referred to as two-level policing (Jacot-Descombes &
Niklaus, 2016). Overall, this model gives municipalities the freedom to determine how they
approach policing, including whether to hire a private security company to perform some aspects
of providing security like parking surveillance, as opposed to engaging cantons to provide these
services (Jacot-Descombes & Niklaus, 2016). Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus (2016) noted that
whereas this model gives municipalities the freedom to determine the approach to providing
security, it is complex and costly.
Involve citizens in exercising oversight over criminal justice actors/institutions
Effective oversight and accountability are critical features for every modern criminal
justice system. It is a feature of all criminal justice systems in countries that are seeking to
develop a democratic culture (Nall & Mamayek, 2013). Decentralization of the criminal justice
system provides a more compelling reason to put in place effective oversight arrangements for
the system. This is because decentralization of criminal justice services increases the contact
between personnel working within the criminal justice system and the citizenry, which increases
the chances of human violations occurring. Nall and Mamayek (2013) indicated that there are
various models of civilian oversight mechanisms for the police. These include human rights
commissions, anticorruption commissions, ombudsman and civilian oversight boards (Nall &
Mamayek, 2013). It must be noted that sometimes the mechanisms identified above are a hybrid
(Nall & Mamayek, 2013). Nall and Mamayek (2013) found this to be the case in Hong Kong.
The researcher also found that apart from countries who adopted a dedicated civilian oversight
board, other oversight institutions usually carry out multiple mandates.
Nall and Mamayek (2013) investigated the growing interest of Asians in the democratic
governance of their countries and the impact of this phenomenon on civilian oversight of the
police. The researchers found that many developed economies have recognized the importance
of the involvement of citizens in handling complaints of police misconduct (Nall & Mamayek,
2013). Nall and Mamayek (2013) observed that there is a correlation, though not sufficient,
between the level of democracy that a country enjoys and the involvement of its citizens in
providing oversight and accountability in the criminal justice system. The researchers further
noted that in developed economies the description of a police institution as democratic is an
indication that the police work as agents who protect and serve their community. The authors
also found that countries that are ranked highly as democracies put in place policing systems that
are “open, transparent and accountable to civilian oversight mechanisms” (Nall and Mamayek,
2013, p. 121). However, Nall and Mamayek (2013) found no correlation between the democratic
credentials of a country and the number of mechanisms in place that civilians participate in
oversight. A case in point is China, which has a well developed civilian oversight board (Nall &
Mamayek, 2013). According to Nall and Mamayek (2013), their study revealed that “democracy
rankings are not good predictors of the existence of the values and elements of democratic
policing in nations” (p. 127). Nall and Mamayek (2013) attempted to explain this finding by
asserting that perhaps it is because democratic values and principles are so well assimilated by
the population in advanced democracies that there is no need for civilian oversight. If this
assertion is sustained, then there is a stronger case for postconflict societies to put in place
civilian oversight mechanisms to get their citizens actively involved in holding actors within
their criminal justice system accountable.
Summary
Criminal justice system is a tool for stabilization in postconflict countries (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). Resources from donors mostly from Western countries have been used to
implement these reforms (Gordon, 2014). This has influenced the direction of the reforms and
contributed to mixed results hence resulting in questions about the appropriateness of the reforms
for postconflict societies (Gordon, 2014). In Chapter Two the challenges associated with
internationally led support to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict countries with an
emphasis on local ownership was presented. I also presented approaches used to decentralize
criminal justice services, including using technology to increase access to the system (Bagaric,
Hunter & Wolf, 2017 & Mazerolle, 2014), designing and implementing community policing
programs (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017) and operating legal aid schemes (Mayo, 2013). Further,
I demonstrated the importance of decentralization for access to the criminal justice system.
The outcome of reviewing the literature on the phenomenon of interest revealed, among
others that, to improve the chances of internationally supported interventions to reform criminal
justice systems in postconflict settings yielding the desired results, the interventions must be
tailored to suit the context where they are being implemented (Ansorg, 2017). This requires
engagement with the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). However, in practice, this has not been done for
varied reasons, including the associated practical difficulties in adopting this approach (Murdoch,
2015), the lack of political will, by the elite in postconflict countries, to engage with ordinary
citizens in security sector reform processes (Murdoch, 2015 & Williams, 2018) and the absence
of known and viable non Western approaches (Westernman, 2017) to justice and security sector
reform. To address these challenges, several recommendations have been made including the
need for a middle path that combines the quest for local ownership with approaches/practices that
are working in other societies like the West (Murdoch, 2015).
In Chapter three, I presented the research design and describe the phenomenon of
interest, the research approach and; design, rationale for choosing the methodology, my
sampling, data collection strategy, sample size, the analysis plan, instrumentation and highlight
my role as the researcher.
Chapter 3: Research Method
“You sit on the old mat, to plait the new mat”.
A Liberian proverb
Introduction
In this qualitative study, I investigated how (the approach) criminal justice services were
decentralized in Liberia between 2011 and 2017 and the extent to which the approaches towards
decentralization in Liberia were influenced by the uniqueness of the Liberian context. Also
investigated, in this study, is the effects of decentralizing criminal justice services on the
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and Liberia’s peace and stability.
Description of Approach
I used the grounded theory approach to answer the research questions of this study. The
grounded theory “. . . is an approach to qualitative research that attempts to develop theory that
comes from data or the field” (Ravitch & Carl, 2016, p. 22). The principal objective of
conducting a qualitative research adopting the grounded theory approach is to provide theoretical
explanations of themes that emerge from data collected pursuant to the study (Barello et al.,
2015; Patton, 2015). Barello et al. (2015) indicated that a researcher conducting a grounded
theory qualitative research collects and analyzes data simultaneously, making it possible for the
recruitment of participants based on the themes emerging from the data analysis.
Rationale for the chosen approach. Several factors inform the decision to use the
grounded theory approach for this study. These include the following: first, the participants (i.e.,
the prospective sources of data for my study were persons who have in varied ways interacted
with Liberia’s criminal justice system, hence are competent to make significant contributions to
answer the research questions). Second, the choice of the grounded theory approach aids the
process of arriving at findings and making recommendations from data collected from Liberia,
the research site, that are tailored for Liberia’s postconflict reconstruction. Third, in a desire to
increase the chances of the recommendations of this study being implemented, I counted on the
participants of this study to champion the implementation of recommendations. This is because,
in a grounded theory study, the findings emerge from the data collected and analyzed. Therefore,
because the participants of this study were drawn from key actors in Liberia’s criminal justice
system, there is a greater chance of this study’s recommendations being implemented because the
recommendations will emerge for the data participants provided during data collection for this
study.
Role of the Researcher
Personal and professional relationships I have with participants. For almost 10 years,
I actively participated in international efforts to provide technical support and advice to support
the Government of Liberia in its efforts to reform the country’s criminal justice system. Broadly,
the reforms focused on institution, law, and policy reform. The government sought to enhance
access to the criminal justice system by decentralizing the services provided by the justice
system. My previous work in Liberia meant that a professional relationship existed between
participants and myself. These relationships, in some cases, transcend a professional one because
the duration of my stay in Liberia and the nature of the work I did resulted in me developing
personal friendships with some of the potential participants. In my professional capacity, I
supervised some of the participants of this study at work. This may have created an uneven
power relationship with some of the participants. Most important, having actively participated in
international efforts to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system, this study was an indirect
evaluation of my work in Liberia, thus creating a potential conflict of interest situation.
How I managed biases. In qualitative research, it is utopian to assume that a researcher
can effectively distance himself or herself from the research process (Patton, 2015). This is
because reports of qualitative research are laced with the researcher’s biases (Patton, 2015).
Despite this reality, a qualitative researcher cannot throw his or her arms in the air and not take
steps to mitigate the effects of these biases on the researcher’s report. Accordingly, I took the
following steps to ensure that this study’s report substantially reflected participants' views. These
steps included, first and foremost, acknowledging my biases as the researcher (Ravitch & Carl,
2016). Second, a peer debriefer assisted me in reducing my biases; subjecting the data collected
and the ensuing analysis to peer debriefing to affirm the collected data, its analysis, and the
emerging findings (Spall, 1998). Lincoln and Guba (1989) encouraged researchers to identify a
peer debriefer with whom they will work during the research (Spall, 1998).
Participant Selection
Description of the target group of interest. Participants were drawn from officials who
worked in Liberia’s criminal justice system during the period under review (i.e., 2011-2017);
staff of selected civil society organizations; and Liberia’s international partners who actively
supported the process to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system. They public officials were
responsible for policy formation and engaged with Liberia’s international partners in deciding the
direction of the justice system’s reform. This puts them in the best position to aid me in
answering the research questions. These public officials were also responsible for implementing
the reforms and communicating with the population. Some of the participants worked within the
system and so gained firsthand knowledge of the effects of the reforms. The international
community supported the reform process. To a large extent this category of participants
represented their national interest. In some cases, international development and
nongovernmental agencies were also used to implement the reform. These agencies contributed
to achieving certain strategic objectives of their principals. Interviewing them provided insights
into the factors that influenced the choices made to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Description of the sampling strategy and sample size. Creswell (2007) observed that it
is important to select interviewees that possess the requisite knowledge and understanding of the
phenomenon of interest of the research being conducted (Turner, 2010). I recruited and
interviewed participants who were rich sources of information, to answer this study’s research
questions. The theoretical sampling strategy was used to recruit participants who fit this
description. As previously noted, this study is a qualitative study that is used the ground theory
approach. Breckenridge and Jones (2009) stated that the “Theoretical sampling is a central tenet
of classical grounded theory and is essential to the development and refinement of a theory that is
‘grounded’ in data” (p.113).
Glaser and Strauss (1967) made the point that the theory that emerges from the data
collected pursuant to investigating a phenomenon of interest is of more relevance to the study
than any existing theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Based on this Breckenridge and Jones
(2009) informed their readers that theoretical sampling seeks to generate and develop conceptual
theory and narrow data collection, in a systematic fashion, in order to develop a theory. Data
collection in theoretical sampling is focused on, amongst others, identifying gaps in data
collected that must be filled (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009 & Patton, 2015). Glaser and Strauss
(1967) made the point that theoretical sampling is an iterative process in which data collection,
coding and analysis are undertaken by the researcher for purposes of influencing the researcher’s
choice of what data to collect next and from which source to collect the data (Breckenridge &
Jones, 2009). Glaser and Strauss (1967) also stated that the ultimate objective of this exercise is
to develop a theory that emerges from the data collected (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009).
Breckenridge and Jones (2009), citing Hood (2007), described theoretical sampling as being in
many respects akin to purposeful sampling. Morse (2008) made the point that the rationale for
selecting particular participants in studies using the theoretical sampling strategy change as the
theoretical needs of the study evolves (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Glaser (1978) asserted that
data analysis and coding that occurs in the initial stages of the study that is using the theoretical
sampling strategy is done in a rapid manner (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). However, through
further theoretical sampling and memo writing, there is an opportunity to continuously refine
codes to fit the data collected (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Glaser and Strauss (1967) posited
that the process of theoretical sampling continues until a core category emerges after which the
researcher focuses on collecting data that is relevant to the identified core category
(Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Patton (2015) indicated that in studies using the theoretical
sampling strategy, “sampling becomes more selective as the emerging theory focuses the
inquiry” (p. 289). Boychuk-Duchscher and Morgan (2004) admonished researchers to be careful
in collecting data when using theoretical sampling as the sampling strategy (Breckenridge &
Jones, 2009). This is because there are chances of the researcher manipulating the data collected
rather than allowing what is supposed to be an inductive process to evolve (Breckenridge &
Jones, 2009). This creates the danger of the actual nature of the data collected eluding the
researcher (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). It is instructive to note that Strauss and Corbin (1998)
divided the theoretical sampling process into three stages (i.e., “open sampling, relational and
variational sampling and discriminate sampling” [Breckenridge & Jones, 2009, p. 116]).
Breckenridge and Jones (2009) indicated that since data collection in studies using the theoretical
sampling strategy is done to ensure that the data collected supports an emerging theory, the
researcher must, to start with, have tentative ideas of a theory upon which the study will build.
To achieve this, the researcher will have to use the purposeful sampling strategy to identify
information rich sources after which the theoretical sampling strategy will kick in for purposes of
feeding the emerging core categories from the purposeful sample (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009).
My prior knowledge of Libera’s (i.e., the research site) aided the process of deciding where to
start data collection from, however, the strength of the evidence gathered determined the weight I
placed on the emerging theories (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). As previously noted, I worked in
the research site for 10 years and so know the actors in the phenomenon of interest. With this
knowledge and the tentative ideas on the phenomenon of interest, I identified 5 information rich
participants as the starting and based on the emerging theory from the data collected, through the
codes generated and memo writing, other information rich sources were identified to support the
emerging codes.
Several considerations influenced the sample size for this study. These considerations
include the fact that the study was undertaken with the grounded theory approach. Creswell
(1998) and Morse (1994) informed their readers that for studies using a grounded theory
approach, the ideal sample size must range between 20 and 30 or 30 and 50 participants
respectively (Mason, 2010). A second consideration for deciding on this study’s sample size is
the fact that, according to Mason (2010), the sample size for qualitative studies are relatively
smaller in comparison to quantitative samples. This is because, in qualitative research, the fact
that a piece of data or code occurs in the data collected is sufficient reason for it to form part of
the analysis. Put differently, the frequency that a piece of data occurs in the data collected is not a
necessary and sufficient condition for it becoming part of the analysis in qualitative research
(Mason, 2010). However, Mason (2010) cautioned that the data size should be large enough to
provide different but germane viewpoints on the phenomenon of interest of the study. Rubin and
Rubin (2012) made the point that persons recruited to participate in a study must be
knowledgeable in the phenomenon of interest. Thirdly, Charmaz (2006) asserted that the
objectives of a study are a key influencer of a study’s sample size (Mason, 2010). The objective
of this study is to partially fulfill the requirements for obtaining a doctorate degree from Walden
University, so the number of interviewees were kept within the limits provided by the experts
above. An important consideration is the background of the participants recruited. As noted
earlier, most of them are professionals who have work/worked in supporting criminal justice
reform in Liberia and a few are private citizens familiar with Liberia’s criminal justice system.
As pointed out by Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) experts generally tend to share similar views
on issues that are within their professional competence. Consequently, a researcher does not
require a large sample size of experts to make original discoveries. The resources available to me
as a doctoral student also informed my decision on this study’s sample size. Ritchie, Jane, Lewis,
Jane, Elam and Gillian (2003) indicated that the resources available to a researcher influences the
sample size (Mason, 2010). With the constraints on time and money, as well as my inexperience
in conducting research, the sample size for this study is 30 participants, including the 5
participants initially selected to orient me in determining the nature of the data to collect and the
source from which I should collect data. The imperatives of the theoretical sampling strategy
provided the signposts that determined whether data collection had reached saturation. These
include, Glaser and Strauss (1967) admonishing that when using theoretical sampling, data
collection must cease when the core category is “considered dense and data collection no longer
generates new leads” (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009, p. 116). When this point is attained, Glaser
(1992) claimed that the sampling and the study are over (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009).
Conversely, Glaser and Strauss (1967) made the point that where the theoretical sample is
inadequate there will be a lack of integration and gaps in the emerging theory (Breckenridge &
Jones, 2009). The sample size of this study and the fact that the emerging theory influenced the
decision on the nature and sources of the data collected resulted in me attaining saturation from
the data collected.
Describe the criterion for sample selection. To facilitate data collection, the following
criteria was used in determining who will be selected to participate in the study. The participant
was:
●at least 25 years old (at age 25, participants would have acquired at least a high
school certificate and gained some experience/knowledge in the phenomenon of
interest of this study).
●involved in policymaking and implementation to reform Liberia’s criminal justice
system.
●a professional in the criminal justice system.
●an advocate of decentralization of criminal justice services.
Description of how participants were contacted and invited. Conducting interviews is
critical in qualitative research (Patton, 2015). As previously noted, participants for this study
were drawn from persons in both public and private sectors who were involved in reforming
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017. Based on this criterion, and employing
the theoretical sampling strategy, 5 information rich sources were identified and informed about
the study (i.e., its objectives, methodology etc.). These participants were cautioned that though
they participated in identifying other information rich sources, the prerogative to decide who
participates in the study rested with me. They were also informed that participating in the
interview is voluntary and they could withdraw their participation at any time. After the initial 5
participants orally agreed to participate in the study and aid in identifying other information rich
sources, I sent an invitation (i.e., electronic and/or hard copy) to participate in an interview to
collect data for this study. The invitation reechoed the purpose of the research and the voluntary
nature of their participation. It also indicated the expected duration of the interview and the
timeframe within which the interview had to be conducted and gave the, then, potential
interviewees another opportunity to indicate their willingness and availability to be interviewed
for this study. The invitation also indicated that should they agree to proceed with participating in
the study, a consent form will be sent, via email and/or in hard copy, for their information. Hard
copies of this consent form were made available to the participants on/at the day and venue of the
interview and they signed it prior to the commencement of the interview (i.e., for participants
who I physically met to collect data). Where the interview was conducted virtually
i.e., via technology, the participant was asked to electronically sign the consent form or indicate
their consent via email. A similar approach, with the requisite modifications, was adopted in the
case of the other 25 participants of this study.
Instrumentation
This study’s theoretical frameworks, its research questions, and the themes and issues
emerging from the literature review, influenced the interview guide/questions. These informed
my preparation of an interview guide that aided me conduct the interviews to collect data. The
guide consisted of questions that were broadly phrased to allow me to tailor the interview
questions to fit the profile of the interviewee and to pose follow up questions. A number of
measures were put in place to ensure that this study’s findings are valid and credible. The
measures ensured the credibility of the study’s findings and a conclusive link between the data
collected and my findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Anney (2014) indicated that there should be
coherence between the data collected and the researcher’s interpretation of the data. Member
checking was another activity used to ensure content credibility and validity. According to Guba
(1981) member checking is a process in which “data and interpretations are continuously tested
as they are derived …” (Anney, 2014, p. 277). The efforts at securing informed consent during
the recruitment of participants were additional steps taken to enhance the credibility and validity
of my findings in this study. As previously noted, every opportunity was seized to remind
participants that participating in this study was voluntary.
Description of other Data Sources
Data was collected from varied sources. The primary source was from interviews
conducted with participants selected for this study. Peer reviewed journal articles was the second
source of data consulted for this study. Liberia’s legal framework was also invaluable source of
information. Reports prepared by various institutions (i.e., Liberia’s public institutions
particularly those within the criminal justice sector, civil society organizations and Liberia’s
international partners) were referred to during this study.
Procedures for Data Collection
Data for this study was gathered from participants through conducting individual
interviews. Where possible, interviews were conducted with the aid of technology, particularly
with interviewees who had reliable internet connection and agreed to dispense with face to face
interviews. All the interviews were conducted at times and venues convenient for the
interviewee, provided the interviewee’s preferences promoted collecting data in a conducive
atmosphere and within the timelines for completing this study. All interviews were recorded
using both an audio recorder and a mobile phone application called Rev Voice Recorder. Notes
were taken to complement the audio recording. There interviews were conducted in 2019 after
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (i.e., 04-04-190668917). Follow
up interviews were conducted with the aid of technology in 3 cases. Permission was sought from
interviewees whose interviews are conducted face to face for follow up interviews to be
undertaken using technology e.g., telephone, WhatsApp, email and Short Message Service
(SMS). Interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes.
After each interview, the participant was debriefed. During the debriefing session, the
purpose of the study was reiterated, and the contact details of the researcher provided to the
participant. I encouraged participants to seek clarifications on any concerns they had in
connection with this study.
Several measures were taken to protect the identity of the participants from the period of
recruitment, through to the interview and debriefing stages, as well as during follow up
interviews. Each participant was assigned a unique numeric code which was electronically
stored, and password protected. Also, the names of all the participants were stored electronically
and protected with a password on a different device. To protect the participants who were
selected based on information provided by the initial 5 information rich sources, I collected their
contact details and personally contacted. This ensured that those who eventually participate in the
study are not known to the participant(s) who recommended them.
Data Analysis Plan
To enable me to answer this study’s research questions, a data analysis plan was
prepared. As pointed out by Smith and Firth (2011), data analysis is not an event, it is an iterative
process which ceases when the researcher is satisfied that there is coherence emerging from
analyzing the data collected.
Research Questions
This qualitative study has three research questions. They are:
RQ1: What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system
between 2011 and 2017?
RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?
RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?
RQ3: How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the system’s
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?
RQ.3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be
improved?
Description of the Approach that Fits the Plan
The framework approach is the approach that is compatible with the data analysis
approach that I used for this study. Sutton and Austin (2015) asserted that in operationalizing the
framework approach to data analysis, the following steps must be observed. First, the data
collection interviews should be transcribed, then coded (La Pelle, 2004). According to La Pelle
(2004), coded for the framework approach can be done either manual or with the aid of
Qualitative Data Analysis Software. The next step is to review the formulated codes having an
eye on the research questions to ensure coherence between the research questions and the codes.
I used NVivo 12 coding software to code the transcripts. La Pelle (2004) stated that in addition to
reviewing to ensure alignment between the research questions and the codes, the researcher is
also required to review the codes to ascertain if there are errors and correct them. An important
step for a researcher using the framework approach is to conduct a credibility test of the
formulated codes. This is done by submitting the formulated codes and the transcripts to a
debriefer for review (Sutton & Austin, 2015). The debriefer’s task is to determine the extent to
which the codes formulated by the researcher are in harmony with the views of interviewees
(Sutton & Austin, 2015). In keeping with this, I submitted the transcripts and the codes to a
friend who holds a doctorate degree for review. He provided very useful feedback which I took
onboard.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness, in qualitative research, is a concept that describes the processes that are
engaged in to ascertain the rigor that a particular study has been subjected to by the researcher(s)
(Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Shenton (2004) informed readers that the test of trustworthiness is
passed when a qualitative research is found to be confirmable, transferable and credible.
Transferability. Transferability, as an element of trustworthiness, refers to the extent to
which a qualitative research’s finding is applicable to other contexts (Shenton, 2004). To
enhance the chances that my finding in this study meets the transferability criteria, peer reviewed
articles selected mostly from postconflict countries were used for this study. This influenced the
study’s research questions and my interview guide/questions.
Dependability. Dependability evaluates the extent to which another qualitative
researcher who elects to research into the phenomenon of interest of this study, within the same
research site and with the same participants, is likely to arrive at findings similar to what I
arrived at (Shenton, 2004). The objective of ensuring that a study passes this test, is to make it
possible for other qualitative researchers to employ the same research processes that I used in
this study (Shenton, 2004). To increase the possibilities of a particular study meeting the
dependability criteria, the researcher must document each of the processes that were undertaken
during the research (Shenton, 2004). To increase the chances of this study meeting the
dependability test, I accurately captured, in this study’s references section, the citations of all
reports, peer reviewed articles and other sources of information that I consulted for this research.
Also, the entire research process, including details of the data collection process and analysis as
well as coding, has been set out in detail.
Confirmability. Confirmability is the third test that every qualitative research is required
to pass. To ascertain if this test has been passed or failed, those reviewing this study’s research
report seek to find evidence that conclusively suggests that my findings emerged from the data
collected and that that the findings are not a product of my idiosyncrasies (Shenton, 2004).
Submitting the codes generated from the interview transcripts and the steps taken to ensure
dependability, especially providing citations of the peer reviewed articles used for this study,
were all geared towards making this study meet the confirmability test.
Credibility. Lincoln and Guba (1985), in defining credibility, described it as a process in
which the extent to which the findings of a qualitative study can be positively linked to the
phenomenon of interest as lived through the experiences of participants (Shenton, 2004). To
meet the credibility test, in the data analysis chapter of this dissertation, I ensured that relevant
quotations/statements made by participants were lifted from the transcripts and incorporated into
the chapter. Additionally, I gave the codes and transcripts to a peer debriefer to ascertain the
extent to which the codes reflected participants' views. The fact that different methods were used
to collect data also contributed to strengthening my claims that this research report is credible
(Shenton, 2004). Finally, Anney (2014) recommended that member checking contributes to a
study meeting the credibility requirement. As previously noted, I engaged in member checking
during data collection and analysis for this study.
Summary
In this chapter, I restated the objectives of this qualitative study, the research questions
that will guide this study and identified the grounded theory approach as the approach that will
be used for this study. My role as a researcher, particularly my relationship with the potential
participants was also highlighted. My possible biases and ethical issues that may arise during this
study and how they will be managed were also identified. Also, the sampling size and strategy
were highlighted, and justification provided for the choice. The criteria for selecting participants
and how participants will be recruited as well as how interviews will be conducted and recorded,
were also set out in this chapter. Further, the plan to analyze the data collected was laid out.
Finally, the processes to ensure that this study’s findings pass the trustworthiness test were laid
out. The next Chapter presents the data collected from participants.
Chapter 4: Data Collection and Analysis
“I don’t think anyone who’s been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018 could
doubt the progress made, in terms of the functionality of the justice system … by and
large the police are able to respond, not the way that will be expected for them …, but …
there is a better perception of the security that the police can provide”.
Participant 024
Introduction
In this qualitative grounded theory case study, I investigated efforts to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017. Insights shared by participants on what
approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, the extent to which
context specific interventions were designed and implemented to make Liberia’s criminal justice
system accessible, how decentralization has affected the system’s functionality and Liberia’s
peace and stability as well as what can be done to ensure locally owned processes to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system are presented in this chapter.
An interview guide of 26 questions aided me in gathering the view of participants to
answer the following research questions on this study’s phenomenon of interest: RQ1:
What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011
and 2017?
RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?
RQ2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?
RQ3: How decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system has affected the system’s
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?
RQ3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be
improved?
In this chapter, I describe the research setting, the participants, the data collection and
analysis processes, and provide evidence of trustworthiness in this study. Following this, the
results of this study are presented by highlighting the themes and the subthemes emerging from
the data collected. Quotations from statements made by participants in the interviews are
reproduced to support the themes and subthemes. A summary of this chapter is provided before
proceeding to the final chapter of this dissertation.
Research Setting
As earlier stated, the theoretical sampling approach was used to identify 30 information
rich participants for this study. With this sampling strategy, the theory that emerges from the
iterative process of data analysis enables the researcher to answer the research question
(Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). I drew participants from persons who worked in Liberia’s
criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017, civil society organizations, and from Liberia’s
international partners who were involved in reforming the criminal justice system during the
same period.
Demographics of Participants
As previously noted, 30 information-rich participants were interviewed for this study. Of
this number, 6 were female and 24 were male. Of the 30 interviewees, 22 were Liberians and 8
(i.e., 2 female and 6 male participants) were foreigners. All the participants were actively
involved in efforts to make the criminal justice system accessible. Participants were at least 25
years old, involved in policy making and implementation to reform Liberia’s criminal justice
system, professionals in the criminal justice system and/or civil society advocates of
decentralization of criminal justice services. Table 1 presents the demographics of this study’s
participants.
Table 1
Demographics of Participants
Gender Foreigners Liberians
Males 6 18
Females 2 4
Total (N=30) 8 22
Data Collection
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the procedure that was
used to collect data for this research. The approval number is 04-04-190668917. Informed
consent was secured from each participant ahead of collecting data from them. Because this
study was qualitative and used the grounded theory approach, the theoretical sampling approach
was used to recruit participants. As previously noted, the theoretical sampling is a tenet of
traditional grounded theory research (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). Through an iterative process,
it is used to develop theory that is grounded in the data collected.
Initially, I identified 5 information rich participants based on my knowledge of the
research site. These participants were contacted via email and invited them to participate in the
study. A consent form was attached to the email with a request to the potential participants to
indicate their consent. After their consent was secured, face to face interviews with them were
scheduled. I recorded the interviews and had them transcribed and then I coded them. My
knowledge of the research site, suggestions from these participants and the ensuing gaps in the
data collected informed my recruitment of the remaining 25 participants. The 25 participants
received emails from me in which I informed them about this research and sought their consent
to participate. After procuring their consent, we agreed on dates, locations, and times for the
interviews. Twenty eight interviews, including the initial 5 interviews were conducted in person
and/or with the aid of technology (i.e., via telephone/WhatsApp calls). All interviews were
recorded. Two participants opted to provide written answers rather than being interviewed.
Walden University’s Institutional Review Board approved collecting data from these 2
participants. I spent 5 days at the research site during which 16 participants were interviewed.
Unique numeric codes were assigned to each participate to protect their identity and the codes
saved electronically and protected with a password. Participants were interviewed from/in
various locations across the globe including Australia, Ghana, Italy, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Almost all participants
answered all the interview questions which were tailored to suit each participant. There posed
follow up question(s)/interviews in 3 cases to seek clarification. I made notes during the
interview and this assisted me in data collection and analysis. Interviews lasted between 40
minutes and 2 hours. Transcriptions of the interviews run into 400 pages.
Data Analysis
Data analysis is an iterative process that ceases when the researcher is satisfied that there
is coherence in the theory emerging from analyzing the data collected (Smith & Firth, 2011). A
commercial entity was contracted to transcribe the interviews. I reviewed each of the transcripts
against the corresponding audio recording to ensure they accurately reflected participants’ views.
Transcribing, data collection and coding continued simultaneously, with the themes emerging
from the coding exercise determining the data I collected (i.e., the profile/perspectives of the
participant recruited).
The framework approach was used to analyze this study’s data. According to Sutton and
Austin (2015), when using the framework approach for data analysis, interviews must be
transcribed. A Qualitative Data Analysis Software (i.e., in vivo 12.0) aided me to code the data.
After coding the interviews/transcripts, the formulated codes were reviewed to ensure coherence
with the research questions and to identify errors and correct them where they existed (La Pelle,
2004).
Evidence of Trustworthiness
In qualitative research, trustworthiness describes the processes used to ascertain the rigor
that a researcher subjects a study to (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). A qualitative study passes this test if
it is found to be confirmable, transferable and credible. As noted earlier, the following steps were
taken to ensure that my findings are trustworthy.
Credibility
Lincoln and Guba (1985) indicated that, to prove credibility, the findings of a qualitative
study must be positively linked to the phenomenon of interest as experienced by the participants
(Shenton, 2004). Direct quotes from the transcripts of my interviews with participants have been
provided in this chapter to confirm the credibility of my findings. Additionally, a peer debriefer
reviewed the codes and transcripts to determine if they emanated from the views expressed by
participants. Thirdly, the quotations reproduced in this chapter evidence recurring themes and
trends shared by different participants on the same issues and this affirms this study’s credibility.
Member checking was also employed to meet the credibility requirement (Anney, 2014).
Confirmability
All conclusions arrived at in this study are supported by direct quotations from
participants to ensure that this study’s findings are confirmable. The link between the
conclusions and the supporting quotes were verified and confirmed by the debriefer. In addition
to this, the citations of all peer reviewed journal articles used for this study are provided.
Dependability
Every process engaged in during this study is documented in this report. This is to ensure
that the findings of this study meets the dependability criteria. In this regard, the citations of
reports, peer reviewed articles and other sources of information consulted for this research are
accurately captured in the references section of this study. An accurate description of how data
was collected, analyzed and coded for this study is also laid out. With all these, any person who
decides to conduct a qualitative study on the same phenomenon of interest, in the same research
site, using the same participants, will arrive at my findings in this study.
Transferability
In qualitative research, the transferability test seeks to prove the extent to which the
researcher’s findings are applicable to similar contexts (Shenton, 2004). I investigated local
ownership of efforts to make the criminal justice system accessible in a conflict affected setting
(i.e., Liberia) and how this has influenced the criminal justice system’s functionality and
Liberia’s peace and security. The processes engaged in while conducting this study have met this
criterion by using/consulting peer reviewed articles on postconflict countries. Also, this study’s
research questions, the theoretical frameworks and the interview questions were formulated
based on insights from the literature reviewed for this study. These were all geared towards
ensuring that this study’s findings are valid in similar settings.
Presentation of Findings
Several codes and categories emerged during the process of analyzing the data collected.
After examing the codes and categories 7 themes and 25 subthemes were generated. For ease of
reference, all the themes, subthemes and their corresponding Research Question (RQ) are
identified below, before presenting participants views in support of each theme and subtheme.
RQ1: What approaches were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011
and 2017?
Theme One: Forging partnerships, law, policy infrastructure and institutional reform and
development.
Subthemes
●Partnerships
●Law and policy development and reform
●Infrastructural development
●Institutional reform and development.
RQ2: How nationally owned and inclusive was the decentralization process of Liberia’s criminal
justice system?
Theme One: Decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system somewhat nationally owned
and inclusive.
Subthemes:
●Actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.
●Reasons for involving nonstate actors in the Decentralization.
●Decentralization was elite driven local population rarely consulted.
●Decentralization process was elite driven as ordinary citizens and local
communities seldom consulted.
●Some consideration given to the Liberian context.
●No consideration given to the Liberian context; foreigners drove it
●Decentralization process was nationally driven.
Theme Two: Combination of homogenous and non-homogenous approach adopted to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Subthemes:
●Decentralization process was a combination of context specific interventions
and externally driven.
●Interventions to decentralize were a hybrid i.e. national and internationally
driven efforts.
RQ 2.1: How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive processes to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?
Theme One: International actors supporting processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice
system must understand Liberia, design and implement interventions specific to the Liberian
context and be patient.
Subthemes:
●Foreign/international actors were knowledgeable about Liberia and its
criminal justice system.
●Foreign/international actors were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its
criminal justice system.
●Foreign/international actors were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and
its criminal justice system.
●Design and implement Liberia-specific interventions.
RQ 3: How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the system’s
functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?
Theme one: Traditional Justice System was the Primary Source of Justice for Majority of
Liberians Particularly in Rural Communities
Subtheme:
●Prior to Liberia’s civil war, criminal justice services were available to few
inhabitants mostly in Monrovia and the county capitals.
Theme two: Decentralization has made the Criminal Justice System Manifest Very Basic Signs
of Functionality and contributed to Liberia’s Peace and Stability
●Criminal justice system has inadequate capacity and is yet to be functional.
●Decentralization has made the criminal justice system functional.
●Criminal justice chain working together.
●Criminal justice chain not working and/or partially working together.
●Decentralization has contributed to peace and stability.
●Decentralization is helping to address root causes of Liberia’s civil war.
RQ 3.1: How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be improved?
Theme One: Develop criminal justice institutions and change the approach to making the system
accessible.
Subthemes
●Institutional reform and development.
●Change in attitude and approach required.
After highlighting all the themes and subthemes gathered from the data collected to
answer each research/sub question, I now present the views participants shared in support of each
theme and subtheme. In the rest of this chapter, for ease of reference, each of the Research
Questions and sub questions will be chronologically reproduced and in every case, followed by a
Table and/or Figure presenting or depicting the findings/themes/subthemes then, the detailed
views expressed by participants in support of the respective themes and subthemes will be set
out.
Research Question 1: What Approaches Were Used to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal
Justice System between 2011 and 2017?
As earlier noted, for ease of reference and presentation of the findings emerging from
data collected to answer Research Question 1, Table 2 presents, and Figure 1 depicts, the
approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system and the number of responses in
support of each of the approaches.
Table 2
Approaches To Decentralize Criminal Justice Services In Liberia.
Findings Number of
responses (n)
Responses in
percentages (%)
Institutional reform and development 24 52
Infrastructure development, including creation of justice and
security hubs
10 22
Forging partnerships 7 15
Law and policy development and reform 5 11
Total responses (N) 46 100
Figure 1. Approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system Themes
Theme One: Forging Partnerships, Law, Policy, Infrastructural and Institutional Reform
52
22
15 11
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Institutional reform and
development
Infrastructure development
(Creation of Justice and
Security Hubs)
Forging partnerships (Law
and policy development and
reform)
Law and policy development
and reform
%
and Development
This theme emerged from coding answers to the research question: “What approaches
were used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?” “Forging
partnerships, law, policy, infrastructural and institutional reform and development” is the theme
that emerged. This theme means that, during the period under review, efforts to make Liberia’s
criminal justice system accessible created partnerships, reformed legislation and policy,
improved infrastructure and developed the capacity of criminal justice system institutions. Now,
I will proceed to isolate each part of this theme in a subtheme and present participants’
perspectives in support of both the theme and subtheme.
Subthemes
The following subthemes emerged from the theme under consideration:
Subtheme One: Partnerships
There were several actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system and
these actors forged partnerships to make criminal justice services accessible. I will identify the
actors involved later on in this chapter. Participants shared the following views in support of this
subtheme:
According to Participant 006, “… in all we were looking at a partnered approach and
strengthening the criminal justice system. … they certainly saw the benefits of working
together”. Participants highlighted the roles played by private and public institutions to make
Liberia’s criminal justice system assessable. Some of these institutions are not classical criminal
justice institutions but have mandates that require them to work with classical criminal justice
institutions. To some extent these arrangements are akin to Third Party Policing and this
contributes to making the criminal justice system accessible (Mazerolle, 2014). For instance,
there is an arrangement between the Government of Liberia and the private sector, especially
large multinational companies, where these companies have their own private security
arrangements, including policing in the geographical area where they operate. In this regard,
Participant 010 stated that:
Prior to recent years, there were no private security companies. There were
concession agreements to have private security in certain areas. And I recall that
LAMCO had a private security company that was even armed and trained by the
National Police Academy. That assisted, to a very large extent, the community in
that particular location/county. That helped the criminal justice system to a large
extent. In those places where you could not have the police, the private security
companies provided security. But they had to coordinate with the national security
institutions like the police who would have them processed in those areas. But
they were not prosecuting themselves. As the population grew, the ratio of the
police to the population could not match. And so, we encouraged people to open
private security companies. But of course, with strict orders, rules and regulations
through the national police, to be trained by professional security officers.
Participant 012 said the following on using private security companies to support the criminal
justice system:
They are an extension of the criminal justice system. … they have defined parameters;
they do access control. … to control access to the parameters they are providing
security, where the police will not be able to function. So, for me, it is important that
we collaborate because they provide private law enforcement services.
Partnership between the Liberia National Police and individual members of the community was
also identified by participants. They referred to this as community policing initiatives. According
to Participant 006:
... so, protecting life and property is the primacy of policing. … We have seen
issues of people taking justice into their own hands, or people just looking to the
traditional justice system to get some quicker solutions. So, in community
policing … we worked very passionately; successfully negotiating and helping
them devise a community policing strategy and a community policing plan
which was owned centrally by the State. We also, as part of our community
capacity building and development mandate, looked to try to equip people at the
headquarters and the local level, … to use the community to be part of the crime
solution. In order to up the security transition, it was important that all the
security agencies in Liberia would invest in community policing, and to
strengthen the partnership between the community and the police; building a
trusting confidence, and hopefully, looking to transcend that into the criminal
justice system.
Participant 010 also indicated that, “… we had the Community Watch team, which was
established in Monrovia as a pilot program, and when it became very successful, we decided to
take it to the counties." This Participant further stated that:
The Community Watch Forum was there to assist the citizens, in educating the citizens
about the law. So, this was a police project as it relates to law enforcement. Because it
was difficult to enforce these things because of the level of education in the various
counties. So, we developed these Watch Teams to work along with the community. It
was the same as community policing. In fact, after a while, the watch teams became the
community policing.
To a lesser degree, participants noted that partnerships were established with integrity institutions
like the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), the General Auditing Commission
(GAC) and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR), and the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU).
Participant 013 said the following on collaboration between the criminal justice system and the
LACC:
In a sense, yes there was collaboration. But the way they operate, mostly except where
the issues that arise has some national significance. Then maybe the LACC acts. But
mostly they looked at the following issues that have to do with integrity
…
This participant also stated that “the people who use the LACC are mostly the Government.
There has been collaboration … between the LACC, the police and other government
institutions”.
Partnerships were also established with women and the traditional system in the community to
resolve disputes. This is captured by Participant 019 who notes that:
The Women Peace Hut is using the traditional system to resolve conflict. So, they
were established in parts of Liberia. In terms of decentralization, they reached
down to the innermost parts of these counties. So, in these counties they had the
chairman and leaders of these groups there. They established a structure for them
when they met from time to time. Just in case of any conflict, these women brought
issues to light. So, for example, Sexual and Gender Based Violence …; part of their
work has been to help to notify the police about these issues. And for most parts of
the country they speak to the Town Chief.
Participant 029 identified efforts to educate the population about the criminal justice system as
one approach adopted to make the system accessible. In the words of this Participant: Another
thing we were doing was awareness raising, I think, especially from the justice end in terms
of increasing people’s awareness of justice services so that people can access the justice
system. Because there is very little information in terms of the activities and services that are
there. So that awareness is also increasing the demand of the judicial services.
Participant 023 shared this view, according to this Participant; “… so what we are doing as an
organization is first to create awareness that there is justice and that the justice should be for all.”
Subtheme Two: Law and Policy Development and Reform
Law and policy development and reform is another subtheme of the theme under
consideration. Under this approach, amendments and/or enactment of policies and pieces of
legislation were undertaken to make the criminal justice system accessible. According to
participants, issues addressed through law and policy reform included legal aid and recruiting
Public Defenders to provide legal services to indigent members of the community. Participant
016 noted that “... moves were made by the Judiciary where they began to recruit law school
graduates as Public Defenders and deployed in the counties.” Additionally, Participant 009 stated
that:
Before the concept of the regional hubs were established, Liberia had one Public
Defender … assigned to each county outside of Monrovia, which made the
processing of cases absolutely impossible and a backlog that was impossible to deal with.
But with the institution of the hubs, we then had the idea where we could increase the
number of Public Defenders in the counties where the hubs were established to improve
access to justice for those people in those areas. Participant 011 affirmed this by stating
that “… one specific service was the public defense system; to the extent that you had
Public Defenders in all of the counties.”
Demand for the services of Public Defenders exceeded the resources available. A legal aid policy
and legislation was required to address this. However, efforts in this regard proved to be a
challenge. This is evidenced by the following statement made by Participant 016: The legal aid is
still something that we are grappling with. We don’t have a fully functioning legal aid regime.
With the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Ministry of Justice, we
drafted a legal aid policy; up till now, they are still trying to validate it.
Participant 016 also stated that:
The services of paralegals and a variety of legal aid schemes have been used in
Liberia. However, this has proved to be a huge challenge as some lawyers and
judges have resisted introducing paralegals to create access to Liberia’s criminal
justice system. … we have a lot of institutions in Liberia providing legal aid
services and there have been challenges. We have had some Presidents from the
Bar Association who have accepted the work of paralegals; some have not
accepted it. Some people feel that these are people that are going to take jobs
away from lawyers.
Despite this, this Participant noted that “… there are a lot of institutions who have been engaged
in paralegal activities, but we want to standardize it. For instance, some civil society
organizations have collaborated and appointed Community Legal Advisors outside the capital.”
This Participant further noted that:
The Carter Center has worked with the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
and they have paralegals which they call Community Justice Advisors. What they
do is that they go into the field and they create awareness on several law issues.
For example, they will take the law on rape to the marketplaces and towns in the
communities. And when you create awareness then people will begin to bring
issues. So, when they bring the issues, some of the Community Justice Advisors
are able to handle them through mediation. So, they conduct mediatory services.
Where they are unable, they will forward it for Pro Bono services; an
arrangement with the Bar where they do Pro Bono services.
As previously noted, legislation was enacted to deal with several issues within the criminal
justice system. Participant 008 noted:
There were laws made … to address some of the immediate challenges that we
were having; either dealing with cases of rape, domestic violence … a
considerable amount of work had been done to decentralize the police in terms of
reforming the law itself. A new Act was passed, the Immigration Act was also
amended in that process; a new Act was passed to address the issue of drugs. The
Drug Enforcement Agency was created to deal with that.
This Participant also states that:
... we worked on the Acts … The same way with the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization; we changed the name to a service so that the impressions will be
created that these institutions are not colonial institutions … but, they are to
serve the population.
Participant 013 also mentioned “a New Police Act, Immigration Act, the National Security
Reform and Intelligence Act, a new Drug Enforcement Agency Law” as examples of legislations
that were enacted to make the criminal justice system accessible.
Participant 009 indicated that: “… we had the jury law passed”. Participant 011, this by stating
that “… the jury management system was also decentralized.”
Subtheme Three: Infrastructure Development
Providing infrastructure for criminal justice institutions is another intervention used to
decentralize the criminal justice system. Participant 011 highlighted the improvement the
system’s infrastructure has witnessed by stating that, “… go around the country; there are
facilities in the localities.” In relation to infrastructure Participant 001 stated that: “… improving
infrastructure particularly in areas where the correction system was non-existent.” This was
supported by Participant 005 who noted, “one of the big changes was the construction of prisons
… magistrate courts across the country with Quick Impact Project funding.” Participant 003
indicated that, “… we started looking at decentralization to a point where we had to build
regional jails.” Participant 002 noted that: “Basically the attempt was to decentralize the courts,
the prisons, the police and creation of a probation and aftercare service that in my opinion was
not well thought out.” Participant 004 listed infrastructure support provided to make criminal
justice services accessible: “an office, a telephone, transport and in a few cases even
accommodation.” Police stations were built primarily in the county capitals. This is evident from
Participant 012, who noted that “… police stations were built in the counties; thus, there has been
infrastructure in the counties. But primarily in the county capitals.” Participant 005 noted that: It
seemed to be in the end infrastructure based, but my personal viewpoint will be that in part, this
happened because of extreme resistance of the Judiciary and the legal professionals more
generally to any form of real substantive reform during the period. The general view of the
Judiciary was that there was no need for reforms.
To improve the criminal justice system’s infrastructure, Participant 006 stated that:
“… there was the use of Quick Impact Project funds through the United Nations
Mission in Liberia. … these were projects designed to cost between $25,000 and
below depending on the nature of specific projects. It may go as far as $50,000.
Now, these projects were designed to have quick impact in areas of need and …
the rule of law sector was a priority. And so that looked at the creation of police
stations, for instance across counties where there was an absence …. We also saw
some court buildings being built; there were also vehicles purchased; so, there
was a range of either building institutional capacity in some aspects or looking
into equipping resources of the criminal justice system not only in the capital but
also, beyond the capital.
Participant 024 shared this view and indicated that:
… there were, through different programs for infrastructure: quite a number of Quick
Impact Projects with the UN mission which was relatively small amounts of funding
being utilized but also through other donors; and also, some government support but very
few or very small amounts. In terms of infrastructure with police stations, courthouses,
prisons or correctional facilities and so on.
Participant 029 also identified that several buildings have been constructed for criminal justice
institutions. According to this Participant “… besides the hub approach, the government has been
constructing courts in some of the counties, police stations in some of the counties, prison
facilities also in some of the counties.”
Participant 013 appeared to downplay how much improvement has been done to criminal
justice system infrastructure, despite the impression given by some participants that
infrastructure development received a lot of attention. This Participant said that “one or
two infrastructures; few magisterial courts being built. Few correctional institutions
upgraded and updated; few police stations being built.”
Subtheme Four: Institutional Reform and Development
Institutional reform and development is the fourth subtheme under the theme being
discussed. Several interventions were undertaken to develop Liberia’s criminal justice
institutions. Human resource development (i.e., training/capacity building) is one such
intervention. According to Participant 001 “capacity building was undertaken for the systems to
become functional.” Participant 003 highlighted training as one of the actions taken to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. According to this Participant, “training was an
approach to develop criminal justice institutions.” This is supported by Participant 004 who
noted “training of judges, training of lay persons as magistrates, … training of police officers, the
training of correction officers, …” In the same vein, Participant 013 stated that “the Judicial
Training Institute is also training magistrates that is also helping to increase the number of
judges, magistrates and defense attorneys.” Participant 014 indicated that “there has been police
training, which was done between 2005/2011 ... The law school is training more lawyers.”
Another approach emerging from the data is recruiting qualified personnel to work in criminal
justice institutions. According to Participant 016:
… within that period, they were recruiting a lot of qualified lawyers to enter the
justice system. All the County Attorneys in the country except for the County of
Montserrado were non law school graduates while the law required that you
needed to be a law graduate before you can practice law in Liberia. So, there was
a move to replace most of the unqualified people to bring in trained lawyers and
we organized a lot of training on a quarterly basis.
Participant 008 supports this assertion by stating that “… the problem within these kinds of
institutions is staffing. So, we had to go in and look at appointments, the issue of tenure …”
According to Participant 012, “… there was a reinforcement of officers; men and women in the
service to beef up support to the officers in the respective counties.” Participant 024 stated that
“… UN funding was used to hire … Liberian lawyers as prosecutors and defense counsel and
they were deployed out to the counties. Subsequently, funding was secured for that in a more
permanent way” Participant 004 noted that there was a “physical presence of men and women
trained according to international standards as police officers.” Participant 018 mentioned
“Deployment of County Attorneys.” Participant 029 stated that:
So, the Liberia National Police … they are decentralized. We have the
immigration service, security and management also decentralized, prison
rehabilitation is decentralized, of course not fully, but we have them across the
counties. The Judiciary, of course we have the courts so that people will be able
to report and look at their cases; there were magisterial courts and circuit courts
across the different areas.
Participant 020 stated that there “have been more prosecutors out there.”
Participant 024 asserted that:
There was a large-scale recruitment of the police from the very beginning … the
police were ... recruited from scratch pretty much. And so … more and more
police officers were recruited and sent out to the counties …. Same as prison
officers; there were specific programs to recruit and train and deploy them and
that was quite successful overall.
Participants identified the creation of new criminal justice offices/institutions within the criminal
justice system as another category of interventions to decentralize the criminal justice system. In
this regard, Participant 013 stated that “I think for the police, we have the Women and Children
Protection Section which has been decentralized. We also have the Professional Standards
Division for complaints which has been also decentralized.” Participant 009 stated that:
The Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit for example now works with the
Criminal Court E to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence everywhere. Now, before
the war, it was mostly done in magisterial courts. … Because of the new law now, you
have the SGBV Crimes Unit, which is not only in Monrovia. Now we have one in Nimbi
County.
Participant 015 identified “restructuring of the security apparatus”. Participant 004 stated that
“every county in Liberia had to have a functioning police system.”
According to Participant 006:
One of the other strategies was to have a localized approach to improving
responses and information exchange around what was happening. So, the County
and District Security Councils were established. … We set in place
representatives of typically the security agencies, which also had representatives
from the broader criminal justice system coming together and … trying to have a
better understanding of what the crime and security in the counties were like;
trends that were recurring and perhaps looking at what best responses were
required…, advocate or a sharing of different approaches. That will then cascade
down to the county level and then once again making sure that the local actors
got together with those that were in the position to make a difference.
Exchanging interaction, and looking at problem solving approaches, … to know
what the crime and security situation at the county level. And once again using
that to lobby through their own administrators, back to ministers or back to the
President to give the necessary support; whether there will be funding or
otherwise to address what was community concerns.
Participant 007 stated that “… the County and District Security Councils were set up … to get
the local people involved.” Participant 008 supported this assertion and stated that: The
statutory system itself did not really involve the natives. In other words, the judge goes there,
sits behind his desk waiting for a case to come before them. They did not link the criminal
justice system to the whole concept of establishing peace and stability in the various political
subdivisions in a harmonious way. But the whole idea is that, if you get people involved, that
could support the system, then not only will it create that comfort in their minds and that they
are part and parcel of the system; but it will also aid in terms of investigations and reporting
of
crimes. So those were the ideas for the integration of County and District Security
Councils ... to see how they could provide support to the system itself. … They
could not sit to investigate and find someone guilty and sentence them. There
were levels, they could play at their own communities so that the information
flow can then help move the system through the statutory mechanism ….
Participant 010 also mentioned the County Security Councils and the objectives for establishing
them. According to this Participant:
The County Security Council came in later. ... we had what we call ‘the Joint
Security Council’, which functioned in Monrovia. So, the Minister of Justice said,
we cannot function as a Joint Security Council only in Monrovia. So, let’s have it
extended to the county level. And so, we tried to establish that. It worked a little
bit but just in a few counties that were nearby. But most of the counties that were
very far and were not accessible did not enjoy the benefit of the operations of the
County Security Council administration.
Participant 011 also mentioned the County Security Councils and stated that: The
establishment of the County and District Security Councils came out of
consultations. That was part of the efforts aimed at inclusiveness. One issue that
was raised by the locals was that they wanted to have a say in the governance of
the security sector …. in fulfilment of what was required, the government put in
place a council. Those councils were meant to bring on board locals from
different sectors from the counties to be able to contribute to the provision and
management of security services delivered.
This Participant further states that “… it was mandatory that they had to come together on a
regular basis, that is, local government operatives or officials, the Paramount Chiefs, the clans,
District Commissioners … sitting with the heads of security in those counties to discuss.”
According to Participant 013:
… the National Security Reform and Intelligence Act … talked about creating
County and District Security Councils. … . When there are issues and the Council
meets, and a justice institution is supposed to take that up, they are then mandated
by those County Security Councils to act. For example, if it is a correction issue,
overcrowding of the correctional facilities, the issue is brought up …
Participant 013 also stated that the County and District Security Councils are serving as dispute
resolutions and early warning mechanisms:
… the feedback that we are getting is that that initiative is well placed. Because
disputes that have created frictions in past years are being resolved as a result of
the County and District Security Councils bringing the people together. And areas
where the conflict will erupt … and create insecurity, they are able to resolve it.
Participant 030 indicated that:
Complaint mechanisms are established in the justice system where aggrieved
persons can complain against judges and police and the complaint is forwarded to
Monrovia in the case of a judge. In the case of a police officer, the complaint is
forwarded to the Professional Standard Board of the Liberia National Police in the
regional headquarters for investigation and appropriate recommendations to the
Liberia National Police Headquarters in Monrovia.
Justice and Security Hubs Project
The Justice and Security Hubs project is one intervention that all participants mentioned
in one way or another. This intervention cuts across infrastructure and institutional development.
According to Participant 024:
… the Justice and Security Hubs project was an initiative from a Joint Program
which started in 2011, coming out of Liberia’s Priority Peace Building Plan which
was putting a focus on decentralization of services or provision of services at the
local level. And a large degree of funding, comparatively speaking, in terms of
making funds available in Liberia at that time … coming in from Peacebuilding
Fund which was put specifically to support decentralization in terms of criminal
justice … in addition to the various actors and infrastructure it was talking about –
things like the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit which was a
centralized office working for Monrovia for a number of years initially was also
extended to … certain counties to provide some support for survivors of SGBV.
Participant 002 affirmed this by stating that:
One effort that I am aware of is the creation of hubs; where physical
infrastructures were put up to provide criminal justice services to the people and
personnel from within those areas were recruited, trained and deployed within
those hubs …
According to Participant 026, the Hub project covered the following counties: “Region 1: Bong,
Nimba and Lofa, Region 2 being: Maryland, Grand Kru and River Gee Region 3: Grand Gedeh
and Sinoe Region 4: Bomi, Grand Cape Mount and Gbarpolu and Region 5: Rivercess, Grand
Bassa and Margibi.” Participant 014 stated that:
… the significant improvement between 2011/2017 was the establishment of the
criminal justice hubs in 5 areas in the country. The hubs were supposed to be
criminal justice centers all over the country. This included the police, prosecution,
corrections …. So, the idea was to have the mobile police attached to a hub but to
oversee security in other counties that are covered by the hub.
Participant 007 stated that “the whole idea was the hub; and to build 5 different ones in 5
different counties to provide full criminal justice services just as we were doing in Monrovia”.
Participant 015 indicated that:
with respect to access to justice, of course the concept of the hub was also developed.
Where construction took place and officers were assigned to different hubs. Where they
afforded people the opportunity to bring complaints. So, it was a holistic approach that
we had over the period 2011/2017.
Participant 010, stated that:
the concept of the hub came up to help the police and the immigration to
decentralize. And when that concept came up, it was born to a very large extent
by our international partners. They were involved in the concept of the hub. The
first one was developed in Gbarnga, with the intention of building other ones in
other counties.
In the words of Participant 020:
The hubs were set up to host all the actors within the criminal justice system to
provide access to just. So, within the setting of the hubs, all of the actors were to
be right there so that we could be able to get things moving faster than how it’s
been set up over the years. It was meant to speed up law enforcement; criminal
justice services within the different regions so as to improve the delivery of those
services. The concept was a very beautiful one. The intended purposes were
excellent but there were unintended negative consequences …
According to Participant 025:
… the challenge was that Liberia was so broken after the conflict and there was
such lack of trust and conflict in the society. And further linked to that was a lack
of government presence, security institutions and governance around the country.
And I think that the idea of the hubs came up in order to make sure that there is a
presence of rule of law institutions around the country as the peacekeeping
operations eventually will wind down. To ensure that there is a government
presence, there was this idea to create 5 hubs.
Participant 021 stated that:
the justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. And
out of the 5, each hub will cater for 3 counties. As you know Liberia has 15
counties. So, the first one was the Gbarnga regional hub, and that accounts for
Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties. And the second should have been in Harper
Maryland, and the third in Zwedru and fourth and fifth Grand Gedeh and
Maryland.
According to Participant 006:
The Justice and Security Joint Program … was the agreement between the United
Nations mission and the government represented by the Chief Justice and the
Minister of Justice. And it was really geared towards decentralizing access to
justice and security in the counties. So, this was reaching beyond Monrovia that had
a presence. But this was really designed to try and make sure that those services
were extended beyond the capital. The first hub was in Gbarnga, it was designed to
look at all the elements of the criminal justice system; from policing, right through
the criminal justice system to prisons and it was done on a regional basis. But it was
set up and designed so that it would provide a decentralized service in three
counties.
According to Participant 009, in the Gbarnga hub, “… we built a courthouse; we built housing
for policing and for immigration …”. In the words of Participant 030, “The establishment of the
justice and security hub in Liberia has been the driving force behind decentralization of the
formal criminal justice system.”
I now proceed to present data collected to answer the second Research Question of this
study which is, how nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system.
Research Question 2: How Nationally Owned and Inclusive was the Process to Decentralize
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System?
For ease of reference, Table 3 presents, and Figure 2 depicts, participants' responses
indicating how nationally owned and inclusive the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system was.
Table 3
Participants’ Responses Indicating How Nationally Owned And Inclusive the Decentralize of
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System Was
Findings Number of
Responses (n)
Responses in
percentages (%)
No consideration of the Liberian context; decentralization
was foreign driven
24 28
Decentralization process hybrid local, national and
international driven
17 20
Civil society organizations and traditional leaders involved 15 17
One-size-fits-all approach adopted across Liberia to
decentralize criminal justice services/system
12 14
Non-homogenous approach adopted to decentralization 9 10
Consideration given to the Liberian context 6 7
Decentralization process was a combination of homogenous
and non-homogenous approaches
3 3
Total Responses (N) 86 100
Figure 2. Participants responses indicating how nationally owned and inclusive the
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system was.
Themes
Theme One: Decentralization of Liberia’s Criminal Justice System was Somewhat
Nationally Owned and Inclusive
Subthemes under this theme are:
Subthemes
Subtheme One: Actors Involved in Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System
Participants identified countries, international development cooperation agencies,
supranational organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations, the Government of
Liberia and its agencies as the actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.
The countries involved could be divided into Developed or Western countries and Developing
countries. In some cases, the Developed countries supported the decentralization process through
their respective international development cooperation agencies.
Countries. As previously noted, this category included both Western countries and
countries from other parts of the developed world. Australia, Germany, Ireland, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were the Western countries
identified by participants. This assertion is supported by the following statement made by
Participant 005 that “Sweden and the US were providing assistance to the criminal justice
sector.” Participant 007 stated that “… from my own experience, it was the Americans that we
got the biggest support from … Germans funded the probation; the Americans trained the
Emergency Response Unit of the Liberia National Police; the Swedish people helped with
improving our forensic capacity and helping us take people abroad to be trained as pathologists
...” China and Japan are the other Developed countries that supported the process.
International development cooperation agencies. As previously noted, participants also
pointed out that some of the Developed countries provided support through bilateral cooperation
and through their development cooperation agencies. These agencies included the United States
Aid agency (USAID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and
Irish AID.
Developing countries. A few African countries through bilateral or multilateral
arrangements supported the process of making Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible.
Participants identified Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe.
Supranational organizations. Intergovernmental and or regional organizations were
involved in decentralizing criminal justice services in Liberia. Participants mentioned the United
Nations and its agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund.
According to Participant 014:
The UN is the number one. The United Nations Mission in Liberia’s (UNMIL) Quick
Impact Project ... they were monitoring the prisons, and they were doing training; UNDP
helped the Ministry of Justice with the procedure to find out how the law can be amended
to sort of help the decongestion in the prisons.
This was corroborated by Participant 015 who, in identifying actors stated: “UNMIL, UN with
respect to capacity building, Peacebuilding Fund …UNDP …” Participants also identified
regional/intergovernmental organizations like the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). Participant 001 stated that “Yes! ECOWAS played a
major role. I understand that even before the coming in of the UN, ECOWAS played a critical
role.” Participant 005 stated that “ECOWAS concentrated on the police and training …”
Participant 007 also stated that: “Yes, ECOWAS was involved. In fact, they provided us with
funding … for the border between Liberia and Ivory Coast. … to build houses for immigration
and police because most of them were at the border sleeping on the ground.” Participant 029
listed the international actors involved in the process of making Liberia’s criminal justice system
accessible:
… basically, we have the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United States government, the
Swedish, Irish Aid, EU, ECOWAS, the British government also supports, Ghana
also provides support in different areas. … So, we had a lot of support from
Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon and Senegal so all of those countries that came from
Africa to help revitalize our security sector and to provide training for our men
and women.
Participant 002 identified “The United Nations, the Peacebuilding Fund and the national
government.”
Government of Liberia. The Government and people of Liberia were another category of
actors that participants identified. Participant 009 stated that, “… the Government of Liberia
through the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry Justice and her agencies including the Liberia
National Police (LNP), and the Judiciary”. Participant 012 noted that, “… the Legislature based
on their oversight function also provided services; making sure that the laws are adequate and
predictable” Participant 029 also stated that:
We see the Chief Justice and the Minister of Justice having regular meetings, we
have seen the government’s development plan. There is a whole lot that is dedicated in ensuring
that the services are decentralized. And it is being coordinated by the Chief Justice and Minister
of Justice along with the partners and supporters for the process …. They are ensuring that, that
same structure at the national level is duplicated at the county level, we have local authorities
sitting to ensure that the services are decentralized.
International nongovernmental organizations. Examples of international
nongovernmental organizations include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Republic Institute, The Carter Centre, the Geneva
Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), as well as faith-based organizations like
Lutheran World Service and the Catholic Relief Services. According to Participant 001, “…
international partners including ICRC, who are very good partners particularly for the corrections
sector.” Participant 024 stated that “The broader UN family international actors plus international
NGOs such as Norwegian Refugee Council was doing a lot of work in the criminal justice
system in the early days and organizations such as the American Bar Association.”
Local nongovernmental organizations. There were also local nongovernmental
organizations or civil society groups including Prison Fellowship Liberia, Foundation for
International Dignity, the Liberia National Bar Association, the Liberia National Law
Enforcement Association, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the Peace Resource
Centre, the Community Watch Forum and the Trial Judges Association involved in the
decentralization process. According to Participant 014 “… there is an organization called Prison
Watch that goes all over the country; along with the justice ministry monitoring the condition of
the prisons and so on …”
Local communities and individuals and civil society. Participant 017 identified
“Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), The Carter Centre, and Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission”. Participant 021 identified “the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission; the
Foundation for International Dignity, the Peace Resource Centre.” According to Participant
024:
I will say that Justice and Peace Commission by being active in the counties, was
monitoring and seeking to ensure that cases brought before the formal justice
system would be processed, so that people working or people living in the
counties ended up being more familiar with the system and being supported and
engaging with it. So that would be one way. I will say that … The Carter Center
educated about the justice system but also their willingness to focus outside of the
formal justice system with other actors assisted in bringing criminal justice
services although not necessarily formal services to the population of Liberia.
Participant 030 indicated that “Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission, the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) …”
Participant 029, identified the following local civil society organizations as being involved in the
decentralization process:
… we have one association called PDP I think, they are engaging in human rights
programs, NAYMOTE providing services that involves tracking of government
services and ensuring that the government delivers all those promises. We have
the Foundation for Human Rights and Development that does human rights
awareness raising across the country.
In addition to non-governmental and civil society groups, local communities and individuals
were involved in the decentralization process. According to Participant 025,
… we tried to engage the civil society organizations and local actors. We had a
number of talks and engagements with civil society organizations in Monrovia
and also, at the first hub in Gbarnga. And then we also engaged locally with the
Peace Huts and had conversations with civil society organizations in most parts of
the country on issues relating to human rights, issues relating to justice and land
issues and other things.
Participant 023 stated there “are a couple of us civil society organizations that are working not
too many.” Participant 003 stated that “... local NGOs, the traditional groups; everyone was
involved in the decentralization process.” On the involvement of local communities and
nongovernmental organizations, Participant 024 stated, “I would say yes but few and far
between.” Participant 015 also stated that “… we had them from all sectors. We had professional
institutions, we had religious groups, and cultural groups involved in the process.” Chiefs and
other traditional leaders are important actors in Liberia’s local communities. In this regard,
Participant 016 highlighted the interaction between criminal justice officials and traditional
leaders. According to this Participant, “… there are some instances where some magistrates work
with chiefs in matters that are strictly traditional. So, there is a lot of cooperation and
respectability.” Participant 027 opined that:
There have been some major interruptions and interferences in the jurisdiction of
traditional leaders and chief priests. The court doesn’t have jurisdiction to say that
this is a matter for traditional authorities, high priests. So, I cannot say
authoritatively the impact except for a few references. I can say there has been a lot
of interference.
Participant 014 also highlighted the challenges associated with the jurisdiction between the
traditional justice and the formal criminal justice. According to this Participant:
Most of the time, traditional leaders talk about their role. They want a bigger role.
They believe that much of the power has been taken away by extending the
criminal justice system. … They tend to feel that their importance is diminished
by the criminal justice system. For example, tribal courts have been used to
resolve crimes committed in the local areas. So much awareness has to be done in
terms of what their jurisdiction is in dealing with domestic issues, customary
marriages, and tradition led issues. And these are large areas. So, matters
involving secret societies, those are matters that the local traditional leaders and
chiefs can easily handle. They have been told they cannot handle the other matters
because there are rules and matters must go through due process … so that is still
a sticky area. The local leaders feel their powers are diminishing …
Participant 026 indicated that, during the implementation of the second and third justice and
security hubs, efforts were made to understand the interaction between the traditional justice
system and the criminal justice system:
I do know that at the second phase of setting up hubs 2 & 3, working to
understand the interface between the criminal justice system and the traditional
justice system was one of the activities that was done. Because at that time it
became apparent that inasmuch at the criminal justice system was working, the
traditional justice system was having a lot of impact. For example, when it
became clear that some people who were being raped preferred to have settle the
rape cases at home instead of taking it to the police, an intervention was required.
So, I think Carter Centre or one of these institutions was asked to work in that
direction to see what method they would use to harmonize the criminal justice
system and if there were any grievances that needed to be addressed.
Also, Participant 004 indicated that traditional leaders are very important stakeholders in Liberia
hence the decentralization of the criminal justice system cannot take place without their active
involvement. According to this Participant:
And then also on the cultural side, all the secret societies, you know the United
Nations tried to engage them, train them and to remove some for the obnoxious
things that they were doing like burning of people’s fingers; those cruel practices
that were in the system. So, they also played an important role. One cannot deny
that. More specifically in rural Liberia, outside Monrovia. … It was a deliberate
effort because you cannot talk of decentralization without involving them.
Because the other partners were found in Monrovia and the county capitals. But
these people were found everywhere; from the southern, western and central parts
of Liberia. If we didn’t make a deliberate policy to involve them, we weren’t
going to succeed. We weren’t going to achieve what we wanted to achieve ...
Participant 026 stressed the efforts made to involve the local community in the decentralization
process.
… we had public outreach officers on the ground who were having regular
meetings with people on the ground and informing them about their rights to
justice and security. And we also had a complaint mechanism, where the local
people were informed about their rights to justice and security. If their rights were
abused by justice and security actors, they would be able to write complaints back
to us and we were able to forward it to the Judiciary and Ministry of Justice.
Participant 020 set out some of the work that was done with the local community and how this
engagement enhanced access to the criminal justice system:
So, we had to work with the Community Watch Forum, setting up community
initiatives in all of those communities. Working closely with the district and
county setups. We worked with local NGOs, we worked with human rights
groups, in order to carry out all those other functions. One of the groups that we
did partner with was the Press Union of Liberia. I think it was quite effective
bringing them in as stakeholders. Beyond that, it depended on what we were
doing, we identified all our stakeholders. We had the local community, we had
youth groups, and we had the motorcyclist’s union, which we found to be quite
effective, even though other law enforcers may disagree, believing that they were
a distraction due to their recklessness. So, when we identified them as
stakeholders, what we did was that we had to provide training for them to see how
they could reduce the number of accidents. There were times that there would be
accidents down the road. If we didn’t have motorcyclists along that way to bring
the wounded to the hospital or bring the information to the police, we would not
get it for a very long time. So, they were a major stakeholder. And there would be
issues going on in the villages that we will not be aware of. They would bring the
information to us. We also worked with women’s groups who proved to be very
effective because whenever there was a situation regarding the women, they
represented all of the potential people who could be part of the services.
Participant 029 stated that, “to a larger extent, some consultation took place. That is why the
justice system has those working at the grass root level to do awareness raising and to be able to
address some of the critical issues at the community level.”
Participant 009 pointed out the importance of engaging with the local community and how this
had improved over time especially in the hubs project:
Because in the beginning …, we realized that outreach, engaging the community,
ensuring that they were a part of those things, was important, so we taught the
concept as it was and what we had done in Hub 1 and we carried that to hubs 2
and 3. And we met with every Tom, Dick and Harry and we hired local NGOs,
and local CSOs and had meetings with the county leadership with the traditional
leaders, and faith-based leaders. We said, ‘hey, this is what is coming’.
Subtheme Two: Reasons for involving nonstate actors in the Decentralization
Table 4 presents, and Figure 3 depicts, participants views on reasons for involving civil
society, local organizations and traditional leaders in the process of decentralizing Liberia’s
criminal justice system.
Table 4
Participants’ Views on Reasons for Involving Civil Society, Local Organizations and Traditional
Leaders In Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System
Reasons Number of Responses (n) Responses in percentages (%)
To promote national
ownership and inclusiveness
11 37
To promote public outreach
and awareness
7
23
To promote oversight and
accountability over the
criminal justice system and
the decentralization process
6 20
To provide criminal justice
services
4 13
To implement projects on
behalf of donors
1 3
To promote sustainability 1 3
Total Responses (N) 30 100
Figure 3. Participants Views On Reasons For Involving Civil Society, Local Organizations And
Traditional Leaders In The Process Of Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System
As evidenced in Table 3 presents, and Figure 2, Participants assigned several reasons for
involving non-governmental organizations and civil society groups in the decentralization
process. This is captured in the following statements that they made:
To promote oversight and accountability. According to Participant 015, “… civil
society has been involved. By raising concerns in respect of law violation, giving reminders as to
what should be done, involved in our discussion at different levels. Making contributions with
respect to how the restructuring should be done ...”
37
23 20
13
3 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Promote national
ownership and
inclusiveness
Promote public
outreach and
awareness
Promote oversight
and accountability
Provide criminal
justice services
Implement projects
on behalf of donors
Promote
sustainability
%
Participant 015 also stated that:
Because if you leave it only with the government, sometimes there is a tendency that
people will quickly forget some of the issues that they are supposed to do. And
sometimes, those who are the head of those institutions are human beings and there is a
tendency that they will forget some of the issues so civil society serves as the watchdog.
So, they come in to give reminders.
Participant 029 shared similar views:
So many reasons: first thing is to deal with accountability and oversight issues. To be
able to ensure that people have access, to ensure that there is a fair and transparent
process. So being an independent person in the society, it serves as a link between the
government and the community. And so, they have a good niche in accountability,
transparency, and so involving them is an added value to the process.
Participant 025 stated that:
… it was also a way to get actors involved and there would be checks and
balances of the presence of the police and every local institution. Because one
concern was that if you build hubs and create a strong presence of police and law
institutions then you need to have checks and balances of their presence and make
sure, that there are those who are watching and can bring issues and problems to
the knowledge of decision makers.
Participant 019 explained why civil society organizations (CSO’s) were involved, stating
that: “…, the way Liberia is … and also because of government’s bureaucracy and corruption, at
the end of the day, it seems the only option to really get to the people is really through the
CSOs.”
Participant 002 stated that “They provided the needed oversight mechanism and strengthened
national ownership”.
To provide criminal justice services. Participant 008 stated that:
I think Liberia has been blessed with a multitude of national and international
partners. At the local level, NGOs who are involved in human rights; NGOs who
are involved directly in projects; the Liberia National Bar Association, who
provided legal aid; the Justice and Peace Commission, and a few other institutions
who were there. Some were also involved in working with our partners to identify
areas of support, where they can play that role.
Participant 005 stated that “we did have NGOs being there in terms of service provision. You
have had a number of NGOs over the years in partnership with UN agencies like the UNDP
providing support in different aspects of the criminal justice system.” According to Participant
013:
For example, the Community Watch Forum, which is really helping the police in
many districts where the police are few; they are there to collect information and
pass it on to the police. … female lawyers association, who also support or assist
in terms of gender based violence, … faith based organizations, because you have
the churches all over, the traditional people all over; they were solving criminal
cases even though their powers have been drastically curtailed. They still hear and
try minor cases.
Participant 021 also stated that “… the civil society organizations, … have been involved
because there is legal aid service provided by them …” According to Participant 013, “… you
know the government cannot provide for the entire country and so civil society players are there
to support the Government's efforts.”
To promote national ownership and inclusiveness. Participant 014 stated that “… there
has always been some portion of civil society involvement. Sometimes, civil society
organizations are invited. Whenever they have a criminal justice conference, the civil society is
invited.” Participant 016 asserted that civil society organizations invited themselves to the
process because of the stake they had in it, “they (CSOs) have not been scouted for. I think that
they see a need and they try to help.” Participant 006 stated that “there were a number of charity
minded organizations that … were trying to make a difference wherever they were …”
Participant 012 stated that:
… they are playing a pivotal role in making sure that the reforms don’t just take
place in Monrovia. It has to take place where the people are; the local areas. So,
the counties, districts, and even the border towns also need to be looked at in a
critical way.
Participant 008 stated that:
If an international NGO gets a contract to deal with things like prolonged pretrial
detentions. … they get to Liberia; they don’t know the ground. They need to have
one or two renowned or known groups to work with. So, they benefit from the
process and the Liberian group that is also struggling, it is a welcoming
opportunity for them, and they will get some money in the process. So, there is a
marriage there; everyone benefits.
According to Participant 007, the population was involved in the decentralization process
because the criminal justice system belongs to them: “… the system belongs to the people. It just
doesn’t make sense for the government to want to decentralize a system and impose it on the
people. So, the idea was to get all these people involved so they could reach out to the people.”
According to Participant 009 it was for “others to come on board to take ownership of some of
these projects”. Participant 011 stated that:
One key thing was the issue of ownership. The fact that we had our local institutions and
people involved, showed the extent of ownership; it showed that they had their voice and
could make decisions and could find solutions to issues.
Participant 009 noted that “civil society organizations are invited because they represent the
ordinary people.” Participant 010 stated that:
One of the reasons is to get more institutions to participate in the decentralization
process. Because the criminal justice system should not be restricted to the implementing
institutions, and for community purposes and taking the criminal justice system to the
people, we needed the churches and the local NGOs to do this. They had direct contact
with people in these communities and districts. And initially, when the police cannot
reach in terms of crimes these organizations stepped in. If we had to investigate, we
relied on witnesses who live in the society in order to have a successful investigation. So,
it was very important to have these nonstate actors involved.
Participant 007 stated that, “… when we decided to harmonize both the formal and
informal system we consulted with the people. When we decided to have the hub in Gbarnga we
went to the people and had a dialogue with them.” Participant 013 stated that “I am sure before
the process began, there were a series of meetings both at the national level and grass root level.
So, the views of the community were brought in and absorbed in the decision-making process.”
Participant 015 confirms that members of the community were consulted in the drafting of
Liberia’s National Security Strategy. According to this Participant, “… when we were writing
out the National
Security Strategy, we decided to include the arrangement where they could participate”.
Participant 030 indicated that “To make the system work, both state and nonstate actors must
form partnerships on decentralization of the criminal justice system.”
Participant 015 also stated that the reason “is to have a wider participation, because the wider the
scope in the participation, the wider the process will become.” According to Participant 026, It
was because they were on the ground, they knew the terrain, they had physical touch with the
people on the ground and because they knew the terrain, they were able to understand the
vernacular easily so such things as raising the awareness and training were easy for them to do
as compared to program staff. So, they had that advantage as compared to the program staff who
didn’t know the terrain and could not speak the language and those kinds of things.
To promote public outreach and awareness. Participant 019 stated that “We worked
through various civil society organizations to provide awareness in about 6 counties.” Affirming
this stance, Participant 021 stated that:
When it comes to the civil society, they have been involved because there is a legal aid
service ... They give support by providing security awareness and some training to
residents in hub counties so that they could access the formal justice system rather than
going to the informal justice system. Because most often, people choose the informal
justice system because they feel that it is faster. Oftentimes, the formal justice system
takes longer, and they may not have the resources and capacity to go to court and so
forth.
Participant 009 stated that “there were civil society organizations involved in outreach especially
… Carter Centre, Prison Fellowship, and national and international NGOs.” According to
Participant 009:
… for hubs 2 and 3 which is rural Liberia, and trying to get the information out to
people, it was very important that those civil society organizations who were
already based in those areas would help. It was to ensure partnership and to
encourage them to get the citizens involved.
According to Participant 023:
… what we are doing as an organization is first to create awareness that there is justice
for all. … we are creating awareness and we try to bring the two systems together so
that there can be commonality to work together. In that way, we will be able to
decentralize the services. Because once you are bringing dialogues to the
traditionalists, in the form of customary laws and what have you - and then the formal
justice system, you tend to create a framework that both can work. And when they can
work together, that can be a way of decentralizing the services.
According to Participant 018 “… we worked more on awareness; making people aware of their
rights to enable them to exercise them and to ensure their enforcement because when you are not
aware you have these rights, exercising them will be difficult.” Participant 021 stated that “…
civil society created awareness in the different counties. So, the rate at which people are now
choosing to go to the formal justice system is gradually increasing as compared to the informal
system.” According to Participant 027:
I think the rationale was that for communication. As we know, for it to be
effective and accessible, the messenger must understand the terrain to be able to
communicate the message. And so … that was the criteria that … made it all the
more relevant to involve civil society actors in the local communities. To
implement projects on behalf of donors. Participant 008 observed that the
unwillingness of some donors to fund projects to decentralize the criminal justice
system by contributing to the Government of Liberia’s budget and/or the absence
of local capacity to implement such projects resulted in donors contracting
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement projects on
their behalf and this resulted in the involvement of NGOs in the decentralization
process:
Well, I think that in postconflict countries you … don’t have that much local
capacity on the ground, in terms of institutions that can provide some of those
services. So, if the Americans or the Europeans want to support the hub for for
instance, they must do it through institutions. And some of them want to do it
but they don’t want to give the money to the government. You see, that is
another problem. They don’t want to put that money into the national budget
so that the government can do it. No! so, they put these up for companies and
institutions to apply and the most capable people at that time based on their
criteria are the international NGOs.
Participant 030 also noted that “Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission, the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) … have by and large been
implementing partners of international partners …”
To promote sustainability. Participant 011 stated that “… by virtue of you being a part
of a process even helps to bring about some form of sustainability.” Despite this objective,
Participant 030 observed that:
Local partners such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the Foundation for
International Dignity (FIND) … who have by and large been implementing partners of
the international partners are now hindered in how much they can do because many, if
not all, of the international partners have pulled out.
Subtheme Three: Decentralization was elite driven local population rarely consulted
Despite the views held by participants about the involvement of individuals, local
communities and traditional leaders in the decentralization process, there were other participants
who held contrary views on the involvement of these segments of the Liberian community in the
decentralization process, in fact some described the process as driven by the political elite. This
is evidenced by the following statements made by participants:
Decentralization process driven by elite. The following participants held the view that
the process was elite driven: Participant 010 stated that “… the elite had the idea and the idea
was implemented in Monrovia and taken into the counties. But for it to be implemented, we had
to encourage the locals to get involved.” Participant 029 stated that “yes, it was an elite driven
approach.” Participant 014 affirmed the fact that the decentralization process was an elite driven
process:
… because letters are written to the organizations for representation at these
meetings. And most times, it is the leaders that will come. They will not take
anyone from the village or street to come. But it is the leadership or the chief …
that will come; …. So yes, it is a proxy arrangement where ordinary people are
represented by leadership.
Participant 013 agreed that the process was elite driven: “… For example, where you had the
working group, the Community Watch Forum that is in all the districts. And the locals are
represented by their leaders.” The local community’s minimal involvement in the hubs project
was also highlighted by Participant 027:
Some of the feedback we got was that they weren’t engaged with that much. The
local community had very little or no information even though the process around
building the hub was quite systematic. But it seemed more that the
decentralization of criminal justice services focused more on the hardware side of
the projects that infrastructure development and later the social communication
side.
Participant 001 indicated that literate members of the society were involved:
Some of them were involved, especially the literate members who were involved in
the decentralization, but some were not. Issues of ownership came in. Because
even the representation in terms of partisan politics was not good in some of these
areas.
On the participation of the local community and ordinary citizens in the decentralization process,
Participant 002 indicated that there was “not much involvement.”
Participant 004 lamented over the minimal involvement of the local community and the elite
nature of the process:
Sitting back, I think the local communities played an important role in the
decentralization process, but it wasn’t at a massive and higher level. When I say
massive, I mean that, say thousands and thousands of people are being involved.
It was a few hundred here and there. Mainly the leaders of the secret societies, the
leaders of healers, some of the rebel leaders who turned into local lords ... It
wasn’t massive. If you want a transformation, it should include all sectors of the
population. It should include provision of resources that will enable an impact that
you can physically see. An impact that leads to the decolonization of the mind of
the people. It wasn’t done. The content of the training was good, but it didn’t
reach as many people as it should.
Participant 018 confirmed the minimal involvement of the local population - “… the concepts are
crafted in Monrovia and we go to the counties for validation.” Participant 021 stated that:
“we forget that Monrovia is not Liberia. We need to go back to the rural areas. Yes, it
was an elite process. So, we need to go back to the rural areas. In fact, there were
different perceptions about the hub. Some thought it was a camp for the police to detain
people”.
According to Participant 023 civil society organizations were involved but have to ensure that
the Government does not see them as competitors. In this regard, the Participant stated: Well,
the government itself has their own setup and mindset about certain issues, especially those
issues that they think can promote them most. Those are the things they go after. Now, as a
civil society organization, in an attempt to buttress the effort or criticize it, they think that
you are competing with them. So, it becomes a competition. So, what do we do to get rid of
that challenge? We create dialogue; so that they see civil society as a partner not as a
competitive organization. So, in terms of a smooth ride; no, it hasn’t been a smooth ride.
Participant 002 indicated that “I would say they were not involved; they may have been invited
to some meetings just for record purposes.”
Local population not involved. Participant 010 acknowledged the need to involve the
local population and the fact that the inadequate engagement with the local population was due to
lack of funding for this purpose:
… what we wanted to do was to be able to have an outreach program to the locals to
sell the idea of the hub. But all those things needed funding. And honestly, we did
not have the locals involved much because we did not have the financial capacity to
do a total orientation.
Participant 023 blamed the international community for the level of involvement of the local
population. According to this Participant, “the international community came with funding. They
needed to showcase to their donors that the government is willing to accept the hub concept. So,
they meet behind closed doors and whatever they talked about nobody knows.” Affirming this
view, Participant 009 indicated that:
In the beginning in Gbarnga, it took us a while to get people to understand because there
was no outreach. There was construction before outreach. … there was no outreach to the
people, so the people were not excited about it and it was only because towards the end,
when we were constructing the Circuit Court, that people started to understand the
concept.
The fact that ordinary citizens were informed and not consulted is stressed by Participant 024:
I think that we put a focus on this on paper and if you read the joint program, the
narrative of that and the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan or the Priority Plan, that was the
focus; about reaching out to ordinary citizens and having them involved in the
process; the outreach side of things … that people are aware of what the system is
and how it works and so on. But I think we were always perhaps focusing on
informing citizens rather than listening to citizens.
Participant 020 affirmed the fact that the involvement of the local community was mostly to
inform them about what was being done to make the criminal justice system accessible: “… they
were well informed. They participated in workshops as to how the new system was going to
work. They were welcoming and accommodating. These were local people at the grassroots
level.” Participant 021 shared similar views. According to this Participant, the engagement with
the local community was to:
... create awareness. We were telling them what we have done not what should be
done. We have this big building here; this is what we have done; these are the
services we provide; these are the people you will meet, and this is what you
should expect from them. This is what we were telling them.
Participant 030 confirmed this, claiming that: “Prior to the establishment of the Gbarnga
Regional Justice and Security Hub, public outreach officers created awareness in the various
communities.”
Traditional leaders and by extension the traditional justice system not involved.
Participant 019 highlighted the resistance the police had for giving traditional leaders jurisdiction
in some criminal matters. This Participant observed that “when I did this work with the Women
and Children Protection Section, the first impression was, we cannot do this thing. These
traditional people are not well trained. … Because they are not trained, cases cannot be referred
to them.” According to Participant 003, traditional leaders felt that they were being dictated to as
opposed to having a say in the criminal justice system. This is captured in the statement below:
One of the things here is that, traditional authorities wanted to have a say within the
system. They didn’t like the part of the system where they were being dictated to. They
wanted to be able to resolve certain issues …
According to Participant 005 there was a recognition that the traditional justice system is an
important part of Liberia’s justice system so must be involved in the decentralization process,
however the structure of Liberia’s government resulted in a disjointed approach:
I think it should be noted that there were sound human rights concerns about some
aspects of the criminal justice systems as practiced in parts of Liberia, like Trial by
Ordeal which was practiced. But as I said, I think one of the failures in terms of a holistic
approach is the fact that the Ministry of Internal Affairs which was responsible to
traditional authorities found itself dealing with criminal justice issues which were under
the Ministry of Justice. And therefore, the legal framework that focused around
customary justice remained unreformed and unchanged.
Although the traditional justice system was used by many outside the capital, Participant 004
indicated that “it wasn’t given enough attention, and it reflected the reality of the state of Liberia;
that there is discrimination against the rest of Liberia, and everything is in favor of Monrovia.”
Participant 005 shared the view that not much attention was given to the customary justice
system because it was looked down upon by the elite:
I don’t think very much consideration was made because of the justice system. I
think partly due to the elite’s dislike of it. The impression I got frequently from
many Liberians when I spoke about the customary justice system was
embarrassment. Whether that was justified or not was another matter. But I think
the customary courts could have been used much better especially to deal with
minor crimes. They could not deal with serious crimes. I think they could have been
better used in dispute resolution.
Participant 004 described the engagement with the traditional justice system as part of the
decentralization process as one that was not sustained and elite driven:
There were several meetings held across Liberia, but the process was once more driven
from Monrovia. The process did not consider that it was a process and not an event that
you go to any of the counties and hold an event or seminar, do the training and you bring
the radio people to report it. You get one or two journalists to report it. And then we do
the reports … and add the pictures, in certain cases add the names.
Participant 008 shared the view expressed by Participant 004 about the importance of the
customary justice system and admitted that little attention was paid to the customary justice
system in the decentralization process. This Participant identified several challenges hindering
the active involvement of the traditional justice system in the decentralization process: In my
opinion, I don’t think the criminal justice system, or the extent of the customary justice
practices were a factor in the decentralization process. I think the overriding concern was
political. Firstly, in fulfilment of such obligation that each county is supposed to have XYZ
facilities. And if the government were to consider the presence of the traditional and
customary practices, it means that the the government has accepted those practices as
accurate or adequate … There is a tendency to believe that in the customary setting, you take
a particular county; most of the people belong to one tribe and therefore they all accept a
particular custom. But in that society also, because of people moving out or because of
companies and other economic activities, you now have a whole group of people
who don’t belong to that particular customary practice, who do not believe, who
do not accept that customary practice. And therefore, if the government were to
turn around and say, ‘well as far as we know, there is a traditional court in that
area and so we are satisfied with that’. Now for you to make that decision, you
have to do an assessment and this I believe has not been done. You need to assess
not only in terms of the substantive customary or traditional law that they are
trying to interpret but the procedure that they use to support those cases. And I I
think it is the Government's responsibility if you want to make a choice or decide
and say look, we don’t have adequate resources, and clearly, we cannot institute
statutory courts in all places around Liberia. So that those areas where there are
traditional courts, we let those traditional courts operate or we create a linkage
between them and maybe the statutory system, so they could be the first point of
intervention and if you are not satisfied, then you can take your appeal to the
statutory court. And that is one way of looking at it. Or to say, well look, we
need to have an assessment. How are those courts run? And so, these are the
types of assessment we need to do. I mean there are positive values, even
maintain the cohesiveness of the community themselves; people go in and come
out smiling as opposed to the statutory courts where after a hearing people
become enemies …. So, there needs to be an assessment done and then thinking
about how we can link them to the statutory system.
The inadequate attention being paid to the customary justice system has created challenges,
especially challenges relating to jurisdiction. According to Participant 027 this has resulted in a
tense relationship between the customary and statutory justice systems:
… we realized that the advancement of the criminal justice system was happening
in tension. There was a lot of tension with the traditional justice system, with the
elders of the communities. So, some of the feedback was that, some of the cases
that were brought before the court, resulted in conflict over jurisdiction.
Traditional leaders were saying no, this is a matter to be determined by the chief,
this is a matter to be determined by the high priest and this is not a matter for the
Monrovia court. … the criminal justice system is encroaching on major territory
that for a long time has been occupied by the traditional elders, by high priests
and where the customary system of the Liberian tradition has been the prerogative
or has been presumed to have the prerogative to handle the matter, matters that are
now coming under the jurisdiction of the formal justice system. So, there is a lot
of tension; a lack of understanding on the part of the traditional leaders, in terms
of where does their authority end? And where does the court begin? … That is a
major problem.
Participant 023, in admitting the tension between both systems of justice, noted: “... government,
like I said, they think that the formal justice system and customary justice system fight, so, they
prefer the formal.” Participant 017 held a contrary view on the relationship between the
customary and statutory justice systems: “I will not say it is tense. There are times they
collaborate. And that is why when normally there is a meeting where they discuss issues and
right the wrongs.” Participant 027 argued that “the fact that there are lawyers and court sittings
are held in the rural areas on a recurrent basis seem to suggest that the traditional authorities have
had very little role in the design of this very important project.” In the words of Participant 001
“in Africa, the criminal justice system is just an opened door. Where I can come to the chief in
the locality and tell him my problems and it would be solved together. That is the “Palava Hut.”
But now we are creating a wall around to jail criminals.”
Partial involvement of civil society organizations. Some participants held the view that
civil society organizations were partially involved in the decentralization process. Participant 005
stated that “civil society organizations took part in the consultation process especially if they
were very significant in their local area. Otherwise, I think that they were really on the advocacy
side and some service provision.” Participant 009 stated, with respect to the involvement of faith
based organizations, that:
No. They were not involved. The only time they probably would have been involved is
when we were doing a perception survey and we were asking everybody questions and
they would give their opinion, but they were not involved in carrying the message or in
the implementation of particular projects. And having said that, not in the security and
justice system per se, but on the other hand, when we were trying to institute the
probation and parole system, yes, we did use more traditional leaders and more
faithbased leaders because it is about the reform of the criminal; you know to ensure that
they were a part of the process.
On the involvement of the local community, Participant 008 stated that “I think the involvement
has been minimal.” Participant 006 described the engagement of the local population as “very
little.” Participant 019 indicated that “I think the local community was involved in some cases
but in many cases, they may not have been involved. And even if they were, it was in a minimal
sense.”
Reasons for an elite driven process. Participants assigned the following reasons for the
elite nature of the decentralization process. Participant 008 admits that the noninvolvement of the
local community in the decentralization process was deliberate due to the associated financial
implications:
Some of the local population including traditional leaders have roles to play but we have
been slow in recognizing those roles that they played and therefore we have not given
them that stamp or imprimatur so to speak; to say look, these are major partners, and we
need to recognize them, because that recognition will come along with financial
commitments. You cannot recognize without providing support. And so sometimes it is
deliberate.
The structure of Liberia’s Government was the reason provided by Participant 010 for the
minimal or noninvolvement of traditional authorities:
the reason why they were not active in the first place in the beginning was
because the cultural group was directly working with the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. And the Internal Affairs was not properly established at the time to be
able to carry on the function to decentralize the system in all the counties.
Subtheme Four: Some Consideration Given to the Liberian context
Participant 011 insisted that:
One thing we must understand is that there has been a number of discussions
amongst the government. Some of these approaches that were needed to be taken
did not come from the international community. It actually came from the
consultations. And I told you that the next thing was to ascertain the affordability.
So, there were times that when we found out that the things that we want to do,
probably the cost was too high, we had to adjust to make sure that what we
needed to be done was affordable and had local content.
Participant 025 stated that:
Yes, I think they were very much aware of Liberia’s history and culture. The
problem was that there is both a long-term history and culture and you have the
more recent past with the civil war. And I think the persisting problem of Liberia
was the very strong focus on Monrovia and the presence of good governance and
absence of the rule of law around the country. And of course, during the war, a lot
that was destroyed. So, I think we were very much aware of this, but that
awareness is very difficult to translate into one single conclusion because it makes
the challenge very complex. And I think this is part of a problem in a country like
Liberia coming out of a conflict … and having to deal with the peace and state
building challenges in a postconflict country … then you have the long-term
effects of history and culture, that also needs to be factored in, which makes
things very difficult. … trying to deal with all that is of course extremely
challenging.
Participant 004 asserted that: Yes, it did influence the decision. The point about influence and
implementation is the challenge. You influence the decision, you plan what you want to do, and
in the implementation process, you don’t do it with the strength of the influence.
Participant 008 stated that:
I will say to some extent, yes. The civil war in Liberia taught a lot of people a lot
of lessons. People were able to identify the shortcomings in the criminal justice
system. So, while the structure may not have changed, how those institutions
work informed the players and authorities in reforming them. Like for instance,
people always complain that the system caters more for the rich and not the
poor and that if you are a poor man and you are caught in the criminal justice
system, you will never win. So, the new decentralization said, ok, we will
create Public Defenders. That was in the law, but I never saw it materialize. So,
if you don’t have a lawyer; we provide you with Public Defense. That’s a
response to some of the shortcomings in the criminal justice system. We
expanded the jurisdiction of the magisterial courts. But there were still areas
that had no courts. The only ones were traditional courts, and these were not
rendering full justice to them. So, the new decentralization created additional
areas where magisterial courts were established and not only establishing them
but training people as magistrates. … the law says you must be a lawyer to be a
magistrate so, we decided to train people who are not lawyers to become
Associate Magistrates because in many of the areas you cannot find full
magistrates.
According to Participant 011:
There was priority given to the customary justice system. As part of our entire reform, it
was factored in and what was now being mentioned was that the customary justice
system is seen as equal, compared to the statutory justice system. And it is accepted by
all.
Participate 011 also stated:
Definitely! A committee was established after identifying and making sure that the
customary system is supportive of the system and there was a need to weed out
practices that had no connection with the formal system. The customary system …
are still dealing with minor cases …. They are still fining people. The only
remedy that is there, if you go through that system and you are not satisfied, you
can leave and come to the formal justice system.
Participant 014 stated that, “… the view was that, it was the absence of the criminal justice
system working that contributed to conflict in this country. … so yeah, it was factored in, in
order to sustain peace and stability in the country.”
Participant 029 articulated similar views:
Of course! For example, after the war, we had almost everything being damaged.
… The police stations were all destroyed so the funding that came from international
partners we took into consideration that we will rebuild those facilities. So, they made it
more specific to address specific needs of the current situation in Liberia. So those were
the things that were taken into consideration to ensure they addressed the peculiar needs.
Nonhomogenous approach to decentralization in various geographical areas.
Participants were asked if a homogenous approach was adopted to determine how the criminal
justice system/services were decentralized in the various geographical locations in Liberia. This
was to test the extent to which interventions at the macro level were influenced by conditions
specific to the context at that level. Where this was the case, it could be concluded that local
ownership principles were upheld and where this was not the case, the conclusion is that it was
driven by external influences either at the national level, by international actors or both.
Eight participants indicated that each geographical area in Liberia was seen and treated as
unique in the decentralization process. For instance, Participant 020 stated “No! I think it was not
a one size fits all thing. It was carefully thought of and all the factors were taken into
consideration.” Participant 006 indicated that “I think it certainly wasn’t homogenous.”
Participant 009 stated that:
I will agree that it was not seen as homogenous. We did look at each geographical
area and tried to look at one of the things that came, especially when we looked at
where we would be after we had implemented hub 1. When it came to the
decision where to situate hub 2 be, we had to ensure that we were looking at the
security elements of things, looking at, for example, the previous war in Liberia,
and how were these societies and communities affected? And which was affected
first? And where did the intrusion come from. So, all of those things were
considered before deciding … Hub 1 which was mostly central Liberia, was to
look at the South-East to ensure that we augment the criminal justice system in
that area especially when it comes to the police and the Bureau of Immigration,
because those are border towns. So that is one of the reasons why hub 2 being in
Maryland was so important. …. if you look at hub 2, …. We were focusing on
ensuring that we deployed officers to the towns and areas. We were focusing on
the Bureau of Immigration for protection of border security which was important.
So, providing those two services I would say were the reasons why we went into
Maryland, River Gee and Grand Kru.
Participant 010 said: “They were not treated the same …” Participant 021 noted that:
Yes. Prior to even decentralizing the whole system, they were informed by a number of
participatory assessments, engaging with the different geographical/social structures in
the counties, by that you will know some of the issues and challenges and how to craft a
way forward. So that process of information gathered informed what services that are
more needed to a particular area. In Bong county for example, you have 16 -17 services
being delivered. In the South East, which is very difficult, it is challenging because of the
road condition etc. … although the judges should be resident there, but because of the
inadequate social services there, sometimes they come to Monrovia …, So, all of that
was taken into consideration.
Participant 029 held similar views:
No, I think each part was treated as unique. So, the needs in Bong are different
from the needs in Margibi or probably in Lofa. So, it was dependent on the
individual circumstances of a specific geographical area. … And also, not only
that, beside the structures, services for example in some other counties, you will
have health services attached. In other counties, you will not have that. And so,
you have to provide those services there, again, depending on the geographical
location.
Participant 025 noted that conceptually, the hubs approach to decentralization did not adopt a
homogenous approach:
I think the idea with the hubs was that they would adjust the presence and form based
on the need to prioritize the various parts of the country. At least, if we had succeeded in doing
the hubs quickly, then it would have been possible to ... and then from the hubs, the idea was
that they will be able to move around and have access to the areas around. So, I think that it
was probably part of the efforts. Participant 002 indicated that “I would say each part was
treated as unique as advised by the historical and existing geographical boundaries.”
Elaborating further, this Participant stated that “Partly yes for example the historical
background of the location of the first hub was advised by the civil war historical happenings
and the people’s culture.”
Participant 030 also noted that:
… I believe geopolitical, ethnic and demographic factors were considered. For
example, given the size of some counties in the southeastern part of Liberia, they do
not have the same number of police officers and other criminal justice actors
assigned there as bigger and more accessible counties.
Participant 020 stated that: “… it was not a one size thing. It was carefully thought of and all the
factors were taken into consideration”. … Like for the South-Eastern region, because we could
not reach all the places, the difficulty in reaching some of these places, infrastructure difficulties,
made it impossible to have been able to build special locations, county by county. But rather the
decentralization had a regional approach.
Subtheme Five: No Consideration of Liberian Context; Foreigners drove it.
As previously noted, some participants held the view that the process to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system was driven by the international community. This is reflected in
their responses captured in following statements when asked if the process and interventions
were nationally or externally driven. Using the hub concept as an example of the context concept
divide, Participant 005 stated that:
… there was a disregard for the existing structures of local governance in Liberia.
Liberia has a very structured system which is based on counties. The hub concept
was fundamentally regional or multicounty structures. So, the initial
conceptualization was somewhat ignoring the actual reality on the ground ... So,
we had an attempt to put a square peg into a round hole; ... probably the worse
example. I am not sure whether to term it local ownership or they were just not
considering the localized system. Every county has its own systems of
administration at the local level and the United Nations to a large extent tried to
ignore this.
In the words of Participant 002, “I do not think there was any consideration given to the context
it appeared the need to meet the spending deadlines and to satisfy donor requirements prevailed
over the actual national needs.” This Participant also observed that “A very hurried
implementation with little consideration of what the people needed or how sustainable it would
be is what I saw.” According to this Participant, the decentralization process was “More external
driven with poor nationals who were very dependent and a President who wanted to leave a
legacy hence very little national ownership, if any.”
According to Participant 006:
The building blocks for the criminal justice system were not equitable. In
a lot of ways they were biased in their development because that was what was geared
towards what the United Nations brought, what the international community wants, so,
there was a range of complexities. It was never about what is best for Liberia… This is
not mini United States of America, it is a Liberia problem; let’s give it a Liberia
solution.
Participant 014 stated that:
I think it is a combination of the need for national ownership and support from the
internationals. … I think with the hub; some ideas came from abroad, yes, the hub
and the Magisterial Sitting Programme ... The Magisterial Sitting Programme for
example, initiated by the United Nations, was something that nobody knew here.
But in terms of trying to decongest the prisons... something that the Government
realized ... came from experience in Malawi or so. Someone suggested it.
Participant 018 stated that:
… the local context was not fully understood; you know, how Liberians approach
things. The sense of ownership, the international community didn’t get it. They
were just checking lists. Everybody was rushing to complete deliverables so you
look nice on the surface and that was ok.
According to Participant 020:
Law enforcement cannot be devoid from the culture. You can bring the international
best practices and look at the culture of the people and see what is quite applicable. I believe
that one of the mistakes that were made was to implement international practices without
consideration of the Liberian culture ... The traditional justice system is one that is utilized by
many ordinary Liberians. Therefore, context specific efforts to decentralize the criminal justice
system should not ignore this system of justice. However, most of the participants indicated
that efforts to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system did not factor in the prominent role
of the traditional justice system and how this could hinder or facilitate the decentralization
process. For instance, Participant 027 stated that:
I don’t think much thought was given to it. And I think it’s been overlooked … customs
and traditions … they are perceived to be less superior. And so again it was the arrogance
from Monrovia that anything out there is not written down is less superior. That has been
the way of life for the last 200 years of people out there. That is how they have lived.
These are the decisions that kept the level of social cohesion and it is these decisions that
have been passed down from generation to generation, but they are not written down.
They are customary laws that have shaped their practice, tradition and culture. … But
whatever the case is, I don’t think there was a lot of thought given to traditional leaders
and giving them if not a central role, but a significant role. Everyone needs to understand
the level of inclusion; the level of complementarity required to have a more robust
criminal justice system and a level of clear understanding on the separations of power in
the rural areas. And that the criminal justice system has to function in a way that the
traditional justice system cannot function. So, I don’t think there was a significant room
to allow that level of understanding to prevail.
Participant 009 asserted that the prominent role of the traditional justice system was inadequately
considered in the decentralization process. According to this Participant:
It was considered. But it was not considered in depth because if you look at the
terminology that was used, it was the decentralization of the criminal justice
system. So, in essence, the informal justice system does not deal with criminal
matters. So, the focus was on strengthening the criminal justice system because
people would usually go to the informal justice system to deal with simpler
matters … But another argument was made that if the formal justice system was
decentralized to the point where in each town and village, we had a police station,
a magisterial court, and all of those things, people would then have the choice to
go to the formal justice system. However, the results of that showed that people
preferred going to the traditional justice system. The reason why people go to the
traditional justice system is because it is more accessible. They are there, they are
easy. You get up in the morning and you have a problem, like someone stealing
your goat, you can go to the Town Chief … in your village. However, to go to a
police station, you must walk 5 miles. So, it is the absence we felt that the focus
was on strengthening those areas.
Participant 024 shared similar views:
… because the support given to them in Liberia was very much provider driven,
meaning that those people who were working to support the system would bring
in their own understanding and knowledge of criminal justice, not in all cases but
they largely didn’t have the knowledge of the customary justice system. And
therefore, I think there was a little more focus on the formal justice system … I
think we were looking at how can we ensure that they are working better, how can
we ensure that they’ve got equipment and facilities ... But I don’t think that we
were looking at the environment in which they were working. And because we
weren’t looking at that environment, we didn’t pay attention to the customary
justice system. And I also think that not only were we not paying enough attention
in that way, we were also somehow undermining it in other ways by saying you
shouldn’t go to the customary justice system for X, Y and Z cases/subject matter
(i.e., you should go and use the formal justice system with certain matters). Even
though we knew that even in those situations, the formal system was failing. So, I
think that we perhaps failed on more than one account in terms of paying attention
to the customary justice system.
Similar views were shared by Participant 029 because this Participant stated that “no attention
was given to that. Though they recognized those traditional justice systems that were in place,
but then there was caution to try and refine or reform the processes around that …” Participate
008 explained why attention was not given to the traditional justice system:
… cultural practices are different. And even in any political subdivision, you may
find different cultural practices and traditional values. … The criminal justice
system has standard rules. It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices.
So, if it is access to justice, if it is investigating crime, charging a crime,
prosecuting a crime, sending someone to jail, if you cannot find the bail, those
things are standard as you go around the country. The real challenge remains the
impact of the traditional and cultural practices on the statutory approach on the
criminal justice system. So, if you were in Grand Kru and someone is arrested for
rape and the people who are resident there don’t consider rape as a major crime,
and they want you to release the person, even when the law says the person is not
entitled to bail …. Now if you go to another county, maybe for them, rape is
treated as a major thing that they cannot tolerate. … In some counties for instance,
they may want to do Sassyewood (i.e., Trial by Ordeal) to extract a confession.
But should we use that as a basis now? Now that we have a unitary government,
we have a justice system and we want to be homogenous.
Participant 001 stated that “I will say it was externally driven. … because it was forced to take
place, Liberians were influenced to go where they went.” A similar view was shared by
Participant 027:
I will say it was largely influenced by the United Nations. To the extent where it
bordered on the path of what has been done elsewhere - it was influenced more
about lessons learnt elsewhere rather than understanding the Liberian culture,
Liberian context and grounded specifically in that. So again, I will say that it was
modelled on expediency rather than a deliberate approach to grounding the
criminal justice system in the local system and culture.
Participant 004 stated that key functionaries of the justice and security sectors in Liberia were
initially not supportive of the hub projects:
I think that it was titled externally. You know in any African country, if you have a
few millions, you can tilt anything to your advantage and that was what it was.
And that is the reason why if you look at the hub, it was fully externally driven …
They themselves in government were not united on the hub project. So, these are
some of the things. …. but at a certain point in the implementation, it was center
stage now by the government through the Minister of Justice, Christiana Tah.
Participant 021 pointed out how only a few people were convinced about the hub project and it
became a national project:
There are just 2 or 3 persons and once they get convinced, that is all. One
was taken to America and spent some time there. We forget that Monrovia
is not Liberia. We need to go back to the rural areas.
Participant 005 pointed out that the decentralization process in Liberia was not voluntary:
There was an enforced decentralization caused by external intervention, which was
resisted by the established elite structures around the criminal justice system. So,
you had a centralized situation where it really depends on what you call local
ownership or decentralization; ... you had a Judiciary that was highly resistant to
any form of decentralization and ... the international community wanted to
decentralize but the locals wanted to control the process themselves. What you
rather had was a judiciary system which was elite based and was trying to possess
power for the narrow elite group and did not want to devolve power. And you had
an actual attempt by the international community to impose decentralization in the
process, which was not actually being appreciated at least by the judicial actors in
the process. … I mean there was obviously some consultation going on. But I
think the general approach from the government side was … a lot of cash being
offered, and we can’t afford to spend ourselves so let’s get the infrastructure. So
that reflected the general priority across the entire criminal justice system in
Liberia. It was unsustainable infrastructure such as the hub, were built. There was
this general approach, where favoring let’s say infrastructure ... and this was
certainly, something that the judiciary was guilty. The judiciary was not very
happy with small courts built with funds from UNMIL’s Quick Impacts Project.
They thought that they were not sufficient for the majesty of the judicial process,
but on the other hand, when we ended up building, the infrastructure that fits the
majesty, then we had the problem of unsustainable infrastructure given the
economy of Liberia.
Participant 008, explaining how the process was externally driven, highlighted how the hub
project was alien to Liberia:
… what the United Nations decided to do was to divide the country into regions
and concentrate those services in these regions and then divide the counties
amongst those hubs. … The idea of the hubs was not a Liberian idea. I am not too
sure, whether there was a replica somewhere that has been done in other areas, but
it may have been a very good idea elsewhere, that was introduced by any one of
our partners.
Participant 013 assigned figures (i.e., percentages) to how much of the ideas for the hub project
were driven by Liberians and how much by international partners:
More or less the internationals were responsible for 60% and the locals 40% of
the hub project idea. I think the idea came from an international. It was debated
and found that it was ok. But later on, it was realized that why build a courthouse
several miles away. When the existing courthouse is in ruins. Why not rehabilitate
the existing structures and build new ones around the same place?
Affirming the fact that the process was externally driven, Participant 016 also identified the
international actors who drove the decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system: …
I feel that it was more or less externally driven. Because there was a lot of support and
influence from external actors, UNMIL, USAID, UNDP; these were key people that drove
the system that made it functional. They were giving a lot of material and financial
support. In fact, in certain instances, if they did not call a meeting it would not be held.
There were a lot of issues, so you didn’t see a clear cut willingness on the part of national
actors at the time.
Participant 018 stated that:
No doubt that it was led by the international partners. UNMIL has always been at
the forefront making recommendations. They gave prescriptions on how society
moved and developed. And so, all the prescriptions came from the international
community, and that is where the money went. So, we didn’t have money, the
country didn’t have money, so with all these programs crafted in Washington and
Accra probably so there was no money.
Participant 019 said the process was externally driven and this has had a negative impact on the
Government of Liberia’s commitment to the process:
I think the decentralization process was mainly internationally driven.
… To some extent, it has been beneficial. There are still challenges. Again, in
everything there would be benefits. But for me, in my work, I have found more of
the challenges because this was internationally driven in my view; the
Government’s commitment has been very little. And because the Government’s
commitment has been little to nothing, people who are charged to carry out their
responsibility are faced with so many challenges.
Participant 023 cited the fact that international partners decided which parts of the criminal
justice system to strengthen as being the reason why some parts of the criminal justice chain are
strong and others weak, hence adversely affective the entire system:
In my mind, I think that it was internationally driven because there was a bit of
exclusivity from the internationals. If you have a good idea, that you want to see
everybody benefits, I think it is to bring people on board. People you want to see
on board who you think are good practitioners. But for example, UNMIL and
other international organizations, ECOWAS, USAID, invested so much into
prosecutions. And they overlooked even the public defense. The investment in the
prosecution was higher than the defense counsel. On the other hand, the
traditional justice system, how much support went there? So, it was
internationally driven, because when these internationals including UNMIL
withdrew their support, it became a challenge.
Participant 026 argued that the United Nations as the lead in the hubs project undermined the
Government’s decentralize efforts as the project was not completed:
The United Nations had its own role in the design of the program, which
undermined the Government’s efforts. For example, the UN knew that they were
going to build five justice and security hubs. ... and when the Government asked
them to … build the remaining four hubs after they had built the first hub, the UN
now came up and said, ‘You know what, we cannot build the remaining hubs
because we no longer have the interest in dealing with any huge infrastructure’,
which I think undermined the Government’s ability to also decentralize justice and
security hubs as planned. So, in some cases, the donors themselves have their own
role to play in the situation, they do have their own interests and … once they no
longer have interest; they try to play around using different kinds of politics. The
Government can make justice and security a priority and really understand what is
required to decentralize justice and security … I know justice and security is
expensive, but they can do it in a more prudent way at their own level … I think it is
going to help. Instead of working with the UN and saying, ‘we want this program
and start a big program that the Government cannot sustain, it becomes a problem.
Sustainability is a key issue in the whole sector. Participant 011 stressed how some
international actors failed to align their interventions with national plans:
The Government of Liberia had established a Plan of Action to decentralize the
criminal justice system. The United States will come and say, ‘Yes you have your
specific actions and goals; we not supporting your specific actions, we will
support the goal in a different way’. But yet at the end of the period, we will come
and say this is how much we have spent on decentralizing your system ... and
sometimes, for example, the European Union will come and tell you I am going to
determine my own actions to support your projects or I will support your specific
action, but you must prefinance it.
Participant 021 cited the fact that officials of the criminal justice system were often trained
abroad as evidence to back a claim that the process was externally driven:
I think it was externally driven. I say that because if you look at the police that are
being trained, where are they being trained? And what training are they
acquiring? Take for instance you send our police to China, America, or the sub
region, you confuse them. Training in each of those countries are based on a
different context. And also, if you look at some of the requirements for you to
become a police officer and looking at the Liberian context, our level of education
and all of that, I think it is too high. So, all that affects the decisions that we take.
I think to a larger extent it was externally driven based on lessons learnt from our
partners in other contexts.
Homogeneous approach to decentralization across Liberia. The following statements
made by participants support the opinion that a homogenous, hence potentially externally driven
approach, was adopted to decentralization across the various geographical locations in Liberia.
Participant 001 stated that “… Liberia is a homogeneous country; everything was the same.” On
this question, Participant 003 stated that:
… it was a universal approach, because if you say you want to do things
differently in each county, the whole thing will not come together smoothly. So,
what happened is that, everything was done on a pilot and that pilot was done
from one county to the next then to the next. So, you find that everything was
uniform. And because it was uniform, it was easy to follow. As you know in
Liberia, one county can have two or more tribes. … So yes, the whole idea was
that whatever was used in one county should be the same in other counties.
Participant 004 stated that:
we had a fair approach. Every county should get A, B, C, D criminal justice
services or facilities. But that should not have been the case. We should have done
some form of positive discrimination to bring the counties that were at the lower,
lower level up to a certain level …
Participant 005 notes “I will say I saw very little sensitivity in terms of local cultures and
situations in any of the reformed processes.” Participant 006 stated that:
I think to a large degree, what was done was replicated across but not necessarily
in equal fashion. So, for instance it is not that every county got a prison. It is not
that every county got a courthouse at the same time, it was not that there was
some planning in relation to where best to have a police station, immigration. …
So, there was the thinking that, ‘we need to have the following’ and then there
was a whole lot of debate and negotiations towards who is going to support the
development.
According to Participant 013 “a one size fits all approach was being used across the
board.” Participant 019 stated that:
So, for the most parts, they are only designing a one size fits all approach that
does not really put the nitty-gritty of the issues into consideration. … I think the
decentralization process was mainly internationally driven. It was not well
thought out to take into consideration some of these issues. Looking at every
county in Liberia is a unique place even though there are similarities. Yes, some
of them can group together but they have unique cultures, unique societies that
have their unique way of thinking.
Participant 014 indicated that:
In my view, it has not taken into consideration the uniqueness of the areas. I think
it has been a lot of thinking of the people in terms of how to make the criminal
justice system like you said in a homogeneous way. … because you know, you
cannot design a system or laws that don’t work. So, I don’t think we considered
the peculiarities of the various groups or areas of the country. You know it is a
tough society to go through, to do one law for one set of people and another law
for another set of people.
Participant 018 stated that “… there was no uniqueness. … There were no variations in terms of
security.” Participate 008 affirmed this view by noting that: “I think they treated them as
homogenous.” Participant 024 stated:
… it was a homogenous approach. Basically, there was Monrovia the capital city
and everything outside. And therefore, it is as if you do something in one county,
you do it in another county without necessarily looking at the specific needs of
each county. … I think that in retrospect we should have utilized the data that we
had to inform the discussion a bit more. … understanding of how things worked
in each county … Also, the approach of actors who were already there; I don’t
think we ever really took that time to consider the knowledge that we had or tried
to get the knowledge from national actors, (i.e., what they had and what worked
within the system from one county to another or bring people together from the
various counties to understand what/how things have been working).
Reasons for a homogenous approach. Participants provided the following reasons for the
one size fits all approach adopted in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Nature of the legal framework and structure of Liberia. Participant 022 stated that:
Liberia is one country. It is also a small country. The legal framework applies to
the country as a whole and the same laws apply to people everywhere. And that is
not a bad thing especially if you limit the jurisdiction of the formal justice system
to those very serious cases … The institutions that we are supporting are also
national institutions. The Liberian National Police has police personnel in every
county; … But I think these police officers, prosecutors and judges should be
bound by these same rules that apply in other counties.
To promote unity and equality as well as due to the fear/possibility of entrenching
ethnicity. Participate 008 stated that:
I think they treated them as homogenous because if you look at it being unique,
then we have to now dig deep into the cultural and traditional aspect of those
political subdivisions. Every county in Liberia is unique in a way. The cultural
practices are different. And even in any political subdivision, you may find
different cultural practices and traditional values. Now, in terms of the
government, it is to promote unity. The criminal justice system has standard rules.
It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices. … So, all of these things
are going into informing the type of structure you need to put there; perhaps I will
even say the number of courts that you put there. … the cultural practices must
not be the criteria in you determining what kind of structures that you should put
there, or the judges you should put there, or the Public Defense that you should
put there; … To that extent, the Government has not done very well, because there
are some of the courts in some of these counties and there is nothing happening
there. I look at some for the returns; how many cases are being processed in the
town... But the plan, the architecture remains the same; there should be a Circuit
Court and there should be magisterial courts and lower than that, you will find
traditional courts that deal with the issues in various areas. Participant 005
affirmed the assertion make by Participant 008 on the reasons for adopting a
homogenous approach:
I think there was a fear partially of enhancing tribalism, given the importance
of tribes or clans in the Liberian society and also in some cases strong, long
disputes between different groups. I think there was a fear that if you went
down that path, you would end up concentrating on the Bassa group and not
the significant other communities that lived in that county. And you just end up
concentrating on the majority of ethnic groups in any one county.
And I think this was especially important when you talk about the North-East of the
country where you had a long term dispute between three very important groups
who were intimately involved in the civil war. I think there was a real fear of trying
to avoid any form of favoritism.
Participant 014 stated that:
In the cities, where you have members of the Masonic Craft, and if you are not a
member, you cannot even discuss issues affecting the society. And the way people
treat each other has implications for the criminal justice system. For example, if a
nonmember of Poro or Sandy conducts themselves in a way against a senior members
of the organization, the senior member is given preferential treatment. He is considered
to be right over the nonmember. And so, a nonmember can be taken advantage of by a
member because they do not consider you a full member of society. It is like being a
nondocumented immigrant. How do you go to the law? Your rights have been violated
but you are even afraid to go to and report. … in the Constitution, under Article 11, the
law protects every citizen; there should be equal protection.
Subtheme Six: The decentralization process was nationally driven.
The following are views shared by participants in support of their assertion that the
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system was nationally driven: Participant 026
stated: “I think that it was nationally driven”. Participant 021 stated that: “The court was built
based on the principles of national ownership and leadership, …”. Participant 020 stated that:
“the United Nations did not force everything down our throat.” Participant 007 indicated that:
Decentralizing the criminal justice system is the Government of Liberia’s exercise.
But external assistance was welcome; we needed their expertise; we needed their
money. But the Government is responsible to own their services; not the NGOs, not
the international governments, we were responsible for our own services and projects
in Liberia.
Consequences of not considering the context. Participants identified the following
consequences arising from the decentralization process not being influenced by the context:
Hub concept abandoned due to implementation challenges. Participant 021 stated
that:
… initially the plan was to have 5 Justice and Security regional hubs in place. …
But unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was
not taken forward because the lesson learnt from the first construction in Gbarnga
is that it took longer than we expected. And so, our partners from the United
Nations specifically, the Peacebuilding Commission Chair spoke with the
Government and the Government bought into the idea and saw the need to
prioritize service provision rather than the physical infrastructure. So currently we
have not had infrastructure in all areas except for Bong County.
Participant 022 noted that: “… the hub approach has come to a standstill. Originally, the idea was
5 hubs. But after the Gbarnga hub after the investments were made … the hub concept came to a
standstill. But the decentralization itself continued.”
According to Participant 006:
The first hub in Gbarnga, it was designed to actually look at all the elements of the
criminal justice system from policing right through the criminal justice system to
prisons, and it was done on a regional basis. But it was set up and designed that it
would provide decentralized services in 3 counties. … It came with mixed
reviews but if we spoke honestly about it, we would say that the cost benefit
analysis didn’t really deliver what it was intended to deliver. As we know, the
sustainability of justice and security services was very hard on Liberians at the
time. So, it had mixed results; whilst there was improved access to justice and
security, it was really servicing a county as opposed to the design and the premise
of having the ability to strengthen and extend to other counties, but it actually
didn’t deliver as intended. Notwithstanding, there were improvements.
According to Participant 008:
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,
it did not proceed as planned. There was a delay in its completion.
And it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because of
that, it had an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas.
Participant 010 stated that:
… the whole idea was to decentralize the system around the country. …; we were
able to set up hub 1 with the intentions of setting up hub 2 but it never happened,
because hub 1 was not even getting the support and so we could not have
established hub 2.
Lack of planning. Participant 016 attributed the homogenous approach to the absence of
planning. This Participant stated that: “Quite frankly, I don’t think there was a clear roadmap.”
Nonjudicious use of resources and sustainability challenges. Participant 005 indicated
that:
I think the most important thing is the elephant in the room (i.e., the decision to use
Peacebuilding Fund money … to construct hubs in the regions). That was the Gbarnga hub;
where they completely ignored the fact that the system operated on a county basis. Similar views
were shared by Participant 011 on the functioning of hub 1 in Gbarnga: According to this
Participant, “Serious challenges. A lot of problems. It is not doing fine because the funds and
support that used to go there is no longer going there; (i.e., funds from the Government of
Liberia).” According to Participant 021:
In the Gbarnga Hub right now, the ceilings are falling off, the walls are falling off
because they used substandard materials. In the court, they can be hearing a case
and suddenly you hear a boom! Something falls off. All these should have been
considered. … So, the hub is functioning, but it is challenged. Take for instance,
you used to feed officers three times a day and now the money has diminished,
just because the Government doesn’t have capacity to do so. So, you put a lot of
strain on the officers.
Participant 016 gave another example of a donor funded project that ceased to operate when
donor funding ended:
… the World Bank decided to fund the Human Rights Office in the Ministry of
Justice for 5 years. When the World Bank funding lapsed, the Ministry of Justice
did not put any money in it. Equally is the ADR office. It was a trial period which
run for 3 years, I guess. After the international funding stopped, the ADR office
closed completely, and they are no more there. These are important factors but
then again if the priorities of the Minister or key financial decision makers are not
in that area then there cannot be funding. I think there was an appreciable move
on the part of the international community. They kept the fire blazing. They kept
the Librarian's feet to the fire. My disappointment is the fact that since they left,
there has not been any forward movement to enhancing the criminal justice
system. I am not saying there is no action but there has not been any strong move.
So, then I look at how did the international community prepare for sustainability? On
the operations of the hub in Gbarnga, Participant 014 stated that “the Ministry’s budget has
not reached the point where it can handle that. Some things take time.” Participant 015 stated
that:
… what is really the situation which you cannot blame the international community
is to do with the issue of sustainability. That should be ownership. We just have to
work towards sustaining it and getting it running. And we have challenges like any
other country around the world. We just have to be committed in the process. You
know there is no process that is exempt from error. There will be minor errors, but
those errors are not significant to really change the concept and meaning of what
was done.
Participant 017 indicated that:
I will say yes; it is functioning but with a lot of challenges. It ranges from
logistics; right now, the issue at hand is food for the people. Like I said we have
about 100 officers and initially they were fed three times, but as we went along,
the feeding has reduced to once a day. And right now, we have a challenge of
even having food for the officers. … It started during the last month to the
elections in 2018, the middle part and then up to where we are now. Initially, the
budget allocated for the hub as far as we are concerned was $750,000 that was
covering up for food for the officers, vehicle spare parts, fuel to run the generator,
salaries for the workers, cleaning materials, agriculture materials and what have
you. But as we went along the line, it dropped and kept dropping. Now, it is
around $200,000/$300,000 or so. … Every month we are supposed to conduct
three patrols because of a few challenges and not having spare parts to service the
vehicles, we have stopped the patrol component. So right now, what is working is
response to security incidents.
Designing and implementation of ill conceived projects. According to Participant 005:
the rationale was to have one stop shop, where you had the police, immigration,
and also, the prosecution; the Public Defenders, judiciary based in one location,
and the courts. This was I think with hindsight an ill-conceived plan because it
didn’t actually fix the local realities and the conceptualization of the
international or external actors especially the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund.
According to Participant 018:
The just and security hubs are gathering dust because nobody is going there. They
are going to their farms. You have got to find out why people do things and what
will make them change. So, you say, ‘in Nigeria or Ghana, the chiefs do this or
that; because we are all black, so we are supposed to think, alike right?’ They
forget that Liberians are unique people.
Participant 009 stated that:
The problem we have is that, with the establishment of things, you do not have
any financial support, so if you have an institution established but it has no
support to carry out its work, then it becomes dead in a lot of ways. And the same
thing with the laws. The laws are passed; like we had the jury law passed but what
was never considered is how to roll out the jury law so that it becomes effective.
So again, there was no funding provided to ensure that these good intentions were
carried out. So, the same thing can be said with the Liberia Anti-Corruption
Commission; to say that yes, we have an anticorruption system to prosecute
people, but I can name on my two fingers how many cases have been handled by
them although we have such a huge Commission with quite qualified people in
there. If they are not given the financial support and the political will to ensure
that things are done; they will not make the desired impact.
Theme Two: Hybrid approach used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system
The following three subthemes flow from this theme:
Subtheme One: Decentralization process was a combination of context specific
interventions and solutions from abroad.
There was a category of participants who indicated that the interventions which were
used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system were influenced by internal conditions in
Liberia and solutions from abroad that were unsuitable for Liberia.
Participant 005 pointed out how the hub project was based on a regional structure akin to the
decentralized police structure. This structure is different from how the Judiciary and the
prosecutions are decentralized. In the words of this Participant:
The structure of the reformed police was a regional structure, whereas the Judiciary
retained the prewar county based structure. So, you had a little bit of disconnect
between the chains of command; in the judicial process; the County
Attorneys, the judges, and then the police structure which was semi decentralized.
According to Participant 029:
Driving this process was not just a Liberia thing. Remember, we had the UN
mission here; we had the United Nations police working along with us. The setup
was such that it was in a way that it supported the entire system in whichever area
you are looking at it. They supported everything to make sure they built capacity
to ensure that they left a working system. … Were there extreme sensitivity put in
it? To an extent! Could there have been further efforts to minimize unintended
consequences? Yes!
Participant 011 pointed out how, initially, there was an absence of a uniform concept of training
the police, hence each country that trained the Liberia National Police trained them according to
that country’s police training doctrine, thus confusing officers of the Liberian National Police.
According to this Participant:
… what we saw in the reform of the police, that in the initial stages, someone
from Bangladesh coming to train the police with the Bangladesh police system.
So, it became a mixture of so many other things to the extent that we had to sit
down and outline what we do in the police so they can understand that we are
doing …. Liberia is different and if we say we are going to follow what other
countries do, it will not help us.
Subtheme Two: Homogeneous and nonhomogeneous approaches used to decentralize.
One participant indicated that a combination of homogeneous and heterogeneous
approaches was used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system in the various geographical
locations:
According to Participant 026:
I think that initially the idea was homogenous; it was a one-size-fits-all situation.
But then after the establishment of hub 1, it became clear that even in Liberia, the
infrastructure system could not allow for the program to be implemented as
homogeneously as we thought. For example, in hub 1, construction alone took
about 2 years and then trying to replicate the program in the South Eastern region
was a bit difficult and then based of the difficulty of building the hub in the South
Eastern region, a lessons learnt workshop was held with stakeholders, which
informed the program that inasmuch as there was a need to construct the regional
hub in the South Eastern region, the South East was in dire need of justice and
security services so a two phased approach should be used. And one of those
phases were to ensure that we first deploy men and women and while the men and
women are working, we could build the hub later. Unfortunately, the construction
of the hub didn’t happen. Participants were asked whether the decentralization
process was nationally or internationally driven. Their responses were mixed with
the most suggesting that the process was either internationally driven or both
nationally and internationally driven. In a few cases, responses indicated that the
process was solely nationally driven.
Subtheme Three: Interventions to decentralization were national and international.
Participant 011 stated that “it was a nationally driven affair with the support of our
international partners … They said, Yes, I will put money there, but I require this and that
before we invest our money. So, the only precondition was that the only way it can happen is
when you go my way.” This view was shared by Participant 0025: “I think it was both. I think
everyone realized that this was something that was needed. So, I think it was both.” Participant
027 cited various factors to support the assertion that the process was nationally driven:
Well, I think it’s a combination of factors. Part of it is that the whole rebuilding
process or reform process was to build strong institutions grounded in the
principles of the rule of law to ensure that the laws are being followed. So, you will
see from the judiciary side; you have lawyers returning to their counties as County
Attorneys. These were new features in the Liberian legal system or criminal justice
system taking a court beyond Monrovia. And then of course the
United Nations played a significant role in coming up with this particular module around
the hubs.
Participant 003 stated: “It was both ... if you would remember everyone came to Monrovia for
criminal justice services and they were tired of coming to Monrovia every time.” In justifying the
stance that the process was both internally and externally driven.
Participant 005 stated:
I think I will tend to favor both arguments. The reason being that undoubtedly, especially
when the United Nations Mission was preparing for its departure ... Transition was the
key issue. The United Nations provided many services in the counties than they did in the
capital anyway. So, one of the most important features of the whole Transition process
was deploying extra police to the counties, extra border guards, and also a process of
professionalization of magistrate courts, infrastructure buildings but also ensuring the
legally qualified magistrates will sit on the cases. But why I say both is because I think of
the concentration by the Government, the moment they realized the United Nations was
going and that they had a major problem if they don’t actually address decentralization
rapidly … there was a strong Government driving it towards the end as well.
Participant 006 stated “I think a bit of both.” Participant 008 indicated that:
No, that one is nationally driven because of the architecture. The law requires that
you have a Circuit Court. If there is a law in the Country commanding things to
be done, the partners most often will provide support in that area. They will not be
pressure for you to move away except if you do that in an amendment to the law.
So that was nationally driven. Now in terms of what do you do to give effect to
the intent of the statutes is quite another thing. Because the law says that statutory
courts should be established but it doesn’t tell you how many judges you are
supposed to have there, how many lawyers or prosecutors you are supposed to
have there and whether they should sit every day from 8am-4pm those are
decisions that are made by the Government with the support of their partners. This
is driven by the financial support that you have. Most of our partners were a lot
interested in issues relating to domestic violence. So, they provided money to
expand the courts. So, for this decentralization, the architecture is nationally
driven but in terms of those elements for that architecture where focus needs to be
placed on, it is both nationally and internationally driven. Some of the
international partners looked at the immediate causes of the conflict, or maybe
their own interest.
Participant 009 also indicated that the process was externally and internally driven: I
think it was both. I think it was a good idea that came externally. Because I
remember … going to a meeting where all these fantastic ideas were shared. And
the reason why I think that it is both is that yes, the Minister at the time wanted
reform; she was dying because she could see all the difficulties in ensuring that
people in Liberia got access to justice. However, I think the development of the
concept was done without first a baseline being done. So, the development I
figure was done by the United Nations or whoever it was at the time.
Participant 010 cited the need for partnerships and adherence to law as the reasons why the
decentralization process was driven from both angles:
I will say both because we couldn’t function on our own. Our international partners had
to come in to support in terms of funding and capacity building, in order to be able to
implement those projects. … I don’t want to say that it was all international ideas. It was
like what we actually wanted as a country or for the criminal justice system. And we
didn’t just sit there for all those ideas to be implemented in Liberia. Going by the
Constitution or laws, and so if there were new ideas, we had to ensure that those ideas
were in stream with the Constitution, of the Liberian law and once we did that, we were
able to amend the laws in order to implement that. … if we had decided that we wanted
to change anything, it would have taken a longer time for the project to come up. Even
though we could not afford the hub concept, our Government bought the whole concept
with the hope that the budgetary issues would have improved at that time to be able to
support instead of saying no. You see the hub is a big concept and once it made sense,
they embraced it with the hope that the economy will improve. So, I don’t think it was an
imposition by our partners.
Participant 012 also affirmed the fact that the process was externally and internally driven: “It’s
both in a way because the external factors and parties saw some inadequacies in the delivery of
the services that should make the criminal justice system viable.” Participant 013 indicated that
there was a need for access to justice in Liberia and the international community facilitated the
actions of government agencies in this regard:
I could say both. You know initially when the reform started, the United Nations
Mission in Liberia was here, and other donors came in with different ideologies
but then at one point, the locals and citizens themselves felt that they need to get
involved; for example, initially when the reform started the decisions made by
government and partners were not coerced. But then after the civil society
working group came into being, from then it was perceived that locals needed to
get involved. So, I could say both. Initially, it was the internationals but later the
locals got involved.
Participant 015 highlighted how experiences and practices from other African countries were
accepted by the Liberian authorities:
It was both; nationally and internationally because we resolved to practice
international best practices. Because we live in a global world. Liberia is not
different from Ghana or Sierra Leone. So, the process was driven under the
arrangement that we had with respect to the restructuring …. Of course, the the
international community played a role in the process so that both were
involved. So, whatever was done was not done by the perceived imposition of
international staff, but it was a concept that we all agreed that this was the best
international practice and because we live in a global world and there was a
need to conform to that.
Participant 020 provided pointers to why the process was driven by both internal and external
actors. According to this Participant, “We (i.e., Liberians) had lots and lots of meetings as it
relates to how to make them functional and also participated in activities ...” Participant 012
shared similar views:
So, the process started by mobilizing and bringing together policy makers from the
Judiciary, Legislature and Executive to brainstorm on the needs – first of all to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the justice and security system and then
to identify what the needs are.
Participant 024 stated that there was a push from both external and internal actors: “I think it was
an external push, but I think that it was also a push by national actors.” Participant 014 indicated
that the process was not an external imposition:
It was not imposed because they were accepted by the locals. … In some
situations, … people were convinced about some of the things. ... So, the hub was
a good idea but the problem was how to sustain it, but we will take it because the
need is there. Even now, people are still considering decentralizing the hub idea
the Judiciary itself. So yes, it is a good idea, but do we have the budgetary
allocations for it?
Participant 015 indicated that there were a number of challenges with Liberia’s criminal justice
system and the international community was helping Liberians address the challenges hence the
process was both externally and internally driven. According to this Participant: The
international partners came to provide support and so the support they were providing was
based on the concern of those different institutions. But again, before the war, there were a lot
of systems that were not functioning. Take for instance the law that governs the police. If you
look at the old law that governed the police, I think that it was a full page document. The law
that controls the Police Academy in terms of what it is supposed to do is in two and half
pages. So, an institution that has that kind of critical function in ensuring justice, in helping to
enhance the rule of law will have a law that is supposed to speak in entirety what they are
supposed to do in terms of professionalism is just defined on a full page document. You need
to imagine what will happen. So, there will be situations where they will need to operate the
perception and discretion of
sometimes officers of the law. So, when the UN came, there was a huge task.
Putting a police system in place; doing capacity building, providing logistical
support, looking at the issue of infrastructure that was broken down, so that was
huge. So, what they did was that they were able to help us define the system in
terms of how we should proceed. And what we needed in order to make this
happen, they provided it to some extent.
Participate 029 held a similar opinion:
I will say both externally and nationally driven. Externally driven given the fact that most
of the funding comes from international donors, they had their own objectives and what
they wanted to achieve. And of course, the Government also has its own plan ...
Participant 030 also noted that “With the coming of UNMIL, I believe that the process of
criminal justice system accessibility is nationally owned and internationally driven.”
Research Question 2.1: How can International Actors support Nationally Owned and
Inclusive Processes to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System?
For ease of reference, Tables 5 present recommendations to Liberia’s international
development partners on how they can support nationally owned and inclusive processes to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Table 5
Recommendations to Liberia’s International Development Partners on How They Can Support
Nationally Owned and Inclusive Processes To Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System
Recommendations Number of
Responses (n)
Recommendations in
percentages (%)
The international community should understand 6 18
the context and avoid a pure legalistic approach
to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system
Promote the traditional justice system 4 11.8 The quest to advance national
ownership and 4 11.8
implement Liberia specific interventions must
permeate all programming
(Table continues) Adoption of a holistic approach to decentralize 4 11.8
Liberia’s criminal justice system
International development actors, must have a 3 8.8
long-term approach and be patient when
supporting access to justice processes in
postconflict countries
Need for conceptual clarity of distinction 3 8.8
between national ownership and local ownership
International development assistance actors to 2 5.8
establish genuine partnerships
Development actors must support the design and 1 2.9
implementation of geographic specific
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system
Priorities/approaches to decentralize Liberia's 1 2.9
criminal justice system must be identified
through a nationally owned process and
international support must be channeled to
support the priorities/approaches
(Table continues) The government’s ability to sustain 1 2.9
internationally funded interventions when the
support ends should inform the decentralization
process
Liberia’s government to take the lead in the 1 2.9
decentralization process
Build a professional criminal justice system insulated from Liberia’s partisan
politics 1 2.9 Actors involved in making Liberia’s criminal 1 2.9
justice system accessible must learn lessons
from similar contexts
Government of Liberia to evaluate previous 1 2.9
engagements with the international community
and learn lessons
Promote South - South cooperation in Liberia’s 1 2.9
decentralization process
Total Responses (N) 34 100
I present the statements participants made in support of the recommendations
summarized in Table 5 and the ensuing themes and subthemes below:
Theme One: International Actors must Understand Liberia, Design/Implement Liberia
Specific Interventions and be Patient
Ensuring that interventions are context specific is one way of upholding national
ownership principles. To increase the chances that this happens requires, among other things,
that actors (local and foreign) working on processes like enhancing access to Liberia’s criminal
justice system, understand Liberia. In this regard, participants were asked whether international
actors who worked to decentralize the criminal justice system understood the Liberian context.
From the answers provided below, participants held mixed views:
Subtheme One: Foreigners were Knowledgeable about Liberia and its Criminal Justice
System
Only 2 participants held the view that foreigners working to make Liberia’s criminal
justice system accessible knew the country and system they were working in. Participant 001
believed that foreigners who had worked in Liberia for a relatively longer time eventually got to
know Liberia better. This Participant indicated that “…for those who had stayed a little longer
they got to understand Liberia and its people …”. Participant 002 indicated that “I would say
they did as most of them had worked and stayed in Liberia for a good period of time since the
inception of the mission and the mission had the capacity to keep records to ensure continuity”.
Subtheme Two: Foreigners were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal justice
system
Most participants felt that most of the foreigners who worked on reforming Liberia’s
criminal justice system had inadequate knowledge about the context in which they worked.
Participant 003 stated “I don’t think they really understood Liberia entirely. ... I can tell you that
most of them did not understand Liberians. They thought Liberians were not intelligent.”
Participant 022 stated that:
… you get to a Country and you are expected to hit the ground running. We often
need a lot of time and space to really dive in and gain a proper understanding of
what really happens. We talk in practical terms about what happens with police
reports, prosecution files, courts and court cases etc. So, I will be self-critical and
say that it will be good for us internationals to really try to get a good hand on the
workings of the land in this justice system we want to strengthen or reform. In
fact, when I arrived here … I found out that it was very hard to really get data
needed to get a picture of how police officers work, how prosecution takes place,
how many juveniles are in prison. ... That information is not available. If you
were to ask the Chief Justice how many cases were heard in 2018, he will not be
able to get it for you. In fact, if you even give him more days, he will not be able
to get it for you. So, data collection is a problem for all of us.
Participant 001 stated: “those of us who did not come from the American legal system on which
the Liberian system is based, struggled with the American system, and were not able to make a
big impact.” Participant 027 stated that:
I am afraid most of the approaches used after conflict are driven more by
expediency than they are deliberately designed to understand the nuances of
culture, tradition and ensuring that these mechanisms are in direct response to
cultural nuances. No. I think it is more about how after conflict international
systems especially UN systems tend to apply the same approach used in previous
missions to African countries, … they think all Africans are all the same. So, the
attitude of the UN to engage in an expedient fashion has undermined the
effectiveness of most of the reform processes.
Participant 004 stated that:
… you know, when we come in, we want to be seen achieving concrete, positive
results. So, because our minds are made up, some of the nuances, we don’t see,
and we don’t challenge it, but we don’t make an attempt to understand and
overcome it. … . If the Special Representatives of the Secretary General had
made it a deliberate policy to spend at least two weeks every month or every other
month in one of the counties; staying there, seeing to it that they resolve the
challenges they faced; it would have brought more concrete results … Some
foreigners understood but the vast majority did not understand. It is important that
future … international support looks at how people are employed and the kind of
people that need to be deployed to postconflict societies. It is extremely
important.
On the same issue, Participant 005 responded:
No! Because every single … international tends to think that whatever they do
back home, and it is just as applicable to Africans as it was to anybody else; we
think that the system that we have grown up with is the way to do things. That
tends to put a lot of reluctance. But when you also bear in mind, if you want, the
existing structures were fundamentally based on inequality, they were correctly
questioning whether national structures remained appropriate. And I think that
was legitimate questioning.
Participant 006 stated that:
I am sure some did. But I’ll probably say many didn’t. Using myself as an
example, I had little appreciation or understanding of what had gone on in
Liberia, and really what was needed for Liberia. I bring my training and
international experiences into a Liberia context, but we never had a roadmap to
say this is an agreed position between government and the international
community saying, this is the agreed pathway; one pathway with a whole list of
priorities and people arrived to support that ... and so we had a schedule of work
ahead of us. People just had to listen; spend time observing to try and shape and
influence at the right time about change and a lot of times that takes time. You
have got to build trust and a lot of people looking for a quick and easy way and
never really had a long-term goal. And I think that was a real problem for us
Participant 007 stated:
Our culture is a bit complicated and sometimes people don’t know what they are
expected to do in everyday activities. These internationals came with their own
experiences and culture from their own countries. And anytime you do that, you
will be making a very big mistake. Liberia’s culture is complex, and the people
are complex too.
Participant 008 stated that:
Honestly, I don’t think many of them fully understood the problems in Liberia,
people who get into positions of authority feel that they know everything and
have the answers to everything. And we really don’t listen that much to our local
experts. And many programs are also politically driven, and maybe driven by the
resources of the partners because we have not been able to really put our foot
down; … in identifying national priorities and then telling our international
partners that ‘these are our priorities. You came here to help us; these are the
things we will need’. And you cannot blame them also because very frankly, most
of these international players who are coming are civil servants in their own
countries, they want to do something that can raise their own profile with the
institution that they work for. But we have not really put our foot down
concerning national ownership because that will change everything as opposed to
listening more to the person that has the purse.
Participant 009 stated that:
No, I don’t think they did. You know, what I love about research and documents and
stuff, people seem to think that this is a postconflict country, so issues that happen in postconflict
countries need to be replicated here. So, they are failing to look at Liberia as an individual
country with individual problems. They looked at Liberia as a postconflict. Participant 011 said
that “no they did not understand Liberia.”
In the words of Participant 013:
I can say no. Because when you are coming on a mission, you should be prepared
in all angles. And this is not in the case of Liberia, but I think that there are
learning lessons for other missions. You know when you bring in soldiers and
police and they want to reform ... most of these guys that are brought in they are
not specialists; ... so when you are starting a mission, those who attended the
Security Sector Reform Course at the Folke Bernadotte Academy have a very
broad understanding of how to reform. So, if you just come in and you don’t have a
pool of expertise, you are going to find it difficult. For example, a decision was
made to dissolve the Armed Forces of Liberia completely and rebuild it. A decision
was also made to revamp the police and to make everyone resign and start all over
again. And that decision to us was not a very wise decision.
Participant 010 stated that:
I can recall when we were reforming the Police Act, a Ghanaian was contracted to come
and help; we felt that that should have been done alongside a local partner.
Maybe a lawyer or an officer who had experience. But it was fully handled by the
Ghanaian partner. So, they tried to impose their own system; … Most of the
things that were inside the document could not work with the kind of society that
we have.
Participant 029 held similar views about the knowledge of foreigners working to reform
Liberia’s criminal justice system. According to this Participant:
I don’t think they understood it fully. I hold this view because most of the international
workers had different views and thoughts when it comes to the way justice and security
services should be delivered. Some of them came from the British legal system. Some
American, some French, so different views, the way things are done over there is quite
different. So, most of them didn’t have a strong grip on the justice system and so they
also had a problem in terms of how they were providing services.
Participant 016 stated “I think they understood Liberia to a limited extent. I don’t think they
understood the culture, history because they had a fixed solution approach.” Participant 021
stated that: “I think there were some that didn’t understand.”
Subtheme Three: Foreigners were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal
justice system.
Participants who held the view that internationals who worked on decentralizing Liberia’s
criminal justice system were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal justice
system expressed this view in the following statements. Participant 002 stated “I wouldn’t think
to the fullest. And in fact, this created some of the problems that we had.” Participant 015 stated
that:
The truth of the matter is that there were some that understood it, there were some
that did not understand it. The majority understood it. Because the thing about it
was that, it was not that they operated in isolation. … there were times that there
were confrontations behind closed doors; we spoke to those who did not
understand it and we spoke to them that this is how it is supposed to be done.
And, as time went by, some of those who did not understand it, understood it.
Participant 012 stated that:
Yes, I think they understood based on best practices and experiences that they had
because the UN has been around for more than 50 years. And Liberia is not the only
country that has experienced war. Liberia is not the only country that has experienced a
failed state. There are other states that failed before Liberia and there are experiences that
the UN or UNMIL has generated from these contexts that were brought to bear on
Liberia.
Participant 018 stated:
I think they understood to a point. Like all other projects. … they understood the
challenges Liberia faced in terms of resources, manpower, and capacity, how to fill up
those gaps there are major laws that needed to be passed to reform the society. They
understood it but at the end of the day they had to show the deliverables.
According to Participant 020:
To a little extent they did. What they had as their advantage was the fact that they
came with experiences of interventions in other areas and that gave them an urge
as to how to intervene here in Liberia. I mean they didn’t really understand
Liberia’s context 100 per cent but they understood how to engage and solve
issues.
Participant 014 stated that: “the thing is, most of the people that I know that worked with the
criminal justice system in Liberia were Africans and had some sort of similar challenges in their
own country.”
Table 6 presents, and Figure 4 depicts participants' views on the knowledge of members
of international actors about Liberia and the criminal justice system they were decentralizing.
Table 6
Participants’ Views on the Knowledge of Foreigners About Liberia and the Criminal Justice
system They Were Decentralizing
Themes Number of
Responses
(n)
Responses
in
percentages
Foreigners were not knowledgeable about Liberia and its
criminal justice system
16 64
Foreigners were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its
criminal justice system
6 24
Foreigners were knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal
justice system
3 12
Total Responses (N) 25 100
Figure 4 Foreigners/International Actors Knowledge Of Liberia And Its Criminal Justice System
64
24
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1. International actors were not
knowledgeable about Liberia and
its criminal justice system
2. International actors were
partially knowledgeable about
Liberia and its criminal justice
system
3. International actors were
knowledgeable about Liberia and
its criminal justice system
%
Foreigners/international actors knowledge of Liberia and its criminal
justice system
Based on participants' opinions on the knowledge of international actors supporting the
reform of Liberia’s criminal justice system, participants made the following recommendations on
how international actors can better uphold national ownership principles in decentralizing
Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Subtheme Four: Design and implement Liberia specific interventions
Participants recommended that the following principles and actions should inform the
design and implementation of Liberia specific interventions.
The quest to advance national ownership and implement Liberia specific
interventions must permeate all programming. According to Participant 004 national
ownership principles should be central to the entire decentralization process:
What I can say is that national ownership should be on top of the agenda at all
meetings. It should be dear to the heads of organizations, the lower, middle and
higher levels of government and of the UN system. And the idea should not just
be that, we need to train, that if you bring in lawyers into the UN mission, can we
make sure that when they are going, they have 30, 40, 50 or 100 other lawyers
trained directly or indirectly to replace those who are going out.
Participant 021 expressed reservations over Liberia’s partners’ belief in promoting national
ownership principles in their support to the decentralization process. This Participant impliedly
advocated for Liberia’s partners to demonstrate their support for such principles by ensuring that
they do not approach the decentralization process with preconceived ideas. In this Participant’s
words, “Ownership is tokenistic! Because someone will come, they already have a blueprint of
what they want to do. And because they have their own money, they want to come and persuade
you.” Participant 007 stated that “we had to determine what will work for us. ... Because nobody
could impose their ideas ….” Participant 002 asserted that “Liberia is very complicated, and the
goal must begin with the government and then fight corruption and other related hindering
factors to get any success in the decentralization.”
Clarify conceptual distinction between national ownership and local ownership.
Participant 005 stressed the need for a clarification of the conceptual distinction between national
ownership and local ownership in the design and implementation of all development activities,
including decentralization of the criminal justice system. According to this Participant:
My feeling quite strongly is that, we in the international community and the
global rule of law community still does not understand the difference between
national ownership and local ownership. That is the difference between what the
state and elite want and what the population wants. And frequently, we found
ourselves satisfying the interest of the elite rather than satisfying the interest of
the masses. And I think that conceptually, we have yet to get our heads around
that. … I think we often mistook national ownership for local ownership. And we
didn’t necessarily understand that they were potentially different. Sometimes they
are, sometimes they weren’t. And I think that despite the fact that the topic of
local ownership is about 15 years old, it is still not really well developed.
Because local ownership should never be about supporting an elite per say. But
on the on the other hand, we obviously need to bring the elite on board otherwise
it won’t work. So, a hybrid; a holistic approach is what is required.
Participant 024 made a similar observation: “I think that maybe the international community
when it speaks of national ownership focuses very much on government ownership rather than
national in a broader sense.”
Understand the context and avoid an overly legalistic approach to decentralization.
Participant 027 recommended that the international community should avoid a purely legalistic
approach to decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system:
I think the reform process was in the direction of legal experts and not expertise around
anthropology, expertise around sociology, expertise around community development
generally, these are the different expertise that in my view should be involved in rolling
out the justice and security hubs, rolling out the criminal justice system so that you go
into the community with the full knowledge of what are the forces that you are dealing
with. What are the local traditions? What are the local customs? But it was all about law.
But these kinds of reforms, when you are dealing with the traditional processes, it is more
than just law. You are dealing with a way of life. You are dealing with culture. You are
dealing with tradition. And so, anthropology is a very important factor in trying to
position the law, in trying to ground the justice systems in local beliefs and traditions and
identity. So, I will say the United Nations skipped that, the UN didn’t involve that sort of
thing and so all we have today is an abundance of laws that appear to be isolated in
communities, a body of law that has no meaning to people. People are still embracing
their local culture and tradition which they value and understand more.
Participant 006 observed that: “when we went in … we should have put a handbrake on, and we
should have looked at processing what was in place and also what were the issues in relation to
the criminal justice system previously in the Liberian context? What were the development needs
and priorities?”
Similar sentiments were shared by Participant 029:
… I think they should have spent time to understand how the system works in Liberia.
And that would have been fair information that we could build on in terms of developing
a program. And I know most of the programs were derived from other countries and so
they were a little difficult to implement. And some of them reflected national issues but
again some didn’t reflect national issues.
Participant 016 stated that:
… I am wondering, why would people be confident to go to the chief and not go to
the court? And Liberia now; I don’t know the literacy rate, but I don’t think it’s
even 20%. So how do you engage an illiterate population into a literate system?
All the facts have to be considered. It needs to be brought to the table for
discussion.
Participant 016 said “tailor the Liberians to a Liberia solution.”
Design a citizen centered criminal justice system and involve citizens in the process.
Participant 020 advocated for Liberians to demonstrate an interest to adhere to national
ownership principles from the onset of the process:
… the internationals were the ones pushing Liberia to take ownership of the
process. Liberia did not pay attention and did not take ownership until it reached
the point where they knew for sure that the international community like the UN
was pulling out, before they came around to start to correct some things that were
needed to have been corrected, which of course if you had sufficient time to be
corrected.
Participant 006 recommended the involvement of trustworthy citizens/people who will work in
the national interest:
Had we brought in actors, Liberia’s representatives who were going to be there in
Liberia’s interest and not just pushing agendas. … less about corruption,
nepotism, crime conduct, and all these sorts of things. Had we actually got
genuinely nationally interested people in building Liberia, without bringing in
those individual biases.
Participant 019 advocated for the creation of a citizen centered criminal justice system for
Liberia, “the Legislature is making laws that they don’t understand. That is the challenge.
Because you should make laws that take the citizens into consideration”. Participant 014
advocated for the education of the population about Liberia’s laws and the criminal justice
system:
I think one other thing to do is public awareness. You know, teaching the local
people about the laws. Even if you decentralize services and people don’t know
about it, they will still practice the traditional justice system. An example is in
Liberia, they have a limited number of police, limited number of magistrates,
from my understanding, … they have a strong belief in the traditions over
magistrates, over Circuit Courts. So, you have a low number of police reports
coming from these areas. … For example, there have been cases where someone
died of an unknown cause and they accused someone of being the murderer. Just
because of their local traditions. Someone pointed out and they believed. … So,
some people don’t take matters to court. They used the traditional justice system
to deal with matters. But they use the traditional justice system to make a case that
should not be made. And because some of the actors who are working in the
criminal justice system actually believes in the traditional system, a police officer
will charge someone of murder, and they do think it is right.
Participant 023 recommended that the local community should be involved from the onset:
Liberia is too small. So, if you are going to say people from the Central region,
Eastern region, Northern region, bring them together and say to them, this is the
idea that we have. Bring the leaders together and say this is something we want to
do. Is it practical? Can we do it? And then they tell you, no, we don’t think it is
good.
Participant 005 made a similar recommendation by calling for early engagement with all levels
of the Liberian society in the decentralization process. According to this Participant, “… the
problem really was that there wasn’t an engagement by the various levels of the Liberian society
in decentralization until it was too late, and many decisions had been made”.
Design geographic specific interventions to decentralize the criminal justice system.
Participant 014 advocated for geographic specific interventions to decentralize the criminal
justice system and allowing the existing infrastructure to inform the decentralization process:
… in some parts of the counties, it could take you 8 hours to get to a magistrate court because
of no roads or poor roads. Or it is just bush paths. And where the motorway exists, they have
not been rehabilitated for 10 or 20 years, some since the war. And when it comes also to the
police going to a crime scene, it is also a problem. So yes, access to the criminal justice system
is also inhibited by infrastructure development. And then in other parts of the country also,
there is no detention facility, so people who commit the crime are actually allowed to roam. …
They also don’t have access to medical facilities, they don’t have access to schools for the
children of criminal justice officials to go to. It is sort of connected to other services. … So,
there are too many challenges throughout the country. The logistical challenges and the human
resource availability are linked. So, without a deliberate design, those who live in areas that
have logistical and infrastructure challenges are virtually left on their own.
Priorities to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system must be identified
through a nationally owned process and Liberia’s international partners must support the
process and implementation of the priorities. Participant 008 advocated for a nationally led
process to identify priorities that international actors support:
… there is a need for national ownership in dealing with our partners. So, when
you know your problem, and you do not identify those problems as your priorities
when you get international support, then the support that you get will become
driven by external partners. And this is what happened mostly in Liberia. And
these challenges were caused by those who could pump money into the system.
And in the name of national ownership the government did not come up to say,
“this is what we want. If you want to help us, put the money there. If you cannot
help us, then take your money away.” No! It didn’t happen that way.
Promote the traditional justice system. Participant 001 recommended support for
processes that encourage the traditional justice system to resolve disputes. This Participant cited
examples from the Maasai community in Kenya and stated that:
..., in Kenya, they have the Masai in their communities and they are a bit
traditional. They are very conservative. And when you go to their communities,
they still maintain their culture. If you look at their statistics, in terms of the
number of criminals from that place, they are very few. ... They can resolve
their own issues in their own communities. Very few referrals, in cases like
murder, instead of bringing to the court, they prefer for the person to pay with
many cows. That is the bad side of the method.
Participant 027 recommended the active use of the traditional justice system to resolve disputes
including criminal cases:
… I know Rwanda went on a reform with the Gacaca process. I don’t have details
but I think it was Gacaca, it has come to shape Rwanda’s criminal justice system
in a large measure. It might be good to see how they rolled out Gacaca courts to
form the backbone of the criminal justice system in rural Rwanda.
Participant 019 stated that:
I think the whole system needs to be looked at again in the context of South-South
cooperation, giving it a more local context, looking at the traditional system in
Liberia. Once, I was in the Pacific, … we were in a conference and one of the
natives said, ‘why are you using all your big knowledge against our traditional
culture? Just understand that our tradition has been the keeper of the peace’. So
sometimes this is the mistake that we make. We have a traditional system. Though
there are lapses, it is also good to be measured.
Participant 023 pointed out how the formal justice system is considered alien to ordinary
Liberians and how there is a preference for the traditional justice system:
So, you go and plant a court and people think that they can resolve their problems
and that is ok for them. So, they sit down and solve their issues the traditional
way. Because they think that when the court comes in, you will put them in jail.
They don’t believe that the court provides fair justice. So, they will run away from
the courts and you will see that in a day, the court will be empty, … the judge will
be sitting at the court and have no work to do.
Adopt a holistic approach toward decentralization. Participant 014 recommended the
adoption of a holistic approach to decentralization. Evaluating the approach adopted by the
international community in Liberia, this Participant stated, “I think that with the police they
started well in terms of training the police, but it took time with similar intervention with training
lawyers …, by now, we would have had more magistrates and lawyers”. A similar
recommendation was made by Participant 025 who advocated for the adoption of a holistic
approach that emphasizes service delivery as opposed to infrastructure and combines long and
short-term objectives:
…, for the immediate impact of the 5 hubs should have been implemented
… focusing on services in the different regions rather than bricks and
mortar. And with the holistic approach, making sure that you are not
focusing only on the walls of the buildings but a focus on all the services
and aspects needed for the rule of law chain in the criminal justice system.
But also linking that to the whole long term approach to short term ones.
… the international partners should have both a short term and a long term
coordinated approach to support Liberia in doing that. An example of this
is for police. You don’t need to do much to ensure their presence. You just
need some cars and uniforms, but you need to do that in a way that it is
sustainable. So, you just can’t give them cars, you need to ensure that
there is a way to service the cars and all that stuff and have uniforms for
the police, but then you need to link that to more long term measures in
terms of police training and in terms of creating government institutions
before the long term can take over and support this kind of step by step
strengthening of institutions around the country. And that then of course
needs to be put into the context of Liberian needs and conditions with the
traditional justice system and all these things. I think we should have from
the beginning tried to get a much more holistic approach both in the short
term and for the long term. Now, we did that after, much later on, and it
should have been something done from the beginning.
Participant 025 also stressed the importance of emphasizing coordination among actors
supporting the decentralization process from the onset “I think what one should have done at the
very onset was a much stronger emphasis on the coordination”. Participant 006 also
recommended that attention should be paid to all parts of the criminal justice system in the
decentralization process. This Participant stated that “I don’t think the same level of attention or
investment was made to all necessary areas. And like we mentioned earlier; the criminal justice
system was only as strong as its weakest link hence the challenges”.
Interventions must be sustainable with funding from the government. Participant 010
was of the view that the Government must ensure sustainability of decentralized services: Well
the whole idea of national ownership was with the Government’s willingness to be able to work
on the progress of the decentralization program. But the Government is not willing to work along
this line. And honestly, that is not national ownership. To have national ownership, you must be
able to take over and just move with the program. You must be able to have the capacity to
continue the program. But as the hub project stands now it cannot be continued because of a lack
of support for the process.
International actors should support the government to take the lead in the
decentralization process. Participant 025 recommended that to promote national ownership, the
international community must support the Government to take the lead:
… sometimes, we were waiting for the Government to take the lead rather than
helping them, guiding them, to take the lead at doing things. And I think that the
place where Liberia was, Liberia would have needed better, stronger support from
the United Nations and from the international partners in terms of actually moving
things forward. So, national ownership in a postconflict country, one has to look
very carefully at what all the international community have, and we should have
had a rather stronger role in that …”.
Participant 002 recommended that:
I think the answer lies with the nationals interrogating the whole criminal justice system
on their own at the right time … Again, who is a Liberian is it the Americo-Liberian or
the Liberian, because this too is an issue. The Americo-Liberian wants to bring in the
American systems.
Establish genuine partnerships (i.e., do not tell recipients what to do) and build
trust. Participant 006 advocated for establishing trust and partnerships with ordinary citizens “so,
you should actually make sure that you are working with the partners. Bringing people of trust
that are really trying to work in the nation’s best interest”. Participant 007 called for “partnering
with the actors in a comprehensive manner; fixing the system as a part of the whole system and
having greater access to the people”.
Participant 006 advocated for genuine partnerships between recipients of international
assistance to reform criminal justice systems in postconflict countries and their international
partners. This Participant cited the Australian Government’s approach to supporting such
processes in postconflict societies:
Australia has a large bilateral development program, and … invests a lot in
enhancing these partnerships to boost regional security. … the work ... done is
a good model of working in partnership not necessarily telling them what they
need but also trying to look at locally designed solutions to the local based
problems, and how we can best support them.
Have a long term approach and be patient. Participant 021 admonished the
international community to have a long term approach and be patient:
I think that everything in terms of the international community, in terms of in
postconflict environment, somehow in peacekeeping, is always just too rushed.
Everything is also rushed it is always immediate and it is always short term even
if you are looking at three years, the yearly plan within that. And I think that is
damaging because you are not looking at what you are trying to achieve in a
longer term. You are just looking at immediate needs and priorities, which don’t
necessarily cumulatively add up to an overall result.
Participant 018 called for a gradualist approach to decentralization “I think it should have been
gradual. Decentralize city by city, service by service; test it, evaluate it; it shouldn’t have been a
massive national rollout”. Participant 022 observed the lack of patience on the part of the
international community supporting Liberia. According to this Participant, building a justice
system does not happen overnight, hence the international community should be patient and stay
the course:
In my view, I think what always happens is when crisis looms then the
international community is nowhere to be seen, so we allow it to explode then
there is a peace agreement then we get here then we come up with so much
money because we don’t have any information and we have so much money and
we don’t even know how to spend the money and before we know we are leaving.
… to establish a proper justice system, it takes a generation.
Build a professional criminal justice system insulated from partisan politics.
Participant 006 indicated that insulating criminal justice system appointments from
partisan politics and appointing competent people into positions within the criminal justice
system will promote national ownership:
We saw the influence and reach of the power of the President has, and so even
then, you have got people who are heads of agencies who were not supposed to
be there because they were not actually going to bring any significant
transformation; that is why there was the need to have separation of powers so the
criminal justice system would work without depending on the government.
Learn lessons from similar contexts. Participant 004 called on the international
community to learn lessons from similar contexts:
For example, the lessons learnt in Sierra Leone helped us with the implementation in
Liberia and I am sure certainly the same thing will apply in the future, the DDR
process in Somalia or even in South Sudan and of course in the Central African
Republic. The lessons learnt should be comprehensive; one shouldn’t see it as a
defensive thing. One should be honest to admit mistakes because in this world,
mistakes are made, and they are there to be corrected. And at the UN level, they
need to share the lesson learnt across so that UN country offices, subregional offices
will be in the know. When senior officials are being appointed to certain positions,
as part of the interview processes, they must look at the lessons learnt so that they
don’t come as greenhorns. You will need to read and understand the challenges that
their predecessors had …
The Government of Liberia should evaluate its engagements with the international
community on decentralizing the criminal justice system and learn lessons. Participant
008 recommended that going forward, the Government should evaluate it previous
engagement with its international partners to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system to
inform future the dealings between both parties:
So, moving forward, I think that it is important firstly, to look back within the
period under review; there are positive things that the Government did, there are
positive things that the international partners did, but there are still remaining
challenges. So why is it that we still have these challenges? It is those
shortcomings that will provide the guide we need.
Promote South-South cooperation. Participant 019 recommended that attention should
be paid to promoting South-South cooperation in exploring options in decentralizing Liberia’s
criminal justice system:
We have better examples; Ghana, Nigeria. They may not have been super the way
you want it but I believe that you have to start from somewhere. Because of the
work that I do, I had to take Liberians on a work tour with some NGOs to the
United States. I refused! I told them I cannot take these people to the United
States. It will not make any sense. … Liberia is Liberia. And I said, ‘why don’t
you take them to Ghana?’ And when they eventually agreed with me, even the
participants themselves didn’t like it. They benefited more from going to Ghana
because they saw things and came to make things a little better. They could
identify with what they were dealing with here. Subsequently we took them to
Kenya, Uganda and some of the things were similar.
Research Question 3: How has Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System affected
the System’s Functionality and Liberia’s Peace and Stability?
For ease of reference, Tables 7 and 8 presents participants' views on how decentralization
of the criminal justice system has influenced the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and
stability.
Table 7
Participants Views on the Effects of Decentralizing the Criminal Justice System on the System’s
Functionality.
Findings Number of
Responses (n)
Responses in
percentages (%)
Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice
system functional (but two participants said the
benefits are yet to be felt)
20 69
Criminal justice system has inadequate capacity and
is yet to be functional
9 31
Total Responses (N) 29 100
Table 8
Participants Views on the Effects of Decentralizing the Criminal Justice System on Liberia’s
Peace and Stability.
Findings Number of Responses (n) Responses in percentages
(%)
Decentralization of the
criminal justice system has
contributed to Liberia’s peace
and stability
2 50
Decentralization is helping to
address the root causes of
Liberia’s civil war
2 50
Total Responses (N) 4 100
I proceed to present participants answers to interview questions that aided me to answer research
question 3. Participants painted a picture of the state of the criminal justice system prior to the
period under review. This contributed to answering this research question. In this regard,
participants were asked how decentralized the criminal justice system was prior to the civil war.
Theme One: The Traditional Justice System Primary Source of Justice for Majority of
Liberians Particularly in Rural Communities
The following subthemes arise from this Theme:
Subtheme One: Before Liberia’s Civil War, Criminal Justice Services Available in
Monrovia and County Capitals
Very limited decentralized criminal justice system up to county capital. Participant
021 indicated that prior to Liberian’s civil war, the criminal justice system was decentralized.
This Participant asserted that:
Yes, technically we will say it was decentralized. I am saying that because if you look at
the criminal justice system; the police, immigration, courts, etc. were decentralized by
having for example regional officers, regional commanders from the police placed in
strategic areas. The courts and corrections system in a way were also decentralized, we
had the justice and peace courts. And these were very low-level courts.
Participant 011 indicated that, “… it was decentralized before the war; it was accessible. … So,
far as you have Supreme Court reports as far back as the establishment, it suggests to me that
that component was working especially in the counties”. Participant 009 stated that: The
criminal justice system was decentralized, however, most decisions that affected the people in
the rural areas were made in Monrovia. So, although we had the courts, the police and
immigration and all those things there, they were not particularly working in collaboration
with one another, nor were they able to sustain the workload that was required. Another
reason why I say it was not decentralized is that services in Liberia are still not decentralized,
they are
de-concentrated but it was never decentralized although we used that word, for the
term to say that the services are decentralized, they are not because they are still
concentrated in the capital city of each county. So that means that people in the
rural villages still had to travel many miles to come to get the services.
According to Participant 010:
Well, decentralized to a certain extent but not in total. Because at the time, if I
can recall, there were 9 counties in Liberia. And all 9 counties had police
officers. And others had the immigration officers. Like, there were districts in
those 9 counties. But there were sections that the criminal justice system could
not cover at the time. And the criminal justice system could not have covered all
sections because of accessibility to those particular areas. We had no roads at all
or deplorable road conditions, and because of the culture in some of those
particular areas.
Participant 012 stated that: “By and large it was decentralized; it just needed to be strengthened
… We used to have regional and district commanders, because wherever a police station is, that
area becomes a decentralized area …”. Participant 015 stated that, “we had circuit courts in all
the counties. We had magisterial courts in the counties and Justices of the Peace courts. The
police were also across the entire county”. Participant 018 stated that, “we had magisterial
courts. We had circuit courts. So, because of that we can say yes ...”. Participant 020 indicated
that, “well, not to the extent to which the hub was seeking to address. But it ran in an effective
manner then. They were able to dispense justice within the existing framework, …” Participant
024 stated that the criminal justice system had, to a limited extent, been decentralized at the
county level:
Well, I will say in theory but perhaps not in practice. I mean, they have it on the
books. They have the criminal justice system in principle rather than in, maybe,
infrastructure. … There is the provision for courts in every county. … correctional
facilities in every county; again, in theory and then police depots in the county
offices; ... So, I will say yes in theory, the system was set out to cover the entire
country. In practice, of course, it didn’t operate like that prior to the civil war -
and also, subsequently after the civil war. But certainly prior to the civil war, there
weren’t many functioning. The criminal justice system wasn’t functioning that
way, either because of a lack of deployment of criminal justice actors or
infrastructure or both.
Participant 011 stated that: “decentralized up to the county capital”. Participant 013 stated that:
I will say, yes in a sense because we have the various courts, police stations all over,
correctional institutions all over; so, in a sense yes, we had structures in all the
counties. Except you want to qualify what you mean by decentralization. In one sense,
yes you have it but, in another sense, most of the decision making was centralized. …
Well, in all the counties there were police, etc. There was an attempt to create the
criminal justice system throughout the country, at least at the county level but not
beyond that.
Lack of infrastructure and human resources affected decentralization. Participant 008 stated
that “prior to the war, accessibility to the justice system in Liberia was hampered because of the
poor road conditions. And those poor road conditions also affected the government's response
capacity and ability to provide services nationally”.
Participant 021 stated that:
Well, for the courts in locations outside Monrovia, they were not strengthened
especially when it comes to the human resource capacity, and when it comes to
even logistical capacity there were challenges. And then some of those who were
judges were like apprentices; …
Participant 015 stated that:
… we never had before the war the public defense system, where you have a
Public Defender within the different courts in the different counties. Before,
people were left alone to find lawyers to represent them. Those who did not have
money to hire lawyers were at the mercy of the judge.
Participant 010 cited the lack of logistics as a reason for the criminal justice system not
functioning:
... if a crime is committed and there is no vehicle to transport the police to the scene
and they have to walk to be able to reach a particular village, it could take them
days to get there. Even the judges are also faced with the same problem as well.
Because I have heard that there are local judges walking for about 4, 5, 6 miles to
court to be able to judge cases. How is that possible?
Decentralization of the criminal justice system is new to Liberia. Participant 023
asserted that, “when it comes to decentralization of the criminal justice system, it is quite new in
the sense that a bulk of activities have never been decentralized”. Participant 030 claimed that
“Prior to the civil war and the intervention of UNMIL, I have not seen or noticed any
phenomenal decentralization of the criminal justice system in Liberia.”
The criminal justice system was dysfunctional. Participant 015 indicated that “before
the war, there were a lot of systems that were not functioning”. Participant 021 stated that:
Over the years, one of our serious conflict factors that led to the war was the weak and a
dysfunctional justice system. So, citizens didn’t have trust in the system.
They saw it to be corrupt. They thought the system was also expensive to engage.
And then there was this common saying that there is no justice for the poor. So,
unless you have money, you cannot have justice. So, there is not much confidence
in the formal justice system. They prefer the informal justice system.
Justice of the peace courts were established to operate outside magisterial districts.
Participant 013 mentioned the role of the Justice of the Peace courts in providing criminal justice
services in the local communities:
… what happened is Justices of the Peace were commissioned by the President … They
were just like magistrates, but they operated outside magisterial areas. They hear minor
cases just as the magistrates, but they were not actually paid by the government. So, in
order for them to survive, they have to pay themselves. And in doing so, they would
come down with heavy fines, they would put people in jail, they would take on heavy
fees. So, there were many things they were doing which the Chief Justice and other
people felt that it was not good and so they had to stop.
Legal framework not supportive of real decentralization. Participant 012 stated
that: We didn’t have the structure in the law. The Act of the police was not too
elaborate until after the war where we decided to make it more formal by putting it in
the law setting out the structure of the Liberian National Police and that it should be
decentralized.
The criminal justice system provided services only in Monrovia. Participant 008
observed that:
… there were a couple of other services which were more centralized in
Monrovia. For instance, none of the counties had the capacity to handle a riot or a
civil disobedience issue in other counties. Response had to come from Monrovia.
Which means the process of investigation and prosecution was very slow. … We
had about 8,000 police officers prior to the conflict.
Traditional justice is a major source of justice in rural areas. According to
Participant
009:
In Liberia, you have two justice systems. You have the formal justice system
where you go through the courts and all that and then you have the traditional
justice system where you have the chiefs and the elders, who manage the civil
issues/non-criminal mostly in the counties; so, because of those two systems, you
will then claim that in those villages, people had some kind of access to justice in
those counties. And it can also be argued that because of the informal justice
system, a lot of things were not done up to par. People were taken advantage of; it
did not provide justice. Because if a murder for example happened, or a rape
happened, you still had to seek justice which was miles away. Because those
people were not equipped to handle those kinds of problems.
Participant 023 stated that:
Liberia has a dual justice system. You have the customary system (i.e., customary
laws) and then you have the formal system which is the formal justice system.
So, in the rural parts, the informal justice system is practiced there and then
coming to the urban part, which practices the other part of the justice system (i.e.,
the formal justice system). So, there’s always been some kind of conflict between
the formal and informal justice system.
Now that I have established the state of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the civil war, I
present participants’ views on the impact of decentralization on the functionality of the criminal
justice system and peace and stability in Liberia.
Theme Two: Criminal Justice System Showing Very Basic Signs of Functionality and
contributing to Liberia’s Peace and Stability
The following subthemes emerged from Theme Two of the Research Question under
consideration. The subthemes and statements made by participants in support of the subthemes
are captured below:
Subtheme One: The Criminal Justice System not functional and its Capacity Inadequate
many citizens yet to have access to the criminal justice system. Participant 004 stated that
decentralization is yet to make the criminal justice system functional: “… it has brought
justice to some people. But it is not as large as I would have expected it to be. So, there are
challenges … and if it is managed, it can bring about a lot more benefits to the people and
Government of Liberia”.
Participant 022 highlighted the slow progress made in the system’s functionality “… some
progress has been made but I think it is a slow process because you are coming up against self
interest; people who don’t like changing things”. According to Participant 027 “… the human
rights report on Liberia also reveals that there are still issues with the courts speedily looking into
trials, there are still a huge number of pretrial detainees.
Criminal justice system lacks basic logistics. Participant 016, used a practical challenge
encountered by people seeking criminal justice services to assess the impact of decentralization
on the system’s functionality:
You encourage people to take their cases to the police, but he gets to the police and they
say give me LD 2000 (i.e., $20) to cover the costs of the transfer of the accused to the
court and you know he doesn’t have it.”
Participant 015 observed that the infrastructure deficit in the criminal justice system is affecting
its functionality:
… we still have challenges. We do not have the correction facility we should have in all
the counties. Some of the counties right now do not have all the facilities. Even in those
places where we have a facility the size of the inmate population … can no longer
withstand the case load in terms of people who have been sent to prison after conviction,
pretrial detainees, all of those are challenges.
Criminal justice system ineffective despite decentralization (i.e., effects of
decentralization yet to be felt). Participant 021 acknowledged the fact that decentralization has
made the criminal justice system functional, but suggests that it remains ineffective: “Yes, it is
functioning, but effectively functioning I will say no”. Similar views are shared by Participant
020:
… there have been lots and lots of structural development. There have been more
prosecutors out there, with the hope that it was going to help the system, but not
as effectively or efficiently as it was intended to have been.
Decentralization has made the criminal justice system functional, but benefits are
not visible. Participant 024 admitted that decentralization has improved the criminal justice
system’s functionality however the benefits are not visible:
… when I look at my own country, our criminal justice system is something that
was and is a work in progress. And that is just because some things remain
imperfect which is the case in Liberia; you have to have a starting point. And I
think there was a successful starting point. I think the benefits of that are not
necessarily readily available, but I think that perhaps in a way that the system
might develop gradually over the years, it developed more quickly over a short
period of years than it would otherwise have. But nevertheless, the impact of that
is yet to be seen.
Participant 027 shared similar sentiments:
Well, at the very minimum I will say yes. The fact that these institutions didn’t
exist before, people had to come down to Monrovia. So minimally I will say the
fact that this system now exists; … In terms of reporting rape cases, they have
gone up; ... It is because you now have the infrastructure in our court system there
and so, I will say minimally, yes, they have been effective.
Inadequate funding, human resource capacity and infrastructure affecting
functionality of the criminal justice system. Participant 020 indicated that inadequate
personnel and infrastructure are affecting the functionality of the criminal justice system:
… the police should have had barracks built in other areas so as to hold more officers in
those areas. Because if you look at the deployment right now, the police proportion ratio,
it’s about 1 officer to 700 people. And if you even take
that ratio further as per the demography, you will realize that it goes as high as 1 to
2000 in some areas based on the lack of infrastructure for deployment or lack of support to
sustain the deployment even though the infrastructure was there. So, there should have been
more police barracks so as to decentralize the deployment. Participant 020 highlighted how
factors such as the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease and the economic downturn of Liberia’s
economy affected the decentralization of the criminal justice system:
As you may be aware, the restructuring and reform process in the UNMIL
Drawdown Plan called for support of about 8,000 police officers. However, Ebola
and the economic downturn affected this ... up to 2017, the number still remained
around 5,000 officers which was way below the threshold. So, it made it difficult
to deploy … to cover most of the areas ...
Indicators and Reasons for Criminal Justice System yet to be Functional
This section captures the indicators participants used to support their views that the
criminal justice system is dysfunctional, and the reasons they assigned for this state of affairs.
Selective justice and impunity. Participant 023 asserted that justice delivery is selective,
and impunity is rife:
There are some people who are untouchable. They can commit a crime and you
don’t touch them! But others, the very poor people on the streets that have no
means even to hire a lawyer. But in our Constitution, such people must have their
day in court and must also have legal representation. So, it is quite selective, and
it makes it more difficult for the rural parts of the country to really experience full
access to justice.
Participant 016 cited the inability of the criminal justice system to provide justice as an indicator
of a nonfunctioning criminal justice system:
Somebody’s daughter has been raped, your money has been stolen, someone has
lost a relative and the institutions are not able to facilitate the next step. … It
poses challenges. And besides that, when people are unaware of the next step,
even aware of the processes, it creates mistrust in the system.
Participant 022 described the entire situation in Liberia as fragile with adverse consequence for
the rule of law:
… for me the situation is still quite fragile politically, economically, socially, but
also, when it comes to the rule of law situation. I mean there are clear indications
from our civil society partners, especially outside Monrovia, that anybody can be
bribed, that perpetrators can buy their way out of prison. Cases can be prioritized
based on payments to judges, prosecutors, clerks, correctional officers, you name
it. And obviously it doesn’t hold very well for any justice system ...
Specialized criminal justice services yet to reach the vulnerable population.
Participant 020 lamented over the fact that the Women and Children’s Protection Unit of the
Liberia National Police, which was designed to be located very close to the vulnerable
population i.e. women and children, to provide them with specialized services, continues to be
centralized:
Take for instance the establishment of the Women and Children’s Protection Unit
within the police which should have been decentralized in all of the counties. Yes,
they are at the headquarters level but when you start from the district level, it was
not there. That’s where we had most of the problems. They were intended to have
been there in all of those areas. Unfortunately, due to the capacity problem, lack of
support, that which was intended to be a benefit to the vulnerable in those areas is
now being restricted.
On the same issue, Participant 019 noted that:
Most of these works were done in urban areas within these counties. From my
own experience, it has not been really decentralized. It hasn’t gone beyond the
county capitals for the most part. In one case though, it did. I had to devise a
strategy that went into real deep villages. I went ahead to design a program for the
Women and Children’s Protection Unit and the Liberian National Police, … they
were able to go into deep villages.
High levels of pretrial detainees. Participant 005 cited the high number of pretrial
detainees as an indicator of a dysfunctional criminal justice system:
In reality, there was a massive backlog of pretrial detention …. There was never an
attempt to try and deal with bail. Liberia had a mechanism by which pretrial
detention could be considerably dropped. In international criminology, the
principle always is that if a crime is bailable, the principle should be that the
accused should not be incarcerated, unless there is a strong risk of the offender
fleeing or alternatively a security risk because they are violent and might
intimidate witnesses etc. So even though the bail system actually existed in
Liberia, it was not being used. Or if it was used, it was usually for corrupt
purposes.
Participant 021 also cited the level of pretrial detainees as an indicator of the weakness of
Liberia's criminal justice system “One of the key weaknesses has been too many pretrial detainee
cases”.
Poor citing of the hub in Gbarnga. Participant 013 described the Gbarnga Hub as a
failure because of its location:
Yeah it was a failure. If you look at the location of the Gbarnga hub, it is far away from
the town. And security wise, you are to build the infrastructure close to the people where
they can have easy access.
Lack of coordination amongst criminal justice institutions. Participant 016 lamented
over the absence of coordination amongst criminal justice system institutions. This Participant
observed that “in most places, there is no proper coordination between the police and the courts”.
Lack of public confidence in the formal justice system. Participant 022 observed that
public confidence in the formal justice system is low:
Public confidence in the formal justice system is low. This … system does not
work for ordinary people; poor people. And if you compare it with the numbers
for the informal justice system, approval ratings, of the informal justice actors and
processes hit the roof 70+ and 80+ per cent across a wide variety of indicators in
terms of stability, speed, the human rights record, in terms of executing decisions,
rulings, judgement. So, they are the trusted ‘go to’ venue or forum. That is not a
bad thing. Of course, we would like to see to it that the most serious cases (e.g.,
rape, murder), are channeled through the formal justice system. That is happening
gradually. But there is still a very long way to go.
Hub dysfunctional due to unsupportive legal framework and lack of human
resources. Participant 008 felt that the hub concept was not working as planned and attributed
this to the existing legal framework:
So, if you wanted to use the idea of the courts, it meant that you had to go and
amend the laws and create hubs at the regional level which meant that we do not
emphasize so much on the counties. … if we had done that, it would mean that
there will be a higher court at the regional level that would have in a sense added
to decentralization. It means that, all the cases originating from the Circuit Courts
in Gbarnga, Lofa and Nimba will come to Gbarnga for review. But it did not
happen that way.
Participant 004 indicated that the hub project has not yielded the desired results due to factors
like inadequate human resources:
… it didn’t have the desired impact that we wanted. I am being frank with you,
because first and foremost we didn’t have the personnel … we never got that
target police population ratio. And then the bulk of the resources, as you would
know, was basically in the capital Monrovia, and a little bit of the resources
trickled down to the capital of the counties.
Participant 005 attributed the poor results of decentralization on the functionality of the criminal
justice system to the process being policy oriented and Monrovia-centric rather than dealing with
the situation on the ground. According to this Participant, “that also reflects the fact that the job
was very much Monrovia centered, and policy orientated, rather than looking at the processes on
the ground”.
Inadequate legal literacy amongst citizens. Participant 016 pointed to the population’s
lack of awareness of their rights and how the criminal justice system functions as a reason for the
dysfunctional criminal justice system. This Participant argued that:
Because someone expects that when someone wrongs me and I go to the court, I
expect that he will go to jail for 10 to 15 years; you find out that he does not even
know that the accused person has the right to bail. … That is why we actually
need paralegals that would help inform the people.
Lack of constitutional and judicial reform. Participant 005 opined that the lack of
constitutional and judicial reform has had an impact on decentralization and the functionality of
the criminal justice system:
I think in my personal opinion, although I may be tempted to be biased, the
weaknesses in the criminal justice system in Liberia were largely due to the lack
of a sustained and comprehensive reformed judiciary. But essentially as I said,
that was prohibited or stopped at a point when the decision was made to retain the
constitution rather than start off with a new constitution.
Multiplicity of institutions established with duplicitous mandates. Participant 005
noted the multiple institutions established by foreign organizations supporting the
decentralization process. According to this Participant, establishing these institutions was
uncoordinated and usually driven by the personal preferences of the officials and/or
organizations involved in the process and this has resulted in a duplication of functions and a
dysfunctional system:
… one of the frustrations I think, was that lots of the institutions were created and/or
supported (e.g., Palava Huts and hubs) and these were actually created and driven
by internationals living in the capital. I remember we charted out all these pieces of
institutions, and a number were functional across the whole country. Some would
work in one place and not another place. Frequently, this reflected the enthusiasm
of those internationals frequently rather than serving the needs of the locals who
looked desperately for assistance and so would say yes to anything. … There was
extreme reluctance to say no to anything that was offered. And there was a lack of
sensitivity or common sense by any of the international institutions and the local
owners. And creating these structures were not coordinated and reflected a
nonholistic systemic approach.
Lack of equity in the allocation of resources to decentralize all parts of the criminal
justice chain. Participants expressed their views on whether, comparatively, there was a fair
allocation of funding across the various parts of the criminal justice chain. This is an indicator of
whether attention was paid to all parts of the criminal justice chain as this would affect the
system’s functionality.
Unequal treatment of the various parts of the chain. The majority of participants were
of the view there was a deliberate policy to fund the police more than the other parts of the
criminal justice chain, with the corrections being the part that received the least support. This is
reflected in the statements below:
Participant 029 noted that:
… the government wanted to provide services across the counties so that the three
parts of the criminal justice chain and their services are fully functional. But of
course, with the limitation that comes with budgetary issues, they cannot. So, of
course, you will definitely find out that the attention was not equal.
Participants were asked which part of the chain reached the most attention. Participant 029 stated
“I will say the police, the next one will be the courts and then you have the prisons and
rehabilitation”. According to this Participant this is evidenced by the allocations made in the
budget:
If you have the chance to download the budget between 2011/2017, you will see
for example, the allocations made for the judiciary, the allocations made for the
police, the allocations made for the corrections and rehabilitation; you will see a
big difference.
Similar sentiments were shared by Participant 003:
… the Judiciary did their own project. So, you find that they had built courts in
several areas where they do not even have a means of transporting their own
people that come in. How do you take the prisoner to such a faraway place? The
courts, the police because they are upfront, people tend to pour more money into
them.
Participant 005 indicated that the police received the greatest attention:
I think policing received by far the biggest amount of support. And I think that
was largely focused on the need to ensure some form of physical security. The
neglected area was the prisons. They were the poor child at the door. And the
Judiciary was somewhere in the middle. They did get some significant support but
not as much as they would have liked. … I think it came down to priorities. And I
think that overall, in a peacekeeping mission, there is always going to be an
emphasis both from the Government and the international community for
stabilization. And that is always going to happen and that emphasis sometimes
leads to neglect of the judicial/justice side and I think one of the things you can
say is that towards the end, the last few years, there was talk about the criminal
justice chain and trying to look at the reform process in a holistic manner. I think
had this happened in the beginning of the Mission, if there had been sustained
engagements with the Judiciary right in the early days, and the understanding that
you needed to reform the entire criminal justice chain in a coordinated manner, it
would have actually been a more successful venture.
Participant 006 also pointed to the police as the largest recipient of support:
There was much more investment in the law enforcement agencies … One of the
areas that did not get a lot of attention were the prison system … There wasn’t
enough investment done in the prosecuting, public defenders so that there could
be a robust criminal justice system and trial process …
Participant 008 identified the police as the recipient of most of the support but also noted that the
Judiciary received adequate attention:
I still believe the Supreme Court received adequate attention in terms of funding.
Below that, the judges in the various courts got regular attention. But from an
institutional perspective, the police get more budgetary allocation simply because
of their size …. But the bulk of these vehicles were kept in Monrovia. So, on
paper, there may have been some budgetary allocation for the police, but the
management of the resources was a problem because most of those resources are
kept in Monrovia and they do not go to the various counties. … . The
prosecutorial department of the Ministry of Justice has always had the lowest
allocation. It is not properly staffed. The salaries are low. … the prosecutorial
budget is grossly inadequate. … Corrections are also the same. The facilities, and
in a way maybe people just seem to be less concerned about the prisons. People
are detained and we forget about them; that remains a major challenge. The
prisons are overcrowded and there is a lack of appropriate facilities. Even
Monrovia Central Prison, it is congested; it was built to have a capacity of
between 300 and 400 prisoners. But sometimes it goes to between 1200 and 1500
inmates.
Participant 010 rationalized the attention the police received:
… you cannot say the police received more. Honestly, the only reason why it
appears like the police received more support is because of the huge numbers,
which required more. But individually, as a police officer in terms of salary and
benefits, those are not there.
This Participant also noted:
Some parts received more. And that had a negative impact on the system also. If you
take the Judiciary; lawyers etc., and then the police, immigration, the salary disparity was so
huge. You pay a police officer very little and then you pay the judges and lawyers far more
than the rest. For example, if you don’t have the appropriate budget, the police officers not
wearing proper uniforms and they are not presented well, so their dignity is not protected,
how do they function under those kinds of atmosphere? If they are not paid on time and are
paid very little, how can they support their families? How can they send their children to
school? Participant 013 noted that “for corrections, I don’t see much improvement to what
obtained in the past because you just have the prisons”. Participant 011 noted:
Most of the attention was focused on the courts and the police components. By the
police component we mean institutions of police power (i.e., Liberia National
Police, … the Liberia Immigration Service … Drug Enforcement Agency). I will
clearly say corrections received the least.
Participant 012 noted:
They were supposed to receive the same attention but, in many instances, it was not
like that. For instance, the criminal justice system is between two branches of the
state. It is between the Executive and the Judiciary. And the Judiciary controls its
own budget. And so, they have their own control. …The amount you pay the
Judiciary is far in excess of what you pay a police officer.
Participant 013 noted “… but the police usually gets the bulk of it and maybe the Judiciary. The
security components of the police had the highest. The corrections had the lowest. I cannot
compare the rest because I do not have the figures”.
Participant 014 stated:
Corrections are always given low attention. The police get more attention because you
know the needs of the police are seen by local and ordinary people and by the politicians
… even the corrections people complain that even for example in the community, a
police officer is more respected than a corrections officer.
Participant 016 indicated that:
No! They were not treated equally. Sometimes it depends on how best you can push
your case to the Legislature. It also depends on the Minister of Justice’s own
interests. We have had ministers whose key priorities have been the prisons. We
have had a Minister whose key priority was prosecution. We have also had a
Minister whose key priority was security. So, it depends where your interest lies.
If your priority is security, you push more for security.
Participant 018 affirmed the views shared by most participants: “in my opinion, as it stands, I
don’t know the budget for those areas, but you talk about the police, I see more attention in that
sense; the cars, patrolling. In terms of the courts; I see new structures being built …” Participant
019 also noted:
… the police are the number one thing that they focused on. And I think the next one is
prisons; the Bureau of Corrections. And here is the tricky part. For the most part again,
these things were internationally driven. Some of the divisions of the criminal justice
system were created by our international partners. So, for example if you look at the
police, the Women and Children Protection Unit, that was created by UNMIL. Bureau of
Corrections, same thing. So even though you go and try to plant those things in the
interior, you will notice they have one or two officers responsible for so many counties.
Simply because the Government’s commitment to these things is not really there. They
are actually still looking to the international community to feed the system.
Participant 020 observed that:
UNMIL was concerned about having a security presence in the areas that security
was being withdrawn. … so, because the process was primarily to get uniformed
men and women in those areas, primarily the police, more of the funding went
more into getting the police in those areas. So, when you even consider the police
presence in those areas, there was physical presence. The police could make more
arrests. But were corrections available to deal with it? Was the immigration
component strong enough to handle whatever there was? So, as a result, the system
was not holistically strengthened. So, the police were dumping more on the court,
the court was dumping more on the corrections. So, as a result, there was a
disproportionate distribution of resources …
Participant 021 stated that “I think the police, immigration, and the courts received the most
compared to the corrections. Not in terms of preference but in terms of giving them priority. The
most I think is the police and the least will be corrections”. Participant 024 corroborated
assertions held by participants above, on the prominent attention the police received: Certainly
not equal attention, no. If you look at the respective resources, personnel and financial,
dedicated towards the police compared to the corrections system and compared to the justice
system as a whole, you would see that would be significantly different. Within the Government
also, I think this is common in most countries; the law and order part of the justice system is
given greater focus than those accused of crime. I think that being a postconflict environment,
certainly, there was a focus on maintaining peace and stability. There was quite a significant
focus on the law and order side of things.
Participant 007 noted that “…they did not receive equal attention. The police received the most
attention”. In spite of the views shared above on which part of the criminal justice chain received
the most support, Participant 015 departed from the general view held by the majority of
participants and stated that:
Well, I can’t really speak to equal support because I do not have the data in terms of
statistics … But I think it was done to the extent where if you really want to detect
in terms of who received greater support, there might be just a little gap in terms of
differences. Because as we were preparing the law enforcement component, which
serves as the entry when it comes to criminal cases, we were also preparing the
courts. And that is why there has been new courts constructed in places where we
never had courts in response to the decentralization of the criminal justice system.
Subtheme Two: Decentralization has made the Criminal Justice System Functional
Participants shared divergent views on the impact of decentralization on the system’s
functionality.
Criminal justice system functional due to decentralization. Participant 009 observed
that the criminal justice system “is functioning better because of two things; the access and the
fact that I feel that more cases are being heard. So, justice is not as delayed as it was before”.
Participant 026 cited the fact that police officers are seen across the Gbarnga Hub region as an
indication that the criminal justice system is functional:
… if you take hub 1 just as a case study, just by deploying police officers in to
respond to criminal incidents such as mob violence and other cases, if you talk to
people in the region, they will tell you that, the system has been really
supportive. If you also look at the perception survey done by the Peacebuilding
Office, the two perception surveys, they can tell you that people’s perception
about the criminal justice system has actually changed from negative to positive.
Participant 029 stated that:
... The police have improved in terms of the response time for incidents. They have been
very fruitful. We had a case last year where in the Lofa court facility was about to be
burnt down and we had officers from Gbarnga to respond effectively. While in the past,
you had to deploy people from Monrovia. … because we had people in Gbarnga, they
responded quickly to address that situation. So that’s one success story with the hub. …
And so, because of that through the experience, the government decided to roll the
program in the regions to ensure that services are closer to the people and that people can
have unhindered access.
Participant 017 affirmed this view: “… they respond to the regional counties, because they are
based at the hub in order to shorten response time unlike before when they respond from
Monrovia”.
Decentralization has enhanced the rule of law, access to, and oversight of, the
criminal justice system. Participant 015 stated that the County and District Security Councils
have improved security sector governance, access to the criminal justice system and oversight:
Their County and District Security Councils role is that they discuss issues that they face …
So, for example, if a community does not have a police station and there is an issue of mob
justice that continues to take place, people are being confronted with issues and there are no
courts and no police stations so the people come together to see if that issue is of security
concern, they elevate the matter to the appropriate institution. … some of the places, we have
never had a police station, magisterial court. As a result of the County Security Council
convening and making policy recommendations to the central government, the government
was able to construct magisterial courts, police stations, deploy men into those places thereby
bring the rule of law into those communities.
Participant 027 indicated that, “if decentralization had not happened, we would still have been
dealing with a system where in large parts of the country, you do not have a court, you do not
have lawyers, but I think there’s been a lot of progress …” Participant 011 shared similar views
“… it has become easier and more accessible. But that was not the case yesterday. In fact, in
some of the counties, they don’t even have the structures. Most of the counties never had
correction facilities; now they do.” Participant 024 cited the deployment of criminal justice
personnel and building of infrastructure for the criminal justice system across the country as
evidence of some functionality, because there is a presence of the criminal justice system across
Liberia:
Well, let me take the functionality of the system in the basic sense. In terms of
having actors deployed, in terms of having functionality, in terms of having a
place for a court to be, a police station presence in a county or district and having
a facility to take people securely and safely, … I mean I don’t think anyone who
has been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018 could doubt the progress
made in that, in terms of the functionality of the justice system in that way. I think
that, by and large, the police are able to respond. Not in the way that will be
expected for them to respond to individual cases and things like that, but I
certainly, think that there is a better perception of the security that the police can
provide. I think that the focus on community policing over recent years has
improved. They are starting to improve the relationship between the police and
the community; as providing a service to them. I think that the courts are more
problematic, and I think they will continue to be …
Participant 014 cited the fact that impunity is being addressed by Liberia’s criminal justice
system as evidence of how decentralization has influenced the system functionality:
... people who before were powerful can now be arrested and jailed. And for a lot
of the local people that is a lot of achievement ... that the powerful now are under the
umbrella of the law. So that is quite important. ... So, in most of the places, people
who were acting with impunity are now careful of what to do because their people
are going to jail and staying there for a long period. And so gradually it is serving as
a protection mechanism for local people who were before powerless to say, ‘I will
go to the police.
Participant 010 indicated that, “yes, it has become more functional than before because the
system did not reach out to certain areas. But now, they have reached out to other areas, far more
than it used to be”. Participant 029 also indicated that decentralization of the criminal justice
system had enhanced the presence of the criminal justice system across Liberia: Yes. … I will
take the judiciary for example. Across the counties before, we had people who were serving as
magistrates but were not lawyers. With the decentralization, they identified that as a critical
problem and what they have done is to introduce a training program to ensure that these guys go
through a 1 year or 1 year 6 months training so that they get the basics of law before they can
serve as magistrates. So that has enhanced the delivery of the service so that they can be
delivered at the county or community level.
Participant 017 cited the reduction in the number of cases on the court docket in the Gbarnga
Circuit Court as evidence of the functionality of the criminal justice system arising from the
Gbarnga Hub:
Now what has happened is that; one, there has been more focus on the justice
delivery system. So, there is great improvement in terms of how justice is
delivered at the courts. The evidence is that, cases that are on the docket of the
Gbarnga Circuit Court has really reduced.
Participant 008 stated that:
Decentralization has also helped to hold the government to look at all of the
counties in a way, because allocation may not be sufficient. … because of the
political activity in Liberia, those representatives are now serving as a mouthpiece
to address the legal challenges that they may have in their county. And the way to
respond to their concerns is not to bring those people to Monrovia but to open
other avenues to get redress so it has opened the eyes of many people. And mind
you, the decentralization process has also gone with some level of advocacy, …
so, people are demanding; they are not just sitting down as passive.
Participant 016 indicated that the Gbarnga Hub has improved oversight and accountability of the
criminal justice system:
The County Attorneys, security, courts, have to give reports, and the
establishment of the hub brought in special offices that allows for mechanisms to
check judicial and security actors in the county. So, a police officer knows that he
or she is not above the law. Citizens can complain to the hub manager and the
case can be forwarded, and several disciplinary actions taken.
In the words of Participant 030:
… . The current structure of the criminal justice system has been the Women and
Children Protection Section in the Liberia National Police. Prior to the civil war,
the Liberia National Police did not have this Section. In Montserrado County,
Criminal Assizes D and E were created by legislative enactments thereby
increasing the criminal courts to five (criminal assizes A, B, C, D and E). Besides,
the Supreme Court of Liberia, in exercise of its authority under Article 75 of the
Constitution promulgated Judicial Canons that provide for the Judiciary Inquiry
Commission that investigates complaints of impropriety against judges and
magistrates and makes appropriate recommendations to the Chief Justice for
consideration of the Supreme Court Bench.
As an indicator of decentralization having made the criminal justice system functional,
Participant 030 listed the services that have been decentralized in the Gbarnga Hub. According to
this Participant:
As a result of the establishment of the Gbarnga Regional Justice and Security Hub
criminal justice services such as confidence patrol by the Police and Border Patrol
Officers of the Liberia Immigration Services (LIS) have been extended to the
towns and villages in those regions where the hub is established but this
decentralization involves huge budgetary support. With UNMIL full presence in
Liberia having ended, the criminal justice system in Liberia is as responsive as it
was when UNMIL and other donors provided material and financial support.
Participant 011 attributed the functioning of the criminal justice system to the new administrative
structures created to manage processes within the criminal justice system. According to this
Participant, “today, we have a different system of managing them. We now have court
administrators, and looking at these people and their qualifications, that is a different ball game
all together”. Participant 026 said, “yes, I think it has reduced some of the tension that was being
placed at the central level, some of the areas never had magistrates, some of the areas never had
judges”. Participant 018 stated that, “… the courts are looking better, magistrates are being
trained. … outside of Monrovia, at least some people now have access to the justice system.
Some are close to the courts and the police”. According to Participant 029:
… decentralization has been beneficial in a lot of ways because they are able to
enhance the delivery of services across the country; and so, people can now access
different services in different parts of the country. But it has also created
challenges when it comes to sustainability of the projects and programs. … And
the government in most instances is not able to match up and sustain those
services … the Government didn’t roll out a plan to ensure that when the funding
dried up, … So, it is actually a fault from the Government’s point of view.
According to Participant 015, decentralization has engendered public confidence in the criminal
justice system and promoted the rule of law: “it has developed trust in the formal justice system
by our people. The second thing is, it has reduced mob justice because people feel now that they
can go to court; the court is effective”. Participant 021 claimed that decentralization has educated
citizens on how to access the criminal justice system “… to an extent yes. Because if you look at
the whole consciousness. The citizens are conscious minded compared to before”. Participant
008 indicated that:
… there has been some form of justice simply because of decentralization. So,
because of that access to justice, access to the players that are in that system,
enables people to benefit a little bit more from those elements of the justice
process whether it is the right to appeal, or preserve their innocence and all those
things.
Participant 008 also asserted that, “so, when you talk about decentralizing the criminal justice
system within the Liberian context, it reinforced the structure that was there before the war but to
make it more functional …” Participant 014 stated that:
Well, there are a number of buildings in Gbarnga and prosecutors as well. They
have the County Attorney. This means that at all times, there will be prosecutors
both at the circuit court level and at the magisterial level. … From what I have
seen, visiting Gbarnga, there are cases being heard. And then maybe because of
its proximity to Monrovia, they are a little bit monitored and those who manage it
know they are being monitored.
According to Participant 006:
I will say in some parts of Monrovia, some of the courts were working well;
functioning effectively more than others... a solid response, a solid investigation
etc. Some trials were able to start … That is why I say aspects of it worked better
than others.
Participant 014 indicated that, “the hubs have been established but they are yet to be functional in
all the other parts of the country. The Gbarnga Hub so far, I think, is the best functioning and that
is for central Liberia. It is well functioning with courthouses, magisterial etc.”
Reform of legislation has enhanced the criminal justice system’s functionality. Participant
011 indicated that the enactment of legislation for the Liberian National Police had enhanced the
criminal justice system’s functionality:
Today, our Liberian police, which is the first component of the criminal justice system, at
least have laws, unlike yesterday, when their jurisdiction was not spelt out. There are
systems that are put in place that were not put in place before.
Subtheme Three: Criminal Justice Chain Working Together
Participants were also asked if the various parts of the criminal justice chain were
working together. This was to ascertain how functional the criminal justice system is, their
responses were mixed.
Participants expressed the following views in support of the opinion that the parts of the
criminal justice chain are working together.
Participant 005 stated that on a day to day basis the various parts of the criminal justice
chain were working together:
My feeling was that on a day to day basis, they worked relatively well together.
But there were clear examples why some of the things were disjointed. For
instance, judges were not considering the capacity of prisons to hold prisoners.
This was especially important in Monrovia, where petty criminals will often
be incarcerated and put in very unfavorable conditions.
Participant 010 expressed the view that the various parts of Liberia's criminal justice chain were
working together as there was coordination amongst them. According to this Participant, “there
is now coordination between the police, immigration and the courts”. This view was also shared
by Participant 012 who stated that “yes there is collaboration, coordination and cooperation
among and between the justice and security institutions”. Participant 026 stated that:
Yes, they are. If you went to Gbarnga for example and say there is a rape case, the
SGBV Crimes Unit will go and do an investigation, then the police will go and
arrest, then the police will turn the person to the court and the court will do the
investigation and then if the person requires going to jail, then they will send them
to jail. But of course, I am not denying the issue of prison overcrowding; they are.
It is a critical challenge which has several factors.
Participant 029 stated that the various parts of the criminal justice system are working together at
the county and national level “Yes they are working. There is coordination between the various
sectors both at the national and county levels. Yes, they are working”. Participant 015 stated that:
Yes, they are working together. The only issue as I speak to you are the challenges
that each institution faces. But with respect to the formal work, they have been
working together. Before the war, if someone was taken to court, or the police
station, the police conduct the investigation, and submit their findings with the
person. But right now, when someone is taken to the police station, they have to ensure
that you have a lawyer at the police station. So, it has improved. So that coordination is
there. Years back, you had to find your lawyer when you came to court. But now once
you get to the court and you do not have a lawyer, the a defense attorney under the
public defense arrangement provides you that. … I agree there are issues. That is
why I said, it is true the system is working but there are still challenges. …, under
the law, they provide for release, after two Terms of Court, if you are not being
brought before the judge for trial ... over the years, lawyers have been invoking
that law. So, the law is working, and it is being applied. So, with respect to the full
application functioning, I will continue to say that once the system is established
and it is working, there are still gaps that we need to resolve. … All three parts
have to be well functioning in order to be effective. All the components have
challenges. They have capacity, logistical
issues …
Subtheme Four: Criminal Justice Chain not Working and/or Partially Working together
Participant 022 stated that:
They have to, they don’t have a choice. But I think the coordination and
communication can be a lot better. If you look at the performance of the
individual institutions, you will see some progress. But the performance of the
chain as a whole has some gaps (e.g., lack of coordination and even the
attitude). ... The police investigation is done; prosecution does an excellent work
and everything is ready but then the courts mess up. The case doesn’t appear on
the docket for whatever reason. Maybe it could be corruption or whatever
sluggishness. But that ultimately means that people who suffered as a result of
this crime will still be disappointed. Lost files etc. that really have a direct bearing
on the sector as a whole. There is still a lot of room for improvement.
Participant 023 cited existing conflicts between various parts of the criminal justice chain as
evidence that parts of the chain are not functional:
We have tried to see how, as a nation, we could be promoting criminal justice
practices. But you also see that they are in conflict with each other. The police and
prosecution, there is always conflict. The police think that they are not getting the
best of support because, for example, the lawyers are prosecutors, are to present
evidence to the courts for a crime that someone will be charged with. Now they
go to court without the real evidence. When a prosecutor loses a case, they think
that it is as a result of the fact that the police did not do their work. Because
assuming the police provides tangible evidence on that particular criminal case,
then they would have done their best in the courts. ... When you come to the
courts and the prisons, there is also conflict between the two. The prisons think that
the court is overburdening them. Budgetary allotment given them is quite limited.
Participant 013 stated that:
They are playing their role, but how effective they are playing this role is the
issue. So, if you have overcrowded jails and prisons, it means something is
wrong. That means either the courts are not functioning well or because some
people just get lost in the system. So yes, they are working, individually per their
mandate but then there is a need to have regular consultation meetings to
exchange ideas.
Participant 014 expressed frustration over the lack of implementation of the bail system in
Liberia, because it was violating the rights of accused persons because they were being held in
custody for an inordinately long period:
… if someone comes to complain to the police that a crime has been committed, and the
police arrest the person and the person is charged and sent to court, it happens that the person is
in jail. So, the bailing system as it is now is not effective. The complainant doesn't come to the
hearing; the person stays in jail for a long time without bail. To keep someone in jail for a long
time, beyond 30 days, is a violation of the person’s rights. The rule of law should provide for
that. Participant 001 indicated that the various parts of the criminal justice chain are not working
together “I give a straight no! … Because if they were working together it means that processing
the case would be easier. Because they are not working together, the cases are not completed”.
This view was shared by Participant 019 who stated:
… So, the police are doing one thing, the prisons are doing another thing. For
example, you will hear from the police that the reason why many people are going
to prison and are complaining is because of the prison being overcrowded. And it
is because the court is sending people there for very minor cases. … So, you see
the coordination is not there.
Participant 020 also cited the existence of overcrowded prisons as evidence that the parts of the
chain are not working together. “I just mentioned to you the issue of the overcrowded prison, the
stuck up dockets. So, they are not working efficiently.” Participant 008, agreed that the various
parts of the criminal justice are not working together and attributed the state of affairs to unequal
budget allocation:
… clearly, this is where the budgetary allocation comes in. The budgetary
allocation into the system has not been uniform. Maybe, Monrovia receives a lot
more because that is where the capital is, maybe counties where you have
concessions will maybe receive a lot more. And there are counties where they are
really suffering. … So, this is the problem, the architecture is there, if you look on
paper, you will see that each county has a police post, has a court, it has a
prosecutor but none of these institutions work very well. If the appropriate
budgetary allocation is not given to them …this remains the challenge. Salaries
are very low and in some of the areas it is not forthcoming; it is not coming in
regularly, and some of them have nothing to work with.
Participant 025 indicated that:
… there was some problem with the justice system in itself because there had difficulties
cooperating with the Chief Justice and getting the program in place and there were
strong sensitivities between different parts of the justice chain and all these things rather
than us working towards the various government institutions and developing programs
for the different parts of the rule of law chain, we never got the holistic approach to
solving the issues of the different parts.
Participant 009 observed:
No. Not anymore. But we did through 2011-2017, until the Minister of Justice
Christiana Tah left, we worked in harmony because we had one goal; to ensure we
had an integrated system, a holistic system, looking at it in a whole. She loved
that word, holistic system, where all the chains were connected, and all was
working in harmony; that’s what she was aiming for. But is that what we got? No!
Because when she left, and the acrimony set in, people then went back to thinking
about their system, their institutions, so it became individual. But something that
helped us again was UNMIL’s drawdown. That helped us again in trying to work
together in a holistic manner, trying to reform the system.
Participant 024 noted that the working relationship between parts of the criminal justice has
improved even though the institutions/agencies see themselves as competitors: I think they
are working together better than they had been. I think that there are still limitations like
before in each of the institutions and understanding their responsibilities and seeing it as a
joint responsibility. And I still think that they still see each other as competitors for their
resources. I do think they are more aware of each other’s needs and limitations. I think that
they are more aware that they can function more effectively if they were together.
Participant 0021 also observed that “they are working together, but there is a need for
strengthening coordination. They are working but may not be effective”.
Subtheme Five: Decentralization has Contributed to Peace and Stability
Participants shared varied views on the contribution of a decentralized criminal justice on
Liberia’s peace and stability.
Decentralization has ensured peace and stability. Participant 001 stated that citizens
are resorting to the criminal justice system to resolve their disputes and this is contributing to
peace in Liberia:
Maintaining peace and security in Liberia, they have succeeded. Because the
communities realized that they are able to solve some of their issues, but others can be
solved through the criminal justice system. … they are able to solve it through the
criminal justice court.
Participant 026 affirmed Participant 001 assertion by stating that:
Yes, it has. Because we were able to deploy more lawyers, judges, more cases are
being heard at the local level, and now when people have issues, they are able to
go to the court rather than put the law into their own hands. So, if you look at the
issue of mob violence, even though it is still happening, it has reduced
considerably. Most of the cases in the various courts are being dealt with in a
faster way as compared to before.
Subtheme Six: Decentralization is Addressing Some Causes of the Civil War.
According to Participant 008 decentralization is helping to address the root causes of the
war: I think it has been beneficial to the Liberian people; the benefits that the people are entitled
to in a democratic process, …, the very things we were trying to address have been identified as
the root cause of the conflict. Participant 021 stated that “yes, for the purpose of stabilization; for
the purpose of sustaining our peace and in the light of consolidating out peace and also for the
purpose of meeting elements of the Sustainable Development Goals”. Participant 021 also stated
that decentralization of the criminal justice system has helped to address the concerns of citizens
“… in a way it helped to accelerate the process of addressing citizen concerns”.
Research Question 3. 1: How can the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice System be
Improved?
Table 9 below presents participants recommendations on how the functionality of
Liberia’s criminal justice system can be improved.
Table 9
Recommendations and Actions to Improve the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice
Institutions
Recommendations Actions required
Undertake institutional
reform and development of
Liberia’s criminal justice
institutions/system
Provide adequate financial resources to
implement the decentralization process
Reform the criminal justice system’s
legal framework
Address infrastructure gaps but abandon
the hub concept
Increase number of court terms, police
officers and judges and the use of the
traditional justice system
Enhance coordination and oversight of
the criminal justice chain.
(Table Continues)
Deployment of criminal justice officials
outside Monrovia
Use technology to make the criminal
justice system accessible
Improve logistics
Overhaul the entire criminal justice
system
Improve communication, outreach and
legal literacy of the population about the
criminal justice system
Change of attitude required
Cultivate strong culture of integrity in
criminal justice officials, ensure
coordination and oversight of the
criminal justice chain.
Decentralization processes must be
Liberian owned as well as sustainable
and international partners should remain
credible.
Focus on the population who are the
intended recipients of criminal justice
system services
The following opinions were shared by participants on how the functionality of Liberia’s
criminal justice system could be improved:
Theme One: Develop Criminal Justice Institutions and Modify Approaches to Making the
System Accessible.
Two subthemes emerged from this Theme.
Subtheme One: Institutional Reform and Development
Overhaul the entire criminal justice system. Participant 005 called for a fundamental
reform of the entire criminal justice system:
… infrastructure is fine but when infrastructure is not accompanied by a
systematic reform process, inevitably the reform process is flawed. By
concentrating on infrastructure rather than engaging in systemic reform issues, I
think Liberia lost an opportunity to really see the comprehensive judicial reform
or a wider criminal justice reform.
Provide adequate financial resources. Participant 001 recommended “adequate
resourcing for all the various parts or the criminal justice chain”. Participant 003 shared similar
views: “I think in order to have a functional system in any way, you need to pour resources into
it”. Participant 008 shared a similar “… provide adequate budgetary support”. In the words of
Participant 017 “the only thing that can be further enhanced is the budgetary allocation”.
Participant 006 advocated for an increase in funding to support the various decentralization
processes “… we should have looked at funding support. We had to prioritize the building blocks
and actually make sure that we are matching those capacity building and development
arrangements with funding”.
Undertaking law reform. Participant 008 advocated for law reform “look at the laws,
there will be a need to reform some of the areas; criminal procedure laws”. Participant 020 called
for “law reform, increasing capacity and changing the existing law”. Participant 029 noted that,
“some of the laws are archaic and so there is a need to look at it and ensure that they reflect the
common reality”. Participant 019 called for legislation to strengthen coordination amongst
criminal justice institutions: “One of the things I tried to do that we could not do was to look at
the Ugandan example where they were able to do some kind of legislation that makes all the
justice system chains work together”.
Increase the number of court terms, police officers and judges as well as involve the
traditional justice system. Participant 029 advocated for an increase in the number of court
terms and judges as well as use of the traditional justice system for dealing with minor criminal
offences:
… increase the number of court terms or can we increase the number of judges in
the court? Or is it possible to use the traditional justice system to address some of
these petty or minor cases … we can use the traditional system to handle very
petty cases that the chief in the town or elders can be able to settle.
Participant 016 stated that “you need more police stations and officers”. Participant 030 noted
that:
The customary justice system as a parallel legal system is not well structured and
given its rightful place in our justice system. There is a need to elevate the
customary justice system by revising regulations, repealing and amending statutes
relating to Liberian customary law and practices
Address infrastructure gaps but abandon the hub concept. Participant 008
recommended the abandonment of the hub concept because it has been overtaken by the passage
of time. This Participant said that; “I think we have passed that stage now.”. Participant 009
identified the need to address the infrastructure gaps within Liberia’s criminal justice system:
“we have infrastructural issues ... so it is not one thing that has to be addressed”. This Participant
recommended that infrastructure of the criminal justice system must be located close to
beneficiaries. This supports Participant 008 recommendation to abandon the hub concept which,
conceptually, is large scale infrastructure. Participant 029 also advocated for “… smaller ones
than a huge infrastructure that is unsustainable”.
Deploy criminal justice officials outside Monrovia. Participant 018 also recommended
that criminal justice system officers should be deployed outside Monrovia. According to this
Participant, “pretrial detainees are still there but lawyers are not encouraged to deploy outside
where the services are decentralized”. Participant 021 supported the call to deploy personnel
outside Monrovia by indicating that the deployment must not be on paper but must result in the
physical movement of criminal justice professionals. This Participant said, “you have got
personnel in places on paper for instance you see that on paper about 102 police officers have
been deployed to a location outside Monrovia but on the ground, they are about 4, and they are
being paid …. They come back to Monrovia”.
Improve communication, outreach of criminal justice institutions and legal literacy.
Participant 027 advocated for an improvement in communication and outreach on the rights of
citizens, the workings of, and services provided by the criminal justice:
I think there is still a need for a lot of communication; a lot of outreach. In some
places people still do not know that these services are available beyond Monrovia.
People need to be aware of that. People need to understand their rights. There is still
a lack of awareness on rights.
Capacitate civil society, the criminal and; traditional justice systems. Participant 022
advocated for an improvement in human resources and infrastructure for the criminal justice
system and the strengthening of civil society and informal justice system:
We should continue to support the employment of qualified staff for different
counties. A lot of magisterial judges/lawyers are not well trained, so training is
important in addition, beefing up of personnel should continue, but with
sustainability in mind because ultimately the Government will have to absorb that
cost (i.e., salaries and maintenance cost). There is the need to create a conducive
environment for these people to work in. So of course, there is the need for
infrastructure and office supplies, but at the same time, continue to invest in civil
society and the informal justice system because civil society plays an important
watchdog role and the informal justice system will continue to be the preferred
choice for the overwhelming majority of Liberians, especially when it comes to
the nitty gritty issues.
Participant 023 also called for training of criminal justice system personnel:
I think in my mind, even though they have done quite a number of crusades, there
has to be more training for criminal justice practitioners; the police, prosecutors
and judges. So now we are training judges and clerks because, in that way, the
courts become more functional and people can begin to trust the courts and there
could be accountability.
Participant 029 also recommended that the authorities, “ensure that people are trained to deliver
services”. Participant 004 advocated for the recruitment of qualified personnel to work in
Liberia’s criminal justice system:
… any criminal justice system in the world, no matter how you design it, if it has
no qualified professional men and women of high integrity, it can’t work. … Most
of the time in many postconflict societies which is what we find... you design
something, and you don’t have the men and women qualified, with experience to
run it. ... so, you bring in foreigners who simply don’t know the system, who
simply don’t know the culture. Example, Liberia is one of the Anglo-American
systems, and also, they have a traditional justice system which you find across the
rural part of Liberia. Liberia has a dual justice system, and the dual system can
only work if you have qualified professionals.
Enhance coordination and oversight within the criminal justice chain. Participant
008 recommended that attention should be paid to all parts of the criminal justice chain: It
is not enough to strengthen prosecution if you cannot strengthen the judicial
process. Say you want to eliminate prolonged pretrial detentions; what does that
mean? The police have a role to play with that; the judges have a role to play with
that; the prosecution has a role to play with that. So, we need to have a system
that will look at all the various organizations and we bring them up
simultaneously; all of them have to operate in a parallel way …
Participant 009 highlighted the need to address institutional and systemic weaknesses of the
criminal justice system:
We got institutionalized blockages in our criminal justice system. If we are
looking at the system in a holistic manner; starting from the police going all the way
to the prisons, we have institutionalized blockages. And ensuring that they work
together as one and trying to unblock the system in all of these parts would help or
hinder the functioning of the system.
Participant 008 recommended that criminal justice institutions should be strengthened: So,
if you look at the police, more work needs to be done. It is more than just
numbers. They need to work. I can tell you the whole investigative process of the
police is very weak. So, you need to strengthen those institutions. And strengthen
them at the national and local levels. And when I say national level, I mean
Monrovia, but also throughout the country.
Participant 014 called for bail to be used to ensure suspects are not held in custody for prolonged
periods because this violates their rights. According to this Participant, “to keep someone in jail
for a long time is a violation of the person’s rights. The rule of law should provide for that”.
Improve logistics. Participant 014 advocated for the provision of adequate logistics “I
think providing logistical support. For example, if you have no vehicle for the Magistrate Sitting
Programme ... there is a need for inclusion in the budgetary allocation”. Participant 029 called for
the introduction of mobile courts in the justice delivery process:
… in some counties, we can use the mobile court system - where we take the
lawyers and judges and they go to specific circuits and sit there to handle some of
the cases. So, there can be a mobile court that other counties use to enhance the
justice system.
Use technology. Participant 015 recommended using technology to make the criminal
justice system accessible:
Law enforcement itself has major components; the individual components and of
course the technological hardware that is needed to help you to be more effective.
Take for example, officers are in this day and time doing manual traffic control at
major intersections. It is supposed to be managed by traffic lights and cameras so
that if someone violates traffic regulations, his license plate is photographed by
the camera and his information is taken to a control center. So, we come to be
professional in investigation, getting fingerprints, and developing the evidence for
court. If you are challenged in those areas, it makes it difficult to do proper
presentation in terms of evidence before the court. So, then you bring the
prosecutor to a point where they have to go the extra mile in terms of proving the
accused person’s guilt.
Participant 029 advocated for technology to be used for record keeping and tracking cases within
Liberia’s criminal justice system:
… do we have a digital system where we can be able to track the cases across the
country? For example, if a judge comes to a court; if we have a digital system that tracks
the cases when they came in, and how they were defended, and you know basically, to
know the cases that are overdue.
Participant 022 cautioned against unbridled use of technology to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system:
I am personally not in favor of pushing for some sort of digital revolution maybe
also, because I have seen expensive attempts including in Timor Leste where
millions were invested and didn’t really lead to any meaningful efficiency. …
Electricity is still a big problem in Liberia. Finance is a big problem. Facilities
like offices are not there to accommodate expensive equipment. And again, I will
also bring up the sustainability issue, we buy very expensive equipment for
instance solar panels. So, what happens when the machines break down in places
like Grand Kru. … You don’t need anything fancy. Mobile phones are a very
important tool of communication in this country. Coverage is quite good and
cheap. It is important that staff in the field will also have phones and that they are
able to communicate; not that they are not communicating, they are with their
superiors in Monrovia. … So, I think that it is a bit early especially outside the
capital. I don’t see how this could work.
Subtheme Two: Change in attitude and approach required
Decentralization processes must be Liberian owned, sustainable and international
partners should remain credible. Participant 008 called on Liberia to embrace local ownership
of the decentralization process: “Liberia also needs to support local ownership”. Participant 018
advocated for attitudinal change amongst criminal justice officials:
You see most of the time people can change the law; you can reform it from
different angles, but how are people going to abide by it? Legal education, more
professional approach to work, everything is not politics. People must take their
work seriously. How much does it take to do that? … So how can people take the
job seriously? Be it a cleaner or a judge, you must play your part; do your best.
Participant 010 stated that projects must be sustainable:
… I don’t think the approach was balanced in terms of maintaining and sustaining the hubs.
And that the international community did not focus on it properly. An appropriate approach
will be to come back to the drawing board and look at the whole concept and see what the
challenges are and let the commitment be real, otherwise there will still be problems.
Participant 016 highlighted the inadequate attention that was paid to ensure that the various
interventions geared towards decentralizing the criminal justice system could be sustained by the
Government of Liberia after international support had dried up “… the international community
should have discussed sustainability more. They should have conducted a lot of training for
qualified personnel to be able to sustain those systems”. Participant 015 recommended that
Liberia’s Government must ensure sustainability of activities to decentralize the criminal justice
system. According to this Participant, “what is critical right now is the issue of sustainability.
How can the government strategize to sustain what they themselves led to put in place”?
According to Participant 008, the involvement of nongovernmental organizations in the
decentralization process created challenges for sustainability of the projects after the
international funding ended. This Participant also stated that: “I wouldn’t say the involvement of
NGOs affected the legitimacy, but it did have an impact on sustainability, especially long term
sustainability. Because when an international NGO comes, the time there is limited; they leave
when their time comes”. Participant 022 explained the state of the Government’s finances: …
we know that the government budget has gone down in recent years especially after the Ebola
crisis and there was a standstill in the Liberian economy. After 2014, it hasn’t really seen that 7
or 8% growth that was there prior to Ebola. So, let’s say $550 million a year. I mean it is a
small country, but it is still not a lot of money to play with and between 70 and 80 million
allotted for justice and security.
Participant 004 disagreed with the assertion that maintaining the hubs is too expensive for the
Liberian government to sustain from its resources:
I don’t agree with that. Liberia has the resources to manage the hubs, ... The
problem that we face as Africans is that, we simply don’t put in the resources to the right
things … We need to have a culture whereby every year we put 5 pens down and out of
the 5 pens, we say we will use 3 pens of that to do this and that and keep the remaining 2
and save it and use it when there is an emergency. Participant 027 identifies with the
position that the Government of Liberia can fund the operations of the Gbarnga Hub:
I think the question is, can the national budget maintain the hub? Yes, I think it
can … I think we may be discussing the misallocation of resources, but I don’t
think that we can talk about the insufficiency of the resources …
Participant 020 talked about sustainability and recommended that Liberia’s international partners
should not have undertaken a total overhaul of the Liberia National Police. According to this
Participant, the restructuring of the police should have kept some of the old experienced and
skilled hands:
… there was certain expertise that is no more there in the police. We never got it
back. There is an old adage here that says, ‘you sit on the old mat, to plait the new
mat’. So, you cannot tear up the old mat and sit on the ground to plait a new mat.
So, I believe that there was expertise that they threw away.
Participant 011 recommended that Liberia’s international partners should remain credible and
consistent:
But let me just say this; partnership goes with confidence first and credibility. In
many instances where you see the goalposts being shifted in the middle of the
game and the rules changing in the middle of the game, there is an issue that
should be addressed. If it is not addressed, they become a problem with the
partnership.
Cultivate a strong culture of integrity in criminal justice officials, ensure
coordination and oversight of the criminal justice chain. Participant 024 opined that the
functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system can be achieved by getting each part of the
criminal justice chain to play its role and improving oversight and accountability within the
system. According to this Participant:
… ensuring that people have the system move, which is partly to do with everybody
playing their role, the police doing their jobs better, the prosecution doing their jobs
better, the judiciary doing their jobs better, ... But I think the only way that that
happens is when there is effective oversight, accountability, and improved
management in the system.
Participant 016 also advocated for strengthening oversight and accountability measures within
the criminal justice system:
There are a lot of complaints that cases are brought to the police station and they
charge money or else they will not. All of those have to be stopped. We need
strong disciplinary measures against police officers that fail to abide by the law.
Participant 013 recommended that “people working there must be honest; must be
credible; and they must be professional. If we can get a high level of professional people, that
will make a difference. And of course, avoid corruption”.
Pay attention to the recipients of criminal justice services. Participant 024 indicated
that too much attention was paid to criminal justice service providers to the neglect of recipients
of criminal justice services, a situation this Participant recommends must change:
I also think that our focus was so much on the providers of the service rather than the
recipients of the service. … there was very little focus on their responsibilities as the
police, as the judiciary, as the prosecution and much more focus on what their needs
were. And I think that the international community facilitated that thinking and also
encouraged competition between the different institutions of the criminal justice system
rather than a communal responsibility.
Participant 021 called for deliberate actions to build public confidence in the criminal justice
system:
Over the years, one of our serious conflict factors that led to the war was the weak and
dysfunctional justice system. So, citizens didn’t have trust in the system. They saw it to
be corrupt. They thought the system was also expensive to engage. And then there was
this common saying that there is no justice for the poor. So, unless you have money you
cannot have justice. So, there is not much confidence in the formal justice system. They
prefer the informal justice system. In fact, there is a survey … that alone indicates that the
population has more trust in the informal justice system. They prefer to go to the chiefs
and the community leaders for justice.
Participant 025 recommended that the focus in the decentralization process should be on
services rather than infrastructure “… in terms of the immediate impact of the 5 hubs, … the
focus should be on services in the different regions rather than bricks and mortar”.
Participant 020 also recommended the adoption of a conflict sensitive approach to law
enforcement:
… I spoke about a conflict sensitive oriented approach to law enforcement ... You
know elections the world over there are serious challenges. Even in Liberia, the
international community was seriously concerned that our first election was going
to be handled solely by the Liberia police. And we didn’t have time to theorize the
whole concept, but we applied it and it worked. So, if this concept can now be
theorized and officers can relate to it, I honestly believe that we can see a 100%
delivery of criminal justice services as relates to law enforcement.
Participant 023 recommended the introduction of a paralegal scheme in Liberia:
I have visited for example, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa; one of the
things that they have done is to empower the criminal justice sector such as using
paralegals. For me, they stand as a bridge between the population and
decentralizing the criminal justice system. Because in Liberia right now, we still
have a challenge of formally recognizing paralegals. We are still pushing this, and
we hope that it will come... Because lawyers are assuming that if you were to give
a go ahead to, or license paralegals …; … lawyers are going to be out of job
because cases are not going to come up for prosecution and paralegals will be
assumed as lawyers. … So, we are still trying to persuade them.
Participant 024 also recommended the establishment a paralegal program in Liberia: I
think one of the principal things is the paralegal systems that have been used or
established effectively in other parts of Africa but also specifically within West
Africa. I think that in terms of accessibility and in terms of decentralization and
improving people’s access to the justice system and understanding of the justice system.
I think there is obvious resistance to that in Liberia. But nevertheless, I do think that
there is something that could be learned from that, there are similar problems across all
of those systems and across other countries as well where there aren’t enough lawyers.
You just don’t have enough in the formal system to process the kind of people that are
coming into the system. And therefore, you need to go out. And I think there are some
really interesting approaches in other places (e.g., Sierra Leone, Nigeria) … Liberia has
got absolutely no real justification for refusing to take this stuff forward.
Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter 4, I presented the data collected and the findings from 30 interviews
conducted for this study. Through the interviews, participants shared their views on the
approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, the extent to which national
ownership principles were upheld in the decentralization process, and how decentralization has
affected the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and Liberia’s peace and stability.
Participants also made recommendations on what international actors supporting the
decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice system could do to ensure national ownership of the
decentralization process. As previously noted, 7 themes and 25 subthemes connected to this
study’s research questions and the relevant literature were identified. Overall, participants
pointed out that actors supporting the decentralization process were both national and
international. National actors included the Government of Liberia, civil society organizations and
local communities. The international actors included the United Nations, the African Union, the
European Union and the Governments Germany, Ghana, Japan, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United
States of America. Whereas participants acknowledged the role of ordinary Liberians and their
Government, they believed the process was elite and foreign driven with local communities
being informed rather than consulted on the process. Participants observed the lack of national
ownership of the process and the challenges of sustaining the process after international support
has ended had affected the outcome of the process to make criminal justice services accessible
across Liberia. Participants were also critical about the neglect of the traditional justice system,
which is the main source of justice for ordinary citizens particularly those residing outside the
major cities. In Chapter 5, I discuss the results of this study, draw conclusions, highlight the
implications of this study’s findings for social change, and make recommendations.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
“… building state institutions and structures, without … paying attention to developing
relations between the state and its people, will not … benefit peacebuilding in the long
term …” (Gordon, 2014, p. 126).
Introduction
My purpose in this grounded theory qualitative case study was to identify the
approaches used in decentralizing criminal justice services in Liberia to determine
how inclusive and nationally owned the decision making and implementation of the
decentralization processes were. I also ascertained whether decision makers were
cognizant of Liberia’s peculiar context (e.g., history, social structure, actors,
resources, and legal framework) in deciding the approaches to be used to decentralize
the criminal justice system. I also investigated the influence, if any, of
decentralization on the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system and her
peace and stability as well as identified homegrown and tailored recommendations to
enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system. Further I was interested in
knowing participants views on how international actors could support nationally
owned and inclusive processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system as
well as how decentralization of the criminal justice system had affected the way the
system functions and Liberia’s peace and stability.
Research Questions
The following Research Questions were answered in this study:
RQ1. What approaches have been used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice
system between 2011 and 2017?
RQ2. How nationally owned and inclusive was the process to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system between 2011 and 2017?
RQ2.1. How can international actors support nationally owned and inclusive
processes to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system?
RQ3. How has decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system affected the
system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability?
RQ3.1. How can the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system be
improved?
A semi structured interview guide was used for data collection to answer the
Research Questions. Seven themes and 25 subthemes connected to this study’s research
questions and the related literature were identified.
In this chapter, I discuss this study’s Research Questions, draw conclusions, highlight the
implications of the findings for social change, and make recommendations.
Interpretation of the Findings
Participants in this study identified the approaches used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system between 2011 and 2017, and they shared their perspectives on whether the
processes adopted were nationally owned and inclusive. They also shared their views and on the
effects of decentralization of the criminal justice system on the system’s functionality and
Liberia’s peace and stability. Participants made recommendations on how the functionality of
Liberia’s criminal justice system can be enhanced with homegrown solutions and interventions
that are tailored to suit the
Liberian context.
In the following section, I discuss and interpret this study’s findings. To facilitate this,
the finding(s) for each Research Question is/are summarized in separated Tables which are
presented under each Research Question.
RQ1: What Approaches have been used to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice
System between 2011 and 2017?
Participants identified 4 broad approaches to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice
system. They are; building/forging partnerships, undertaking law and policy development
and reform, institutional reform and development as well as infrastructure development.
Table 10
Findings - Research Question 1
Research Questions Findings
RQ 1: What approaches were used
to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system between 2011 and
2017?
i. Institutional reform and development ii.
Infrastructure development, including the Justice
and Security hubs iii. Forging partnerships iv. Law
and policy development and reform
Forging partnerships
Seven participants, including Participants 006 and 013, indicated that several actors
were involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system and that these actors
partnered the criminal justice chain (i.e., the police, judiciary, and corrections/prisons) to
provide criminal justice services across Liberia. According to Participant 006, “… in all
we were looking at a partnered approach and strengthening the criminal justice system.”
Thought situated in another context or society, this finding is supported by authors such as
Gibbs and Ahlin (2013); Kasali and Odetola (2016); and Tumalavičius, Nikolayevskyy,
and Endziņš (2017), who asserted that governments are increasingly recognizing the fact
that they cannot monopolize security, hence are collaborating with local communities to
deliver security. For instance, Tumalavičius et al.
(2017) found that in Lithuania, partnerships between the police and the population contributed to
making the society safe. Lippman (2014) encouraged collaboration between the bench and the
bar as one way of promoting access to justice.
Participants identified a partnership between the Liberia National Police and
members of the community. They referred to this partnership as community policing
initiatives. Community policing is an intervention that is often used in postconflict and
other settings to enhance security. For instance, community policing was used in Sierra
Leone to decentralize security structures (Bangura, 2018), it has also been used in Liberia
(Bacon, 2015), South Africa (Super, 2014), Nigeria (Kasali & Odetola, 2016), Lithuanian
(Tumalavičius et al., 2017), and in the United States (Bent-Goodley & Smith, 2017).
According to Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus, (2016) it is an approach to policing that
citizens can easily evaluate. The context in which community policing programs are to be
implemented by be considered in their conceptualization and implementation (BentGoodley
& Smith, 2017).
Participant 013 indicated that there were partnerships with Liberia’s integrity
institutions such as the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, the General Auditing
Commission, and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, as well as
other public institutions such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Financial
Intelligence Unit. Arguably, these partnerships may qualify, to an extent, to be described
as third-party policing because they contribute to making the criminal justice system
accessible. Mazerolle (2014) identifies third party policing as an approach that can be
used to enhance access to the criminal justice system and the services it provides.
According to Mazerolle and Ransley (2005), third party policing involves a
partnership between the police and an external entity (i.e., the third party), in which the
legal powers of the third party, which may ordinarily not be available to the police, are
used to prevent or control crime. There is a shift from encouraging policing models to
establish third party policing relationships to making such relationships a requirement in
policing models (Mazerolle, 2014). Though used to a lesser degree, in Liberia, the
partnerships between the police and integrity institutions like the Liberia Anti-Corruption
Commission could contribute to making criminal justice services accessible. This is
because it increases the number of institutions or forums through which criminal justice
services can be accessed or provided hence potentially increasing the chances of citizens
receiving criminal justice services.
Ubink and Weeks (2017) asserted that customary justice systems are effective
mechanisms for enhancing access to justice in rural communities in Africa because they
are accessible, cheaper, use fewer formal procedures and speak languages that the local
community speak and understand. Dandurand (2014) advocates for increasing the use of
mediation as a dispute resolution approach. Though mediation is not synonymous to
using customary justice mechanisms in dispute resolution, mediation is one of the
processes used by the customary justice system in resolving disputes. Despite the
prominent role the traditional justice system has in the lives of Liberians, particularly in
the rural areas, no participant identified using the customary justice system as an
approach that was used to make the criminal justice system accessible.
I am of the view that this is an opportunity for a partnership between the
traditional and statutory justice systems, an opportunity that has been missed in Liberia.
Most participants criticized the non-involvement and/or consultation of traditional leaders
in the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Inherent in this criticism,
is an acknowledgment of the role and place of the customary justice system in Liberia.
The reason being that traditional leaders are charged with administering justice in that
system of justice. Not mentioning the use of the customary justice system as an approach
to make the criminal justice system accessible, confirms the fact that little or no attention
was paid to the customary justice system’s role in access to justice in Liberia and/or that,
even when it was considered, it was seen as a system which should not handle serious
criminal matters. It also highlights the elite and Monrovia-centric nature of the
decentralization process. Some participants confirm this assertion. For instance,
Participant 004 indicated that “it (i.e., the customary justice system) wasn’t given enough
attention, and it reflected the reality of the state of Liberia; that there is discrimination
against the rest of Liberia, and everything is in favor of Monrovia”. Participant 005 also
indicated that “I don’t think very much consideration was made because of the traditional
justice system. I think partly due to the elite’s dislike of it. The impression I got … from
many Liberians … about the customary justice was embarrassment”.
In the words of Participant 027:
… we realized that the advancement of the criminal justice system was happening in
tension. There was a lot of tension with the traditional justice system, with the
elders of the communities. …, some of the cases that were brought before the court,
there were conflicts over jurisdiction. Traditional leaders were saying no, this is a
matter to be determined by the Chief, this is a matter to be determined by the high
priest and this is not a matter for the Monrovia court. … the criminal justice system
is encroaching on major territory that for a long time has been occupied by the
traditional elders, by high priests and where the customary system of the Liberian
tradition has been the prerogative or has been presumed to have the prerogative to
handle the matter (i.e., matters that are now coming under the jurisdiction of the
formal system). So, there is a lot of tension; a lack of understanding from the part of
the traditional leaders in terms of where does their authority end? And where does
the court begin? … That is a major problem.
The disinterest in making the customary justice system a forum for seeking justice
in Liberia is confirmed by Bamidele (2017) who indicated that harmonizing Liberia’s
statutory and traditional justice systems was identified in the National Plan of Action for
Gender Based Violence as one way to enhance access to justice particularly for women.
However, the researcher observed that this was yet to be done. Participant 008 explained,
in the following statement, why attention was not given to the traditional justice system: …
cultural practices are different. And even in any political subdivision, you may find
different cultural practices and traditional values. … The criminal justice system has
standard rules. It is not influenced by cultural and traditional practices. So, if it is access to
justice; if it is investigating crime, charging a crime, prosecuting a crime, sending
someone to jail, (i.e., if you cannot find the bail)
those things are standard as you go around the country. The real challenge
remains the impact of the traditional and cultural practices on the formal criminal
justice system. So, if you were in Grand Kru and someone is arrested for rape and
the people who are resident there don’t consider rape as a major crime, and they
want you to release the person, even when the law says the person is not entitled
to bail; …. Now if you go to another county, maybe for them, rape is treated as a
major thing that they cannot tolerate. … In some counties for instance, they may
want to do Sayyewood (i.e., Trial by Ordeal) to make you confess judgement. But
should we use that as a basis now? Now that we have a unitary government; we
have a justice system and we want to be homogenous.
In rationalizing the reasons for the lack of attention being paid to the customary
justice system to make the criminal justice system accessible, Participant 008 cited the
human rights violations that occur in the customary justice system’s processes. This is
acknowledged by Ubink and Weeks (2017) who identified violations such as the absence
of legal representation. To address this, Ubink and Weeks (2017) advocated for effective
oversight over the customary justice system and the need to subject customary justice
systems to the constitution and other fundamental human rights norms and standards. As
Ubink and Weeks (2017) pointed out themselves, implementing this recommendation
may result in the customary justice system being formalized, hence losing its peculiarities.
However, there is almost no other option in any modern democratic state. The fact that
human rights violations occur in the customary justice processes is not a sufficient reason
to disregard the customary justice system as an option for enhancing access to justice
services, particularly in postconflict settings. After all, serious human rights violations
also occur in formal criminal justice systems and are even worse in postconflict settings
where there are other challenges that make the occurrence of such violations the norm.
These violations include detaining suspects for prolonged periods, processes being
affected by weak institutions, inadequate human resources and corruption. However,
these violations in the formal criminal justice system have not formed the basis for not
working with the criminal justice system to reform it and make it accessible. What has
always been done is to work at improving the criminal justice system and making it
human rights compliant. In any case, I think that involving the traditional justice system
in making criminal justice services accessible has the potential of reforming the
traditional justice system and making it a human rights complaint over time. Like the case
in the formal justice system, it is only in actively using the customary justice system to
dispense justice that the system evolves and improves. However, care should be taken not
to steer the evolution process in a direction that results in the customary justice system
losing its identity.
A distinction has to be drawn between human rights violations perpetrated by the
traditional justice system and the contempt that some people have for the customary
justice system as a system or source of justice. Such a distinction will result in the
customary justice system not being neglected as a partner in enhancing access to justice or
relegating it to the background, as appears to be the case in Liberia. It is also important
that challenges associated with using the customary justice system as a source of, or
forum for justice are not used, as a shield, by persons who are contemptuous of this
system of justice, to cover their real intentions. In postconflict societies, a refusal or
failure to use the customary justice system as an avenue for seeking justice results in a
violation of the right of the citizenry to justice. This is because of the inadequate
capabilities of the formal justice system in postconflict settings. Indeed, Bacon (2015)
observed that to get Liberia’s customary justice system to uphold human rights, some
unintended consequences occurred (i.e., prohibiting the customary justice system from
assuming jurisdiction over certain categories of cases resulted in no justice for victims of
those cases because the formal justice system is inaccessible in certain locations). These
claims are shared by Participant 024 who claimed that:
I don’t think that we were looking at the environment in which they were
working. And because we weren’t looking at that environment, we didn’t pay
attention to the customary justice system. … we were also somehow undermining
it in other ways by saying you shouldn’t go to the customary justice system for X,
Y and Z cases/subject matter (i.e., you should go and use the formal justice
system for X, Y and Z cases/subject matter). Even though we knew that even in
those situations, the formal system was failing. So, I think that we perhaps failed
on more than one account in terms of paying attention to the customary justice
system.
To deal with possible human rights violations perpetrated by the customary
justice system, Malawian traditional courts deal with a limited number of civil cases and
the formal courts deal with criminal cases and certain civil cases (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).
Persons aggrieved by the decisions of the customary courts have the opportunity to
appeal in the formal courts (Ubink & Weeks, 2017). South Africa has adopted a similar
approach where customary courts deal with civil cases and minor criminal offences
(Ubink & Weeks, 2017). Determining these jurisdictional issues are highly political and
contentious discussions, as well as sovereign decisions that must be informed by the
history and culture of the context (Ubink & Weeks, 2017).
In addition to the possible human rights violations that are associated with having
a pluralistic justice system, it is important to highlight some consequences that have
occurred in other postconflict societies and may also occur in Liberia if the customary
justice system is actively engaged to deliver justice. For instance, Jackson (2013) claims
that coexistence between the statutory and traditional justice systems at the local level
reinforces the power dynamics at that level, entrenches the position of the local elite and
deprives the nonelite of having access to justice.
Law and policy development and reform
Participants indicated that law and policy development and reform is another
approach used to decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. According to
participants, legislation was amended and or enacted and policies were formulated with
the objective of making the criminal justice system accessible. Issues addressed through
law and policy reform include legal aid; a public defense program; legal frameworks for
the national police, immigration service and drug enforcement agency; and reform of the
jury system. These initiatives are reflected in the following statements from participants:
Participant 008 indicated that “there were laws made … to address some of the
immediate challenges that we were having; either dealing with cases of rape, domestic
violence …”. Participant 013 also stated that “a new Police Act, Immigration Act, the
National Security Reform and Intelligence Act, a new Drug Enforcement Agency Law
…” were enacted. Participants 009 and 011 respectively indicated that: “… we had the
jury law passed” and “… the jury management system was also decentralized”.
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) confirm that, in Liberia, policy and law reform were
undertaken to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible. According to these
researchers, a considerable amount of time was spent to develop plans, policies,
legislation and projects to set the stage for decentralization in Liberia. It is obvious that
important pieces of legislation were enacted to make criminal justice services accessible.
What is unclear is the impact of this legislative reform. This may become clearer in
discussing other research questions.
Infrastructure development
The third approach was identified by 10 participants including Participants 001,
004, 005 and 012. It is infrastructure development. These participants identified
providing infrastructure as an approach that was used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system. The following statements capture some Participants’ perspectives:
Participant 001 said the following about the approach to develop infrastructure: “…
improving infrastructure, particularly in areas where the corrections system was
nonexistent…”. Participant 004 indicated that infrastructure support to make criminal
justice services accessible included providing “an office, a telephone, transport, in a few
cases even accommodation …”. Participant 005 noted that “one of the big changes was
the construction of prisons … magistrate courts across the country with Quick Impact
Project funding”. Participant 011 stated that “… go around the country, there are facilities
in the localities” and Participant 012 noted that “… police stations were built in the
counties; there had been infrastructure in the counties, but primarily in the county
capitals”.
Justice and security hubs
The Justice and Security Hubs project was a major intervention used to
decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia. This intervention was touched on by
almost all Participants, it straddled infrastructure and institutional reform and
development. According to Participant 024:
… the Justice and Security hubs was an initiative from a Joint Program which
started in 2011 coming out of Liberia’s Priority Peacebuilding Plan, which was
putting a focus on decentralization of services or provision of services at the local
level. And a large degree of funding, comparatively speaking, in terms of making
funds available in Liberia at that time … was coming in from the Peacebuilding
Fund, which was put specifically to support decentralization in terms of criminal
justice … in addition to the various actors and infrastructure that I was talking
about (i.e., things like the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit), which
was a centralized office working in Monrovia for a number of years initially, was
also extended to … certain counties to provide some support for survivors of
SGBV.
Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) confirm the finding that infrastructure was
provided across the country to facilitate the decentralization of Liberia’s criminal justice
system. The authors observed that decentralization in Liberia has focused on
“rudimentary activities” (p. 372) like rebuilding infrastructure at the county level.
Inadequate infrastructure for the criminal justice sector is not exclusive to postconflict
societies. For example, the Government of Brazil decided to construct prisons to deal
with overcrowding in Brazil’s prisons (Silvestre, 2016). Silvestre (2016) however
concluded that in Brazil, the increase in the number of prisons did not successfully
address the challenge of overcrowding in prisons. I made a similar finding in this study
regarding Liberia. This is because Participants pointed out that new prison infrastructure
did not limit overcrowding, citing this as an indicator of a dysfunctional criminal justice
system. Whereas participants mentioned that infrastructure was built, it is important to
use what existed after the war as the baseline (i.e., this should form the reference point
and be an indicator of how much infrastructure was built in Liberia and whether the new
infrastructure is capable of significantly improving access to justice in Liberia). This
reality and Silvestre (2016) findings that in Brazil the increase in the number of prisons
did not address the issue of overcrowding in prisons confirm the fact that improving
infrastructure alone does not address challenges hindering the quest to enhance access to
justice. There must be a combined approach (i.e., a holistic approach) to enhance access
to justice in Liberia and other contexts.
The hubs project is a unique intervention because it departed from building small scale
infrastructure in communities across Liberia. As previously noted, the hub project adopted a
regional approach in which Liberia was divided into 5 regions and large scale infrastructure
was planned to be built in these regions. Though the hubs were relatively further away from
the recipients of criminal justice services, this project was the biggest effort to expand
criminal justice services outside Monrovia. This project had very laudable intentions, but it
suffered implementation challenges leading to its modification after the pilot phase in
Gbarnga and its eventual abandonment. Participants shared the following opinions about the
hub project: Participant 022 stated that “… the hubs approach has come to a standstill.
Originally, the idea was 5 hubs. But after the Gbarnga hub, after the investments were made
… I think that the hub concept came to a standstill.
But the decentralization itself continued”. According to Participant 008:
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,
it did not proceed as originally planned. There was a delay in its completion.
And it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because
of that, it did have an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas.
Participant 005 indicated that:
I think the most important thing, the elephant in the room, was the decision to use
Peacebuilding Fund money to finance the hubs and construct hubs in the regions.
… where they completely ignored the fact that the system runs on a county basis.
Participant 021 stated that:
the justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. … But
unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was not
taken forward because the lesson learnt from the first construction took longer than
we expected. And so, our partners from the United Nations (i.e., the Peacebuilding
Commission Chair) spoke with the government and government bought into the
idea and saw the need to prioritize service provision rather than the physical
infrastructure. So currently we have not had infrastructure in all areas except for
Bong County.
On the hub project, Participant 008 indicated that; “I think we have passed that stage
now”.
The reviews of the hub project questioned the judgement of the decision makers
at the time. The quest to decentralize the criminal justice system outside Monrovia is not
the source of concern raised by participants, it is the approach (i.e. dividing the country
into regions, contrary to the structure of the state). The other concern is putting up large
scale infrastructure and in locations which, though compared to Monrovia was closer to
the recipients of criminal justice services, but practically and in most cases inaccessible
by the population due to poor road networks and the long distances that ordinary citizens
have to travel, sometimes on foot to access services.
Below, in Figure 5, is a map of Liberia with the location of the Gbarnga hub and
the proposed locations of the 4 other hubs. The Gbarnga hub was to service three counties
Bong, Nimba and Lofa. The map provides an opportunity to appreciate the distance that
litigants and criminal justice actors had to travel to access justice or provide justice from
the Gbarnga hub. The impact of the heavy rains on the criminal justice system’s
operations and the fact that ordinary citizens have to travel on foot for long distances to
access criminal justice services is confirmed by Bacon (2015). These Liberian challenges
should have informed the design, siting and implementation of the hub project. However,
it is practically impossible to decentralize an overly centralized criminal justice system
immediately to the community level. It required time and other resources that were not
readily available. Therefore, it is unfair to entirely blame decision makers for their
decision to decentralize through the hub project. However, with hindsight, a combination
of having criminal justice services and relatively small scale infrastructure sited on a
regional basis close to the population to deal with the challenges already identified, like
heavy rains and bad roads, would have been a preferable approach. This may have been
resource heavy but would have had a greater positive impact. Priority could have been
given to locations that were affected most by the challenges of access to the criminal
justice system and poor infrastructure.
Figure 5 Map of Liberia
Institutional reform and development
This is the fourth approach that I found to have been used to make Liberia’s
criminal justice services accessible. Under this approach, institutions are revived,
reformed and in some cases, established.
Participants identified interventions that were undertaken to develop Liberia’s
criminal justice institutions. One of them is human resources development (i.e., training,
mentoring and capacity building/development). According to Participant 001 “capacity
building was undertaken for the systems to become functional.” According to Participant 003,
“training was an approach to develop criminal justice institutions”. Participant 004 mentioned
“training of judges, training of lay persons as magistrates, … training of police officers, the
training of correction officers, ….” Participant 013 indicated that
“the Judicial Training Institute is also training magistrates that is also helping to increase
the number of judges, magistrates and defense attorneys.” Participant 014 stated that
“there has been police training, ... The law school is training more lawyers.” According to
Participant 016:
… they were recruiting a lot of qualified lawyers to enter the justice system. All the
County Attorneys in the country except for the county of Montserrado were non
law school graduates while the law required that you needed to be a law graduate
before you can practice law in Liberia.
This Participant also stated that “... moves were followed by the Judiciary where they
subsequently began to recruit law school graduates to place them in as Public Defenders in the
counties.” Participant 008 observed that “… the problem within these kinds of institutions is
staffing. So, we had to go in and look at appointments, the issue of tenure
….”
Participants also identified the creation of new offices/institutions within the
criminal justice system as a category of interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system. According to Participant 013, “… for the police, we have the Women and
Children Protection Section which has been decentralized. We also have the Professional
Standards Division for complaints which has been also decentralized.” Participant 009
stated that “the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crimes Unit … works with Criminal
Court E to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence everywhere. … before the war, it
was mostly done in magisterial courts. … .”
Institutional reform is an endeavor that receives a lot of attention in criminal
justice system reform, particularly in postconflict settings where systems and institutions
have broken down and qualified human resources are either inadequate or non-existent.
Fyanka (2014) observed that, as part of efforts to reform Liberia’s police, additional
police officers were recruited, trained and deployed outside the capital, although with
almost no resources to work. Schroeder and Chappuis (2014) stressed the point that
security sector reform takes various forms including strengthening oversight of the
security sector and professionalizing institutions within the sector. Gribanova and
Vulfovich (2017) highlighted the importance of designing policies that are geared
towards creating safe, inclusive and just cities. Addressing the prevalence of gender and
sexual violence related cases, resulted in the creation and decentralization of specialized
criminal justice institutions. According to Bacon (2015), in Liberia, interventions to
reform the criminal justice system and make it accessible included establishing a
specialized court, with jurisdiction across the entire country, to try sexual and gender
violence cases and the decision to establish units of the Women and Children Protection
Section across Liberia. The researcher also noted the establishment of the Sexual and
Gender Based Violence Unit, a specialized prosecution unit, dedicated to prosecuting
sexual and gender related cases. Bacon (2015) also found that between February 2009,
when Liberia’s specialized court was established to try sexual and gender-based violence
related cases, and July 2011, only 34 out of the 200 cases reported had been prosecuted.
Bacon (2015) further noted that out of the cases prosecuted, only 16 convictions were
secured (i.e., 50% conviction rate). This conviction rate could arguably be seen as
positive for persons using the rate of conviction as an indicator. However, prosecuting 34
out of 200 cases is discouraging given the number of interventions put in place and the
amount of resources committed to deal with sexual and gender-based violence related
cases. In any case the criminal justice system is not in place only to convict, hence using
the conviction rate as an indicator of success is flawed, inappropriate and misleading.
Establishing County and District Security Councils is one institutional
arrangement to provide an avenue for members of the local community to discuss and find
local solutions to security challenges confronting them in their communities. These
councils serve as early warning mechanisms and provide an opportunity for ordinary
citizens to participate in the governance process. According to participants, the councils
promoted peace and stability and allowed ordinary citizens who normally have no
opportunity to participate in decision-making to have a say in their affairs. Participant 007
stated that “… County and District Security Councils were set up … to get the local
people involved.” Participant 006 indicated that:
One of the other strategies was to have a localized approach to improving
responses and information exchange around what was happening. So, the County
and District Security Councils were established. … with representatives of
typically the security agencies, which also had representatives from the broader
criminal justice system coming together and … tried to have a better
understanding of what crime and security in the counties were like; trends that
were recurring and perhaps looking at what best responses were required ...
Participant 011 also mentioned that “the establishment of the County and District Security
Councils actually came out of the consultation. That was part of the efforts aimed at
inclusiveness”. Participant 013 stated that:
… the feedback that we are getting is that that initiative is well placed. Because
disputes that have created frictions in years are being resolved as a result of the
County and District Security Councils bringing the people together. And areas
where the conflict will erupt … and create insecurity, they are able to resolve it.
Participant 013 also stated that:
… the National Security Reform and Intelligence Act … talked about creating
County and District Security Councils. … . When there are issues and the Council
meet, and a justice institution is supposed to take that up, they are then mandated
by those County Security Councils to act. For example, if it is a corrections issue;
overcrowding of the corrections, the issue is brought up …
Liberia’s County and District Councils are akin to community safety mechanisms.
According to Gordon (2014), community safety mechanisms are an approach
towards security and justice sector reform. Various jurisdictions label these mechanisms
differently. Bastick and Whitman (2013) found that in Sierra Leone and Haiti, they are
known as local security committees. Using community safety mechanisms could promote
inclusion and address the challenges associated with the top bottom approach which
characterizes donor led security sector reform interventions (Gordon, 2014 & Homel &
Masson, 2016). It also contributes to increasing the chances of such interventions being
sustainable, it promotes efficient, transparent, effective and accountable security sector
institutions and improves the relationship between the government and the governed
(Gordon, 2014). Gribanova and Vulfovich (2017) asserted that the proximity of city
authorities to citizens and their familiarity with the local context put city authorities in a
better position to develop solutions for crime prevention. Accordingly, crime prevention
policies must adopt a decentralization approach, principally because they require
proximity of actors for implementation (Gribanova & Vulfovich, 2017). The fact that the
County and District Security Councils promoted peace in Liberia supports Arnusch
(2010) assertion that not incorporating persons at the community level into security sector
reform processes, in Liberia, could turn potential champions of security sector processes
into spoilers (Gordon, 2014). Arnusch (2010) also claimed that in Liberia, community
safety mechanisms which had filled the void in the absence of state justice and security
institutions, were not incorporated into the processes seeking to reform the justice and
security sectors (Gordon, 2014). Though I found that the participation of local
communities and actors in Liberia’s criminal justice decentralization process left much to
be desired, there was no evidence, in this study, of Arnusch (2010) assertion. It is obvious
that the community safety mechanisms referred to by Arnusch (2010) were not creatures
of legislation (i.e., they were created by communities and not the state). This does not
negate the veracity of Arnusch (2010) claim because my study was conducted almost a
decade after the Arnusch (2010) research. The reason being, the National Security Reform
and Intelligence Act, established the security councils, was enacted in 2011 i.e., a year
after Arnusch (2010) was published. I will argue that, the fact that Liberia eventually
formally establish the County and District Security Councils as a community safety
mechanism, affirmed Arnusch (2010) assertion about the merits of having them as part of
security sector, and by extension, justice sector, reform in postconflict societies.
Despite the positive case made for using community safety mechanisms, the
literature highlights several limitations and cautions their use. They include the concern that
incorporating community safety structures into security sector reform programming may
institutionalize community structures and this may lead to the structures losing their
essence and character. This is because the wide range of community concerns that these
structures are designed to address risk being securitized (Gordon, 2014). Secondly, the
bottom up approach to security sector reform that is associated with engaging community
safety structures to security sector reform programming may result in these structures
supporting a state-centric approach to security sector reform and defeat the objectives of
establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Donais (2008) also indicated that when community
structures are incorporated into security sector programming, donor support for operating
the structures may undermine the quest for local ownership of the activities of these
structures and negate the reason for establishing them (Gordon, 2014). Also, Donais and
Knorr (2013) citing Campbell (2011) stressed the point that the power differentials between
community actors and those at the state/national level may result in a cooptation of the
community (Gordon, 2014).
The aforementioned limitations, though valid, appear to focus on community
safety mechanisms that are not sanctioned by the government or are a result of
arrangements at the local level. The membership of Liberia’s security councils is a mixture
of state and nonstate actors but tilted towards state actors. This suggests a combination of
a top bottom and bottom up approach to security sector reform.
In this regard, though the composition of Liberia’s community safety mechanism
gives a character of a hybrid (i.e., state and community structure) the said limitations and
caution are relevant and need to be kept in mind by stakeholders as they have the potential
of influencing the process in Liberia.
RQ 2: How Nationally Owned and Inclusive was the Decentralization Process of
Liberia’s Criminal Justice System between 2011 and 2017? The
second research question gauged participants perception of the extent to which in
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system, national and local ownership
principles were upheld. Participants expressed mixed views, leading to my finding,
captured in Table 11 below that though the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system was driven by both national and international influences the
international influence was stronger.
Table 11
Findings - Research Question 2
Research Questions Findings
RQ 2: How nationally owned and Process to decentralize the criminal justice system
inclusive was the process to was a combination of national and international
decentralize Liberia’s criminal influences but tilted in favor of international justice
system between 2011 and influences.
2017?
Participants answered a number of interview questions to aid me answer this
research question. For instance, participants were asked to identify the actors involved in
the process of decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.
They identified the following actors: Western and developed countries like
Australia, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of
America. For instance, Participant 005 mentioned Sweden and the United States of America
and Participant 007 identified Germany, Japan and China. In some cases, these countries
supported the process through their development cooperation agencies such as United States
Aid Agency (USAID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and Irish
AID. Some African countries like Ghana and Nigeria also supported the process. Another
category of actors that participants identified are supranational or intergovernmental
organizations such as the United Nations and its agencies, funds and programs, the European
Union, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States. Participants
also mentioned international nongovernmental organizations such as the National
Democratic Institute, The Carter Centre, the International Committee of the Red Cross and
the Norwegian Refugee Council. Local nongovernmental and civil society organizations
including Prison Fellowship Liberia, the Liberia National Bar Association, Liberia National
Law Enforcement Association, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Prison Watch
and the Trial Judges Association were also identified.
From the list of actors mentioned, it is evident that Liberians, Western/developed
countries, neoliberal institutions, developing countries, nonstate actors (including local
nongovernmental organizations) were involved in the process of making criminal justice
services accessible across Liberia. Few participants mentioned local communities and
nongovernmental organizations as actors in the process. Indeed, Participant 024 described
the involvement of local communities and nongovernmental organizations as “… few and far
between”. The noninvolvement of citizens and local civil society organizations in the
decentralization process reflects on the neglect/refusal and unwillingness of drivers of the
process to engage with Liberia’s and local communities/organizations as opposed to an
inability and/or unwillingness of ordinary citizens and local organizations to participate in
the process. The roles played by ordinary citizens and local
organizations in the decentralization process is a determinant of how nationally owned and inclusive
the process was. This will be examined in the ensuing discussions.
Involvement of civil society, local organizations and traditional leaders
Participants assigned multiple reasons for involving civil society and local
organizations in the decentralization process. Six Participants including Participants 015,
019, 021, 025 and 029 indicated that they were involved to promote oversight and
accountability over the criminal justice system and the decentralization process. For
instance, Participant 015 stated that, “… civil society has been involved, by raising
concerns in respect of law violations; giving reminders as to what should be done; ...
Making contributions with respect to how the restructuring should be done ...” Participant
019 stated that: “… the way Liberia is … and also because of the government's bureaucracy
and corruption, at the end of the day, it seems the only option to really get to the people is
really through the CSOs.” Cubitt (2013) supports the finding that involving civil society in the
process was to enhance oversight of the process and the criminal justice system. According to
Cubitt (2013) involving civil society in interventions to reform the justice and security sectors
serves as a check on possible abuses of power by the state and its agents (Gordon, 2014).
The second that 4 Participants including Participants 005 and 013 gave for
involving local communities and organizations is to provide criminal justice services. In
this regard, Participant 005 stated that “we did have NGOs being there in terms of service
provision. You have had a number of NGOs over the years in partnership with UN
agencies like the UNDP providing support in different aspects of the criminal justice
system.” According to Participant 013, “… you know, the Government cannot provide for
the entire country and so civil society players are there to support Government’s efforts.”
Bacon (2015) supports the finding that local nongovernmental organizations and by
extension citizens were involved in providing criminal justice services. Bacon (2015) found
that, in Liberia, only 2% of cases go to the formal justice system to seek justice while 45%
of cases are resolved through the customary justice system. Isser et al, supported this
assertion by stating that in Liberia, only 50% of sexual-related offenses are reported, out of
which 28% are reported to informal settings (e.g., family heads, traditional leaders, elders
and secret societies). Also, Denney (2014) asserts that in the developing world, nonstate
actors play a prominent role in the lives of citizens because they are accessible, relatively
less expensive in their charges and able to deliver the “locally valued currency of justice”
(p. 254). Denney (2014) cited Albrecht and Kyed (2011) who asserted that “80 per cent of
disputes in the global South are resolved by nonstate means” (p. 253). In Sierra Leone,
traditional chiefs are responsible for providing justice and security services to over 80% of
Sierra Leoneans and 85% of crimes and conflicts in Sierra Leone are first reported to
traditional authorities (Jackson, 2013 & Denney, 2014).
The third reason, that 11 participants, including Participants 007, 008, 009, 012,
014 and 016, provided for the involvement of local organizations and communities is to
promote national ownership and inclusiveness. Nonstate actors play an important role in
the criminal justice system in postconflict settings, hence they cannot be ignored from
processes seeking to reform sectors like the criminal justice system. Participants shared the
following views in support of this assertion: Participant 014 stated that “… there has
always been some portion of civil society involvement. Sometimes, civil society
organizations are invited. Whenever they have the criminal justice conference, civil
society is invited.” Participant 016 asserted that “they
(CSOs) have not been scouted for. I think that they see a need and they try to help.” For
Participant 009, “civil society organizations are invited because they represent the
ordinary people.”
There is evidence from the literature that supports the fact that the quest to
promote national ownership and inclusiveness leads to involving local and civil society
organizations. For instance, Nathan (2007) asserted that international efforts to reform
the justice and security sectors must engage local actors as this will increase the chances
of local actors not resenting the reforms and will sustain the interventions after
international development assistance has ceased to flow (Gordon, 2014). The United
Nations (2008) advocates that national ownership should involve “nationally led and
inclusive processes in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society,
including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others, are actively engaged”
(Gordon, 2014, p. 128).
According to 6 participants, including Participants 009, 018, 019 and 021,
nongovernmental agencies, individuals, local communities and civil society groups were
involved in decentralizing the criminal justice system to promote public outreach and
awareness. In connection with this, Participant 019 stated that “We worked through
various civil society organizations to provide awareness in about 6 counties”. Participant
009 stated that “there were civil society organizations involved in outreach especially
when it comes to that, it was people like Carter Centre, Prison Fellowship, and national
and international NGOs.” According to Participant 018 “… we worked more on
awareness; making people aware of their rights in order for them to be able to exercise
them and to ensure enforcement because when you are not aware you have these rights,
exercising them will be difficult.” Homel and Masson (2016), van Tongeren (2013) and
Whitman (2013) support these findings. These authors recommended establishing
mechanisms in communities to provide, amongst others, an avenue for information sharing
about security and safety (Gordon, 2014).
The fifth reason, ascribed by 1 participant (i.e., Participant 008) is to implement
projects on behalf of donors. Many reasons account for this. They include reluctance on
the part of donors to use government agencies to implement projects. This is because of the
capacity constraints and corruption that often characterize these agencies in postconflict
settings. Participant 008 stated that:
So, if the Americans or the Europeans want to support the hub for instance, they
have to do it through institutions. And some of them want to do it but they don’t
want to give the money to the government. You see, that is another problem. They
don’t want to put that money into the national budget so that the government can
do it. No! So, they put up these for companies and institutions to apply and the
most capable people at that time based on their criteria is the international
NGO.
Whereas this reason is attributable to only one Participant, it could be argued that it
is a view shared by all Participants who attributed the involvement of the local community
and civil society to activities related to making the criminal justice system accessible. For
instance, civil society organizations providing criminal justice services or creating
awareness in communities may often be doing so in implementation of donorfunded
projects.
The last reason assigned by participants for involving civil society and local
organizations in the decentralization process is to promote sustainability. Participant 011
stated that “… by virtue of you being a part of a process even helps to bring about some
form of sustainability.” Although only one Participant assigned this reason, it could be
argued that the quest for sustainability is linked to the quest for national ownership and
inclusiveness. This argument increases the number of participants assigning this reason
from 1 to 12 participants. This in sync with Gordon (2011) call for interventions to
reform the security sector to be locally owned (Gordon, 2014). According to Gordon
(2011), this is the surest way to increase the chances of the project addressing community
needs and yielding the desired results (Gordon, 2014). Oosterveld and Galand (2012)
illustrated the consequences of not carrying the populace along in designing and
implementing criminal justice reforms by referring to the ill fate suffered by a project to
reform Timor-Leste’s formal court system. Blease and Qehajia (2013) cited how the
process to prepare Kosovo’s National Security Strategy failed to uphold national
ownership principles (Gordon, 2014). Jackson (2010) cited the United States’ efforts to
reform Iraq’s security sector and the resultant creation of institutions considered alien and
unreflective of their history and culture by the local population, a situation which
negatively affected the project’s outcomes and its sustainability (Gordon, 2014).
A distinction must be drawn between an intention and the reality. The fact that
almost half of this study’s participants assigned the quest to promote local ownership and
sustainability as the reasons for involving the local population does not necessarily mean
that the objective was met. In fact, the level and nature of their involvement are important
ingredients for carrying the population along in the reforms. From Participants statements,
it is difficult to find evidence that supports a deliberate and extensive involvement of the
local population and organizations in the decentralization process to rake in the benefits
of local ownership and sustainability.
From the number of participants who assigned various reasons for involving the
local community and civil society organizations, it is obvious that the quest to promote
national ownership and inclusion is the foremost reason for involving civil society
organizations in decentralizing the criminal justice system. Promoting oversight and
accountability is the second highest reason assigned by participants. Despite the
overwhelming number of participants who cited national ownership, a close review of
what participants said in support of the quest to promote national ownership and
inclusiveness showed that to a large extent, participants invited themselves to the process
(i.e. there was no deliberate process to involve them) the quest for national ownership
was not actively manifested in the views expressed by participants. Their involvement
was to inform them about what was happening and not to consult them. Indeed,
Participants 008 and 006 respectively, described the engagement with the local
community as being “minimal” and “very little”. Importantly, although, authors like
Gordon (2014) acknowledged that sustainability is an element of national ownership, the
fact that only 1 participant mentioned it is worrying and questions the extent to which the
various actors in the decentralization process considered sustainability as a major reason
for involving individuals, local communities and organizations. Later in this chapter, I
will examine the place of sustainability in the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system.
The fact that superficial consultation of local actors is unlikely to engender local
ownership and sustainability is suggested by 17 participants, including Participants 001,
003, 005, 008, 009, 019, 023 and 024, who indicated that individuals, local communities
and especially traditional leaders were not involved in the process. According to
Participant 023 “the international community came with funding. They needed to
showcase to their donors that the Government is willing to accept the hub concept. So,
they meet behind closed doors and whatever they talked about nobody knows.”
Participant 009 indicated that “in the beginning in Gbarnga, it took us a while to get
people to understand because there was no outreach. Before outreach started, there was
construction …” Participant 003 said “one of the things here is that the traditional
authorities wanted to have a say within the system. They didn’t like the part of the system
where they were being dictated to.” Participant 008 indicated that “in my opinion, I don’t
think the customary justice system, or the extent of the customary justice practices was a
factor in the decentralization process.” In fact, this Participant suggests a deliberate
intention to exclude traditional leaders on the basis of the financial implications
associated with involving them. These realities led 11 participants, including Participants
010, 014, 021 and 029, to conclude that the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system was elite driven and/or Monrovia centric.
Denney (2014) explained the apparent reluctance to involve traditional authorities
and the traditional justice system in efforts to make criminal justice services accessible in
postconflict countries. According to Denney (2014), development partners supporting
reforms of the justice and security system in fragile societies gear their efforts to build
institutions and systems that replicate Western institutions, and this excludes nonstate
actors. This is because of the obligations of the Weberian state model in the affairs of
citizens. As a result of this notion, donors naturally prefer to focus on supporting state
actors and neglect nonstate actors. International actors like the Department of
International Development (DFID) in Sierra Leone, neglecting and/or refusing to design
their programmatic interventions to suit the context for which they are being
implemented, runs contrary to Kelsall (2008) “going with the grain” of African
development (Denney, 2013 p.7). This leads Kelsall (2008) to observe that the imposition
of such externally driven approaches for Africa’s development are yet to yield the desired
results (Denney, 2013). This approach is an application of Western principles that do not
suit the context (Denney, 2013). Kelsall (2008) observations are confirmed by Denney
(2013), who found that as a result of DFID’s approach to security sector reform in Sierra
Leone, the results of the interventions were limited.
There are challenges associated with working with traditional authorities to make criminal
justice services accessible. These challenges must be recognized in programming and
implementation. For instance, in Sierra Leone, chiefs contributed to the situation leading to the
country’s civil war (Denney, 2013). Leonard (n.d), acknowledged this challenge and
recommended that “The challenge is not to terminate existing local and informal Social Contracts
for the sake of Western models of security, but instead to make local governance more responsive
and effective in a manner that accommodates the legitimacy of local institutions” (Ansorg, 2017
p. 141). Inherent in this recommendation is an advice that the dynamics on the ground in
postconflict settings must be respected and managed in a manner that facilitates program
implementation and observes Western values at the same time. This approach may be a useful
middle path but operationalizing it may suffer practical challenges that may lead to undertaking
justice sector reform in postconflict countries through a Western prism.
I have dwelt on not engaging with traditional authorities in the decentralization
process in the last two paragraphs. This follows my conclusions that citizens were not
consulted. Admittedly, this may have created an impression that citizens and traditional
authorities are being used interchangeably. In spite of the fact that traditional authorities are
citizens, nonstate actors and operate at the local level, I am not equating the lack of local
engagement of citizens in the decentralization process solely with not engaging
traditional/customary justice though there is an overlap.
As previously noted, participants identified Western countries and institutions as
actors involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. Western approaches to
reforming criminal justice systems in postconflict societies are manifested in building
courthouses, police stations and prisons and training personnel to work in these agencies
(Denney, 2014). Seeking to approach the processes through the lenses of the Weberian
state model is synonymous to a blind transplantation of Western cultural practices and
systems into postconflict societies, which are usually not Western, developing or failed
states. The contexts are different and blindly engaging in such transplantation enhances
the chances that it will not flourish in the new context.
In postconflict countries, nonstate actors have a huge amount of legitimacy which
is grounded in religion and culture. This is not the case in Western modelled justice and
security institutions, which are seen by the population in postconflict societies as alien
and untrustworthy (Denney, 2014). In view of the place and role of traditional leaders in
the justice and security sectors in postconflict settings, Baker (2005) advocated for
engaging traditional authorities as a condition precedent to successful police and justice
reform in Sierra Leone (Denney, 2013). Swenson (2018) informed readers that the
progress made by nonstate actors in dispute resolution has resulted in some experts
calling for forming coalitions with actors that are beyond the formal institutions to
implement justice sector reform activities. Bacon (2015) shared this view in the context of
Liberia. Dinnen and Peake (2013) indicated that, in Sierra Leone, policing services and
other formal government institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and
citizens in the rural areas rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve their
disputes. This view is shared by Ansorg and Haastrup (2016), who believe that the
Western approach to security sector reform in postconflict settings in Africa is elite and
male driven and neglects females and female related organizations (Ansorg, 2017). It is
worthy of note that Angola and Rwanda are postconflict countries described by Ansorg
(2017) as exceptions to the practice where security sector reform is an elite driven
enterprise. Ansorg (2017) also expressed concern over the negative impact on creating
security in postconflict countries which arises from international development actors
being disinterested and not being cognizant of local/traditional institutions. This is
because, potentially, local institutions can secure peace and stability in postconflict
settings (Ansorg, 2017). Westernman (2017) shares this view as the author posited that
the goal of security sector reform in postconflict situations is to create a workable and
sustainable security system that, amongst others, creates a democratic relationship
between the legitimate authorities of the country.
In this regard, Egnell & Halden (2009) argued that the approach adopted by
Western countries bars any possibility of adopting other practical and potentially more
effective approaches to reform the justice and security systems in postconflict settings
(Denney, 2014). As previously noted, Denney (2014) found that, in Sierra Leone, despite
the huge role traditional leaders play in providing justice and security, the British
Government funded programs to reform the security sector failed to actively engage
them. Denney (2014) attributed this approach to factors including the influence of
Western values on the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development’s
(DFID) programming, the fact that DFID dealt only with state actors and not informal or
nonstate actors like chiefs, and the nationality of technical staff recruited to implement
programs (i.e., most of them are citizens of donor countries who are mostly Western).
Denney (2013) argued that it is relatively easier to find the values that Western
institutions propagate within formal state institutions, hence donors’ preference for
dealing with them. This rationalization is questionable as there is evidence that Western
institutions have extended assistance to state actors whose respect for human rights and
international law principles leave much to be desired (Denney, 2013). The absence of
uniform standards in dealing with state and nonstate actors led Denney (2013) to observe
that:
The distinction made between the human rights abuses committed by states and
those committed by informal actors is further indicative of the prism of political
liberalism and bureaucracy through which DFID understands the world and
models its development assistance. Justice, security, democracy and human rights
thus become most effectively served by a centralized state authority, properly
structured and rule-bound by legal-rationalism. Chiefs, conversely, represent
unaccountability and a lack of oversight, rendering them unmanageable forces
(p.20).
Tailoring interventions to fit the specific needs of the micro and macro level.
Conceptually, ownership of the process to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice
system should not be limited to the micro (i.e., national) level. It should transcend to the
macro (i.e., local) level as well. The existence of ownership and inclusion at the national
level and not at the local level indicates an elite and/or externally driven process. Tailoring
peacebuilding interventions to suit a particular context requires, inter alia, that each part of
the geographical area affected by the conflict is treated as unique (i.e., the application of a
one size fits all approach to peacebuilding across a particular postconflict setting may
defeat the quest to adopt a context specific approach to peacebuilding (Schultze-Kraft,
Valencia & Alzate, 2016). In this regard, participants shared their perspectives on whether
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system were tailored to suit the
requirements/imperatives of the context at both national and local levels. Six participants,
including Participants 004, 008 and 011 indicated that some consideration was given to
the Liberian context.
For instance, Participant 004 claimed that:
Yes, it did influence the decision. The point about influence and implementation is the
challenge. You influence the decision, you plan what you want to do, and in the
implementation process, you don’t do it with the strength of the influence. Eight
participants including Participants 002, 021, 025 and 029 indicated that a
nonhomogenous approach was adopted to decentralize criminal justice services across
the various geographical locations in Liberia. In support of this assertion, Participant 029
stated that “I think each part was treated as unique. So, the needs in Bong are different
from the needs in Margibi or probably in Lofa. So, it is dependent on the individual
circumstances of a specific geographical area.” Twenty three participants, some of them
foreigners) including Participants 001, 004, 005, 006, 020, 021, 023, 026 and 027 were of
the view that no consideration was given to the Liberian context and that the
decentralization process was externally driven by foreign actors. To back this claim,
Participant 001 stated that “I will say it is externally driven. … because it was forced to
take place, Liberians were influenced where they went.” According to Participant 020: …
law enforcement cannot be devoid from the culture. You can bring the international best
practices and look at the culture of the people and see what is
quite applicable. I believe that one of the mistakes that was made was the
international practices without consideration of the culture …
Participant 029 stated that “no attention was given to that. Though they recognized those
traditional criminal justice systems that were in place, but then they were cautioned not to
try and refine or reform the processes around that …”
These views confirm the earlier finding that the local communities and groups
were not consulted and that it was an elite driven process. However, 4 participants
indicated that the process was nationally owned and driven. Participant 026, for example,
said that “I think that it was nationally driven.”
One size fits all approach adopted across Liberia
Contrary to the views held that the approach to make criminal justice services was
not homogenous, 12 participants including Participants 001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 014 and
019, said that a homogenous approach (i.e., a one size fits all approach was adopted in the
decentralization process). Participant 001 stated that: “… it was a homogeneous country;
everything was the same.” Participant 004 stated that:
we had a fair approach. A, B, C, D criminal justice services or facilities. But that
should not have been the case. We should have done some form of positive
discrimination to bring the counties that were at the lower, lower level up to a
certain level …
Participant 005 noted “I will say I saw very little sensitivity in terms of local
cultures in any of the reform processes.” In the words of Participant 013 “a one size fits
all approach was being used across the board.”
Majority of the perspectives expressed by participants confirm the absence of
context specific interventions, local ownership and nonconsultation of the local
communities, a situation Chanaa (2002) describes as the “conceptual-contextual divide”
(Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135). The finding that international efforts to decentralize
criminal justice services in Liberia ignored national and local ownership principles is
mirrored by the findings of Dursun-Özkanca (2018) in evaluating how much local
ownership considerations influenced Kosovo’s foreign funded rule of law programs.
According to the researcher, a top down approach was adopted by the European Union
and United Nations in addressing only serious crimes and this neglected the local
community. In this case, local ownership was restricted to some aspects of the reform
process. It is worth stressing that this is not to suggest that adopting a top-down approach
is necessarily a bad thing.
Designing and implementing security sector reform interventions to suit the
context for which they are intended has been an enduring challenge for reform efforts and
has hindered the implementation of security sector reform programming (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014). This assertion informed Ginty (2010) conclusion that security sector
reform is an imposition of Western ideas (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014). No wonder
authors like Ansorg (2017), Dinnen and Peake (2013), Gordon (2014) and Westernman
(2017) believe that designing and implementing untailored interventions has, in some
cases, been deliberate, to satisfy parochial objectives. This claim also confirms the fact
that reforming the justice and security sectors, particularly in postconflict settings, is an
interest-driven endeavor between and amongst donors and recipients of donor support
(Gordon, 2014 & Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). For these reasons, Kostovicova (2008)
recommended that security sector reform processes must be joint exercises to provide
technical solutions to development problems and create relationships between the
government and the governed (Gordon, 2014). According to Peake, Scheye and Hills
(2007) these imperatives are ignored in security sector reform processes, so the politics of
the process is on the altar of finding technical solutions to the problems (Schroder &
Chappuis, 2014).
Participants assigned two reasons for the one size fits all approach adopted to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Participant 022 cited Liberia’s legal
framework and the structure of the country. According to this Participant, “Liberia is one
country. It is also a small country. The legal framework applies to the country as a whole.
And the same laws apply to people everywhere.” The second reason was provided by 3
Participants (i.e., Participants 005, 008 and 014). According to these Participants, a
homogenous approach was used to promote unity (i.e., addressing concerns over
entrenching ethnicity) and equality. In support of this claim, Participant 005 said “I think
there was a fear partially of enhancing tribalism, given the importance of tribes or clans
in the Liberian society and also in some cases strong long disputes between different
groups …”
Evidence and consequences of conceptual contextual divide in Liberia.
According to participants, not tailoring interventions to suit the Liberian context had
the following consequences: Five participants, including Participants 006, 008, 021 and
022 mentioned the fact that the hub concept, which Participant 024 described as
the flagship project for making Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, has been
abandoned due to implementation challenges. The following statements made by
participants reflect their perspectives of the hub project: Participant 021 stated that: the
justice and security regional hub; initially the plan was to have 5 in place. … But
unfortunately, in the middle of implementation, the infrastructure aspect was not taken
forward because the lessons learnt from the first was that construction took longer than
we expected. And so, our partners from the United Nations (i.e., the Peacebuilding
Commission Chair) spoke with the government and the government bought into the idea
and saw the need to prioritize service provision rather than the physical infrastructure.
So currently we have not had infrastructure in all areas except for Bong County.
Participant 022 noted that “… the hubs approach has come to a standstill. … after the
Gbarnga hub after the investments were made … I think that the hub concept came to a
standstill. But the decentralization itself continued.” Participant 006 stated that: The first
hub in Gbarnga; it was designed to actually look at all the elements of the criminal
justice system; from policing, right through the criminal justice system to prisons and it
was done on a regional basis. But it was set up and designed that it would provide a
decentralized service in 3 counties. … It came with mixed reviews but if we spoke
honestly about it, we would say that the cost benefit analyses didn’t really deliver what it
was intended to deliver. As we know, the sustainability of justice and security services
was very hard on Liberians at the time. So, it was mixed results; whilst there was
improved access to justice and security; in the mind, it was really servicing a county as
opposed to the design and
the premise of having the ability to strengthen and extend to other counties, but it
actually, didn’t deliver as intended. Notwithstanding, there were improvements. According to
Participant 008:
the Gbarnga project would have been the forerunner to all the other areas. First,
there was an implementation problem in terms of the construction itself. And so,
it did not proceed as originally planned. There was a delay in its completion. And
it consumed a lot more money than it was originally intended. And because of
that, it did have an impact on the construction of the hubs in the other areas.
Reviewing participants' comments on the hub project leads to the conclusion that in
Liberia, the hub project is one manifestation of what Chanaa’s (2002) referred to as “conceptual-
contextual divide” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014, p.135).
Seven participants, including Participants 005, 016 and 021 identified the third
impact of not designing and implementing context specific interventions. According to these
Participants, ignoring the context results in a non-judicious use of resources and creates
challenges for sustainability.
Three participants including Participant 005 and 009 also identified the design
and implementation of ill-conceived projects as being a consequence of ignoring the
context.
Decentralization process was a combination of context specific and externally
driven interventions (i.e., hybrid local, national and internationally driven
efforts/approaches). Seventeen participants including Participants 003, 005, 006, 009,
010, 011, 012 and 029, claimed that interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal
justice system were informed by the needs of Liberia and external/international interests.
According to these Participants, this approach was manifested in the homogenous and
nonhomogenous approaches adopted to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system.
For these Participants, the choice of approaches/interventions was a hybrid between the
imperatives of the context and demands from international partners who were funding the
process and projects. The following statements capture participants perspectives on this:
Participant 005 claimed that the hub project was based on a regional structure akin
to the decentralized police structure, but which is different from how the judiciary and the
prosecution’s decentralized structure:
The structure of the reformed police was a regional structure, whereas the
judiciary retained the prewar county based structure. So, you had a little bit of a
disconnect between the chains of command; in the judiciary process, the County
Attorneys (prosecutors), the judges, and then the police structure which was semi
decentralized.
According to Participant 029:
Driving this process was not just a Liberia thing. Remember, we had the UN
mission here; we had the United Nations Police working along ... The setup was
such that it was in a way that it supported the entire system in whichever area you
are looking at it. They supported everything to make sure they built capacity to
ensure that they left a working system. … Was there extreme sensitivity put in it?
To an extent! Could there have been further efforts to minimize unintended
consequences? Yes!
Participant 011 stated that “it was a nationally driven affair with the support of our
international partners … They said, Yes, I will put money there, but I require this and
that. So, the only precondition was that, the only way it can happen is when you go their
way.” Participant 006 stated “I think a bit of both.” Participant 012 noted that “It’s both
in a way because the external factors and parties saw some inadequacies in the delivery
of the services that should make the criminal justice system viable.” Participant 020
indicated that “We (i.e., Liberians) had lots and lots of meetings as it relates to how to
make the system functional and also participated in activities to make it functional ...”
Participate 029 held a similar opinion:
I will say both externally and nationally driven. Externally driven given the fact that
most of the funding came from international donors, they had their own objectives
and what they wanted to achieve. And of course, the Government also has its own
plan.
The views expressed above are those of most participants. This is an indication that the
approach to decentralize criminal justice services in Liberia was a hybrid between local
needs and international demands. This is in keeping with recommendations in the
literature on how to mitigate the variance between practicalizing the quest for national
ownership in justice and security sector reform in postconflict settings and what happens
in reality. For instance, Murdoch (2015) canvassed a middle path that upholds the
practice of allowing programming to reform the criminal justice system in postconflict
settings not to ignore standards, principles and practices from the West, because this will
enhance the impact of the reforms. Gordon (2014) cited Donais (2009) who claimed that
despite the case made for upholding local ownership principles in such reforms,
upholding these principles need not be total and immediate (i.e., making local ownership
principles influence programming in justice and security sectors in war ravaged societies
is a process and not an event; this process cannot be forced but requires an element of
being deliberate and right timing).
There is also a need to keep a balance between the level of national ownership and
quantum of international demands required at each stage of the process. Jackson (2011)
and Caparini (2010) claimed that a hybrid between the top down approach and the bottom
up approach are critical to operationalize security sector reform in a substantive and
inclusive manner (Gordon, 2014). Mac Ginty (2011) affirmed this view as the researcher
also noted that a hybrid approach fulfils the imperatives of “local ownership”
“participation” and “sustainability” (p. 133) in security and justice sector reforms in after
conflict settings (Gordon, 2014). Supporting this claim, Homel and Masson, (2016)
called for a connection between the top bottom and bottom top approaches. Krawczyk
and Muhula (2018) recommended adopting a bottom up approach to accountability to
engender citizen participation in local government and decision making in Liberia. I will
discuss the outcome of adopting the middle path approach to decentralizing criminal
justice services in Liberia in discussing research question 3. Suffice it however to note for
now, that, despite the overwhelming claim made by participants that a middle path
approach was adopted, as earlier noted, I found that local communities and organizations
were hardly consulted but, in some cases, they were informed about the decentralization
process. This raises questions about the presence and quality of the middle path approach
adopted in Liberia. By quality I am referring to how much of the decision making and
implementation was influenced by Liberia and Liberians. From the findings on the
involvement of local communities and civil society organizations, it is evident that in
Liberia the so called hybrid between local requirements and external or international
influences was skewed in favor of the demands and interests of the international
community, hence raising doubts about how middle the path/approach was in Liberia.
However, the practical challenges highlighted by Oosterveld and Galand (2012)
on how the urgency associated with implementing such reforms makes it difficult to
engage in extensive public consultations must not be ignored (Gordon, 2014). Despite
Donais (2009) positing that timing is key in meeting the requirements of the hybrid
approach, there should be minimum standards or requirements for upholding local
ownership principles, at every stage of the process and that should be benchmarked and
form the basis for regular monitoring.
RQ2.1: How can International Actors Support Nationally Owned and Inclusive
processes to Decentralize Liberia’s Criminal Justice System?
In discussing the findings under Research Question 1, international actors were
found to have been actively involved in decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system.
As previously noted, the literature reveals that international support to decentralize
criminal justice services must be nationally owned and inclusive. To be inclusive and
nationally owned the interventions must be context specific; designed and implemented at
the micro and macro levels. This must be done from a position of knowledge (i.e., both
technical knowledge and knowledge of the context). Knowledge of the context is acquired
from extensive consultations with various shades of opinion and interest groups at national
and local levels and these consultations must continue to inform the decentralization
process.
The following findings are gleaned from recommendations made by participants
on how international actors can support nationally owned and inclusive processes to
make criminal justice services accessible in Liberia. Table 12 presents recommendations
(i.e., 12 of them) made by participants.
Table 12
Findings - Research Question 2 (1)
Research Question Findings
RQ 2.1 How can international actors i. The international community should support
nationally owned and inclusive understand the context and avoid a pure processes to
decentralize Liberia’s legalistic approach to decentralize criminal justice system?
Liberia’s criminal justice system.
ii. Promote the traditional justice system
(Table Continues)
iii. The quest to advance national
ownership and implement Liberia
specific interventions must permeate all
programming
iv.Adoption of a holistic approach to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice
system
v. International development actors, must
have a long-term approach and be
patient when supporting access to justice
processes in postconflict countries vi.
Need for conceptual clarity of
distinction between national ownership
and local ownership vii. International
development assistance actors to
establish genuine partnerships
(Table Continues)
vii. International development actors
must support the design and
implementation of geographic specific
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system ix. The
government’s ability to sustain
interventions that are implemented to
make criminal justice services
accessible in Liberia when
international development support ends
should be considered when making
choices on which interventions to
adopt to make the criminal justice
system accessible
x. Liberia’s government to take the lead
in the decentralization process xi. Build
a professional criminal justice system
insulated from Liberia’s partisan
politics
(Table Continues)
xii. Actors involved in making Liberia’s
criminal justice system accessible must
learn lessons from similar contexts
First, participants recommended that international actors should design and implement
interventions that are Liberia specific. Participants identified condition precedents to successfully
implementing this recommendation. They are:
●That national ownership principles must permeate all programming (i.e., national
ownership principles should be central to the entire decentralization process);
●That there is the need for a conceptual clarification of the distinction between national
ownership and local ownership. Schroder and Chappuis (2014) acknowledged the
challenges associated with conceptualizing what national and local ownership is.
According to the authors the vagueness inherent in the concepts arise from the fact
that, there is no clarity on whose interests should influence the analysis. Similar views
are shared by Krogstad (2013) who indicated that there is still an absence of
consensus on what constitutes local ownership
(Gordon, 2014).
●That the context must be understood and an overly legalistic approach to
decentralization should be avoided. Understanding the context requires that
foreigners must be knowledgeable about the context in which they work.
Participants had mixed views on how well foreigners who supported and/or
worked to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system understood Liberia and the
criminal justice system they were working to make accessible. Only Participants 001, 002
and 014 indicated that foreign/international actors were knowledgeable about Liberia and
its criminal justice system. Even this Participant stated that “… for those who had stayed a
little longer they got to understand Liberia and its people …” Participant 002 indicated
that “I would say they did as most of them had worked and stayed in Liberia for good
period of time since the inception of the mission and the mission had the capacity to keep
records to ensure continuity.” Participant 014 claimed that: “the thing is, most of the
people that I know that worked with the criminal justice system in Liberia were Africans
and had some sort of similar challenges in their own country.” It is instructive to mention
that Participant 001 and 002 attribute the knowledge of the context to the fact that it had
been acquired over time. It could be argued that these knowledgeable foreigners were
initially not knowledgeable, and this affected the design, implementation and outcome of
the interventions they championed to make the system accessible. Inherits in Participants
001 and 002 statements was an acknowledgment that not all foreigners were
knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal justice system. Participant 014 impliedly
indicated that foreigners from African countries were knowledgeable because they came
from countries with similar challenges. Whilst this rationalization may be true, the fact that
no two contexts are the same must not be lost. This becomes more acute when dealing with
a postconflict setting where the dynamics are different. Also, these knowledgeable Africans
who worked in Liberia may have been working for organizations who had their own
approach and interests, and this would have affected how much the fact that they came
from countries with similar challenges like Liberia’s influenced their work and its
outcomes.
Sixteen participants, including Participants 001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009,
011 and 027, indicated that foreign/international actors were not knowledgeable about
Liberia and its criminal justice system. They said so in the following statements:
Participant 003: “I don’t think they really understood Liberia entirely. ... I can tell you
that most of them did not understand Liberians. They thought Liberians were not
intelligent.” According to Participant 001, “those of us who did not come from the
American legal system, we struggled with the American system, and were not able to
make a big impact.” On the same issue, Participant 005:
No! Because every single … international tends to think that whatever they do
back home, is just as applicable to Africans as it was to anybody else; we think
that the system that we have grown up with the way to do things.
Participant 007 stated:
Our culture is a bit complicated and sometimes people don’t know what they are
expected to do in everyday activities. These internationals came with their own
experiences and culture from their own countries. And anytime you do that, you
will be making a very big mistake. Liberia’s culture is complex, and the people
are complex too.
Participant 011 said that “no, they did not understand Liberia”. Participant 016 stated
that, “I think they understood Liberia to a limited extent. I don’t think they understood
the culture, history because they had a fixed solution approach”. Participant 021 stated
that: “I think there were some that didn’t understand”. Though referring to another
context, the finding that foreigners who supported the processes were not knowledgeable
about Liberia and its criminal justice system is shared by Denney (2014). Denney (2014)
attributes the standardized approach adopted by donors to reforming the justice and
security sectors to the small pool of international experts (e.g., former police officers and
lawyers) who are engaged to reform these sectors as well as these experts being
knowledgeable about the design and functions of Western justice and security systems.
Six participants including Participants 018 and 020, indicated that
foreigner/international actors were partially knowledgeable about Liberia and its criminal
justice system. For instance, Participant 018 stated:
I think they understood to a point like all other projects. … They understood the
challenges Liberia faced; in terms of resources, manpower, and capacity; how to
fill up those gaps there are major laws that needed to be passed to reform the
society.
According to Participant 020:
To a little extent they did. What they had as their advantage was the fact that they
came with experiences of interventions in other areas and that gave them an urge
as to how to intervene here in Liberia. I mean they didn’t really understand
Liberia’s context 100 per cent but they understood how to engage and solve issues
From the number of views expressed, participants were of the view that the knowledge of
the foreign experts that supported the decentralization process of Liberia’s criminal
justice system, about Liberia and the criminal justice system, left much to be desired.
This certainly affected the design, implementation and results of the interventions they
championed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible.
A second recommendation was made by 4 participants including, Participants 016,
027 and 029. Participant 027 stated that the international community should understand
the context (i.e., Liberia) and avoid a purely legalistic approach to decentralization of
Liberia’s criminal justice system. In some respect, this recommendation is akin to the
approach adopted in the design and implementation of police reforms in Bougainville
where New Zealand, the main international actor supporting criminal justice system
reform/development, supported an approach that departed from the orthodoxy of
postconflict criminal justice system reform in which international experts impose a top
bottom approach from textbooks and blueprints from other jurisdictions (Dinnen &
Peake, 2013). Also, recommending an approach that is not entirely legalistic re-echoes
Peake, Scheye & Hills (2007) assertion that security sector reform processes are political
processes as well, hence actors should refrain from adopting a purely technical approach
to reform (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014).
For the third recommendation, participants called on international actors to design
a citizen centered criminal justice system and involve citizens in the design,
implementation and operationalization of the process and system. A criminal justice
system cannot be described as citizen centered if women are ignored. Such a system is
incomplete and unresponsive. To successfully design and implement a citizen centered
criminal justice system, priorities to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system
must be identified through a Liberia owned and led process with international support
being channeled to support those priorities. Ironically only 6 participants; including 006,
019 and 020; out of the 30 participants in this study made this recommendation despite
the general criticism that local actors were excluded. I expected to see this
recommendation being made by majority, if not all, participants. Researchers like Gordon
(2014) recommend the establishment of citizen centered criminal justice systems.
According to this researcher, “Efforts focusing on building state institutions and
structures, without sufficiently paying attention to developing relations between the state
and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126).
Gordon (2014) assertion highlighted the utility of recommendations made by participants
on promoting ownership and sustainability. Bacon (2015) found that in Liberia donors
were not keen to work with the traditional justice system because they concentrated their
interventions in the capital even though the majority of the citizens, of which women
outnumbered men, lived in villages outside the capital.
Fyanka (2014) supported the view that there is the need to ensure that priorities are
nationally identified in an inclusive manner. Accordingly, Fyanka (2014) advocated for
programmatic interventions to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system to be influenced
by the challenges confronting Liberia’s criminal justice system, because this increases the
chances of a positive impact and reduces the challenges of promoting sustainable
peacebuilding. Ansorg (2017) also noted that to ensure the acceptance and sustainability
of reform efforts in postconflict settings, there is the need for the local population to be
informed about the reforms. Having a citizen centered criminal justice system has several
advantages including promoting national ownership, designing context specific
interventions and increasing the chance of the interventions being sustained after
international development assistance has run out.
Participant 014 (i.e., only 1 participant) also recommended that international
development actors must support the design and implementation of geographic specific
interventions to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Bacon (2015) and Jackson
(2017) support this recommendation. Jackson (2017) for instance, noted that the work of
the international community working in postconflict countries is concentrated in the
capital cities because donors are not willing to work in parts of the country where the
state lacks legitimacy. This reason is not applicable to Liberia because during the period
that this study is focusing on (i.e., 2011- 2017), the Liberian government was generally in
control of the entire country. However, there is the possibility that international
development assistance focused less outside the capital because of the inaccessible nature
of those geographical locations, particularly during the raining season and other resource
challenges. Another possible reason is the fact that the systemic challenges of the criminal
justice system had to be resolved by the leadership of these institutions who were based in
the capital. Indeed Bacon (2015) noted that in Liberia the inaccessible nature of the roads
during the raining session affected the delivery of projects to enhance access to the formal
criminal justice system in those locations and this affected access to justice for women as
they had to undertake long journeys, sometimes over days, often on foot, to access
services provided by the formal justice system.
Participants also recommended promoting the traditional justice system. This
recommendation was made by 4 participants including Participants 001, 023 and 027.
This recommendation came from few participants despite the suggestions by many
participants that the traditional justice system was neglected in the decentralization
process notwithstanding its prominence as a dispute resolution mechanism for many
Liberians. This irony may be a reflection that the majority of participants, although
knowledgeable about the place of the traditional justice system, are not in the category of
the population that ordinarily patronizes the services provided by this system of justice.
As previously noted, in Liberia, donors were reluctant to work on or with the customary
justice system (Bacon, 2015). Denney (2014) made similar findings about DFID’s
support in Sierra Leone. According to Baker and Scheye (2007) international actors and
approaches to reform the justice system, in postconflict settings, erroneously assume that
the absence of a formal justice system amounts to a lack of access to justice, that citizens
in postconflict settings prefer seeking justice from the formal justice system and that the
formal justice system is more sustainable compared to the customary justice system
(Jackson, 2013). The customary justice system in Liberia is strong and prominent in the
affairs of the citizenry, particularly those residents in the rural areas. The system is
accessible, credible and cheaper. Although the traditional justice system may in some
instances violate human rights, ignoring their role as a credible source of justice is at the
peril of Liberians, the government and its partners, including the international
community.
Three participants including Participants 014 and 025 called for the adoption of a
holistic approach to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. The criminal justice
system is made up of various parts that work together to get the system function. The
tendency in postconflict settings is to pay attention to security, law and order. This results
in resources being channeled to support the police to the neglect or near neglect of other
parts of the criminal justice system. As a result of this, there is an uneven development of
the various parts of the system and this negatively affects the functionality of the entire
system. As will be demonstrated in discussing research question 3, in Liberia,
participants indicated that the Liberia National Police was the largest recipient of
resources and corrections and the prisons system received the least, a fact that negatively
affected the system’s functionality. The finding that in Liberia most of the resources was
spent on security related activities is mirrored by Jackson (2013) who found that in Sierra
Leone, there was a focus on security (i.e., the police) and less on justice and this
adversely affected reforms of the justice part of the criminal justice chain. This reality in
postconflict justice and security sector reform makes a strong case for a holistic and well
coordinated approach to reforming the criminal justice system.
Participants also recommended that consideration should be given to the
Government’s ability to sustain interventions to make criminal justice services accessible
in Liberia, particularly when international development support ends. This consideration
must be informed by the choices made to make the criminal justice system accessible.
Paradoxically, this recommendation was made by only 1 participant, (i.e., Participant 10)
even though participants acknowledged the need for interventions to be sustainable and
they admitted that this was lacking in Liberia’s reform processes. Perhaps the number of
participants making this recommendation is an indication that participants adopted a
realistic view on the sustainability question, the reason being that in postconflict
environments like Liberia, the government’s ability to effectively assume financial
responsibility for sustaining interventions put in place with resources from abroad has run
out is doubtful and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Liberia’s economic situation
became worse because of the drop in world prices of rubber, Liberia’s main export, and
the impact of the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease, which resulted in the exit from Liberia
of some foreign private investors (World Bank, 2016). These factors have affected the
country’s finances and its ability to maintain existing projects and programs.
Related to the recommendation on sustainability is Participant 025 counsel. This
Participant advocated for international actors to support Liberia’s government to take the
lead in the decentralization process. This recommendation is at the heart of seeking to
ensure that internationally supported projects in Liberia are sustainable and owned by
Liberians. Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) supports this recommendation as the researchers
asserted that adopting a sustainable approach to decentralization is the surest way to reap
maximum benefits from decentralization. To achieve this, projects and programs must be
nationally owned/driven and tailored to fit the context where they are being implemented
(Bacon, 2015 & Dinnen & Peake, 2013).
Their recommendation called on international development assistance actors to
establish genuine partnerships. Specifically, it called on international actors not to tell
recipients of their assistance what they should do, it also called for a deliberate effort to
build trust. Two participants (i.e., Participants 006 and 007) invited the international
community to resist the natural tendency, as funders of efforts to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system, to be overly prescriptive in their interventions. The fact that
international actors are overly prescriptive in their assistance is reinforced by Denny
(2014) who criticized the practice in overseas development assistance where blueprints
are replicated in various postconflict settings whether they were successful or not. This
recommendation seeks a shift from the norm and wants to see national ownership and
interventions tailored for Liberia rather than using blueprints from other contexts. Though
practically difficult to implement for varied reasons, including the interests of
international development assistance actors and the dynamics in postconflict settings,
implementing this recommendation remains possible. As previously noted, Bougainville
is a setting in which this approach was successfully adopted by New Zealand (Dinnen &
Peake, 2013). This may be just one example, but it is still a practical manifestation that the
approach is doable and requires the political will particularly on the part of international
actors.
Three Participants (i.e., Participants 018, 021 and 022) recommended that
international development actors must have a long term approach and be patient when
supporting access to justice processes in postconflict countries. This recommendation
highlights the fact that making Liberia’s criminal justice system, and criminal justice systems
of postconflict societies, accessible is a process and not an event. As noted by Jackson
(2013), reforming the legal system takes time and a lot of investment, hence all actors,
including those spearheading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries, must be prepared to
endure. In this regard, the quest to show progress and/or to quickly move to other conflict
affected settings, for whatever reasons including competing demands on scarce resources or
the pursuit of national interest, must be resisted as this results in unfinished business, raises
questions about sincerity, results in imprudent use of foreign taxpayers’ money and increases
the chances of postconflict settings sliding back into conflict because the triggers of the
conflict and the mechanisms to avert a recurrence have not been properly dealt with and/or
put in place. This is why this recommendation is appropriate and must guide international
development actors in deciding when to withdraw their support to criminal justice reform in
conflict ravaged countries. It must however be acknowledged that the tendency for recipients
of international development assistance to be inordinately dependent on external resources is
high and this becomes entrenched with the effusion of time (i.e., when international
development assistance becomes the norm and dependency a way of life), recipients make no
efforts to assume their sovereign obligations. Since international development assistance is
finite and assuming responsibility for providing criminal justice services is part of the Social
Contract, a balance must be struck between dealing with the challenge of creating a
dependency culture and leaving unfinished business behind. This balance should be
established objectively and in advance through a deliberate, inclusive and planned process.
Another recommendation gleaned from the data collected called for building a
professional criminal justice system insulated from Liberia’s partisan politics. This
recommendation was made by Participant 006. This recommendation does not advocate
for a criminal justice system insulated from politics but rather from partisan politics. This
distinction is important because, at a certain level, the criminal justice system all over the
world encounters politics. It must be acknowledged that in postconflict, settings factors
like the lack of trained human resources, effective oversight and accountability, and
interference by politicians in the affairs of state agencies, affects the ability of these
agencies to be professional and this affects ownership and sustainability of the reform
process. The criminal justice system is operated by human beings, for the system to
provide services to everyone who seek the same, the human and other resources of the
system must be professional and equipped. There should also be a legal framework
providing a professional criminal justice system/institution.
When I discussed research question 1, participants alluded to the enactment of
legislation for some criminal justice institutions and the various institutional development
initiatives adopted to make the criminal justice system accessible. All these suggest that
efforts were made to professionalize Liberia’s criminal justice system. However, building
a professional criminal justice system in Liberia like other advanced countries remains a
work in progress even so requires time. The pace and the success of building a criminal
justice system insulated from partisanship depends on the political class and their
commitment to building a professional criminal justice system. The population must
demand and insist on this. A criminal justice system operated by professionals will build
public confidence in the criminal justice system and, in a postconflict setting, contribute to
peace and stability. It will also justify the investments of donors.
Participant 004 recommended that actors involved in making Liberia’s criminal
justice system accessible must learn lessons from similar contexts. At the heart of this
recommendation is an invitation to ensure that interventions are tailored to suit the Liberian
context. This recommendation also advocates that the phenomenon of international actors
and experts replicating blueprints used in other contexts must cease.
Researchers like Ansorg (2017), Bacon (2015), Bent-Goodley and Smith (2017), Denney
(2013), Dinnen and Peake (2013), Gordon (2014), Schroeder and Chappuis (2014), and
Westernman (2017) support this recommendation. This recommendation, among others,
means that experts deployed to support efforts to make criminal justice services
accessible in Liberia and by extension other postconflict countries must learn from
previous experiences and avoid repeating mistakes. It is important that this
recommendation is not understood to mean that participants were calling for a blind
replication of interventions that have worked in other settings or a jettisoning of
interventions that failed in other contexts. The reasons being that, it may well be the case
that an intervention that failed in one context will have a positive impact in another. For
this recommendation to be effective, international experts must be knowledgeable about
Liberia and the criminal justice system they are seeking to make accessible. The most
effective way to understand Liberia is to genuinely and actively involve Liberians at all
stages of the process and to allow the knowledge gained to influence policy choices and
programmatic interventions.
Linked to the immediately preceding recommendation is one made by Participant
008, who called on the Government of Liberia to evaluate its previous engagements with
the international community and learn lessons. This recommendation seeks to evaluate the
engagement between Liberia’s Government and its international partner, with the aim of
informing future dealings. This examination is vital to ensure ownership and to maximize
the benefits of the relationship.
Four participants (i.e., Participants 004, 022, 023 and 029) recommended the
development of the capacity of criminal justice system actors, the traditional justice
system and civil society organizations. In this regard, Participant 023 indicated that: I
think in my mind, even though they have done quite a number of crusades, there had to
be more training for criminal justice practitioners; the police, prosecutors and judges. So
now we are training judges and clerks because, in that way, the courts become more
functional and people can begin to trust the courts and there could be accountability.
Participant 029 said “ensure that people are trained to deliver services.” Participant 004 stated
that:
… any criminal justice system in the world, no matter how you design it, if it has no
qualified professional men and women of high integrity, it can’t work. … Most of
the time in many postconflict societies that is what we find... you design something,
and you don’t have the men and women qualified, with experience to run it. .... so,
you bring in foreigners who simply don’t know the system, who simply don’t know
the culture. Example, Liberia is one of the Anglo-American systems, and also the
traditional justice system which you find across the rural part of Liberia. Liberia is
a dual system, and the dual system can only work if you have qualified
professionals.
The last recommendation was made by Participant 019. It is a call to promote
South-South cooperation in decentralizing Liberia’s decentralization process. This
Participant recommended that attention should be paid to promoting South South
cooperation to explore options to realize their objectives. Actors in decentralizing
Liberia’s criminal justice system include a few countries from the Global South. These
countries have similar challenges and are potentially in a better position to assist Liberia
make the right policy choices to make her criminal justice system accessible. However,
the reality is that most countries from the Global South lack the resources to lead
international assistance in postconflict settings. Where they are involved, it is on a very
low scale or they are coopted or employed by the West and other developed countries
and/or neo-liberal institutions. In which case, they are required to design and implement
interventions that affirm their paymasters’ interests and choices, thus no change in
approach occurs. Williams (2018) shared this view with respect to the peacekeeping
model that the international community has adopted in Somalia.
I now turn to discuss the findings of this study relating to research question 3.
RQ 3: How has Decentralizing Liberia’s Criminal Justice System Affected the
System’s Functionality and Liberia’s Peace and Stability As
previously noted, Liberia’s criminal justice system, like other criminal justice systems,
is made up of various parts including the police, corrections/prisons, judiciary and
oversight mechanisms. These parts play independent but mutually reinforcing roles to
get the system to function. Where one or more of these parts malfunctions, it affects
the system’s ability to function as a whole. The goal of decentralizing Liberia's
criminal justice system is to make the system’s services available to the population
across Liberia (Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018). The availability of the services provides
an opportunity for the population to seek redress for their grievances Nyei (2014). It
also shows the presence of the state in the lives of the population and contributes to
Liberia’s peace and stability
(Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).
State of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the war
In determining how decentralizing the criminal justice system has affected the
system’s functionality, there is the need for a baseline to compare the current state of
access to Liberia’s criminal justice system to. In this regard, participants asked to share
their views on the state of the criminal justice system prior to Liberia’s civil war. The
period prior to the war is used as the baseline because although Liberia’s conflict ended
about eight years prior to 2011 (i.e., the reference year of this study) efforts to
decentralize criminal justice services were intensified from 2011 with the hub projects. As
stated earlier, the hubs project which was part of the strategy leading to the exit of the
United Nations’ peacekeeping operation. Participants shared the following views:
According to Participant 024, prior to the civil war, the criminal justice system
was decentralized from Monrovia to the county capitals. Participant 008 indicated that the
criminal justice system lacked infrastructure and human resources, and this affected
decentralization. Participant 013 claimed that to enhance access to the criminal justice
system, Justice of the Peace Courts were established to operate outside magisterial
districts. Participant 012 claimed that decentralization of the criminal justice system was
hindered because the legal framework did not support real decentralization. Participant
008 also described the criminal system as a system that provided services only in Monrovia.
Participant 009 indicated that traditional justice was the primary source of justice in
Liberia’s rural areas.
The foregoing views paint a picture of a criminal justice system which was
accessible to only a few, located in Liberia’s capital and to some extent the county
capitals. To a very large extent, the criminal justice system could be described as
designed and working only for inhabitants of Monrovia who were mostly the elite, with a
traditional justice system providing justice for inhabitants of Liberia’s rural communities
and perhaps some major cities (Bacon, 2015). While this may on the face of it appear
discriminatory, it needs to be acknowledged that Article 65 of Liberia’s Constitution
provides for a dual justice system that should operate across Liberia. The courts are
required to apply both statutory and customary law in the administration of justice.
Hence, the traditional justice system being the source of justice in rural areas will is not in
itself discriminatory. However, there is evidence from data collected of a deliberate effort
to encourage Liberians to use the formal justice system although it lacked a presence in
many parts of the country. Participants like 024 alluded to this and described it as
deliberate efforts to undermine the traditional justice system in favor of the formal justice
system.
Criminal justice system is showing signs of basic functionality and contributing to
Liberia’s peace and stability
The picture painted by participants about the reach of the criminal justice system
prior to the civil war served as the baseline for determining how the decentralization
process has affected the criminal justice system’s functionality. Broadly, participants
indicated that decentralization has made the criminal justice system manifest very basic
signs of functionality and is contributing to Liberia’s peace and stability. This finding is
informed by the mixed views that participants shared on the current state of Liberia’s
criminal justice system’s functionality. One view expressed by 3 participants including
Participant 004 was that the criminal justice system is yet to be functional because,
according to Participant 004, many citizens are yet to have access to the criminal justice
system. Two participants including Participant 016, indicated that the criminal justice
system lacks basic logistics, another 2 participants including Participant 021, indicated that
in spite of the efforts to decentralize the criminal justice system, the system remains
ineffective. Participant 020 (i.e., 1 participant) claimed that the criminal justice system is
plagued with challenges that are affecting its functionality. These challenges include
inadequate funding, human resources and infrastructure.
Participant 020 went further to explain how factors like the Ebola Virus Disease
and the downturn in Liberia’s economy affected the decentralization of the criminal
justice system and 3 participants including Participants 016 and 022 described the process
of decentralizing the criminal justice system as being characterized by selective justice
and impunity. Also, 2 participants, including Participant 019, stated that specialized
criminal justice services are yet to reach the vulnerable population. Another 2 participants,
including Participant 021, described the criminal justice system as being beleaguered with
high levels of pretrial detainees. Participant 013 described as poor the siting of the hub in
Gbarnga, far away from the population (i.e., the recipients of the services it provides).
This is because its location was affecting the system’s functionality. Related to this,
another 3 participants indicated that the hub in Gbarnga was dysfunctional due to the
existence of a legal framework that does not support it and inadequate human resources.
Participant 016 lamented over the lack of coordination amongst criminal justice
institutions. Participant 022 indicated that there was a lack of public confidence in the
formal justice system. Inadequate legal literacy amongst citizens was cited by 1
participant. Participant 005 mentioned the lack of constitutional and judicial reform and
the multiplicity of institutions established with duplicitous mandates as an indicator and
reason for the dysfunctional criminal justice system. Explaining this, Participant 005
indicated that foreign organizations and international experts supporting the
decentralization process established multiple institutions in an uncoordinated manner.
According to this Participant, this was often driven by the personal preferences of
officials/organizations involved and has resulted in the duplication of functions and a
dysfunctional system.
Resourcing parts of the criminal justice chain
Resources are important to build a functional criminal justice system. As
previously noted, depending on how much resources are allocated to reform the various
parts of the criminal justice chain and how the resources are distributed to the various parts
of the chain, the entire chain, including the part that receives most of the resources, may
remain nonfunctional. In this regard, participants had the opportunity to share their views
on resource allocation in the decentralization of the criminal justice system. Participants
indicated that there was no equity in the allocation of resources to decentralize the various
parts of the criminal justice chain. Sixteen participants including, Participants 007, 018,
019, 021, 016, 020 and 024 indicated that most of the resources were allocated to the
police, the judiciary being the second highest recipient of resources and corrections getting
the least.
In the words of Participant 024
I think this is common in most countries; the law and order part of the justice
system is given greater focus … I think that being a postconflict environment;
certainly, the focus is on maintaining peace and stability. There was quite a
significant focus on the law and order side of things.
This claim is supported by Jackson (2013) who found that in Sierra Leone, the
postconflict reconstruction efforts placed premium on security and less on justice (i.e.,
more on the police) and this had an adverse effect on the outcome of the reforms of the
justice part of the criminal justice chain across local and central levels of the country’s
structure. The reforms in Sierra Leone focused on the police and neglected other parts of
the criminal justice chain (Jackson, 2013). In spite of this, Howlett-Bolton (2008)
asserted that the Sierra Leonean police was ineffective (Jackson, 2013). This proves the
point that strengthening one part of the criminal justice chain and neglecting other parts
results in a dysfunctional criminal justice system despite the resources channeled to
support that part of the chain.
Comparing the state of the criminal justice system prior to the war and its current
state suggests that there is very little difference between the two periods. For instance, the
finding that specialized services were yet to reach the vulnerable in Liberia is confirmed
by Bacon (2015) who found that in 2011 out of 71 female officers of the Women and
Children Protection Section (i.e., a specialized unit of the Liberia National Police
dedicated to respond to sexual and gender related offenses) only 5 (7%) were located in
rural communities. Participant 022 confirmed the presence of the traditional justice system
in rural Liberia and the preference of the majority of
Liberians for this system of justice. This Participant referred to the outcome of a public
perception survey conducted in 2018 which found that over 70 % of respondents
preferred and used the traditional justice system. Dinnen and Peake (2013) found that,
similarly, in Sierra Leone, policing services and other formal government
institutions/services are concentrated in the urban centers and citizens in the rural areas
rely on the customary law/justice system to resolve disputes. The lack of adequate
infrastructure and human resources in Liberia is striking because in discussing research
question 1, infrastructure and human resources were found to be two of the approaches
adopted to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is either that there was a real
dearth in human resources and infrastructure, so the results of all the efforts after the civil
war to address these challenges have only been a drop in the ocean. The other possible
explanation is the gestation period of getting these resources to reach a level that
positively affects the system’s functionality. Also, a combination of all the factors
identified above could explain participants’ claims of inadequate human resources and
infrastructure in Liberia’s criminal justice system despite efforts to improve them. The
finding that human resources and infrastructure were inadequate in Liberia’s criminal
justice system is supported by Fyanka (2014) who found that policing was ineffective in
Liberia because there was a disconnect between efforts to reform the police, inadequate
human resources to support the criminal justice system’s operations and an absence of the
criminal justice system across Liberia, especially in Liberia’s rural parts. Krawczyk and
Muhula (2018) also found that weak human resource capacity is a challenge confronting
decentralization in Liberia. Unfortunately, the hub concept, which was intended to be the
most far reaching effort to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, received
mixed and often negative reviews by participants and this may be part of the reason why
infrastructure and human resources remains a systemic challenge. These explanations
should not be interpreted to mean that the challenges of any criminal justice system,
particularly in postconflict settings, can be resolved overnight. I will therefore argue that
even if the hub project and other interventions yielded the desired results, some of the
challenges or indicators used by Participants to describe the criminal justice system as
dysfunctional would have been present, though, perhaps in less prominent quantities. As
has been revealed above, the inequitable allocation of resources to support the various
parts of the criminal justice system in the decentralization process and the fact that the
police received the largest allocation, is not unique to Liberia.
Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice system functional Despite the
views expressed above, some participants were of the opinion that decentralization has
made the criminal justice system functional. In this regard, 2 participants, including
Participant 009, observed that the criminal justice system “is functioning better because
… I feel that more cases are being heard. So, justice is not as delayed as it was before.”
Sixteen participants including, Participants 006, 011, 015, 018, 021, 026 and 027
indicated that decentralization has enhanced access to, and oversight of, the criminal
justice system and enhanced the rule of law in Liberia. According to Participant 027 “if
decentralization had not happened, we would still have been dealing with a system where
in large parts of the country, you do not have a court, you do not have lawyers, … there’s
been a lot of progress.”
Participant 024 indicated that:
I don’t think anyone who’s been in Liberia in 2003 and came back again in 2018
could doubt the progress made, in terms of the functionality of the justice system
in that way, I think that by and large the police are able to respond, not the way
that will be expected for them to respond to individual cases and things like that,
but I certainly think that there is a better perception of the security that the police
can provide.
Participant 011 (i.e., 1 participant) indicated that legislative reform has enhanced the
criminal justice system’s functionality and 2 participants (i.e., Participants 024 and 027)
indicated that the criminal justice system is functional, but the benefits of decentralization
are yet to be felt.
The number of participants who indicated that the criminal justice system was
functional exceeds those who indicated that the system was showing signs of
functionality. On the face of it, these findings appear contradictory. However, if they are
interpreted within the wider context of the data collected, particularly the various
indicators that participants cited as evidence of a dysfunctional criminal justice system, I
am of the opinion that these apparent opposing perspectives are reconcilable and can be
rationalized. Given the gestation period of criminal justice reform in postconflict settings,
the state of Liberia’s criminal justice system prior to the war and the state of affairs at the
time of collecting data, I have concluded that decentralization has resulted in Liberia’s
criminal justice system showing basic signs of functionality. The reason being that
participants who indicated that they system was functional may have been measuring the
state of affairs to what it was before, which is natural but not an appropriate indicator to
inform programmatic interventions that seek to make the system really accessible.
As previously noted, the criminal justice system is made up of various parts, who
play individual but reinforcing roles to get the system to function. In this regard,
participants were asked whether the various parts of the criminal justice chain were
playing their respective roles in the criminal justice system. I posed this question to test
participants perspectives on the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Answering this question, 6 participants, including Participant 005, 010, 012 and 029,
indicated that the various parts of the criminal justice chain were working together. For
instance, Participant 012 stated that “yes there is collaboration, coordination and
cooperation among and between the justice and security institutions.” Twelve participants
including Participants 001, 009, 022, 023 and 024 said that parts of the criminal justice
chain are not working and/or partially working together. In the words of Participant 024: I
think they are working together better than they had been. I think that there are still
limitations … I still think that they still see each other as competitors for their resources. I
do think they are more aware of each other’s needs and limitations. I think that they are
more aware that they can function more effectively if they were together.
Since working together is a work in progress in every criminal justice system, expectations
should be measured in postconflict settings. To increase the chances of this improving in
Liberia, there is the need to improve how the parts of the criminal justice chain and
criminal justice institutions work together. They need to see themselves as complementary
and not competitors. There should be a reward and sanction system as well as a
mechanism to actively encourage this to happen. The mechanism must have the capacity
and political support to get criminal justice institutions to work as a system. The need for
such a mechanism to be capacitated is supported by Krawczyk and Muhula, (2018) who
found that in Liberia, these public institutions have weak coordination capacity.
How decentralization has affected Liberia’s peace and stability
Jackson (2017) claimed that there is agreement among researchers that a link exists
between decentralization and conflict though there is no consensus over the nature of the
relationship. Schultze-Kraft, Markus and Morina (2014) held similar views as they
asserted that despite the fact that decentralization is used as a peacebuilding intervention,
the evidence to support a nexus between decentralization and development is minimal
even in stable environments (Schultze-Kraft, Valencia & Alzate, 2016).
Participants 001 and 026 (i.e., 2 participants) claimed that decentralization of the
criminal justice system has contributed to Liberia’s peace and stability and another 2 (i.e.,
participants 008 and 021) indicated that the decentralization process is helping to address the
root causes of Liberia’s civil war. According to Participant 026:
Yes, it has. Because we were able to deploy more lawyers, judges, more cases are
being heard at the local level, and now when people have issues, they are able to
go to the court rather than put the law into their own hands. So, if you look at the
issue of mob violence, even though it is still happening, it has reduced
considerably. Most of the cases in the various courts are being dealt with there in
a faster way as compared to before.
Participant 021 stated that “yes, for the purpose of stabilization; for the purpose of
sustaining our peace and in the light of consolidating our peace and also for the purpose
of meeting elements of the Sustainable Development Goals.” This Participant also
claimed that “… in a way it helped to accelerate the process of addressing citizen
concerns.” Peace and stability are manifestations of the rule of law. This is supported by
Hamann (2012) who claimed that “Decentralisation will make a contribution to
establishing rule-of-law structures if the population concerned is given a genuine
possibility of participating and if it strengthens the responsibility and accountability of
the individual” (p. 37/569). The fact that Liberia continues to enjoy peace and stability
after the brutal civil war is a sign that the rule of law is being entrenched.
Jackson (2017) also asserted that, the presence of a strong local government in
postconflict settings engenders lasting peace. Manor (2006) backed this assertion as, according
to this researcher, making decentralization an important part in postconflict reconstruction
increases the chances of public services reaching the poor and governing inclusively (Jackson,
2017).
Decentralizing the criminal justice system could result in the extension of the
state’s authority and presence into parts of the country which have never felt the presence
of government (Dinnen & Peake, 2013; Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016; Escobar-Lemmon &
Ross, 2014; Hamann, 2012; Krawczyk & Muhula, 2018; Schultze-Kraft, Valencia &
Alzate, 2016; Tang & Huhe, 2016;). Extending the justice system in postconflict settings
assures the private sector of the security of their investment, hence encourages private
investment (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014). According to Denney (2014), the World Bank
claimed that a reformed criminal justice system encourages the population to resort to the
criminal justice system to address their grievances. The United Nations also emphasized
the point that reforming the criminal justice system is a contribution to enduring peace
and development (Gordon, 2014). Bigdon and Hettige (2003) claimed that
decentralization has the potential to mitigate conflict because it provides a peaceful
approach “to manage inter-group tensions, increases representation and participation, and
improves service delivery, all of which reduce the likelihood of conflict” (Jackson, 2017,
p. 751). Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2011) augured that a link exists between decentralization
and trust in public institutions (Esteller-More´, 2013). According to Romeo (2002)
decentralization is a way of “demilitarizing politics in divided societies” (Jackson, 2017, p.752).
Where the conflict trigger is inequality or marginalization, decentralization has been
found to contribute to enduring peace (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). In Sierra Leone,
decentralization was used as a tool for stabilization and resulted in progress in its
postconflict recovery phase (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016 & Jackson, 2017). Schroder and
Chappuis, (2014) hold the view that in postconflict environments justice sector reform is
seen as a tool for stabilization. According to Jackson (2007), Sierra Leone’s central
government operated a system that focused only on the capital, neglecting the rest of the
country, and this led to the civil war (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
Despite assertions about the case made for decentralization in postconflict
reconstruction, it must be pointed out that authors like Edwards and Yilmaz (2016) posit
that there is an absence of agreement on the advantages of decentralization in postconflict
reconstruction and stabilization. According to Edwards and Yilmaz (2016), one theory
indicates that decentralization deepens internal conflicts and the other argues that
decentralization mitigates conflict. Brinkerhoff (2005) and Schou and Haug (2006)
shared similar sentiments (Jackson, 2017). The root causes of a particular conflict is an
important determinant of how decentralization will affect peacebuilding processes in that
society (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Where ethnicity (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016) or
political rivalry Bigdon and Hettige, (2003) cited in Jackson (2017) is the conflict driver,
decentralization worsens the situation (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016). Bertrand (2004) found
that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia fueled violence because of the local elite’s quest
for control over resources (Edwards & Yilmaz, 2016).
According to the report of Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Liberia’s civil war was largely driven by exclusion of the indigenous population by the
settlers. Like Sierra Leone, Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that
this resulted in a system of government which treated Monrovia, inhabited by the settlers,
positively differently from the indigenous population who lived outside the capital
(Government of Liberia, 2010). This system had been perpetuated for well over a
century, leading to numerous conflicts with the 14 year civil war being the most serious.
Given the triggers of Liberia’s civil war, it can be argued with a great degree of certainty
that the fruits of the quest to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice within a larger project
to decentralize public services will lead to peace and stability in Liberia. This is because,
decentralizing the criminal justice system does not result in the distribution of resources,
particularly money, as Bertrand (2004) noted was the case in Indonesia (Edwards &
Yilmaz, 2016) and there is consensus that the criminal justice system must be accessible
across. However, the methodology used to decentralize criminal justice services can
derail the benefits of decentralization. For instance, in Liberia, the finding that the
traditional justice system and leaders were deliberately ignored in the process to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system, must be watched as this could be the
Achilles Heel of the efforts to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. Table 13
presents participants views on how decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice has affected
the system’s functionality and Liberia’s peace and stability.
Table 13
Findings - Research Question 3
Research Questions Findings
RQ 3: How has decentralizing
Liberia’s criminal justice
system affected the system’s
functionality and Liberia’s
peace and stability?
i. Decentralization has made Liberia’s criminal justice
system functional (but two participants said the benefits
are yet to be felt) ii. Decentralization of the criminal
justice system has contributed to Liberia’s peace and
stability and is helping to address the root causes of
Liberia’s civil war
Research Question 3 (1). How can the Functionality of Liberia’s Criminal Justice
System be Improved?
In discussing research question 3, I concluded that the functionality of Liberia’s
criminal justice system still leaves much to be desired. To answer this research question, I
solicited participants views on what should be done to improve the system’s
functionality. The primary objective of answering this research question was to solicit the
perspectives of participants, the majority of whom are Liberian, to proffer solutions that
preferably have elements that depart from the orthodox approach to criminal justice
reform in postconflict societies. Participants made 2 broad recommendations and several
subrecommendations. Implementing the subrecommendations would aid the
implementation of the broad recommendations. The 2 main recommendations are that
there is the need to further reform and develop Liberia’s criminal justice
institutions/system and that there is the need to change the approaches and attitudes used
to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible. Table 14 presents recommendations
on how to improve the functionality of Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Table 14
Findings – Research Question 3 (1)
RQ 3.1: How can the
functionality of Liberia’s
criminal justice system be
improved?
i. Undertake institutional reform and
development of Liberia’s criminal justice
institutions/system.
ii. All actors involved in the decentralization
process must change their attitude towards the
process.
Reform and develop Liberia’s criminal justice institutions/system
This recommendation is an acknowledgement that institutions of Liberia’s
criminal justice system still require reform and development. This is an indication that
criminal justice system reform is an evolutionary process, which requires patience and
time, particularly in postconflict settings. Hence, despite the resources and time that have
been committed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system accessible, there is still work to
be done. Going forward, the reform process requires that some of the approaches that have
been used to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system should be pursued. Participants
also recommended a change in approach and in the attitude of actors involved in the
process. Participants recommended the following actions to reform and develop Liberia’s
criminal justice system: -
Participant 005 (i.e., one Participant) called for a complete overhaul of Liberia’s
criminal justice system. This recommendation highlights the need to focus on dealing
with the systemic challenges plaguing and clogging Liberia’s criminal justice system.
According to this Participant, the process of making the criminal justice system accessible
has over focused on improving infrastructure with less attention being paid to addressing
the systemic challenges of the justice system. This recommendation also emphasizes the
need for a holistic approach to criminal justice reform and confirms Silvestre (2016)
finding about the negative unintended consequences of the Brazilian government’s
decision to focus heavily on building prison infrastructure to deal with the huge prison
population and not addressing other challenges within the criminal justice system.
Three participants, including Participant 029, called for steps to be taken to
address the infrastructure gap in the criminal justice system through the construction of
small-scale infrastructure closer to the population they are expected to serve. In this
regard, this Participant advocated for “… smaller ones than a huge infrastructure, that is
unsustainable.” Closely related to the need to improve infrastructure is the
recommendation made by 3 participants including Participants 014 and 029 that logistics
for the criminal justice system need to be improved.
Five participants, including Participants 001, 008 and 017, called for the
allocation of adequate financial resources to implement initiatives to decentralize
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Decentralization processes require resources to
implement. With limited resources particularly in postconflict countries like Liberia. This
reality casts doubts on the possibility that adequate resources can be provided to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. It is my considered view that calling for
the provision of adequate resources to fund the decentralization of Liberia’s criminal
justice system is, respectfully, a wishful request which has almost no certainty of being
realized. Liberia’s government will have to find creative ways of being efficient in using
its limited resources. It is in this light that the orthodox approach to criminal justice
reform in postconflict societies must be questioned and/or revised. Maximizing the use of
limited resources requires, among other things, tailoring interventions to suit the context.
It also requires a middle path between the quest by international actors, who are
supporting the process, to promote certain interests and values and the realities on the
ground. Keeping this balance must be done through a thoughtful process, with innovation
as a guiding principle. It requires a departure from the norm and being exhibiting some
degree of altruism, a call though achievable is likely to remain utopian for the
foreseeable future.
The third recommended action calls for reforming the criminal justice system’s
legal framework. Participant 029 and 3 others shared this view. According to this
Participant, “some of the laws are archaic and so there is a need to look at it and ensure
that they reflect the common reality.” The foundation of the rule of law is certainty and
this is partly achieved through legislation which is published and enforceable. Having
legislation which does not reflect the demands of the time makes the quest to entrench a
rule of law culture in Liberia a mere slogan. Because of the civil war, Liberia is
confronted with criminal conduct that hitherto was unknown to it and its legislation is not
in touch with this reality.
During Liberia’s civil war, normal processes like law reform slowed down or
came to a standstill and existing legislation was overtaken by changes that occurred. To
address this requires legislative reform and intervention. One issue requiring legislative
reform that Participant 029 identified is the need to reform the Judiciary Law to increase
the duration of Court Terms to enable courts sit for longer periods, thereby increasing
access to justice. Another area that participants want attention to be given to is for judges
of the formal justice system to collaborate with the traditional justice system to dispense
justice. This will require policy and legislative reform and an overhaul of the criminal
justice system’s processes.
Participants 008, 009, 014 (i.e., 3 participants) recommended the enhancement of
coordination within the criminal justice chain. To this end, Participant 008 observed that: It
is not enough to strengthen prosecution if you cannot strengthen the judicial process. Say
you want to eliminate prolonged pretrial detentions; what does that
mean? The police have a role to play with that; the judges have a role to play with
that; the prosecution has a role to play with that. So, we need to have a system
that will look at all the various organizations and we bring them up
simultaneously; all of them have to operate in a parallel way …
Participant 009 stated that:
We got institutionalized blockages in our holistic system. If we are looking at the
system in holistic manner; starting from the police going all the way to the
prisons, we had institutionalized blockages. And ensuring working together as one
and trying to unblock the system in all of these parts would help the functioning
or dysfunction of the system.
Participant 027 (i.e., 1 participant) recommended the improvement of the
knowledge of the population about the criminal justice system. This Participant called for
improved communication and legal literacy amongst the population. This
recommendation seeks to improve the interaction between the criminal justice system and
the population and the population’s appreciation of their rights and obligations as well as
how the criminal justice system works. A population whose legal literacy skills are
enhanced will potentially be an effective partner of the system and contribute to making it
functional, accountable and accessible.
The last recommendation was made by 2 participants including Participant 015. It
advocates for technology to be used to make the criminal justice system accessible.
Participant 015 recommended the use of technology to perform law enforcement functions
such as traffic related duties (e.g., traffic lights and close circuit cameras) can be used so
that scarce human resources that are being used to perform traffic control duties can be
freed up to perform other duties. Holmberg (2014) and Jacot-Descombes and Niklaus
(2016) shared this recommendation. However, Participant 022 cautioned against unbridled
use of technology to decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. This Participant stated
that:
I am personally not in favor of pushing for some sort of digital revolution, maybe
also, because I have seen expensive attempts including in Timor Leste where
millions were invested and didn’t really lead to any meaningful efficiency. …
Electricity is still a big problem. Finance is a big problem. Facilities like offices
are not there to accommodate expensive equipment. And again, I will also bring
up the sustainability issue, we buy very expensive equipment for instance solar
panels. So, what happens when the machines break down in places like Grand
Kru. … You don’t need anything fancy. Mobile phones are a very important tool
of communication in this country. Coverage is quite good. I think it is important
and also, cheap. It is important that staff in the field will also have phones and that
they are able to communicate; not that they are not communicating; they are with
their superiors in Monrovia. … So, I think that it is a bit early especially outside
the capital. I don’t see how this could work.
This Participant’s caution does not reject the use of technology to make Liberia’s
criminal justice system accessible, it only advocates for circumspection in determining
the level of sophistication of the technology that is deployed. This recommendation is
supported by Parkin and Wedeking (2016) who argued that technology must be harnessed
to enhance access to justice. Watson, Rukundakuvuga and Matevosyan (2017) claimed
that, in postconflict societies, technology can be used for case management as was done
in Rwanda. Also, technology can be used to make the judiciary accessible (Parkin &
Wedeking, 2016).
Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) advocated for replacing the traditional
approaches to incarceration with technology for certain offences, excluding sexual
offences. The researcher argued that this may contribute to reducing recidivism and aid
rehabilitation. According to Bagaric, Hunter and Wolf (2017) technological incarceration
could reduce the cost of incarceration by half or one third. Using technology to
incarcerate has disadvantages including breaching the rights of convicts. Whereas the use
of technological incarceration may come with advantages, the infrastructure required to
implement this form of incarceration is undeveloped even in the Western world let alone
a postconflict republic like Liberia. Hence, using this approach in Liberia is imprudent or
to say the least requires time, resources and further advancement/development of the
country. Creating, operating and maintaining a website that provides vital information to
the population is one way to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system with the
aid of technology. However, in a society where illiteracy is rife and internet penetration
low, this will be beneficial only to the elite.
The caution expressed by Participant 022 should not be discounted. Even though
the world is moving towards digitizing a lot of processes, in the name of national
ownership and tailoring solutions to suit the Liberian context, an attempt to digitize
Liberia’s criminal justice system’s processes to enhance access to justice must be measured
but at the same time bold. A realistic balance needs to be kept between the need and/or
quest to digitize and the ability of such interventions to be sustained with public resources
generated within Liberia.
All actors must change their attitude and approach
The second broad recommendation participants made, called for an attitudinal change by
all actors working to make criminal justice services accessible in Liberia. These include
overseas development actors. As will be revealed in the actions suggested to implement
this recommendation, participants all called for a departure from the orthodox approach
used to reform criminal justice systems in postconflict societies. The following are the
specific actions that participants identified to be taken to implement the second
recommendation.
First, 2 participants (i.e., Participants 008 and 018) advocated for national
ownership of the decentralization process (i.e., Liberians need to own the processes to
enhance the system’s accessibility to the population). In this regard, Participant 008 said
“Liberia also needs to support local ownership.” Practically, this should, in part, translate
into Liberians owning the process and the international community supporting them to be
in the driver’s seat. It will not be easy nor immediate but needs to be done. At what stage
that this is done (i.e., the timing) is important.
The second action that 8 participants including Participants 010, 015 and 016
advocated for, was to ensure that processes to enhance access to the criminal justice system
are sustainable. In support of this recommended action, Participant 016 stated that “The
international community should have discussed sustainability more. They should have
conducted a lot of training for qualified personnel to be able to sustain those systems.”
Participant 015 believed that “what is critical right now is the issue of sustainability. How
can the government strategize to sustain what they themselves need to put in place?” As
previously noted, a major challenge confronting Liberia’s criminal justice system is the
inability of the government to sustain projects that were initiated and supported through
international development assistance. This challenge is a recurring theme associated with
criminal justice reform processes supported with international aid in postconflict societies
(Denney, 2014). Krawczyk and Muhula (2018) acknowledged the link between ensuring
that interventions to decentralize public services are sustainable and reaping the maximum
benefits of the decentralization process. In this regard, Dinnen and Peake (2013) and
Bacon (2015) claim that decentralization processes that are nationally owned/driven and
tailored to fit the context where they are being implemented are projects that are likely to
pass the sustainability test.
Participant 024 called for a focus on the population who are the intended
recipients of criminal justice system services, an approach this Participant observed was
missing in Liberia. This Participant claimed that:
I also think that our focus was so much on the providers of the service rather than
the recipients of the service. … there was very little focus on their responsibilities
as the police, as the judiciary, as the prosecution and much more on what their
needs were. And I think that the international community facilitated that thinking
and also encouraged competition between the different institutions of the criminal
justice system rather than a communal responsibility.
As previously mentioned, Kostovicova (2008) asserted that security sector reform
processes require creating relationships between the governed and the government so the
governed have a “say in it” (Gordon, 2014). This recommendation has the added
advantage of bolstering public confidence in the criminal justice system. Chappuis and
Heiner (2009) also observed that in Western liberalism, security sector reform provides
the basis for statehood to create “people-centered security” (Schroder & Chappuis, 2014,
p.134). Gordon (2014) noted that “Efforts focusing on building state institutions and
structures, without sufficiently paying attention to developing relations between the state
and its people, will not, it is argued, benefit peacebuilding in the long term” (p.126).
Denny (2014) promotes an approach to security sector reform that focuses on the end
user of justice and security services. According to this researcher, this approach
recognizes the relationship between providers of justice and security services. Knight
(2009) also called for security sector reform processes to have a Social Contract element
since this will create a situation where the focus is on the relationship between the state
and the citizenry (Gordon, 2014). A citizen or user centered approach will move the
debate from whether to deal with state and nonstate actors to an integrated approach to
reforming the justice and security sectors (Gordon, 2014). Adopting the end-user
approach to security sector reform results in a bottom-up approach to security sector
reform and takes criminal justice reform processes out of the hands of the elite in
postconflict societies (Gordon, 2014). The call that security sector programming should
abandon the dichotomy between state and nonstate actors is a positive one because,
potentially, it promotes inclusion, national ownership and acknowledges the dynamics on
the ground in postconflict countries as opposed to the current theoretical approach that
inordinately promotes the Weberian approach to state building.
Two participants called for the deployment of criminal justice officials outside
Monrovia. This recommendation is linked to the previous one relating to an approach that
seeks to focus on the users of the criminal justice system. In this regard, Participant 018
observed that “pretrial detentions are still there but lawyers are not encouraged to deploy
outside where the services are decentralized.” As noted earlier, Bacon (2015) found that,
in Liberia, donors focused their attention in the capital even though the majority of the
population was located outside the capital. Jackson (2017) shared similar views because
the author indicated that the international community supporting reforms in postconflict
countries are not enthusiastic about extending their support beyond the capital.
Practically, this approach of the international community adversely affected the interests
of Liberia’s rural population because they did not benefit from the support provided to the
formal justice system and the traditional justice system that supported them did not
receive the desired support from the international community’s support.
However, the international community cannot bear the entire blame; if national
actors believed in supporting the traditional justice system and matched this interest with
demands on their international partners, the neglect of the traditional justice system
would not have been so palpable. As claimed by Participant 005, some of Liberia’s elite
appear to be inwardly embarrassed about being associated with the traditional justice
system. Supporting and involving the traditional justice system in dispensing justice,
complemented by the deployment of officials of the criminal justice system, has the
potential of addressing the challenge of access to justice in Liberia’s rural areas and
Liberia as a whole.
According to Denney (2014), a working relationship between both systems of
justice is manifested in a situation where a judge of the formal justice system refers a
matter to the traditional justice system for arbitration and chiefs refer electoral related
matters that are before them to the police. For this to occur and be effective, actors within
both systems of justice must be trained, this is even pertinent in operationalizing Article
65 of Liberia’s constitution which enjoins the courts to apply both customary and statutory
laws in the administration of justice. Five participants including Participants
004, 022 and 029 called for training of personnel delivering justice services. For instance,
Participant 029 invited Liberia’s authorities to “ensure that people are trained to deliver services.”
Collaboration between state and nonstate actors in postconflict settings to provide
access to justice is in line with Denney (2014) and Jackson (2013) who called for
abandoning the approach to criminal justice reform that draws a dichotomy between state
and nonstate actors with foreign actors gravitating towards working more or only with
state actors. Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan (2008), shared this view because they
noted that in postconflict countries nonstate and state actors collaborate to provide public
services under a framework described as “hybrid or non-Weberian political formations”
(Podder, 2014, p. 215). Jackson (2017) also noted that “… in postconflict environments the
relationship between these former local government organizations and nonstate providers;
that may include armed actors - is critical in terms of providing services like security” (p.
751).
When the population does not feel the presence of the state, nonstate actors step in
to fill the void, hence working with nonstate actors in postconflict reform processes is not
only sensible but an imperative. In other words, attempting to create a security
architecture along the Weberian style in postconflict settings is futile, an imprudent use of
scarce resources and flies in the face of national ownership principles (Denney, 2014;
Podder, 2014 & Homel & Masson, 2016). Collaboration amongst actors in the criminal
justice system including the traditional justice system requires that they communicate.
This is acknowledged by 2 participants. Dandurand (2014) stated this recommendation.
According to this research, due to the complexities of the criminal justice system, actors
within the system must collaborate and communicate to be effective and generate the
public’s confidence in the system. There is however a caveat that, when involving
nonstate actors, all sections of the society including women and youth must be
represented (Gordon, 2014) because the reform processes must resist any attempts to
preserve discriminatory practices that characterized the preconflict and conflict periods
(Jackson, 2013). This recommendation is also supported by Dinnen and Peake (2013)
who found that, in Bougainville, police reform processes actively engaged women, and
this resulted in an increase in the number of women police officers.
Related to the recommendation for a citizen centered criminal justice system is the
call by Participant 025 for the efforts to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice
system to focus more on the delivery of services rather than infrastructure. This
recommendation affirms the soundness in the decision to abandon the hub project as
initially conceptualized for an approach that focuses on service delivery whilst building
small scale infrastructure to house and dispense criminal justice services. Services
provided by paralegal have been used to make criminal justice services accessible in
postconflict countries (Swenson, 2018). According to some participants, attempts to
establish a paralegal scheme has been largely resisted in Liberia. According to Participant
024:
I think one of the principal things is the paralegal systems that have been used or
established effectively in other parts of Africa but also specifically within West
Africa. I think that in terms of accessibility and in terms of decentralization and
actually, improving people’s access to the justice system and understanding of the
justice system. I think there is obvious resistance to that in Liberia. But
nevertheless, I do think that there is something that could be learned from that,
there are similar problems across all of those systems and across other countries
as well where there aren’t enough lawyers. You just don’t have enough in the
formal system to process the kind of people that are coming into the system. And
therefore, you need to go out. And I think there are some really interesting
approaches in other places. Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and other bits and pieces…
Liberia has got absolutely no real justification for refusing to take this stuff
forward.
Swenson (2018) referred to paralegals as barefoot lawyers. Paralegals work with lawyers
to provide criminal justice services (Jackson, 2014). They are nonstate actors who have proved
effective in providing access to justice in postconflict countries (Swenson, 2018). The United
Nations has endorsed using these barefoot lawyers to enhance access to justice in postconflict
countries (Swenson, 2018). In Sierra Leone, they actively providing services that enhance the
population's access to the criminal justice system. They provided legal literacy skills, advice on
how to navigate the criminal justice system and mediation (Denney, 2014 & Jackson, 2013).
Stomseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006) claimed that “Paralegal assistance seems to offer that
ever-elusive commodity: a do-no-harm intervention with capacity to improve both the state and
nonstate justice sectors in almost any setting, including postconflict societies'' (Swenson, 2018,
p. 52).
According to Maru (2006), paralegals are cost effective services that are sustainable
(Swenson, 2018). Baker (2010) also indicated that in postconflict environments,
paralegals bring state and nonstate justice together (Swenson, 2018). In Timor-Lestor,
Swenson (2018) found that paralegals assisted in resolving disputes in a shorter time
compared to the formal justice system.
There are challenges that are associated with using paralegals to enhance access to
justice. According to Swenson (2018), lines of accountability between paralegals and
certain actors like their donors, local/traditional authorities and state authorities are
blurred, and this creates multiple lines of accountability and management. Secondly,
decisions arrived at by paralegals are not binding, hence may result in delays in bringing
closure to disputes and fuel impunity (Swenson, 2018). This is because the powerful in
society will disobey their orders thus affecting the vulnerable in society, especially
women (Swenson, 2018). Also, operating a paralegal scheme automatically increases the
forums for dispute resolution and creates an opportunity for abuse by litigants who may
mischievously engage in forum shopping (Swenson, 2018). The lack of human resource
capacity to operate paralegal schemes and the fact that they usually operate in remote
locales, away from the eyes of oversight structures, may affect the quality of justice they
dispense (Swenson, 2018). In connection with the challenge of lack of oversight,
Castillejo (2009) found that in Sierra Leone, the presence of other nonstate actors, like
civil society organizations, working on access to justice issues provided oversight over
paralegals (Jackson, 2013). For paralegal programs to be successful, they must be
supported by the elite and powerful in the community (Swenson, 2018).
As earlier noted, Participant 024 claimed that lawyers in Liberia, who are part of
the elite in every society have been reluctant to support the introduction of a paralegal
scheme in Liberia. This is in spite of the access to justice challenges confronting
Liberians. Given the reasons provided by Participant 024 for the resistance, it is evident
that Liberian lawyers are engaging in an act of self-preservation. The unsuccessful
attempts to introduce a paralegal program in Liberia despite the highlighted benefits,
confirmed Swenson (2018) assertion that support from the society’s powerful and elite is
a condition precedent for establishing and implementing a successful paralegal scheme in
postconflict settings. What is at stake in Liberia is a conflict between satisfying the
parochial interest of a few which is packaged as seeking the interest of the larger society.
The quest for, and right to, justice that is sought by most of the population has been
ignored. The inability of the formal justice system to provide access to justice in the
foreseeable future must energize the government to weigh the interests at stake and work
collaboratively to get various actors on board, failing which leadership is required to
uphold the interest of the majority of citizens for access to justice (i.e., to introduce a
paralegal scheme in Liberia while addressing the excesses associated with its
introduction).
The interests at stake in the discussions to introduce a paralegal program in
Liberia is one instance where the conceptual challenge of what constitutes national
ownership is manifested. This confirms Gordon (2014) and Schroder and Chappuis
(2014) assertion about the interest driven nature of criminal justice system reform even in
postconflict settings. The debate over introducing a paralegal scheme in Liberia also
highlighted the battle between national and local ownership and what happens in such
contests (i.e., often national ownership prevails). Residents of Liberia’s local
communities, who are mostly the poor and vulnerable will be better off receiving
paralegal services, but at the national level there is opposition and the voice at the
national level being that of the powerful and elite is, so far, holding sway. This must
change! The desire to introduce a paralegal program in Liberia to enhance access to
criminal justice services, is an example of an instance where programs that have been
successfully implemented in other contexts can be tailored and implemented in another
context with similar challenges.
Two participants including Participant 016 and called for coordination and
oversight of the criminal justice chain. According to this Participant, “There are a lot of
complaints that cases are brought to the police station and the police charges money or
else they will not follow up on the case. … We need strong disciplinary measures against
police officers that fail to abide by the law.” It is important that criminal justice reform
processes are holistic and coordinated to ensure the judicious use of resources and that all
parts of the criminal justice system receive the required attention. These will increase the
chances of reaping the intended consequences of the decentralization process. As noted
earlier, the consequences and manifestations of an uncoordinated criminal justice reform
process was found in Sierra Leone where the postconflict reconstruction process focused
heavily on security and less on justice and this adversely affected the justice part of the
chain and, as observed by Howlett-Bolton (2008), the effectiveness of the police was also
negatively affected (Jackson, 2013). As part of a holistic and coordinated approach to
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system, oversight mechanisms need to be
strengthened. Effective oversight and accountability are features of every modern criminal
justice system operated by countries who are developing a democratic culture (Nall &
Mamayek, 2013). When criminal justice systems are decentralized, their interaction with
the population increases and this increases the chances that human rights abuses will
occur, particularly in postconflict countries. This creates a compelling reason for Liberia to
enhance oversight and accountability of its criminal justice system. For a postconflict
society, these challenges have implications for building enduring peace and stability and
can also defeat the purpose of having an accessible criminal justice system. Establishing
an effective oversight and accountability mechanism contributes to enhancing public
confidence in the criminal justice system. The need for democratic civilian oversight in
Liberia’s security sector is recognized by Fyanka (2014) because the researcher
recommends that security sector reform processes in Liberia must be designed and
implemented in a manner tailored towards civilian oversight over the sector.
In furtherance of the overarching recommendation for attitudinal change
Participant 11 called on international partners to remain credible and consistent in the
decentralization process. This Participant indicated that:
But let me just say this; partnership goes with confidence first and credibility. In
many instances where you see the goalposts being shifted in the middle of the
game and the rules changing in the middle of the game, there is an issue that
should be addressed. If it is not addressed, they become a problem with the
partnership.
Credibility is key in every partnership, more so when it comes to upholding national
ownership principles in delivering international development assistance. Being consistent
requires that international actors stay committed to genuinely upholding national
ownership principles in the assistance they deliver. It also ensures that when agreements
are made between international actors and recipients of their assistance, parties stick to
their commitments with enough room to jointly change course should there be a change
in the situation. The need to remain credible and consistent is also required of national
actors. According to Gordon (2014), the fact that local actors lack the political will to
support reform processes is acknowledged by Heaped (2012). Underlying this absence of
political will are interests of local actors that may be adversely affected by the ongoing
reforms (Gordon, 2014). Jackson (2013) affirmed the need for consistency and
commitment amongst actors in criminal justice reform processes in postconflict settings,
by drawing the attention of those leading the reforms and the intended beneficiaries, to
accept the fact that the process is time and resource consuming and requires endurance.
Theoretical Framework
The results of this qualitative study validated the theoretical frameworks used to conduct
this research and brings clarity to the research questions. Structural
Functionalism and Realism theories were used to conduct this study. Realism is used to analyze
the behavior of states (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). According to Realist
Theory, states are emboldened by their power to act in pursuit of their national interests.
The following assumptions underpin the Realist Theory: that the international system is
state centric; that the conduct of states in international politics is conflict driven, hence
anarchic; that states are sovereign and have different capabilities and sizes; that states are
rational and unitary actors in pursuing their national interest; and that a state’s power
determines, predicts and explains its actions. Structural Functionalism theorists claim that
social entities such as organizations, are organisms that are comprised of different parts.
Each part plays a unique role(s) and these parts work together to contribute to keeping the
organism alive and functional (Babbie, 2015). In this regard, where a part malfunctions,
the ability of the organism to function according to its design to achieve the objective(s)
for which it is designed is adversely affected and makes the organism incapable or
ineffective (Babbie, 2015).
This grounded theory qualitative study found that the majority of the actors involved in
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system were states, quasi-state institutions and
inter-governmental organizations. Almost all of the actors were Western and/or developed
countries and institutions oriented towards the neoliberal ideology. These states committed
resources to support Liberia’s postconflict recovery processes, including enhancing access
to the criminal justice system. The processes championed by these actors promoted
neoliberal institutions and values. Institutions that were created and the reforms that were
undertaken sought to or replicated neoliberal institutions without due regard to the
specificities of the Liberian context. For example, the traditional justice system, which is
the primary source of justice for most of the Liberian population, at best received negligible
attention, even though the huge resources committed to reform the formal justice system
are yet to yield the desired results. I also found that nonstate actors, ordinary citizens,
traditional leaders and civil society organizations were hardly consulted in the
decentralization processes. As indicated in the literature, this is a common occurrence in
postconflict reconstruction because international actors seek to promote the
Weberian style of security sector reform which has a state centric approach (Denney,
2014). The recurrence of this mistake in security sector reform in postconflict
reconstruction has resulted in authors like Schroder and Chappuis, (2014) questioning the
appropriateness of the Weberian-style model in postconflict peacebuilding processes.
That approach furthers the interests of the countries funding the reforms, hence the
likelihood that they will abandon it despite its apparent inappropriateness, in favor of
approaches that suit the Liberian context, is almost nonexistent and confirms the realist
theorists’ explanation of how states behave.
With respect to the appropriateness of Structural Functionalism for this study, it is evident
that participants held the view that, for understandable reasons, the process of making Liberia’s
criminal justice system accessible focused more on the police and less on other parts of the
criminal justice chain. This approach had a negative impact on the criminal justice system’s
functionality. The benefits of investing in the Liberian National Police were acknowledged by
participants in a recently conducted public perception survey whose report is yet to be published.
Results of the survey indicates that the performance of the police was rated higher than other
parts of the criminal justice chain. However, the same report highlighted participants
dissatisfaction with the entire criminal justice system and expressed a preference for the
traditional justice system. Thus, confirming the fact that where one part of the system is
strengthened, in Liberia’s case the police and the others neglected, no or little progress is made.
This raises the question about the extent to which resources committed to reform Liberia’s police
were judiciously used, vis-à-vis the functionality of the criminal justice system.
Focusing relatively more on the police and less on the other parts of the criminal
justice chain, confirms assertions by proponents of the Structural Functional Theory that
the inability of a part of the system or organism to function makes the entire system
dysfunctional. For the avoidance of doubt, the disproportionate amount of support
channeled to the police compared to the other parts of the criminal justice chain is not the
sole reason why Liberia’s criminal justice system was found to be far from functional.
Other reasons for this state of affairs have been revealed in discussing research questions
2 and 3.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded without equivocation that participants
reinforced the underpinning assumptions of both theoretical frameworks used for this study
and confirmed the appropriateness of the choice for this study.
Limitations
The following limitations were associated with this study: first, despite the fact that
the majority of participants indicated that ordinary citizens were informed but not
consulted in the decentralization process, the majority of Liberians who took part in this
study were the elite and actively involved in the decentralization process, hence their
perceptions that the process was not inclusive may be reflecting their position, as elite
Liberians vis-à-vis the international actors and not in relation to ordinary Liberians vis-
àvis their involvement in the process. Thus, talking to ordinary Liberians may have
enriched this study’s findings. Therefore, this study may have perpetuated the elitism
associated with the process to enhance access to Liberia’s criminal justice system.
Whereas the majority of the participants being Liberian could be the basis of answers that
reflected the true state of affairs, these participants belong to the elite, schooled and
socialized in Western liberal thinking, and this certainly shaped their perspectives,
perspectives that may not be shared by ordinary Liberians who form the majority of the
population. Also, at the time of collecting data, there a government had just assumed
office and some participants may have been dissatisfied with the direction the new
government was leading the country in general, and the criminal justice sector in
particular, and this could have clouded their judgement and their answers. Also, some of
the participants had left their public office functions in the criminal justice system, much
earlier on, and so may not have been current on the happenings of the criminal justice
sector. Some of the participants may also have shared perspectives that were outside the
period that this study focused on. It must however be noted that changes in the criminal
justice system, particularly in postconflict settings, have a long gestation period so sharing
views that are not so further away from the period under review will not fundamentally
affect the accuracy of the perspectives shared nor my findings. Furthermore, the fact that a
relatively limited number of foreigners participated in this study and this deprived this
study of other perspectives from foreigners who implemented international development
assistance programs. The inability to recruit more foreigners to participate in this study
was due to a number of factors including the fact that they were often bound by
confidentiality requirements linked to their employment contract and/or they were not
available or disinterested. In addition to the said limitations, participants were
disproportionately drawn from parts of the criminal justice chain and this may have
skewed answers in favor of parts of the chain they worked for. The last limitation of this
study arises from the limited number of female participants. This deprived the study of the
views of women who form most of Liberia’s population, belong to the vulnerable group,
were active in the peace process and would be the prime beneficiaries of an accessible
criminal justice system.
Recommendation for Future Research
The following recommendations are made for future research:
1. Conduct a similar study as this study but use quantitative and/or mix-method
methods with a larger sample size because this will reflect better the views of
ordinary Liberians.
2. What kind of criminal justice system does Liberia need and can afford?
3. What will be the impact of efforts to promote the rule of law culture in Liberia if the
customary justice system is resourced and receives stronger backing from Liberia’s
elite to use it as a system of justice?
4. What will it take to prepare formal justice actors to accept traditional justice actors as
partners in justice delivery?
5. What will it take to have a citizen centered criminal justice system in Liberia?
6. Beyond paying taxes, how can the private sector contribute to decentralization of the
criminal justice system, without the system feeling beholden to them?
7. Conceptual clarity on what constitutes local and national ownership.
8. Conceptual clarity on terminology (i.e., referring to indigenous systems of justice as
informal justice systems rather than customary or traditional justice or even non-
formal justice systems).
Recommendations
Making criminal justice services accessible in postconflict societies is a complex
endeavor with many actors involved and a multiplicity of interests to be satisfied. It is a
process and not an event. It evolves and requires patience. Desires for quick fixes and
showing impact/progress are natural but unrealistic and unhelpful. Despite the high level
of interest national actors demonstrate and no matter how much resources are channeled;
their absorptive capacity is limited but grows over time. Where this is forced, negative
unintended consequences will arise and place burdens on all actors, with ordinary citizens,
particularly the vulnerable, being the worst affected. If the objectives of reforming criminal
justice systems in peacebuilding efforts are going to be achieved all actors should be seen
as important parts of a system working in various but reinforcing ways towards the
ultimate objective of enhancing access to justice. This requires genuine partnership, not
devoid of seeking to satisfy parochial interests, but also not sacrificing the primary goal of
enhancing access to criminal justice services for all, no matter the geographical location in
Liberia. Seeing change will require several actions, most of them I identified during
discussions regarding research question 3(1).
Within the afore-stated realities, the following recommendations are made for all
actors in Liberia’s criminal justice decentralization process:
First, there is the need for an evaluation of all approaches that have been used to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice system. This should involve all actors with the
Government of Liberia in the lead. The evaluation should be honest and thorough, and its
findings should inform the way forward as well as the design and implementation of a strategic
plan to enhance access to justice in Liberia.
A nationally led and inclusive conversation to answer the question: what kind of
justice system including the criminal justice system does Liberia need and can afford?
should be convened, with appropriate time and resources allocated for its preparations.
Women, youth, civil society, ordinary people and traditional authorities must be
represented in this dialogue and their views taken on board. This conversation must be
informed by the past and promote Liberia’s national interest and uphold its international
commitments. It must not seek to mimic other contexts blindly but rather project Liberia’s
unique identity. This exercise should not be overly legalistic; so, must have perspectives of
sociology, anthropology, history, reality and political judgement, which must culminate
into designing a criminal justice system that is citizen centered and reflects Liberia’s
history, culture and post-civil war demography.
Efforts to uphold and operationalize the constitutional imperative of operating a
dual justice system in Liberia must be intensified with study tours undertaken to
jurisdictions with similar challenges/systems/structures as Liberia. In this regard, I
strongly recommended that Liberia’s authorities and its partners undertake a study tour to
Bougainville to have a first-hand opportunity and feel of the system operating there. This
will help clarify the conceptual challenges relating to how to involve the traditional justice
system in dispensing criminal justice services in Liberia. This is because, from the data
collected, there is an absence of conceptual clarity on how this can be done in a modern
democratic state. Traditional leaders must be recognized as allies in dispensing justice in
Liberia. This recognition should create partnerships. It will be long, painful and require
enormous amounts of resources but in the long run worthwhile. Extending the criminal
justice system’s reach to adequately cover the entire country will remain a work in
progress in our lifetime. Even when this becomes a reality, the reasons for the
population’s preference for the traditional justice system over the formal justice system
will not have been addressed, hence the traditional justice system will continue to be a
prominent forum and source of justice. This questions’ the prudence of the decision to
channel limited resources on decentralizing the formal justice system which is not the
preferred forum for seeking justice by the majority of Liberians.
The traditional justice system is steeped in culture, religion and tradition and
inherent in this are cultural notions of fairness. Whereas, it is true that there are human
rights violations that arise from its practices, the same can be said about the formal justice
system. Efforts must be made to address these human rights violations and the temptation
resisted to unnecessarily use foreign standards of human rights and fairness to harshly
judge the traditional justice system. There is no doubt in my mind that, parallels of
international human rights standards can be found within local traditions and cultures.
Alternatively, efforts to find a hybrid between international standards and values vis à vis
those arising from indigenous Liberian culture should be undertaken. This outcome will
have to be allowed to evolve so should not be forced. Liberia’s traditional justice system
should be allowed to operate in a modern state within reasonable legal limits. It should
interact/work with the formal justice system. However, it must always be remembered
that the traditional justice system loses its identity when it is overly codified, hence a lot
of caution must be taken in determining how the traditional justice system operates within
a modern democratic state. In this regard, a middle path approach must be adopted.
Certainty and predictability are cardinal principles of the rule of law. Arguably, the
absence of codification of processes of the traditional justice system is not synonymous
or amount to, an absence of certainty and predictability. It is worth stressing that in
recommending a middle path does not mean that I am advocating an alternative or
additional system of justice for Liberia. I am only advocating for an operationalization of
Article 65 of Liberia’s Constitution as envisaged by its framers of having a dual justice
system (i.e., customary and statutory systems of justices).
Third Party Policing should be actively used in Liberia. I did not find this
approach to policing being used in Liberia, in spite of indications by Mazola (2018) of a
shift towards using this approach in law enforcement. Liberia’s traditional and religious
leaders have an enormous amount of social capital which the police lack. The police can
harness the moral authority that these leaders have to carry out their functions.
Liberia and its partners must actively explore South South cooperation in seeking
support and options to make the criminal justice system accessible. This would be helpful
for Liberia as there is a greater chance that technical support and advice from Third
World countries are more likely to be practically aligned to Liberia’s challenges, thus
also addressing the challenge of sustaining these interventions when international
development assistance ceases.
There is also the need for urgent, coherent and holistic constitution and law reform
in Liberia. This recommendation is linked to previous ones on holding a national
conversation on Liberia’s justice system and the need to operationalize Liberia’s dual
justice system. Legislative reform is a huge undertaking and requires a deliberate effort
and dedicated resources. It should harmonize overlapping legislation, address the
systemic challenges which are making the criminal justice system weak and
dysfunctional. It must repeal archaic legislation and bring Liberian legislation and
practice in conformity with Liberia’s international obligations. In this regard, the
Legislature is an important actor which must be involved very early in the process. The
role of the Legislature rarely came up in the data I collected. This is of real concern for a
postconflict country trying to build a rule of law culture. Efforts must be made to mitigate
this perceived lack of relevance of the legislative body in the criminal justice reform
process. Another actor who was not mentioned, but very relevant for implementing this
recommendation, is Liberia’s Law Reform Commission, which is charged with leading
and coordinating criminal justice system reform.
Participants cited the high levels of pretrial detainees and overcrowding in
Liberia’s prisons as indicators of a dysfunctional criminal justice system. This situation
does not only suggest a dysfunctional criminal justice system but also amounts to an
abuse of the rights of inmates. It is also an unnecessary charge on the taxpayer.
Therefore, in addition to addressing the weaknesses in legislation and practices that are
causing this challenge, serious consideration should be given to reintroducing and/or
strengthening processes or approaches like restorative justice, alternatives to
incarceration, parole, probation, noncustodial sentencing and community service into
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Effective oversight of the various parts of the criminal
justice system is important for addressing the issue of overcrowding in Liberia’s prisons.
Therefore, steps should be taken to strengthen oversight mechanisms of the criminal
justice system.
Civil society and members of the community must be strengthened to actively
participate in the reform processes. They must be considered partners in the process and
must be consulted and not informed about the process as was revealed by participants as the
practice. They must assist in being the watchdogs and hold the government and its
international partners accountable. For this to happen, they must be knowledgeable and
resourced; in a setting like Liberia this will require external help, which may result in
cooptation and defeat the objectives of supporting them. However, if the objectives of
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system are to have a chance of being achieved, this
is an important recommendation that must be implemented. This recommendation does not
seek to replace the need for the classical oversight mechanism that every criminal justice
system must have. The point that Liberia’s criminal justice chain requires strong oversight
cannot be overemphasized. A number of the pointers that participants provided as
indicators of a dysfunctional criminal justice system and some of the challenges of the
criminal justice system can be addressed by effective oversight mechanisms.
Peacebuilding efforts in Liberia must adopt the territorial peace approach. This
approach has the objective of ensuring that interventions to decentralize Liberia’s
criminal justice system do not adopt a one size fits all approach across the country
(Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate, 2016). It calls for a macro level approach to
decentralizing Liberia’s criminal justice system. Treating the entire country as the same
and replicating elements of the entire criminal justice chain without regard to the
specificities of the various geographical areas defeats the quest to promote local
ownership. According to Schultze-Kraft, Valencia and Alzate (2016) the territorial peace
approach fuses elements of decentralization, access to justice and security as well as rural
development.
Technology should be employed to make Liberia’s criminal justice system
accessible. This recommendation must be implemented with considerable caution.
Liberia is a postconflict society with several challenges which pose challenges on using
technology including in the criminal justice system. As previously noted, Liberia should explore
using technology for record keeping, case management, traffic management and security, DNA
testing and other forensic support for investigations, and creating websites with information such
as legal texts, cause lists and decided cases. This can enhance access to the criminal justice
system and improve the administration of justice.
Implications for Social Change
In this study, I found that the decentralization process was not inclusive as it did not
consult ordinary Liberians, civil society and traditional leaders. I also found that the
decentralization process has resulted in some semblance of functionality although there is
still a long way to go. However, the existence of the state/government through the
presence of criminal justice institutions, although limited, was found to be contributing to
Liberia’s peace and stability. Participants called for a change in attitude and approach in
how international development assistance is delivered and received in reforming
Liberia’s criminal justice system. Specifically, the need to ensure that nonstate actors
such as traditional leaders and the traditional justice system are involved in the process
and that interventions are context specific and sustainable, were highlighted as important
changes required to making the criminal justice system functional and ensuring Liberia’s
peace and stability. Liberia’s traditional justice system has been identified as an
important player in justice delivery that is being suppressed by officialdom partly due to
human rights abuses associated with its processes and the contempt that some members
of the privileged class have for this system of justice. Specific recommendations were
made to reverse this trend and the attendant benefits highlighted.
These findings offer an opportunity for all actors supporting processes to enhance
access to criminal justice services to pause and rethink their approach. International
development actors must focus on local ownership and sustainability and act according to
the tenets of both concepts (i.e., local ownership and sustainability). This will require a
balance between the quest to achieve their national interest objectives and ensuring that
resources committed to reform Liberia’s criminal justice system result in tangible
benefits to Liberians. The outcome of implementing this recommendation may result in
taxpayers in donor countries being satisfied with the progress their resources are bringing
to Liberia.
The findings and recommendations of this study call for a fundamental shift in how
criminal justice reform processes are implemented in postconflict countries. If acted upon,
they will reduce the threshold of how much national interest considerations inform such
endeavors and potentially create an opportunity for ordinary citizens to actively participate
in decision making on issues affecting them. This will increase accountability in public
service, a culture which is nearly absent in postconflict settings. This will, in turn, reduce
the dependency of recipient countries on international development assistance, enhance
progress towards a democratic culture and contribute to enduring peace. Ultimately, access
to the criminal justice system in Liberia will contribute to achieving SDGs 11 and 16,
which seek to make cities and human settlements inclusive, resilient, safe and sustainable
as well as promote peace, justice and strong institutions.
Conclusion
This study investigated the approaches that have been used to decentralize
criminal justice services in Liberia, how inclusive and nationally driven/led the process to
decentralize Liberia’s criminal justice has been, and the impact of decentralization on the
functionality of the criminal justice system and on Liberia’s peace and stability. It also
focused on soliciting participants views on how to enhance the functionality of Liberia’s
criminal justice system. This study contributes to filling the gap identified in the literature
and has the potential of enhancing social change if the recommendations are
implemented. The need for national ownership and inclusive processes in criminal justice
reform in postconflict settings has eluded many peacebuilding efforts. The call for
attitudinal change in how these interventions are delivered through international
development assistance is known but this change is yet to occur. Peacebuilding efforts in
a postconflict setting are shared efforts and change in attitudes and approach is necessary
to ensure that they do not perpetuate conditions that triggered conflict.
