Introduction The Fisheries Sector is Significant
The fisheries sector is significant for millions of people’s food and economic security.1 It
accounts for about 17% of animal protein and provides an estimated 600 million people with
livelihoods.2 In addition, the sector contributes annually to the government revenue of many
states.3 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has reported that most
developing states rely heavily on the export of aquatic products to contribute to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).4 The importance of the fisheries sector is also evident in the increase in global
demand for fish consumption. The FAO’s most recent State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture
(SOFIA) report estimates that in 2020, fish consumption rose to about 20.2 kg per capita, double
the consumption rate of 50 years ago.5
For the Gulf of Guinea states, the fisheries sector is particularly essential to their economy as it
contributes to livelihoods, food security, and revenue. It is an important economic sector to over
nine million people who depend on it directly and indirectly for livelihood.6 Additionally, it
provides about 3.1% to 55.8% of animal protein sources to millions of people, particularly those
living in coastal communities.7 The fisheries sector also contributes significantly to the national
GDP of states such as Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, mainly through access fees with Distant
Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs).8
Unfortunately, global fish stocks are severely threatened by several factors, including climate
change, pollution, and overfishing.9 However, the unsustainable practice of Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has been criticised for being a significant threat to fish stocks.10
Globally, the estimated value of IUU fishing is between 11 to 26 million tons of fish, valued at
1 Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Towards Blue Transformation
(FAO Report, 2022) 86.
2 Ibid 86, 109.
3 Ibid 91 – 107.
4 Ibid 91.
5 Ibid 82.
6 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unreported Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development (SDGs) for Countries in the Gulf of Guinea’ (2019) 99 Marine Policy 414 (‘Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable Development Goals’).
7 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (FAO Report, 2018) 67.
8 ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)’, European Commission (Web Page)
<https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-
agreements-sfpas_en>
9 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Towards Blue Transformation (n 1) xvi, 200 – 203.
10 David J. Agnew et al., ‘Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing’ (2009) 4 (2) Plos One 1 – 6; U R
Sumaila et al., ‘Illicit Trade in Marine Fish Catch and its Effects on Ecosystems and People Worldwide’ (2020) 6 (9)
Science Advances 2.
USD10 billion to USD23.5 billion annually.11 For Gulf of Guinea states, it has been estimated
that IUU fishing represents 40% to 65% of fish catch.12
IUU fishing threatens fish stocks and is also connected with other maritime crimes. IUU fishing
vessels have been implicated in maritime crimes such as trafficking (human, drugs, and arms),13
people smuggling,14 piracy,15 document forgery,16 money laundering,17 and tax and customs
fraud.18 Such crimes negatively impact the maritime security of states. Therefore, recent security
studies, discussions, and policies have broadened their understanding of maritime security
threats from a traditional notion of maritime security, focusing on threats to national security to
include non-traditional security threats, including IUU fishing.19 As such, this thesis aims to
contribute to understanding IUU fishing as it relates to the threat it poses to maritime security,
and then provide a more holistic approach to combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
1.1 The Concept of IUU Fishing and its Limitations
Understanding the meaning of the term IUU fishing is the first step towards comprehending its
maritime security dimensions. The term emerged from several discussions in international and
regional fora in the early 1990s.20 It was first formally used in a 1997 report by the Convention
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), highlighting the
11 David J. Agnew et al., ‘Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing’ (2009) 4 (2) Plos One 4.
12 ‘Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing’, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
U.S Department of Commerce (Web Page, 28 June 2017) <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-
illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing>; Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fight Against Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa a Regional Challenge (FAO Report, 2020) 3; Alkaly Doumbouya et al.,
‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa’
(2017) 4(50) Frontiers in Marine Science 1.
13 Mary Mackay, Britta Denise Hardesty, and Chris Wilcox, ‘The intersection Between Illegal Fishing, Crimes at
Sea, and Social Well-Being’ (2020) 7 Frontiers in Marine Science 4, 5.
14 Emma Witbooi et al., ‘Organized Crime in the Fisheries Sector Threatens a Sustainable Ocean Economy’ (2020)
588 (7836) Nature 52.
15 U. Rashid Sumaila and Mahamudu Bawumia, ‘Fisheries, Ecosystem Justice and Piracy: A Case Study of Somalia’
(2014) 157 Fisheries Research 154-163.
16 ‘Successful Results Achieved in Second IUU Fishing Operation with Liberian Government’, Sea Shepherd (News
Article, 8 June 2018) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/sola-stella-2-wrap/>
17 Environmental Justice Foundation, Fear, Hunger and Violence: Human Rights in Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Fleet
(EJF Report, 26 October 2020) 28.
18 ‘Sea Shepherd Assists Liberian Coast Guard with Arrest of Cargo Vessel for Illegal Fish Trade’, Sea Shepherd
(News Article, 2 January 2019) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/arrest-liberia-haifeng/>
19 Mercedes Rossello, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing as a Maritime Security Concern’ in Lisa
Otto (ed), Global Challenges in Maritime Security (Springer, 2020) 33 – 44; Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The
Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a Threat to Human and
National Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ (2020) 13(2) African Security 116 – 146; Maurice Beseng, ‘The Nature and
Scope of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Fisheries Crime in Cameroon: Implications for Maritime
Security’ (2021) 14 (3) African Security 262 – 285.
20 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International
Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, (BRILL, 2010) 25.
growing risk of overfishing in the Southern Ocean.21 However, there was still a need to develop
a global strategy to combat this problem.
In 2001, the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) (a voluntary instrument), which was developed within the
framework of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, outlined the first
comprehensive and accepted definition of IUU fishing.22 The IPOA-IUU described each
component of the term IUU fishing in connection to marine areas subject to the high seas and
states’ national jurisdictions as follows:
3.1 Illegal Fishing refers to activities:
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State
without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
3.1.2. conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional
fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and
management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or
relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
3.1.3. in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by
cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national
authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management
organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the
reporting procedures of that organization.
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that
are conducted by vessels without nationality, or those flying the flag of a State not party to that
organization, or by fishing entity, in a manner that is inconsistent with or contravenes the
conservation and management measures of that organization; or
3.3.2. in areas or for fish stock in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent
21 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Implications of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
(National Intelligence Council Memorandum, 19 September 2016) 17.
22 Food and Agriculture Organisations, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted on 23 June 2001 at the 102nd Session of the FAO Council (‘IPOA-
IUU Fishing’).
with states responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international
law.23
There are two main issues with the definition given by the IPOA-IUU. First, some in the
academic sphere have argued that the definition does not account for the overlap in activities in
the distinct components of IUU fishing.24 For instance, not all IUU fishing is illegal, as
unregulated fishing may not violate national laws.25 However, in many domestic jurisdictions,
unreported fishing is a form of illegal fishing since any fishing activities that violate national
laws and regulations can be categorised as illegal fishing. If not reporting fish catch violates
national laws and regulations, it follows that unreported fishing is also illegal fishing.26 Bard
argued that because of this overlap, there is a blur between the three categories of IUU fishing.27
Therefore, ‘IUU fishing’ is a general term used to describe all fishing activities that ‘undermine
efforts to conserve and manage fish stocks in all capture fisheries.’
Second, the IPOA-IUU definition of IUU fishing does not recognise other criminal activities
associated with IUU fishing. From the definition, there are three distinct components of IUU
fishing: ‘illegal fishing,’ ‘unreported fishing,’ and ‘unregulated fishing’. Each application of the
different components relates to fishing areas subject to waters within the state’s national
jurisdiction and high seas.28 Illegal fishing encompasses any fishing activities conducted by a
national or foreign vessel in contravention of international or national laws.29 Unreported fishing
is the non-reporting, misreporting, or under-reporting of fisheries data to the relevant national
authority or relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO).30 Unregulated
fishing relates to high seas fishing or fishing within waters managed by any RFMO. Therefore,
unregulated fishing is any fishing activity in violation or contravention of the conservation and
management measures (CMMs) of an RFMO and in violation of international laws.31
Consequently, IUU fishing is any fishing activity that contravenes national, international, and
RFMO fishing laws and CMMs.
23 IPOA-IUU Fishing (n 22) ch 2, app 3.
24 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson (n 20) 44, 53.
25 Denzil G.M. Miller, Natasha M. Slicer, and Eugene Sabourenkov, ‘An Action Framework to Address Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing’ (2014) 6(2) Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 72.
26 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson (n 20) 44, 53.
27 Rachel Baird, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical
Factors Relevant to its Development and Persistence’ (2004) 5(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 302.
28 Kamal-Deen Ali, Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges (Leiden Boston
Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 101.
29 IPOA-IUU Fishing (n 22) ch 2, app 3.1.1.
30 Ibid ch 2, app 3.2.1.
31 Ibid ch 2, apps 3.3.1, 3.3.2.
The application of the term means that if there are weaknesses in national and RFMO CMMs,
criminal operators can take advantage of the gaps in legislation to engage in illicit activities.32
For instance, if the domestic fisheries law does not accommodate criminal activities that may
arise when conducting fishing activities, bringing criminal activities associated with IUU fishing
vessels under control becomes difficult. Consequently, the state must have a robust criminal
code that captures fishing activities related to criminal activities. Thus, demonstrating that the
IPOA-IUU definition of IUU fishing is ill-equipped to address the downstream of criminal
activities that may arise when conducting fishing activities.
1.3 Understanding the Problem of IUU Fishing
Globally, fish stocks are experiencing a significant decline, threatening the sustainable
development of fisheries resources. The FAO’s 2022 State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture
report noted that from 1974 to 2019, there was a decline in global marine fish stocks.33
According to the FAO’s assessment, the percentage of stocks fished within biologically
sustainable levels declined from 90% in 1974 to 64.6% in 2019.34 The FAO also estimates that
approximately 34.2% of global marine fish stocks are overfished.35 Several studies have
criticised IUU fishing as the primary contributor to this decline.36
32 Ali (n 28) 102.
33 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Towards Blue Transformation (n 1) 46.
34 Ibid.
35 Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Sustainability in Action (FAO
Report, 2020) 54.
36 F.K. E. Nunoo and P.K. Ofori-Danson, ‘Declining Fish Stocks in West Africa: Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported
(IUU) Fishing’ in P.K. Ofori-Danson et al. (ed), Assessment and Impacts of Development Activities on the Marine
Environment and the Fisheries Resources in the Gulf of Guinea (Digibooks Ghana Limited, 2015) 183 – 199; Dyhia
Belhabib et al., ‘Fisheries Catch Misreporting and its Implications: The Case of Senegal’ (2014) 151 Fisheries
Research 1 – 11.
Figure 1: The state of the global marine fish stocks, 1974 – 2019.
Source: FAO 2022. 37
It is challenging to estimate the economic impact of IUU fishing precisely as it is an illicit
activity and the exact amount of catch taken is unknown. However, several researchers have
conducted studies and collected and analysed data from several states to reach an estimated
value of IUU fishing. David J. Agnew et al. conducted one of the earliest attempts to assess the
global extent and economic impact of IUU fishing on fish stocks.38 The study estimates that
between 2000 and 2003, IUU fishing represented between 11 and 26 million tonnes of fish
caught annually, with an estimated value of USD10 – 23.5 billion.39 Since then, the FAO has
used this estimate in several reports to estimate the impact of IUU fishing on fisheries
management and sustainability.40
Subsequent studies have made remarkable breakthroughs in understanding IUU fishing and its
impact on fisheries management. For instance, a 2017 study by Doumbouya et al. found that the
annual economic cost of illegal fishing in Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone is an estimated USD2.3 billion.41 A more recent global data estimate
37 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Towards Blue Transformation (n 1) 47.
38 Agnew et al. (n 10) 1 – 6.
39 Ibid 4.
40 Food and Agriculture Organisations, The Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport Vessels and
Supply Vessels (FAO Report, 2016) 1 – 6; Food and Agriculture Organisation, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing (FAO Report, 2016) 1 – 4; Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of World Fisheries and
Aquaculture. Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All (FAO Report, 2016) iii.
41 Alkaly Doumbouya et al., ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing:
The Case of West Africa’ (2017) 4(50) Frontiers in Marine Science 4, 7.
by Sumaila et al. approximated that between 7.7 and 14.0 million metric tons of unreported fish
catches are potentially traded illegally and redirected out of the legitimate market annually.42
This suggests that gross revenues of between USD8.9 and USD17.2 billion are lost through the
illicit trade of fish annually, threatening millions of people’s food and economic security.43
Further investigations have revealed that IUU fishing not only directly impacts fish stocks but is
also connected with other maritime crimes.44 The nexus between IUU fishing and other
maritime criminal activities was first raised in the ninth meeting of the United Nations Open-
ended Informal Consultative Process on Ocean and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) in July
2008.45 Later in the same year, the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) debated the connection between IUU fishing
and maritime crimes.46 After that, the United Nations General Assembly in UNGA Resolution
64/72, in 2009, called for states to examine the connection between IUU fishing and organised
crimes.47
Subsequently, several studies have been conducted on crimes in the fisheries sector.48 A 2011
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study discovered that fishing vessels are
used for both human trafficking and drug trafficking.49 Another study by Mackay et al. revealed
that fishing vessels are linked with maritime crimes such as corruption, document forgery,
money laundering, trafficking (human, drug, and arms), forced labour, and piracy.50
42 U R Sumaila et al., ‘Illicit Trade in Marine Fish Catch and its Effects on Ecosystems and People Worldwide’
(2020) 6 (9) Science Advances 2.
43 Ibid.
44 Mary Mackay, Britta Denise Hardesty, and Chris Wilcox, ‘The intersection Between Illegal Fishing, Crimes at Sea,
and Social Well-Being’ (2020) 7 Frontiers in Marine Science 1 - 7.
45Report on the Work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the
Sea at its Ninth Meeting, GA Res 63/174, UN Doc A/63/174 (25 July 2008) para 10(e) <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/440/03/PDF/N0844003.pdf?OpenElement>; Seokwoo Lee et al., ‘Slipping the
Net: Why Is it So Difficult to Crack Down on IUU Fishing’ in Myron H. Nordquist et al. (ed), Freedom of
Navigation and Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 13 October 2014) 111.
46 Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
on its Fourth Session, Held in Vienna from 8 to 17 October 2008, UN Doc CTOC/cop/2008/19 (1 December 2008),
para 210 <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/CTOC_COP_19_Report -_edited_version.pdf>
47 Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments, GA Res 64/72,
UN Doc A/RES/64/72 (19 March 2010, adopted 4 December 2009) para 61 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/477/51/PDF/N0847751.pdf?OpenElement>
48 Mackay, Hardesty, and Wilcox (n 13) 1- 7; Jade Lindley, Sarah Percy, and Erika Techera, ‘Illegal Fishing and
Australian Security’ (2019) 73 (1) Australian Journal of International Affairs 82-99; Eve de Coning and Emma
Witbooi, ‘Towards a New ‘Fisheries Crime’ Paradigm: South Africa as an Illustrative Example’ (2015) 60 Marine
Policy 208 – 215.
49 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry. Focus on:
Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Drug Trafficking (Issue Paper, UNODC, 2011) 3
(‘Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry’).
50 Mackay, Hardesty, and Wilcox (n 13) 4, 5.
Additionally, Witbooi found people smuggling and tax crimes to be connected to fishing
vessels.51
More specifically, the nexus between IUU fishing and maritime crimes was demonstrated in an
abalone fishery case in South Africa, which led to the closure of the fishery in 2008.52 It was
revealed that abalone poaching was associated with criminal activities such as drug trafficking,
money laundering, and racketeering.53 This link is also demonstrated by the Viking case, where
the Indonesian Navy apprehended the illegal fishing vessel, Viking, carrying forged vessel
identity documents.54
As such, recent policy discussions and studies reflect an expansion in their understanding of the
maritime security risks associated with IUU fishing.55 For instance, in February 2013, the
International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) held its first international fisheries
enforcement conference to address crimes in the fisheries sector.56 More recently, in August
2021, the United Nations Security Council held a high-level open debate on enhancing maritime
security.57 The discussion revolved around how maritime crimes are undermining maritime
security at an alarming rate. Notably, the discussion classified IUU fishing as a risk to maritime
security.58 In addition, a study by Rossello argued that IUU fishing is a maritime security
concern and calls for states to address the operational synergies between IUU fishing and
transnational organised crimes, mainly through the framework of RFMOs.59 A similar study by
Beseng argued that IUU fishing impacts the maritime security of Cameroon and urges the states
51 Emma Witbooi et al., ‘Organized Crime in the Fisheries Sector Threatens a Sustainable Ocean Economy’ (2020)
588 (7836) Nature 50 – 52.
52 Don Liddick, ‘The Dimension of a Transnational Crime Problem: The Case of IUU Fishing’ (2014) 17 (4) Trends
in Organized Crime 295.
53 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 99; Ardi Hendharto, ‘Understanding IUU Fishing as
a Transnational Organized Crime with Special Example of the Benjina Case’ (2018) 23(2) kajian 101.
54 Witbooi et al. (n 51) 49.
55 Mercedes Rossello, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing as a Maritime Security Concern’ in Lisa
Otto (ed), Global Challenges in Maritime Security (Springer, 2020) 33 – 44; Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The
Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing as a Threat to Human and
National Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ (2020) 13(2) African Security 116 – 146; Maurice Beseng, ‘The Nature and
Scope of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Fisheries Crime in Cameroon: Implications for Maritime
Security’ (2021) 14 (3) African Security 262 – 285.
56 ‘1st INTERPOL International Fisheries Enforcement Conference’, International Criminal Police Organisation
(INTERPOL) (Web Page, February 2013) <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmetal-
crime/Events/Meetings/1st-INTERPOL-International-Fisheries-Enforcement-Conference>
57 Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti ‘Remarks at a Security Council High-Level Open Debate on “Enhancing Maritime
Security: A Case for International Cooperation’ United Nations (Web Page, 9 August 2021)
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/remarks-security-council-high-level-open-debate-%E2%80%98enhancing-
maritime-security-case-for-international-cooperation%E2%80%99-delivered>
58 Ibid.
59 Mercedes Rossello, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing as a Maritime Security Concern’ in Lisa
Otto (ed), Global Challenges in Maritime Security (Springer, 2020) 41, 42, 44.
to recognise the connection between IUU fishing and other maritime crimes.60
Furthermore, prominent maritime security studies are broadening the understanding of IUU
fishing and including it as a maritime security threat.61 For instance, Bueger stressed the need to
integrate IUU fishing into maritime security discussions.62 He emphasised that IUU fishing
should be classified as a significant threat to the human security of coastal communities to
understand what maritime security entails.63 Likewise, Chapsos specifically highlighted IUU
fishing as a significant threat to maritime security.64 More recently, Lindley, in her analysis of
criminal threats undermining the Indo-Pacific maritime security, also identified IUU fishing as a
threat to maritime security.65
1.4 Mitigating Measures to Combat IUU Fishing
The international community has developed several international legal instruments to address
the challenges of IUU fishing. These instruments include the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),66 the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 FAO
Compliance Agreement),67 the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the
1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement),68 the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent,
Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA),69 and the Cape
60 Maurice Beseng, ‘The Nature and Scope of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Fisheries Crime in
Cameroon: Implications for Maritime Security’ (2021) 14 (3) African Security 267 – 280.
61 Christopher Rahman, ‘Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Vision for Good
Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand’ (Research Discussion Paper No 07/09, Centre
for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, 2009) 31 – 36
<https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=lawpapers>; Christian Bueger, ‘What is Maritime
Security’ (2015) 53 Marine Policy 161.
62 Christian Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security’ (2015) 53 Marine Policy 159 - 164.
63 Ibid 161.
64 Ioannis Chapsos, ‘Is Maritime Security a Traditional Security Challenge?’ in Anthony J. Masys (ed), Exploring the
Security Landscape: Non-Traditional Security Challenges (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 70 -72.
65 Jade Lindley, ‘Criminal Threats Undermining Indo-Pacific Maritime Security: Can International Law Build
Resilience?’ (2020) 2(2) Journal of Asian Economic Integration 209, 210.
66 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’).
67 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels
on the High Seas of 1993, opened for signature 24 November 1993 (entered into force 24 April 2003) (‘FAO
Compliance Agreement’).
68 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 3 (entered into force 11 November 2001) (‘UNFSA’).
69 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,
opened for signature 22 November 2009 until 21 November 2010 (entered into force 5 June 2016) (‘PSMA’).
Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing Vessels (the 2012 Cape Town Agreement).70 These
agreements represent legally binding instruments (often called ‘hard law’) designed to address
IUU fishing. Other non-legally binding international instruments (often referred to as ‘soft
law’), such as the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries71 and the 2001
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU),72 have also been adopted to target IUU fishing.
Additionally, RFMOs, which are the primary mechanisms that govern fish stocks in Areas
Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) and for cooperation between states, have developed
several CMMs to prevent and deter IUU fishing in waters under states’ national jurisdiction and
ABNJ. For instance, several RFMOs have an IUU vessel list, blacklist IUU fishing vessels,73
and adopt Catch Documentation Schemes (CDSs) to improve seafood traceability and curb IUU
fishing.74 Furthermore, most RFMOs have created a list of authorised vessels to help improve
control over fishing activities and identify IUU fishing vessels.75 Regional Fisheries Bodies
(RFBs) such as the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) and the Fisheries Committee
for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) in the Gulf of Guinea have also adopted measures
that target IUU fishing. For instance, the FCWC has developed a Regional Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (RPOA-IUU) in the
fight against IUU fishing.76 The RPOA-IUU contains measures and actions that its member
states may take to combat IUU fishing.
70 Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation of the Provisions of the Torremolinos Protocol of 1993
relating to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977, opened for signature
11 February 2013 to 10 February 2014 (not yet in force) (‘The 2012 Cape Town Agreement’).
71 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995).
72 IPOA-IUU Fishing (n 22).
73 These RFMOs include the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the General Fisheries Commission for the
Mediterranean (GFCM), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the North Pacific Fisheries
Commission (NPFC), the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries
Management Organisation (SPRFMO), the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA), and the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). ‘Combined IUU Vessel List’, Trygg Mat Tracking (Web Page)
<https://iuu-vessels.org>
74 These RFMOs are the CCAMLR, CCSBT, GFCM, ICCAT, NAFO, NEAFC, and SEAFO. See Barbara Hutniczak
and Claire Delpeuch, Combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Where Countries Stand and Where
Efforts Should Concentrate in the Future (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Report, 30
November 2018) 99 -128.
75 These RFMOs are CCAMLR, CCSBT, GFCM, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NEAFC, NPFC, SEAFO, SIOFA,
SPRFMO, and WCPFC. Barbara Hutniczak, Claire Delpeuch, and Antonia Leroy, Intensifying the Fight Against IUU
Fishing at the Regional Level (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Food, Agriculture
and Fisheries Papers No. 121, 14 February 2019) 12 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/b7b9f17d-
en.pdf?expires=1657853791&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2D3C168C445D2674B467076B9CBBB4C5>
76 Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea, Regional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea
(FCWC) Member Countries (2019-2023) (FCWC, 2018).
Furthermore, various states have also developed and implemented several policy measures to
combat IUU fishing. Examples include developing a National Plan of Action to Combat Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (NPOA-IUU) modelled after the IPOA-IUU,77 adopting
Fisheries Management Plans (FMPs), using International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
numbers as a Unique Vessel Identifier (UVI), Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), and
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to assist in Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
(MCS) operations.78
The European Union (EU), the world’s largest importer of seafood products,79 also maintains a
list of non-cooperating third-party states in the fight against IUU fishing under its Council
Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (EU IUU Regulation).80 The regulation was adopted on 29
September 2008 and entered into force on 1 January 2010.81 According to the regulation, states
the EU identifies as having inadequate measures to fight IUU fishing may risk being identified
as non-cooperative states.82 First, they may be issued a formal warning known as the ‘yellow
card’ to improve their existing measures.83 After that, if they fail to take action to address issues
highlighted by the EU, they may be issued a ‘red card’ which acts as a ban on exporting seafood
to the EU.84 If the required improvements are made, they are delisted by issuing a ‘green card’.85
The introduction of the carding system has caused some states in the Gulf of Guinea, such as
Ghana,86 Guinea,87 and Sierra Leone88 to be issued a yellow card by the European Commission
77 IPOA-IUU Fishing (n 22).
78 Lucy Towers, ‘Exemption on Fishing Vessels Having IMO Identification Numbers Lifted’ The Fish Site (News
Article, 6 December 2013) <https://thefishsite.com/articles/exemption-on-fishing-vessels-having-imo-identification-
numbers-lifted>
79 ‘Leading Importers of Fish and Fishery Products Worldwide in 2020 (in billion U.S. Dollars)’, Statista (Web Page)
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/268266/top-importers-of-fish-and-fishery-products/>
80 European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 Establishing a Community System
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Amending Regulations (EEC), No.
2847/93, (EC) No. 1936/2001 and (EC) No. 601/2004 and Repealing Regulations (EC) No. 1093/94 and (EC) No.
1447/1999, (EU, 2008) Preamble 25.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid art 33.
83 Ibid arts 23, 24.
84 Ibid art 38.
85 Ibid art 24(3).
86 European Commission, ‘Fighting Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Commission Notifies the
Republic of Ghana with a Yellow Card’ (Press Release, 2 June 2021)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2745>
87 Commission Decision of 15 November 2012 on Notifying the Third Countries that the Commission Considers as
Possible of Being Identified as Non-Cooperating Third Countries Pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No
1005/2008 Establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing [2012] OJ C 354/1, arts 142 – 217.
88 European Commission, ‘Fighting Illegal Fishing: Warnings for Kiribati, Sierra Leone and Trinidad & Tobago,
while Sri Lanka is Delisted’ (Press Release, 21 April 2016)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1457>
(EC). Guinea89 and Cameroon90 have also been issued a red card for failing to address IUU
fishing issues.
Additional efforts to combat IUU fishing have been made by Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) such as the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd, World
Wildlife Fund (WWF), and Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT). Some of these groups have undertaken
ground-breaking studies that have provided valuable information into the problem of IUU
fishing (including maritime crimes in the fisheries sector).91 They also often partner with
different states in the fight against IUU fishing in territorial waters by conducting joint patrol
operations with national law enforcement authorities. For instance, Sea Shepherd collaborates
with several national authorities and regional partners in developing states such as Liberia and
Sierra Leone to conduct joint surveillance and patrol actions at sea.92 Greenpeace has also
undertaken joint surveillance operations with local authorities in the Gulf of Guinea to inspect
IUU fishing activities at sea.93
Unfortunately, these measures alone have not successfully combated IUU fishing, particularly
its criminal dimensions.94 Indeed, Coning and Witbooi have theorised that the primary reason is
that current measures in fighting IUU fishing view IUU fishing through a fisheries management
lens and address IUU fishing as a management problem.95 The problem with the fisheries
management approach is that it focuses on IUU fishing as a resource management issue and
completely ignores the maritime security challenges IUU fishing poses. De Coning and Witbooi
posit that the fisheries management approach misdiagnoses the problem as an ‘illness’ in the
culture and behaviour of the fishing industry rather than as a ‘fundamental failure of regulation
89 Commission Implementing Decision of 26 November 2013 Identifying the Third Countries that the Commission
Considers as Non-Cooperating Third Countries Pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 Establishing a
Community System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing [2013] OJ C 346/2,
arts 122 – 203.
90 European Commission, ‘Fight against Illegal Fishing: Commission Identifies Cameroon as a Non-cooperating
Country’ (Press Release, 5 January 2023) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7890>
91 Environmental Justice Foundation, Fear, Hunger and Violence: Human Rights in Ghana Industrial Trawl Fleet
(EJF Report, 2020) 11 - 44; Greenpeace, Forced Labour at Sea: The Case of Indonesian Migrant Fishers
(Greenpeace Report, 31 May 2021) 1 – 38; World Wildlife Fun and Trygg Mat Tracking, Unregulated Fishing on the
High Seas of the Indian Ocean. The Impacts on, Risks to, and Challenges for Sustainable Fishing and Ocean Health
(World Wildlife Fund Report, 2 November 2020) 4 – 50.
92 ‘Sea Shepherd’s Current Partnerships’ Sea Shepherd (Web Page) <https://www.seashepherdglobal.org/our-
campaigns/iuu-fishing/learn-more/>
93 ‘Joint Surveillance and Inspection on Illegal Fishing Activities in Senegal’, Greenpeace (Web Page, 27 April 2017)
<https://media.greenpeace.org>; ‘Joint Inspection on Illegal Fishing Activities in Sierra Leone’, Greenpeace (Web
Page, 18 April 2017) <https://media.greenpeace.org >
94 Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
and Transnational Organized Crime’ (2014) 41(4) Ecology Law Quarterly 962 – 980.
95 Eve de Coning and Emma Witbooi, ‘Towards a New ‘Fisheries Crime’ Paradigm: South Africa as an Illustrative
Example’ (2015) 60 Marine Policy 209 – 211.
and enforcement systems’.96 Nonetheless, the FAO in 2014 stressed that the realities of
corruption and organised crimes in the fisheries sector, which add complexity to combatting
IUU fishing, need to be addressed through supplementary means beyond fisheries control and
enforcement.97
In recent years, several academic studies have advocated for a more comprehensive approach to
IUU fishing. Telesetsky argued that IUU fishing should be considered a transnational ‘serious
crime’ that should be criminalised under national law.98 She argued that a way to stop criminal
activities in fisheries is through ‘credible fear of actual incarceration’.99 Similarly, Lindley et
al. argued that IUU fishing is a security issue and treating IUU fishing as a crime is a more
effective and coherent approach to the problem.100 Another study by De Coning and Witbooi
posits that IUU fishing should be regarded as a criminal offence and be addressed through the
broader realm of fisheries crime approaches.101
For this reason, this thesis will add to the growing body of work that argues that a more
effective approach is needed to combat IUU fishing and its criminal dimensions. While recent
developments in policymaking, maritime security discussions, and academic studies are
beginning to broaden their understanding of the maritime security issues surrounding IUU
fishing, there is still a lack of comprehensive understanding of the maritime security challenges
IUU fishing poses, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea region. As such, this thesis analyses the
maritime security issues surrounding IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea and proposes that a
fisheries-maritime security approach is more effective in combating the IUU fishing problem.
1.5 Thesis Structure and Methodology
This thesis makes the above arguments in seven chapters. Chapter One gives a general
background into IUU fishing. It has reviewed several existing secondary data sources, including
books, articles, and publications on the widespread problem of IUU fishing on a broader scale,
relating to fisheries management and its link with other maritime crimes. It highlights the
limitations of the current approach to IUU fishing and the need for a more comprehensive and
integrated approach to combat the maritime security issues surrounding IUU fishing and
combatting IUU fishing.
96 Ibid 210.
97 Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Opportunities and Challenges
(FAO Report, 2014) 132.
98 Telesetsky (n 94) 939 – 997.
99 Ibid 996.
100 Jade Lindley, Sarah Percy, and Erika Techera, ‘Illegal Fishing and Australian Security’ (2019) 73 (1) Australian
Journal of International Affairs 82 -99.
101 Coning and Witbooi (n 95) 210 – 214.
Chapter Two addresses the research question on the importance of the Gulf of Guinea’s
maritime domain. In doing so, it develops a geographical definition of the region for this thesis
by drawing from scholarly literature. It examines the socioeconomic profile and the geostrategic
and geopolitical importance of the Gulf of Guinea from historical to current times. It highlights
the importance of the region’s maritime domain, particularly its fisheries resources, energy, and
international trade to the region and the global economy. It also demonstrates the need to protect
the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain against maritime issues and risks.
Chapter Three sets out the conceptual background of maritime security and addresses the
research question on the development of maritime security threats. First, the chapter reviews
maritime security definitions in the existing scholarly literature and develops a definition of
maritime security. It then draws from primary and secondary data sources to examine the
evolution of maritime security threats from the traditional notion of sea power focused on
national security to include non-traditional threats. The chapter also conceptualises major
maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea within the framework of transnational organised
crimes. This allows for the examination of major transnational organised crimes (piracy, drug
trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and migrant smuggling) in existing scholarly
literature, providing a more in-depth analysis of these threats.
Chapter Four addresses the research question on the link between IUU fishing and the Gulf of
Guinea’s maritime security. It examines IUU fishing and maritime security literature and
highlights the nexus between IUU fishing and maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. It
demonstrates that the fishing sector is intricately connected to two dimensions of maritime
security. Fishing vessels engage in IUU fishing and transnational organised crimes, such as
piracy, migrant smuggling, and trafficking (people, drugs and arms). Corruption, money
laundering, tax and customs fraud are also connected to IUU fishing.
Chapter Five analyses the legal, institutional, and policy frameworks for combatting IUU
fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, legal, institutional and policy frameworks provide
regulatory measures for addressing IUU fishing and maritime security. Therefore, the chapter
draws from primary data to investigate and identify the gaps in legislation that impede
combatting IUU fishing and its associated criminal activities.
Chapter Six investigates the efficacy of the current approaches to IUU fishing and then draws
the thesis together by identifying measures that states can adopt to enhance existing measures to
combat IUU fishing. In doing so, the chapter reviews current legislation and policies to assess
whether Gulf of Guinea states have adopted best practices required by international fisheries
law to combat IUU fishing. The chapter then proposes that adding a maritime security approach
to the existing fisheries management approach offers a better solution to the security issues
surrounding IUU fishing and combatting IUU fishing.
Finally, Chapter Seven then synthesises the findings in each chapter bringing together
information that supports the thesis’s conclusions. Further research work is also identified.
1.6 Thesis Statement
The ongoing problem of IUU fishing and associated maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea
exists because of the lack of a comprehensive and practical approach to combatting IUU fishing.
Indeed, the existing fisheries management approach to combatting IUU fishing in the region
appears to be inadequate to combat the maritime security issues surrounding IUU fishing. The
road to achieving a more effective solution involves adding a maritime security approach to the
existing fisheries management approach to combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
1.7 Research Aims and Objectives
This research aims to examine whether a more integrated approach is needed to combat IUU
fishing and its maritime security dimensions in the Gulf of Guinea while developing an answer
to this primary question:
Can a fisheries-maritime security approach deal more effectively with IUU fishing in
the Gulf of Guinea?
The following sub-questions will aid in developing an answer to the primary question above:
1. What is the importance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain?
2. How have maritime security threats evolved in recent years?
3. What is the link between IUU fishing and the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime security?
4. What are the legal, institutional, and policy frameworks for addressing IUU fishing and
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea? What limitations and gaps exist in these
frameworks?
5. What are the impacts of the gaps in Gulf of Guinea states’ measures in combatting IUU
fishing on maritime security?
6. What is the way forward?
1.8 Purpose and Scope
Purpose
With declining global fish stocks, we have seen that several studies have highlighted the threat
IUU fishing poses to fisheries management and sustainability.102 However, in recent years,
concerns have been raised about the impacts of IUU fishing on maritime security on a broader
scale.103 While several studies, security discussions, and policies have started to expand their
understanding of maritime security threats to include IUU fishing, there is still a lack of
comprehensive research on the maritime security challenges IUU fishing poses, particularly in
the Gulf of Guinea region. Current studies in the Gulf of Guinea have generally focused on
combatting IUU fishing through a fisheries management approach, and the relationship between
IUU fishing and maritime security has not been adequately recognised. Consequently, this
research will contribute to the current understanding on the nexus between IUU fishing and
maritime security and provide an integrated fisheries-maritime security approach to addressing
the IUU fishing problem. An integrated approach can offer an improved ‘cross-cutting’ solution
to the security issues surrounding IUU fishing and combatting IUU fishing.
Scope
The scope of this thesis will involve the analysis of the impact of IUU fishing on the maritime
security of states in the Gulf of Guinea and examine current international and national legal,
institutional, and policy frameworks to address IUU fishing and associated crimes in the Gulf of
Guinea. It will critically examine seven case study states in the Gulf of Guinea (Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone) to help provide a comprehensive
analysis of IUU fishing and maritime security in the region. More specifically, this research will
provide an in-depth analysis of the following:
1. The significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain;
2. The evolution of maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea;
3. The nexus between IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea;
4. The international and national legal, institutional and policy frameworks for combatting
IUU fishing and transnational organised crimes in the Gulf of Guinea; and
5. The limitations of the current approaches in combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea.
102 Agnew et al. (n 10) 1 – 6; Doumbouya et al. (n 41) 4, 7; Sumaila et al. (n 42) 2.
103 Coning and Witbooi (n 95) 209 – 211; Telesetsky (n 94) 939 – 997.
1.9 Conclusion
The fisheries sector is essential for the global community's food security, livelihoods, and
revenue. However, fish stocks have been experiencing a significant global trend of decline since
the 1970s. IUU fishing has been criticised as a major threat to fisheries resources and a
contributor to the reduction of fish stocks globally. Unfortunately, recent studies have also
shown that IUU fishing has a connection with other maritime crimes.
The international community and national governments have adopted several measures to
combat IUU fishing. However, these measures have been inadequate in tackling IUU fishing
and its criminal dimensions. As such, this thesis argues that a more comprehensive and
integrated approach is needed to combat IUU fishing effectively. It will propose that adding a
maritime security approach to the existing fisheries management approach to combatting IUU
fishing is a superior and far more effective strategy than simply focusing on the regulation and
enforcement of fisheries CMMs. An effective solution to IUU fishing and its criminal
dimensions will require an integrated fisheries-maritime security approach.
CHAPTER 2
THE GULF OF GUINEA
2.1 Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain is of strategic importance to economies of states in the
region. It serves as a source of energy and is an essential gateway for not only its coastal states
but also its landlocked states.104 Beyond these aspects, the Gulf of Guinea is also rich in fish
resources.105 This is especially important for states’ food security, income, and revenue.106 The
analysis in this chapter argues that the maritime domain of the Gulf of Guinea has a broader
significance to the region and the global community. Given its importance, the maritime
environment of the Gulf of Guinea needs to be adequately protected against maritime threats.
The broad significance of the Gulf of Guinea is presented in three parts. The first part examines
the various definitions of the Gulf of Guinea and then presents the definition of the Gulf of
Guinea to be used throughout this thesis. The second part examines the geostrategic and
geopolitical significance of the Gulf of Guinea. It discusses the strategic importance of the Gulf
of Guinea maritime domain from the historical era to current times. History tells us that the
maritime environment was essential for the success of the transatlantic slave trade from the 16th
to the 19th century. Contemporarily, it is an essential source of fisheries resources, energy and an
important route for international shipping and trade. The last part then analyses the
socioeconomic status of the Gulf of Guinea. It highlights the importance of protecting the
maritime domain to improve the economic situation and enhance the standard of living of
people in the Gulf of Guinea. It argues that high population growth in the region demands that
states provide food and livelihood for their people.
2.2 Defining the Gulf of Guinea Region.
There is no universally agreed definition of the Gulf of Guinea. The region is generally defined
as the area that makes up West and Central Africa. For instance, the International Hydrographic
Organisation (IHO) gave a geographical definition of the southwest extent of the Gulf of Guinea
as a line running South-eastward from Cape Palmas in Liberia to Cape Lopez in Gabon (0º38’
S, 8º42’E).107 Looking at this definition, the IHO gave a narrow description of the Gulf of
104 Charles Ukeje and Wullson Mvomo Ela, African Approaches to Maritime Security – The Gulf of Guinea
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Report, 2013) 9.
105 Dyhia Belhabib, Vicky W.Y. Lam, and William W.L. Cheung, ‘Overview of West African Fisheries Under
Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptive Responses of the Artisanal and Industrial Sectors’ (2016) 71
Marine Policy 15.
106 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Towards Blue Transformation (n 1) 86.
107 International Hydrographic Organisation, Limits of Ocean and Seas (Special Publication No. 28, 3rd ed, 1953) 19
<https://epic.awi.de/id/eprint/29772/1/IHO1953a.pdf>
Guinea, including only ten coastal states.108 The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), a regional
body, states that the Gulf of Guinea region comprises only eight coastal states, indicating a
difference between geography and politics.109
However, in recent years, more emphasis has been on defining the Gulf of Guinea pragmatically
rather than geographically.110 Recent definitions of the Gulf of Guinea have had more political
than geographical dimensions, leading to the extension of the region to include more states in
West and Central Africa (including landlocked states). For instance, Wardin, Duda111 and
Okafor-Yarwood,112 defined the Gulf of Guinea based on their shared understanding of regional
maritime security challenges. Wardin and Duda defined the Gulf of Guinea to include 18 coastal
states in the Atlantic Ocean, including one landlocked state.113 In contrast, Okafor-Yarwood
defined the Gulf of Guinea as comprising 19 states in West and Central Africa, stretching from
Senegal to Angola.114
This thesis will adopt a working definition of the Gulf of Guinea relative to the maritime
security and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing subject matter. It will draw from
the studies above and define the Gulf of Guinea region from a political perspective. More
specifically, it will adopt the definition given by Dr Kamal Ali in his book, ‘Maritime Security
Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges’.115 The reason for using Ali’s
definition of the Gulf of Guinea is that it has a more comprehensive scope than other definitions
analysed above. This is vital because it will aid in a more exhaustive analysis of approaches to
address IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
The Gulf of Guinea will be defined as the region from Mauritania to Angola and its offshore
108 Coastal states include Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São
Tomé and Príncipe, and Gabon.
109 Member states include Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
110 Ali (n 28) 16, 17.
111 K. Wardin and D. Duda, ‘Characteristics of Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and its Influence on International
Maritime Transport in the Region’ in Adam Weintrit and Tomasz Neumann (eds), Marine Navigation and Safety of
Sea Transportation: STCW, Maritime Education and Training (MET), Human Resources and Crew Manning,
Maritime Policy, Logistics and Economic Matters (Taylor and Francis, 2013), 177.
112 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 416.
113 Gulf of Guinea states includes Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of
Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
114 Coastal states are Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, The
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic, Guinea, and Angola.
115 Ali (n 28) 17.
maritime zones. This region comprises 25 states: Mauritania, Senegal, Cabo Verde, The Gambia,
Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria,
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Burkina Faso, Congo, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Mali, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, and Angola. They consist
of 20 coastal states116 and five landlocked states.117
The five landlocked states, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger, are
included in the definition of the Gulf of Guinea because they are not immune to the threats faced
by coastal states in the region. For instance, they may be affected by IUU fishing activities and
trafficking of arms and drugs. In addition, these landlocked states rely on the ports of
neighbouring coastal states and the sea routes of the Gulf of Guinea for international trade and
transportation of goods, particularly the landlocked state Chad.118 Therefore, the inclusion of the
five landlocked states in the operational definition of the Gulf of Guinea allows for a more
comprehensive and inclusive approach to addressing IUU fishing and maritime security
challenges in the region.
Figure 2: The Gulf of Guinea.
Source: Adapted from Kamal-Deen Ali 2015. 119
However, within this broad regional definition, the research focuses on the maritime security
116 These states are Angola, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
117 These states are Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, and Niger.
118 Ali (n 28) 19.
119 Ibid 18.
and IUU fishing issues of seven states that are at the centre of the wider Gulf of Guinea
region.120 These states are coastal states experiencing significant annual fish deficits and facing
severe food and income challenges.121
The Gulf of Guinea has a large continental shelf, which is an important zone for fishing
operations and provides important fishing grounds for coastal states.122 The regions continental
shelf provides a habitat for a variety of fish species and has been identified as one of the world’s
most important fishing areas.123 The fishing grounds of the region are diverse, ranging from
pelagic to demersal species, with some of the main fish species caught in the region including
sardines, mackerel, tuna, barracuda, snapper, and shrimp.124 The Gulf of Guinea is characterised
by the prevalence of upwelling seasons that bring nutrient-rich waters to the surface, resulting in
an abundance of fish in the region.125 These rich fishing grounds attract Western states,
including the European Union (EU) and China, resulting in the depletion of fish stocks, IUU
fishing and other maritime security challenges.126
2.3 Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s Maritime Domain
This section examines the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s
maritime domain.127 It argues that the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime environment plays a vital role
in national and global economies. Historically, the maritime domain was crucial for the
successful conduct of the transatlantic slave trade in the 16th to 19th centuries. In contemporary
times, it is a significant source of fisheries, crude oil, natural gas, and an important trade route.
2.3.1 Historical Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s
Maritime Domain
The importance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain can only be adequately understood by
120 This research focuses on seven coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea: Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
121 The FAO classifies Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone as states facing severe food
and income challenges. Nigeria is facing significant fish deficit of up to 2.5 million metric tonnes annually.
122 According to Article 76(1) of UNCLOS, a continental shelf “…. comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial seas is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”
123 Pierre Morcos, Center for Strategic & International Studies, A Transatlantic Approach to Address Growing
Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (online, 1 February 2021) <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-
approach-address-growing-maritime-insecurity-gulf-guinea>
124 ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles. Ghana’, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department (Fact Sheet,
February 2016) <https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/facp/gha?lang=en>; ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles.
Liberia’, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department (Fact Sheet, September 2019)
<https://www.fao.org/fishery/docs/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/FI_CP_LR.pdf>
125 ‘Upwelling’, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Webpage)
<https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/tutorial_currents/03coastal4.html
126 See generally sec 2.3.2.1.
127 This analysis is modelled after the work of Ali (n 28) in ch 3.
examining its past trade and trading activities. Before colonialism and Europe’s ‘Scramble for
Africa’, the Gulf of Guinea already had an intricate economy, particularly around trade. The
pre-colonial Gulf of Guinea was home to many great empires.128 These empires had developed
trading systems that involved trading slaves and goods, including salt and gold.129 Notably, the
coastal Mali empire benefitted from maritime trade.130 The Niger River was used to transport
bulk goods to other regions, contributing to the rise of the Mali empire.131
However, maritime trade in the Gulf of Guinea became more significant during the transatlantic
slave trade era from the 16th to the 19th century.132 The Europeans used the region to penetrate
Africa and to advance and consolidate the European colonial enterprise and presence via
missionary, consular, and commercial activities. First, the Portuguese came into the Gulf of
Guinea and claimed a trade monopoly.133 They also established trading posts in the region. The
first was in Ghana (the then Sao Jorge de Mina) and then moved further down the coast to
Angola.134 Initially, these trading posts were used as a fort for trading gold.135 However, as time
passed, their focus shifted to slave trading. These trading posts were used to house millions of
people from the Gulf of Guinea for transport across the Atlantic Ocean to the United States (US)
and Europe.136
After that, other European states - Spain, England, Germany, Belgium, and France - followed
suit in building more trading posts in various coastal parts of the region, such as Badagry in
Nigeria, Luanda in Angola, and Cabinda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.137 People
were taken from the Gulf of Guinea to work in the sugar, cotton, cocoa plantation, and gold and
silver mines, while others were used as domestic servants.138 The Gulf of Guinea's maritime
128 Examples of some notable empires are the Ghana empire, Mali empire, and Songhai empire.
129 Alberta O. Akrong, ‘Trade, Routes Trade, and Commerce in Pre-colonial Africa’ in Wendy Harcourt (ed). Gender,
Democracy and Institutional Development in Africa (Springer International Publishing, 2019) 67 – 98.
130 The Mali empire was located around the upper area of the Niger River. ‘The Mali Empire’ National Geographic
(Web Page) <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/mali-empire>
131 ‘Summary: The Kingdom of Mali and the City of Timbuktu in the 14th Century’, South African History Online
(Web Page, 27 August 2019) <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/summary-kingdom-mali-and-city-timbuktu-14th-
century>
132 See generally Martin A. Klein, ‘Urban Slavery in West and West Central Africa During the Transatlantic Slave
Trade’ (2021) 10(1-2) Journal of African Diaspora Archaeology and Heritage 46-65.
133 Emma George Ross, ‘The Portuguese in Africa, 1415-1600’ The Met (Web Page, October 2002)
<https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/agex/hd_agex.htm>
134 Christopher R. DeCorse, ‘Early Trade Post and Forts of West Africa’ in Eric Klingelhofer (ed), First Forts: Essay
on the Archaeology of Proto-Colonial Fortifications (Brill, 2010) 214.
135 Ibid 210.
136 Joseph C. Miler, ‘A Marginal Institution on the Margin of the Atlantic System: The Portuguese Southern Atlantic
Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century’ in Patrick Manning (ed), Slave Trade, 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced
Labour (Routledge, 1996) 214-257.
137 Ali (n 28) 37.
138 Eric William, Capitalisim & Slavery (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press, 1944) 52.
domain provided human labour to Western states to improve production and economic
prosperity, thereby increasing their wealth and power.
2.3.2 Current Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s Maritime
Domain
2.3.2.1 Fisheries Resources.
The Gulf of Guinea is one of the best-endowed fishing grounds in the world, supporting
significant fish biomass. These fish resources are an essential source of food and livelihood for
people in the region, especially coastal communities. Over 40% of the region’s population
living in coastal communities depend on fish for food and animal protein.139 States like the
Gambia (51.8%), and Ghana (53.9%), São Tomé and Príncipe (55.8%), Sierra Leone (54.4%)
heavily depend on fish for animal protein.140 In addition, fish provides a source of income for
over 9 million people.141 Fish is also a source of government revenue for states like Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, which depend on the fisheries sector for foreign direct
investment through license fees, fisheries partnership agreements, and exports.142
2.3.2.1.1 Foreign Interests in the Gulf of Guinea Fisheries
The global decline of fish stocks and the high marine productivity induced by the Canary
Current, Benguela Currents and Guinea Current upwelling system makes the Gulf of Guinea an
attractive location with much global interest.143 These interests are supported by the provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).144 First, Part V of
UNCLOS created the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime and gave the Gulf of Guinea
states sovereign rights over living resources up to 200 nautical miles from their baselines.
Article 62 of UNCLOS then provides that coastal states should determine a total allowable catch
and their national capacity to harvest the living resources in their EEZ.145 When the coastal state
cannot harvest its total allowable catch, it shall give ‘other states’ access to the surplus of the
allowable catch through access agreements and other arrangements. The term ‘other states’ in
the UNCLOS text implies foreign states and Article 62 indicates conditions that the coastal
states may impose on foreign fisheries access.
139 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment in the Gulf of Guinea – The
Bonga Oil Field Example’ (2018) 9 Transnational Legal Theory 255 (‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine
Environment in the Gulf of Guinea’).
140 Percentages refer to the contribution of fish to animal protein. Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (n 7) 67 – 68.
141 Okafor- Yarwood, ‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment in the Gulf of Guinea’ (n 139) 255.
142 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
143 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa’ (2015)
10(3) PLoS ONE 4 (‘Euros vs. Yuan’).
144 UNCLOS (n 66).
145 Ibid art 62.
Second, Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS provide access regimes for shared and highly migratory
fish stock such as tunas. These fish stocks do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal state. Therefore, foreign states outside the Gulf of Guinea region can access these fish
stocks with management quota and catch limits set out by the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
Foreign interest in the Gulf of Guinea’s fisheries is also supported by access agreements entered
into by Gulf of Guinea states.146 These access agreements allow foreign access to the surplus of
the Gulf of Guinea’s fisheries resources in exchange for financial compensation.147 As of
August 2022, the EU had 13 Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) in force, ten of which are
with states in the Gulf of Guinea.148 Six of these agreements are tuna-related (Cabo Verde, Côte
d’Ivoire, São Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon, Senegal, and The Gambia).149 Two are mixed
agreements (Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau) and two are dormant agreements (Equatorial
Guinea and Liberia ).150 In addition to the EU, China also has FPAs with several Gulf of Guinea
states.151 While these access agreements aid contracting states to contribute significantly to
public revenue and improve trade, they have been criticised as contributing to IUU fishing in the
Gulf of Guinea.152
2.3.2.2 Gulf of Guinea’s Crude Oil and Natural Gas
Crude oil and natural gas are essential sought-after commodities in the international economy,
and their importance to energy needs cannot be over-emphasised. Official data analysed in the
British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 revealed that crude oil
accounts for the most significant share of energy consumption.153 Natural gas also substantially
contributes to global energy (Figure 3).
146 Ali (n 28) 69.
147 Belhabib et al., ‘Euros vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 4.
148 ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)’, European Commission (Webpage)
<https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-
agreements-sfpas_en>
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Belhabib et l., ‘Euros Vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 1 – 17.
152 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Dyhia Belhabib, ‘The Duplicity of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy
in Third Countries: Evidence from the Gulf of Guinea’ (2020) 184 Ocean and Coastal Management 1- 2.
153 British Petroleum, Bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2022| 71st Edition (BP Report, 2022) 10.
Figure 3: Global primary energy.
Source: Bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2022. 154
Table 1: Gulf of Guinea OPEC oil-producing states 2021.
State
Proven Crude Oil
Reserves (million
barrels)
Crude Oil Production
(1,000 b/d)
Crude Oil Exports
(1,000 b/d)
Angola
2,516
1,124
1,080
Equatorial Guinea
1,100
93
93
Gabon
2,000
181
181
Nigeria
37, 050
1,323
1,592
Republic of
Congo
1,811
267
251
Key: b/d (barrels per day).
Source: OPEC Annual Report 2022. 155
For some Gulf of Guinea states, crude oil is a significant source of revenue, with enough proven
oil reserves to produce more than they can consume. Table 1 shows that in 2021 Nigeria
154 Ibid.
155 This table only includes ‘proven’ oil reserves from OPEC members. Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 2022 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 57th Edition (OPEC Annual Report, 2022) 10.
possessed most of the region’s oil reserves. The state was also the largest crude oil producer in
the Gulf of Guinea, with an average daily crude oil production of 1.32 million barrels.156 It also
exported about 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day in the same year. Crude oil is so vital to
the economy of Nigeria that oil exports supply about 90% of its foreign exchange157 and
contribute to an estimated 7.24% of GDP.158
Nigeria was closely followed by Angola, with about 2.5 billion proven oil reserves and an
estimated production rate of 1.12 million barrels per day. However, more recent data show that
in 2022, Angola’s surpassed Nigeria as the Gulf of Guinea’s largest oil producer. In May 2022,
Angola produced over 1.16 million barrels of crude oil daily, while Nigeria only produced 1.02
million barrels per day.159 The same trend continued in June 2022, with Angola producing over
1.17 million barrels daily and Nigeria producing a daily average of 1.15 million barrels.160
The region also hosts other prolific oil producers, such as Chad. The landlocked State of Chad
was estimated to hold an average of 1.5 billion barrels of oil reserves in 2021.161 It joined the
league of oil-producing states in the region in 2003162 and had an estimated crude oil production
of over 140,000 barrels per day in 2020.163 Cameroon,164 and Ghana,165 are other oil producers
in the region. Oil discoveries have also been made in Senegal, and the state is expected to start
oil production in 2023.166
156 Ifesinachi Okafor- Yarwood et al., ‘The Blue Economy- Cultural Livelihood-Ecosystem Conservation Triangle:
The African Experience’ (2020) 7 Frontiers in Marine Science 3.
157 Sylvester Okotie, Napoleon Ogbon Ogbarode and Bibobra Ikporo, ‘The Oil and Gas Industry and the Nigerian
Environment’ (2018) The Political Ecology of Oil and Gas Activities in the Nigerian Aquatic Ecosystem 47.
158 National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report Q4 2021 (NBS, February 2022) 5.
159 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (OPEC, 12 July 2022) 47.
160 Ibid.
161 ‘Chad’, Central Intelligence Agency (Web Page) <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/chad/>
162 ‘The World Bank in Chad’, The World Bank (Web Page) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview>
163 ‘Chad – Country Commercial Guide’, International Trade Administration (Web Page, 7 September 2020)
<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/chad-oil-and-gas>
164 ‘Cameroon – Country Commercial Guide’ International Trade Administration (Web Page, 28 October 2021)
<https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/cameroon-oil-and-gas>
165 ‘Ghana’, U.S. Energy Information Administration (Web Page)
<https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/GHA>
166 Manon Laplace, ‘Senegal’s Maiden Offshore Oil Production Pushed to 2023’ The Africa Report (News Article, 25
November 2019) <https://www.theafricareport.com/20442/senegals-maiden-offshore-oil-production-pushed-to-
2023/>
Table 2: Gulf of Guinea OPEC natural gas producing states 2021.
State
Natural Gas Reserves
(billion cu. m.)
Natural Gas Marketed
Production (million cu.
m)
Natural Gas Exports
(million cu. m.)
Angola
301
8,820
5,084
Equatorial Guinea
39
7,047
4,694
Gabon
26
454
----
Nigeria
5,848
48,572
38,464
Republic of Congo
284
415
----
Key: Cu. m. (cubic meters).
Source: OPEC Annual Report 2022. 167
Besides crude oil, the Gulf of Guinea is also rich in natural gas. In 2021, there were an
estimated 205.8 trillion cubic meters of total worlds proven natural gas reserves.168 Based on the
information in Table 2, Nigeria accounts for about 2.8% of the world’s natural gas reserves and
also has the region's largest proven natural gas reserves, with an estimated 5.8 trillion cubic
meters of reserves. Examples of other states with proven natural reserves in the region are:
Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.169 These vast
deposits of oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Guinea have received increased interest from major
global energy consumers, including the US, China, and states in the EU.
2.3.2.2.1 The United States Energy Interests in the Gulf of Guinea
Globally, the US is the number one oil-producing state, with a daily crude oil production of
about 11.1 million barrels per day in 2021.170 Nonetheless, the US is also the third largest
energy importer because of its high dependence on crude oil for its energy needs.171 In 2021, it
imported about 6.1 million barrels of crude oil daily, only behind China (10.3 million b/d).172
The US Energy Information Administration (IEA) reported that in 2021, the US daily
consumption was an average of 19.78 million barrels, a long way from the 11.1 million barrels
produced per day.173 Furthermore, the IEA expects energy consumption to continue to rise till
167 Data was compiled from OPEC. See Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2022 OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin 57th Edition (OPEC Annual Report, 2022) 10.
168 Ibid 76.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid 26.
171 Ibid 54.
172 Ibid.
173 ‘How Much Oil is Consumed in the United States?’, U.S. Energy Information Administration (Web Page)
<https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=33&t=6>
2050 due to economic and population growth, making the importation of oil from foreign states
crucial.174 This high energy consumption and demand is primarily from the US Department of
Defense (DoD), the state's largest institutional consumer of energy, making access to oil a
matter of national security for the US.175
The US seeks oil imports from foreign states to meet its energy needs and in recent decades, has
been paying increasing attention to the Gulf of Guinea due to several factors. First, concerns
with diversifying its energy sources, especially with its declining domestic oil production.176
Second, the US ban on Russian oil imports due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.177 Additional
factors such as the geographical location of the Gulf of Guinea, and the offshore oil fields where
oil is extracted make the Gulf of Guinea an attractive location for the US.178 Its location has
many advantages for loading tankers and provides stability in oil production levels.179 In
addition to the strategic location of the Gulf of Guinea, the light and sweet oil, which yields a
high volume of gasoline, confirms this attraction for the US.180
174 ‘EIA Projects U.S. Energy Consumption will Grow Through 2050, Driven by Economic Growth’, U.S. Energy
Information Administration (Web Page, 3 March 2022) <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51478>
175 Constantine Samaras, William J. Nuttall, and Morgan Bazilian, ‘Energy and the Military: Convergence of
Security, Economic, and Environmental Decision-Making’ (2019) 26 Energy Strategy Reviews 2.
176 ‘U.S. Crude Oil Production Fell by 8% in 2020, the Largest Annual Decrease on Record’, U.S. Energy
Information Administration (Web Page, 22 December 2021)
<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=50621>
177 The White House, ‘FACT SHEET: United States Bans Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal’
(Media Release, 8 March 2022) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/08/fact-
sheet-united-states-bans-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/>
178 Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘The Geo-Strategy of Oil in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for Regional Stability’ (2010)
45(3) Journal of Asian and African Studies 372.
179 Ibid.
180 Ali (n 28) 40.
Table 3: United States crude oil imports from Gulf of Guinea oil-producing states, 2018 to
2021.
Country
2018
2019
2020
2021
1000 (b/d)
Angola
90
33
28
32
Cameroon
3
9
19
4
Chad
20
5
-
-
Equatorial Guinea
19
9
-
-
Gabon
5
-
-
-
Ghana
11
24
24
51
Nigeria
175
186
67
108
Republic of Congo
-
15
5
-
Key: b/d (barrels per day).
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 181
Table 3 shows that the Gulf of Guinea’s oil is vital to the US economy. In fact, despite the
importance of fossil fuels declining and the use of renewable and green energy sources
increasing,182 the Table shows that the US still has a high need for the region's crude oil imports.
Most US imports from 2018 to 2021 in the Gulf of Guinea came from Nigeria, Angola, and
Ghana.
Table 4: Examples of Gulf of Guinea states with United States energy investments.
State
Chevron
Exxon Mobil
Angola
✓
✓
Cameroon
✓
✓
Chad
x
✓
Equatorial Guinea
✓
✓
Ghana
✓
x
Nigeria
✓
✓
Republic of Congo
✓
x
Source: Chevron and ExxonMobil’s official websites. 183
181 Data has been taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration Website. See ‘U.S. Imports by Country of
Origin’, U.S. Energy Information Administration (Web Page)
<https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_a.htm>
182 ‘Local Renewable Energy Benefits and Resources’, United States Environmental Protection Agency (Web Page)
<https://www.epa.gov/statelocalenergy/local-renewable-energy-benefits-and-resources
183 ‘Exploration and Production in Africa’ Chevron (Web Page) <https://www.chevron.com/operations/exploration-
production/exploration-production-in-africa>; ‘Global Operations’ ExxonMobil (Web Page)
<https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/operations/global-operations>
Additionally, the US currently has substantial crude oil and natural gas investments in the
several Gulf of Guinea states (Table 4). For instance, Chevron operates and holds a 40% interest
in all onshore and near-offshore oil facilities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria under a joint
venture agreement with the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).184
This joint venture agreement gives Chevron exploration and production rights to oil fields in the
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Chevron also holds a 36.7% interest in West African Gas
Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCo), which transports natural gas from Nigeria to Benin,
Ghana, and Togo.185
2.3.2.2.2 China’s Energy Interests in the Gulf of Guinea
China is among many states interested in the Gulf of Guinea’s oil. China is one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world, with an economic growth rate of 8.1% in 2021.186 This
economic growth rate, combined with an already robust population and the voracious appetite
for cars, has dramatically expanded China’s energy needs.187 The oil demand has been so rapid
that in 2017, China surpassed the US to become the largest importer of crude oil.188 From 2017
to 2021, China’s imports have continued to grow from 8.4 million barrels per day in 2017 to
10.3 million barrels per day in 2021.189 These import needs are mostly met by Russia and
several states in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates) (Table 6). However, China has diversified its crude oil supplies by importing from
Gulf of Guinea states.
184 ‘Exploration and Production in Africa’ Chevron (Web Page) <https://www.chevron.com/operations/exploration-
production/exploration-production-in-africa>
185 Ibid.
186 ‘GDP Growth (Annual %)’, The World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>
187 Zhong Xiang Zhang, ‘China’s Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses’ (2011) 39(12) Science
Direct 7612.
188 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2022 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 57th Edition (OPEC
Annual Report, 2022) 54; ‘China Surpass the United States as the World’s Largest Crude Oil Importer in 2017’, U.S.
Energy Information Administration (Web Page, 31 December 2018)
<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37821>
189 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2022 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 57th Edition (OPEC
Annual Report, 2022) 54.
Table 5: China’s top crude oil suppliers 2020.
Source: US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress 2021. 190
Table 5 shows that the Gulf of Guinea is China’s third-largest source of oil after the Middle East
and Russia. In 2020, Angola was the fourth largest supplier of China’s crude oil, supplying an
estimated nine per cent of China’s crude oil. Other states in the region, such as Cameroon,
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, also supply crude
oil to China.191
Furthermore, China’s three largest state oil corporations, China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China Petroleum
& Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), have expanded their global access to oil and gas resources
by purchasing shares in Nigeria and Angola oil fields as well as acquiring a significant share of
Nigerian oil output. For instance, in 2006, CNOOC, the largest offshore oil and gas state oil
corporation in China, acquired a 45% stake in an offshore oil field in Nigeria, valued at USD2.3
billion, one of the most significant purchases by a Chinese company at that time.192 Likewise, in
2012, Sinopec purchased a 20% stake in a Nigerian offshore oil field from Total, valued at
USD2.5 billion.193
190 United States Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2021 (US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, 2021) 164.
191 Cyril Obi, ‘The Changing Dynamics of Chinese Oil and Gas Engagements in Africa’ in Arkebe Oqubay and Justin
Yifu Lin (ed), China-Africa and an Economic Transformation (Oxford University Press, 2019) 174.
192 David Barboza, ‘Chinese Energy Giant to Buy Stake in Nigerian Oil Field’ The New York Times (New York, 10
January 2006) 5.
193 ‘Total Sells $2.5 Billion Nigeria Oil Field Stake to Sinopec’, Reuters (News Article, 12 November 2012)
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-total-sinopec-idUSBRE8AI0HY20121119>
In 2013, Sinopec bought a ten per cent stake in Angola’s oil field called Block 31, operated by
Marathon Oil Corporation, for USD1.5 billion.194 In 2019, CNPC, China’s largest oil and gas
producer in terms of output, also signed a contract with the government of Benin to build and
operate a crude oil pipeline in the region.195
2.3.2.2.3 EU Energy Interests in the Gulf of Guinea
In the 20th century, industrialisation in the 27 member states of the EU (including the United
Kingdom) was fuelled by coal for energy generation.196 However, in recent decades, there has
been a shift to using crude oil and natural gas for transportation, electrical generation, and
industrial production, which has increased the EU’s reliance on crude oil for energy.
Currently, states in the EU lack sufficient large oil and gas reserves and therefore depend on
foreign states oil and gas imports to meet their energy needs. In 2020, an estimated 57.5% of the
EU’s energy needs were met by imports.197 Russia was its most significant supplier of crude oil
(29%), while Nigeria only supplied the EU with 6% of its crude oil.198 However, with the
current sanctions on Russia, the EU is now looking to Africa to fill the gap in its energy
imports.199 In July 2022, Reuters reported that energy firms in the EU are considering projects
with a total value of USD100 billion in Africa.200
The EU is not only considering diversifying its crude oil suppliers to end its reliance on Russia
but also shifting towards renewable energy sources due to its concerns about global climate
change.201 Gas is becoming the EU’s preferred energy source. In 2021, natural gas represented
194 ‘China’s Sinopec Buys Marathon’s Angola Oil Fields for $1.52 Billion’, Reuters (News Article, 23 June 2013)
<https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-cnpc-idUKBRE95M07B20130623>
195 Zheng Xin, ‘CNPC to Spread Global Reach with Crude Oil Pipeline in West Africa’, China Daily (Hong Kong, 13
August 2019) 10.
196 The 27 member states in the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cypris, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Alan Fernihough and Kevin
Hjortshøj O’Rourke, ‘Coal and the European Industrial Revolution’ (2021) 131(635) The Economic Journal 1135 –
1149.
197 Eurostat, ‘Energy Imports Dependency by Products’ (14 April 2022)
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_07_50/default/table?lang=en>
198 ‘From Where do we Import Energy’, Eurostat (Web Page)
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-
2c.html#:~:text=Russia%20is%20the%20main%20EU,and%20Nigeria%20(both%206%20%25).>
199 Noah Browning, Ron Bousso and Wendell Roelf, ‘Analysis: Ukraine War Rekindles Europe’s Demand for
African Oil and Gas’, Reuters (News Article, 22 July 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-war-
rekindles-europes-demand-african-oil-gas-2022-07-22/>
200 Ibid.
201 Noah Browning, ‘Investments in Africa Energy Needed to Aid Quitting Russian Supply – EIB’, Reuters (News
Article, 22 June 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/investment-african-energy-needed-
aid-quitting-russian-supply-eib-2022-06-21/>
about 25% of EU energy imports, only behind crude oil (62%).202 To satisfy its need for gas as a
renewable energy source, the EU is looking towards the Gulf of Guinea to meet its energy
needs. In April and May 2022, representatives of Germany and Italy visited Senegal, the
Republic of Congo, and Angola in search of natural gas deals.203 However, as of the time of
writing, the terms of these deals are yet to be agreed.
Nevertheless, states such as Nigeria and Angola that have large reserves of natural gas have the
potential to fill the supply gap left by Russia. Nigeria has already expressed its willingness to
export more natural gas to the EU.204 Thus, the Gulf of Guinea can potentially replace a large
portion of Russian gas exports to the EU in the future.
2.3.2.3 International Maritime Trade and Shipping
In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea has seen a significant increase in maritime traffic and trade.
Trade in the region has averaged USD208.1 billion, with exports representing USD137.3 billion
and imports representing about USD80.4 billion.205 The region generates foreign exchange GDP
and promotes economic growth by exporting oil, gas, and other goods from the coastal and
landlocked states. For instance, cocoa is one of the region’s most significant exports. According
to data analysed by the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), Gulf of Guinea states
accounted for about 74% of global cocoa production for the year 2020/2021.206 Côte d’Ivoire
and Ghana are the largest producers and exporters of cocoa in the world, with Côte d’Ivoire
producing about 2.2 metric tons and Ghana producing about 1.1 metric tons annually.207 Côte
d’Ivoire supplies about 40% of global cocoa,208 contributing an estimated ten per cent to the
national GDP.209 Ghana also supplies about 25% of the world’s cocoa, accounting for up to
202 ‘EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent developments’ Eurostat (Online Article)
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-
_recent_developments#:~:text=For%20natural%20gas%20the%20largest,50%20%25%20for%20Italy%20and%20Ge
rmany.>
203 Andreas Rinke and Sarah Marsh, ‘Germany is Keen to Pursue Gas Projects with Senegal, Says Scholz on First
African Tour’, Reuters (News Article, 23 May 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-looms-large-scholzs-
first-africa-tour-chancellor-2022-05-22/>; ‘Italy Set to Sign More Africa Gas Deals to Offset Russia’, Reuters (News
Article, 20 April 2022) <https://www.tradingview.com/news/reuters.com,2022:newsml_L5N2WH3UL:2-italy-set-to-
sign-more-africa-gas-deals-to-offset-russia/>
204 Sami Olatunji and Stephen Angbulu, ‘FG Plans More Gas Exports to Europe, EU Supports Nigeria with $385bn’,
Punch (Online, 15 February 2022) <https://punchng.com/fg-plans-more-gas-exports-to-europe-eu-supports-nigeria-
with-n385bn/>
205 ‘Trade’, Economic Community of West African States (Web Page) <https://ecowas.int/?page_id=370>
206 International Cocoa Organisation, Production of Cocoa Beans (ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, Vol.
XLVII, No.2, Cocoa Year 201/22, 31 May 2022) <https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/Production_QBCS-
XLVIII-No.-2.pdf>
207 Ibid.
208 World Bank Group, Côte d’Ivoire Economic Update (The World Bank Report Vol.2, July 2019) 9.
209 African Development Fund, Cocoa Sector Governance Support Project (PAGFIC) (ADF Appraisal Report, 2018)
3.
seven per cent of national revenue.210 Other states like Nigeria and Cameroon are also
significant producers and exporters of cocoa in the region.211
In addition to cocoa, the region generates export earnings from natural resources such as gold,
diamond, cobalt, titanium, and tantalum. These resources attract significant interest from
various foreign states, such as India, China, and the US. However, the EU is the Gulf of
Guinea’s first and largest trading partner.212 In 2020, the EU accounted for 20% of the region’s
exports and 22% of its imports.213 Table 6 shows that in 2021, Nigeria, its largest trading
partner, accounted for about 30% of EU exports and 48% of imports from the region. Other
notable trading partners are Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Senegal (Table 6).
The goal of export trade in the Gulf of Guinea is to contribute to the state’s GDP, drive
domestic production, and promote economic growth. Import trade is also significant in
providing food for states in the region. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) discovered that Africa (including the Gulf of Guinea) imports about
85% of its food consumption.214 In addition, most Gulf of Guinea states have become net
importers of food and agricultural products to meet demand. For instance, in 2019, agricultural
imports in Nigeria exceeded exports by N689.7 billion (USD1.62 billion).215
210 Matthew Mpoke Bigg, ‘Incoming Ghana Government Gives Cocoa Sector Chance of Fresh Start’, Reuters (News
Article, 20 December 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ghana-cocoa/incoming-ghana-government-gives-
cocoa-sector-chance-of-fresh-start-idUSKBN1481Q5>
211 International Cocoa Organisation, Production of Cocoa Beans (ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, Vol.
XLVII, No.2, Cocoa Year 201/22, 31 May 2022).
212 ‘West Africa’, European Commission (Web Page) <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-
country-and-region/countries-and-regions/west-africa_en>
213 European Commission, ‘Economic Partnership Agreement with West Africa – Facts and Figures’ (10 June 2021)
3 <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152694.pdf>
214 Paul Akiwumi, ‘COVID-19: A Threat to Food Security in Africa’, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (News Article, 11 August 2020) <https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-threat-food-security-africa>
215 Taiwo Oyaniran, ‘Current State of Nigeria Agriculture and Agribusiness Sector’ Price water House Coopers
(AFCFTA Workshop, September 2020) 3 <https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/afcfta-agribusiness-current-state-
nigeria-agriculture-sector.pdf>
Table 6: Total value of the European Union’s trade in goods with Gulf of Guinea states in
2020 and 2021.
State
EU Exports to …
(Million €)
EU Imports from …
(Million €)
Angola
2,725
1,894
Benin
678
42
Burkina Faso
862
150
Cabo Verde
499
84
Cameroon
1,602
1,772
Central African Republic
116
31
Chad
177
1,202
Côte d’Ivoire
3,380
4,081
Democratic Republic of Congo
1,024
1,495
Equatorial Guinea
291
1,293
Gabon
735
964
The Gambia
203
11
Ghana
3,081
2,005
Guinea
835
465
Guinea-Bissau
146
3
Liberia
1,218
750
Mali
1,220
36
Mauritania
755
655
Niger
309
170
Nigeria
11,169
17,514
Republic of Congo
709
704
São Tomé and Príncipe
69
16
Senegal
3,735
464
Sierra Leone
251
272
Togo
1960
125
Total
37,749
36,198
Source: European Commission 2022. 216
Maritime shipping is the gateway for most import and export trade in the Gulf of Guinea. It has
been estimated that over 90% of the exports and imports of the region are transported by sea.217
It is also estimated that approximately 300,000 vessels carry import and export goods through
216 Eurostat, ‘EU27 Trade in Goods by Partner (2021, Excluding Intra-EU Trade)’ (20 April 2022) 1 -4
<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf>
217 African Union, ‘Africa’s Blue Economy is a Vehicle for Sustainable Development’ (Press Release, 7 June 2019)
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/36807-pr-blue_economy_pr-1.pdf>
the Gulf of Guinea waters annually.218 Therefore, the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain must
be adequately protected to enable the free flow of international trade and shipping.
2.3.3 Discussion
The analysis in the section above demonstrates that there is a predicated increase in economic
development in the Gulf of Guinea due to oil and gas demand. The analysis shows that the US,
EU and China are looking towards the Gulf of Guinea to meet their energy needs, thus bringing
potential economic development to the region. However, increased economic development in
the oil and gas industry has the potential to intensify maritime security challenges. For instance,
piracy is a significant maritime security concern in the oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea. In
2020, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported a total of 82 reported piracy incidences
in the Gulf of Guinea.219 The increase in oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Guinea could
provide new momentum for pirates who already feel economically marginalised by state
authorities.220 Therefore, it is imperative that Gulf of Guinea states address new increase in
economic activities in the oil and gas industry to avoid spill-over into the fishing industry.
2.4 Socioeconomic Status of the Gulf of Guinea
This section gives an overview of the socioeconomic status of the Gulf of Guinea region.221 It
demonstrates the importance of prioritising the food and income security of people to improve
the socioeconomic situation of the Gulf of Guinea.
2.4.1 Gulf of Guinea’s Population and Economic Activities
The entire area of the Gulf of Guinea region has a combined coastline of 9,663 thousand square
meters (Table 7). The region also has a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of an
estimated USD963 billion, exports an estimated USD144 billion, and imports USD130 billion
goods and services. In addition, states in the region speak five formal languages (Table 7).222
Fifteen states speak French,223 six states in the region speak English,224 five states speak
218 Nana Raymond Lawrence Ofosu-Boateng, ‘A SWOT Analysis of Maritime Transportation and Security in the
Gulf of Guinea’ (2017) 5(8) Open Journal of Social Sciences 14.
219 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2020 (ICC IMB Annual Report, 2021) 67.
220 Sohel Uddin, Ronke Phillips and Henry Austin, ‘” Fishing for Crime”: Desperation, Lack of Opportunities Behind
the Nigerian Piracy, Experts Say’ NBC News (Online, 9 November 2013)
<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fishing-crime-desperation-lack-opportunities-behind-nigerian-piracy-
experts-say-flna2d11569382>
221 This section is modelled after the work of Ali (n 28) in ch 2.
222 These languages range from English-speaking states to French-speaking states, Portuguese-speaking states,
Spanish-speaking states, and Arabic-speaking states. Some states have two or three official languages. For example,
Equatorial Guinea has three official languages (Spanish, Portuguese and French).
223 The French-speaking states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte
d'Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
224 The English-speaking states are Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
Portuguese,225 two states speak Arabic,226 and only Equatorial Guinea speak Spanish. Table 1
compiles and presents the socioeconomic profile of the Gulf of Guinea.
225 The Portuguese-speaking states are Angola, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and São Tomé and
Príncipe.
226 The Arabic-speaking states are Chad and Mauritania.
Table 7: Socioeconomic profile of the Gulf of Guinea.
Data interpretation: Human Development Index (HDI) ranking indicators (2019): (≥ 0.800) = Very high human
development; (0.700 – 0.799) = High human development; (0.550 – 0.699) = Medium human development;
(< 0.550) = Low human development. Sources: Language, population (2022), population growth (2022), and
coastline,227 GDP (2021), GDP growth rate (2021), imports and exports (2021),228 human development index
227 Language, population, population growth, and coastline data has been taken from the Central Intelligence Agency
website. See ‘World Fact Book’, Central Intelligence Agency (Web Page) <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-
factbook/>
228 GDP, GDP growth rate, and import and export data have been taken from the World Bank database. See ‘Word
Bank Open Data’, The World Bank (Web Page) <https://data.worldbank.org>
(2019),229 and United Nations (UN) country category (2021 ).230
The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) estimated that, as of November 2022, the
world population is eight billion.231 Currently, the Gulf of Guinea accounts for over 636 million
of the world’s population (an estimated 8%). Nigeria accounts for the region's highest
population, with over 225 million people. It is also the sixth most populous state in the world,
with a steady population increase annually.232 Other states like Niger (3.66%), Equatorial
Guinea (3.5%), Angola (3.36%), Benin (3.34%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(3.14%) are experiencing even more population growth rates in the region (Table 7).233
As the Gulf of Guinea’s population booms, providing food and livelihoods for its people
becomes essential.234 However, despite a significant population growth rate, socioeconomic
indicators for most states remain weak. Table 7 shows that a 17 out of 25 states are listed in the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category.235 These states cannot meet the mounting
developmental needs to enhance the standards of living of their nationals. Indeed, a 2021 study
published by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in partnership with
the West Africa Sub-Regional Office for the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
and the World Food Programme (WFP), revealed that in 2021, nearly 25 million people in the
region could not meet their basic food needs.236 This estimate was 34% higher than in 2020.237 It
also revealed that the percentage of people living on less than USD1.90 a day increased from
2.3% in 2020 to 2.9% in 2021, leading to extreme poverty rates of 34.4%.238 In addition,
income levels are still low across states in the region.239
229 Human Development Index (HDI) data has been taken from the United Nations Development Programme’s
official website. See United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Index (HDI)’
<https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/data/2020/2020_Statistical_Annex_Table_1.xlsx>
230 United Nations Committee for Development Policy, ‘List of Least Developed Countries (as of 24 November
2021)’ (2021) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf>
231 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospect
2022. Summary of Results (UNODC Report, 2022) 3.
232 Table 1 shows that in 2022, Nigeria’s population increased by 2.5%.
233 Percentages refer to annual population growth rates.
234 Ginger L. Denton and Jonathan R. Harris, ‘The Impact of Illegal Fishing on Maritime Piracy: Evidence from West
Africa’ (2019) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 2.
235 17 states are in the LDS category. According to the UN, LDCs are considered low-income states that are most
vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks. ‘Least Developed Countries (LDCs)’, United Nations Department
of Economics and Social Affairs (Web Page) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-
category.html>
236 Economic Community of West African States, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the World
Food Programme, Monitoring Report on the Impacts of COVID-19 in West Africa (UN Report, August 2021) 19.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid 22.
Nonetheless, despite the deteriorating economic situation and the impact of COVID-19, the
economy of most states in the Gulf of Guinea significantly grew in 2021 (Table 7). Economic
growth averaged an estimated 3.8% across states in the region. However, there is still room for
improvement and growth. The maritime domain must be protected to improve the economic
situation of Gulf of Guinea states. The maritime environment has been recognised as essential
for states’ economic development.240 Therefore, states must provide a safe and secure maritime
environment where institutions supporting millions of people’s food and income security can
flourish. The fisheries sector offers significant potential to improve the economic situation of
Gulf of Guinea states if adequately harnessed and given sufficient investments to support the
sector’s growth.241
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the importance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain to the global
economy. It examines the definition of the Gulf of Guinea, its socioeconomic profile, and
geopolitical and strategic interests. The analysis in this chapter reveals that the Gulf of Guinea’s
maritime domain has been vital from historical times and is also essential in contemporary
times. Today and in the future, its importance is seen in fisheries, energy, and international
shipping and trade, which are essential revenue generators for states in the region.
The analysis reveals that the Gulf of Guinea’s resources attracts competing foreign states’
interests which can be interpreted as the new ‘Scramble for Africa’ for the Gulf of Guinea’s
marine oil and gas resources. This new competing interest in the Gulf of Guinea’s resources
means that the maritime domain assumes a broader international significance. A predicated rise
in economic activity in the offshore area due to oil and gas, means a possible rise in maritime
security issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, it is essential to position the whole maritime
domain to cope with these drivers.
240 Michelle A. Voyer et al., ‘Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: Intersection and Interdependencies in the
Indian Ocean’ (2018) 14 (1) Journal of Indian Ocean Region 28 – 48.
241 Coning and Witbooi (n 95) 208.
CHAPTER 3
MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has demonstrated that the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain is an
essential source of fish, energy, and an important trade route. The chapter illustrated that the
maritime domain is important for the region and the international community. Therefore,
protecting the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime environment from maritime threats is essential.
Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea has increasingly drawn regional and international
attention due to non-traditional maritime security threats such as piracy, smuggling of migrants
by sea, trafficking (drug, people, and arms), and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU)
fishing. The early focus on maritime security was traditionally slanted toward national security
and states’ military interests as opposed to non-traditional threats. However, drawing on primary
and secondary literature, this chapter argues that maritime security threats have evolved to
include non-traditional maritime security threats. The chapter illustrates that since the terrorist
attack in the United States (US) on 11 September 2001, maritime security discussions have
broadened their understanding of maritime security to include traditional and non-traditional
threats. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea states should consider expanding their perception of maritime
security threats to include IUU fishing.
The chapter makes the above argument in three parts. The first part examines the definition of
maritime security from organisational perspectives and in the field of security studies and, in
doing so, adopts a working definition for the thesis. The second part investigates the evolution
of maritime security threats. It analyses the development of the concept as it was first used as an
element of the broader concept of national security, which focused on traditional security issues
until it evolved to include non-traditional security threats. The analysis will provide a more
holistic understanding of maritime security and IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, the
third part examines the major maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea under the
framework of transnational organised crime and its implications for national and regional
security.
3.2 The Concept of Maritime Security
Maritime security is a broad topic covering many policy sectors. This term was first coined in
the 1990s due to the growing concerns over maritime terrorism and its associated threats.242
242 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies’
(2017) 93(6) International Affairs 1293.
However, it was formally recognised in the international sphere after the 9/11 attack in the US.
Despite this, there is still no international legal definition for maritime security. It is defined
from the perspective of persons using the term and its context.
This section will first examine various definitions of maritime security from organisational
perspectives and in security studies and then draw from these definitions to create a definition
for the thesis.
3.2.1 Definition of Maritime Security
The term maritime security has no universal legal definition and has been used in diverse ways
by various authors depending on the context in which it is used.243 From a defence perspective,
the US Department of the Navy defined maritime security as those operations that aid in the
protection of sovereignty and resources, as well as ensuring free and open trade and countering
transnational crimes, terrorism, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.244
From a shipping perspective, maritime security is concerned with the safety of international
transport systems and the safety of ports and ships.245
From an academic perspective, maritime security is understood in several ways. Klein argued
that the most helpful way to understand maritime security is not to define the concept, but ‘to
identify what are commonly perceived as existing or potential threats to maritime security and
the steps that have been or need to be taken to address these threats.’246 In contrast, Rahman
gave an exhaustive examination of the different perspectives from which we can view maritime
security: security of the sea itself, ocean governance, maritime border protection, military
activities at sea, and the security regulation of the maritime transportation system.247 In the first
approach, the security of the sea itself, he argued that protecting the marine environment and its
living and non-living resources are at the forefront of maritime security.248 The centre of
attention is the protection of the ocean and its resources, not the implications of marine
environmental security on humans and political relationships. In the second approach, ocean
governance, Rahman argued that proper management of the oceans might ensure some form of
peace and stability.249 He stresses the importance of governments’ creation and implementation
243 However, it is crucial to understand what this concept means to be clear about what should be done to attain future
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Rahman (n 61) 29.
244 Department of the Navy Washington DC, Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy
(Department of the Navy Washington DC Report, 25 May 2010) 35.
245 Catherine Zara Raymond and Arthur Morriën, ‘Security in the Maritime Domain and its Evolution Since 9/11’ in
Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (ed), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (Auerbach
Publications, 2008) 3,4.
246 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2011) 11.
247 Rahman (n 61) 30.
248 Ibid 30 – 31.
249 Ibid 34 – 34.
of rules and regulations on ocean governance. These rules would act as a conflict resolution
mechanism for problems occurring at sea, which then acts as a tool for ocean governance. In the
third approach, maritime border protection, Rahman argued for ocean governance by
international and regional organisations and the effective management of maritime zones by
coastal states.250 States should be able to effectively exercise control over waters under their
maritime jurisdictions, especially those in relation to the exploration and exploitation of their
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).251 In the fourth approach, military activities at sea, he argued
for controlling and regulating arms at sea.252 He explained that this approach might be difficult
and impossible for various reasons and pointed to past examples of regulations to prevent war at
sea that failed, such as the interwar Washington-London treaty system of naval arms limitations.
In the fifth alternative approach, regulation of the maritime transportation system, he argued that
maritime security could be viewed from its development after the 9/11 attack in the United
States.253 Before the attack, states and international organisations barely considered security
issues in the maritime environment, with only one regulation in place to deal with maritime
security: the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA Convention)254 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.255 The global perception of maritime
security changed after the attack, with the United States at the forefront, bringing the issue of
terrorism to the attention of International Maritime Organisations (IMO). After the attack,
several maritime measures were implemented, including the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code as an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention.256
The ISPS Code made provisions for satellite-based Long-Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) of SOLAS-regulated ships.257 Therefore, the 9/11 attack changed maritime security
forever, and the IMO will continue to be a hub connecting many nations in combatting maritime
security issues.
Bueger also provided a comprehensive analysis of perspectives from which to view maritime
250 Ibid 34 – 36.
251 Ibid 36.
252 Ibid 36 - 40.
253 Ibid 40 - 42.
254 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature
10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992).
255 Protocol to the Convention of 10 March 1988 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS (entered into force 1
March 1992).
256 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184, 1185
UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1980) ch XI-2.
257 Ibid ch V, reg 19-1.
security: the maritime security matrix, securitisation, and security/community practice.258 He
theorised that these frameworks should be looked at holistically to grasp what maritime security
entails. The first framework, the maritime security matrix, identifies maritime security relations
to other concepts that may be integrated into maritime security. According to him, four related
concepts require consideration: seapower, marine safety, blue economy, and human
resilience.259
Sea power concerns the part military forces play in protecting the state and the threats to
national survival. Marine safety relates to the protection of ships and the marine environment,
including the regulation of port security, shipping, the safety of seafarers, and search and rescue
provisions. The blue economy revolves around the economic opportunities offered by ocean
resources, ranging from maritime resource extraction to coastal tourism. Lastly, human
resilience is about the security of coastal communities and their living conditions and the
protection of food and livelihoods, with a particular focus on IUU fishing and human
trafficking.
Figure 4: Maritime security matrix.
Source: Christian Bueger 2015. 260
258 Bueger (n 62) 159-163.
259 Ibid 160, 161.
260 Ibid 161.
The thesis adopts a similar position to that of Bueger’s 2015 paper.261 However, it argues that
marine safety will not be a part of the maritime security matrix. Marine safety relates to
accidents at sea, and maritime security relates to criminal activities at sea. The African Maritime
Safety & Security Agency (AMMSSA) made a clear distinction between the two terms,
providing the following for the definition of maritime security and marine safety:
‘Maritime security is concerned with the prevention of intentional damage through sabotage,
subversion, or terrorism’ and defined marine safety as ‘… the prevention of accidental damage
or incidents of marine environmental pollution or loss of life at sea through the development of
technical support systems, the auditing of recognised classification societies, development of
common methodologies for the investigation of maritime accidents, and the establishment of
vessel traffic monitoring and information systems.’262
The thesis treats marine safety and maritime security as separate terms with clearly defined
boundaries to avoid overlapping, which might confuse regulatory and policymaking when
aiming to combat maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea.
As previously mentioned, Bueger introduced the concept of securitisation as a viable way to
understand the concept of maritime security. This concept involves analysing how some issues
in the maritime security agenda have been securitised.263 He noted that the securitisation
framework involves presenting maritime security issues as existential threats to a referent
object. This will ensure that measures are put in place to protect the referent object from the
maritime security threat. For instance, piracy is presented as a threat to the state and
international trade. This will make piracy more of a priority for the international community,
where it can be addressed as a matter of urgency, resulting in more resources being devoted to
its eradication. He argued that the securitisation of maritime security threats such as piracy and
armed robbery at sea, smuggling and trafficking in persons by sea, illicit trafficking of arms and
weapons, illicit trafficking of narcotics, and IUU fishing will reconstruct how these threats are
viewed and combatted.264
Bueger’s third framework introduces the concept of community security practice. It entails the
activities that are conducted by state actors when they are undertaking maritime security.265 It is
261 Ibid.
262 ‘Risk Prevention and Maritime Security’, African Maritime Safety & Security Agency (Web Page)
<www.amssa.net/intelligence/risk-prevention-and-maritime-security.aspx>
263 Bueger (n 62) 161, 162.
264 Ibid 162.
265 Ibid 162, 163.
interested in cooperating with all relevant state actors in the maritime environment. In this form
of cooperation, actors relevant to the maritime sector should implement measures to protect
their maritime environment. For example, enhancing collaboration between international actors
for joint policies, operations, information sharing, and surveillance through radar, satellites, or
data tracking. He argues that looking at the practice of state actors will reveal how the meaning
of maritime security has become settled and institutionalised in a distinct set of practices.
3.2.2 Thesis Application of Maritime Security
Though maritime security as a concept is not universally defined, maritime security must be
defined in this thesis to understand what should be done to attain future maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea. The thesis will define maritime security by drawing from the above definitions
of Klein, Rahman and Bueger and this will further encompass protecting the ocean from threats
arising from its use.
The thesis will identify and examine maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea and will
conceptualise major maritime security issues under the framework of transnational organised
crimes, to allow comprehensive study of these threats.
3.3 The Development of Maritime Security Threats
Early studies on maritime security focused on national threats from interstate rivalries and
disputes. It mainly related to threats to the physical survival of the state266 and was defined in
militarised terms that focused on national security as opposed to non-traditional security.267 The
main interest was developing states’ military capabilities in dealing with external military
threats. It mainly encompassed the traditional notion of sea power rather than non-traditional
security threats.
After the terrorist attack in the US on 11 September 2001, the global community became aware
of vulnerabilities that pose a danger to not only the survival of a state, but to its quality of life
and identity. The concept changed significantly as an innovative approach was characterised by
expanding perceived threats to include non-traditional maritime security challenges, such as
IUU fishing, trafficking (drug and people), piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling and
marine pollution. It is now common for discussions on what constitutes a threat to maritime
266 Henrik Österblom, Andrew Constable, and Sayaka Fukumi, ‘Illegal Fishing and the Organized Crime Analogy’
(2011) 26(6) Trends in Ecology and Evolution 261.
267 John Baylis, ‘The Concept of Security in International Relations’ in Navnita Chadha Behera et al. (ed),
Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century (Springer, 3rd ed, 2008),
496.
security to be considered in more concrete terms.
The most notable author on maritime security, Till, confirmed this by addressing crucial threats
to maritime security in his development of the concept of ‘good order at sea’.268 He argued that
there are four attributes to achieve good order at sea: the sea as a resource, the sea as a medium
of transportation, the sea as an area of dominion, and the sea as an environment. He analysed
vital threats to these attributes, including drug trafficking, terrorism, migrant smuggling, and
piracy. By analysing these threats, Till has shown that identifying threats to good order at sea is
paramount to maintaining maritime security. The book also mentioned that ‘the concept of
“security” has widened… from traditional, “hard” national defence to issues of marine
safety’.269
Furthermore, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) made mention
of several activities that can compromise the security of states, including fishing activities, a
range of military activities like the use of weapons, and the collection of information to the
detriment of the defence of the coastal state.270 From this perspective, it is clear that not only do
a range of military activities threaten states security, but also that threats like IUU fishing
activities, piracy, trafficking, and terrorism are harmful to the maritime security of a state.
In the Gulf of Guinea, the development of maritime security threats can be traced back to the
pre-colonial era when European powers were competing for dominance along the coastal stretch
of the Gulf of Guinea. The Europeans built forts and castles along the coast to protect their
trading interest and establish a foothold in the region.271 These castles were used to store goods,
as well as to house soldiers and enslaved people.272 However, the presence of these castles also
led to a long period of enslavement of people, which created resentment and tension between
the Gulf of Guinea coastal states and European powers.273
In contemporary times, maritime security threats in the region have evolved to include non-
traditional security threats, such as piracy, trafficking (drugs, arms and people) and IUU
fishing.274
268 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2009) 282- 300.
269 Ibid 286.
270 UNCLOS (n 66).
271 See sec 2.3.1.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 See generally sec 3.4 and ch 4.
3.4 Maritime Security Threats in the Gulf of Guinea
As seen above, traditionally, the concept of security in the Gulf of Guinea has been based on
military disputes, paying little or no attention to non-traditional threats. However, due to the
9/11 terrorist attack, the region has been compelled to address not only dangers to the physical
survival of the state, but also non-traditional maritime threats.
The Gulf of Guinea’s main non-traditional maritime threats have the characteristics of
transnational organised crime. For example, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms
trafficking, and migrant smuggling.275 As such, this section will conceptualise maritime security
threats in the Gulf of Guinea within the framework and meaning of transnational organised
crime. It will analyse the meaning of transnational organised crime and then give an in-depth
analysis of five major transnational organised crimes in the Gulf of Guinea.
3.4.1 Transnational Organised Crime
The term transnational organised crime has been around for a long time and has evolved over
the years.276 The term has evolved since the 1980s due to globalisation and improved
communication technologies worldwide.277 There is no accepted legal definition for
transnational organised crime, though there is a definition given by the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC).278 In 2000, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the UNTOC and its three protocols addressing illegal migration,279
trafficking in persons,280 and trafficking in firearms,281 as the leading international instruments
to prevent and combat transnational organised crimes.282 The UNTOC implicitly defines
transnational organised crime using three elements as having a: (1) transnational element;283 (2)
275 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment
(UNODC Report, February 2013) 45 (‘Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa’).
276 Aleeza Mosley, ‘The Implementation of International Maritime Security Instruments in CARICOM States’
(United Nations-Nippon Foundation Thesis, The United Nations, 2009) 12.
277 ‘Transnational Organized Crime’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (Web Page)
<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime>
278 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, opened for
signature 12 to 15 December 2000, 2225 UNTS 209 (entered into force 29 September 2003) (‘UNTOC’).
279 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 12 to 15 December 2000, 2241 UNTS 507 (entered
into force 28 January 2004) (‘Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air’).
280 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 12 to 15 December
2000, 2237 UNTS 319 (entered into force 25 December 2003) (‘Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons’).
281 Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for
signature 2 July 2001, 2326 UNTS 208 (entered into force 3 July 2005) (‘Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms’).
282 UNTOC (n 278).
283 Ibid art 3(2).
organised crime element;284 and (3) serious crime element.285
The UNTOC states that an offence is transnational in nature if:
(a) It is committed in more than one state;
(b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction
or control takes place in another state;
(c) It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in
criminal activities in more than one state; or
(d) It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.286
The second element points to the involvement of an organised criminal group which means:
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in
concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or
other material benefits.287
Lastly, regarding the third element, serious crime means ‘conduct constituting an offence
punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious
penalty’.288
Hence, the definition given by UNTOC implies that transnational organised crime is any
criminal activity by a group of organised individuals formed for financial or other gains with
severe implications for international security.
More definitely, the US National Security Council (NSC) defines transnational organised crime
as:
those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the
purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part
by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or
violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational
284 Ibid art 2(a).
285 Ibid art 2(b).
286 Ibid art 3(2).
287 Ibid art 2(a).
288 Ibid art 2(b).
structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms.289
Both definitions by UNTOC and the NSC stress the organisational element of transnational
organised crime (the definition of by the NSC definition more explicitly) and the fact that
financial gain is not the only motivator. The crucial point is that transnational organised crime
involves a group of people who operate illegally, transnationally, for financial gain or other
profits.
Given the UNTOC does not explicitly provide a list of transnational organised crimes, it allows
for a broader application of the term to accommodate new crimes (including IUU fishing) that
may emerge as international, regional, and national conditions change over time.290 Examples of
transnational organised crimes addressed by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the UNTOC include corruption, money laundering, illicit trafficking in
endangered species, terrorism, piracy, trafficking (people, drugs, and arms), and migrant
smuggling.291 IUU fishing is another such offence that has emerged internationally.
The following section will use data from the UNODC, the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), the Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and academic
literature to examine significant transnational organised crimes in the Gulf of Guinea and their
impacts on national and regional security.
3.4.1.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Discussions about piracy and armed robbery begin with a problem definition with far-reaching
political consequences. These two concepts are discrete terms that must be differentiated as they
pose a severe threat to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The concept of piracy includes
incidents that fit into the definition in Article 101 of UNCLOS. Armed robbery at sea fits the
definition given by the IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) Code of Practice for the Investigation of
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.
UNCLOS states as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private aircraft, and directed:
289 ‘Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime’, National Security Council (Web Page)
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime>
290 Mary Ann Palma-Robles, ‘Tightening the Net: The Legal Link Between Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing and Transnational Crime Under International Law’ (2015) 29(1) Ocean Yearbook 150.
291 UNTOC (n 278) arts 6 - 8; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Combatting Transnational Organized
Crime Committed at Sea (Issue Paper, UNODC, March 2013) 1 – 49.
i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against, persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub paragraph (a) or
(b).292
IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships defined armed robbery against ships as consisting of the
following acts:
1) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation or threat thereof, other than
an act of privacy, committed for private ends and directed against ship or against persons or
property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and
territorial sea;
2) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described above. 293
The main difference between these definitions is that while UNCLOS specifies that piracy
occurs on the high seas, IMO specifies that armed robbery at sea occurs within a state’s internal
waters and territorial sea. Bearing in mind that many of the Gulf of Guinea attacks happen
within a state’s territorial waters and even further away from the coast, this thesis will
incorporate both the definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea for ease of analytical
convenience. However, for simplicity, the term piracy will include piracy and armed robbery at
sea.
Piracy is a major maritime security threat affecting the Gulf of Guinea coastal states. According
to the data provided by the IMB, there has been a steady increase in piracy incidences in the
Gulf of Guinea.294 In 2020, there was a total of 84 incidents, up from 64 incidents in 2019.295
Nigeria is most affected by piracy in the region, with attacks, hijacking, and crew kidnappings
292 UNCLOS (n 66) art 101.
293 International Maritime Organisation, Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships, Res A.1025 (26), IMO Doc A 26/Res.1025 (18 January 2010, adopted 2 December 2009),
annex para 2.2 <http://www.un.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf>
294 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Report for the Period of 1 January – 31 December 2020 (ICC IMB Annual Report, 2021) 6.
295 Ibid.
rising annually.296 However, vessels in other states such as Ghana, Guinea, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Liberia also experience piracy attacks.297
3.4.1.1.1 Oil Bunkering and Crew Kidnappings in the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea is increasingly becoming a prime global trade route for transporting crude
oil from the region’s largest oil-producing states to the world.298 Crude oil has enabled a ‘black
market’ for fuel to exist and caused an atmosphere in which piracy can thrive.
Unlike other regions of the world, most of the piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are a product
of the disorder in the oil industry.299 Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea mainly target oil vessels,
siphoning oil from these vessels and then carrying it farther afield, thereby fulfilling the criteria
for a transnational organised crime.300 Illicit oil bunkering practices are often a result of pirates
feeling economic injustice and marginalisation from the government. This is especially true in
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, where the lack of access to the oil riches around them, angers
the pirate groups.301 People in the Niger Delta community believe they derive no benefit from
the oil trade and therefore engage in acts of piracy.
Originally, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea were less concerned with kidnapping crew members
for ransom and more concerned with stealing oil cargo for sale in the black markets. However,
in recent times, due to COVID-19, the fall of oil prices and the collapse of demand, kidnapping
for ransom cases have risen.302 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that in 2020
the Gulf of Guinea saw a significant increase in kidnappings.303 A total of 130 crew members
were kidnapped, making up 95% of worldwide incidents (135 kidnappings globally).304 Pirates
296 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region (UNODC
Report, 2005) 45, 46.
297 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Report for the Period of 1 January – 30 June 2018 (ICC IMB Quarter 2 Report, 2018) 9.
298 Devotha Edward Mandanda and GUO Ping, ‘Differences and Similarities between Gulf of Guinea and Somalia
Maritime Piracy: Lessons Gulf of Guinea Coastal States Should Learn from Somali Piracy’ (2016) 56 Journal of
Law, Policy and Globalization 42.
299 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (n 275) 45.
300 Brigitte Rohwerder, Piracy in the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Strait of Malacca (GSDRC Rapid Literature
Review, September 2016) 17 <http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/piracy_rohwerder.pdf>
301 Sohel Uddin, Ronke Phillips and Henry Austin, ‘” Fishing for Crime”: Desperation, Lack of Opportunities Behind
the Nigerian Piracy, Experts Say’ NBC News (Online, 9 November 2013)
<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fishing-crime-desperation-lack-opportunities-behind-nigerian-piracy-
experts-say-flna2d11569382>
302 Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) and the
Global Oil Price Shock on the Fiscal Position of Oil-Exporting Developing Countries (OECD Policy Responses to
Coronavirus Report, 30 September 2020) 4, 9.
303 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2020 (ICC IMB Annual Report, 2021) 25.
304 Ibid.
target foreign crew members of vessels who are then ransomed for millions of dollars.
In the first quarter of 2021, the region accounted for all 40 kidnapped crew global incidents and
the only crew death.305 These pirates target all types of vessels, including fishing vessels.306
Crew onboard fishing vessels are sometimes captured for ransom.307 In 2020, it was reported
that a Ghanaian fishing vessel was attacked by pirates when underway south of Cotonou. 308
This was not an isolated incident. The same report mentioned four separate incidents in various
parts of the region where pirates attacked and kidnapped fishing crew members.309 Available
literature suggests that hijacked fishing vessels are sometimes used as ‘motherships’ to launch
attacks on oil tankers.310 A 2021 IMB report confirmed this when pirates attacked and hijacked a
fishing vessel in the Gulf of Guinea.311 The vessel was later used to attack oil tankers.312
These attacks are highly detrimental to national and regional security, causing significant
economic losses and putting shipping and trade routes at risk. Piracy severely threatens
maritime security and the maintenance and development of international maritime trade which
is critical for the Gulf of Guinea’s economies.
3.4.1.2 Drug Trafficking
According to the UNODC, drug trafficking is ‘a global illicit trade involving the cultivation,
manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws’.313
This definition covers all aspects of individual chains of drug commodities, cultivation,
manufacture, distribution, and sale. However, this section will only focus on the distribution and
sales of illicit drugs.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), there are
three primary illicit drug flows in the Gulf of Guinea: cocaine, cannabis, and
methamphetamines.314 Cocaine trafficking is the region’s most significant drug trafficking flow.
305 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021 (ICC IMB Quarter 1 Report, 2021) 21.
306 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2020 (ICC IMB Annual Report, 2021) 27.
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid 27.
309 Ibid 27, 28.
310 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 123.
311 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021 (ICC IMB Quarter 1 Report, 2021) 21.
312 Ibid.
313 ‘Drug Trafficking’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Web Page) <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/drug-
trafficking/index.html>
314 Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development, Illicit Financial Flows: The Economy of Illicit Trade
in West Africa (OECD Report, 20 February 2018) 62.
The prevalence of cocaine trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea came with the declining US drug
market and growing demand in Europe.315 Since the late 2000s, an alarming amount of cocaine
has flowed through the Gulf of Guinea to Europe.316 Colombian cocaine was trafficked to
Europe via the region with transit hubs in Benin, Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau.317 A recent report
suggested that Guinea may also be a hub for drug trafficking due to the increase in drug seizures
in the last few years.318 Drug traffickers seeking to outplay effective law enforcement have
established new routes through the Gulf of Guinea and are transporting South American cocaine
through the region.319 In 2008, a report by UNODC estimated that at least 50 tons of Columbian
drugs pass through the Gulf of Guinea annually.320
Another problem the Gulf of Guinea faces is the trafficking of pharmaceutical opioids. In 2021,
the UNODC and Regional Office for West and Central Africa (ROSEN) published a report on
the trafficking of tramadol and other pharmaceutical opioids in West Africa.321 The report
revealed that in 2017, tramadol seizures in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 87% of all illicit
drug seizures in Africa and 77% worldwide. In Nigeria alone, there was a combined seizure of
168 tonnes of tramadol from 2016 to 2018. 322 In 2018, more than 16 million tablets were seized
in Niger, and around 44 tons of tramadol were seized in Côte d’Ivoire.323 However, these figures
should be treated with caution because of the nature of the crime itself, which goes largely
undetected and can only be estimated by arrest and interceptions of perpetrators and data
supplemented by intelligence estimates.324
Drug consignments are sometimes sent by sea and follow what has become informally known as
‘Highway 10’, a reference to the 10th degree of latitude that connects the northern part of Latin
America with its closest point on the African continent across the Atlantic.325 The recent
315 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (n 275) 3.
316 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, COVID-19 and the Drug Supply Chain: From Production and
Trafficking to Use (UNODC Research Brief, 2020) 27 (‘COVID-19 and the Drug Supply Chain’)
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/covid/Covid-19-and-drug-supply-chain-Mai2020.pdf>
317 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimension, Impact, and Response (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2011) 9.
318 Bangaly Conde, ‘Guinea, A New Hub for Drug Trafficking?’ Made for Minds (News Article, 25 January 2021)
<https://www.dw.com/fr/la-guin%C3%A9e-nouvelle-plaque-tournante-du-trafic-de-drogue/a-56332767>
319 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Annual Report 2008: Covering Activities in 2007 (UNODC, 2008) 31.
320 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa (UNODC
Report, 2008) 1.
321 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, At the Crossroads of Licit and Illicit. Tramadol and Other
Pharmaceutical Opioids Trafficking in West Africa (UNODC Report, 2021) 1-64 (‘At the Crossroads of Licit and
Illicit’).
322 Ibid 11.
323 Ibid.
324 Figures are severely under-reported and should not be taken as an accurate scale of the problem.
325 Joseph Kirschke, ‘The Coke Coast: Cocaine’s New Venezuelan Address’, World Politics Review (Web Page, 11
September 2008) <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2631/the-coke-coast-cocaines-new-venezuelan-
address>
COVID-19 pandemic has only increased the transportation of illicit drugs by sea in the Gulf of
Guinea. One might think that the COVID-19 control measures would have halted the trafficking
of drugs in the region. However, drug traffickers are adapting to the situation and changing
strategies. In 2020, the UNODC noted that the COVID-19 control measures have caused
traffickers to shift drug transportation routes to primarily using sea routes.326 There are
indications that the reduction in air travel to Europe, along with increased interception of
shipments on land,327 has led to a corresponding increase in drug trafficking by sea in the Gulf
of Guinea.328
Drug traffickers sometimes use fishing boats for drug trafficking operations. Research has
shown that they occasionally use sizeable commercial fishing boats, called ‘mother ships’
specially reconstructed for cocaine storage, to discharge their shipments at sea to smaller fishing
vessels from the coast of some states in the Gulf of Guinea.329 Research has also shown that
sometimes drugs are trafficked using small local fishing vessels from Latin America through the
region.330 These small fishing boats are used because they can make a trip without drawing too
much attention to themselves amidst the heavy maritime traffic off the coast of the Gulf of
Guinea.331 Sometimes, these fishing vessels are used to drop shipments at sea for pick-up by
‘mother ships’.332 These ‘mother ships’, usually African vessels, are used for transport to the
Gulf of Guinea, where they are transported to Europe using small local fishing boats.333
The use of fishing boats to traffic drugs was reiterated by a news report in 2006 when Ghanaian
authorities seized 647 kg of cocaine worth USD145 million in Ghana.334 Authorities suspected
that the cocaine from South America had been dropped off by air into Ghana’s offshore
territorial waters and then picked up by tuna fishing boats and brought ashore. In other cases,
fishing boats transport drugs within the region. In 2021, the UNODC reported a case of a
woman arrested in Bonoua, Côte d’Ivoire, using fishing pirogues to illicitly traffic drugs from
Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire. 335
326 COVID-19 and the Drug Supply Chain (n 316) 5.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
329 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa the Threat to Stability and
Development (With Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau) (UNODC Report, December 2007) 19.
330 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 83.
331 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The Transatlantic Cocaine Market’ (Research Paper, UNODC, April
2011), 33 <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e809c692.pdf>
332 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 84.
333 Ibid.
334 ‘Police Seize 674 kg of Cocaine Worth $145 million’ The New Humanitarian (Online, 8 January 2006)
<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2004/01/08/police-seize-674-kg-cocaine-worth-145-million>
335 At the Crossroads of Licit and Illicit (n 321) 30.
3.4.1.2.1 Implications for National and Regional Security
The national and regional security challenges posed by drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea
cannot be underestimated. It can potentially lead to the development of local drug markets and
gang criminality. A study has shown that drug traffickers are increasingly being paid in ‘kind
rather than cash’ in the region.336 This trend was confirmed by a news report, noting that fishing
vessels trafficking drugs in the Gulf of Guinea are increasingly being paid with drugs rather
than money.337 These drugs are then sold to local communities for profit, creating local drug
markets that pose a hazard to individuals and the state.338 There are also increasing trends of
local consumption of cocaine in the region as it transitions from being just a transit hub to a
consumption area as well.339 This can trigger violence in a volatile region, thus endangering
national and regional security.
Another national security implication is the infiltration of drug traffickers into politics. For
example, there have been links between senior government, security officials, and drug cartels
in Guinea-Bissau.340 The assassination of Guinea-Bissau’s president in 2009 and the arrest of
the chief of staff in 2010 have been linked to struggles over control of drug trafficking
territories.341 Furthermore, in 2012, allegations were made that the president and vice president
were arrested for their involvement in drug trafficking.342 Most recently, in 2020, the head of
Guinea-Bissau’s immigration agency was arrested on allegations of cocaine trafficking.343 This
demonstrates that the presence of drug trafficking has the potential to compromise national
governance and political structures.
The most severe security implication of drug trafficking is its interrelationship with other types
of organised crime. A study found that drug trafficking is one of the leading drivers of other
criminal activities.344 In the Gulf of Guinea, drug traffickers launder their profits and may
sometimes use illegal firearms for protection.345 Terrorist groups also have links with drug
336 Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa (n 320) 5.
337 Joshua Learn, ‘The Number of Small Fishing Vessels Smuggling Illegal Drugs Has Tripled’ (2 November 2020)
Smithsonian Magazine <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/number-small-fishing-vessels-smuggling-
illegal-drugs-has-tripled-180976157/>
338 Ibid.
339 ‘Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime’ United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (Web Page)
<https://unowas.unmissions.org/drug-trafficking-and-organised-crime>
340 Kwesi Aning and John Pokoo, ‘Understanding the Nature and Threats of Drug Trafficking to National and
Regional Security in West Africa’ 2014 3(1) Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 5.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 ‘Guinea-Bissau Migration Agency Boss Arrested for Alleged Cocaine Trafficking’, Reuters (News Article, 15
September 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-drugs-idUSKBN2661HO>
344 Caitlin Hughes, Jenny Chalmers and David Bright, ‘Exploring Interrelationships between High-Level Drug
Trafficking and Other Serious and Organised Crime: An Australian Study’ (2020) 21(1) Global Crime 28-50.
345 Ibid.
trafficking operations in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, in 2012, the US Drug Enforcement
Administration arrested three Malians for conducting drug trafficking operations for Al-Qaeda
in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM).346 Al-Qaeda has been alleged to be engaging in drug
trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea to fund its operations.347 In Ghana, three nationals were
arrested for arranging to transport cocaine across Africa to support the activities of Al-Qaeda.348
Drug traffickers sometimes use funds obtained from drug trafficking operations to support the
recruitment, training, and radicalisation of other terrorist groups.349
3.4.1.3 Arms Trafficking (Small Arms and Light Weapons)
Over the years, the trafficking of arms in the Gulf of Guinea has drawn much attention in the
media.350 The Gulf of Guinea cannot produce its own military-grade weapons.351 However,
ongoing regional conflicts have sustained the demand for arms, making arms trafficking
prevalent.352 Nigeria is the largest recipient of illegal arms in the region, with Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SALW) superseding other weapons being trafficked.353 SALW have been used
in virtually all types of conflict emanating from the region.354
The region has received large amounts of illegal weapons in various conflicts.355 However, it is
challenging to estimate the percentage of weapons circulated in the region, and not possible to
calculate the percentage coming by sea.356 Nevertheless, research has shown that sometimes
fishing vessels are used to traffic weapons in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly through the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria.357 In 2018, 43 people on a Nigerian fishing boat were arrested by the
Cameroonian Navy in Cameroon’s territorial waters. During their search, they recovered
346 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Terrorist Financing in West Africa’ (FATF Report, 2013) 26.
347 Aning and Pokoo (n 340) 6.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, ‘Cameroon, Nigeria Investigate Arms Traffickers Accused of Supplying Weapons to
Separatists’ Voice of America News (News Article, 3 September 2021)
<https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_cameroon-nigeria-investigate-arms-traffickers-accused-supplying-weapons-
separatists/6219186.html>; ‘Over 40,000 Annual Deaths from Arms Trafficking in Africa’ Ethiopian Observer
(Online, 9 November 2018) <https://www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2018/11/09/over-40000-annual-deaths-from-arms-
trafficking-in-africa/>
351 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (n 275) 34.
352 Ibid.
353 Abubakar Mohammed and Yahaya Baba, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Challenge of National Security
in Nigeria’ (2017) 7(2) Sokoto Journal of the Social Sciences 265, 269.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid 266.
356 Ibid.
357 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats: Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing as a Threat to Human and National Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ (2020) 13(2) African Security
125 (‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’).
automatic weapons, including AK47s.358
3.4.1.3.1 Implications for National and Regional Security
The continual availability of weapons due to the trafficking of arms fuels conflict and political
instability and is threatening national and regional security. This section will note two
significant direct implications for national and regional security.
Firstly, trafficked arms are sold at a lower cost, thereby granting insurgent groups direct and
cheap access to weapons to carry out criminal acts.359 For instance, in Nigeria, arms are
trafficked into the state by sea and used by insurgents to commit crimes such as piracy and
terrorism.360 An insurgence leader was reported to have said that arms can be easily purchased
off ships anchored off the coast of Nigeria.361 The profit from the sale of these weapons can also
be used to gain assets like recruits and communications equipment to use for conflicts within the
state and region. The implication of this is the loss of thousands of lives.
Secondly, because of the financial gains derived from arms trafficking, insurgent groups are
more likely to adjust their preference towards material gains instead of political movements,
making it harder to force them to lay down their weapons when their demands are met.362
3.4.1.4 Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants
Trafficking in persons, also known as human trafficking, is defined by Article 3(a) of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, as:
…. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipts of persons by means of
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at the minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
In simple terms, trafficking of persons is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or
358 Ibid 126.
359 Côme Dechery and Laura Ralston, Trafficking and Fragility in West Africa (Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
Group World Bank Report, 2015) 14.
360 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (n 275) 34.
361 Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (ed), Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the
ECOWAS Region (Small Arms Survey, 2005) 25.
362 Dechery and Ralston (n 359) 14.
receipt of persons using threats to exploit them.
Research has demonstrated that trafficking in persons and forced labour remains a problem in
the Gulf of Guinea, with trafficked victims in West Africa accounting for about 13% of total
victims trafficked to Western and Southern Europe.363 A study has also shown that children
represent a vast majority of victims trafficked in the Gulf of Guinea,364 representing more than
75% of trafficked victims.365 Children are taken for sexual exploitation and forced labour. These
children are sought after because they are a source of cheap and docile labour.366 In 2009, a
report based on interviews conducted by the UNODC discovered that young girls in Nigeria are
trafficked for sexual exploitation and prostitution from the Gulf of Guinea through the Canary
Islands to Italy.367 They may stay in Italy or be moved to other European cities.368
Another trend of trafficking was recorded in 2015 by the International Justice Mission (IJM),
which investigated child trafficking and forced labour in the fisheries sector in the southern
region of Lake Volta in Ghana.369 The report found that trafficking of children, usually ten years
old or younger, is prevalent in Lake Volta. It also found that most children working in the lake
were born in other communities and were trafficked to Lake Volta. These children are often
given to traffickers by their parents. They are subjected to physical violence, have inadequate
clothing and shelter, work long and unacceptable hours and are assigned unsafe and complex
tasks for children of their age.
Trafficking in persons must be differentiated from the concept of smuggling of migrants defined
in Article 3(a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air as the
‘procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefits, of
the illegal entry of a person into a state of which the person is not a national or permanent
resident’.370 The concepts are similar but different in that migrant smuggling is undertaken with
the consent of the migrant, while human trafficking is where the trafficked persons are moved or
363 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Trafficking in Persons 2020 (UNODC Report, 2020) 165.
364 Ibid 135.
365 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Human Trafficking in West Africa: Three Out of Four Victims are
Children says UNODC report’ (Press Release, 5 February 2021) <https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/press/human-
trafficking-in-west-africa_-three-out-of-four-victims-are-children-says-unodc-report.html>
366 ‘Causes’ International Labour Organisation (Web Page) https://www.ilo.org/moscow/areas-of-work/child-
labour/WCMS_248984/lang--en/index.htm>
367 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa A
Threat Assessment (UNODC Report, July 2009) 44.
368 Ibid.
369 Kirsten Singleton, Katrina B. Stone, and Julie Stricker, Child Trafficking into Forced Labour on Lack Volta,
Ghana (International Justice Mission Report, 2016) 12-93.
370 ‘Migrant Smuggling’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Web Page)
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/migrant-smuggling/migrant-smuggling.html>
traded under duress for such purposes as prostitution and forced labour.
The UNODC 2013 threat assessment report of West Africa showed that migrant smuggling is a
huge issue in the Gulf of Guinea, with migrants being smuggled from the region to Europe
annually.371 Migrant smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea is prevalent because of the poor standard
of living and the search for a better future. In fact, since 2014, Europe has seen a significant
increase in illegal migrants from the Gulf of Guinea.372 A 2006 report by the UNODC points to
one primary area where the smuggling of migrants from the Gulf of Guinea to Europe occurs at
sea: across the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands or mainland Spain.373
Thousands of people from the Gulf of Guinea each year cross the Atlantic Ocean to migrate
illegally to Europe, facing harsh and brutal conditions.374 For the poor, fishing vessels are the
only option for transportation.375 Data by the UNODC indicates that both large and small fishing
vessels are used for migrant smuggling.376 The small fishing boats are used to pick up illegal
migrants from several states along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea to the Canary Islands.377 This
data also reveals that there had been incidences of Ghanaian groups buying and repairing
pirogues in Senegal for migrant smuggling.378 In Senegal, a classic case of migrant smuggling
involves migrants paying a fee and then being transported by pirogues to a trawler at sea.379
A similar smuggling trend was revealed by a 2010 UNODC literature review which points to
fishing boats being used in the early 2000s to smuggle migrants from the region and Morocco to
Southern Europe.380 Another migration trend was reported by the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organised Crime involving 5,000 West Africans wanting to flee poverty due to
the depleted fish stock in Senegal using wooden handmade fishing boats to escape to the Canary
Islands.381 These fishing boats are not often used to smuggle migrants, but when used, they are
371 Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (n 275) 26.
372 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018 (UNODC Report, 2018)
143.
373 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe
(UNODC Report, July 2006) 16.
374 Ibid 18.
375 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Annual Report 2008 Covering Activities in 2007 (UNODC Annual
Report, 2008) 34.
376 Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe (n 373) 18.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid 19.
380 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Smuggling of Migrants into, through and from North Africa (UNODC
Report, 2010) 6.
381 ‘Illicit Migration to Europe: Consequences of Illegal Fishing and Overfishing in West Africa’, Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Web Page, 8 May 2015) <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illicit-
migration-to-europe-consequences-of-illegal-fishing-and-overfishing-in-west-africa/>
part of a more extensive smuggling operation.382
Even though the Gulf of Guinea consists primarily of source states and not destination states,
this activity can still be categorised as a maritime security threat in the region. These criminals
usually use old and unseaworthy vessels carrying hundreds of migrants simultaneously.383 There
is a significant risk of the boat sinking, thereby putting their lives at risk and creating further
maritime security issues.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the concept of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis shows
that broader aspects of maritime security are a relatively new area. After reviewing the available
definitions of maritime security in existing literature, this chapter finds that no universally
accepted definitions of maritime security exist. Various authors define maritime security
differently depending on the context in which it is being used. However, this analysis shows that
there are central elements to the concept of maritime security such as international peace and
security, security from crimes at sea, maritime resource security, environmental security, and
sovereign integrity. The analysis then derived its own working definition of maritime security for
this thesis to mean the protection of the ocean from threats arising from its legitimate use.
The analysis of this chapter has also demonstrated that there are multiple non-traditional
maritime security threats in the region: piracy, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, people
smuggling, and human trafficking at sea. It reveals that fishing vessels are intertwined with
these threats. Fishing boats are used to transport illicit drugs, people, and arms. They are also
used in the illegal migration of people and as a means of attacking oil tankers by pirates. As
such, Gulf of Guinea states should expand their perception of maritime security to include non-
traditional maritime security threats such as IUU fishing.
382 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 61.
383 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A
MARITIME SECURITY THREAT?
4.1 Introduction
In the Gulf of Guinea, the fisheries sector is a significant contributor to the food security,
livelihoods, and revenue of states. However, the sector's ability to continue contributing to food,
income and to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of states, is threatened by the decline of
fisheries resources.384 Factors such as pollution385 and climate change386 have contributed to the
decline of fish in the region.387 However, to a large extent, the unsustainable practices of Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has also contributed to fish stocks decline.388 IUU
fishing in the Gulf of Guinea is estimated to represent 40% to 65% of fish catch.389
For a long time, the focus has been on IUU fishing as it concerns fisheries management and
conservation matters.390 This chapter argues that combatting IUU fishing requires a more
integrated approach, which involves recognising that IUU fishing is also a maritime security
threat. In doing so, this chapter analyses current data on IUU fishing and maritime security in
the Gulf of Guinea. The first part of this chapter examines the nature of IUU fishing in the Gulf
of Guinea. The second part then takes a close look at the situation in the Gulf of Guinea in
relation to the link between IUU fishing and maritime security. It uses two distinct but
interdependent dimensions of security, human and national security, to examine the impact of
IUU fishing on the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime security.
4.2 Nature of IUU Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
Examining the nature of IUU fishing is critical to combat this problem in the Gulf of Guinea.
While this section is not definitive, it provides an overview of the available primary information
384 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
385 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment in the Gulf of Guinea’ (n 139) 254-
271.
386 Belhabib, Lam, and Cheung (n 105) 15-28.
387 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment in the Gulf of Guinea’ (n 139) 254-
271.
388 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
389 ‘Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing’, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
U.S Department of Commerce (Web Page, 28 June 2017); Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fight Against Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa a Regional Challenge (FAO Report, 2020) 3; Doumbouya et al.
(n 41) 1.
390 Rossello (n 59) 34-36.
on the nature and extent of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
Table 8: Primary forms of IUU fishing and observed IUU fishing offences in the Gulf of
Guinea.
Primary Forms of IUU Fishing
Observed IUU Fishing Offences From 2009 - 2016
IUU fishing by legal domestic
and foreign large-scale industrial
fishing vessels
IUU fishing by illegal foreign
fishing vessels
IUU fishing by small-scale
fishing vessels in waters under
the jurisdiction of their state or
waters of neighbouring states
Under-reporting of fishing effort
Gear-related offences
Fishing in a prohibited zone
Fishing without a license
Forgery-marking default
Unauthorised entry or exit to or from an EEZ
Fishing without an authorisation
Mistreatment -corruption – failure to comply
Absence of an observer onboard
Under-reporting of fish catch
Illegal trans-shipment
Absence of national crew onboard
Technical negligence
Absence of proper documentation onboard
Change of target species
VMS-AIS default
Fishing for prohibited species or juveniles
Failure to land catch
Illegal discards
Failure to pay license fee
Sanitary and health issues
Violating fishing regulation
Sources: Primary forms of IUU fishing391 and observed IUU fishing offences.392
The Gulf of Guinea is known to have abundant fisheries resources, partly because of the higher
primary production from the major eastern boundary upwelling system in the Guinea Current
Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) and the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem
(CCLME).393 However, in recent years, scientific research has discovered that the average
391 Food and Agriculture Organisation ‘Fight Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa. A
Regional Challenge’ (FAO Report, 2020) 3.
392 Doumbouya et al. (n 41) 4.
393 Belhabib, Lam and Cheung (n 105) 15.
annual Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) of both large-scale and small-scale fisheries has declined
in the region.394 Reduced fish catch is a strong indicator of over-exploitation (including legal
fishing under agreements) and decreasing amounts of fish.395 Research has shown that more
than 50% of fisheries resources from the coastline of Senegal to Nigeria have already been over-
exploited.396 Several factors, such as climate change,397 pollution,398 and overfishing,399 have
contributed to the decline of fish resources. However, the unsustainable practices of IUU fishing
have significantly contributed to fish stock decline.400
Fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea broadly consist of the small-scale fishing sector (artisanal and
semi-industrial) and the large-scale fishing sector (industrial).401 The small-scale fishing sector
is dominated by local artisanal and subsistence fisheries, which support many coastal
communities in fishing, fish processing, and trade.402 Women play an essential role in pre and
post-harvest activities.403 In contrast, the large-scale fishing sector mainly comprises foreign-
owned industrial vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) such as states in the
European Union (EU), China, and Russia, among others.404
Large-scale foreign vessels from DWFNs have contributed to the depletion of fisheries
resources by overfishing and by fishing in zones reserved for small-scale fishers.405 The
information on the actual levels of catch for management has been impacted by vessels
conducting illegal trans-shipments at sea and misreporting and under-reporting catches and
landings.406 Under-reporting of fishing efforts by foreign vessels was identified as the region's
most recurrent IUU fishing problem.407
394 Ibid 20-21.
395 Ibid 20.
396 Alfonso Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing and Under-Reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets (Overseas Development Institute Report, June 2016) 11
(‘Western Africa’s Missing Fish’).
397 Belhabib, Lam and Cheung (n 105) 15-28.
398 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment in the Gulf of Guinea’ (n 139) 254-
271.
399 Okafor-Yarwood and Belhabib (n 152) 1.
400 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
401 André Standing, ‘Criminality in Africa’s Fishing Industry: A Threat to Human Security’ (African Security Brief
No.33, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 6 June 2017) 2 <https://africacenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/ASB33EN-Criminality-in-Africas-Fishing-Industry-A-Threat-to-Human-Security.pdf>
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
405 Doumbouya et.al. (n 41) 4; Beseng (n 60) 9,10.
406 Doumbouya et.al. (n 41) 4; Beseng (n 60) 9,10.
407 Doumbouya et. al. (n 41) 4.
The reason for foreign industrial vessels in the Gulf of Guinea waters is partly due to the
growing international demand for fish and food security issues in their national waters,
prompting them to expand their operations to the Gulf of Guinea to maintain supply.408 Most of
these foreign large-scale industrial vessels operate under an access agreement called a Fisheries
Partnership Agreement (FPA) with states such as Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Mauritania, Senegal, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe.409 These
agreements enable foreign vessels to have access to the fisheries resources of Gulf of Guinea
states. FPAs grant subsidised local maritime access to Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs)
for an access fee that covers their operations, payable to national governments.410 These access
agreements are intended to contribute to developing the fisheries sector and improving
infrastructure.411 However, FPAs have been criticised for being a primary contributor to the
unsustainable exploitation of fisheries resources and enabling various forms of IUU fishing in
the Gulf of Guinea.412
FPAs usually have catch-related access fees for vessels, but often have other forms of benefit to
the local state, such as financial assistance to the coastal state via aid projects (an approach
favoured by China).413 Gulf of Guinea states with FPAs have access agreements with DWFNs
that appear primarily concerned about the financial benefits gained from both fishery
agreements and aid.
Assessing the value from DWFN access alone is made complicated by this access-aid mix and
the lack of recognition of IUU fishing. A recent study for West African nations found ‘Overall,
China provides resources equivalent to about 4% of the ex-vessel value [value at landing] of the
catch taken by Chinese distant-water fleets from West African waters, while the EU pays
8%’.414 These low rates of return for DWFN access are similar to the 6% of the value of purse
seiner catch received by Pacific Island states in 2011 prior to the implementation of the Pacific
Nauru Agreement (PNA) Vessels Days Scheme which has increased access to ‘around or in
408 Tabitha Grace Mallory, ‘China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and Implications’ (2013) 38
Marine Policy 99-108; Miren Gutiérrez et al., China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet Scale, Impact and Governance
(Overseas Development Institute Report, June 2020) 8.
409 ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)’, European Commission (Webpage)
<https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-
agreements-sfpas_en>
410 Okafor-Yarwood and Belhabib (n 152) 1.
411 ‘Human Rights Impacts of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sectors in Africa’ The Danish Institute for Human
Rights (Fact Sheet No.1, July 2019) 1
<https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/migrated/human_rights_impacts_of_the_fisheries_an
d_aquaculture_sectors_eng.pdf>
412 Okafor-Yarwood and Belhabib (n 152) 1- 2.
413 Belhabib et al., ‘Euros Vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 9.
414 Ibid 1.
excess of 20%’.415 Gulf of Guinea states wish to have a fair payment for access fees that is
separate to aid payments and not be subject to IUU fishing practices.
Assessment of the benefits from DWFNs to West African nations is made more difficult as only
a portion of the region's estimated total catch by foreign vessels is reported to local authorities
(EU 29% and China 8%).416 However West African coastal states continue to sign agreements
with DWFN, even though they are aware of their lack of capacity to enforce the conditions of
these agreements and with the evidence showing the decline of the fisheries resources. For
instance, Senegal, which has experienced a significant decline in its fish resources due to years
of overfishing (including legal fishing) and IUU fishing, has had an FPA/ access agreement with
the EU since 1979 and more recently with China.417 This FPA is renewed every couple of years
with an apparent return of 20% of catch value from both fish access and aid projects which are
being conflated.418 The FPAs inadequately account for IUU fishing and the Gulf of Guinea
states risk placing immediate financial gains ahead of the long-term health of their fisheries
resources.
While most studies implicate large-scale foreign vessels as those committing IUU fishing
offences,419 it is evident that small-scale fisheries also substantially contribute to IUU fishing in
the Gulf of Guinea.420 Although there is limited data on IUU fishing by small-scale fisheries in
the region, one study discovered that small-scale fishers, particularly in the Niger Delta region
of Nigeria, resort to IUU fishing locally.421 The study found that some local fishers sometimes
use illegal fishing gear or equipment, fish in restricted waters, and sometimes work with
industrial vessels to trans-ship their illegal catches.422 Also, these fishers travel to other
neighbouring states to fish illegally.423 Similarly, the National Fisheries & Aquaculture
Authority (NaFAA) in Liberia indicated that illegal fishing activities are being carried out by
vessels from Ghana, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire in Liberian waters.424 Most times, these vessels are
not aware that their actions constitute IUU fishing. As far as they know, they are only going
415 Thomas Ruaia, Steve Gu’urau and Chris Reid, Economic and Development Indicators and Statistics: Tuna
Fisheries of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 2020 (Forum Fisheries Agency Report, 2020) 17.
416 Belhabib et al., ‘Euros Vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 1,10.
417 Cecilia Hammarlund and Anna Anderson, ‘What’s in it for Africa? European Union Fishing Access Agreement
and Fishery Exports from Developing Countries’ (2019) 113 World Development 174.
418 Belhabib et al., ‘Euros Vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 13.
419 B.P. Satia and B. Horemans, Workshop on Conflicts in Coastal Fisheries in West Africa, (FAO Technical Report
No. 53, 1993) 24-26.
420 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 127-129.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid 127.
423 Ibid 128-129.
424 National Fisheries & Aquaculture Authority, ‘NAFAA Fines Illegal Ivorian Fishermen US$5,000.00’ (Press
Release, 7 April 2020) <https://nafaa.gov.lr/index.php/medias/press-release/nafaa-fines-illegal-ivorian-fishermen-us-
5-000-00>
where they can catch fish or are fishing with available equipment due to the decline of fish
resources.425
It should be noted that it is challenging to classify illegal fishing activities by small-scale fishers
as IUU fishing due to the unregulated nature of small-scale fisheries. There are hardly any
reporting systems in place for small-scale fisheries in the region.426 Notwithstanding, IUU
fishing by small-scale fisheries can undermine the conservation and management of fish stock.
4.3 IUU Fishing a Maritime Security Threat in the Gulf of Guinea?
The main implications of IUU fishing concerns the management and conservation of fisheries
resources but also may have implications for maritime security. In recent years, developments in
maritime security studies suggest a progressive broadening in the knowledge of maritime
security threats towards a framework more responsive to the security risks associated with IUU
fishing.427 A study by Rossello proposed that the association between IUU fishing and maritime
security can be understood by its impact on human communities and its operational synergies
with crimes.428 A similar study by Okafor-Yarwood demonstrated the relationship between IUU
fishing and maritime security in Nigeria, using two distinct but interdependent dimensions of
security: human and national security.429 This section uses a similar framework to analyse the
nexus between IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by analysing its impact
on human and national security.
4.3.1 Impact on Human Security
Human security was first internationally recognised in the 1994 Human Development Report.430
Before this report, state security was prioritised over individual security.431 However, the
Human Development Report claimed that individuals should be the primary referent of security
rather than the state, considering states have become less vulnerable to external attacks since the
decline of inter-state wars.432 The report defined human security as ‘safety from chronic threats
as hunger, disease and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the
425 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 127.
426 Ibid.
427 Ioannis Chapsos and James A. Malcolm, ‘Maritime Security in Indonesia: Toward a Comprehensive Agenda?’
(2017) 76 Marine Policy 179.
428 Rossello (n 59) 35.
429 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 116-146.
430 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security
(UNDP Report, 1994) 22-44.
431 Hasan Mahmud et al., ‘Human Security or National Security: The problems and Prospects of the Norm of Human
Security’ (2008) 1(4) Journal of Politics and Law 67-68.
432 Ibid 22.
patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’.433 The definition
broadened the security framework from a state-centred approach to encompass seven key
person-centred human security components: economic security, food security, health security,
environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.434 For is,
the analysis of the impact of IUU fishing on human security will cover five vital components of
human security with maritime dimensions: environmental security, economic security, food
security, personal security, and community security.
Figure 5: The link between IUU fishing and human security in the Gulf of Guinea.
Source: Adapted from Okafor-Yarwood 2020. 435
To understand how IUU fishing impacts human security, we must first understand the
importance of fish to the Gulf of Guinea’s coastal communities. In the Gulf of Guinea, where
about 40% of the population lives in coastal areas,436 fish is an essential contributor to the
economic security of nine million people who depend on fish directly or indirectly for
livelihood.437 Fisheries are especially significant for the food security of the coastal
communities of low-income food-deficit states in the region (Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra-Leone) as they provide for up to 54.4% of their animal protein
(Table 9 and 10).438
433 Ibid 23.
434 Ibid 24-33.
435 ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 124.
436 Okafor-Yarwood and Belhabib (n 152) 1.
437 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unreported Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 414.
438 Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (n 7) 49, 67, 68.
E
S
E S
I , U ,
Unr
F
H S
F S
P S
C S
Table 9: Contribution of fish to select economies in the Gulf of Guinea and IUU fishing
estimates.
Indicator
Year
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-
Bissau
Liberia
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra
Leone
Population
(Millions)
2017
29.1
12.1
1.8
4.7
190.9
15.4
7.5
Annual
Fisheries
Production (t)
2017
439,319
130,250
6,735
14,854
1,212,475
498,672
202,185
Contribution
to Animal
Protein (%)
2017
53.9
27.3
3.9
13.9
37.3
40.2
54.4
Contribution
to GDP (%)
2017
1.2
4.1
-
3
0.5
1.8
6.6
Contribution
to
Employment
(1000)
2010
636.9
94.5
226.4
14.4
168.0
58.2
35.2
IUU Fishing
Estimate
(USD
millions)
2012
–
2017
50
-
239.8
75
600 - 800
300
50
Sources: Population,439 annual fisheries production and contribution to animal protein,440 contribution to GDP,441
contribution to employment,442 and IUU fishing estimate.443
439 Population data was compiled from the World Bank database. See ‘Word Bank Open Data’, The World Bank
(Web Page) <https://data.worldbank.org>
440 Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (n 7) 67, 68.
441 Contribution to GDP data has been obtained from governments official websites. In cases where data could not be
obtained from official websites (Guinea and Senegal), data has been obtained from African Development Bank and
the FAO. See Ghana Statistical Service, Rebased 2013-2018 Annual Gross Domestic Product Ghana (Report, April
2019) 5; Carpophore Ntagunguria, Africa Economic Outlook 2018. Guinea (African Development Bank Report,
2018) 3; National Fisheries & Aquaculture Authority ‘OPEC Fund Provides US$20 Million to Improve Liberian
Fishery Industry’ (Press Release, 12 September 2022) <https://nafaa.gov.lr/2022/09/12/opec-fund-provides-us20-
million-to-improve-liberian-fishery-industry/>; National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product
Report (Q4 & Full Year 2017) (NBS, February 2018) Appendix; ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles’,
Fisheries and Agriculture Organisation (Web Page) <https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/facp/search>; Statistics Sierra
Leone, Report on the 2016 and 2017 Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) Figures at 2006 Prices (Statistics Sierra
Leone National Accounts Unit, August 2018) 18.
442 Contribution to employment data has been compiled from Dyhia Belhabib, U. Rashid Sumaila, and Daniel Pauly,
‘Feeding the Poor: Contribution of West African Fisheries to Employment and Food Security’ (2015) 111 Ocean &
Coastal Management 77.
443 IUU fishing estimate data has been taken from official sources, newspapers, publications, and articles. See
Environmental Justice Foundation, The “People’s” Fishery on the Brink of Collapse. Small Pelagic in Landing of
Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Fleet (EJF Report, 7 April 2020) 14; Jeremias Francisco Intchama, Dyhia Belhabib and
Raul Joaquim Tomàs Jumpe, ‘Assessing Guinea Bissau’s Legal and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and
Table 10: Total value of international trade of seven fishery commodity groups in the Gulf
of Guinea.
Source: Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics 2018. 444
Key: *Low-income food-deficit states. f- UN estimates.
The fisheries sector is a contributor to the national GDP of states such as Angola (4.6%),445
Chad (1.3% - 4.5%),446 and Gambia (1.8%).447 It is additionally a source of foreign direct
investment for states such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Senegal through access
Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them’ (2018) 5(79) Frontiers in Marine Science 9; National Fisheries and
Aquaculture Authority, ‘NaFAA Makes History Signs Fisheries Science Degree MoU with UL’ (Press Release, 13
March 2022) <https://nafaa.gov.lr/index.php/medias/press-release/nafaa-makes-historysigns-fisheries-science-degree-
mou-with-ul>; Eromosele Abiodun, ‘Report: Nigeria Loses $600m Annually to Illegal Fishing’ This Day (Online, 16
September 2019) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/16/report-nigeria-loses-600m-annually-to-illegal-
fishing/>; Freedom C. Onoaha, ‘Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm’
Aljazeera Center for Studies (Web Page, 12 June 2012) 12
<https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports/documents/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20M
aritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf>; Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Fisheries Catch
Misreporting and its Implications: The Case of Senegal’ (2014) 151 Fisheries Research 1; ‘Illegal Fishing Costing
Sierra Leone US$ 50 Million Annually’, Stop Illegal Fishing (News Article, 25 July 2018)
<https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/illegal-fishing-costing-sierra-leone-us-50-million-annually/>
444 Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (n 7) 49.
445 ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles. The Republic of Angola. Country Profile’, FAO Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department (Fact Sheet, October 2018) <https://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/AGO/en>
446 ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles. La République Du Tchad. Country Profile’, FAO Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department (Fact Sheet, May 2019) <https://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/TCD/fr>
447 ‘Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles. The Republic of Gambia. Country Profile’, FAO Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department (Fact Sheet, February 2015) <https://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/GMB/en>
fees from DWFNs.448 For instance, between 2000 and 2010, Guinea-Bissau received USD5.7
million in access fees from the EU.449 They also received USD2.9 million in access fees from
China for the same period.450
The small-scale fisheries sector, plays a vital role in the region's economic security and supports
coastal communities.451 It generates over USD3.5 billion annually in GDP for the Gulf of
Guinea’s economies.452 It also employs almost one million people in the region compared to the
industrial sector, which only employs an estimated 47,000 people on industrial vessels.453 While
men usually do fishing, the women are primarily involved in onshore post-harvest activities,
undertaking fish processing, storage, and distribution.454 Women also play a central role in
national and intra-regional trading.455 They use their income from the sale of fish to provide
adequate healthcare, food, and education for their children, making fish a significant contributor
to the economic and food security of women and children.456 This secondary contribution to
welfare and wellbeing in small-scale fisheries has not been sufficiently quantified or recognised
in national economic data.
IUU fishing undermines the human security of coastal communities by negatively impacting the
livelihood and food security of fishing communities in the Gulf of Guinea.457 Fish stock
reduction means a reduced catch for fishers, which affects their economic security and the
means by which many support their families.458 The impact on livelihoods goes hand in hand
with the impact on the food security of coastal communities. When the livelihoods of local
fishers are affected, it significantly reduces their capacity to support the food needs of
themselves and their families.459
IUU fishing also impacts the economic security of Gulf of Guinea states. While the economic
448 ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)’, European Commission (Webpage)
<https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-
agreements-sfpas_en>
449 Belhabib et al., ‘Euros Vs. Yuan’ (n 143) 13.
450 Ibid.
451 Dyhia Belhabib, Krista Greer, and Daniel Pauly, ‘Trends in Industrial and Artisanal Catch Per Effort in West
African Fisheries’ (2018) 11(1) Conservation Letters 2.
452 Ibid 2.
453 Ibid 9.
454 Standing (n 401) 2.
455 Belhabib, Greer, and Pauly (n 451) 1; Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish (n 396) 27.
456 Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish (n 396) 26.
457 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
458 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 122.
459 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 415.
cost of IUU fishing is challenging to estimate, existing data suggests that between 40% and 65%
of fish caught in the region are caught illegally.460 As demonstrated in Table 11, IUU fishing is
believed to carry a high economic cost to Gulf of Guinea states.
Table 11: Economic cost of IUU fishing in six Gulf of Guinea states from 2010-2015 in
USD millions.
Year
Illegal Value
Unreported Value
Unregulated
Value
Total Value
2010
1,459
376
0.1
1,836
2011
1,669
376
6.2
2,052
2012
1,608
543
4.6
2,155
2013
1,831
177
3.8
2,011
2014
1,704
285
11.4
2,000
2015
1,996
263
4.1
2,263
Total
10,267
2,020
30.2
12,317
Source: Doumbouya et al. 2017.461
Looking at the above breakdown, the economic loss induced by IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea from 2010 to 2015 for Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, and
Sierra Leone was an estimated at USD12.3 billion. 83% of the total amount was from illegal
fishing alone, 16% from unreported fishing, and then 0.2% from unregulated fishing. Although
these figures are best available estimates and do not reflect the exact figures of the cost of IUU
fishing, they do indicate that the cost to the region is severe.462 It robs governments of revenue
with which they could improve their fisheries sectors and support coastal communities.463
In addition, the impact of IUU fishing is also reflected in the levels of by-catches.464 In the
region, IUU fishing vessels target fish breeding grounds as they seek to exploit fisheries
resources illegally.465 This leads to the destruction of delicate habitats, which is detrimental to
the marine environment. These by-catch species are then discarded into the sea, where they
decompose, polluting the marine environment.466 The impact on coastal communities,
460 ‘Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing’, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
U.S Department of Commerce (Web Page, 28 June 2017) <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-
illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing>; Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fight Against Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa a Regional Challenge (FAO Report, 2020) 3; Doumbouya et al. (n 41) 1.
461 Doumbouya et al. (n 41) 7.
462 Rossello (n 59) 35.
463 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 124.
464 Ibid 122-123.
465 Ibid.
466 Ibid 123.
particularly in the Niger Delta region, is that fishers spend prolonged periods in the sea, only to
make it back home and realise that a considerable number of discarded by-catch species are
dead, further undermining efforts to provide food for their families.467
Furthermore, IUU fishing threatens the personal security of local fishers in the region. There
have been anecdotal reports of conflicts between industrial fishing vessels and small-scale
fishers competing for fisheries resources in zones reserved for small-scale fishers.468 In some
Gulf of Guinea states, such as Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and The Gambia, there is a
demarcated zone called the Inshore Exclusive Zone (IEZ) for use by small-scale fishers
exclusively.469 A study revealed that in Sierra Leone, foreign fishing vessels are known to
collide with small-scale fishers when accessing waters reserved for small-scale fishing.470 In
2019, another study discovered that between 2012 and 2016, industrial fishing fleets spent about
three per cent to six per cent of their time fishing in waters reserved for small-scale fisheries,
which often led to a collision with small-scale fishers.471 Indeed, one report estimates that about
250 locals die annually in the region from collisions with industrial vessels within waters
reserved for small-scale fishers.472
Lastly, IUU fishing threatens the cultural traditions of coastal communities in the region. The
sea and fish are vital to the preservation of the traditions of many coastal communities in the
Gulf of Guinea.473 Fishing itself is essential in the traditional beliefs of some coastal
settlements.474 For instance, some communities in Ghana reproduce gender and labour divisions
through fishing, such as the practice of keeping women away from participating in fishing due
to the belief that they are unfit for the work.475 Fishing is viewed as a man’s job, while women
primarily process and sell the fish.476 Similarly, research has discovered that in the Niger Delta
467 Ibid 123.
468 John C. Cannon, ‘Illegal Industrial Fishing Hampers Small-Scale African Fisheries’, Mongabay (News Article, 3
February 2020) <https://news.mongabay.com/2020/02/illegal-industrial-fishing-hampers-small-scale-african-
fisheries/>
469 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Catching Industrial Fishing Incursion into Inshore Waters of Africa from Space’ (2020)
21(2) Fish and Fisheries 382.
470 Sjarief Widjaja et al., Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Drivers (Ocean Panel Blue
Paper, 2020) 20.
471 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Catching Industrial Fishing Incursion into Inshore Waters of Africa from Space’ (n 469)
379-392.
472 Dyhia Belhabib, ‘‘Spyglass’ Reveals Fisheries Crime’, China Dialogue Ocean (News Article, 5 March 2020)
<https://chinadialogueocean.net/13306-spyglass-reveals-illegal-fishing/>
473 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 124.
474 Joseph Kingsley Adjei and Solomon Sika-Bright, ‘Traditional Beliefs and Sea Fishing in Selected Coastal
Communities in the Western Region of Ghana’ (2019) 11(1) Ghana Journal of Geography 1-19.
475 Ibid 13,14.
476 Ibid.
area of Bonny in Nigeria, fishing is a major cultural tradition that must be upheld.477 The
depletion of fish resources impacts their cultural traditions, as they risk losing their identity as a
traditional fishing community.478
4.3.1.1 Select Case Study States in the Gulf of Guinea
The analysis of this section will focus on seven states in the Gulf of Guinea: Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. This section uses these states
(excluding Nigeria) because they are classified by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) as low-income food-deficit states facing severe food and income challenges
(Table 10). Nigeria is included in the analyses because it is experiencing a significant fish
deficit of about 2.5 million metric tonnes annually.479
This section uses data obtained from the FAO, Non-governmental Organisations,480 Fisheries
Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC), and academic literature to assess the
contribution of fish to Gulf of Guinea states and the impacts of IUU fishing on the human
security of coastal communities.
4.3.1.1.1 Ghana
In Ghana, fish contributes an estimated 1.2% to the national GDP of the state. Fish also
constitutes about 53.9% of animal protein, and an estimated 637 thousand fishers depend on fish
for employment (Table 9). Export earnings are also significant for revenue, as shown in Table
10. However, Ghana is affected by IUU fishing, particularly illegal Saiko fishing. Saiko fishing
is the illegal trans-shipment of deliberately targeted fish by foreign industrial trawlers to local
specially adapted canoe operators at sea, and it is sold to coastal communities for profit.481 It is
an illegal practice that has contributed to the decline of Ghana’s fisheries and has resulted in
Ghana becoming a high importer of fish to satisfy demand (Table 10).482 The FCWC estimates
that due to Saiko, only about ‘a quarter to a third of the actual catch’ is reported by industrial
vessels, as a substantial catch of small pelagic fish by the vessels goes unreported and does not
feature in marine fisheries statistics.483 The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) also
477 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 145.
478 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 124.
479 Godwin Oritse, ‘Nigeria has 2.5m Metric Tonnes of Fish Deficit’ Vanguard (Online, 3 March 2021)
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/03/nigeria-has-2-5m-metric-tonnes-of-fish-deficit-minister/>
480 NGOs include the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Greenpeace.
481 Senyo Agbleze, ‘Saiko: The Illegal Sea Trade Benefitting All’, Ivolunteer International (Blog Post, 10 February
2021) <https://www.ivint.org/saiko-the-illegal-sea-trade-benefiting-all/>
482 Alicia Mosteiro Cabanelas et al., Transshipment: A Closer Look - An In-depth Study in Support of the
Development of International Guidelines (FAO Technical Paper, 2020) 32, 33.
483 Godfrey Baidoo-Tsibu, ‘Ghana: Saiko is Sacrilege’ Fisheries Committee for the West and Central Gulf of Guinea
(News Article, 5 December 2019) <https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/ghana-saiko-is-sacrilege>
estimated that, in 2017, about 100,000 tonnes of fish worth over USD50 million were traded
illegally through Saiko.484
Saiko fishing targets small pelagic fish species such as sardinella and chub mackerel in
territorial waters.485 Small pelagic fish is vital to the food security of coastal communities.486
Saiko has pushed the state’s fisheries onto the verge of an almost irreparable catastrophe,487 with
Ghana’s small pelagic fish stocks in imminent danger of collapse.488 Alarmingly, a 2019 report
by the EJF has revealed that Ghana’s small pelagic fish (particularly the sardinella) will collapse
in less than five years if there is no change or significant action by the government to curb the
illegal Saiko fishing.489 Correspondingly, another research report from the Scientific and
Technical Working Group discovered that the current state of small pelagic stocks is severely
overfished.490 It also found that as artisanal fishing efforts continue to increase, catches of small
pelagic fish are declining.491 Local fishers are staying longer at sea, with an average fishing trip
of two days, contrasting with half a day in the 1970s.492 This comes at a high cost to coastal
communities’ economic and personal security. An EJF report showed that about 80% to 90% of
fishers surveyed saw a decline in their income over the past five years.493 Another 70% reported
damage to their fishing gear by industrial trawlers.494 Consequently, in June 2021, Ghana
became the second state to be issued a second yellow card by the European Commission (EC)
(the first yellow card issued in 2013 was lifted in 2015) as a non-cooperating third party in the
fight against IUU fishing.495
484 Environmental Justice Foundation, The “People’s” Fishery on the Brink of Collapse. Small Pelagic in Landing of
Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Fleet (EJF Report, 7 April 2020) 14 (‘The “People’s” Fishery on the Brink of Collapse’).
485 Environmental Justice Foundation, China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa: A Spotlight on Illegal Practices Withing
Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Sector (EJF Report, 11 October 2018) 1 (‘China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa’).
486 Ibid.
487 Daniele Fattibene, Empty Oceans: EU Policy and Illegal Fishing in Ghana (Instituto Affari Internazionali Report,
20 October 2020) 2.
488 The “People’s” Fishery on the Brink of Collapse (n 484) 4.
489 Environmental Justice Foundation, Stolen Fish at Sea: How Illegal ‘Saiko’ Fishing is Fuelling the Collapse of
Ghana’s Fisheries (EJF Report, 17 June 2019) 8.
490 Najih Lazar et al., Status of the Small Pelagic Stocks in Ghana 2018 (Scientific and Technical Working Group and
USAID/Ghana Sustainable Fisheries Management Project Report, December 2018) 9.
491 Ibid 7.
492 Ibid 3.
493 Environmental Justice Foundation, A Human Rights Lens on the Impact of Industrial Illegal Fishing and
Overfishing on the Socio-economic Rights of Small-scale Fishing Communities in Ghana (EJF Report, 17 August
2021) 7.
494 Ibid.
495 European Commission, ‘Fighting Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Commission Notifies the
Republic of Ghana with a Yellow Card’ (Press Release, 2 June 2021)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2745>; ‘Ghana Given Second ‘Yellow Card’ Warning
from EU Over Illegal Fishing’, Environmental Justice Foundation (News Article, 2 June 2021)
<https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/ghana-given-second-yellow-card-warning-from-eu-over-illegal-fishing>
4.3.1.1.2 The Republic of Guinea
In Guinea, the small-scale fisheries sector employs over 95 thousand fishers and contributes
4.1% to the national GDP (Table 9). Fish is a crucial nutritional staple in the diet of Guineans
and makes up about 27.3% of animal protein (Table 9). Guinea also depends on fish for export,
as the state has seen export growth from 2015 to 2018 (Table 10). Historically, Guinea is one of
the worst affected states in the Gulf of Guinea, with a 2007 study discovering that more than
half of the foreign-flagged vessels in its territorial waters are linked to IUU fishing activities.496
Belhabib confirmed this in her 2012 analysis of Guinean fisheries when she noted that Guinea
has one of the worst cases of IUU fishing and, by extension, one of the worst cases in the Gulf
of Guinea.497 Most fish stocks in the state are over-exploited, particularly those along the
coastline.498 Coastal communities are struggling to cope with declining fisheries resources, and
this has caused conflicts between foreign industrial trawlers and small fishing boats. There have
been reports on the competition for fish in Guinean waters by Chinese industrial fishing vessels
and small-scale fishers.499 These foreign industrial fishing vessels destroy local fishers’ fishing
nets and sometimes run into pirogues endangering coastal communities' livelihoods and lives.500
In response, the EC issued a yellow card to Guinea in 2012, followed by a red card in 2013.501
However, in 2016 the red card was lifted following significant progress made by Guinea to curb
IUU fishing.502
4.3.1.1.3 Guinea Bissau
Guinea-Bissau’s waters are home to about one million tons of fisheries resources, of which 350
to 500 thousand tons can be sustainably fished annually.503 The fisheries sector is vital to coastal
communities, employing over 226 thousand people and providing about 3.9% of the state’s
animal protein (Table 9). Fish also plays an essential role in the economy as the state is export
dependent for foreign exchange (Table 10). However, Guinea-Bissau loses an estimated 50% to
496 Environmental Justice Foundation, Pirate Fish on Your Plate – Tracking Illegal-Caught Fish from West Africa
into the European Market (EJF Report, 2007) 14.
497 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Guinea Fisheries: Past, Present and Future’ (2012) 20(3) Marine Fisheries Catches in West
Africa 91.
498 ‘Guinea’ Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (Web Page, 2021) <https://www.spcsrp.org/en/guinea>
499 Beatrice Gorez and Joëlle Philippe, ‘Issues for Local Artisanal Communities in Potential Future EU-Guinea
SFPA’ (Policy Brief, Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA), 7 July 2020), 5
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d402069d36563000151fa5b/t/5f034f7a4670440cf03ae004/1594052475097/2
00706+Guinea+SFPA.pdf>
500 Ibid.
501 ‘Commission Proposes to Lift ‘Red Card’ from Republic of Guinea after it Steps up Fight Against Illegal Fishing’
European Commission (Press Release, 13 September 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/items/33123>
502 Ibid.
503 Jeremias Francisco Intchama, Dyhia Belhabib and Raul Joaquim Tomàs Jumpe, ‘Assessing Guinea Bissau’s Legal
and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them’ (2018) 5(79) Frontiers in
Marine Science 2.
60% of its total fish catch to IUU fishing.504 In 2017, IUU fishing by industrial vessels generated
an estimated annual loss of USD239.8 million, an estimated 56% of all fish caught.505 For a
state where small-scale fisheries play an important role in providing national revenue, food,
jobs, and livelihood for a significant proportion of its population,506 the depletion of the state’s
fisheries resources negatively impacts the human security of coastal communities. A study
reported that the depletion of fish resources is causing conflicts between foreign vessels and
small-scale fishers for access to zones reserved for small-scale fishing.507
4.3.1.1.4 Liberia
About 80% of the population in Liberia depends on fish for animal protein.508 Fish constitutes
about 13.9% of animal protein (Table 9). Table 9 shows that fish contributes three per cent to
the national GDP, and an estimated 14 thousand small-scale fishers depend on the fisheries
sector for income and employment. Nevertheless, it has been reported that Liberia loses about
USD75 million annually from IUU fishing, threatening the state's food security and driving food
scarcity.509 As shown in Table 10, since 2015, annual production has not met yearly fish
demand, causing the state to become highly dependent on imports.510 Not only is IUU fishing
affecting the food security of its coastal communities, but there have also been reports of
conflicts between large-scale fishing vessels and small-scale vessels, which are especially
prevalent in Liberia’s shrimp fisheries.511 These conflicts are sometimes direct (industrial
vessels running down small-scale fishing vessels) or indirect (industrial fishing fleets taking all
available fish or shrimp), threatening the personal and human security of local fishers and
communities.512 Indeed, due to the pervasiveness of IUU fishing and the willing ignorance of
the government to deal with this threat, Liberia was issued a yellow card by the EC in May 2017
as a formal warning that could lead to a seafood export ban if there are no changes to its
504 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 418.
505 Jeremias Francisco Intchama, Dyhia Belhabib and Raul Joaquim Tomàs Jumpe, ‘Assessing Guinea Bissau’s Legal
and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them’ (2018) 5(79) Frontiers in
Marine Science 9.
506 Ibid.
507 Standing (n 401) 1.
508 ‘Liberian Fishing Communities Threatened by Chinese Supertrawlers’, Environmental Justice Foundation (News
Article, 14 July 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/liberian-fishing-communities-threatened-by-chinese-
supertrawlers>
509 National Fisheries & Aquaculture Authority, ‘NaFAA Makes History Signs Fisheries Science Degree MoU with
UL’ (Press Release, 13 March 2022) <https://nafaa.gov.lr/index.php/medias/press-release/nafaa-makes-historysigns-
fisheries-science-degree-mou-with-ul>
510 Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (n 7) 49.
511 Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish (n 396) 28.
512 Ibid.
management practices.513
4.3.1.1.5 Nigeria
In Nigeria, the small-scale fisheries sector employs about 168 thousand people and contributes
0.5% to the national GDP (Table 9). Fish is also one of Nigeria's most affordable and widely
available protein sources, contributing an estimated 37.3% of animal protein to coastal
communities (Table 9). However, despite the vital contribution that fish makes to the food
security and livelihoods of the state, IUU fishing is a significant threat. Indeed, the state is a net
importer of fish as domestic fish production cannot meet national demand, as shown in Table
10. Table 9 shows that losses from IUU fishing to the state are estimated at USD600 to 800
million in revenue annually.514 The state loses an estimated USD70 million to Chinese and EU
trawlers, and USD29 million per annum to illegal shrimping alone.515
Consequently, an investigative report discovered that the state’s fisheries resources are at risk of
collapse.516 Frustrated by the inability of small-scale fishers to catch more fish due to the decline
in fish resources, local fishers are fishing far out from the coast and into waters under other
states’ national jurisdiction. A study confirmed this when the Coordinating Chairman of Akwa-
Ibom State and the Niger Delta Artisanal Fishers Association of Nigeria (ARFAN) mentioned
that reduced catch drives local fishers to Cameroon, particularly Bakassi Peninsula.517 In
addition, the decline of fish is causing local fishers to engage in IUU fishing in the vicinity of
oil pipeline installations, risking triggering additional negative effects including oil leaks,
marine pollution, and creating more maritime security risks.518
513 ‘Liberia: National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority Fighting to Lift EU Yellow Card on Liberian Fishing
Vessels’ IUU Watch (Web Page, 6 February 2020) <http://www.iuuwatch.eu/2020/02/liberia-national-fisheries-and-
aquaculture-authority-fighting-to-lift-eu-yellow-card-on-liberian-fishing-vessels/>
514 Eromosele Abiodun, ‘Report: Nigeria Loses $600m Annually to Illegal Fishing’ This Day (Online, 16 September
2019) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/16/report-nigeria-loses-600m-annually-to-illegal-fishing/>;
Freedom C. Onoaha, ‘Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Nigeria as a Microcosm’ Aljazeera Center
for Studies (Web Page, 12 June 2012) 12
<https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports/documents/201261294647291734Piracy%20and%20M
aritime%2>
515 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Pollution, Fisheries and Food (in)Security in the Gulf of Guinea’ (Research Paper
No 5/2018, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, 6 January 2018) 3
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3117284_code2473549.pdf?abstractid=3117284&mirid=1>;
Oluwatomisin Amoke, ‘Nigeria Loses $70 million to Illegal Fishing’ The Nation (Online, 6 May 2021)
<https://thenationonlineng.net/nigeria-loses-70m-to-illegal-fishing/>
516 Gideon Sarpong and Elfreda Kevin-Alerechi, Stolen at Sea: An Investigation into Illegal Chinese Transshipment
Activities in Ghana and Nigeria (Modern Ghana Special Report, 10 November 2020).
517 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 128.
518 Ibid 127.
4.3.1.1.6 Senegal
Senegal’s coastline is one of the richest biodiversity zones in the Gulf of Guinea.519 The
fisheries sector is a key economic sector that provides income and livelihood for over 58
thousand people and contributes 1.8% to the national GDP (Table 9). Fish makes up 40.2% of
animal protein in the Senegalese diet (Table 9). Fish is also a significant contributor to the
economy, as Senegal largely depends on fish for exports (Table 10). However, Senegal’s rich
fishing grounds have been negatively affected by IUU fishing activities. The result is an annual
loss of USD300 million.520 It has been reported that the state has experienced a drastic decline in
its fisheries due to unsustainable fishing practices.521 In the 1990s, Senegal’s local fishers caught
up to 80% of the fish consumed locally.522 However, the number decreased to 50% in 2014.523
In 2018, documents presented by the FAO showed that 90% of Senegal’s fisheries are fully
fished or facing collapse.524 In 2021, the situation did not change for the better. A report
revealed that small pelagic fish stocks are already overfished, and scientists have warned that
fishing efforts must be reduced by at least 50% to prevent collapse.525
4.3.1.1.7 Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, fish is the most important source of animal protein intake, contributing to an
estimated 54.4% of animal protein (Table 9). The fisheries sector contributes about 6.6% to the
national GDP and employs approximately 35 thousand people.526 The fisheries sector also
contributes to Sierra Leone's economy as it is a net fish exporter (Table 10). However, IUU
fishing is becoming a significant threat. Due to the high prevalence of IUU fishing, the EC
issued Sierra Leone a yellow card in 2016 (still in place).527 The yellow card warns the state to
improve its fisheries management practices or risk being red-carded (banning seafood exports to
the EU). The state is estimated to lose an annual revenue of USD50 million to IUU fishing.528
IUU fishing has resulted in declining fisheries resources forcing small-scale fishers to fish for
519 Barthèlemy Blède, Andrè Diouf and Pascaline Compaorè, ‘How can Senegal Combat Illegal Fishing’ Institute for
Security Studies (Web Page, 17 November 2015) <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-can-senegal-combat-illegal-
fishing>
520 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Fisheries Catch Misreporting and its Implications: The Case of Senegal’ (2014) 151
Fisheries Research 1.
521 Ibid.
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid.
524 Food and Agriculture Organisation, General Situation of World Fish Stock (FAO Report, 2018) 4.
525 ‘New Project Uses Transparency and Participation to Fight Illegal Fishing in Senegal’ Environmental Justice
Foundation (News Article, 4 June 2021) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/new-project-will-use-transparency-
and-participation-to-fight-illegal-fishing-in-senegal>
526 Belhabib, Sumaila, and Pauly (n 442) 78.
527European Commission, ‘Fighting Illegal Fishing: Warnings for Kiribati, Sierra Leone and Trinidad & Tobago,
While Sri Lanka is Delisted’ (Press Release, 21 April 2016)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1457>
528 ‘Illegal Fishing Costing Sierra Leone US$ 50 Million Annually’, Stop Illegal Fishing (News Article, 25 July
2018) <https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/illegal-fishing-costing-sierra-leone-us-50-million-annually/>
longer hours, further away from the shore.529 Even then, large-scale industrial vessels still
encroach in waters reserved for small-scale fishers, causing conflicts between industrial and
artisanal vessels. They sometimes have run-ins with local fishers in the struggle for fish
resources, destroying their local fishing gear and, in some extreme cases, causing serious severe
harm (death or injury) to local fishers.530
4.3.2 Impact on National Security
National security is a widely contested term, with some academic scholars demanding the
inclusion of environmental issues as a national security threat.531 This thesis will adopt the
definition of national security given by Okafor-Yarwood, as the ‘ability of a nation-state to
protect its internal values or features (people, economic interest, boundaries, and environment)
from external threats’.532 From this definition, it is clear that the downstream of criminal
activities that may occur during fishing activities pose a threat to national security.533
Fishing vessels are used as ideal vessels for conducting various criminal activities because of
several combined factors, such as their legitimate presence at sea, the lack of transparency
around their movements, and their ability to trans-ship and access small boats.534 Research has
shown that fishing vessels involved in illegal activities are more willing to expand their
operations into other crimes to support their ventures.535 In most cases, these crimes are
transnational and organised, manifesting in a broad range of organised criminal activities such
as money laundering, corruption, document forging, and tax evasion.536 Other serious organised
crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and piracy are also involved.537
529 Environmental Justice Foundation, Fisheries and Food Security in the Commonwealth (EJF Report, 2011) 13.
530 Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish (n 396) 28, 30.
531 Marc A. Levy, ‘Is the Environment a National Security Issue?’ (1995) 20(2) International Security 35-62; Richard
A. Matthew, ‘The Environment as a National Security Issue’ (2000) 12(1) Journal of Policy History 101-122.
532 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 124.
533 Rossello (n 59) 34-36.
534 Witbooi et al. (n 51) 51.
535 Lindley, Percy, and Techera (n 100) 86.
536 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Evading the Net: Tax Crime in the Fisheries Sector
(OECD Report, 2013) 25-34.
537 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 27-31
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
Figure 6: The link between IUU fishing and national security in the Gulf of Guinea.
International concerns have been raised concerning the possible connection between IUU
fishing and transnational organised crime and called for:
…states, including through the appropriate international forums and organizations, to study the
cause and methods of and contributing factor to illegal fishing to increase knowledge and
understanding of those possible connections, and to make the findings publicly available, bearing
in mind the distinct legal regimes and remedies under the international law applicable to illegal
fishing and international organized crime.538
In response to this call, in 2011, the United Nations commissioned a report under the United
Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) based on studies on transnational organised crime
in the fishing industry.539 It reviews many pieces of literature and presents instances of worker
violations and forced labour on fishing vessels. It also documented cases where fishing vessels
were used for the trafficking of humans and drugs, including people smuggling.540 Following
this, other studies have been conducted on the connections between IUU fishing and
538 Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments, GA Res 64/72,
UN Doc A/RES/64/72 (19 March 2010, adopted 4 December 20) para 61 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/477/51/PDF/N0847751.pdf?OpenElement>
539 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 3.
540 Ibid.
T an Custom Fraud
D F
M L
I , U and
U F
N Sec -
T
O C
C
P
T (H , D
Arm )
P S
transnational organised crimes, particularly its links with piracy,541 drug trafficking,542 migrant
smuggling,543 and human trafficking.544 There have also been demonstrated linkages between
IUU fishing and people smuggling in Australia,545 human trafficking in Thailand,546 and the rise
of piracy in Somalia’s waters.547
In the Gulf of Guinea, fishing vessels are currently implicated in IUU fishing and various
transnational organised crimes, including piracy, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, arms
trafficking, and drug trafficking.548 This poses national security threats to states in the region. A
study suggested that IUU fishing vessels are used to traffic illegal arms in the Gulf of Guinea,
which are then used for conflicts within the region.549 For example, in 2018, it was reported that
43 people were arrested aboard three foreign fishing vessels in Cameroon’s waters carrying an
assorted range of ammunition and weapons, including AK-47s.550 These vessels were also found
to be illegally fishing in Kole oil fields during a routine control mission by the Cameroonian
Navy.551 These arms trafficked using fishing vessels are then used to fuel conflict in the region,
further endangering national security.552
Tax and customs fraud,553 document forgery,554 money laundering,555 and corruption556 are other
transnational organised crimes that occur on IUU fishing vessels in the Gulf of Guinea. Table 12
presents cases of fishing vessels used to engage in IUU fishing, human trafficking, document
541 U. Rashid Sumaila and Mahamudu Bawumia, ‘Fisheries, Ecosystem Justice and Piracy: A Case Study of Somalia’
(2014) 157 Fisheries Research 154-163.
542 Dyhia Belhabib, Philippe Le Billon and David J. Wrathall, ‘Narco-Fish: Global Fisheries and Drug Trafficking’
(2020) 21(5) Fish and Fisheries 992-1007.
543 Witbooi et al. (n 51) 52.
544 Christina Stringer and Thomas Harré, ‘Human Trafficking as a Fisheries Crime? An Application of the Concept to
the New Zealand Context’ (2019) 105 Marine Policy 169-176.
545 Lindley, Percy, and Techera (n 100) 86-89.
546 Environmental Justice Foundation, Pirates and Slaves How Overfishing in Thailand Fuels Human Trafficking and
the Plundering of Our Oceans (EJF Report, 2015) 1-34; Environmental Justice Foundation, Thailand’s Seafood
Slaves Human Trafficking, Slavery and Murder in Kantang’s Fishing Industry (EJF Report, 30 November 2015) 1-
41.
547 Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mahayni, ‘The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: The Rich Versus
the Poor’ (2011) 31(8) Third World Quarterly 1377-1394.
548 See sec 3.4.1 in ch 3.
549 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 126.
550 Nkeze, ‘Bakassi: Cameroon Navy Intercepts Weapon-Bearing Boats’, Cameroon Tribune (Online, 10 September
2018) <https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/20368/fr.html/bakassi-cameroon>
551 Ibid.
552 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 125.
553 ‘Sea Shepherd Assists Liberian Coast Guard with Arrest of Cargo Vessel for Illegal Fish Trade’, Sea Shepherd
(News Article, 2 January 2019) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/arrest-liberia-haifeng/>
554 ‘Successful Results Achieved in Second IUU Fishing Operation with Liberian Government’, Sea Shepherd (News
Article, 8 June 2018) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/sola-stella-2-wrap/>
555 Environmental Justice Foundation, Fear, Hunger and Violence: Human Rights in Ghana’s Industrial Trawl Fleet
(EJF Report, 26 October 2020) 28 (‘Fear, Hunger and Violence’).
556 Beseng (n 60) 276.
forgery, tax evasion, and corruption in the Gulf of Guinea.
Table 12: IUU fishing cases with additional crimes reported in the Gulf of Guinea.
Location
Reporting
Entity
Year
Type of
Vessel
Headline
Additional Crime
Ghana
Environmental
Justice
Foundation
2020
Fishing
Vessels
Fear, Hunger and
Violence: Human
Rights in Ghana’s
Industrial Trawl Fleet
Modern
Slavery/Labour
abuses/Human
trafficking,
Corruption/
Bribery
Liberia
Sea Shepherd
Conservation
Society
2019
Fishing
Vessel
Operation Sola Stella
Results in 15th Arrest
for Fisheries Crime
Document forgery
Liberia
Sea Shepherd
Conservation
Society
2018
Refrigerated
Cargo
Vessel
Sea Shepherd Assist
Liberian Coast Guard
with Arrest of Cargo
Vessel for Illegal Fish
Trade
Tax evasion and
document forgery
Liberia
Sea Shepherd
Conservation
Society
2017
Fishing
Vessel
Large Fishing Trawler
Arrested in Covert
Operation by Sea
Shephard Global and
the Liberian
Authorities
Tax and customs
fraud
Liberia
Sea Shepherd
Conservation
Society
2018
Fishing
Vessel
Liberia Arrests High-
Tech Poachers for
Illegal Fishing and
Attempted Bribery
Attempted Bribery
Source: EJF and Sea shepherd official websites.
Transparency International has identified corruption as a transnational organised crime problem
linked to IUU fishing in developing states, including states in the Gulf of Guinea.557
Bribery is widespread at sea, with fisheries officers too often identified as involved in corrupt
practices. A 2020 Environmental Justice Foundation report found that fisheries observers are
substantially compromised by bribery in Ghana, which impedes their reporting obligation on
557 Maíra Martini, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Corruption (Transparency International Report,
5 September 2013) 4,5.
IUU fishing activities at sea.558 Fisheries observers are not the only ones being bribed. Another
study found that fisheries officers from the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal
Industries (MINEPIA) district and sub-district offices in Cameroon are being bribed by artisanal
fishers to obtain or renew their fishing licences.559
An investigative report by Aljazeera alleged that naval enforcement officers in Sierra Leone are
being bribed by fishers for tips on how to avoid Navy patrols.560 Additional proof of this trend
was reported by the EJF when it found that captains of IUU fishing vessels give fish boxes to
enforcement officers to evade arrest in Guinea.561 These bribes severely undermine fisheries
enforcement efforts, allowing IUU fishing to go unpunished.
Political corruption is also a significant problem along the fisheries value chain in the Gulf of
Guinea. An investigative report conducted by Modern Ghana with support from the Money
Trail Project, a Eurasian and African grant fund, alleged that the lack of political will to combat
IUU fishing in the region is due to political corruption in the fisheries sector.562 For instance, in
Ghana, several political elites hold directorship and shares in local front companies that help
foreign trawl vessels obtain licences.563 The report further stated that these political elites lobby
to register new fishing vessels, reinstate licenses, drop enforcement proceedings, and reduce
sanctions.564 Another U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) report found that
199 fishing vessels were arrested and sanctioned in Ghana between 2007 and 2015.565 However,
some fines were not paid in full and were exempted by the Minster of Fisheries.566
Furthermore, research has suggested that because of dwindling fisheries resources in the region,
engaging in transnational organised crime has become more attractive.567 For instance, Witbooi
asserted that IUU fishing vessels use human trafficking and forced labour to boost profit and cut
costs to offset declining revenue from dwindling fish stocks.568 Links between IUU fishing
vessels and human trafficking and forced labour abuses in the Gulf of Guinea are well
558 Fear, Hunger and Violence (n 555) 28.
559 Beseng (n 60) 273.
560 ‘Pirate Fishing (Part 1) – People and Power’ Aljazeera (YouTube, 26 January 2012)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKQ0rf06Jw4>
561 Environmental Justice Foundation, Pirate Fishing Exposed. The Fight Against Illegal Fishing in West Africa and
the EU (EJF Report, II October 2012) 26 (‘Pirate Fishing Exposed’).
562 Gideon Sarpong and Elfreda Kevin-Alerechi, Stolen at Sea: An Investigation into Illegal Chinese Transshipment
Activities in Ghana and Nigeria (Modern Ghana Special Report, 10 November 2020).
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid.
565 Friends of the Nation, Baseline for Prosecution: Summary of Fisheries Arrests and Prosecution in the Western
and Eastern Commands (The USAID/Ghana Sustainable Fisheries Management Project Report, August 2015) 23 -25.
566 Ibid.
567 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 116-146.
568 Witbooi et al. (n 51) 51.
established.569 A study by the Environmental Justice Foundation recorded several human rights
violations aboard IUU fishing vessels in the Gulf of Guinea’s waters.570 The report noted that
the crew worked long hours in unhygienic and hazardous conditions. Most of the crew were
smuggled from impoverished regions and were brought to work fisheries grounds of the Gulf of
Guinea, far from their home states. These men were confined onboard by having their national
passports confiscated, forcing them to remain aboard the vessel in international waters for years
without coming ashore. These fishing boats conduct trans-shipments are sea, effectively
imprisoning the crew and giving them no opportunity to leave. Another study by the Global
Initiative against Transnational Crime has also noted a link between IUU fishing vessels and
human trafficking for forced labour in the Gulf of Guinea.571
A research report by the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) also points
out that foreign vessels involved in human trafficking offences are engaged in IUU fishing
activities in the Gulf of Guinea.572 The United States Department of State confirmed this in 2014
when it highlighted that forced labour on fishing vessels usually co-occurs with IUU fishing.573
The report went further, stating that in the coastline of Sub-Saharan Africa (including the Gulf
of Guinea), forced labour is prevalent in European and Asian IUU fishing vessels seeking to
exploit poorly regulated waters. In 2013, Greenpeace reported a similar trend of human
trafficking for forced labour when it gave an account of Senegalese naval authorities that
arrested a Russian-flagged illegal fishing vessel named Oleg Naydenov off southern Senegal,
near the border of Guinea-Bissau.574 Upon investigation by the government of Senegal, they
found that the crew aboard the vessel were forcefully kept onboard for fear of losing their
payroll and being unable to return home.575 In addition to causing unfair competition with legal
569 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 26
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
570 Environmental Justice Foundation, All at Sea. The Abuse of Human Rights Aboard Illegal Fishing Vessels (EJF
Report, 2010) 8 (‘All at Sea’).
571 Teale Bondaroff, Tuesday Reitano and Weietse Van der Werf, The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus:
Illegal Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime (The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and
the Black Fish Report, 2015) 49.
572 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 27
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
573 U.S. Department of State, The Intersection Between Environmental Degradation and Human Trafficking (Office
to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2014) 2.
574 Daniel Simons, ‘Russian Fishing Trawler Arrested as Local Fishermen in Senegal Protest Foreign Industrial
Fleets’, Greenpeace (News Article, 9 January 2014) <https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/russian-fishing-trawler-
arrested-as-local-fishermen-in-senegal-protest-foreign-industrial-fleets/>
575 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 28
operators, this negatively impacts people’s rights, thus threatening the peace and stability of the
region.576
People smuggling has also been linked to the decline of regional fisheries resources. Local
fishers have discovered that their boating skills are in demand for use to migrate people to
Europe illegally. In the case of Senegal, the drastic decline of fish in the state’s waters is driving
local fishers to use their boats, risking their lives to illegally transport fellow Senegalese to
Europe for the promise of greener pastures.577 In 2018, it was reported that local fishers were
using their pirogues to transport Senegalese, endangering their lives by travelling a perilous
journey by sea to the Canary Islands to escape the food security crisis in the state.578 The perils
of such efforts are highlighted by a case from 2020 when an estimated 150 migrants died after
they were shipwrecked in a wooden boat off the coast of Senegal.579 It was suspected the ship
was trying to transport the migrants by sea to the Canary Islands.580
One of those factors contributing to illegal migration from the Gulf of Guinea is the loss of
income of coastal communities from the decline in fish resources made worse by IUU fishing.
This view was recognised and supported by INTERPOL when it mentioned that the illegal trade
of fish could cause harm to the livelihoods of people, resulting in forced migration.581 A similar
study by Jönsson posited that the decline of fisheries in Senegal severely impacts coastal
communities' livelihoods and survival, leading them to forced illegal migration.582 In 2020, it
was reported that more than 400 young people from the region drowned on their way to
Europe.583 Even with the loss of lives, this trend does not seem likely to end any time soon, as
death does not serve as a much-needed deterrent to this tragic and illegal activity. As of 2021,
the United Nations International Organisations for Migration (IOM) has estimated that about
456 people have died or disappeared attempting to cross the Mediterranean from West Africa
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
576 Witbooi et al. (n 51) 51.
577 Meaghan Beatley and Sam Edwards, ‘Overfished: In Senegal, Empty Nets Lead to Hunger and Violence’ Global
Post Investigations (Web Page, 31 May 2018) <https://gpinvestigations.pri.org/overfished-in-senegal-empty-nets-
lead-to-hunger-and-violence-e3b5d0c9a686>
578 Ibid.
579 Mady Camara and Ruth Maclean, ‘Hundreds Die at Sea off Senegal’s Coast on a Perilous Route to Europe’, The
New York Times (Online, 2 November 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/world/africa/senegal-migrants-
drown.html>
580 Ibid.
581 ‘INTERPOL Marks a Decade of Tackling Serious Organized Environmental Crime’, International Criminal
Police Organisation (INTERPOL) (News Article, 23 November 2020) < https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-
Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-marks-a-decade-of-tackling-serious-organized-environmental-crime>
582 Jessica H. Jönsson, ‘Overfishing, Social Problems, and Ecosocial Sustainability in Senegalese Fishing
Communities’ (2019) 27(3-4) Journal of Community Practice 221-223.
583 Emma Wallis, ‘Senegal Mourns Those Who Drowned Migrating’ Info Migrants (News Article, 16 November
2020) <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/28545/senegal-mourns-those-who-drowned-migrating>
using the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands.584
The impact of declining fisheries resources on national security is also visible in its link to
piracy. In 2018, the United Nations Secretary-General stated that there is a link between piracy
and IUU fishing.585 Although he was referring to the connection between IUU fishing and
piracy in Somalia, this view was supported and used in an analysis of piracy and IUU fishing in
West Africa.586 Denton and Harris argued that the decline of fisheries resources from IUU
fishing results in a corresponding increase in piracy in the region.587 Another report claimed that
local fishers are turning to piracy to supplement their diminishing incomes.588 Their skills are
easily used for piracy because of their ability to operate and navigate boats.589 In 2012, local
fishers in Senegal noted that unless the state government does something to address IUU fishing
in the state’s waters, they will be driven to engage in piracy.590
Furthermore, IUU fishing vessels’ illegitimate presence at sea and lack of transparency
regarding their movement make them susceptible to mass kidnappings, hijackings, and piracy
attacks. In her analysis of data received from the Nigerian Navy, the Federal Department of
Fisheries and Aquaculture, and the Nigerian Trawler Owners Association (NITOA), Okafor-
Yarwood revealed that IUU fishing vessels are susceptible to pirate attacks.591 The data showed
that some fishing vessels in Nigeria fell victim to piracy because they engaged in some form of
IUU fishing. 592 For instance, they were fishing in prohibited areas. In many cases, the
authorities were unaware of the presence of those IUU fishing vessels but were only alerted
because they needed rescuing.593 These hijacked fishing vessels are sometimes used as mother
ships to carry out further pirate attacks. For example, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
reported that on 8 February 2021, a hijacked fishing vessel was used by pirates to carry out
pirate attacks in the region. 594
584 ‘Missing Migrants Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes’, IMO’s Missing Migrants Project (Web Page, 2021)
<https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/africa>
585The Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Off the Coast of Somalia, SC Res 903, UN Doc
S/2018/903 (10 October 2018), para 9 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/307/79/PDF/N1830779.pdf?OpenElement>
586 Denton and Harris (n 234) 16.
587 Ibid.
588 Patrick Pester, ‘Pirate Attacks Linked to Destructive Fishing’ Live Science (News Article, 27 February 2021)
<https://www.livescience.com/pirate-attacks-and-destructive-fishing.html>
589 Ibid.
590 John Vital, ‘Will Overfishing by Foreigners Drive Senegalese Fishermen to Piracy?’ The Guardian (Online, 3
April 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/apr/03/overfishing-foreigners-
senegal-fishermen-piracy>
591 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 131.
592 Ibid 132.
593 Ibid.
594 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Report for the Period 1 January – 31 March 2021 (ICC IMB Quarter 1 Report, 2021) 21.
Lastly, an existing study has suggested that the international drug trade is connected to fishing
vessels in the Gulf of Guinea.595 Although the study only made the statement in passing and did
not elaborate more on the issue, some evidence indicates that fishing vessels are used as a cover
to traffic cocaine and other narcotics in the region.596 For example, an archipelago called
Bijagós Islands off the coast of Guinea-Bissau is renowned for its use by drug traffickers to drop
off cocaine in large shipments for redistribution to smaller fishing vessels via trans-
shipments.597 There are suggestions that due to the decline in fish by overexploitation and IUU
fishing and no alternative legal source of livelihood, fishers in Guinea-Bissau are using their
fishing boats to illegally traffic drugs to neighbouring states like Senegal, The Gambia, and
Guinea-Conakry.598 INTERPOL has also confirmed that fishers faced with diminishing fish
stocks in the region use their fishing vessels to engage in drug trafficking to supplement their
income.599
4.3.3 Discussion
The analysis above shows a clear connection between the impact of IUU fishing on human and
national security in the Gulf of Guinea. When coastal communities' human security is affected
by IUU fishing, fishers are more likely to engage in transnational organised crime, thus
impacting national security. The analysis demonstrates that fishers are turning to piracy, people
smuggling, and arms trafficking due to the decline of fisheries resources from IUU fishing and
the resulting need to supplement their income. Some fishers thus use their skills and ability to
navigate boats to transport illicit products and engage in criminal activities. Several factors,
such as trans-shipment at sea, flags of convenience, and ports of convenience, facilitate these
crimes on board fishing vessels and provide the opportunity for transferring illicit non-fishery
products.600
The use of trans-shipment at sea for human trafficking by IUU fishing vessels has been
595 Catharina Lewerenz and Judith Vorrath, ‘Illegal Fishing and Maritime Security: Towards a Land – and Sea-Based
Response to Threats in West Africa’ (SWP Comments, German Institute for International Politics and Security, 2015)
2 <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/41749/ssoar-2015-lewerenz_et_al-
Illegal_fishing_and_maritime_security.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2015-lewerenz_et_al-
Illegal_fishing_and_maritime_security.pdf>
596 Ibid.
597 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 29
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
598 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 419.
599 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 29.
600 Cabanelas et al. (n 482) 98.
previously discussed.601 It enables vessels to stay at sea for long periods without coming to a
port where they are likely to be inspected regarding crew working conditions.602 Trans-shipment
at sea is significant because not only can it address the nexus between IUU fishing and human
trafficking, but it also has the potential to be a point where other transnational organised crimes
can be addressed.603
If an IUU fishing vessel cannot trans-ship its illicit cargo at sea, it may bring it into a port of
convenience. Generally, ports of convenience aid in the traffic of illegal products as they
provide limited inspection for vessels and create a favourable environment for IUU fishers to
offload and trade fishery and illicit products.604 The Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)
provides minimum standards for port states when conducting inspections on foreign vessels.605
Usually, states that have yet to accede to the PSMA are potentially operating a port of
convenience as these minimum standards may not be met otherwise. As of September 2022,
only 14 states in the Gulf of Guinea have ratified and acceded to the agreement. 606 Therefore,
until other coastal states accede to the PSM agreement, criminal networks are more easily able
to profit from IUU fishing and the trafficking of other illicit products into the region.
Lastly, Flags of Convenience (FoC), reflagging, and open registries contribute significantly to
the problem of IUU fishing and transnational organised crime. Vessels can fly the flag of many
nations to hide their identity to avoid regulations of the beneficial owner’s state, impacting
effective fisheries-criminal law enforcement.607 FoCs and open registries facilitate other crimes
on board fishing vessels as they offer minimum labour and tax law regulations. In the Gulf of
Guinea, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has discovered Cameroon,
Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Togo to be FoCs.608 The
ITF also recognises the connection between FoCs, labour abuses and human trafficking.609 FoCs
promote labour abuses such as payment of low wages, working long hours, and abysmal
standards of food and accommodation.610 One FoC fishing vessel flagged to São Tomé and
601 See sec 4.3.2.
602 Cabanelas et al. (n 482) 99.
603 Rossello (n 59) 36.
604 Ibid 37.
605 PSMA (n 69) arts 12, 13.
606 Available at ‘FAO Treaties Database’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (Web Page)
<https://www.fao.org/treaties/results/details/en/c/TRE-000003/>
607 Liddick (n 52) 300; Environmental Justice Foundation, Off the Hook. How Flags of Convenience Let Illegal
Fishing Go Unpunished (EFJ Report, 20 October 2020) 16.
608 ‘Current Registries Listed as FOCs’ International Transport Workers Federation (Web Page)
<https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/focs/current-registries-listed-as-focs>
609 ‘Flags of Convenience’, International Transport Workers’ Federation (Web Page)
<https://www.itfglobal.org/en/sector/seafarers/flags-of-convenience>
610 Ibid.
Príncipe, where 14 out of 40 crew members died by drowning, demonstrated some of the
problems associated with FoC vessels and labour abuses. The São Tomé and Príncipe flagged
vessel Amur sank while illegally fishing for Patagonian Toothfish (Chilean Sea Bass) in the sub-
Antarctic waters near Kerguelen.611 Further investigation discovered that structural
modifications had made the vessel unseaworthy, crew members did not have proper insurance
coverage and contracts, and there were no fire extinguishers or access to escape routes.612
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the link between IUU fishing and the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime security.
The analysis demonstrates that IUU fishing is connected to two distinct but interdependent
dimensions of maritime security (human and national security). It finds that when coastal
communities’ food and livelihood are affected, fishers are more likely to use their vessels to
engage in IUU fishing and other criminal activities, including human trafficking, arms
trafficking, piracy, people smuggling, and drug trafficking. Corruption, document fraud, and
other financial crimes, such as money laundering and tax and customs fraud, have also been
linked to IUU fishing vessels in the region.
As such, IUU fishing can no longer be considered as purely a fisheries management problem but
also a maritime security threat which results in a less secure maritime environment for the Gulf
of Guinea states. Additional maritime security approaches may be necessary to combat IUU
fishing and its maritime security dimensions. The next chapter will demonstrate that IUU
fishing meets the requirements of transnational organised crime stipulated by the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). Framing IUU fishing as a
transnational organised crime will enhance Gulf of Guinea states maritime security. In doing
this, the chapter will analyse the current legal, institutional, and policy frameworks for
addressing IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. To combat the wide-
ranging negative effects of IUU fishing most effectively, existing legal, institutional and policy
frameworks on IUU fishing must address it as a transnational and organised criminal activity
that threatens the region’s maritime security.
611 All at Sea (n 570) 6.
612 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5
LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS IUU
FISHING AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
5.1 Introduction
After examining the nexus between Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and
maritime security, this chapter analyses the legal, institutional, and policy framework in
addressing IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It posits that existing legal,
institutional and policy frameworks are insufficient to combat the maritime security issues
surrounding IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
Fishing and maritime activities are generally governed by international, regional, and national
legal instruments. Legal instruments provide a framework for ocean governance and maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea.613 As such, the first part of this chapter provides an overview of
the binding international legal instruments to address IUU fishing and maritime security. It
highlights the issues related to addressing the criminal dimensions of IUU fishing and argues
that international frameworks are inadequate to combat associated illicit activities.
The second part analyses the national Legal and Institutional Frameworks (LIFs) for addressing
IUU fishing and transnational organised crime in the Gulf of Guinea. It uses Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone as case study states in order to
understand how these states with different official languages view IUU fishing and to determine
where legislative and institutional improvements are most needed. It finds that IUU fishing is
not expressly characterised as a transnational organised crime and a maritime security threat in
national legislation. It also finds that the relationship between IUU fishing and maritime security
has not been adequately recognised in national legislation. From an institutional perspective,
there are current gaps that hinder interagency fisheries and maritime security law enforcement
cooperation in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting crimes in the fisheries sector.
The last part examines current policies in the context of regional and national state policies and
practices in combatting IUU fishing. Examination of the study states show that national
measures for combatting IUU fishing do not focus on the criminal dimension of IUU fishing but
view IUU fishing through the fisheries management lens.
613 Zaki Mubarok, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational Organized Fisheries Crimes:
Perspectives of Legal and Policy Measures of Indonesia’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2019) 136.
105
5.2 International Instruments for Addressing IUU Fishing and Maritime Security
To adequately address IUU fishing and associated maritime security threats in the Gulf of
Guinea, examining the international instruments for sustainable fisheries and transnational
organised crime is essential. Legal frameworks are vital for the proper utilisation and
sustainability of marine resources. The international legal framework regulating sustainable
fisheries is broadly divided into two parts: (1) the legally binding instruments (hard law); and
(2) the non-binding instruments (soft law).614
The legally binding instruments comprise the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS),615 the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement),616 the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement),617 the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (the 2009 Port State Measures
Agreement),618 and the Cape Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing Vessels (the 2012 Cape
Town Agreement).619 Examples of non-legally binding instruments are the 1995 Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries620 and the 2001
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).621
Transnational organised crimes that occur on onboard fishing vessels are primarily governed by
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its
protocols: 622(Protocol against Illegal Migration 2000,623 Protocol against Trafficking in Persons
2000624 and Protocol against Trafficking in Firearms 2001625). Other legal instruments include
the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption,626 the 2007 Convention Concerning Work in the
614 Ibid 137.
615 UNCLOS (n 66)
616 FAO Compliance Agreement (n 67).
617 UNFSA (n 68).
618 PSMA (n 69).
619 The 2012 Cape Town Agreement (n 70).
620 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995).
621 IPOA-IUU Fishing (n 22).
622 UNTOC (n 278).
623 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (n 279).
624 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (n 280).
625 Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (n 281).
626 United National Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 9 to 11 December 2003, 2349 UNTS 41
(entered into force 14 December 2005).
106
Fisheries Sector,627 the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances,628 the 1977 International Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences,629 and the
1997 OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions.630
627 Convention (No.188) Concerning Work in the Fishing Sector, opened for signature 14 June 2007, 3209 UNTS
(entered into force 16 November 2017).
628 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for
signature 20 December 1988 to 28 February 1989, 1582 UNTS 95 (entered into force 11 November 1990).
629 International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of
Custom Offences, opened for signature 9 June 1977 to 30 June 1978, 1226 UNTS 143 (entered into force 21 May
1980).
630 Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, open for
signature 17 December 1997 (entered into force 15 February 1999).
107
Table 13: International fisheries and criminal instruments.
Instruments for Combatting IUU Fishing
Instruments for Combatting
Transnational Organised Crimes
Associated with IUU Fishing
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea
The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement
The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement
The 2009 Port State Measures Agreement
The 2012 Cape Town Agreement
The 1992 UNCED; Agenda 21; Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development *
The 1995 Rome Consensus on World Fisheries
(FAO)*
The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries *
The 1999 Rome Declaration on Implementation
of the Code of Conduct (FAO) *
The 2001 Reykjavik Declaration on
Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem
*
The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on
Sustainable Development *
The 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation *
The 1999 International Plan of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-
Capacity) *
The 1999 International Plan of Action for
Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in
Longline Fisheries *
The 199 International Plan of Action for the
Conservation and Management of Sharks *
The 2012 Sustainable Development Goals
(Goal 14.4) *
The 2000 United Nations
Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime
and its Protocols (Protocol
against Illegal Migration,
Protocol against Trafficking in
Persons, and Protocol against
Trafficking in Firearms).
The 2003 United Nations
Convention against Corruption
Convention Concerning Work
in the Fishing Sector, 2007
(ILO Convention No.188)
The 1988 United Nations
Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances
The 1977 International
Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance for
the Prevention, Investigation
and Repression of Customs
Offences
The 1997 OECD Convention on
Combatting Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International
Business Transactions
Key: *Non-legally binding instruments.
108
5.2.1 Legally Binding International Fisheries Instruments
Table 14: Ratification of binding international instruments for IUU fishing by Gulf of
Guinea states.
Country
United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea 1982
FAO Compliance
Agreement 1993
UN Fish Stocks Agreement
1995
FAO Port State Measures
Agreement 2009
Cape Town Agreement 2012
Angola
X
X
X
Benin
X
X
X
X
Burkina Faso
X
Cabo Verde
X
X
X
Cameroon
X
Central African Republic
Chad
X
Côte d’Ivoire
X
X
The Republic of Congo
X
X
Democratic Republic of the Congo
X
Equatorial Guinea
X
Gabon
X
X
The Gambia
X
X
Ghana
X
X
X
X
Guinea
X
X
X
Guinea-Bissau
X
Liberia
X
X
X
Mali
X
Mauritania
X
X
Niger
X
Nigeria
X
X
Sao Tome and Principe
X
X
X
Senegal
X
X
X
X
Sierra Leone
X
X
X
Togo
X
X
Source: Compiled from the FAO, UN, and IMO official websites.
5.2.1.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The international community has adopted several multilateral treaties to act as legally binding
instruments to help sustainably utilise ocean resources. One of the earliest multilateral efforts to
do this was the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) which
adopted four international conventions, namely: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
109
Contiguous Zone (CTS),631 the Convention on the High Seas (CHS),632 the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas (CFCLR),633 and the
Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS).634 However, these conventions and the subsequent
1960 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) failed to settle the breadth
of maritime zones including universally agreed fisheries zones for coastal states.635
Consequently, following the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed on 10
December 1982 and came into force on 16 November 1994.636 It is referred to as the
‘Constitution of the Oceans’ and acts as an instrument for governing international ocean affairs
and the sustainable utilisation and conservation of living resources. 637 UNCLOS established six
different maritime zones: (1) Internal Waters;638 (2) Territorial Sea;639 (3) Contiguous Zone;640
(4) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ);641 (5) Continental Shelf;642 and (6) Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction (ABNJ), such as the high seas and the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction.643 UNCLOS defined the rights and duties of states within the six maritime zones
and stipulated guidelines for managing living resources within the zones.644
Articles 56(1) and 77(1) of UNCLOS gave coastal states sovereign rights in their EEZ and
continental shelf to exploit marine living resources. Sovereign rights mean that coastal states
can exercise jurisdiction in exploiting, protecting and preserving fisheries resources in their EEZ
and continental shelf to the exclusion of other states. No foreign state can exploit the living
resources in their EEZ without express permission from the coastal state.645 Foreign access
rights in the EEZ of a coastal state are stipulated in Articles 61, 63 and 64 of the convention.
631 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 205
(entered into force 10 September 1964).
632 Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 11 (entered into force 30 September
1962).
633 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Sea, opened for signature 29 April
1958, 559 UNTS 285 (1958) (entered into force 20 March 1966).
634 Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (1958) (entered into
force 10 June 1964).
635 Farahdilah Ghazali et al., ‘Malaysian Efforts in Combatting IUU Fishing: A Legal and Policy Review’ (2019)
12(2) Journal of East Asia and International Law 394.
636 UNCLOS (n 66); Palma, Tsamenyi, and Edeson (n 20) 58; David John Harris, Cases and Materials on the
International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2004) 464, 381.
637 UNCLOS (n 66).
638 Ibid art 8.
639 Ibid arts 2 and 3.
640 Ibid art 33.
641 Ibid art 55.
642 Ibid art 76.
643 Ibid art 87.
644 Ibid arts 56(1), 61, 77(1).
645 Mubarok (n 613) 140.
110
Article 61 of UNCLOS sets out the obligations of states for the conservation and management
of fisheries resources in their EEZ. Coastal states must promote the sustainable utilisation of
fisheries resources in their EEZ.646 In doing so, coastal states can grant access to other states
through access agreements where they cannot harvest the surplus of their allowable catch.647
Coastal states must determine their total allowable catch through reliable scientific data.648
However, fulfilling this duty poses many difficulties for the Gulf of Guinea, comprised of
developing states.649
In granting foreign access rights, coastal states must ensure that fisheries resources are not over-
exploited. According to Article 61(2), ‘the coastal state…. shall ensure through proper
conservation and management measures that the maintenance of living resources in the
exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation’. Article 62(4) stipulates that
coastal states may establish management measures in their EEZs, including the licensing of
fishing vessels and fishers, determination of species to be caught, size and gear restrictions,
allocating observers onboard fishing vessels, the landing of all or part of a catch, enforcement
procedures, and conditions of cooperative agreements. Coastal states must cooperate with
international, regional, and subregional organisations to ensure that fisheries resources are not
over-exploited.650
Flag states must comply with the conservation and management measures (CMMs) of the
coastal states when fishing in their EEZs.651 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), a judicial body established by UNCLOS, provided a comprehensive analysis of flag
and coastal states’ duties when it rendered its advisory opinion on four legal questions submitted
by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) regarding the problem of IUU fishing in the
EEZ of seven SRFC member states: Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.652 The four questions are:
1) What are the obligations of the flag states in cases where illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are conducted within the Exclusive Economic Zone of
third-party states?
646 UNCLOS (n 66) art 62(1).
647 Ibid art 62(2).
648 Ibid art 61(2).
649 Lei Zhang, ‘Global Fisheries Management and Community Interest’ (2021) 3(15) Sustainability 8590.
650 UNCLOS (n 66) art 61(2).
651 Ibid art 62(4).
652 Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) (Request for
Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Tribunal) (Advisory Opinion) (Case No. 21, 2 April 2015).
111
2) To what extent shall the flag state be liable for IUU fishing activities conducted by vessels
sailing under its flag?
3) Where a fishing licence is issued to a vessel within the framework of an international
agreement with the flag state or with an international agency, shall the state or international
agency be held liable for the violation of the fisheries legislation of the coastal state by the
vessel in question?
4) What are the rights and obligations of the coastal state in ensuring the sustainable
management of shared stocks and stocks of common interest, especially the small pelagic
species and tuna?653
To answer these questions, the tribunal had to determine if it had jurisdiction to entertain the
request submitted by the SRFC. In determining that it had jurisdiction, the tribunal drew on
Articles 16, 21, and 138 of the Statue of ITLOS. Article 16 states, ‘The tribunal shall frame
rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure’.654 Section
21 states, ‘The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted
in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other
agreements which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.’655
Furthermore, Article 138 states that:
1) The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement
related to the purpose of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the
Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.
2) A request for an advisory opinion shall be transmitted to the Tribunal by whatever body is
authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the request to the tribunal.
3) The tribunal shall apply mutatis mutandis articles 130 to 137. 656
In answering the first question, ITLOS found that coastal states are primarily responsible for
preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing within their EEZ.657 Nevertheless, this
responsibility does not relieve flag states from their obligation to combat IUU fishing, as they
also must take necessary measures to conserve and manage resources in coastal states’ EEZ.658
653 Letter from the Sub Regional Fisheries Commission to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 27 March
2013, 2 <https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/Request_eng.pdf>
654 Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) (Request for
Advisory Opinion Submitted to the Tribunal) (Advisory Opinion) (Case No. 21, 2 April 2015) para 38.
655 Ibid.
656 Ibid.
657 Ibid para 106.
658 Ibid para 108.
For the second question, flag states liability arises from ‘due diligence obligation’ to ensure that
vessels flying their flags are not engaging in IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of coastal
states.659 The tribunal referred to the meaning of ‘due diligence obligation’ following the
explanation given by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay case as follows:
It is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures but
also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative
control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities
undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party. The responsibility
of a party to the 1975 Statute would therefore be engaged if it was shown that it had failed
to act diligently and thus take all appropriate measures to enforce its relevant regulations on
a public or private operator under its jurisdiction.660
Therefore, coastal states may hold liable flag states that do not meet their ‘due diligence
obligation’.661
Regarding the third question, flag states liability and international organisations liability are
intricately entwined. Where a flag state is a member of an international organisation, who is
liable? The flag state? or the international organisation? In answering this question, the tribunal
reiterated that flag state liability applies to its conclusion in question two.662 It further reiterated
that the international organisation is responsible for its member states when it enters a fisheries
access agreement with SRFC member states.663 The tribunal noted that the European Union
(EU) must ensure that vessels flying the flag of one of its member states must do their ‘due
diligence obligation’ and comply with the fisheries law and regulations in the EEZs of SRFC
member states.664 Thus, the EU is liable for a breach of a fisheries access agreement in the EEZ
of SRFC member states.
The fourth question relates explicitly to the management of shared and transboundary stocks in
the EEZ of SRFC member states, particularly small pelagic species and tuna. The tribunal
emphasised the provisions of Articles 61, 62, 73, 192, and 193 of UNCLOS, which deal with
659 Ibid para 146.
660 Ibid para 131.
661 Ibid para 147.
662 Ibid para 155.
663 Ibid para 172.
664 Ibid.
CMMs of living resources in the EEZ.665 ITLOS noted several obligations on SRFC member
states to ensure the sustainability and management of shared stocks in their EEZ, including a
duty to cooperate directly or through the SRFC with other states to ensure the conservation and
optimum utilisation of such species in their EEZ.666
For high seas fishing, Article 116 of UNCLOS gives rights to flag states to engage in fishing on
the high seas. However, this right is subject to three provisions:
1) Treaty obligations;
2) Rights, duties, and interests of coastal states provided for in Article 63, Paragraph 2,
and Articles 64 to 67; and
3) Provisions of Section 2, Part VII of the convention.667
Flag states must cooperate with other states in taking appropriate measures to manage and
conserve fisheries resources on the high seas.668 Additionally, states must cooperate to manage
straddling stocks and highly migratory species on the high seas.669 Cooperation by states may be
done through establishing a subregional or regional fisheries organisation.670
5.2.1.2 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement
Although the provisions of UNCLOS set out rights, duties, and guidelines for the sustainable
utilisation of ocean resources, this has not prevented the over-exploitation of fisheries resources
and factors enabling IUU fishing (such as flags of convenience and vessel reflagging),
specifically on the high seas. Consequently, the FAO adopted the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement to respond to the inadequacies of UNCLOS to promote compliance with
international management measures and prevent reflagging of fishing vessels on the high
seas.671 Flags of convenience (FoC) and vessel reflagging facilitate IUU fishing and associated
crimes.672 IUU fishing vessels can change their flag from a party state to a non-party state to
operate under flags granted by FoC states, evading the CMMs of a competent Regional
Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO).673 As such, IUU fishing operators can use FoC to
665 Ibid para 180.
666 Ibid paras 207, 218.
667 UNCLOS (n 66) art 116.
668 Ibid art 117.
669 Ibid arts 63, 64.
670 Ibid art 118.
671 FAO Compliance Agreement (n 67) preamble.
672 Environmental Justice Foundation, Off the Hook. How Flags of Convenience Let Illegal Fishing Go Unpunished
(EFJ Report, 20 October 2020) 10 – 32 (‘Off the Hook’). See also sec 4.3.3 in ch 4.
673 Many FoC states cannot effectively monitor the activities of their fishing vessels. Mubarok (n 613) 142.
violate conservation and management efforts claiming that the CMMs do not bind them under
international law, as they are a non-party state.
Under the 1993 FAO Compliances Agreement, flag states whose vessels operate on the high
seas have a responsibility to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over the fishing vessels
flying their flag, including vessels engaged in the trans-shipment of fish, and to ensure that
vessels comply with subregional and regional CMMs.674 The agreement applies to all fishing
vessels on the high seas, with special provisions for vessels of less than 24 metres in length.675
The agreement covers strengthening flag states’ control, responsibilities, and compliance with
international management measures on the high seas.676 It covers flag states’ responsibilities
such as genuine links;677 establishing and maintaining a national record of authorised fishing
vessels on the high seas;678 international cooperation;679 regional, subregional, and bilateral
cooperation;680 and information sharing.681
However, the agreement has yet to receive wide ratification in the Gulf of Guinea, as only six
states have ratified it (Table 14). The agreement encourages non-party states in the region to
adopt laws and regulations consistent with the agreement’s provisions.682 It is essential to note
that most Gulf of Guinea states (as non-party states) are not obligated to comply with the
responsibilities and obligation of cooperation and information sharing under this agreement and,
as such, may not benefit from the provisions of this agreement. Non-party Gulf of Guinea states
must ratify this agreement to benefit from data sharing, including evidentiary material in
identifying IUU fishing vessels,683 and cooperation in port when notifying flag states where
there is reason to believe that their vessels have violated management measures.684
5.2.1.3 The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement applies to only straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks on the high seas (excluding Articles 6 and 7, which provide for compatible conservation
measures in areas under national jurisdiction).685 It elaborates on Article 64 of UNCLOS
674 FAO Compliance Agreement (n 67) preamble.
675 Ibid art II(2).
676 Palma, Tsamenyi, and Edeson (n 20) 60.
677 Ibid art III(3).
678 FAO Compliance Agreement (n 67) art IV.
679 Ibid art V.
680 Ibid art VII.
681 Ibid art VI.
682 Ibid art VIII(1).
683 Ibid art V(1).
684 Ibid art V(2).
685 UNFSA (n 68).
regarding using cooperation for the conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish species.686 Cooperation can be achieved through the relevant regional and subregional
fisheries management organisation or arrangements.687 Flag states fishing on the high seas are
obligated to conform to relevant regional and subregional fisheries management organisation’s
measures regardless of whether they are members.688 Flag states are responsible for ensuring
that vessels flying their flags on the high seas always conform to all relevant subregional and
regional CMMs when fishing on the high seas.689 Other flag states’ responsibilities include
marking fishing vessels and gear;690 requirements of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS);691
regulation on trans-shipment on the high seas;692 verifying catch through observer programs;693
and Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) of fishing operations.694 States parties to the
Agreement other than flag states are also vested with the power of boarding and inspecting
fishing vessels to ensure compliance with CMMs on the high seas.695 Port states are also
obligated to encourage the effectiveness of international, regional, and subregional measures.696
5.2.1.4 The 2009 Port State Measures Agreement
The PSMA is the first legally binding international agreement to target IUU fishing.697 It was
adopted by the FAO Conference at its thirty-sixth session in Rome on 18 to 23 November 2009
under Paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the FAO constitution, through Resolution 12/220 on 22
November 2009.698 It later came into force on 5 June 2016 after ratification, acceptance,
approval and accession by 25 states.699 The PSMA enumerates comprehensive and legally
binding port state rights, duties, and responsibilities for the long-term conservation and
management of living resources.700 It provides a cost-effective means (as opposed to law
enforcement at sea) to combat IUU fishing, which is especially beneficial to developing states in
the Gulf of Guinea.701
686 Ibid arts 5, 8.
687 Ibid arts 8(2)-(4).
688 Ibid art 8(3).
689 Ibid art 18(1).
690 Ibid art 18(3)(d).
691 Ibid art 18(3)(e).
692 Ibid art 18(3)(h).
693 Ibid art 18(3)(f).
694 Ibid art 18(3)(g).
695 Ibid arts 21, 22.
696 Ibid art 23.
697 PSMA (n 69).
698 Ibid.
699 Mubarok (n 613) 146.
700 PSMA (n 69) preamble.
701 Ibid.
Ports of convenience facilitate IUU fishing and associated crimes.702 As such, the PSMA aims to
close all ports to IUU fishing vessels and their support vessels, including vessels used for trans-
shipments.703 It contains provisions for RFMO enforcement actions;704 conditions for prior entry
into port;705 the use of ports;706 inspections and follow-up actions;707 and flag state
responsibilities.708 It also gives port states the sovereign right to impose conditions for entry into
their ports.709 Port states can deny entry to a fishing vessel if they have sufficient proof that the
vessel has engaged in IUU fishing activities.710 Nevertheless, in circumstances like ‘force
majeure or distress’, IUU fishing vessels can enter the port for assistance.711
When the IUU fishing vessel is in port, the port state must refuse the use of its port for landing,
trans-shipments, packaging, and processing of fishery products.712 When it refuses entry, it must
promptly notify the flag state, coastal state, RFMO, and relevant international organisation.713
This shows that cooperation and information sharing with flag states, coastal states, the FAO
and relevant RFMOs is necessary for ensuring that international CMMs are complied with.
Although the PSMA does not directly address crimes associated with IUU fishing, increased
multi-agency port inspection, and denying port access in the Gulf of Guinea can deter illegal
activities related to IUU fishing vessels and discourage the transfer of illicit fishery and non-
fishery products from entering regional and international markets. Interagency cooperation and
information sharing with all stakeholders and government agencies will result in compliance
with criminal laws such as labour, immigration, drug, tax and customs laws, and potentially
curb IUU fishing.
5.2.1.5 The 2012 Cape Town Agreement
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 2012 Cape Town Agreement (CTA) is the only
internationally binding fisheries instrument to directly address the nexus between IUU fishing
702 Nerea Marteache, Julie Viollaz and Gohar A. Petrossian, ‘Factors Influencing the Choice of a Safer Haven for
offloading Illegally Caught Fish: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Economies’ (2015) 4(1)
Crime Science 1 -13. See also sec 4.3.3 in ch 4.
703 The Pew Charitable Trust, Implementing the Port State Measures Agreement: A Methodology for Conducting a
Capacity Need Assessment (The Pew Charitable Trust Report, April 2017) 3.
704 PSMA (n 69) art 6.
705 Ibid pt 2.
706 Ibid pt 3.
707 Ibid pt 4.
708 Ibid pt 5.
709 Ibid art 8.
710 Ibid art 9.
711 Ibid art 10.
712 Ibid art 11.
713 Ibid art 11(3).
and transnational organised crime.714 It was adopted in 2012 to close the gap in the exclusion of
fishing vessels from the International Convention of the Safety of Life at Sea (also known as the
SOLAS Convention).715 It is an amendment of the 1977 Torremolinos International Convention
for the Safety of Fishing Vessels and the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol. The agreement
establishes technical requirements to safeguard and protect the safety of fishers and observers
on board fishing vessels by stipulating measures for the standards of fishing vessels, including
the design, construction, and equipment of such vessels.716 In developing states such as those in
the Gulf of Guinea, the standards for fishing vessels stipulated in the agreement serve as an
excellent baseline to improve maritime safety and prevent IUU fishing. This means that states
can have more standards but not fewer than those prescribed in the agreement's provisions.
The previous chapter has indicated the relationship between IUU fishing, human trafficking, and
forced labour on fishing vessels in the Gulf of Guinea.717 Research has shown that migrant
workers who seek employment are enticed with job offers and forced to work in unsafe fishing
boats in unhygienic and hazardous conditions.718 The CTA aims to facilitate better control of
fishing vessels by flag states, coastal states, and port states by setting minimum requirements for
fishing vessels of 24 metres or longer in length or equivalent gross tonnage outside territorial
waters. The rationale for including only 24 metres or longer is that these vessels usually operate
on the high seas, and fishing vessels less than 24 metres conduct fishing activities within EEZ
regulated by national governments.719
To effectively address IUU fishing and human trafficking on fishing vessels in the Gulf of
Guinea, there must be coordinated ratification and implementation of the CTA, PSMA, and the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Work in Fishing Convention.720 The ILO Convention
sets minimum required standards for work on fishing vessels, including age limits, hours needed
for rest, accommodation, food, payment of fishers, and repatriation.721 The ratification of these
three treaties will strengthen maritime enforcement and compliance at the regional and national
levels, and ensure favourable working conditions for crews and observers. It will also uphold
714 The 2012 Cape Town Agreement (n 70).
715 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184, 1185
UNTS 2 (entered into force 25 May 1980).
716 See generally the 2012 Cape Town Agreement (n 70).
717 See sec 4.3.2 in ch 4.
718 Fear, Hunger and Violence (n 555) 6 – 47.
719 Mubarok (n 613) 148.
720 As of November 2021, only three states in the region: Angola, The Republic of Congo and Senegal have ratified
the ILO Work in Fishing Convention. See International Labour Organisation, ILO Statues of Ratification of C188 –
Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No.188)
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312333>
721 Convention (No.188) Concerning Work in the Fishing Sector, opened for signature 14 June 2007, 3209 UNTS
(entered into force 16 November 2017) arts 9, 13, 14, 21, 24, 26, 27.
crew safety at sea722 and allow for a coordinated interagency approach at ports to increase the
involvement of relevant fisheries and labour stakeholders in the maritime environment.723
However, the CTA has yet to come into force.724 It will enter into force ‘12 months after the
date on which not less than 22 states, the aggregate number of whose fishing vessels of 24 m in
length and over operating on the high seas is not less than 3,600, have expressed their consent to
be bound by it’.725 As of October 2022, only 17 states with an aggregate number of 1,907
applicable fishing vessels have become a party to the agreement.726 Only two Gulf of Guinea
states are parties to the agreement (Table 14). 727 Gaps that exist for not ratifying all three
treaties allow for the labour abuse of crew members working on fishing vessels flying the flag
of any Gulf of Guinea state. Nevertheless, there is potential for the Cape Town Agreement to
address IUU fishing, human trafficking, and improve working conditions when it enters into
force and is ratified and implemented by states in the region.
722 Widjaja et al. (n 470) 17.
723 Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea, ‘FCWC Engages Liberia Decision Makers on Cape
Town Agreement and Work in Fishing Convention Ratification’ (Press Release, 22 September 2021) <https://fcwc-
fish.org/our-news/fcwc-engages-liberia-decision-makers-on-cape-town-agreement-and-work-in-fishing-convention-
ratification>
724 Except for the EU member states adopting Directive 97/70/EC of 11 December 1997. See International Labour
Organisation, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (ILO Report, 31 May 2013) 33.
725 The 2012 Cape Town Agreement (n 70) art 4(1).
726 ‘2021 Cape Town Agreement to Enhance Fishing Safety’, International Maritime Organisation (Web Page)
<https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/CapeTownAgreementForFishing.aspx >
727 Only the Republic of Congo and São Tome and Principe have ratified the agreement in the Gulf of Guinea.
5.2.2 Legally Binding International Criminal Instruments
Table 15: Ratifications of international instruments for transnational organised crimes by
Gulf of Guinea states.
State
United Nations Convention
Against Transnational
Organised Crime 2000
Protocol Against Illegal
Migration 2000
Protocol Against Trafficking
in Persons 2000
Protocol Against Trafficking
in Firearms 2001
Angola
X
X
X
X
Benin
X
X
X
X
Burkina Faso
X
X
X
X
Cabo Verde
X
X
X
X
Cameroon
X
X
X
Central African Republic
X
X
X
X
Chad
X
X
X
Côte d’Ivoire
X
X
X
X
The Republic of Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo
X
X
X
X
Equatorial Guinea
X
X
X
Gabon
X
X
X
X
The Gambia
X
X
X
Ghana
X
X
X
X
Guinea
X
X
X
Guinea-Bissau
X
X
X
X
Liberia
X
X
X
X
Mali
X
X
X
X
Mauritania
X
X
X
X
Niger
X
X
X
Nigeria
X
X
X
X
São Tomé and Príncipe
X
X
X
X
Senegal
X
X
X
X
Sierra Leone
X
X
X
X
Togo
X
X
X
X
Source: Compiled from the United Nations status of ratification website.
5.2.2.1 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its
protocols are the primary international instruments to suppress and combat transnational
organised crimes.728 The UNTOC has been ratified by 24 states in the Gulf of Guinea (Table
15). The convention provides a comprehensive framework to combat transnational organised
crimes through criminalising organised crimes under national law; making provisions for
extradition and mutual legal assistance; and strengthening member states’ law enforcement.729 It
implicitly defines transnational organised crime with three elements: (1) transnational
element;730 (2) organised crime element;731 and (3) serious crime element.732 However, the
convention does not provide a detailed list of transnational organised crimes. As such, it may be
argued that it allows for a broader application of the term to accommodate new crimes
(including IUU fishing) that may emerge as international, regional, and national conditions
change over time.
Several independent studies have argued that to effectively address the criminal dimension of
IUU fishing, it must be within the framework of transnational organised crime.733 Nonetheless,
IUU fishing can only be classified as a transnational organised crime if it satisfies the
requirements under Articles 2(a) to (b) and 3 of UNTOC. The analysis of Chapter Four reveals
that IUU fishing satisfies the transnational element, such as foreign vessels fishing in the Gulf of
Guineas waters without proper license or authorisation.734 It also meets the organised crime
element as IUU fishing is usually an operation that needs to be carried out with an organised
plan and involves a group of three or more people to obtain financial gain or other benefits.
However, the serious crime element has been debated in academic literature. Telesetsky, in her
analysis of IUU fishing and transnational organised crime, noted that the term ‘maximum’ and
‘more serious penalty’ in Article 2(b) of the convention creates a problem.735 She stated that
‘while it seems that there must be at least a maximum prison sentence of four years for a crime
728 UNTOC (n 278).
729 UNTOC (n 278) arts 16, 18 and 27; Mary Ann Palma-Robles, ‘Tightening the Net: The Legal Link Between
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational Crime Under International Law’ (2015) 29(1) Ocean
Yearbook 149.
730 UNTOC (n 278) art 3(2).
731 Ibid art 2(a).
732 Ibid art 2(b).
733 Mubarok (n 613) 1- 310; Ardi Hendharto, ‘Understanding IUU Fishing as Transnational Organized Crime with
Special Example of Benjina Case’ (2018) 23(2) Kajian 95-109; Telesetsky (n 94) 939-997; Cand Jur. Gunnar
Stølsvik, ‘Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime as a Maritime Security Issue’ (Panel Presentation, United
Nations) <https://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/documents/9_gunnarstolsvikabstract.pdf>; Andrea A.
Stefanus and John A. E. Vervaele, ‘Fishy Business: Regulatory and Enforcement Challenges of Transnational
Organised IUU Fishing Crimes’ (2021) 24(4) Trends in Organized Crime 581 – 600.
734 See sec 4.2 in ch 4.
735 Telesetsky (n 94) 968 and 969.
to qualify as a “serious crime”, it also seems possible that the prison sentence could be longer if
imprisonment can also be considered as a “more serious penalty”.736
Nevertheless, IUU fishing is a serious crime that impacts the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime
security.737 IUU fishing causes harm to the human security of coastal communities by
destroying the environmental, economic, food, personal, and community security of the
region.738 It also causes harm to national security by acting as a vehicle for other crimes in the
Gulf of Guinea.739 Categorising IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime will incur
harsher penalties and serve as a much needed deterrent that will enhance the Gulf of Guinea’s
maritime security.
Different states have varying perspectives on how IUU fishing is classified. Some states view
IUU fishing as a fisheries management problem that attracts only administrative fines. For
example, New Zealand’s Fisheries Act 1996 provides for only administrative penalties for a
range of illegal fisheries offences.740 In comparison, other states like Indonesia have adopted
criminal sanctions for IUU fishing, such as the burning and sinking of illegal fishing vessels.741
For Gulf of Guinea states, the importance and complexity of the maritime environment should
not allow dissociation between IUU fishing and related crimes if IUU fishing is to be effectively
addressed.742 As a result, an integrated approach is required to effectively address IUU fishing
and its criminal dimensions. Gulf of Guinea states should understand that IUU fishing is a
transnational organised crime that should be criminalised.
Articles 5, 6 and 8 of UNTOC require that member states criminalise participation in
transnational criminal activities. Notably, Article 5 states that member states should adopt laws
and other means to criminalise those that engage in criminal activities of an organised criminal
group. States must also criminalise those that engage in ‘organising, directing, aiding, abetting,
facilitating or counselling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal
group’.743 Article 5(1) (b) provides for criminalising activities that aid, abet, or facilitate
transnational criminal groups. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea states are encouraged to criminalise
IUU fishing as it facilitates other maritime crimes. Article 8 also states that national laws should
736 Ibid.
737 See ch 4.
738 See sec 4.3.1 in ch 4.
739 See sec 4.3.2 in ch 4.
740 Fisheries Act 1996 (New Zealand) s 252.
741 Mubarok (n 613) 165 - 168.
742 Ioannis Chapsos and Steve Hamiltion, ‘Illegal Fishing and Fisheries Crime as a Transnational Organized Crime in
Indonesia’ (2018) 22(3) Trends in Organized Crimes 271.
743 UNTOC (n 278) art 5(1)(b).
criminalise activities that promise, offer, or give bribes to public officials. As previously
analysed, there is evidence of operators of IUU fishing vessels offering bribes to fisheries
officers in exchange for obtaining fisheries licences and evading naval patrols in the Gulf of
Guinea.744 In addition, Article 5(2) (b) of the Protocol Against Trafficking in Persons provides
for the criminalisation of ‘participating as an accomplice’ in the trafficking of persons.
Similarly, Article 5 of the Protocol Against Illegal Migration provides for the criminalisation of
participation as an accomplice in smuggling migrants. The above provisions show that
criminalising IUU fishing in national laws would satisfy state obligations under the UNTOC.
States must cooperate and coordinate with relevant law enforcement agencies to prevent and
suppress transnational organised crime.745 States shall also consider entering into bilateral and
multilateral agreements to aid in cooperation with relevant agencies.746 These provisions create
a framework for interagency cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law
enforcement agencies in combating IUU fishing.
5.2.3 Discussion of the Challenges
The analysis above demonstrates that there are low ratifications of binding international
instruments for combatting IUU fishing by Gulf of Guinea states. As shown in Table 14, most
states are yet to ratify fisheries instruments, particularly the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement,
1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 2009 Port State Measures Agreement, and the 2012 Cape
Town Agreement. Since its entry into force in 2016, only 14 states have ratified the PSMA.747
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement has been ratified by only six states, 20 years after its
entry into force. Likewise, the FAO Compliance Agreement has been ratified by six states in the
Gulf of Guinea since its entry into force in 2003. The 2012 Cape Town Agreement has the least
ratifications, with only two ratifying states in the Gulf of Guinea.
The rationale behind the low ratifications is that most Gulf of Guinea states cannot implement
provisions stipulated in these agreements.748 For example, the PSMA has been said to be a cost-
effective means of combatting IUU fishing. However, the lack of eagerness to ratify the
agreement connotes that Gulf of Guinea states are still worried about the cost of implementing
the agreement. This view was supported in a study by Okafor-Yarwood where she posits that
many states in the region had not ratified PSMA because ratification would mean implementing
robust and comprehensive MCS measures, which will come as an added responsibility to states
744 See sec 4.3.2 in ch 4.
745 UNTOC (n 278) art 27.
746 Ibid art 27(2).
747 In October 2022, Nigeria ratified the PSMA.
748 Palma, Tsamenyi, and Edeson (n 20) 94.
in the region that are already struggling to monitor fisheries activities in national waters.749
Low ratification of international instruments is troubling because it implies a lack of political
will by governments in the Gulf of Guinea to support the fisheries sector and combat IUU
fishing. Indeed, the lack of political will is evident in the percentage of the annual budget
allocated to the fisheries sector. For instance, in 2019, 2020, and 2021, only <2%, <1% and
1.5% of Nigeria’s federal annual budget was allocated to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development and its agencies, including the Federal Department of Fisheries and
Aquaculture.750 This is significantly less than the target projection of ten per cent that states in
the African Union agreed to allocate to agriculture and rural development in the Maputo
Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa [Assembly/AU/Decl.7(II)].751 The lack
of allocating adequate funds suggests that the fisheries sector is not a top priority for states in
the region.752
Furthermore, there are low domestication of international instruments for combatting IUU
fishing by Gulf of Guinea states.753 States are reluctant to adopt fisheries international
instruments into their domestic legal system to make it national law.754 The lack of
domestication significantly undermines the impact of international agreements, as without it,
these commitments remain abstract principles or guidelines that do not hold legal weight at the
national level. The AU-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) has identified
16 instruments that have been identified for domestication among states. 755
This thesis can confirm that the domestication of international fisheries agreement by Gulf of
Guinea states is a significant issue impeding effectively addressing IUU fishing and maritime
security. However, it is an area that requires research into the governance and politics of the Gulf
749 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 419.
750Abdulkareem Mojeed, ‘Less than 2% of Nigeria’s Budget Allocated to Capital Agriculture Projects – Official’
Premium Times (Online, 25 September 2020) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/416939-less-
than-2-of-nigerias-budget-allocated-to-capital-agriculture-projects-official.html>; Oge Udegbunam, ‘2021 Budget
Proposal: Again, Nigeria Underfunds Agriculture as Done in the Last 20 years’ Premium Times (Online, 15 October
2020) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/420974-2021-budget-proposal-again-nigeria-underfunds-
agriculture-as-done-in-last-20-years.html>
751 African Union Development Agency, AU 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security (AUDA-
NEPAD Publication, July 2003) <https://www.nepad.org/caadp/publication/au-2003-maputo-declaration-agriculture-
and-food-security>
752 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 419.
753 ‘Promoting Domestication of International Instruments in Fisheries and Aquaculture’ (Advocacy Notice, AU-
Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources, 2018) 1
<https://www.au-ibar.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/pb_20180926_advocacy_note_domestication_en.pdf>
754 Ibid.
755 Ibid 2.
of Guinea states in many sectors, beyond the scope of this thesis and should be an area of future
research for Gulf of Guinea states.
Insufficient ratification and domestication create gaps in the effectiveness of international
agreements in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, gaps in coastlines left by states that have not
ratified and domesticated the PSMA create an avenue for IUU fishing and criminal operators to
land their fishery and non-fishery products in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Senegal,
Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone have all ratified the PSMA. However, Guinea-Bissau
(located in the middle of Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone) has not ratified the
agreement. IUU fishing and criminal operators can land their fishery and illicit products in
Guinea-Bissau to supply Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone markets. Gulf of Guinea
states must recognise that the success of international agreements depends on combined
ratification and, most importantly, domestication and effective implementation on a national
level by all states.
In addition, most international regulatory measures to combat IUU fishing provide a
comprehensive approach to address IUU fishing but are ill-equipped to address the criminal
dimension of IUU fishing. Failure to address associated crimes in international fisheries
instruments makes it challenging to bring crimes committed on board IUU fishing vessels under
control. The UNTOC, on the other hand, does not cover IUU fishing activities or fishing
activities in general. It may be argued that this is because of silos in international law and
policy, as fishing activities fall broadly outside maritime security agendas and discussions.
However, Gulf of Guinea states are encouraged to adopt laws that include provisions that merge
criminal acts with fishing activities.756 This will enable the criminalisation of IUU fishing
activities under national law.
5.3 Existing Legal and Institutional Framework for Addressing IUU Fishing and Maritime
Security in the Gulf of Guinea.
Gulf of Guinea states have not remained aloof to the challenges of combatting IUU fishing and
enhancing maritime security and have adopted legal instruments to address IUU fishing and
strengthen maritime security. However, to effectively address the challenges of IUU fishing,
these national legal instruments must show the connection between IUU fishing and
transnational organised crimes. Indeed, the nexus between IUU fishing and transnational
organised crimes is evident in two ways. First, organised criminal groups may be directly
756 ‘Fisheries Crime: Transnational Organized Criminal Activities in the Context of the Fisheries Sector’, United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Focus Sheet) 5 <https://www.unodc.org/documents/about-
unodc/Campaigns/Fisheries/focus_sheet_PRINT.pdf>
involved in the fisheries sector to support their criminal activities, e.g., international drug
trafficking operators in Guinea-Bissau’s fishing sector.757 Second, IUU fishing operators may
simultaneously engage in criminal activities to conceal their illegal activities, e.g., the use of
money laundering to conceal illegal gains from IUU fishing. Therefore, this section will review
the national fisheries and criminal legislation of seven select Gulf of Guinea states (Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone)758 to determine whether
they reflect the nexus between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime. 759
Additionally, this section will examine the fisheries legislation of the study states to determine
whether IUU fishing is characterised as a transnational organised crime and, therefore, a
maritime security threat. Classifying IUU fishing as a maritime security threat in national
legislation will act as a foundation for integrating fisheries and maritime sectors to combat IUU
fishing. Fisheries legislation for each state was extracted from FAOLEX, ECOLEX, SRFC and
the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) databases and maritime
security legislation was extracted from the NATLEX database and google search results.760
5.3.1 Legal Framework
5.3.1.1 Ghana
Ghana’s 2002 Fisheries Act (Act 625) provides limited criminal liability for fisheries offences.
For instance, the Act provides up to two years imprisonment for the wilful destruction of
another person’s fishing vessel or fishing gear.761 A person that violates a banning order may be
subject to not more than twelve months imprisonment.762 However, its implementing regulation,
Fisheries Regulations, 2010 (L.I.1968), provides explicit and comprehensive criminal sanctions
for fishing activities categorised as IUU fishing.763 Section 8 of the regulation imposes criminal
liability for fishing with illegal set nets. A person convicted under this section may be
imprisoned for up to 12 months.764 A prison sentence of not more than two years may be
imposed for parties that use beach seine nets in marine protected areas.765
757 Lewerenz and Vorrath (n 595) 2. See also sec 4.3.2 in ch 4.
758 The seven study states were selected because they make up of states with three official languages (English,
French, and Portuguese). It is important to see how these different Gulf of Guinea states with other official languages
view IUU fishing. This will enable the identification of states that need legislative improvements.
759 For this thesis, the author reviewed only current fisheries legislation that relate to fishing activities. For criminal
laws, only Acts and Decrees were reviewed. It excluded regulations that may identify the nexus between organised
crimes and IUU fishing and could be an area of future research.
760 An overview of the national legal framework is provided in Appendix 1.
761 Fisheries Act 2002 (Ghana) s 129.
762 Ibid s 127.
763 Fisheries Regulations 2010 (Ghana).
764 Ibid s 8.
765 Ibid s 9.
Table 16: Additional IUU fishing activities and criminal penalties under Ghana’s fisheries
legislation.
Legal Provision
IUU Fishing Activity
Criminal Penalty
Section 12 and 16 of
Ghana’s Fisheries
Regulation 2010
The use of fishing nets
with less than the
minimum mesh size
Imprisonment of not more than three years for a
trawl net with a mesh size of less than sixty
millimetres, a shrimp trawl net with a mesh size
of less than fifty millimetres, and a large pelagic
purse seine-net with a mesh size of less than one
hundred millimetres.
Imprisonment of not more than 12 months for a
small pelagic purse seine-net with a mesh size of
less than twenty-five millimetres
Section 15 of
Ghana’s Fisheries
Regulation 2010
The use of chafers on
trawl nets
Imprisonment of not more than two years
Section 16 of
Ghana’s Fisheries
Regulation 2010
Fishing for turtles
Imprisonment of not more than 12 months
Section 32 of
Ghana’s Fisheries
Regulation 2010
Dumping of fish suitable
for human consumption
For commercial fishing, imprisonment of not
more than three years
For personal use, imprisonment of not more than
three months
Section 49 of
Ghana’s Fisheries
Regulation 2010
VMS offenses
For a person that tampers with a monitoring
device or a master that violates its terms and
conditions, imprisonment of not more than two
years.
For a fishing vessel that is used for the offences
above, the master or charterer of the vessel may
be imposed with an imprisonment sentence of not
more than 12 months.
Section 50 of
Absence of proper
Imprisonment of not more than two years
Ghana’s Fisheries
documentation and
Regulation 2010
falsification of
documentation onboard
fishing vessel
Criminal activities associated with IUU fishing may be prosecuted under Ghana’s Anti-Money
Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044) as IUU fishing operators are known to conceal illegal money
and assets obtained from the activity. Article 1 of the Act creates criminal sanctions for a person
that converts, conceals, disguises, or transfers the property which forms proceeds of unlawful
activity to conceal or disguise the illicit origin of the property. Anyone guilty of this offence
may be liable to imprisonment of a minimum of not less than 12 months and a maximum of not
more than ten years.766 However, in practice, prosecuting IUU fishing under this section may be
difficult as there is no explicit classification of IUU fishing under the Act.
Fortunately, Ghana’s Fisheries Act 2002 acknowledges that fishing vessels are linked with other
crimes and imposes a legal obligation for the master and crews of a fishing vessel to observe
health, customs, and immigration laws.767 Immigration officials are authorised to search any
fishing vessel in carrying out their duties.768 The Fisheries Regulation 2010 also recognises
document forgery in the fisheries sector and prohibits the falsification of any document issued
under the regulation, including licenses and logbooks.769 Additionally, Ghana’s National Plan of
Action to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (NPOA-IUU) expressly notes
the link between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime.770
5.3.1.2 The Republic of Guinea
Fishing activities in the Republic of Guinea are primarily governed by Law No. 2015/26/AN of
14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code.771 This code identifies IUU fishing as a
threat to management and conservation efforts.772 It mandates the prosecution of nationals that
‘support or practice’ IUU fishing.773 It also provides explicit criminal liability for nationals and
foreigners for fisheries violations under the code, but surprisingly does not punish any IUU
fishing offence with imprisonment.774 This suggests that even though the code acknowledges the
crime of IUU fishing, there is hesitation with imposing imprisonment sanctions.
It is understandable why there are no imprisonment sanctions for foreign nationals due to
Section 73(3) of UNCLOS which prohibits such sanctions. However, contrary to expectations,
766 Anti-Money Laundering Act 2020 (Ghana) s 4(b).
767 Fisheries Act 2002 (Ghana) s 77.
768 Immigration Act, 2000 (Ghana) s 44.
769 Fisheries Regulations 2010 (Ghana) s 73.
770 Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development, National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (Ghana’s NPOA-IUU) (MOFAD, 2014) s 7.
771 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea).
772 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea) art 29.
773 Ibid art 32(2).
774 Ibid art 233(5).
there are no imprisonment sanctions for nationals. Even those IUU fishing offences considered
as ‘very serious’ offences under the code (such as fishing without a license in or outside
territorial waters,775 failure to comply with reporting obligations,776 trading or import of IUU
fishing products,777 and the use of prohibited fishing gear or methods778) are only subject to
fines and other administrative sanctions. Specifically, the code imposes a minimum fine of EUR
1,500 and a maximum fine of EUR 10,000 for nationals who practice or facilitate IUU
fishing,779
Nevertheless, Guinea’s Maritime Fishing Code recognises the nexus between fishing activities
and forced labour.780 It may refuse to grant or renew the license to any fishing vessel that does
not meet the technical conditions and standards of safe working conditions in the CTA and
ILO.781 Corruption is also recognised to be associated with fishing activities under the Maritime
Fishing Code. It states that the provisions of the Penal Code will punish corruption or attempted
corruption of fisheries observers on fishing vessels.782 Under the Penal Code, a person that
offers bribes to a public official may be punished with an imprisonment term of three to ten
years.783 Furthermore, Guinea’s NPOA-IUU explicitly recognises the link between IUU fishing,
maritime security and organised crimes. It notes that IUU fishing undermines efforts to address
maritime security and organised crime.784
5.3.1.3 Guinea-Bissau
Decree-Law No. 10/2011, Approving the Regulation on Basic Fishing, the primary legislation
for fisheries management and conservation, creates liability for activities that fall under the
classification of IUU fishing. For instance, industrial fishing without a licence;785 industrial
fishing in territorial waters;786 destructive fishing methods;787 fishing in prohibited areas,
periods, species, or gear;788and industrial fishing without a fisheries observer on board, may be
punished under the law.789 However, liabilities imposed are only limited to administrative
775 Ibid arts 237, 238.
776 Ibid art 241 category 2 (c).
777 Ibid art 241 category 2(e).
778 Ibid art 241 category 2 (k).
779 Ibid art 249.
780 Ibid art 54 (c).
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid art 255.
783 Law No. 2016/059/AN of 26 October 2016 on the Penal Code (Guinea) art 771.
784 Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy, National Action Plan to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Guinea’s NPOA-IUU) (Department of Fisheries, 2017) s 1.2.
785 Decree-Law No. 10/2011 Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation (Guinea Bissau) art 63(a).
786 Ibid art 24.
787 Ibid arts 63(e), 64(c).
788 Ibid art 63(b).
789 Ibid art 64(b)
sanctions.790
Similarly, Decree No. 24/2011, Approving the Regulation on Artisanal Fisheries, which governs
artisanal fisheries within inland waters and territorial sea, imposes only administrative
punishments for IUU fishing activities. These offences include failure to obtain a fishing license
or authorisation;791 fishing in prohibited zones, periods, species, or gear;792 and fishing without a
license on board.793
The lack of criminal sanctions for IUU fishing offences in fisheries legislation may suggest the
lack of political will to combat IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime. Examination of
Guinea-Bissau’s fisheries legislation also shows that the concept of IUU fishing and
transnational organised crime has not been recognised. This implies that Guinea-Bissau’s
legislation has not sufficiently recognised the link between IUU fishing and other crimes and is
inadequate to combat the criminal dimensions of IUU fishing.
5.3.1.4 Liberia
In 2010, Liberia adopted comprehensive fisheries legislation known as the Regulations Relating
to Fisheries, Fishing and Related Activities for the Marine Fisheries Sector in the Republic of
Liberia (also known as the New Fisheries Regulation), to manage its fish resources.794 However,
this regulation failed to include criminal sanctions for IUU fishing activities. It appears that the
drafters of the regulation did not recognise the extent to which criminal organisations would
become involved with fishing activities in Liberia’s territorial waters.
In 2019, Liberia developed its Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law to
amend the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2017. The Fisheries and Aquaculture
Management and Development Law provides comprehensive criminal liabilities for IUU fishing
violations.795 The Act explicitly criminalised IUU fishing offences, such as providing for an
imprisonment sentence of no more than five years for industrial fishing in the Inshore Exclusive
Zone (IEZ).796 The Act also prohibits the import, export, possession, transport, or purchase of
fish taken, possessed, transported, or sold in contravention of any Liberian or international
790 Ibid arts 70, 72.
791 Decree No. 24/2011 Approving the Regulation on Artisanal Fisheries (Guinea Bissau), art 42(a).
792 Ibid art 42(b).
793 Ibid art 43(a).
794 Regulations Relating to Fisheries, Fishing and Related Activities, for the Marine Fisheries Sector in the Republic
of Liberia 2010 (Liberia).
795 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Development Law 2019 (Liberia).
796 Ibid s 4.3.
law.797 Furthermore, the Act assigns a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment for fishing
with prohibited gear and using harmful fishing methods, such as pair trawling.798 Failure to
comply with prohibitions on shark fishing,799 driftnet fishing,800 and fishing for endangered and
protected fish species,801 may also result in a prison sentence of up to three years. The Act also
assigns a maximum sentence of 12 months for introducing genetically modified fish species into
Liberia’s territorial waters,802 and a maximum imprisonment sentence of six months for
dumping fishing gear and other objects at sea, which impedes harvests and puts other vessels at
risk.803
Table 17: Additional IUU fishing activities and criminal penalties under Liberia’s fisheries
legislation.
Legal Provision
IUU Fishing Activity
Criminal Penalty
Section 4.16 of Liberia’s
Fisheries and Aquaculture
Management and Development
Law 2019
Prohibited Fishing in Marine
Protected Areas
Imprisonment for a fixed term
of ten years
Section 9.4 of Liberia’s
Fisheries and Aquaculture
Management and Development
Law 2019
Absence of an Automatic
Identification System (AIS)
onboard
Imprisonment of not more than
five years
Section 10.8 (4) (8) of Liberia’s
Fisheries and Aquaculture
Management and Development
Law 2019
Absence of Proper
Documentation on board
Imprisonment of not more than
one year
Section 10.25 (1) (2) (3) (5) of
Liberia’s Fisheries and
Aquaculture Management and
Development Law 2019
Illegal Trans-shipments
Imprisonment of not more than
five years
The 2019 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Development Law explicitly recognises that
IUU fishing can be associated with transnational organised crime and states that ‘where it
appears that any offence against this Act involved transnational criminal activity or was
committed in association with other transnational criminal activity, an aggravated fine or
797 Ibid s 7.5.
798 Ibid s 4.6.
799 Ibid s 4.7.
800 Ibid s 4.10.
801 Ibid s 4.14.
802 Ibid s 4.9.
803 Ibid s 4.9.
penalty shall be required...’.804 The Act also prohibits child labour on board fishing vessels.805
Document forgery, corruption, and bribery were also recognised under the Act. The Act
prohibits fishing vessels from holding more than one valid registration or offering bribes to
fisheries inspectors or observers.806 Similarly, the NPOA-IUU explicitly recognised IUU fishing
to be associated with transnational organised crime.807
5.3.1.5 Nigeria
The Sea Fisheries Act 1992 is the principal legal instrument regulating marine fisheries in
Nigeria. The Act creates criminal sanctions for destructive fishing practices within Nigerian
territorial waters. The Act provides up to two years imprisonment for using an explosive
substance, noxious or poisonous matter to fish within its territorial waters.808 It also assigns five
years imprisonment sanctions for fishing without being registered and licensed.809 All other
violations under the Act such as making false statements to obtain a fishing licence, are subject
to only fines.810
An examination of Nigeria’s fisheries legislative framework shows that national laws are
inadequate to combat the criminal activities arising from IUU fishing. A review of the fisheries
legislation reveals that the concept of IUU fishing and its nexus with transnational organised
crime does not exist in national laws. A plausible reason for the gap lies in the age of Nigeria’s
fisheries legislation (Appendix 1). The laws were adopted over 30 years ago when the term IUU
fishing did not exist or the recognition that IUU fishing may be associated with other maritime
crimes. Still, it is alarming that Nigeria has yet to amend its Sea Fisheries Act 1992 to comply
with international best practices in relation to IUU fishing and transnational organised crime.
Nevertheless, an examination of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act
2007 shows that ‘unauthorised fishing activities’811 are viewed as a threat to maritime
security.812 However, it may be argued that the Act does not explicitly mention IUU fishing.
Nonetheless, there is potential under this provision for addressing the problem of IUU fishing.
804 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Development Law 2019 (Liberia) s 15.2(d).
805 Ibid s 10.5(3).
806 Ibid ss 10.14(c), 11.14(1)
807 National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority, National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries (NaFAA, 2018) (‘Liberia’s NPOA-IUU’) s 19.
808 Sea Fisheries Act 1992 (Nigeria) s 10.
809 Ibid s 1.
810 Ibid s 12.
811 IUU fishing is any fishing activity that contravenes management and conservation laws, therefore ‘unauthorised
fishing activities’ may be classified as IUU fishing.
812 Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act 2007 (Nigeria) s 23(9)(c).
5.3.1.6 Senegal
In 2015, Senegal revised its Maritime Fisheries Code to include more deterrent sanctions for
fisheries violations, particularly IUU fishing offences.813 This law establishes liability for
nationals for infringements of IUU fishing offences. However, liability is limited to
administrative sanctions such as fines and confiscation of catches and fishing gear.814 The only
violations subject to imprisonment under the law may be an indicator of illegal fishing. For
example, a fisher that prevents an authorised person or an observer from discharging his duty
may be subject to six months imprisonment.815 A person that attacks or threatens violence
against an authorised person or an observer when carrying out his duties may be punished by
imprisonment of six months to a year.816
However, the Maritime Fisheries Code recognises that corruption can be associated with
fisheries activities and therefore stipulates that sanctions in the Penal Code will apply in such
cases.817 Under the Senegalese Penal Code, a person who gives a bribe to a public official may
be imprisoned from two to ten years.818
5.3.1.7 Sierra Leone
The primary legal instrument regulating fisheries conservation and management in Sierra Leone
is the Fisheries and Aquaculture Act, 2018 (No.10 of 2018).819 Although the Act does not
explicitly identify the crime of IUU fishing, it provides options for criminal sanctions for fishing
activities that classify as IUU fishing, such as fishing without a valid certificate of
registration,820 fishing without a valid licence,821 fishing with prohibited gear,822 and fishing with
prohibited methods.823 There is no clear indication as to the exact imprisonment sanctions that
will be given for these offences under the Act, only that the Minister of Fisheries, by statutory
instrument, may prescribe criminal sanctions. However, its implementing regulation, the
Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019, indicates that the court might order a term of
imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.824
813 Law No. 2015-18 of 13 July 2015 on the Code of Maritime Fisheries (Senegal).
814 Ibid arts 122 – 129.
815 Ibid art 131.
816 Ibid art 132.
817 Ibid art 130.
818 Law No. 65 – 60 of 21 July 1965 on the Penal Code (Senegal) arts 16, 159.
819 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2018 (Sierra Leone).
820 Ibid s 13.
821 Ibid s 14.
822 Ibid s 42.
823 Ibid s 40.
824 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019 (Sierra Leone) s 51(2)(a).
Table 18: Additional IUU fishing activities and criminal penalties under Sierra Leone’s
fisheries legislation.
Legal Provision
IUU Fishing Activity
Criminal Penalty
Section 17 (1) (4) of Sierra
Leone’s Fisheries and
Aquaculture Act 2018
Failure to Comply with
Reporting Obligations
Term of Imprisonment as the
Minister, by statutory
instrument, may prescribe
Section 37 of Sierra Leone’s
Fisheries and Aquaculture Act
2018
VMS Default
As Above
Section 47 of Sierra Leone’s
Fisheries and Aquaculture Act
2018
Fishing for Marine Protected
Species
As Above
The Act also recognises the nexus between corruption and fishing activities in Sierra Leone,
making it illegal for an authorised officer to receive or solicit bribes when carrying out his
duties.825 A person that offers a bribe to the authorised officer is also held criminally liable.826
Additionally, the 2019 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulation recognises other crimes like forced
labour and trafficking (persons, firearms, and drugs) on foreign fishing vessels.827 A foreign
fishing vessel engaged in these activities will result in denial of a license to fish in Sierra Leone
waters.828 The regulation also recognises the link between document forgery and fishing
vessels.829
5.3.1.8 Discussion of the Legal Challenges
From the analysis above, some legal challenges need to be addressed. First, there are no explicit
provisions in national legislation classifying IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime or a
threat to maritime security. However, sanctions that may be imposed for IUU fishing offences
suggest how IUU fishing is viewed in the Gulf of Guinea. In legislation, English-speaking states
(Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) view IUU fishing as a crime,830 while non-English-
speaking states (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal) view IUU fishing as a fisheries
management issue and impose only administrative sanctions.
Nonetheless, in practice, criminal prosecutions in English-speaking states are exceedingly rare.
Even when criminally prosecuted, they are not widely publicised. Telesetsky agrees with this
825 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2018 (Sierra Leone) s 21(5)(a).
826 Ibid s 25.
827 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019 (Sierra Leone) s 15(a)(v).
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid s 25(d).
830 English-speaking states may impose criminal sanctions for IUU activities in national legislation.
assertion in her analysis of the top five fish-producing states.831 She noted that criminal
prosecutions of fisheries offences are hardly ever imposed.832 For Gulf of Guinea states, poor
documentation of IUU fishing infringements and prosecutions severely limits one’s ability to
obtain information on sanctions.833 However, data from various media sources, scholarly
literature, the International Criminal Police Organisations (INTERPOL), and observations from
multiple Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)834 reveal that criminal sanctions are rarely
imposed.835 Administrative sanctions are primarily imposed for IUU fishing offences.
One potential reason for not imposing criminal sanctions lies in how difficult it is to criminally
prosecute fisheries offences. Generally, in prosecuting criminal offences, the crime must be
proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, which must be supported by credible evidence. As a result,
criminal prosecution for IUU fishing offences is often difficult because IUU fishing operators
are known to quickly discard or throw overboard evidence at sea.836 Specifically, in the Gulf of
Guinea, criminal prosecutions are hard to obtain because of severe corruption in national
judiciaries. According to Transparency International, most Gulf of Guinea states do not perform
well in the 2020 corruption rankings: Ghana (75/180), Guinea (137/180), Guinea-Bissau
(165/180), Liberia (137/180), Nigeria (149/180), Senegal (67/180), and Sierra Leone
(117/180).837
Additionally, in Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC) reported that between 2018 and 2020, the Nigerian judiciary ranked top in
Nigeria’s Corruption Index.838 It went further to state that during the same period, over N9.5
billion (the equivalent of USD17 million) was demanded, offered, and paid as bribes in
Nigeria’s judicial sector.839 Likewise, a 2021 report published by the Center for Transparency
and Accountability in Liberia reported that court services handed out by the judiciary ranked
fourth among services prone to corruption.840 It noted that judges take bribes to receive
favourable judgments, and sometimes the judges themselves solicit for bribes to try cases, grant
831 Telesetsky (n 94) 972, 979.
832 Ibid.
833 Poor documentation of sanctions may be due to the lack of a legal requirement to publish details of infringements
and sanctions.
834 NGOs used for this analysis are the EJF, Sea Shephard, and Greenpeace.
835 ProQuest and Factiva Newspaper Database were used in this analysis.
836 Telesetsky (n 94) 981.
837 Available at ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, Transparency International (Web Page)
<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020>
838 Sampson Iroka et al., Nigeria Corruption Index Report of a Pilot Survey (Independent Corrupt Practices & Other
related Offences Commission (ICPC) Report, 2020) 17.
839 Ibid 24.
840 Gerald D. Yeakula et al., State of Corruption Report 2021 (Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia,
2021) 37.
bail to detainees, and acquit defendants in criminal cases.841 In a region with high levels of
corruption, IUU fishing operators may pay bribes in return for a favourable judgment, cause
delays in proceedings, or lose evidence. Even if there is little or no corruption, criminal
litigation is a long and expensive process that makes out-of-court settlements attractive. Gulf of
Guinea states struggling financially would prefer to take advantage of the opportunity to speed
up cases and get fast resolution of cases through out-of-court settlements.
Nonetheless, out-of-court settlements are opportune for abuse and are mostly inadequate to
combat the problem of IUU fishing. The Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 case demonstrates how out-of-
court settlements are not deterrent enough to combat IUU fishing.842 In 2019, the Lu Rong Yuan
Yu 956 was detained in Ghana with illegal fish nets and juvenile small pelagic fish on board the
vessel.843 The operators of the fishing vessel were issued a fine of USD1 million (which was the
minimum statutory fine) and an additional GHS 124,000.844 They refused to pay the fine, and
the licence of the vessel was renewed and allowed to go back out to sea again, where they were
later caught for a second time in 2020 by Ghana Marine Police for an identical offence.845
The Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 case demonstrates how essential it is for Gulf of Guinea states to
ensure that IUU fishing penalties are appropriately severe.846 However, the likelihood that IUU
fishing by foreign nationals will be prosecuted criminally in the future is slim. The current
provisions of Section 73(3) of UNCLOS prohibit the criminal prosecution of foreign nationals
for IUU fishing offences. In theory, the convention's provisions must be reviewed and amended
to include criminal sanctions for foreign nationals. However, this is highly unlikely due to the
difficulty in amending any provision of the convention.847 The 2002 meeting of the Convention
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) member states, where
the Australian government tried to amend the application of Article 73(2) of the convention so
that it does not apply to fishing vessels or support craft arrested for IUU fishing, demonstrates
841 Ibid 40.
842 ‘Trawler Re-Arrested in Ghana for Repeated Illegal Fishing Crimes after Refusing to Pay Fine’, Environment
Justice Foundation (News Article, 10 June 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/notorious-trawler-re-arrested-
in-ghana-for-repeated-illegal-fishing-crimes-after-refusing-to-pay-fine>
843 ‘Trawler Charged with Illegal Fishing Continue to Dodge Fines in Ghana’, Environmental Justice Foundation
(News Article, 23 January 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/trawlers-charged-with-illegal-fishing-
continue-to-dodge-fines-in-ghana-1>
844 ‘Trawler Re-Arrested in Ghana for Repeated Illegal Fishing Crimes after Refusing to Pay Fine’, Environment
Justice Foundation (News Article, 10 June 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/notorious-trawler-re-arrested-
in-ghana-for-repeated-illegal-fishing-crimes-after-refusing-to-pay-fine>
845 Ibid.
846 Imposing criminal sanctions will ensure that the crime of IUU fishing is of proportionate sanction.
847 UNCLOS (n 66) arts 312 – 316.
the difficulty in amending any provision of the convention.848 The commission noted that ‘any
amendments to UNCLOS would be a lengthy and complex procedure’ and urged Australia to
take caution in this regard.849
Second, the analysis shows that the nexus between fishing and other crimes is given minimal
attention in fisheries and criminal legislation. Current fisheries and criminal legislation are
limited by the traditional framework that separates fishing and maritime administration and
management. Fishing laws cover many related issues but do not go as far as including all
transnational criminal activities associated with the sector. There are a few provisions in Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone fisheries laws on the nexus between fishing activities and
other crimes. Corruption of fisheries officers and document forgeries are the most recognised
crimes associated with the fisheries sector. It is, therefore, not surprising that only Ghana,
Guinea, and Liberia’s fisheries legislation explicitly recognises the link between IUU fishing
and organised criminal activity. One reason for this could be that when these laws were drafted,
the possibility that IUU fishing could be associated with other maritime crimes was not factored
into the legislative drafting.
Nevertheless, the minimal inclusion of other crimes in fisheries legislation and minimal
inclusion of fisheries activities in criminal legislation shows there is a significant challenge for
authorities in cases where crimes are linked with IUU fishing vessels. For instance, when a
fishing vessel is involved in IUU fishing activities and people smuggling, who is responsible for
such a situation? Fisheries or maritime security law enforcement officials? Is it still a
management issue or a maritime security threat? Or both? What is clear, however, is that current
investigations have shown that there is a nexus between IUU fishing and other transnational
organised crimes.850 Therefore, IUU fishing cannot be viewed in isolation. Consequently,
looking at IUU fishing as a predicate offence to other criminal activities and vice versa will
allow for more concise investigations into IUU fishing and enable more deterrent sanctions.
Improved approaches will also allow for more effective interagency cooperation between
fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies.
5.3.2 National Institutional Framework
To successfully address the criminal dimensions of IUU fishing, there must be effective
848 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission (Report, November 2002) para
8.62; Rachel Baird, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical
Factors Relevant to its Development and Persistence’ (2004) 5(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 323, 324.
849 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission (Report, November 2002) para
8.63.
850 See generally ch 4.
interagency cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies.
This section will examine whether there is effective interagency cooperation between fisheries
management officials and maritime security law enforcement agencies to sufficiently address
the security issues associated with IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. An overview of the
national institutional framework is provided in Appendix 2, and each state is briefly summarised
from available information in legislation, academic literature, and fisheries websites.
5.3.2.1 Ghana
Sustainable fisheries management primarily falls under the Ministry of Fisheries and
Aquaculture Development (MOFAD). However, Ghana’s Fisheries Act 2002 created the
Fisheries Commission to act as the implementing agency for the policies and regulations
established by MOFAD.851 The commission is responsible for all MCS and fisheries compliance
operations in the territorial waters of Ghana. The MCS division of the Fisheries Commission
comprises authorised officers from Ghana Navy, Air Force, and the Fisheries Commission.852
These officers are assigned to ensure compliance with the Fisheries Act and its regulation and
fight against IUU fishing.853 They are given extensive compliance and enforcement powers
under Section 96 of the Fisheries Act 2002, including powers to stop, board, search, seize, and
arrest any fishing vessel. The Act also stipulates that additional agencies may be required to
assist in law enforcement operations.854
Conversely, organised crime falls primarily under the scope of the Economic and Organised
Crime Office and Ghana’s Police Service (Marine Police unit), and is regulated by several
criminal laws (Appendix 1), with two key pieces of legislation being the Economic and
Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Act 804) and the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).855
Other specialised organised crime agencies include Food and Drug Authority, Narcotics Control
Commission, and Immigration Service (Appendix 2).
Interagency cooperation occurs between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement
agencies through the Ports Task Force Ghana (PTFG).856 The task force is coordinated by the
MCS division of Ghana’s Fisheries Commission and supported by the Port State Measures to
Stop Illegal Fishing (PSM-SIF) initiative.857 The PTFG implements the National Strategy and
851 Fisheries Act 2002 (Ghana) s 2.
852 Ibid s 94.
853 Ibid.
854 Ibid s 94(4).
855 Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Ghana).
856 ‘Ports Task Force Ghana’, Stop Illegal Fishing (Leaflet, 2 November 2019) <https://stopillegalfishing.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/PTFG-2019-LEAFLET-FINAL-LR.pdf>
857 Ibid 7, 11.
Action Plan of the PSMA and acts as a coordinating mechanism for fisheries and maritime
security law enforcement agencies in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting IUU fishing
offences and associated crimes in ports.858 It promotes cooperation between members of
Ghana’s Fisheries Commission, Department of Marine Police of the Ghana Police Service,
Ghana Navy, Ports and Harbour Authority, Maritime Authority, National Security, Attorney
General’s Office, Ghana Immigration Services, Air Force, Revenue Authority, Food and Drugs
Authority, National Intelligence Bureau, and Port Health Services and ensures that fishing
vessels are adequately checked and inspected in port.859
Another example of an interagency cooperative mechanism between fisheries and maritime
security law enforcement agencies is the Ghana National Working Group (NWG).860 The
working group improves MCS activities through interagency cooperation and collaboration.861
The NWG consists of agencies from Ghana’s Fisheries Commission, Fisheries Enforcement
Unit, Ghana Police, Ports and Harbour Authority, Air Force, National Intelligence Bureau,
Customs Division of Ghana’s Revenue Authority, National Security, Food and Drugs Authority,
Port Health, Maritime Authority, Narcotics Control Board, Multinational Maritime
Coordination Center Zone F, and the Attorney General’s Department.862
5.3.2.2 The Republic of Guinea
In Guinea, the National Fisheries Monitoring and Protection Center (CNSP) is the key agency
responsible for managing and monitoring fisheries resources in territorial waters.863 It ensures
that fisheries laws and regulations are complied with. It also manages fishing licenses, inspects
fishing vessels and gear, and monitors and controls trans-shipments.864
Nonetheless, the maritime prefecture is the main body created to coordinate the activities of all
national agencies at sea.865 The maritime prefecture is headed by a maritime prefect who acts as
the state's representative and is responsible for maritime security, marine environment
protection, immigration, custom and tax, working conditions at sea, and fighting against illegal
858 Klaudija Cremers et al., Options for Strengthening Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of Human Activities in
the Southeast Atlantic Region (STRONG High Seas Project Report, 2021) 27.
859 ‘Ports Task Force Ghana’, Stop Illegal Fishing (Leaflet, 2 November 2019) 9, 11
<https://stopillegalfishing.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/PTFG-2019-LEAFLET-FINAL-LR.pdf>
860 Ghana’s NWG is supported by the FCWC WATF. ‘Ghana National Working Group Meeting to Improve
Interagency MCS’, Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (News Article, 13 June 2019)
<https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/ghana-national-working-group-meeting-to-improve-interagency-mcs>
861 Ibid.
862 Ibid.
863 Decree No. D/95/303/PRG/SGG on the Status of the National Centre for Fisheries Surveillance and Protection
(Guinea) art 3.
864 Ibid.
865 ‘Maritime Prefecture Guinea Conakry’ Prefecture Maritime (Web Page) <https://prefecture-maritime.gov.gn/>
activities at sea.866 The maritime prefecture hosts the Guinean Maritime Operational Center
(COM), where several fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies, including the
Gendarmerie, Navy, Air Force, Customs, and fisheries law enforcement agencies gather to
allow for better coordination of at-sea operations.867
5.3.2.3 Guinea-Bissau
The National Service for the Inspection and Control of Fishing Activities (FISCAP) is the
primary agency responsible for supervising and implementing the national systems for maritime
surveillance and control of fishing activities in territorial waters.868 FISCAP inspectors, Guinea-
Bissau Navy, and Coast Guard, usually carry out coordinated fisheries MCS through armed
patrols.869 These agents are given powers under Article 46 of the Decree-Law No. 10/2011
Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation, to order a fishing vessel to carry out the necessary
manoeuvres to allow for proper inspection, order the inspection of fishing gear and catch, and
collect all evidence required for an investigation relating to a fishing vessel.
5.3.2.4 Liberia
The National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority (NaFAA) is the primary agency created by
the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2018 to administer and manage the fisheries sector
in Liberia.870 Fisheries inspectors, who are authorised agents under the NaFAA, are tasked with
the responsibility of MCS and ensuring compliance with all fishing laws.871 However, officers
under the Liberian Coast Guard, Liberian Maritime Authority, Liberian National Police, Liberia
Immigration Service, and the Ministry of Justice may be requested to collaborate and coordinate
in discharging the functions and responsibilities of the NaFAA.872 In contrast, the Liberian
National Police is in charge of criminal investigations of organised crimes. However, several
other specialised maritime security agencies deal with organised crimes, such as Liberia’s Drug
Enforcement Agency, Anti-Corruption Commission, and Liberia’s Financial Intelligence Unit
(Appendix 2).
866 ‘Assignments’ Prefecture Maritime (Web Page) <https://prefecture--maritime-gov-
gn.translate.goog/presentation/missions/?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc>
867 Melanie Moyer, ‘Guinea’s Maritime Administrations are Connected to the YARIS Platform’ GoGIN (News
Article, 18 May 2022) <https://www-gogin-eu.translate.goog/2022/05/18/les-administrations-maritimes-de-guinee-
sont-connectees-a-la-plateforme-yaris/?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc>
868 Decree-Law No. 10/2011 Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation (Guinea Bissau) art 43(1).
869 Jeremias Francisco Intchama, Dyhia Belhabib and Raul Joaquim Tomás Jumpe, ‘Assessing Guinea Bissau’s Legal
and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and the Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them’ (2018) 5(79)
Frontiers in Marine Science 4.
870 National Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2018 (Liberia) s 3.1(1).
871 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law 2019 (Liberia) s 11.2.
872 Ibid s 11.1(2).
Cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies occurs through
the fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Coordination Committee (MCS CC), an
interagency collaborative committee comprising stakeholders from various agencies.873 The
MCS CC is part of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARF-P). It was developed
through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by stakeholders to provide maritime
safety and security within Liberia’s territorial waters. The committee is composed of the
Ministry of National Defense (the Liberia Coast Guard), Liberia Maritime Authority, NaFAA,
Liberia Revenue Authority (Department of Customs), National Port Authority, and the Ministry
of Justice (Liberia National Police, Liberia Immigration Services, and the Prosecution
Department).874 This committee acts as the centre of convergence of information from
stakeholders and through it, each stakeholder provides coordination, collaboration, and
cooperation in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting IUU fishing and crimes occurring on
fishing vessels.
Another notable interagency collaborative effort is the joint boarding cooperation agreement
between several fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies to effectively
implement the provisions of the PSMA. NaFAA partners with several maritime security
agencies, including Port Health, Liberia Immigration Service, and Liberia Revenue Authority
(Department of Customs), through a joint boarding system, to ensure the effective cooperation
of all relevant agencies involved in combatting IUU fishing and associated crimes.875 The joint
boarding cooperation aids real-time communication between fisheries and maritime security law
enforcement agencies.876
5.3.2.5 Nigeria
Under the Sea Fisheries Act 1992, a Federal Department of Fisheries (FDF) licensing officer
may enforce national fisheries laws and regulations.877 Section 4(a)(i) of the Armed Forces Act
1993 also gives responsibility to the Nigerian Navy to enforce all customs laws, including anti-
bunkering, fisheries, and immigration laws at sea. The Act further states that the Nigerian Navy
is charged with enforcing national and international maritime laws.878
The FDF collaborates with the Nigerian Navy to enhance maritime security in Nigerian waters.
873 Cremers et al (n 858) 20.
874 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy & Strategy (Bureau of National Fisheries Liberia,
2014) 36 <https://ekmsliberia.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fisheries_policy_doc.pdf>
875 Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea, Record of the 9th West Africa Task Force Meeting
(FCWC Report, 24 – 26 September 2019) 11.
876 The Nigeria NWG is supported by the FCWC WATF.
877 Sea Fisheries Act 1992 (Nigeria) s 9(6).
878 Armed Force Act 1993 (Nigeria) s 4(a)(ii).
It collaborates with the Navy when investigating fisheries offences. For instance, when the
Navy arrests an illegal fishing vessel, it hands the vessel over to the FDF within 24 hours for
further investigation. This partnership was demonstrated by the ORC 5 and CYNTHIA case,
where the Nigerian Navy apprehended two illegal fishing vessels, ORC 5 and CYNTHIA, for
fishing in a restricted zone.879 After the arrest, the Navy handed the vessel and its crew over to
the Federal Department of Fisheries for further action.880
Another notable example of a cooperative mechanism between fisheries and maritime security
law enforcement agencies is the Nigeria NWG, created in 2017.881 The working group includes
agencies from the FDF, Nigerian Navy, Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Port
Authority, Marine Police, INTERPOL, and the Attorney General’s Office.882 Through this
working group, these agencies actively cooperate to share information and investigate IUU
fishing and associated crimes at sea.883
5.3.2.6 Senegal
In Senegal, the Directorate of Fisheries Protection and Monitoring (DPSP) under the Ministry of
Fisheries and Maritime Economy is the primary coordinating structure for fisheries law
enforcement and surveillance operations in territorial waters.884 Fisheries surveillance officers
under the DPSP are primarily responsible for investigating fisheries offences.885 Fisheries
surveillance officers consist of authorised officers from the DPSP, French Navy, Air Force,
National Park, Water and Forest, Customs, National Agency for Maritime Affairs, Judicial
Police of the National Gendarmeries, and the Police.886 Their powers include stopping and
searching vessels; requesting appropriate fishing documentation; and inspecting fishing vessels,
equipment and catch in Senegalese jurisdiction.887
The High Authority for the Coordination of Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine
879 ‘Navy Arrest 26 Crew, Four Foreigners Over Illegal Fishing’ Premium Times (Online, 25 September 2019)
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/south-south-regional/354406-navy-arrests-26-crew-four-foreigners-
over-illegal-fishing.html>
880 Ibid.
881 ‘Nigeria National Working Group of the West Africa Task Force Established’, Nordenfjeldske Development
Services (News Article, May 2017) <https://nfds.info/news/nigeria-national-working-group-of-the-west-africa-task-
force-established/>
882 ‘Nigeria’s Fight Against Illegal Fishing Improves Through Inter-Agency Cooperation’, Fisheries Committee for
the West and Central Gulf of Guinea (News Article, 15 May 2018) <https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/nigerias-fight-
against-illegal-fishing-improves-through-inter-agency-cooperation>
883 Ibid.
884 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fight Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa. A
Regional Challenge (FAO Report, 2020) 6.
885 Law No. 2015-18 of 13 July 2015 on the Code of Maritime Fisheries (Senegal) s 84.
886 Ibid.
887 Ibid s 85.
Environment (HASSMAR) coordinates all state actions at sea, particularly regarding protecting
marine resources and maritime security.888 Through the HASSMAR, all competent
administrative structures at sea, including the DPSP, Gendarmerie, Police, Navy, Air Force,
Customs, and the Autonomous Port of Dakar, coordinate law enforcement actions.889
5.3.2.7 Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) is the primary agency
for fisheries policy regulation and implementation. The MCS unit of the MFMR is responsible
for enforcing the fisheries regulations under the 2018 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act.890 The
MCS unit includes authorised fisheries officers, Navy, Customs, Police, fisheries inspectors, and
observers.891 Their powers include entering, boarding, and searching any fishing vessel without
a warrant.892 In discharging their responsibilities, the MCS unit is authorised to coordinate with
other law enforcement agencies.893
The Sierra Leonean government established the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC) through an
MoU for all maritime activities within Sierra Leone.894 The committee provides a multi-agency
approach to maritime law enforcement. It consists of key fisheries and maritime security law
enforcement agencies such as the MFMR, Office of National Security, Ministry of Defence
(Navy), Sierra Leone Maritime Administration (SLMA), Port Authority, National Revenue
Authority (Customs and Excise Department), Immigration Department and the Marine Police.895
Through this committee, stakeholders involved in maritime operations coordinate joint maritime
patrols and sea-based enforcement actions to improve MCS and maritime security.
5.3.2.8 Discussion of the Interagency Challenges
Combatting IUU fishing and the security issues associated with it requires proficient
interagency cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies to
888 Decree No. 2006-322 of 7 April 2006 Establishing the High Authority Responsible for the Coordination of
Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and the Protection of the Marine Environment (HASSMAR) (Senegal);
‘Presentation’, High Authority for the Coordination of Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and Protection of the
Marine Environment (Web Page) <https://www.hassmar.gouv.sn/content/presentation>
889 Decree No. 2006-322 of 7 April 2006 Establishing the High Authority Responsible for the Coordination of
Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and the Protection of the Marine Environment (HASSMAR) (Senegal) art 16.
890 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act, 2018 (Sierra Leone) s 19.
891 Ibid s 23(1).
892 Ibid.
893 Ibid s 19(2).
894 Sheku Sei, ‘Fisheries Governance Reform in Sierra Leone: Law, Policy and Institutional Arrangements’ (Research
Paper, United Nations Nippon Foundation Fellowship, 2011), 131
<https://www.un.org/oceancapacity/sites/www.un.org.oceancapacity/files/sei-1011_sierra-leone.pdf>
895 Ibid.
identify, investigate, and prosecute IUU fishing operators and criminal networks.896 Currently,
gaps in interagency cooperation at the national level have been identified in the Gulf of Guinea.
First, interagency cooperation is not effective due to factors such as lack of financial capacity,
insufficient personnel, and inadequate information sharing. For instance, in Sierra Leone, there
have been allegations made about the lack of funding to support the JMC functions.897 There are
assertions about the lack of patrol boats which impedes the ability of the JMC to police offshore
waters.898 In Liberia, the joint boarding cooperative agreement between NaFAA and maritime
agencies is impeded by a considerable amount of workload and insufficient staff.899 In Ghana,
there are inadequate authorised persons to effectively implement the PSMA.900 Additionally, the
PTFG function is hindered by slow information sharing between the relevant agencies, leading
to delays in the investigation of cases.901
Second, inadequate knowledge of both fisheries and criminal laws by relevant agencies further
complicates effective interagency cooperation. Fisheries officers are not trained to identify and
detect when fishing vessels are used for carrying illicit products while maritime security
enforcement officers are not trained to identify whether fisheries products have been obtained
illegally or not. This limitation was demonstrated by the Banarly V case, where two fishing
vessels the Banarly V and the Olokun V were arrested by the Nigerian Navy in September 2019
on the suspicion of fishing in a restricted area and catching non-licenced species.902 However,
when they were handed over to the FDF, further investigations disclosed that there were no
infractions.903
The Banarly V case suggests the need for increased fisheries and maritime security law
enforcement cooperation and training. The Nigerian Navy and the FDF need to better
understand and gain knowledge of fisheries and criminal laws such as the Fisheries Acts and
Criminal Codes. Additionally, providing training on fisheries-crime skills is critical in
896 Witbooi, Emma et al., ‘Organised Crime in the Fisheries Sector’ (Ocean Panel Blue Paper, 2020) 20
<https://oceanpanel.org/sites/default/files/2020-
08/Organised%20Crime%20in%20the%20Fisheries%20Sector%20Full%20Paper%20Final.pdf>
897 Jon White, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Sierra Leone Navy and the UK’s Role in its Downfall’ (Research Paper No
17, The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, May 2015), 34
<https://www.kcl.ac.uk/dsd/assets/corbettpaper17.pdf>
898 Saidu Bah, ‘Sierra Leone Tackles Overfishing but Gets Small Fry’ Mail & Guardian (Online, 1 May 2019)
<https://mg.co.za/article/2019-05-01-sierra-leone-tackles-overfishing-but-gets-small-fry>
899 Record of the 9th West Africa Task Force Meeting (n 875) 11.
900 Ibid 10.
901 Ibid.
902 ‘Navy Arrest Fishing Trawler for ‘Illegal’ Activities’, Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea
(News Article, 11 September 2019) <https://fcwc-fish.org/other-news/nigeria-navy-arrests-fishing-trawlers-for-
illegal-activities>
903 Record of the 9th West Africa Task Force Meeting (n 875) 12.
inspecting and carrying out investigations on fishing vessels. The success of interagency
cooperation will require capacity-building to better address the challenges of IUU fishing in the
Gulf of Guinea.
Third, interagency cooperation in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activities
in the fisheries sector is difficult to achieve due to the lack of transparency in the fisheries
sector. Fishing vessels can hide their beneficial owners and remain anonymous to states. For
instance, in Ghana, an EJF report discovered that about 90% - 95% of industrial trawl vessels
belong to Chinese beneficial owners who use local front companies to register as Ghanaian
fishing vessels.904 Likewise, in Liberia, most national fishing vessels have been reported to have
EU beneficial owners.905 Opaque vessel ownership makes investigation of transnational criminal
activities in the fisheries sector challenging for Gulf of Guinea states as beneficial owners
cannot be tracked down.906 Additionally, the lack of transparency severely hampers the effective
prosecution and sanction of IUU fishing and criminal operators as beneficial owners are
unknown.907
Despite this, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs),908 are not included in any national interagency
mechanism.909 FIUs are crucial to identifying and investigating crimes and their benefactors in
the fisheries sector. They can be used to trace suspicious transactions generated by IUU fishing
and financial flows from organised criminal organisations along the fisheries value chain. The
current lack of knowledge on the financial proceeds from IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
impedes effective identification, investigations, and prosecution of criminal activities associated
with IUU fishing. To this end, FIUs in the region should consider making combatting IUU
fishing part of their mandate. They are also encouraged to monitor fishing activities and vessels
involved in fish-related activities, including trans-shipment vessels. The involvement of FIUs
will aid with successful intelligence-led investigatory enforcement approaches in addressing
IUU fishing and associated maritime crimes.
5.4 Current Measures for Addressing IUU Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
National policy and practical measures are necessary for addressing IUU fishing and enhancing
904 China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa (n 485) 4.
905 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 418.
906 Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry (n 49) 117.
907 Coning and Witbooi (n 95) 213.
908 FIUs are national anti-money laundering agencies that can be used by Gulf of Guinea states to identify beneficial
owners of fishing vessels.
909 The examination of each study states FIU website shows that the unit does not collaborate with the fisheries
agencies nor monitor fishing vessels.
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This section explores existing policies and practices for
addressing IUU fishing in the region. The first part analyses whether regional policies and
practices have characterised IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime and a maritime
security threat. The second part analyses policy and practical measures in combatting IUU
fishing by case study Gulf of Guinea states.
5.4.1 Regional Background
As IUU fishing and transnational organised crime have become more prevalent in the Gulf of
Guinea, several regional organisations have highlighted IUU fishing as a threat to maritime
security in their security frameworks. They have adopted several policy initiatives in the fight
against IUU fishing.910 A notable policy initiative introduced is the Code of Conduct
Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime
Activity in West and Central Africa (also known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct).911 This code
was adopted by the heads of state and governments of the member states of the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), and Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon.912 Despite piracy
and armed robbery at sea being the key focus in its creation, the Code identified IUU fishing as
a transnational organised crime, threatening the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime security.913 The Code
also provides a maritime security framework that involves regional cooperation, MCS, and
information sharing in addressing IUU fishing.914 The code enumerates regional cooperative
measures that may be taken by states to address IUU fishing in the region:
1) Sharing and reporting relevant information;
2) Interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected of engaging in transnational organised crime in
the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea;
3) Ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit transnational organised crime in
the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea are
apprehended and prosecuted; and
4) Facilitating proper care, treatment and repatriation of seafarers, fishers, other shipboard
personnel, and passengers subject to transnational organised crime in the maritime domain,
910 These developments in regional policymaking show that the region is broadening its understanding of maritime
security threats from traditional to non-traditional forms of security threats.
911 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity
in West and Central Africa (signed and entered into force 25 June 2013).
912 Maurice Beseng and James A. Malcolm, ‘Maritime Security and the Securitisation of Fisheries in the Gulf of
Guinea: Experiences from Cameroon’ (2021) 21 (5) Conflict, Security & Development 2.
913 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity
in West and Central Africa (signed and entered into force 25 June 2013) art 1(5).
914 Ibid arts 8, 9, 11, 12.
maritime terrorism, IUU fishing, and other illegal activities at sea, particularly those that
have been subject to violence.915
Similarly, Article 3(a) of the African Charter of Maritime Security, Safety and Development
(also known as the Lomé Charter), has identified IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime
and therefore a maritime security threat.916 The Charter instructs state authorities to take
adequate measures to effectively fight IUU fishing.917 It suggests that states should adopt
criminal liabilities for engaging in IUU fishing to ensure proper prosecution of offenders under
their national laws.918 Specifically, the Charter observes that regional cooperation and
information sharing are necessary to combat IUU fishing and other transnational organised
crimes.919
Figure 7: FCWC measures for combatting IUU fishing and associated crimes in the Gulf
of Guinea.
Source: FCWC 2021. 920
915 Ibid art 2(1).
916 African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter), adopted by the
Heads of State and Governments of the African Union (AU) Member States 15 October 2016.
917 Ibid art 20(3).
918 Ibid art
919 Ibid arts 32, 33, 34.
920 ‘The FCWC Regional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Centre’ (30 April 2021) Fisheries Committee for the
West Central Gulf of Guinea 8, 9 <https://fcwc-fish.org/download/3090/brochures-leaflets/16421/the-fcwc-regional-
monitoring-control-and-surveillance-centre.pdf>
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Additionally, the FCWC, a Regional Fisheries Body (RFB),921 has identified IUU fishing as a
significant threat to maritime security.922 In addressing IUU fishing, the FCWC collaborated in a
Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) project called ‘Fisheries
Intelligence and MCS Support in West Africa’.923 The project enabled the establishment and
functions of the Regional Working Group (RWG), called the West African Task Force
(WATF), to provide a regional approach to fisheries enforcement, combat IUU fishing, stop the
illegal trade in illegally caught fish and tackle associated crimes.924 The WATF was formed as
the MCS arm of the FCWC to combat IUU fishing and associated crimes through regional
fisheries enforcement cooperation.925 Through this task force, the six-member states
cooperatively share information on the activities of vessels that engage in IUU fishing, track
fishing vessels and identify possible illegal activity.926 The WATF also operationalises key
conventions (Figure 7) in the fight against IUU fishing.
Since its initiation, the WATF has recorded remarkable successes, including alerting member
states of vessels that engage in IUU fishing and associated crimes.927 Another remarkable
success of the WATF is the strengthening of national multi-agency cooperation in the fight
against IUU fishing and related crimes in the Gulf of Guinea.928 In strengthening national multi-
agency collaboration, the task force has established multi-agency National Working Groups
(NWGs) in each of its member states, acting as a foundation for cooperation, collaboration, and
capacity building between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies.929 The
Nordenfjeldske Development Services (NFDS) has noted that there has been a significant
921 The FCWC has seven member states in the Gulf of Guinea (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and
Togo).
922 ‘Maritime Security’, Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (Web Page) <https://fcwc-
fish.org/what-we-do/fight-illegal-fishing/maritime-security>
923 The NORAD project was an initial four-year project between 2014 and 2018 with a second phase that started in
2019 and was implemented till 2022. ‘Fisheries Intelligence and MCS Support in West Africa – Phase 2’ Fisheries
Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (Webpage) <https://fcwc-fish.org/projects/watf>
924 ‘Twenty Years Working Together for the Sustainable Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture’ (February 2019)
Regional Fishery Body Secretariats’ Network (RSN) Magazine
39 <https://www.fao.org/3/ca3925en/CA3925EN.pdf>
925 The WATF is facilitated by the Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT), Stop Illegal Fishing (SIF), and the Nordenfjeldske
Development Services (NFDS) technical teams. ‘Regional Monitoring Control and Surveillance Centre Launches in
West Africa’, Trygg Mat Tracking (News Article, 12 May 2021) <https://www.tm-tracking.org/post/regional-
monitoring-control-and-surveillance-centre-launches-in-west-africa>; ‘Nigeria’s Fight Against Illegal Fishing
Improves Through Inter-Agency Cooperation’, Fisheries Committee for the West and Central Gulf of Guinea (News
Article, 15 May 2018) < https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/nigerias-fight-against-illegal-fishing-improves-through-inter-
agency-cooperation>
926 ‘Nigeria’s Fight Against Illegal Fishing Improves Through Inter-Agency Cooperation’, Fisheries Committee for
the West and Central Gulf of Guinea (News Article, 15 May 2018) <https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/nigerias-fight-
against-illegal-fishing-improves-through-inter-agency-cooperation>
927 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 419.
928 ‘West Africa Task Force’, Trygg Mat Tracking (Webpage) <https://www.tm-tracking.org/west-africa-task-force>
929 Ibid.
increase in interagency cooperation through these NWGs in the fight against IUU fishing and
associated crimes.930 The NWGs and WATF are working to combat IUU fishing and associated
criminal activity through active interagency cooperation and information sharing.
In addressing IUU fishing and connected crimes, the FCWC recognises illegal trans-shipment at
sea as one of the facilitators of IUU fishing in the region and has adopted a strategy to combat
illegal trans-shipment at sea.931 This strategy identifies key steps for member states to combat
illegal trans-shipment at sea, which include but are not limited to:
1) Harmonising national legislation on trans-shipments at sea;
2) Strengthening interagency cooperation with relevant agencies regarding trans-
shipments at sea;
3) Requiring that trans-shipments should only take place in an authorised designated port;
and
4) Acceding to the PSMA to harmonise port access in denying entry of vessels suspected
to have engaged in illegal trans-shipments.932
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) generally
prohibits trans-shipments at sea, except when they are monitored by ICCAT’s Regional
Observer Programme.933 FCWC and ICCAT trans-shipment policies prevent illegally caught
fish from being landed in the region. They also help combat associated crimes, as IUU fishing
operators are known to use trans-shipments at sea to facilitate crimes in the region.934
The FCWC has also developed a 2019 - 2023 Regional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (RPOA-IUU).935 The RPOA-IUU serves
as a framework for member states when adopting their National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate IUU Fishing (NPOA-IUU). It consists of a general overview of IUU fishing, gaps
in the implementation of the 2009 RPOA-IUU, and revised measures to combat IUU fishing in
930 ‘West Africa Task Force Report Launched’, Stop Illegal Fishing (News Article, 13 June 2017)
<https://stopillegalfishing.com/news-article/west-africa-task-force-report-launched/>
931 Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea, ‘Strategy to Combat Illegal Transhipment at Sea’
(December 2017) <https://fcwc-fish.org/download/3089/institutional-documents/17835/fcwc-strategy-to-combat-
illegal-transhipment-at-sea.pdf>
932 Ibid 3.
933 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Recommendation by ICCAT on Transhipment
(Recommendation 16 – 15, 12 June 2017) paras 13 – 20.
934 See sec 4.3.3 in ch 4.
935 Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea, Regional Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf
of Guinea (FCWC) Member Countries (2019-2023) (FCWC, 2018).
the Gulf of Guinea.
Furthermore, on 12 and 13 May 2021, the FCWC officially launched the FCWC Regional
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Centre (RMCSC) for monitoring fishing and associated
activities (including trans-shipments) to improve maritime security.936
Figure 8: FCWC regional monitoring, control, and surveillance centre.
Source: FCWC 2021. 937
With the launch of this centre, Gulf of Guinea states have a better chance in the fight against
IUU fishing and associated crimes. The centre provides for joint at-sea patrols; access to an up-
to-date list of regional authorised fishing vessels; regional training and capacity building to
strengthen MCS; regional observer programme; and access to a regional VMS.938
936 ‘Launch of the FCWC Regional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (RMCSC)’, Stop Illegal Fishing (Web
Page, 7 May 2021) <https://stopillegalfishing.com/events/launch-of-the-fcwc-regional-monitoring-control-and-
surveillance-centre-rmcsc/>; ‘The FCWC Regional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Centre’ (30 April 2021)
Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea 1-14 <https://fcwc-fish.org/download/3090/brochures-
leaflets/16421/the-fcwc-regional-monitoring-control-and-surveillance-centre.pdf>
937 ‘The FCWC Regional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Centre’ (30 April 2021) Fisheries Committee for the
West Central Gulf of Guinea 10, 11 <https://fcwc-fish.org/download/3090/brochures-leaflets/16421/the-fcwc-
regional-monitoring-control-and-surveillance-centre.pdf>
938 Ibid 4, 5. Having a regional VMS gives a chance to member states that do not have existing monitoring systems in
place to monitor fishing and related activity in their EEZs.
5.4.2 National Overview of Current Measures to Address IUU Fishing
Addressing IUU fishing varies from state to state in the Gulf of Guinea. This section highlights
the current laws, policies and practices of the seven study states in combatting IUU fishing to
determine whether there should be legal and policy reform in the Gulf of Guinea
5.4.2.1 Ghana
By law, foreign investment is prohibited in Ghana’s industrial trawl sector. Section 47 (1)(a) of
Ghana’s Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625) states as follows:
A local industrial or semi-industrial fishing vessel is a fishing vessel owned or controlled by
a citizen, the Government, or owned or controlled by a company or partnership registered
by law in the Republic which has its principal base of business in the Republic and the share
of which is beneficially owned wholly by the Government, a citizen, a public corporation
established by law in the Republic or a combination of any of them.
However, research has shown that foreign companies own most Ghanaian industrial trawl
vessels. An Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) report found that about 90% - 95% of
Ghanaian industrial trawl fleets have Chinese beneficial owners that use local ‘front’ companies
to register as having Ghanaian ownership.939 Other research by Gutiérrez et al discovered that
outside China, Ghana has the largest registry of Chinese Distant Water Fishing Fleets
(DWFFs).940 The research also found that at least 183 Chinese DWFFs are suspected to be
involved in IUU fishing.941
The industrial trawl fleets have enabled various forms of IUU fishing activities to occur in
Ghanian territorial waters.942 IUU fishing activities such as industrial fishing in the IEZ reserved
for small-scale fishers and Saiko fishing have severely contributed to the depletion of Ghana’s
fish stocks. Research data has discovered that between 2012 and 2016, about 28% of industrial
fishing in Ghana occurred in the IEZ, and almost 95% of industrial fishing efforts in the IEZ are
by Ghanaian-flagged fleets (Chinese companies being beneficial owners).943 Research has also
indicated that from 2000 to 2014, the industrial sector accounted for a high number of fish
939 China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa (n 485) 4
940 Miren Gutiérrez et al., China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet Scale, Impact and Governance (Overseas
Development Institute Report, June 2020) 21.
941 Ibid 15.
942 ‘Trawler Fined $1 Million in Ghana’ The Maritime Executive (News Article 16 October 2019) <https://maritime-
executive.com/article/trawler-fined-1-million-in-ghana>
943 Dyhia Belhabib et al., ‘Catching Industrial Fishing Incursion into Inshore Waters of Africa from Space’ (2020)
21(2) Fish and Fisheries 388.
catches.944 These catches are often initially unreported but are, thereafter, landed by the small-
scale fisheries sector due to the illegal practice of Saiko.945 Saiko occurs when industrial fishing
vessels catch and illegally trans-ship frozen local fish staples (generally small pelagic fish)946 to
specially adapted canoes out at sea to be sold back to coastal communities for a profit.
In 2020, the national government committed in Paragraph 718 of its 2020 annual budget, to end
IUU fishing in Ghanaian territorial waters by banning domestic and international fishing vessels
found to be engaging in Saiko and other forms of IUU fishing. The Ghanian Ministry of Finance
stated as follows:
Mr Speaker, the Ministry will intensify the implementation of the Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625)
to ensure that domestic, regional, and international laws that prohibit IUU fishing are strictly
enforced through the following:
Fishing vessels involved in any form of IUU fishing shall be surcharged and prevented
from fishing in the Ghanaian Economic Exclusive Zone;
Artisanal canoes involved in IUU fishing shall be surcharged and banned from
receiving premix fuel; and
All domestic and international fleets that are involved in “Saiko” fishing (i.e., trans-
shipment at sea) shall be banned from fishing in Ghanaian waters.947
As part of its national measures to end Saiko, Ghana’s Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625) and
Ghana’s Fisheries Regulations (L. I. 1968) recognises that Saiko contributes to IUU fishing
practices and as such unsupervised trans-shipments in national waters are banned.948 Trans-
shipments at sea are also prohibited.949 The Fisheries Act imposes a maximum penalty of about
USD2 million for Saiko fishing by industrial fishing vessels and extra penalties when catches
involve juvenile fish,950 and prohibited species.951 Fishing within the six nautical miles IEZ,952
and the use of prohibited gear953 also carry additional penalties. Additionally, the use of light
944 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood et al., ‘Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest: How Attempts to Improve Governance
Impacts African Small-Scale Marine Fisheries’ (2022) 135 Marine Policy 4 (‘Survival of the Richest, not the
Fittest’).
945 Ibid.
946 Industrial fishing vessels target key local fish that support coastal communities' food security and livelihoods.
947 See Ministry of Finance, Ghana, The Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the
2020 Financial Year (Report, 2020) 134.
948 Fisheries Act 2002 (Ghana) s 132; Fisheries Regulations 2010 (Ghana) s 33.
949 Ibid s 134.
950 Ibid s 89(3).
951 Ibid s 90(4).
952 Ibid s 81(8)(a).
953 Ibid s 135.
962 Ibid.
fishing (which is prevalent in Ghanaian waters) is prohibited in Ghana’s Fisheries Regulation.954
Furthermore, Ghana has established an NPOA-IUU modelled after the IPOA-IUU and the
FCWC RPOA-IUU.955 The NPOA-IUU adopts national port state measures to prevent IUU
fishing products from entering national and international markets. Ghana also ratified the PSMA
and established in 2019 the Ports Task Force Ghana (PTFG) to operationalise the National
Strategy and Action Plan for implementing the PSMA.956
The Ghanaian government has appointed fisheries observers onboard industrial fishing vessels
as specified by Section 100 of the Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625). Fisheries observers are major
tools in the fight against IUU fishing. However, the problem with the observer scheme in Ghana
is that ship owners pay observers through the Ghanian Industrial Trawlers Association
(GITA).957 This affects their ability to report IUU fishing activities for the fear of not being paid
salaries. The government has also implemented various bans on both small-scale and large-scale
fisheries since 2016, in line with Section 84(1) of the Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625) and Section
4.2 of the Fisheries Management Plan (2015 – 2019). These bans aim to address IUU fishing,
reduce fishing pressure and restore the fish stock population. For instance, in 2021, the Ministry
of Fisheries and Aquaculture announced a closed fishing season for both artisanal and industrial
fishing vessels between 1 July – 31 August 2021.958 Artisanal fisheries were closed from 1 – 31
July 2021, while industrial fisheries were closed from 1 July – 31 August 2021.959 The ban was
reported to be a success and fishing vessels were reported to have caught more fish post-ban.960
However, it is doubtful that there was total compliance as Ghana does not have an adequate
monitoring capacity to determine its complete success. In addition, the Ghanaian government
has signed a cooperation agreement with neighbouring states, Togo and Benin, to reduce IUU
fishing.961 The cooperation agreement, which was signed in December 2021 and funded under
the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, will allow for joint at-sea patrols and
information sharing between the three states.962
954 Fisheries Regulation 2010 (Ghana) s 11(1).
955 Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development, National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (Ghana’s NPOA-IUU) (MoFAD, 2014).
956 Record of the 9th West Africa Task Force Meeting (n 875) 9.
957 Fear, Hunger and Violence (n 555) 29.
958 ‘Ghana Announces the Closure of the 2021 Fishing Season’, Ghenvironment (News Article, 16 June 2021)
<https://ghenvironment.org/ghana-announces-the-closure-of-the-2021-Fishing-Season>
959 Ibid.
960 Godfred Blay Gibbah, ‘Fishing Trawlers in Bumper Harvest After Closed Season’ Ghanaian Times (Online, 20
October 2021) <https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/fishing-trawlers-in-bumper-harvest-after-closed-season/>
961 ‘Nations Join Forces to Fight Illegal Fishing in Gulf of Guinea’ Africa Defence Forum (Web Page, 25 January
2022) <https://adf-magazine.com/2022/01/nations-join-forces-to-fight-illegal-fishing-in-gulf-of-guinea/>
In 2020, the EJF, in partnership with the Ghanaian government, launched an initiative sponsored
by the EU Communities for Fisheries Project, which empowers artisanal fishers and canoe
operators to collect evidence against industrial vessels fishing in the IEZ via a smartphone
application called DASE (meaning evidence in Fante dialect Ghana).963 IUU fishing offences
such as engaging in Saiko fishing can be reported to national authorities through the application.
Small-scale fisheries use the application to conduct active surveillance by recording, logging,
and reporting any alleged IUU fishing activities by industrial fishing vessels in Ghana’s waters.
Small-scale fishers take photographs of industrial vessels suspected to have conducted IUU
fishing activities with their name and identification number, which is then sent via the DASE
application to Ghanaian authorities. The application records the location where the infraction
took place, which is then uploaded into a central database to be used by the government to catch
and prosecute offenders. As of November 2020, over 100 small-scale fishers have downloaded
the application to fight against IUU fishing in national waters.964
Nonetheless, Ghana has room for growth in countering IUU fishing. For instance, Ghana’s
inadequate laws and the inability to enforce existing legislation have created a favourable
environment for Saiko practice to thrive. Consequently, Ghana was given a second yellow card
from the European Commission (EC) on 2 June 2021.965 Two limitations in addressing IUU
fishing were cited by the EU: (1) inefficient domestic legal framework in combatting Saiko; and
(2) deficiencies in MCS.966 As such, Ghana is currently reviewing and updating three national
fisheries laws to ensure that its CMMs are updated to meet new and emerging trends. First,
Ghana is drafting a new Fisheries Act to replace the current Fisheries Act 2002.967 The new
Fisheries Act must maintain an explicit prohibition of Saiko fishing and contain stricter
penalties for taking juvenile fish (currently at not more than USD1 million)968 and fishing gear
963 ‘New Phone App is Effective Weapons in Ghana’s Fight Against Illegal Fishing’, Environmental Justice
Foundation (News Article, 10 November 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/new-phone-app-is-effective-
weapon-in-ghanas-fight-against-illegal-fishing>
964 Karen McVeigh, ‘Ghanaians Devasted by Illegal Fishing Try Hand at Citizen Sleuthing’ The Guardian (Online,
11 November 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/nov/11/fishing-app-launched-to-tackle-
trawling-in-
ghana?utm_term=2cf123ebd5ea03215299e1daf11427b1&utm_campaign=TheUpside&utm_source=esp&utm_mediu
m=Email&CMP=upside_email>
965 The first issued in 2013 was lifted in 2015 after the government made efforts to improve fisheries management,
including improving MCS and legislative framework. ‘EU Issues ‘Green Card’ to Ghana on Fisheries Management’
Stop Illegal Fishing (News Article, 1 October 2015) <https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/eu-issues-green-card-
to-ghana-on-fisheries-management/>; European Commission ‘Fighting Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing: Commission Notifies the Republic of Ghana with a Yellow Card’ (Press Release, 2 June 2021)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2745>
966 Ibid.
967 ‘New Fisheries Act is Being Drafted to Regulate Sector – Hawa Koomson’ MyJoyOnline.com (Web Page, 12
September 2021) <https://www.myjoyonline.com/new-fisheries-act-is-being-drafted-to-regulate-sector-hawa-
koomson/?param=>
968 Fisheries Act 2002 (Ghana) s 89.
restrictions (currently at not more than USD500,000).969 Ghana is also developing a new
Fisheries Management Plan (which expired in 2019).970 Furthermore, Ghana is reviewing its
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy 2008.971 As for deficiencies in MCS, the Ghanaian
government is planning on purchasing four patrol vessels to assist with law enforcement at
sea.972
Additionally, the lack of political will to combat IUU fishing in the industrial trawl sector
suggests that the Ghanaian government is more concerned with generating revenue. The
Ghanaian government has continued to register new industrial fishing vessels, even though the
sector is operating at overcapacity. Research has shown that at the end of 2019, 76 industrial
trawlers were registered compared to 48 trawl vessels required by the 2015 – 2019 Fisheries
Management Plan.973 One study suggests that the reason for this is that the government favours
the industrial sector and puts effort into developing the sector.974 This will explain why in 2020,
the Ghanaian government tried to register and give licences to three new fishing trawlers.975
However, given that industrial fishing trawlers are a significant contributor to IUU fishing
activities in territorial waters, there should be a reduction in the number of registered trawlers
and no more registration of additional trawlers.
Furthermore, Ghana’s fisheries sector is implicated in crimes such as corruption, human
trafficking, and forced labour.976 The EJF in 2020 discovered that fisheries observers are
severely compromised and are subject to bribes, threats, and corrupt practices, impeding their
ability to report IUU fishing offences.977 Crew members are also forcibly imprisoned and
subject to acts of violence, exploitative working conditions, and human rights abuses on fishing
vessels. However, Ghana has yet to ratify key conventions that protect the rights of fishers and
observers, such as the ILO Work in Fishing Convention, which sets out minimum standards for
work on fishing vessels, and the Cape Town Agreement, which provides for safety measures for
fishers.
969 Ibid s 135.
970 ‘New Fisheries Act is Being Drafted to Regulate Sector – Hawa Koomson’ MyJoyOnline.com (Web Page, 12
September 2021) <https://www.myjoyonline.com/new-fisheries-act-is-being-drafted-to-regulate-sector-hawa-
koomson/?param=>
971 Ibid.
972 ‘Government to Acquire Patrol Boats for Checking IUU Activities in Fisheries’, Ghana Web (News Article, 9
April 2022) <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Government-to-acquire-patrol-boats-for-
checking-IUU-activities-in-fisheries-1511573>
973 ‘Senegal Acts to Protect its Fisheries: Will Ghana Do the Same?’, Environmental Justice Foundation (News
Article, 15 June 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/senegal-acts-to-protect-its-fisheries-will-ghana-do-the-
same>
974 Okafor-Yarwood et al., ‘Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest’ (n 944) 5.
975 Ibid.
976 Fear, Hunger and Violence (n 555) 27.
977 Ibid 7.
5.4.2.2 The Republic of Guinea
The EC issued Guinea a yellow card in 2012, followed by a red card in 2013.978 Following
being red-carded, Guinea made considerable progress in the fight against IUU fishing through
its fisheries legislation. In 2015, it reviewed and updated its Maritime Fishing Code to combat
IUU fishing.979 The code strengthened its sanctions system by including more deterrent
sanctions for fishing activities that contravene management and conservation efforts.980 It
included more dissuasive sanctions for IUU fishing activities.981 IUU fishing offences such as
fishing without a license; unauthorised or unsupervised trans-shipments at sea; the use of
prohibited fishing methods and gear; fishing during closed fishing seasons; non-compliance
with satellite tracking obligations; and not reporting catch data are considered very serious
violations under the code.982 The code also makes it mandatory for industrial fishing vessels of
over 15 metres to have an AIS983 and imposes a minimum of one fisheries observer onboard
fishing vessels.984 However, the code puts the responsibility on shipowners to pay salaries of the
observers, which can create an opportunity for observer abuse like in Ghana.985
The code reviewed its registration and licensing system and makes registration of fishing
vessels a precondition for obtaining a licence or authorisation.986 Industrial and artisanal fishing
vessels and gear must have an identification mark.987 Fish imported and exported from Guinea
must be accompanied by a catch certificate stipulating that the fish do not come from IUU
fishing.988 The code also includes explicit regulatory measures on vessels flying the Guinean
flag, including the prohibition of unauthorised fishing in high seas or territorial zones of another
coastal state,989 and actions to be taken by authorities when a national vessel has engaged in
IUU fishing activities on the high seas or in the jurisdiction of another coastal state.990
978 Commission Decision of 15 November 2012 on Notifying the Third Countries that the Commission Considers as
Possible of Being Identified as Non-Cooperating Third Countries Pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No
1005/2008 Establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing [2012] OJ C 354/1, arts 142 - 217; Commission Implementing Decision of 26 November 2013 Identifying the
Third Countries that the Commission Considers as Non-Cooperating Third Countries Pursuant to Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 Establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing [2013] OJ C 346/2, arts 122 – 203,
979 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea).
980 Ibid Title VIII.
981 Ibid art 5.
982 Ibid art 241.
983 Ibid art 98.
984 Ibid art 106.
985 Ibid art 107.
986 Ibid arts 37, 38, 40(4), 41(1).
987 Ibid arts 88 – 90.
988 Ibid arts 155, 157.
989 Ibid arts 69, 70.
990 Ibid arts 75 -76, 238.
Apart from legislative improvements, in 2016, Guinea made improvements to its MCS by
developing a National Fisheries Inspection Plan.991 The plan established aerial surveillance
systems and equipped Guinea’s Fisheries Monitoring Center (FMC) with a VMS to monitor
vessel compliance.992 Additionally, in 2016, Guinea acceded to the PSMA and has since
incorporated port state measures in its Maritime Fishing Code.993 Thereafter, in 2016, the EC
lifted the trade sanctions after it recognised Guinea’s efforts in combatting IUU fishing.994 In
2017, Guinea adopted its NPOA-IUU to combat IUU fishing.995 The NPOA-IUU focuses on
combatting IUU fishing through continuous improvement of fisheries management by
enhancing Guinea’s legislative frameworks, MCS, and research.996
Additionally, the Guinean government established its Fisheries Development and Management
Plan to manage the fisheries sector and has periodically updated it.997 The most current is the
Maritime Fisheries Development and Management Plan for the Year 2022.998 The government
also uses naval surveillance, technical inspection of fishing vessels, and participatory
monitoring by artisanal fishers for surveillance in the fight against IUU fishing.999 Furthermore,
the Guinean fisheries authorities and Greenpeace vessel Esperanza have conducted joint patrol
operations in national waters to enhance MCS.1000
5.4.2.3 Guinea-Bissau
Decree-Law No. 10/201, Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation sets out several duties and
obligations for fishing vessels in Guinea-Bissau.1001 Industrial fishing vessels authorised to
operate in territorial waters must have a fisheries observer on board;1002 all fishing vessels must
991 ‘Guinea is Back from the List of Non-Cooperating Countries in Illicit Matter’, European External Action Service
(News Article, 11 October 2016) <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/_en>
992 Ibid.
993 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea) arts 131 – 140.
994 ‘Commission Proposes to Lift ‘Red Card’ from Republic of Guinea after it Steps up Fight Against Illegal Fishing’
European Commission (Press Release, 13 September 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/items/33123>
995 Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy, National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 2017 (‘Guinea’s NPOA-IUU’).
996 Ibid.
997 Order No. A/2013/10611/MPA/CAB/SGG of 27 December 2012 Adopting the Fisheries Development and
Management Plan for the 2013 Fishing Campaign (Guinea).
998 Order No. A/2021/2698/MPEM/SGG Approving the Marine Fisheries Development and Management Plan for the
Year 2022 (Guinea).
999 Cremers et al. (n 858) 20.
1000 Greenpeace Africa, ‘Shark Fins Found Aboard Foreign Fishing Vessels During Greenpeace – Guinea Patrol’
(Press Release, 9 April 2017) <https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/press/408/shark-fins-found-aboard-foreign-
fishing-vessels-during-greenpeace-guinea-patrol/>
1001 Decree-Law No. 10/2011 Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation (Guinea Bissau).
1002 Ibid art 21(2).
have and display their identification marks;1003 foreign industrial fishing vessels must inform
relevant authorities of the time of entry and exit of territorial waters;1004 and registration of
artisanal and industrial fishing vessels is a prerequisite for obtaining a license.1005 Decree No.
24/2011 Approving the Regulation on Artisanal Fisheries, which regulates artisanal fisheries in
inland waters and the territorial sea, also provides specific requirements for artisanal fishing
vessels such as licensing requirements,1006 fishing gear and methods,1007 and restricted fishing
areas and fish species.1008
Guinea-Bissau has partnered with Greenpeace to fight against IUU fishing in its territorial
waters. FISCAP and the Greenpeace vessel, Esperanza, have conducted several joint patrol
operations, leading to the arrest of several IUU fishing vessels.1009 Crimes such as drug
trafficking have been found to be associated with fishing vessels in Guinea-Bissau.1010 Drug
traffickers use trans-shipments to drop off cocaine into smaller fishing vessels in the archipelago
Bijagos Island.1011 Consequently, Guinea-Bissau’s Decree No. 24/2011 prohibits trans-
shipments at sea between artisanal and industrial fishing vessels.1012
Nonetheless, it is important to note that Guinea-Bissau is yet to ratify key international
conventions that help in the fight against IUU fishing. It has not ratified the FAO Compliance
Agreement, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, PSMA, or Cape Town Agreement (Table 14).
Additionally, the state has not adopted an NPOA-IUU. Furthermore, MCS capacity is
inadequate to effectively combat IUU fishing.1013 The Navy and Coast Guard (the state's main
MCS agencies) are hugely limited in terms of patrols.1014 The Navy has only two patrol boats to
1003 Ibid art 29.
1004 Decree No. 4/96 Establishing the General Principle of the Exploitation Policy of National Fishery Resources
(Guinea Bissau) s 42.
1005 Ibid s 53(1).
1006 Decree No. 24/2011 Approving the Regulation on Artisanal Fisheries (Guinea Bissau) arts 24 – 26, 28 – 34.
1007 Ibid art 14
1008 Ibid arts 19 – 23.
1009 ‘Guinea Bissau: Joint Fishing Patrol Snags 4 Illegal Fishing Vessels Off Guinea-Bissau’, Fisheries Committee for
the West Central Gulf of Guinea (News Article, 31 March 2017) <https://fcwc-fish.org/other-news/guinea-bissau-
president-boards-greenpeace-ship-to-focus-on-illegal-fishing>
1010 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 29.
1011 Ibid.
1012Decree No. 24/2011 Approving the Regulation on Artisanal Fisheries (Guinea Bissau) art 35.
1013 Ganapathiraju Pramod, Global Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance in 84 Countries.
Guinea Bissau – Country Report (IUU Risk Intelligence Policy Report No. 1, January 2020) 1 – 9.
1014 Jeremias Francisco Intchama, Dyhia Belhabib and Raul Joaquim Tomás Jumpe, ‘Assessing Guinea Bissau’s
Legal and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and the Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them’ (2018) 5(79)
Frontiers in Marine Science 4: Pramod Ganapathiraju, Global Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring Control and
Surveillance in 84 Countries. Guinea Bissau – Country Report (IUU Risk Intelligence Policy Report No. 1, January
2020) 3.
monitor 88 islands, leaving vast areas that cannot be patrolled.1015 Aerial patrols are also limited.
In 2019, only three joint aerial surveillance patrols with the SRFC were conducted in Guinea-
Bissau.1016 Still, in 2017, Guinea-Bissau signed a new protocol for five years with the EU,
allowing EU vessels to fish for several fish species.1017 This suggests that the government places
more importance on revenue from access agreements rather than the benefits of combatting IUU
fishing and enhancing maritime security.
5.4.3.4 Liberia
Large-scale industrial fishing vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) contribute
to IUU fishing in Liberian waters. Okafor-Yarwood et al. posits that the industrial fishing sector
(which includes DWFFs), accounts for 60% of pelagic catches in Liberian territorial waters.1018
The authors further state that 85% and 90% of these catches are never reported to relevant
Liberian authorities.1019 Industrial fishing vessels have also been reported to fish from the IEZ
reserved for small-scale fishers and use prohibited fishing gear, thereby creating conflict
between the industrial and small-scale fisheries sectors, particularly in shrimp fisheries.1020
The government has taken some steps to address IUU fishing in Liberian waters. In 2010, the
government adopted a regulation called the New Fisheries Regulations to protect its fisheries
resources.1021 The Regulation bans several IUU fishing activities, such as the prohibitions on
industrial fishing in the IEZ reserved for small-scale fishers,1022 illegal fishing gear and
methods,1023 unlicensed fishing,1024 and illegal trans-shipments.1025
However, in 2017, the EC issued Liberia a yellow card identifying it as non-cooperative in the
fight against IUU fishing for failing to exercise effective control over its fishing vessels (most of
whom have EU beneficial owners).1026 Even though the warning is still in place, Liberia has
1015 Ganapathiraju Pramod, Global Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance in 84 Countries.
Guinea Bissau – Country Report (IUU Risk Intelligence Policy Report No. 1, January 2020) 3.
1016 Ibid 6.
1017 ‘EU, Guinea-Bissau Sign Fishing Access Agreement’ Stop Illegal Fishing (News Article, 26 June 2019)
<https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/eu-guinea-bissau-sign-fishing-access-agreement/>
1018 Okafor-Yarwood et al., ‘Survival of the Richest, not the Fittest’ (n 944) 6.
1019 Ibid.
1020 Daniels et al., Western Africa’s Missing Fish (n 396) 28.
1021 Regulation Relating to Fisheries, Fishing and Related Activities for the Marine Fisheries Sector in the Republic
of Liberia 2010 (Liberia).
1022 Ibid s 6(1).
1023 Ibid s 7.
1024 Ibid s 14(1).
1025 Ibid s 35(1)(a).
1026 ‘Fight Against Illegal Fishing: Commission Lists Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the Comoros as Non-
Cooperating, and Issues Warning for Liberia’ European Commission (Press Release, 23 May 2017)
made some efforts to control vessels flying its flag. In 2018, Liberia adopted an NPOA-IUU to
combat IUU fishing.1027 The NPOA-IUU laid out action plans to address current gaps in
Liberia’s fisheries legislation, fisheries management, and MCS.1028
Additionally, in June 2019, Liberia acceded to the PSMA, showing its dedication to preventing
IUU fishing products from entering its ports and the international market.1029 It has adopted port
state measures in its fisheries legislation to aid in the implementation of the PSMA.1030 In 2019,
it also developed its Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law to amend
the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2017 to include provisions on licensing, ensuring
that vessels with a history of IUU fishing are not licensed to Liberia.1031 However, it is
imperative to note the law does not include actions to be taken by the state when a Liberian
fishing vessel has contravened CMMs on the high seas or other coastal states jurisdiction. It
only stated that vessels with a history of IUU fishing will not be licensed to Liberia,1032 and that
unauthorised Liberian fishing vessels are prohibited from fishing on the high seas or in the
jurisdiction of another coastal state.1033
To show its commitment to combatting IUU fishing in its waters, the Liberian government in
2020 denied fishing licenses to six Chinese-flagged supertrawlers.1034 These trawlers, if given
licenses, would have taken 12,000 metric tons of fish annually.1035 Each supertrawler is able to
catch 2,000 tonnes which is 4,000 times the catch of a local canoe fisher (an average of 500 kg
annually).1036 Additionally, the Liberian government has partnered with the EJF to launch the
EJF DASE mobile app to empower small-scale fishers in the surveillance of industrial fishing
<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/items/65987/en>; Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable Development Goals’ (n 6) 418.
1027 Liberia’s NPOA-IUU (n 807).
1028 Ibid 27 – 29.
1029 Available at ‘FAO Treaties Database’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (Web Page)
<https://www.fao.org/treaties/results/details/en/c/TRE-000003/>
1030 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Development Law 2019 (Liberia) ss 11.28, 11.29, 11.30, 11.31, 11.32.
1031 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law 2019 (Liberia).
1032 Ibid s 10.6(k).
1033 Ibid s 10.15.
1034 ‘Liberia Protect Small-Scale Fishers from Chinese Super-Trawler Threat’, Environmental Justice Foundation
(News Article, 12 October 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/the-liberian-government-has-refused-to-issue-
fishing-licenses-to-a-fleet-of-six-chinese-flagged-supertrawlers-safeguarding-local-livelihoods-and-food-security>
1035 12,000 tons of fish is more than Liberia’s sustainable annual catch limit of bottom-dwelling fish species,
estimated to be 6,000 tonnes annually. ‘Liberian Fishing Communities Threatened by Chinese Supertrawlers’,
Environmental Justice Foundation (News Article, 14 July 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/liberian-
fishing-communities-threatened-by-chinese-supertrawlers>
1036 Ibid.
vessels.1037 This project will run for four years, from 2020 to 2023.1038
Furthermore, in September 2021, the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority (NaFAA)
reported that it is currently planning on boosting transparency and information sharing between
relevant stakeholders and building a national fishing port to support the implementation of the
PSMA.1039 It also stated that it is finalising the National Strategy and Action Plan for
implementing the PSMA and adopting a National Fisheries Inspection Plan.1040
However, in Liberia’s fisheries, IUU fishing has also been found to have a nexus with other
crimes. The joint patrol partnership between the Liberian Ministry of National Defence and the
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Operation Sola Stella, discovered that fishing vessels were
implicated in crimes such as labour abuse and bribery,1041 document forgery,1042 and tax and
customs fraud.1043 Therefore, the Liberian government must develop more comprehensive
measures to address crimes in the fisheries sector.
5.4.2.5 Nigeria
Although Nigeria does not have fishing partnership agreements with DWFNs, an investigative
news report conducted by Modern Ghana with support from the Money Trail Project, found that
IUU fishing boats from China, in cohorts with some local fishers and security officials conduct
illegal trans-shipments at sea in territorial waters.1044 Reference was made to the Niger Delta
region, where trans-shipment activities by Chinese trawlers are a significant problem.1045 A
similar study by Okafor-Yarwood argued that small-scale fishers faced with increased
competition from declining fish resources are resorting to working with industrial vessels to
1037 National Fisheries & Aquaculture Authority, ‘Liberia Remains Committed to Sustainable Fisheries Management’
Says NaFAA DG’ (Press Release, 15 December 2020) <https://nafaa.gov.lr/index.php/medias/press-release/liberia-
remains-committed-to-sustainable-fisheries-management-says-nafaa-dg>
1038 Ibid.
1039 ‘Liberia Host Technical Fisheries Workshop on “Ending Illegal Fishing”’, Front Page Africa (News Article, 22
September 20201) <https://frontpageafricaonline.com/fishery/liberia-host-technical-fisheries-workshop-on-ending-
illegal-fishing/>
1040 Ibid.
1041 ‘Operation Sola Stella: Combatting Illegal Fishing in Liberia, West Africa’, Sea Shepherd (Web Page, 2017)
<https://seashepherd.org/campaigns/iuu-fishing-africa/iuu-campaigns/sola-stella/>; ‘Liberia Arrest High-Tech
Poachers for Illegal Fishing and Attempted Bribery’, Sea Shepherd (News Article, 2018)
<https://www.seashepherd.org.uk/news-and-commentary/news/liberia-arrests-high-tech-poachers-for-illegal-fishing-
and-attempted-bribery.html>
1042 ‘Operation Sola Stella Results in 15th Arrest for Fisheries Crime’, Sea Shepherd (News Article, 15 April 2019)
<https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/solevant-iuu-arrest/>
1043 ‘Sea Shepherd Assists Liberian Coast Guard with Arrest of Cargo Vessel for Illegal Fish Trade’, Sea Shepherd
(News Article, 2 January 2019) <https://www.seashepherdglobal.org/latest-news/arrest-liberia-haifeng/>
1044 Gideon Sarpong and Elfreda Kevin-Alerechi, Stolen at Sea: An Investigation into Illegal Chinese Transhipment
Activities in Ghana and Nigeria (Modern Ghana Special Report, 10 November 2020).
1045 Ibid.
trans-ship illegal fish catch in Nigerian waters.1046
The Nigerian Sea Fisheries Act 1992 prohibits trans-shipment activities in Nigeria’s EEZ unless
the vessel is registered and licensed.1047 It also prohibits fishing methods, such as using
explosives and poisonous substances.1048 In addition, the Nigerian government made it
mandatory to have a VMS and AIS installed onboard all national fishing vessels.1049 In 2017,
the government also made it compulsory for all national fishing vessels to have an IMO
registration number to help control fishing activities by Nigerian-flagged fishing vessels.1050
However, lax laws and enforcement have caused IUU fishing and other crimes to flourish in
Nigeria. For instance, a study by Okafor-Yarwood reported that in the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria, fishers are turning to piracy to supplement lost income from IUU fishing.1051
Nonetheless, its outdated and limited legal structure suggests that the Nigerian government
places little importance on combatting IUU fishing.1052 For instance, Nigeria’s fisheries
legislation is over 30 years old (Appendix 1). Additionally, Nigeria has yet to ratify the PSMA,
and has not adopted an NPOA-IUU.1053 Enforcement capacity is also extremely limited as the
MCS arm of the Federal Department of Fisheries has not received any budgetary allocation in
over 15 years, impeding proper monitoring of its territorial waters.1054
The Nigerian government has long placed more importance on the oil and gas industry and has
ignored the fisheries sector. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in the region and has an estimated
37 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves.1055 The oil sector accounts for an estimated 90%
of foreign exchange.1056 Therefore, the government remains heavily dependent on oil revenues.
However, oil production and drilling have depreciated in recent years due to global
diversification to green energy, and COVID-19 disruptions. Looking at the oil production rate in
1046 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 127.
1047 Sea Fisheries Act 1992 (Nigeria) s 1(1).
1048 Ibid s 10.
1049 Sunday Ojeme, ‘Illegal Fishing: UN Boosts Nigeria, Others’ Security Measures’ New Telegraph (Online, 19
February 2021) <https://www.newtelegraphng.com/illegal-fishing-un-boosts-nigeria-others-security-measures/>
1050 Stop Illegal Fishing, West Africa Task Force: Cooperation. Collaboration. Communication (Stop Illegal Fishing
Report, 12 June 2017) 39 (‘West Africa Task Force’).
1051 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘The Cyclical Nature of Maritime Security Threats’ (n 357) 131-133.
1052 Nigeria’s fisheries legislation is over 30 years old.
1053 Record of the 9th West Africa Task Force Meeting (n 875) 6.
1054 Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Sayra Van Den Berg Bhagwandas, ‘How Illegal Fishing Harms Nigeria and
What to do About it’ The Conversation (Web Page, 2 June 2021) <https://theconversation.com/how-illegal-fishing-
harms-nigeria-and-what-to-do-about-it-160553>
1055 Chukwuebuka Okafor et al., ‘Moving Beyond Fossil Fuel in an Oil-Exporting and Emerging Economy: Paradigm
Shift’ (2021) 9 (2) Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy Energy 392; ‘Nigeria Facts and Figures’, Organisation of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Web Page) <https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm>
1056 Okotie, Ogbarode and Ikporo (n 157) 47.
Nigeria from 2019 to 2021, there is a steady decline in average daily crude oil production. In
2019 (1.7 million barrels p/d),1057 2020 (1.5 million barrels p/d), and 2021 (1.3 million barrels
p/d) were produced.1058 The decline in oil production has negatively affected the oil sector’s
contribution to GDP. In 2021, the oil sector made a 7.2% overall contribution to GDP,1059 in
contrast with 8.2% and 8.8% GDP contributions in 2020 and 2019, respectively.1060 Thus,
continued reliance on oil revenues threatens the food and livelihoods of people in the state. If
Nigeria does not diversify its economy, especially towards improving the fisheries sector, there
will be severe socioeconomic implications. Nigeria must urgently find alternative sources of
revenue, with a greater focus on revenues generated by the fisheries sector.1061
Interestingly, the Nigerian government has been able to get away with lax fisheries laws and
enforcement for a long time. Usually, the EU, the world's largest seafood importer,1062 is
stringent on states that export to the EU.1063 A plausible reason that Nigeria has evaded EU
sanctions could be that Nigeria is a significant importer rather than an exporter of fish products
to the EU.1064 Regardless, Nigeria is at risk of becoming a major hub of piracy and added crimes
if there are no future changes to national fisheries legislation and MCS.
5.4.2.6 Senegal
In the fight against IUU fishing, Senegal has made several efforts to ensure sustainable
management of its fisheries resources. Faced with the difficulties of Law No. 98-32 on the Code
of Maritime Fisheries,1065 Senegal, in 2015, revised and upgraded its Maritime Fisheries Code to
help combat IUU fishing.1066 The law prohibits fishing methods like the use of explosives or
toxic substances;1067 fishing and trade of prohibited fish species;1068 and the import, trade,
purchase, and possession of illegal fishing nets.1069 The law also requires all industrial fishing
1057 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (OPEC, 14 December
2020) 50.
1058 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (OPEC, 12 April 2022)
45.
1059 National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report Q4 2021 (NBS, February 2022) 5.
1060 National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report (Q4 & Full Year 2020) (NBS, February
2021) 149; National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report (Q4 & Full Year 2019) (NBS,
February 2020) 4.
1061 See sec 4.3.1.1 in ch 4.
1062 ‘Leading Importers of Fish and Fishery Products Worldwide in 2020 (in billion U.S. Dollars)’, Statista (Web
Page) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268266/top-importers-of-fish-and-fishery-products/>
1063 The EU uses the yellow and red carding system to sanction non-cooperating third party states.
1064 See Table 10 in ch 4.
1065 Law No. 98-32 on the Code of Maritime Fisheries did not reflect the current realities of fisheries management and
conservation.
1066 Law No. 2015-18 of 13 July 2015 on the Code of Maritime Fisheries (Senegal).
1067 Ibid art 65(a).
1068 Ibid art 67.
1069 Ibid art 66.
boats operating in national waters to be licenced and authorised1070 and to report their catches by
submitting a logbook containing all catch data, statistics, and other information to relevant
authorities.1071 Industrial fishing vessels must have at least one fisheries observer (vessels of less
than 50 gross tonnages may be exempt).1072 Registration is mandatory for foreign fishing vessels
to obtain a license.1073 Artisanal fishing vessels are also required to register their vessels.1074 All
fishing vessels must inform the authorities before entering and exiting Senegal’s territorial
waters.1075 They must also have identification marks or tags on their vessels.1076
In 2017, the Senegalese government acceded to the PSMA and adopted port state measures in
its 2015 Maritime Fisheries Code to assist in national implementation.1077 Additionally, the
government is working with EJF to involve local fishers in documenting IUU fishing
activities.1078 The government has also pledged to enhance the transparency of fisheries by
committing to implement the standards of the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI),
according to its National Action Plan 2021 – 2023.1079 The next phase after commitment will be
to complete the necessary steps to submit an official application in 2023, according to Senegal’s
agenda.1080 However, it is imperative to note that the government made the same commitment in
2016, but the necessary steps were not taken to submit an official application.1081 Furthermore,
the government has acquired equipment for naval and air force patrols and has equipped its
coastal stations with radars and vessel tracking systems.1082 However, it has been discovered
that the equipment has not been used properly or adequately maintained.1083
In 2020, the Directorate for Fisheries Protection and Monitoring (DPSP) of the Ministry of
Fisheries and Maritime Economy, organised a five-day training course to qualify 54 government
1070 Ibid art 35.
1071 Ibid art 70.
1072 Ibid art 72.
1073 Ibid art 31.
1074 Ibid art 32.
1075 Ibid art 71.
1076 Ibid arts 68, 69.
1077 Ibid arts 74 – 76.
1078 Cremers et al. (n 858) 24.
1079 Ministry of Justice Senegal, National Action Plan Within the Framework of the Open Government Partnership
(NAP – OGP) 2021 – 2023 (National Action Plan, August 2021) 22- 33.
1080 Ibid 23.
1081 Fisheries Transparency Initiative, ‘Mauritania Launches a Global Fisheries Transparency Initiative, Unlocking a
Major Obstacle to Sustainable Fishing; Indonesia, Senegal, and the Seychelles Announce Their Commitment Too’
(Press Release, 4 February 2016) <https://www.fiti.global/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/FiTI_Press_release_20160402.pdf>; ‘Senegal’, Fisheries Transparency Initiative (Web
Page) <https://www.fiti.global/senegal>
1082 Cremers et al. (n 858) 20.
1083 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fight Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa. A
Regional Challenge (FAO Report, 2020) 7.
fisheries officials as fisheries observers.1084 The government has also introduced seasonal
fishing closures for octopus and shrimp during spawning seasons.1085 It has frozen the issuance
of coastal demersal fishing licenses since 20061086 and the registration of new artisanal pirogues
to limit fishing effort in territorial waters.1087
Foreign and domestic fishing vessels must also have a VMS to monitor fishing activities.1088
However, it has been discovered that vessels turn their VMS transponders off to avoid
detection.1089 Also, when the VMS are faulty, there is no follow-up action by fisheries
authorities to get them repaired.1090 The DPSP has also partnered with Greenpeace for joint
patrols and inspections in Senegalese waters.1091 Furthermore, in 2020, the Senegalese
government announced that it denied licenses to 54 industrial fishing vessels with histories of
illegal fishing.1092 Nonetheless, it was later discovered that four vessels were secretly granted
licenses.1093
IUU fishing is also associated with other crimes in Senegal’s territorial waters. The case of Oleg
Naydenov illustrates the nexus between IUU fishing and other crimes in Senegal, where the
National Marine Authority seized the Russian vessel, Oleg Naydenov, for illegal fishing in
1084 ‘54 New Government Fisheries Observers Trained and Qualifies to Fight IUU Fishing in Senegal’, United States
Agency for International Development (News Article, 8 December 2020) <https://www.usaid.gov/senegal/news/54-
new-government-fisheries-observers-trained-and-qualified-fight-iuu-fishing>
1085 Adama LAM, ‘Where is the Fishing Going? Let’s not Scuttle the Ship’ Fisheries Committee for the West Central
Gulf of Guinea (News Article, 6 May 2020) <https://fcwc-fish.org/category/our-news>
1086 Decree No. 5166 of 8 August 2006 (Senegal).
1087 Ministerial Order No.6397 of 29 August 2012 Freezing the Registration of Artisanal Maritime Fishing Boats
(Senegal).
1088 Ganapathiraju Pramod, Viviane Koutob and Mantha Gopikrishna, Global Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring
Control and Surveillance in 84 Countries: Senegal- Country Report (IUU Risk Intelligence Policy Report Volume 1
Number 1, November 2019) 5.
1089 Ibid.
1090 Ibid.
1091 ‘Joint Surveillance and Inspection on Illegal Fishing Activities in Senegal’, Greenpeace (Web Page, 27 April
2017) <https://media.greenpeace.org>; ‘Joint Fisheries Surveillance in Senegal’, Greenpeace (Web Page, 29 April
2017) <https://media.greenpeace.org>
1092 Joelle Philippe, ‘Senegal: The Fisheries Ministry will not Issue any of the Licences to the 54 Vessels of Chinese
and Turkish Origin’ Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (News Article, 9 June 2020)
<https://www.cffacape.org/news-blog/the-fisheries-ministry-will-not-issue-any-of-the-licences-to-the-54-vessels-of-
chinese-and-turkish-origin>; ‘New Trawlers with History of Illegal Fishing Threaten Senegalese Fisheries’,
Environmental Justice Foundation (News Article, 22 April 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/new-
trawlers-with-history-of-illegal-fishing-threaten-senegalese-fisheries>
1093 Ayoba Faye, ‘The Minister of Fisheries, Alioune Ndoye Has Indeed Signed a New License for “A Chinese
Vessel” Fu YUAN Yu 9889’ PressAfrik (Online, 6 May 2020) <https://www.pressafrik.com/Le-ministre-de-la-
Peche-Alioune-Ndoye-a-bel-et-bien-signe-une-nouvelle-licence-pour-un-navire-chinois-Fu-YUAN-Yu-
9889_a215659.html>; ‘Signing of Fishing Licenses: The Evidence that Demonstrates the “Untruths” of Minister
Alioune Ndoye’ Actusen (Online, 12 June 2020) <https://actusen-sn.translate.goog/signature-de-licences-de-peche-
les-preuves-qui-demontent-les-contreverites-du-ministre-alioune-
ndoye/?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc>
Senegal’s territorial waters.1094 During investigations, it was discovered that the crew had been
forcefully kept onboard, unable to return home for fear of losing their payroll.1095 Yet, the
government has not ratified the Cape Town Agreement, which will help safeguard and protect
fishers' safety. Migrant smuggling has also been reported to be linked to IUU fishing vessels in
Senegal.1096
5.4.2.7 Sierra Leone.
The government of Sierra Leone has made various attempts to combat IUU fishing. For
instance, in 2010, Sierra Leone was the first state to close its open registry to FoC vessels.1097
Additionally, in 2011, the government of Sierra Leone partnered with the World Bank to install
VMS transponders on industrial fishing vessels to monitor fishing activities in waters under its
jurisdiction.1098 However, one study reported that skippers manipulated these transponders to
prevent IUU fishing from being noticed.1099 Furthermore, the government banned several IUU
fishing activities in its 1994 Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree, such as fishing
without a licence,1100 industrial fishing in the IEZ,1101 use of prohibited fishing gear,1102 fishing
for prohibited species and juveniles,1103 and prohibited fishing methods.1104
However, the failure of Sierra Leone to implement the provisions of the legislation led to Sierra
Leone being issued a yellow card in 2016 (which is still in force) from the EU.1105 The EC cited
outdated legislation and the inability of Sierra Leone to adequately monitor its fishing
vessels.1106 In response, Sierra Leone repealed its 1994 Fisheries (Management and
1094 Simons (n 574).
1095 INTERPOL Environment Security Sub-Directorate, ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in West African Coastal Region’
(September 2014) 28
<https://www.interpol.int/content/download/5144/file/INTERPOL%20Study%20on%20Fisheries%20Crime%20in%
20the%20West%20African%20Coastal%20Region%20EN.pdf>
1096 Meaghan Beatley and Sam Edwards, ‘Overfished: In Senegal, Empty Nets Lead to Hunger and Violence’ Global
Post Investigations (Web Page, 31 May 2018) <https://gpinvestigations.pri.org/overfished-in-senegal-empty-nets-
lead-to-hunger-and-violence-e3b5d0c9a686>
1097 Simon Akam, ‘Sierra Ends Flag of Convenience for Fishing Vessels’, Reuters (News Article, 29 October 2010)
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sierraleone-fishing-idUSTRE69R4MW20101028>
1098 Max Konneh, ‘Sierra Leone: Fishing Vessels Heed to Minister’s Call to Install Monitoring Transponders’
AllAfrica.com (Online, 6 October 2011) <https://allafrica.com/stories/201110130438.html>
1099 Nwamaka Okeke-Ogbuafor and Tim Gray, ‘Is Community-Based Management of Small-Scale Fisheries in Sierra
Leone the Answer to their Problems?’ (2021) 21 World Development Perspectives 3.
1100 Fisheries (Management and Development) Decree 1994 (Sierra Leone) ss 15(1), 21(1)(b).
1101 Ibid s 30.
1102 Ibid ss 33 – 39.
1103 Ibid s 41.
1104 Ibid s 44.
1105 European Commission, ‘Fighting Illegal Fishing: Warnings for Kiribati, Sierra Leone and Trinidad & Tobago,
while Sri Lanka is Delisted’ (Press Release, 21 April 2016)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1457>
1106 Ibid.
Development) Decree and its 1995 Fisheries Regulation. Thereafter, it adopted the Fisheries and
Aquaculture Act 2018 and Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019.
The 2018 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act and 2019 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations
specifically identified IUU fishing as a threat to fisheries conservation. Both laws banned IUU
fishing activities, such as trans-shipments (except at select places, times, and dates);1107
unauthorised trans-shipments at sea;1108 fishing without a licence;1109 industrial fishing in the
IEZ;1110 fishing using methods, such as dynamites, explosives, and chemicals;1111 and fishing
using prohibited fishing gear.1112 Additionally, Sierra Leone ratified the PSMA in 2018 and has
implemented port states measures, such as an advance request for port entry,1113 port entry
denial,1114 and conduct of port inspections,1115 in its 2019 Fisheries and Aquaculture
Regulations. To further enable the PSMA implementation, Sierra Leone is working with the
support of the FAO and other partners to improve MCS and increase interagency
cooperation.1116
The government of Sierra Leone implemented a one-month ban in April 2019 for industrial
vessels to help combat IUU fishing, reduce fishing pressure and enable fish stock to
replenish.1117 However, there were debates on the usefulness of this ban, with some suggesting
that without a strong MCS strategy in place, IUU fishing will only increase.1118 The lack of
enforcement in Sierra Leone’s territorial waters continues to be challenging as IUU fishing
operators take advantage of the limited MCS gap. Other efforts by the government include,
introducing the DASE smartphone mobile app for small-scale fishers’ surveillance in 20201119
1107 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019 (Sierra Leone) s 31(1).
1108 Ibid s 31(5)(a).
1109 Fisheries and Aquaculture Act 2018 (Sierra Leone) s 14.
1110 Ibid s 4(2).
1111 Ibid s 40.
1112 Ibid s 42.
1113 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations 2019 (Sierra Leone) s 36.
1114 Ibid s 37.
1115 Ibid s 38.
1116 ‘Japan Supports Sierra Leone to Ensure the Sustainability of Marine Fisheries and Improve Livelihoods of the
Fishing Community’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (News Article, 27 June 2019) <https://www.fao.org/sierra-
leone/news/detail-events/zh/c/1200053/>
1117 Uzman Unis Bah, ‘Was Sierra Leone’s One-Month Fishing Ban Enough to Replenish Fish Stock?’ Mongabay
(News Article, 3 July 2019) <https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/was-sierra-leones-one-month-fishing-ban-enough-
to-replenish-fish-stocks/>
1118 Ibid.
1119 ‘Earth Day: celebrating and Supporting Environmental Defenders’, Environmental Justice Foundation (News
Article, 22 April 2021) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/earth-day-celebrating-and-supporting-environmental-
defenders>
and the joint surveillance and inspections with Greenpeace.1120
In 2021, the government introduced the joint patrol partnership with the Sierra Leone Ministry
of Defense and National Security and the Sea Shepherd Conservative Society called Operation
Sierra Leone Coastal Defense, which led to the arrest of five illegal fishing trawlers within two
days of the partnership.1121 Other crimes were found to be linked with these illegal fishing
vessels. Specifically, this link was demonstrated by the Liao Dan Yu 6618 case, where the
fishing trawler was found to be carrying two separate registration documents.1122 Bribery and
corruption is also a significant problem in Sierra Leone's fisheries industry. An official
investigation by Al Jazeera revealed this when a Sierra Leone naval officer alleged that
alarming corrupt practices were happening in the fisheries industry.1123 The insider made
allegations of how he was given five days extra duties by his superiors for reporting an
industrial vessel using a wrong fishing net.1124 He further stated that fishers bribe naval officers
engaged in enforcement duties to avoid fishing patrols. Correspondingly, an EJF report reported
that a fisheries observer was removed from a fishing vessel when he reported that the vessel was
fishing illegally in the IEZ of Sierra Leone waters.1125
5.4.2.8 Discussion of the Challenges
Although significant efforts have been made to combat IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, the
above section has identified that there are several existing legal and policy challenges that
illegal operators exploit to continue perpetrating IUU fishing and criminal activities in the
region.
5.4.2.8.1 Legal Challenges
Inadequate laws and sanctions are not deterrent enough to combat new developments in
fisheries, particularly IUU fishing and its associated crimes.1126 This inadequacy was
1120 ‘Joint Inspection on Illegal Fishing Activities in Sierra Leone’, Greenpeace (Web Page, 18 April 2017)
<https://media.greenpeace.org>; ‘Shark Fins Found on Italian Fishing Vessel Eighteen in Sierra Leone’, Greenpeace
(Web Page, 17 April 2017) <https://media.greenpeace.org>
1121 ‘Five Trawlers Arrested as New Partnership with Sierra Leone Begins’, Sea Shepherd (News Article, 19 April
2021) <https://www.seashepherd.org.uk/news-and-commentary/news/five-trawlers-arrested-as-new-partnership-with-
sierra-leone-begins.html>
1122 Ibid.
1123 ‘Pirate Fishing (Part 1) – People and Power’ Aljazeera (YouTube, 26 January 2012)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKQ0rf06Jw4>
1124 Ibid.
1125 Pirate Fishing Exposed (n 561) 26.
1126 For instance, Nigeria’s Sea Fisheries Act is over 30 years old, and Ghana’s Fisheries Act is over 20 years old.
demonstrated by the Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 case.1127 In 2019, the Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 fishing
trawler was detained in Ghana for catching undersized fish and using illegal fishing nets.1128 The
vessel was issued a fine of USD1 million (the minimum statutory fine) and an additional GHS
124,000.1129 Subsequently, the licence of the vessel was renewed, and the vessel was allowed to
go back out to sea again. However, in 2020, the vessel was arrested for a second time for an
identical offence.1130
The Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956 case suggests that sanctions are not enough to deter IUU fishing and
criminal operators. Fines are inadequate given the economic and maritime security cost of IUU
fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.1131 As Miller et al. puts it, ‘IUU fishing occurs when anticipated
economic benefits outweigh the negative consequences associated with the probability of
detection, and/or when penalty levels for non-compliance with regulatory provisions are
low’.1132 The profitability of IUU fishing outweighs the cost of being caught and sanctioned.
Penalties must be severe to discourage further violations and prevent offenders from benefiting
from IUU fishing and illicit activities. Bearing this in mind, Ghana is drafting a new Fisheries
Act to replace the current Act of 2002.1133 The government is committed to improving its
sanctions system to include more punitive sanctions. The new Fisheries Act must cater to the
current realities of IUU fishing for effective fisheries and maritime security governance to be
achieved.
5.4.2.8.2 Policy Challenges
First, there are weak enforcement mechanisms of current fisheries laws. Many states in the
region lack the capacity and technical ability to manage and control fishing activities in their
waters.1134 For instance, Nigeria does not have enough patrol boats and aircrafts to effectively
1127 ‘Trawler Re-Arrested in Ghana for Repeated Illegal Fishing Crimes after Refusing to Pay Fine’, Environment
Justice Foundation (News Article, 10 June 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/notorious-trawler-re-arrested-
in-ghana-for-repeated-illegal-fishing-crimes-after-refusing-to-pay-fine>
1128 ‘Trawler Charged with Illegal Fishing Continue to Dodge Fines in Ghana’, Environmental Justice Foundation
(News Article, 23 January 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/trawlers-charged-with-illegal-fishing-
continue-to-dodge-fines-in-ghana-1>
1129 ‘Trawler Re-Arrested in Ghana for Repeated Illegal Fishing Crimes after Refusing to Pay Fine’ Environment
Justice Foundation (News Article, 10 June 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/notorious-trawler-re-arrested-
in-ghana-for-repeated-illegal-fishing-crimes-after-refusing-to-pay-fine>
1130 Ibid.
1131 See sec 4.3.1 in ch 4.
1132 Denzil G.M. Miller, Elise Clark, ‘Promoting Responsible Harvesting by Mitigating IUU Fishing: A Three-Block
and OODA Construct?’ (2016) 8 (1) Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 11.
1133 New Fisheries Act is Being Drafted to Regulate Sector – Hawa Koomson’ MyJoyOnline.com (Web Page, 12
September 2021) <https://www.myjoyonline.com/new-fisheries-act-is-being-drafted-to-regulate-sector-hawa-
koomson/?param=>
1134 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 418.
monitor its coastal waters.1135 The Nigerian Navy, is severely underfunded and overstretched,
working with substandard vessels that cannot pursue IUU fishing and criminal vessels.1136 In
2017, the government promised to purchase new patrol boats,1137 but this is yet to be done.1138
In addition, the MCS department of the FDF had not received any budgetary allocation in more
than 15 years.1139 Consequently, fisheries field officers are not effectively trained for effective
law enforcement operations.1140
To complicate monitoring ability, some coastal states in the region are yet to properly delimit
their maritime zones to align with UNCLOS and international best practices.1141 For instance,
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea currently have maritime boundary disputes.1142 The lack of clear
maritime boundaries only limits the ability of coastal states to police and monitor their waters,
creating gaps for IUU fishing and criminal operators.
Despite the limited monitoring capacity, states like Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Liberia, and
Guinea-Bissau continue to enter and renew Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), and grant
licences to foreign states, letting in more IUU fishing and criminal activities into the region. 1143
For instance, in April 2020, 52 industrial fishing vessels with Chinese and Turkish origins
applied for fishing licences in Senegal.1144 However, on 6 June 2020, due to a protest by the
small-scale artisanal fishers association (APRAPAM), civil society organisations (for instance,
Greenpeace), and the industrial shipowners association (GAIPES), the government publicly
announced that they had denied licences to the vessels.1145 But in May 2020, a local media
source revealed (which an investigative report by Greenpeace confirmed)1146 that the
1135 Okafor-Yarwood and Bhagwandas (n 1054).
1136 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 417 -418.
1137 Okechukwu Nnodim, ‘Govt to Purchase Patrol Vessels to Protect Waterways’ Punch (Online, 16 December
2017) <https://punchng.com/govt-to-purchase-patrol-vessels-to-protect-waterways/>
1138 Okafor-Yarwood and Bhagwandas (n 1054).
1139 Ibid.
1140 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 417.
1141 See sec 5.2.1.1.
1142 International Court of Justice, ‘Dispute Between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea Brought Before the Court’ (Press
Release, 5 March 2021) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/179/179-20210305-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf>
1143 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 418, 419.
1144 ‘New Trawlers with History of Illegal Fishing Threaten Senegalese Fisheries’, Environmental Justice Foundation
(News Article, 22 April 2020) <https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/new-trawlers-with-history-of-illegal-fishing-
threaten-senegalese-fisheries>
1145 Joelle Philippe, ‘Senegal: The Fisheries Ministry will not Issue any of the Licences to the 54 Vessels of Chinese
and Turkish Origin’ Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (News Article, 9 June 2020)
<https://www.cffacape.org/news-blog/the-fisheries-ministry-will-not-issue-any-of-the-licences-to-the-54-vessels-of-
chinese-and-turkish-origin>
1146 Greenpeace Africa, Seasick: As Covid Locks Down West Africa its Waters Remain Open to Plunder (Greenpeace
Report, 31 October 2020) 6 – 9.
government had issued licences to the Fu Yuan Yu 9889, even though it was discovered that the
fishing vessel was caught in Djibouti for fishing in marine protected waters in May 2017.1147
Further investigation in June 2020 by another local media source revealed that three additional
foreign licences were also issued to the Fu Yuan Yu fishing fleets (Fu Yuan Yu 9885, Fu Yuan
Yu 9886, and Fu Yuan Yu 9888).1148
Nevertheless, encouraging initiatives are being taken by other Gulf of Guinea states to improve
their monitoring capacity. For instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia has joined forces with Sea
Shepherd Conservative Society to conduct joint patrols.1149 Before this partnership, Sierra Leone
only had one deep-sea offshore patrol vessel for MCS operations.1150 Likewise, Liberia only had
two coast guard speedboats that could not patrol beyond eight nautical miles, and one was not
seaworthy.1151 However, since the partnership with Sea Shepherd in 2017, Liberia has arrested
several vessels for IUU fishing and other criminal activities.1152 Sea Shepherd has also partnered
with Benin, The Gambia, Gabon, and São Tomé and Principe.1153 Additionally, Greenpeace has
partnered with Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone for joint surveillance and
inspections. Furthermore, external support from the Global Fishing Watch and Trygg Mat
Tracking has also been made available to Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and the FCWC to
provide national authorities with satellite tracking data analysis and training to monitor fishing
vessels and compliance risks.1154 Although this project is still in its pilot stage, it has the
potential to address the limited monitoring capacity of states in the region.
1147 Liselotte Mas, ‘Chinese Trawlers Snapped Fishing in Djibouti’s Protected Waters’ The Observers (News Article,
30 May 2017) <https://observers.france24.com/en/20170526-chinese-trawlers-are-photographed-fishing-djibouti’-
protected-waters>; Ayoba Faye, ‘The Minister of Fisheries, Alioune Ndoye Has Indeed Signed a New License for “A
Chinese Vessel” Fu YUAN Yu 9889’ PressAfrik (Online, 6 May 2020) <https://www.pressafrik.com/Le-ministre-de-
la-Peche-Alioune-Ndoye-a-bel-et-bien-signe-une-nouvelle-licence-pour-un-navire-chinois-Fu-YUAN-Yu-
9889_a215659.html>
1148 ‘Signing of Fishing Licenses: The Evidence that Demonstrates the “Untruths” of Minister Alioune Ndoye’
Actusen (Online, 12 June 2020) <https://actusen-sn.translate.goog/signature-de-licences-de-peche-les-preuves-qui-
demontent-les-contreverites-du-ministre-alioune-ndoye/?_x_tr_sl=fr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc>
1149 Sea Shepherd, ‘Sea Shepherd’s Current Partnerships’ (Web Page) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/our-
campaigns/iuu-fishing/learn-more/>
1150 Bah (n 898).
1151 Emma C. Metieh Glassco, ‘Challenges Caused by IUU Fishing in the Offshore: Lessons for Liberia’s Fisheries
Based on Global Review and Analysis’ (World Maritime University Dissertation, World Maritime University, 2017)
54.
1152 ‘Operation Sola Stella Results in 15th Arrest for Fisheries Crime’, Sea Shepherd (News Article, 15 April 2019)
<https://www.seashepherd.org.au/latest-news/solevant-iuu-arrest/>; ‘Five Trawlers Arrested as New Partnership with
Sierra Leone Begins’, Sea Shepherd (News Article, 19 April 2021) <https://www.seashepherd.org.uk/news-and-
commentary/news/five-trawlers-arrested-as-new-partnership-with-sierra-leone-begins.html>
1153 Sea Shepherd, ‘Sea Shepherd’s Current Partnerships’ (Web Page) <https://www.seashepherd.org.au/our-
campaigns/iuu-fishing/learn-more/>
1154 Sarah Bladen, ‘African Nations to Use New Technology in Tightening Port Controls, Fighting Illegal Fishing
with Big Data’ (Press Release, Global Fishing Watch, 4 November 2021) <https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-
release/africa-new-tech-tighten-port-control/>
Second, the review of the policy regulatory measures to combat IUU fishing shows that there is
no focus on the criminal dimension of IUU fishing. The analysis has shown that current
measures for addressing IUU fishing are primarily through the fisheries management lens.
These measures focus on strengthening fisheries management and conservation laws, enhancing
enforcement through increased MCS of fishing activities, and imposing administrative
sanctions. The analysis also shows that investments in combatting the criminal dimension of
IUU fishing are not a priority for Gulf of Guinea states. This may be because Gulf of Guinea
states do not properly understand the nexus between IUU fishing and transnational organised
crime. Nevertheless, the continuation of IUU fishing activities and associated crimes in the Gulf
of Guinea shows that current management measures have not been successful in ending the
problem of IUU fishing. If measures in combatting IUU fishing in the region keep focusing on
IUU fishing as a fisheries management issue, IUU fishing and criminal activities will continue
unabated. An effective solution requires addressing IUU fishing as a management issue and a
facilitator of broader maritime crime. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea states need to adopt measures
beyond fisheries management and enforcement to uncover other crimes in the fisheries sector.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the legal, institutional and policy framework for combatting IUU fishing
and enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The review of the current legal
framework finds that the connection between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime is
given minimal attention in fisheries and criminal legislation. There is a traditional framework
that separates fishing and criminal activities and limits national fisheries and criminal laws.
Consequently, the chapter argues that the current legal framework for combatting IUU fishing is
inadequate. It further contends that Gulf of Guinea states should review their legal framework
and recognise that IUU fishing is not just a fisheries management problem but also a maritime
security threat.
Institutional frameworks are also limited by a range of constraints that limit them effectively
combatting IUU fishing and its criminal dimensions. The chapter finds that several factors,
including the lack of financial capacity, insufficient personnel, and lack of adequate information
sharing, impede effective cooperation between fisheries and criminal law enforcement agencies.
The lack of transparency in vessel ownership in the region further impedes effective
collaboration in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting IUU fishing and criminal activities
in the fisheries sector.
Additionally, the chapter finds that national policy measures have not characterised IUU fishing
as a maritime security threat. Current policy measures focus on combatting IUU fishing as a
fisheries management issue rather than a maritime security threat. The chapter proposes that the
current fisheries management approach to IUU fishing could be because states may not properly
understand the nexus between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime. Therefore, Gulf
of Guinea states should respond to the call made by the UN General Assembly in UNGA
Resolution 64/72 to examine the connection between illegal fishing and organised crime.
Comprehensive research will facilitate the review of current fisheries and criminal laws with an
eye towards shutting down criminal activities linked with IUU fishing. The goal should be to
introduce transnational organised crime elements into fisheries legislation and IUU fishing into
criminal legislation. This will help strengthen national interagency cooperation and capacity
building. Gulf of Guinea states should also characterise IUU fishing as a maritime security
threat in their national legislation. This will enable the adoption of policy measures tailored
towards addressing the criminal dimension of IUU fishing. Policy measures will be more
effective if they are backed by legal instruments.
CHAPTER 6
ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF STATES’ MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING:
RELATIONSHIPS TO MARITIME SECURITY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have examined Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing as a
maritime security threat in the Gulf of Guinea. They demonstrated that IUU fishing threatens
maritime security. One of the key issues of this research was whether adding a maritime security
approach to the existing fisheries management approach could deal more effectively with IUU
fishing. This chapter continues to investigate the current problems of combatting IUU fishing in
the region. It reveals that adding a maritime security approach to the existing fisheries
management approach may have the potential to succeed in combatting IUU fishing and its
criminal dimensions.
The first part of this chapter assesses the adequacy of national best practices in addressing IUU
fishing in the case study Gulf of Guinea states. It will uncover gaps in adopting international
and regional best policies and practices to combat IUU fishing. The second part then examines
how adherence to best practices can enhance regional maritime security. The last part
demonstrates how an integrated fisheries-maritime security approach may be superior to
combatting IUU fishing rather than a fisheries management approach alone, focusing on
fisheries control and enforcement.
6.2 An Assessment of the Adequacy of the Existing Approaches to Combat IUU Fishing
States must adhere to several best practices consistent with international law to combat IUU
fishing and criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Hence, identifying whether Gulf of Guinea
states have implemented best practices against IUU fishing is critical in attaining a long-term
solution to the problem.
In the literature, Miller et al.'s standardised action framework for combatting IUU fishing
proposed a system for evaluating best policies and practices in fisheries.1155 According to Miller
et al., there are several actions under-resourced states may undertake to address IUU fishing.1156
The methodology for this framework is based on international fisheries law, Miller’s experience
as Director of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources
1155 Miller, Slicer and Sabourenkov (n 25) 70 – 88.
1156 Ibid 82.
(CCALMR) in dealing with IUU fishing, and assumes that national laws and compliance
measures will be consistent with these instruments.
This section uses regional information relevant to the Gulf of Guinea, previously obtained by
this research, national fisheries laws and policies, fisheries and maritime websites, and
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) recommendations to
compile the information presented in Table 19.
Table 19: Evaluation of internationally recognised best policies and practices to ensure
compliance with IUU fishing laws in the Gulf of Guinea.
Source: Adapted from Miller et al. 2014.1157
Yes No ICCAT
1157 This table is compiled by the author and adapted from the method proposed by Miller, Slicer and Sabourenkov (n
25) 82. This table uses three state responsibility indicators: flag state, coastal state and port state to evaluate national
best policies and practices after Miller et al. and applies these to available information on Gulf of Guinea states.
Table 19 uses the following symbols: to identify trends in adopting best practices
regulations. Indicates a regulation in place; indicates no regulation is in place; indicates no
national law, but there is compliance with Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
(RFMO) requirements. The information in Table 19 can be used to compare horizontally,
vertically and using three state responsibilities indicators (flag state, coastal state, and port state)
to determine where changes and improvements are most needed.
6.2.1 Horizontal Row Comparisons
Table 19 highlights via a system of colours that best practices under the coastal state category
are more complete than those under the flag state and port state categories. The red and yellow
dots represent issues that need to be addressed to ensure that best practices are in place.
The table shows that under flag state practices, the registration requirement for flagging
national fishing vessels is an area in which improvement is most needed. Although all the laws
of the seven states (Ghana,1158 Guinea,1159 Guinea-Bissau,1160 Liberia,1161 Nigeria,1162 Senegal1163
and Sierra Leone1164) require that national fishing vessels be registered, only Ghana has included
the right to deny registration to national vessels that have engaged in acts that may be
characterised as IUU fishing.1165
To ensure that vessels with a history of IUU fishing are not registered as flag vessels, verifying
vessels' history through the investigation of beneficial ownership is necessary. Unfortunately,
registration requirements across the states featured in this study only include information on
beneficial ownership in the case of Ghana. Ghana’s Fisheries (Amendment) Regulation, 2015,
requires that details of beneficial owners must be submitted before a registration request can be
granted.1166 Nevertheless, Ghana has been criticised for failing to enforce this regulation by
allowing fishing vessels to register without investigating their beneficial ownership. Section
47(1)(a) of Ghana’s Fisheries Act 2002 makes it illegal for local industrial fishing vessels to
have foreign ownership. Section 47(1)(a) intends to ensure that Ghanaian nationals are the
beneficiaries of local industrial fishing licences. Despite this restriction, a report by the
Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) found that approximately 90% - 95% of vessels
1158 Ghana Shipping Act, 2003 (Ghana) ss 2, 3.
1159 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea) art 37.
1160 Decree-Law No. 10/2011 Approving the Basic Fishing Legislation (Guinea Bissau) art 12 (2).
1161 Chapter 11 of Title 21 of the Liberian Code of Laws of 1956 (Liberia) s 50.
1162 Merchant Shipping Act, 2007 (Nigeria) s 5(1).
1163 Law No. 2002-22 of 16 August 2002 on the Merchant Navy Code (Senegal) art 97.
1164 Merchant Shipping Act, 2003 (Sierra Leone) s 15.
1165 Fisheries (Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (Ghana) s 24B.
1166 Fisheries (Amendment) Regulation, 2015 (Ghana) s 24A(e).
registered to the Ghanaian trawl fleet belong to Chinese beneficial owners.1167 The report found
that this is possible through joint ventures between foreign Chinese companies and local
partners to gain access to specific fishing areas.1168 These Chinese companies establish shell
companies to conceal their true beneficial owners, thereby impeding effective fisheries
enforcement, as sanctions are given to the crew, captain, and legal owner rather than the
beneficial owner.1169
Registering vessels without investigating beneficial ownership is also prevalent in Liberia.
Liberia has been criticised for registering fishing vessels with EU beneficial owners.1170 In 2017,
when the European Commission (EC) yellow-carded Liberia, it noted that Liberia had over 100
fishing vessels (mostly transport vessels) operating in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
(ABNJ), over which it could not exercise effective control.1171 However, due to the EC sanction,
by 2020, the number of vessels had reduced to only 20.1172 Despite this reduction, all 20 vessels
still had beneficial owners with foreign interests.1173 Usually, these vessels are registered using
local front companies to obtain a registration certificate.1174 They may then use shares in the
front companies to hold other subsidiary companies that conceal the beneficial owners'
identity.1175 For instance, in 2020, investigations by the EJF discovered that two fishing vessels,
Liberty Grace and Liberty Queen, were registered to a legal person in Liberia and had beneficial
owners with links to South Korea through a Ghanaian natural person.1176 This makes it difficult
for flag states to sanction beneficial owners when their vessels engage in IUU fishing and
criminal activities.
Concerning authorisation to fish requirements, only five out of seven states (Ghana,1177
Guinea,1178 Liberia,1179 Senegal,1180 and Sierra Leone1181) require in their regulations that their
1167 China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa (n 485) 4.
1168 Ibid.
1169 Ibid 5.
1170 Okafor-Yarwood, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the Complexities of the Sustainable
Development Goals’ (n 6) 418.
1171 Fight Against Illegal Fishing: Commission Lists Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the Comoros as Non-
Cooperating, and Issues Warning for Liberia’ European Commission (Press Release, 23 May 2017)
<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/items/65987/en>
1172 Off the Hook (n 672) 25.
1173 Ibid.
1174 China’s Hidden Fleet in West Africa (n 485) 4.
1175 Kelly Rigg, Rémi Parmentier, Duncan Currie, Halting IUU Fishing: Enforcing International Fisheries
Agreements (Oceana Report, December 2003) 6.
1176 Off the Hook (n 672) 25.
1177 Fisheries (Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (Ghana) ss 24K, 24L.
1178 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea) art 69.
1179 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law 2019 (Liberia) s 10.1(1)(a).
1180 Law No. 2015-18 of 13 July 2015 on the Code of Maritime Fisheries (Senegal) art 35.
1181 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulation 2019 (Sierra Leone) s 11(b).
national fishing vessels fishing in a foreign jurisdiction and ABNJ obtain specific
authorisations. Among these five states, only four (Ghana,1182 Guinea,1183 Liberia1184 and Sierra
Leone1185) have provided for the right to deny authorisation when domestic fishing vessels have
a history of IUU fishing. Authorisation requirements for vessels involved in fish-related
activities (such as trans-shipment vessels) outside the EEZ are more lax. Only Guinea, 1186
Liberia,1187 and Sierra Leone1188 have regulatory measures to ensure that vessels involved in
fishing-related activities outside their EEZs are authorised.
A key element in ensuring a good authorisation regime is for authorities to publish the list of
domestic vessels authorised to conduct fishing and fishing-related activities in foreign
jurisdictions and ABNJ, including information on beneficial owners. However, weak
authorisation systems across study states have created problems, as most states examined need
to publish data on their fishing authorisations or licences issued. Data on fisheries websites
shows that only Liberia,1189 and Sierra Leone,1190 among the seven Gulf of Guinea states
studied, publish a national licence list. However, further investigation revealed that these
published licence lists are limited to vessels fishing in Liberia and Sierra Leone’s EEZs, not in
foreign jurisdictions or ABNJ. Publishing a licence list is necessary for other flags, coastal, port
states, and RFMOs to cross-check the validity of authorisations and accept or deny applications
for authorisations accordingly.
There are also inadequate regulations on recalling national vessels to port, seizing vessels and
catch, cooperating with other foreign states, and sanctioning national fishing vessels and
these impede efforts to combat IUU fishing in ABNJ. Table 19 shows that most states still lack
regulations that make acting on information from other states and recalling vessels to port
mandatory. The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement) empowers the acting on information from other states and recalling of
1182 Fisheries (Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (Ghana) s 24M(a)(b).
1183 Decree D/2016/040/PRG/SGG of 18 February 2016 Establishing a System of Inadmissibility of the Application
for a Fishing License and Refusal to Grant the Fishing License (Guinea) art 3.
1184 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law 2019 (Liberia) ss 10.6(f), (k).
1185 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulation 2019 (Sierra Leone) ss 15(1)(a)(iv), (2)(a)(b).
1186 Law No. 2015/26/AN of 14 September 2015 on the Maritime Fishing Code (Guinea) art 71.
1187 Fisheries and Aquaculture Management and Development Law 2019 (Liberia) s 10.1(1)(a).
1188 Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulation 2019 (Sierra Leone) ss 11(b), (c).
1189 National Fisheries & Aquaculture Authority (Liberia), ‘Vessel Listing’ <https://nafaa.gov.lr/index.php/vessel-
registry/vessel-listing>
1190 Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (Sierra Leone), ‘MFMR Fishing Vessel Licensed List’
<https://www.mfmr.gov.sl/publications/>
vessels to port by flag states.1191 Logically, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal, which have
ratified the UNFSA, should have regulations that mandate recalling their vessels to port. The
lack of regulations on recalling vessels to port severely impedes the effective investigation and
sanctioning of IUU fishing vessels. Likewise, the absence of cooperative measures to effectively
coordinate with other foreign states hampers efforts to investigate and prosecute operators
engaging in IUU fishing.
Further complicating efforts to combat IUU fishing, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria have no
regulations sanctioning their national vessels when they engage in IUU fishing activities in
foreign jurisdictions or ABNJ.
Considering port state features, lower in Table 19, there are problems in designating ports for
offloading catch for foreign vessels. The table highlights that six out of seven states have
regulations for designating port access. However, data from the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) reveals that four out of the seven case study states (Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) have not designated specific ports for offloading catch. Only two
states (Ghana and Guinea) currently have designated specific ports.1192 Ghana has two
designated ports (Ports of Tema and Takoradi), and Guinea has one designated port (Port
Autonome de Conakry) for offloading catch.1193
Conversely, data received from ICCAT shows that only Senegal, out of the seven ICCAT
member states, has a designated port for trans-shipments of bluefin tuna (Port Autonome de
Dakar).1194 This implies that foreign-flagged fishing vessels can offload their catch in states with
non-designated ports and vessels are not subject to high levels of port inspections set out in the
Port State Measures Agreement to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing (PSMA).
Further down, the table shows that Nigeria has no regulation requiring advance requests for port
entry. It is thus at risk of being a port of convenience as the state lacks the necessary regulations
to close port/withdraw port services from foreign-flagged vessels suspected of having engaged
in IUU fishing. The implication is that the state is in danger of becoming a favoured destination
for trafficking illicit products.
1191 UNFSA arts 21(5)-(7), 22(4).
1192 See ‘FAO Member States Selection’, Food and Agriculture Organisation (Web Page)
<https://www.fao.org/fishery/port-state-measures/psmaapp/?action=qry>
1193 Ibid.
1194 See ‘Record of Ports’, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Web Page)
<https://www.iccat.int/en/ports.asp>
6.2.2 Vertical Column Comparisons
The information in the vertical columns in Table 19 can also be used to compare the Gulf of
Guinea states across a range of flag, coastal and port state best practices. The table shows that
Ghana is more successful at adopting the best policies and practices and is leading efforts to
combat IUU fishing across study states. Ghana has adopted more robust and comprehensive
laws for flag, coastal, and port state obligations. The state is also more compliant with RFMO
flag and port state measures than other study states. However, as analysed in the section above,
implementing these laws and regulations remains a problem. At the other end of the spectrum,
Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria have adopted the least measures across study states. Both states have
yet to adopt most flag and port state measures to combat IUU fishing (Table 19). More
specifically, Guinea-Bissau needs regulations to effectively control its fishing vessels in foreign
jurisdictions and the ABNJ. At the same time, Nigeria’s laws lack measures to protect its ports.
However, it is vital to note that although Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone
have more comprehensive regulatory measures than Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria, more are
needed for adequate implementation. Further research may be required on implementing best
practices and policies in the Gulf of Guinea. Nonetheless, states with provisions on flag states,
coastal states, and port states' obligations in their national law, are more likely to have a more
effective national implementation than states with no regulations.
6.2.3 Comparisons of Flag State, Coastal State and Port State
The analysis of the results in Table 19 clearly shows that coastal states have more consistently
adopted best practices than flag states and port states, reflecting the differences in these regimes.
In the Gulf of Guinea, coastal states have the sovereign right in their Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) to conserve and manage their marine resources and, in doing so, have a right to enforce
their laws and regulations to ensure compliance.1195 They are authorised to use several
enforcement measures to combat IUU fishing in their EEZs, such as vessel boarding and
inspection; ordering vessels to port; detaining vessels pending investigation; seizure, arrest,
confiscating vessels and their catch; and initiating judicial proceedings for fisheries violations in
the EEZ. However, implementation issues remain across case study states. There is a need for
more financial capacity to effectively enforce best practices obligations.
Robust enforcement of obligations under fisheries laws is challenging and costly for coastal
states. A study using data from 21 states (developed and developing states) revealed that
1195 UNCLOS (n 66) arts 56(1), 73.
fisheries enforcement services are the most expensive measure in fisheries management.1196
Enforcement accounted for 39.7% of cost, compared to administration (32.6%), and research
(27.7%).1197 For the Gulf of Guinea, the expensive nature of enforcement services impedes the
effective enforcement of best practices. For example, a study reported that Nigeria lacks
adequate patrol boats for at-sea boarding and inspections due to financial constraints.1198
Furthermore, corruption severely compromises vessel inspections as perpetrators often bribe
enforcement officers to evade arrest. For instance, in Sierra Leone, there are allegations of naval
officers being bribed by illegal fishing operators to obtain tips on how to avoid Navy patrols.1199
Also, arrested vessels are quickly released without proper investigation and prosecution. For
example, in 2017, during a joint patrol between Greenpeace and fisheries inspectors from
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Senegal, 17 vessels were caught fishing illegally.1200
However, all 17 vessels were still licensed to fish in the region after six months.1201 There was
no response to a request by Greenpeace to local authorities as to what legal actions were taken
after the arrest.1202
Additionally, a study by Doumbouya et al. on states in West Africa, including Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, discovered that about one-third of illegal fishing offences
observed between 2010 and 2016 were not sanctioned.1203 Furthermore, penalties for IUU
fishing are insufficient deterrents as they are too low compared to the potential revenue from
engaging in IUU fishing.1204 Criminal sanctions for IUU fishing offences are also not imposed,
or if they are imposed, they are not publicised.1205
Flag state measures are the least adopted across the states examined. An essential aspect that
needs improvement is the flag state registration requirements. As flag states, states examined in
this study have the exclusive right to define the criteria for granting their nationality to vessels
1196 Tracey Mangin et al., ‘Are Fishery Management Upgrades Worth the Cost?’ (2018) 13(9) PLOS ONE 4, 5.
1197 Ibid.
1198 Okafor-Yarwood and Bhagwandas (n 1054).
1199 ‘Pirate Fishing (Part 1) – People and Power’ Aljazeera (YouTube, 26 January 2012)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKQ0rf06Jw4>
1200 Greenpeace International, ‘Urgent Action Needed to Solve West African Food Security Threat’ (Press Release,
21 November 2017) <https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/11674/urgent-action-needed-to-solve-
west-african-food-security-threat/>
1201 Ibid.
1202 Ibid.
1203 Doumbouya et al. (n 41) 4.
1204 Godwin Oritse, ‘Arrested Chinese Vessel Slammed N3 Million Fine’ Vanguard (Online, 24 June 2020)
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/arrested-chinese-vessel-slammed-n3million-fine/>
1205 See sec 5.3.1.8 in ch 5.
in national law.1206 However, there is currently no international legal framework to regulate the
registration process, so states can set registration standards themselves.1207 Therefore, Gulf of
Guinea states are not legally obligated to investigate vessels’ histories before they can be
registered. Consequently, most Gulf of Guinea states register their vessels without adequately
investigating their beneficial ownership. Nonetheless, a good registration practice is to
investigate a vessel’s history, including records of non-compliance, reflagging, and registration
in another state.1208 When a beneficial owner is unknown, they can hide their history of non-
compliance when they apply to register in a Gulf of Guinea state.1209 Investigating a vessel’s
history requires more inquiry as to the vessel’s beneficial owner.
As port states, Table 19 highlights that most case study states have widely adopted various port
state measures for foreign-flagged vessels. These measures include the designation of a port for
use for offloading catch; advance request for entry into ports; inspection of vessels at the port;
prohibition of landing, trans-shipments, and processing of unauthorised catch; denying port to
IUU fishing vessels; withdrawing port services; detention in port; and sanctions. These
measures correspond with provisions in the PSMA which provide the minimum standards to be
upheld by port states to ensure that products from IUU fishing are not landed in ports.1210 Four
out of seven states examined have ratified the PSMA (Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and
Sierra Leone). Examination of Table 19 shows that these four states are leading in the adoption
of port state measures, as opposed to Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria, which are yet to accede to the
PSMA. This shows that ratification of the PSMA is proving to be a powerful incentive for
compliance with port state obligations. This was one of the reasons that the FAO developed the
PSM approach.
It is also worth noting that states that have not ratified key international instruments for
combatting IUU fishing, such as the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 FAO
Compliance Agreement), UNFSA, and PSMA, are more likely to have gaps in their best
practices and policies in combatting IUU fishing. For instance, Nigeria is yet to ratify the PSMA
and has not provided for regulatory port state measures, such as designation of specific ports for
offloading of catch and advance port entry request (Table 19). This gap has the potential to
1206 UNCLOS (n 66) art 94(1).
1207 Trygg Mat Tracking, Spotlight on the Use of African Flag Registries by High-Risk Fishing Operators (TMT
Report, 28 April 2022) 6.
1208 Hutniczak and Delpeuch (n 74) 27.
1209 Jessica H. Ford et al., ‘Incentivising Change to Beneficial Ownership and Open Registers – Holding Flag States
Responsible for their Fleets and Cost of Illegal Fishing’ (2021) 23(5) Fish and Fisheries 1 – 8.
1210 PSMA (n 69).
allow IUU fishing products into the region. States must make more significant efforts in
acceding to key international agreements and incorporating their provisions into their national
laws. Inclusion will enable more effective national implementation and enforcement action
according to international best practices.
6.2.4 Regional Fisheries Management Organisations Measures for Combatting IUU
Fishing Across Case Study States
RFMOs are crucial in combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea and ABNJ. The RFMO
framework draws on the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement1211 and supports states in the fight
against IUU fishing.
Table 20: Contracting parties and cooperating non-contracting parties to relevant regional
fisheries management organisations that adopt measures to combat IUU fishing.
State
ICCAT
(CP)
IOTC
(CNCP)
WCPFC
CNCP)
SPRFMO
(CNCP)
IATTC
(CNCP)
Ghana
x
Guinea
x
Guinea-Bissau
x
Liberia
x
x
x
x
x
Nigeria
x
Senegal
x
x
Sierra Leone
x
Source: Compiled from ICCAT, IOTC, WCPFC, SPRFMO, and IATTC official websites.
Table 20 shows that all states examined have collectively become Contracting Parties (CP) and
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties (CNCP) to five existing RFMOs with the capacity to
legally adopt binding conservation and management measures (CMMs) to combat IUU fishing:
ICCAT, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Western & Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC), Southern Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
(SPRFMO), and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). However, this section
only covers the ICCAT as it is the RFMO that is designated to cover the Gulf of Guinea region,
while other RFMOs involvement is external to the region.
ICCAT conserves highly migratory species (tuna and tuna-like species) in the Atlantic Ocean
1211 UNFSA (n 68) arts 8 – 10.
and adjacent seas, including the Gulf of Guinea.1212 ICCAT has adopted a wide range of legally
binding CMMs to achieve this goal.1213 Case study states that are members of ICCAT must
ensure that their vessels fishing in the ICCAT Convention area comply with its best practices
and CMMs.1214 One of those measures is that ICCAT members are required, as a prior condition
for the registration of vessels, to investigate the history of compliance of the vessel through
ICCAT and other RFMOs.1215 This involves ensuring the vessel is not on any RFMO IUU
fishing list and is not subject to any sanctions.1216 ICCAT members are also required to deny
large-scale longline registered vessels an authorisation or license to fish where they have
engaged in IUU fishing.1217
Furthermore, as flag states, when notified that an infringement has occurred on a vessel flying
their flag outside national jurisdiction, all members of ICCAT are required to order the fishing
vessel to proceed within 72 hours to its home port designated for inspection.1218 Member states
must also investigate allegations, take action, and cooperate with other states when investigating
vessels suspected of having engaged in IUU fishing.1219 However, enforcement of these
measures is the primary responsibility of the flag state.
ICCAT’s flag state best practices must sufficiently translate into national fisheries regulatory
and policy documents to enable effective enforcement. This adoption is the responsibility of the
flag state. Table 19 shows that many RFMO flag state best practices have yet to be adopted into
national legislation. Thus, inadequate legislation by Gulf of Guinea states undermines effective
compliance with ICCATs rules. Independent data received from the 2021 IUU Fishing Index
reveals that four out of seven states examined rank low in compliance with RFMO flag state
obligations (one indicating the highest levels of compliance and five indicating the lowest levels
1212 As of March 2022, ICCAT had 52 contracting parties, including all seven states examined. See ‘Contracting
Parties’, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (Web Page)
<https://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.html>
1213 ICCAT, Compendium Management Recommendations and Resolutions Adopted by ICCAT for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas and Tuna-Like Species (2022)
<https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/COMPENDIUM_ACTIVE_ENG.pdf>
1214 UNFSA (n 68) art 19(1).
1215 ICCAT, Resolution by ICCAT Concerning the Change in the Registry and Flagging of Vessels (Recommendation
05-07, 14 December 2005) paras 1, 2.
1216 Ibid.
1217 ICCAT, Resolution by ICCAT Calling for Further Actions Against Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
Activities by Large-Scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area and Other Areas (Recommendation 99-11, 16
December 1999) para 1.
1218 ICCAT, ICCAT Scheme of Joint International Inspection (Annex 7) para 4.
1219 ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT to Promote Compliance by Nationals of Contracting Parties, Cooperating
Non-Contracting Parties, Entities, or Fishing Entities with ICCAT Conservation and Management Measures
(Recommendation 06-14) para 1.
of compliance):1220 Ghana (2), Guinea (5), Guinea-Bissau (5), Liberia (5), Nigeria (2), Senegal
(3), and Sierra Leone (5).1221 Inadequate fisheries laws and policies to enable effective
enforcement and compliance with ICCAT measures strongly suggest a lack of political will by
flag states in the Gulf of Guinea to effectively combat IUU fishing.
ICCAT mandates its members to adopt more comprehensive minimum standards of port states’
measures to combat IUU fishing.1222 These measures require members wanting to grant access
to foreign-flagged vessels carrying ICCAT-managed species to designate ports that foreign
fishing vessels can enter.1223 Likewise, member states that have been allocated a bluefin tuna
quota are requested to assign ports where authorised landing and trans-shipments of bluefin tuna
can occur.1224 ICCAT members are to provide the list of designated ports to the ICCAT
secretariat.1225 Members of ICCAT are also required to request information from foreign-
flagged vessels carrying species managed by ICCAT at least 72 hours before entry into port.1226
ICCAT’s measures also oblige member states to deny the use of ports to foreign vessels
carrying ICCAT-managed species on three conditions:
1) Where a vessel lacks a valid flag state authorisation to fish or has engaged in IUU
fishing or supported IUU fishing activities in the ICCAT Convention area;
2) Where there is evidence to show that the fish on board was taken in contravention of
the management measures of ICCAT; and
3) When the flag state does not confirm that the capture was in line with ICCAT
conservation measures.1227
Nonetheless, enforcement of these best practices is the sole responsibility of the port state. Table
19 shows that most states examined have adopted the above port state laws and policies against
IUU fishing. Consequently, most study states score well in compliance with RFMO port state
obligations according to the 2021 IUU Fishing Index: Ghana (1), Guinea (1), Guinea- Bissau
(1), Liberia (4), Nigeria (4), Senegal (1), and Sierra Leone (1).1228 This indicates that adopting
1220 ‘About the IUU Fishing Index’, IUU Fishing Index (Web Page) <https://iuufishingindex.net/about>
1221 ‘Country Profiles’, IUU Fishing Index (Web Page) <https://iuufishingindex.net/report#profiles>
1222 ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing’ (Recommendation 19-04, 20 June 2020).
1223 Ibid para 10(c).
1224 ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation 18-02 Establishing a Multi-Annual
Management Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean (Recommendation 19-04, 20 June
2020) para 69.
1225 ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing (Recommendation 19-04, 20 June 2020) para 10.
1226 Ibid para 13.
1227 Ibid para 22.
1228 ‘Country Profiles’, IUU Fishing Index (Web Page) <https://iuufishingindex.net/report#profiles>
RFMO measures in national legislation and policy aids the effective implementation and
compliance with RFMO rules.
6.3 Enhancing Maritime Security Through Adherence to Best Practices
In this research the term maritime security has been assumed to mean the protection of the
ocean from threats arising from its legitimate use.1229 Therefore, anything that undermines the
security of legitimate ocean activities threatens national and regional maritime security.
Currently, gaps in the adoption and implementation of flag, coastal and port state obligations in
the Gulf of Guinea undermine the security of the ocean, causing severe maritime security
implications. These gaps need to be addressed to enhance maritime security.
First, gaps in the adoption and implementation of flag states’ obligations threaten maritime
security as they create areas and an environment where criminal activities may thrive. The
current flexibility of registration and authorisation processes in the Gulf of Guinea enables the
concealment of the identity of beneficial owners of vessels and facilitates IUU fishing and
potential criminal operators. Such a gap provides favourable conditions for not only IUU fishing
operators but also aids criminals in hiding their identity, thereby impeding effective
investigation and prosecution. This was demonstrated in the case of the Bangun Perkasa fishing
vessel in which the United States (US) Coast Guard seized the vessel for illegal fishing in the
North Pacific Ocean.1230 Almost two years after the seizure, the beneficial owners still could not
be traced, causing the vessel to be scrapped.1231 Unfortunately, the lack of detection allowed the
beneficial owners behind the Bangun Perkasa vessel to continue their illegal activities
elsewhere using other vessels.
Therefore, closing the existing gaps will ensure that when a fishing vessel engages in criminal
activities, the criminal operators behind those activities are stopped and appropriately
sanctioned. This will require strengthening the conditions for the registration and licensing of
vessels to ensure that they conform with international CMMs. From the research, it appears
states can:
1) Provide clear requirements for IUU assessments before vessels are granted flag
registration or fishing authorisation to ensure that vessels with a history of IUU fishing
1229 See sec 3.2.2 in ch 3.
1230 ‘Shark Remains, Rats and Rust – USCG Detains Illegal Drift Net Fishermen’, GCaptain (News Article, 2011)
<https://gcaptain.com/sharks-rats-rust-uscg-detains/>
1231 Stephanie Joyce, ‘F/V Bangun Perkasa Finished Long Journey to Scrapyard’, Alaska Public Media (News
Article, 5 July 2013) <https://www.alaskapublic.org/2013/07/05/fv-bangun-perkasa-finished-long-journey-to-
scrapyard/>
are not flagged or licensed to any state in the region. Information on beneficial
ownership must be required;
2) Refuse vessel applications for registration or license where a vessel is suspected to be
owned by a shell company;
3) Make registration and licencing procedures and conditions transparent and public; and
4) Provide for the suspension, withdrawal, or cancellation of current authorisations when
national vessels engage in IUU fishing.
Second, gaps in implementing coastal states’ best practice obligations can lead to insufficient
monitoring and threaten maritime security. Compromised Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
(MCS) capabilities create gas in detecting illegal activities, making it easy for criminals to
continue their activities unabated. Failing to improve MCS systems will encourage non-
compliance with regulations by criminal operators. Each state must effectively monitor and
enforce regulations within its territorial waters to enhance maritime security. However, since
states often lack the financial capacity to police their waters effectively, maritime security
cooperation is imperative. States need to strengthen interagency cooperation between fisheries
and maritime security agencies to improve monitoring and surveillance abilities, targeted
explicitly toward maritime crimes in the fisheries sector.
Third, the non-designation of ports where foreign vessels can land their catch creates a gap for
criminal operators to land their non-fishery illicit goods. Indeed, ports are key entry points for
illicit goods associated with IUU fishing operations, including drugs, firearms, and human
trafficking. Designation of ports for entry is vital to ensure that standards for port state
inspections are upheld.1232 If any port can be used to offload catch, there is the potential for non-
designated ports to provide a lower level of inspection than designated ports. Both illegal and
criminal operators can exploit this gap, and non-designated ports may become favoured
destinations for offloading, trans-shipping, packaging, and processing illicit non-fishery
products. Therefore, states should emphasise designating ports with trained and qualified
fisheries and criminal law enforcement agents. Designating ports will provide a sound process
and opportunity to inspect the vessel to ensure that illicit cargoes do not enter legitimate supply
chains at international and regional markets.
6.4 Addressing IUU Fishing as a Maritime Security Threat: A Way Forward
This research has demonstrated that IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea is primarily addressed
through a fisheries management lens focusing on fisheries enforcement and control. However,
1232 PSMA (n 69) art 7(2).
the continuation of IUU fishing and associated criminal activities in the region demonstrates
that the existing approaches to addressing IUU fishing have had limited success. Fisheries
management approaches that have imposed administrative sanctions have not eradicated IUU
fishing. Different approaches to combatting IUU fishing need to be investigated and adopted to
deal more effectively with the IUU fishing problem.
The addition of a maritime security approach can offer an improved ‘cross-cutting’ solution to
combatting IUU fishing and the security issues associated with it. The combination of a
fisheries management and maritime security approach has the potential to combat IUU fishing
and other transnational organised crimes in the fisheries sector. The following measures are
proposed:
6.4.1 Legal Measures
First, Gulf of Guinea states need to ratify international laws to combat IUU fishing if they have
not already done so. Not ratifying international laws creates a gap in the region's protection and
allows a niche in which IUU fishing operators and other crimes can emerge. Therefore, there
must be coordinated ratification or accession to international instruments to combat IUU
fishing. Additionally, all Gulf of Guinea states must then adopt the provisions of these
international instruments into their national legislation if they are to enjoy the benefits these
steps may provide. Notably, the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, PSMA, and the 2012 Cape Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing Vessels (the
2012 Cape Town Agreement) must be ratified and implemented.
Agreeing to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance agreement and the domestic
implementation of its provisions will ensure that all Gulf of Guinea states exercise adequate
jurisdiction over their fishing vessels and support vessels.1233 Specifically, it will help Gulf of
Guinea states develop an excellent legal framework for authorising and registering vessels. It
will also help to avoid the practice that enables the flagging or reflagging of IUU fishing
vessels. Likewise, states in the region need to consent to be bound by the provisions of the 1995
UN Fish Stocks Agreement and ensure their vessels fishing on the high seas comply with
RFMO laws and regulations (particularly ICCAT recommendations) and do not engage in IUU
fishing.1234
Ratification of the PSMA is crucial to combatting IUU fishing and related crimes in the Gulf of
1233 FAO Compliance Agreement (n 67) preamble.
1234 UNFSA (n 68) arts 18(1), 19(1).
Guinea. Most states in the region cannot monitor and inspect vessels at sea. As such, ratifying
and implementing the provisions of the PSMA will be cost-effective compared to law
enforcement at sea. Widespread implementation of the PSMA by Gulf of Guinea states also has
the potential to address crimes on board fishing vessels. Increased interagency cooperation
between fisheries and maritime law enforcement agencies in port can be used to identify,
investigate, and address crimes such as forced labour and human trafficking on board fishing
vessels.1235 For this to happen, states must designate ports that will allow for effective inspection
by fisheries and criminal officers. Unfortunately, only 15 of the 25 Gulf of Guinea states have
ratified the agreement. States like Guinea-Bissau that are yet to accede to the PSMA should
consider acceding to it and implementing its provisions in their domestic laws.
It is also essential for states to ratify the 2012 Cape Town Agreement. The Cape Town
Agreement can be used to ensure that fishing vessels take measures to protect the safety of
fishers, considering human trafficking and forced labour abuses on board fishing vessels in the
region. Ratification of this instrument should be done in conjunction with acceding to the
PSMA and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Work in Fishing Convention to be most
effective. Ratification and accession to these instruments, together with effective
implementation in domestic law, can help to address human trafficking on board fishing vessels
through coordinated fisheries and maritime enforcement at ports, as well as ensuring the safety
of fishers and favourable working conditions at sea.
Second, states like Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal need to recast IUU fishing as a
transnational criminal activity and, therefore, a maritime security threat in national fisheries and
criminal laws. This will enable Gulf of Guinea states to enact criminal laws for IUU fishing
offences with a focus on protecting the maritime environment. Currently, administrative fines
are too small in comparison to the illicit monetary gains from IUU fishing, hence driving this
criminal behaviour. Research recognises that an individual may commit a crime when the
expected profit from committing the crime exceeds the benefits from engaging in legal
activity.1236 Sanctions should exceed the illicit profits of IUU fishing and involve fines, the loss
of illegal fishing assets such as boats and catch, and imprisonments. This will ensure that even if
the probability of detection and conviction is low, there will be a disincentive to behave
illegally.
1235 International Labour Organisation, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (ILO Report, 31
May 2013) 41.
1236 Gary S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76(2) Journal of Political Economy
176.
Gulf of Guinea states should consider adopting the US Lacey Act provision, which criminalised
the trafficking of illegally harvested fish that have been taken contrary to domestic law and the
laws of a foreign state. The Lacey Act is an excellent example of a law used successfully for
criminal prosecutions. It was adopted into law by the US in 1900 to combat trafficking in fish or
wildlife and has been amended several times to include a comprehensive range of species.1237
Generally, the Act criminalised the importation, exportation, transport, sale, receipt, acquisition,
or purchase of any fish, wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in contravention
of any law, treaty, or regulation of the US or any Indian tribal law.1238 The law also makes it
unlawful to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase in interstate or foreign
commerce any fish taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of foreign law.1239 The
rationale behind these provisions is to enable the United States to criminally sanction persons
that engage in IUU fishing activities in contravention of national law or regulations of another
state.
The US has used the provisions of this Act to prosecute IUU fishing offenders criminally in two
cases.1240 One notable case was the United States v McNab.1241 On 3 February 1999, an
anonymous fax was sent to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), an agency in the US
Department of Commerce. Information reaching the Department stated that the McNab vessel,
M/V Caribbean Clipper, was arriving in Alabama carrying undersized lobster tails in violation
of several Honduran laws. This allegation was subsequently confirmed by the Direccíon
General de Pesca y Acuicultura (DGPA), the agency responsible for fisheries enforcement in
Honduras when the NMFS contacted them. After this confirmation, the defendants were
charged with violating the Lacey Act. They were subsequently found guilty of conspiracy for
violating the Lacey Act, as well as other crimes such as smuggling and money laundering.
David McNab, Abner Schoenwetter, and Robert Bladford were all sentenced to eight years
imprisonment, while Diane Huang was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Gulf of Guinea
states could also enhance cross-border cooperation in enforcement to combat IUU fishing
operations in the region by adopting a law similar to the Lacey Act.
Third, states like Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone that have already characterised IUU
fishing as a criminal offence should incorporate provisions in their laws that require criminal
sanctions to be imposed and published. As enforcement tools, effective criminal prosecutions
1237 Lacey Act, Title16 U.S.C § 3372 (1900) (United States).
1238 Ibid s 3372(a)(1).
1239 Ibid s 3372 (a) (2) (A).
1240 United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2011);
United States v Miller, 981 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1992).
1241 United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003)
and the publication of sanctions are critical in combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
Gulf of Guinea states should consider following in the footsteps of South Africa when imposing
sanctions for IUU fishing offences. In recent years, South Africa has prosecuted several major
abalone cases as an organised crime with imprisonment sentences of up to 18 to 20 years.1242 If
all Gulf of Guinea states can effectively prosecute infractions, like the above cases in South
Africa, criminal sanctions will be a powerful deterrent to potential perpetrators of IUU fishing.
Achieving these objectives has the potential to be the most successful deterrent to IUU fishing
and related transnational organised crimes.
Fourth, effective cooperation between fisheries and criminal law enforcement agencies is
necessary to combat the criminal dimension of IUU fishing. Examination of current fisheries
and criminal laws shows that there are legal gaps in cases where a fishing vessel is involved in
illegal fishing and criminal activities.1243 What action can be taken in such a situation? Are
fisheries or criminal law enforcement agents responsible? The Australian Maritime Powers Act
is an excellent example of a law that can be used for successful law enforcement action when
these cases arise.1244 Australia adopted the Act in 2013.1245 It provides a standardised legal
framework for maritime enforcement by bringing the powers of different government agencies
currently available under several Acts together under one statute. Members of the Australian
Defence Force, Australian Federal Police, customs officers, or any other person appointed by
the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection are designated maritime officers under the
Act.1246 They are given the powers to enforce Australia’s maritime laws, including the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 and international agreements.1247
Specifically, these maritime officers are given powers to investigate, arrest, enforce warrants,
and seize and detain anything connected to an offence.1248 They may also board, search, seize,
detain vessels or arrest persons.1249An authorisation is required before any of these powers can
be exercised, except in some specific circumstances.1250 Gulf of Guinea states should consider
adopting a law such as the Maritime Powers Act, which will act as a primary law for
enforcement at sea. Such a law could address legislative and administrative weaknesses in
addressing crimes on board fishing vessels.
1242 S v Blignaut [2017] 1 SA 587 (Makaula J) (Local Division); S v Miller [2018] 2 SA 488 (Gamble J); S v Brown
[2019] 2 SA 622 (Makaula J) (Local Division).
1243 See sec 5.3.1.8 in ch 5.
1244 Maritime Powers Act (No 15) 2013 (Australia).
1245 Ibid.
1246 Ibid s 104.
1247 Ibid.
1248 Ibid s 32.
1249 Ibid s 50.
1250 Ibid s15.
6.4.2 Proposed Policy Measures
In the Gulf of Guinea, coherent policy measures are needed to deter IUU fishing and related
transnational organised crimes. This research has identified lack of political will, financial
incapacity, transparency, and corruption as significant constraints to combatting IUU fishing
and its criminal dimensions in the region. As such, developing an effective policy strategy can
help solve the problem. For this reason, this section proposes policy recommendations to fill
gaps in previously analysed regional and national measures.
First, adding a maritime security approach will require recognising IUU fishing as a
transnational criminal activity with a nexus to other crimes. Gulf of Guinea states should take
appropriate regional and national steps to research and gain proper knowledge on the connection
between IUU fishing and transnational organised crime as specified by the UN General
Assembly in UNGA Resolution 64/72. Research outcomes will enable states to have a solid
knowledge of transnational organised crime in regional and national fisheries sector and
encourage more investigations into the fisheries sector.
Second, Gulf of Guinea states must have the political will to prioritise combating IUU fishing
and associated crimes. At the regional level, RFMOs and RFBs such as the Fisheries Committee
for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) and the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission
(SRFC) need to build and strengthen member states political will to take vital steps to combat
crimes in the fisheries sector. This should include educating and raising awareness on the
security implications of IUU fishing and the potential benefits of improving the fisheries sector.
This research has demonstrated that at the national level, combatting crimes in the fisheries
sector is not a political priority.1251 In Nigeria, focus has been on protecting the oil and gas
industry. Nigeria is the largest oil-producing state within the region, with an estimated 37 billion
barrels of proven crude oil reserves.1252 It depends heavily on oil exports to generate revenue for
economic growth.1253 It also relies on oil for about 90% of its foreign exchange earnings.1254
This has made the oil sector a vital industry to Nigeria’s economic development while other
sectors, such as fisheries, are neglected. However, seeing that the protection of the oil industry
and enhancing maritime security is a priority for states in the region,1255 the fisheries sector can
1251 See sec 5.4.2.5 in ch 5.
1252 ‘Nigeria Facts and Figures’, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Web Page)
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm>
1253 Chukwuebuka Okafor et al., ‘Moving Beyond Fossil Fuel in an Oil-Exporting and Emerging Economy: Paradigm
Shift’ (2021) 9 (2) Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy Energy 392.
1254 Okotie, Ogbarode and Ikporo (n 157) 47.
1255 Editorial, ‘Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea’, Punch (Online, 17 December 2021)
<https://punchng.com/enhancing-maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/>
get some trickle-down benefits. States must also realise that improving the fisheries sector has
the potential to contribute significantly to revenue1256 and has additional benefits for the
maritime security of each state and the region.
Third, political will must be translated into action. This can be achieved by addressing
corruption and enhancing transparency along the fisheries value chain to address the inaction of
political elites in the fight against IUU fishing. The lack of transparency currently facing states
in the Gulf of Guinea fosters IUU fishing and other transnational organised crimes. It is well
known that IUU fishing and associated crimes take advantage of corrupt administrations,
particularly states that lack the capacity to police their waters effectively.1257 Thus, it is
imperative to improve transparency in the fisheries sector. Enhanced transparency will improve
integrity in granting Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), registration and licensing
requirements, and enforcement proceedings.
RFMOs have vital roles to play in improving transparency in their fisheries sector which will
have regional benefits. RFMOs need to maintain a comprehensive record of registration and
authorisations information in their authorised vessel list; ensure their vessels have an operational
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS); and set requirements for International Maritime
Organisations (IMO) number. Information on registration and fishing authorisations should be
made publicly available to other RFMOs, international organisations such as the FAO and
national governments. Information on VMS position data should also be provided to other
relevant RFMOs and coastal states for enforcement purposes.
Additionally, RFMOs and national authorities should make it mandatory for their vessels to use
an IMO number as a Unique Vessel Identifier (UVI) that stays with a vessel throughout its
lifetime regardless of flag changes.1258 Using an IMO number enables vessel information to be
cross-checked by other sources. It also helps to enhance transparency and combat other
associated crimes such as human trafficking, especially when vessels flag hop and use multiple
identities.1259 Only Nigeria, among the seven states examined, has mandated their national
1256 See sec 4.3.1.1 in ch 4 (Table 9). ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs)’, European
Commission (Webpage) <https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-
fisheries-partnership-agreements-sfpas_en>
1257 Baher Kamal, ‘The Great Fish Robbery’ Inter Press Service (News Article, 6 June 2022)
<https://www.ipsnews.net>
1258 ‘Briefing – The IMO Number for Fishing Vessels’ Trygg Mat Tracking (Web Page, 20 January 2017)
<https://www.tm-tracking.org/post/2017/01/19/briefing-the-imo-number-for-fishing-vessels>
1259 International Labour Organisation, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (ILO Report, 31
May 2013) 41.
fishing vessels to carry an IMO number.1260 The mandatory use of an IMO number is a
precondition for registration and authorisation of any fishing vessel wanting to operate in
Nigeria.1261 Other regional states should follow suit in making IMO numbers compulsory for
registration and license.
Gulf of Guinea states can also implement the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) standards.
Implementation of the FiTI standards would enable transparency in 12 critical areas, including
information on the status of beneficial ownership, foreign fishing access agreements, fisheries
subsidies, fisheries tenure arrangements, authorised large-scale licenced vessels (including
vessel registry, fishing payments, and recorded catch data), fisheries law-enforcement efforts,
offences, and sanctions given for non-compliance.1262 As of April 2022, only Mauritania has
officially joined the FiTI.1263 Cabo Verde, Senegal and São Tomé and Príncipe have committed
to implementing the FiTI standards, but have not submitted an official application.1264 If all Gulf
of Guinea states become official members of the FiTI, this may assist in improving regional
transparency and collaboration between relevant stakeholders in fisheries governance. In
addition, implementation of the FiTI standards has the potential to directly address human
trafficking on board fishing vessels as it requires that information on labour standards be
publicised.1265 Public access to credible information is critical for good fisheries governance and
combatting IUU fishing and related crimes in the region.
Fourth, effective prosecution is key to combatting IUU fishing and connected crimes and is key
responsibility for each nation in the region. Ineffective MCS and forms of corruption in judicial
processes must be addressed. According to Transparency International, combatting judicial
corruption will need Gulf of Guinea states to adhere to specific standards:
1) Strengthening control or oversight mechanisms for the judiciary, including integrating
involvement of civil society or layperson representation on judicial appointment bodies.
For example, jury and electronic case allocation systems are used to assign cases to
ensure that judges cannot be picked to hear certain cases.
1260 West Africa Task Force (n 1047) 39.
1261 ‘Briefing – The IMO Number for Fishing Vessels’ (n 1258).
1262 Fisheries Transparency Initiative, ‘The FiTI Standard’ (27 April 2017)
11 <https://www.fiti.global/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FiTI_Standard_2017_EN_1.1.pdf>
1263 ‘Mauritania’, Fisheries Transparency Initiative (Web Page) <https://www.fiti.global/mauritania#>
1264 ‘Cabo Verde’, Fisheries Transparency Initiative (Web Page) <https://www.fiti.global/cabo-verde#>; ‘Sao Tomé
and Príncipe’, Fisheries Transparency Initiative (Web Page) <https://www.fiti.global/sao-tome-and-principe>;
‘Senegal’, Fisheries Transparency Initiative (Web Page) <https://www.fiti.global/senegal>
1265 Fisheries Transparency Initiative, ‘The FiTI Standard’ (27 April 2017)
11 <https://www.fiti.global/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FiTI_Standard_2017_EN_1.1.pdf>
2) Improving education and training of judicial officials by ensuring judges are provided
with regular training programmes covering ethical issues and dilemmas. For instance,
peer-to-peer mentoring.
3) Strengthening accountability and discipline by incorporating internal disciplinary
measures, such as creating an independent body to investigate allegations against judges
and ensuring those judicial officers are required to read and sign codes of conduct. Also,
putting whistleblowing policies in place to ensure safe reporting of corruption as well as
regular submission and verification of assets by judicial officials to ensure that conflicts
of interest are identified.
4) Improving human resources management within the judiciary by ensuring that judges
and official judicial recruitments are made on merit through a transparent process and
assigning cases to judges based on objective criteria to prevent case allocation based on
political or private interest. Judges and judicial officers should also be paid adequate
salaries and enjoy good working conditions protected by law to ensure that wages and
working conditions cannot be used to punish or reward judges.
5) Strengthening budgeting processes within the judiciary by publishing contracts and
procurement documents so that civil society, the media, and court users can oversee
court budgets and assist in implementing budget tracking tools.
6) Requiring judges to make judgments and decisions public, and ensuring they are easily
accessible. Ensuring that judges have easy access to information, legislation, cases, and
court procedures. Using journalists as tools for transparency by enabling them to report
freely and fairly on legal proceedings and suspicion of corruption.
7) Implementing judiciary monitoring through performing risk assessments and research
on corruption to help understand the factors that facilitate corruption. Journalists trained
in legal issues can also be used to uncover corruption and hold judges to account.
8) Increasing public awareness of the judiciary’s role to ensure that court users resist
paying bribes to access court services.1266
Fifth, there is a need to develop a more effective compliance strategy for fisheries management
and maritime security rules rather than focusing on monitoring and surveillance. Indeed,
extensive enforcement is costly to Gulf of Guinea states with long coastlines and minimal
financial capacity. Expensive enforcement, along with the use of technology for enforcement
like Automatic Identification System (AIS) and VMS, cannot be relied upon as IUU fishing
1266 Victoria Jennett, Fighting Judicial Corruption (Transparency International Report, 31 October 2014) 6-8.
operators in the region are known to turn their VMS transponders off to avoid detection.1267 AIS
signals can also not be relied upon when there is high maritime traffic, as AIS signals can
interfere with one another.1268 Thus, an effective way to combat IUU fishing and associated
crimes in the Gulf of Guinea would be to ensure compliance with fisheries and criminal laws
and regulations. This may involve boosting voluntary compliance with laws and regulations to
combat IUU fishing and associated organised crimes. Boosting compliance represents a better
strategy because compliance levels will be unaffected even when enforcement is low or non-
existent.1269 People are more willing to obey laws when compliance is not coerced. Therefore,
RFMOs, RFBs, and national governments must strategically boost voluntary compliance with
fisheries and maritime security regulations and policies. This can be achieved by:
1) Ensuring that fisheries and criminal laws are easy and simple to read to ensure an easy
understanding of the rules.
2) Educational programmes to teach fishers laws, regulations, and the importance and
value of marine management and conservation.
3) Educational campaigns that show the importance of complying with rules and
promoting sustainable use of marine resources.
4) Engaging relevant stakeholders through educational forums and public meetings to
facilitate compliance.
5) Positive reinforcement by patrol officers when fishers comply with the rules, including
proactive advice and assistance.1270
Sixth, cooperation and collaboration between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement
agencies is necessary to combat crimes in the fisheries sector. Examination of institutional
frameworks shows that effective cooperation is hampered by several factors including the lack
of trained personnel to identify and investigate illegal and criminal activities.1271 As such, Gulf
of Guinea states should ensure that criminal and fisheries law enforcement agencies are
appropriately skilled on crime in the fisheries sector to enable proper identification,
investigation, and prosecution of criminal activities along the fisheries value chain. Most
importantly, national FIUs should be included in interagency committees for countering IUU
1267 Pramod Ganapathiraju, Koutob Viviane and Gopikrishna Mantha, Global Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring
Control and Surveillance in 84 Countries: Senegal- Country Report (IUU Risk Intelligence Report Volume 1
Number 1, November 2019) 5.
1268 Gohar A. Petrossian, Bryce Barthuly and Monique C. Sosnowski, ‘Identifying Central Carriers and Detecting
Key Communities Within the Global Fish Transshipment Networks’ (2022) 9 Frontiers in Marine Science 14.
1269 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 2006) 21.
1270 Government of Western Australia, Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, Fisheries
Compliance Strategy (September 2018) 6
<https://www.fish.wa.gov.au/Documents/corporate_publications/fisheries_compliance_strategy.pdf>
1271 See sec 5.3.2.8 in ch 5.
fishing activities and simultaneously be required to monitor fishing vessels. FIUs can be used to
reveal beneficial ownership information and uncover other criminal activities in the fisheries
sector, such as tax fraud and money laundering. For this to happen, there must be legal gateways
that will enable this in national laws. As such, legally considering IUU fishing as a predicate
offence for money laundering will put it under the purview of FIUs. This view was recognised
and supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
which perceived that the solution to IUU fishing and associated crimes is by tracing the
financial flows generated by IUU fishing to uncover the ‘complex networks of related criminal
activities’.1272
At the regional level, cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement
agencies in different states in the region can occur through regional and bilateral agreements. A
notable example of a regional cooperative law enforcement agreement is the Niue Treaty and its
bilateral subsidiary agreements.1273 The Niue Treaty is a cooperative agreement between the
Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member states.1274 Through this agreement, FFA
member states cooperate to enforce fisheries laws,1275 share information,1276 and prosecute
offenders.1277 RFB member states in the Gulf of Guinea should enter into a similar cooperative
agreement to enhance regional fisheries and maritime law enforcement. Additionally, Gulf of
Guinea states may enter into bilateral maritime law enforcement cooperative agreements such as
the Australia and France treaties in the Southern Ocean.1278 These treaties provide for cooperative
surveillance1279 and information exchange between Australia and France.1280
Regional and bilateral cooperation in information sharing and maritime surveillance activities can
1272 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Review of Fisheries 2020 (OECD Report, 18
December 2020) 50.
1273 Niue Treaty on Cooperative in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region, opened
for signature 9 July 1992, ILM 32 (entered into force 10 May 1993) (‘Niue Treaty’).
1274 Member states are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau. Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and
Vanuatu.
1275 Niue Treaty (n 1273) art VI.
1276 Ibid art V.
1277 Ibid art VII.
1278 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald
Islands, signed 24 November 2003, [2005] ATS 6 (entered into force 1 February 2005); Agreement with the
Government of the French Republic on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws in the Maritime Areas Adjacent
to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Island, signed 8 January 2007
[2011] ATS 1 (entered into force 7 January 2011).
1279 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald
Islands, signed 24 November 2003, [2005] ATS 6 (entered into force 1 February 2005) art 3.
1280 Agreement with the Government of the French Republic on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws in the
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Island,
signed 8 January 2007 [2011] ATS 1 (entered into force 7 January 2011) art 10.
facilitate both fisheries and transnational organised crime investigation and law enforcement in
the Gulf of Guinea. RFMOs and RFBs can strengthen their performance by adopting similar
cooperative agreements as the Niue Treaty. Specifically, the FCWC, which has identified IUU
fishing as a maritime security threat,1281 could adopt similar regional cooperative schemes. The
FCWC can enhance cooperation with as many actors as possible in law enforcement, including
regional information sharing and joint surveillance efforts focusing on combatting transnational
organised crime in the fisheries sector.
Lastly, Gulf of Guinea states need to regulate and monitor the facilitators of IUU fishing and
associated crimes, particularly those associated with trans-shipments. Indeed, most illegal trans-
shipment activities usually occur at sea and are difficult and expensive to monitor in the Gulf of
Guinea. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea states should consider adopting the new 2022 voluntary
guidelines for trans-shipments, developed by members of FAO.1282 The voluntary guidelines
aim to assist states when developing new trans-shipment legislation and policies.1283 Gulf of
Guinea states can use the guidelines to close gaps in existing trans-shipment regulations.
Gulf of Guinea states can also require that trans-shipment vessels be subject to the same
regulatory measures as fishing vessels. Regulations on trans-shipment should not stop at
prohibiting the activity at sea, but trans-shipment vessels should also be subject to the same
registration and authorisation conditions, including requiring information on beneficial owners
before flagging the vessel. Furthermore, states should consider identifying and monitoring key
actors (central carrier vessels) involved in trans-shipments using tools such as the Global
Fishing Watch to minimise expenses.1284 Fishing vessels interacting with these key actors
should also be identified and monitored, including being subject to thorough inspection as they
arrive or leave the port.1285
In situations where trans-shipment at sea is allowed, RFMOs should ensure that they maintain
clear rules on trans-shipments. Vessels involved in trans-shipments need to be authorised to
operate as trans-shipment vessels on the high seas and be included and listed in all relevant
RFMO vessel authorisation list.1286 Additionally, trans-shipment activities at sea must be fully
1281 ‘Maritime Security’, Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (Web Page) <https://fcwc-
fish.org/what-we-do/fight-illegal-fishing/maritime-security>
1282 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Report of the Technical Consultation on Voluntary Guidelines for
Transshipments Rome, 30 May–3 June and 7 July 2022 (FAO Report No. 1385, 2022).
1283 Ibid app E para 2.
1284 Gohar A. Petrossian, Bryce Bathuly and Monique C. Sosnowski, ‘Identifying Central Carriers and Detecting Key
Communities Within the Global Fish Transshipment Networks’ (2022) 9 Marine Science 12.
1285 Ibid.
1286 Oceana, Achieving Transparency and Combating IUU Fishing in RFMOs (Oceana Report, 5 June 2019) 13.
monitored and supervised by trained personnel e.g., observers from regional observer programs.
6.5 Conclusion
Adherence to international best practices and policies is critical in combatting IUU fishing and
enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, inadequate adoption of best
practices and policies to combat IUU fishing can limit state and regional capacity to effectively
combat associated maritime security threats. Therefore, all flag states, coastal states, and port
states on and around the Gulf of Guinea need further encouragement to adopt and fulfil their
relevant duties and obligations under international law.
As flag states tasked with the primary duty of regulating the activities of vessels flying their
flags, states are encouraged to ensure that registration and authorisation requirements are
exhaustive and that vessels with a history of IUU fishing are not registered or licensed to fish.
Before flagging or licensing a vessel, information on beneficial ownership should be requested,
investigated, and documented.
As coastal states responsible for enforcing CMMs in the EEZ, gaps in the implementation of
regulations lead to ineffective monitoring and surveillance of fishing activities and can threaten
maritime security by allowing criminal operators to continue their illegal activities unabated.
Thus, Gulf of Guinea states should consider cooperating in joint monitoring and surveillance to
improve maritime security.
As port states tasked with ensuring that vessels entering their ports have not engaged in IUU
fishing, states should be encouraged to designate ports where vessels can be thoroughly
inspected. Indeed, ports must ensure that IUU fish products do not enter regional and
international markets. They are also key entry points for illicit goods associated with IUU
fishing, such as drugs, firearms, and other criminal activities. Therefore, Gulf of Guinea states
should consider adopting and implementing regulations that provide for the designation of ports
for foreign-flagged vessels.
Additionally, Gulf of Guinea states can improve the region’s maritime security by combatting
IUU fishing through an integrated fisheries-maritime security approach. This approach
combines fisheries management and maritime security to achieve a more effective solution to
IUU fishing. Through the fisheries-maritime security approach, criminal activities in the
fisheries sector can be addressed. There may also be benefits to fisheries and maritime security
agencies through cost-saving synergies in using enforcement assets jointly. The more integrated
approach may also reduce the gaps in the operational environment of IUU fishing and illicit
activities.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has set out to contribute to knowledge on the nexus between Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and develop a more
holistic solution to combatting IUU fishing and the security issues associated with it.1287 The
research examined IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea against the hypothesis
that an integrated fisheries-maritime security approach is needed to effectively address the
problem of IUU fishing. However, by conducting a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the
legal, institutional and policy framework for combatting IUU fishing and enhancing maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea, this research has demonstrated that states view IUU fishing as a
fisheries management issue and the relationship between IUU fishing and maritime security has
not been sufficiently recognised. Consequently, current approaches to IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea are inadequate. This conclusion supports the primary research question put forward in this
thesis.
This thesis began by examining the Gulf of Guinea and reviewing the importance of protecting
its maritime domain. It examined the significance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime environment
to the global community from historical to current times and then explored the evolution of
maritime security threats in the region, laying the foundation for characterising IUU fishing as a
maritime security issue. The research examined the link between IUU fishing and maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea using seven case study states (Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone). In doing so, it analysed empirical and scholarly
literature on IUU fishing and maritime security in the seven study states, providing context for
the nexus between IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis used
two distinct but interconnected dimensions of maritime security (human and national security) to
demonstrate that there are links between IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea
and that states should recognise those links and protect their maritime environment in a more
integrated way.
The research reviewed the legal, institutional, and policy frameworks to combat IUU fishing and
enhance maritime security in the seven study states. First, it surveyed the international legal
framework, serving as the legal foundation for IUU fishing and maritime security in this research.
It then examined the study states' Legal and Institutional frameworks (LIF) to determine whether
1287 Data used for this thesis is current as of November 2022.
the nexus between IUU fishing and maritime security had been recognised. It also analysed
existing regional and national policy frameworks to understand whether regional and national
policies and practices have classified IUU fishing as a threat to maritime security. Finally, the
research reviewed the seven study states' national legislation and policy frameworks to assess the
adequacy of current approaches in combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
7.2 Research Questions and Findings
This thesis sought to determine whether a more comprehensive approach is needed to combat
IUU fishing. It developed six sub-questions to ascertain whether a fisheries-maritime security
approach offers a better solution to address IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. This section will
review these sub-questions and what the research found.
1) What is the importance of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain?
This research reveals that the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain has long been and remains
important to the global economy from historical to current times.1288 Indeed, from a historical
perspective, the Gulf of Guinea maritime environment was essential for sea trading.1289
However, the research argues that the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain became more
significant during the Atlantic slave trade between the 16th and 19th centuries. The maritime
domain was an essential tool for transporting enslaved people across the Atlantic Ocean to the
United States (US) and Europe.
In contemporary times, the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain is an important trade route for
international shipping and a significant source of essential commodities, including fisheries and
energy.1290 These vast resources have incentivised various foreign interests to compete for the
Gulf of Guinea’s resources. More particularly, the rich fishing grounds of the Gulf of Guinea,
which supports a significant biomass of fish, including pelagic and demersal species, have
brought much foreign attention from states such as China. However, these competing interests
have also brought about a decline in fish resources and an increase in IUU fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea. Consequently, Gulf of Guinea states are encouraged to protect their marine
environment against threats arising from its use.
1288 See ch 2.
1289 See sec 2.3.1 in ch 2.
1290 See sec 2.3.2 in ch 2.
2) How have maritime security threats evolved in recent years?
The findings in this research show that the global perception of maritime security threats has
developed since the terrorist attack in the US on 11 September 2001.1291 Drawing from maritime
security literature, the research finds that before the attack, the focus was on a traditional
military concept of state security as opposed to non-traditional threats.1292 However, since the
terrorist attacks, discussions on maritime security now include traditional and non-traditional
threats such as migrant smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, and IUU fishing. As such, this thesis
encourages Gulf of Guinea states to expand their maritime security threat perception to include
IUU fishing. Gulf of Guinea states are encouraged to broaden their understanding of maritime
security and recognise that IUU fishing is not merely a fisheries management and conservation
problem but also a maritime security issue.
3) What is the link between IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea?
Using seven case study Gulf of Guinea states (Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Sierra Leone), this thesis posits that IUU fishing and maritime security are intricately
linked in the Gulf of Guinea.1293 IUU fishing impacts two distinct but interconnected dimensions
of maritime security (human and national security).1294 The research finds that when there is a
decline in fish resources from IUU fishing, key maritime security components of human security
(i.e. environmental, economic, food, personal, and community security) are compromised.1295
Furthermore, when these different components of human security are affected, national security
becomes threatened. Notably, the research finds that fishers with declining income from IUU
fishing are turning to transnational organised crime to supplement their income.1296 They use their
knowledge and skills of operating and navigating fishing vessels to transport illicit cargo and
engage in other criminal activities. This supports the central idea in the thesis that IUU fishing
and maritime crimes are inter-connected, and so the responses to these two threats should also be
inter-sectoral in nature.
Fishing vessels are ideally situated to engage in IUU fishing activities and other maritime crimes,
such as piracy, trafficking (people, drugs, and arms), and migrant smuggling. For instance, current
literature on IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea shows that IUU fishing vessels have a nexus with
1291 See ch 3.
1292 See sec 3.3 in ch 3.
1293 See ch 4.
1294 See sec 4.3 in ch 4.
1295 See sec 4.3.1 in ch 4.
1296 See sec 4.3.2 in ch 4.
drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau. The thesis also finds corruption, document fraud and other
financial crimes such as money laundering and tax and customs fraud are other crimes linked to
IUU fishing vessels in the region. More specifically, it finds that corruption and bribery are
common on IUU fishing vessels, as naval officers engaged in enforcement duties are often bribed
by fishers to evade arrest. Furthermore, there have been several cases where fishing vessels were
involved in document fraud, tax and customs fraud, and money laundering, where documents
such as fishing licenses were falsified, and proceeds from IUU fishing were laundered to conceal
illicit gains.
Consequently, this thesis argues that IUU fishing can no longer be considered merely a fisheries
management problem, but also a maritime security threat. It contends that states must recognise
the maritime security issues surrounding IUU fishing and adopt measures that effectively address
IUU fishing and associated crimes in their national legal, institutional and policy frameworks.
4) What are the legal, institutional and policy frameworks for addressing IUU fishing and
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea? What limitations and gaps exist in these
frameworks?
The key finding of the research in this thesis is that the legal, institutional, and policy
frameworks for addressing IUU fishing and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea are
inadequate and do not sufficiently recognise the relationships between IUU fishing and
maritime security.1297 International conventions for combatting IUU fishing do not address the
criminal dimensions of IUU fishing,1298 including the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the 1995 UN
Fish Stocks Agreement), and the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 FAO
Compliance Agreement. On the other hand, international instruments for combatting
transnational organised crime, such as United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organised Crime (UNTOC), do not address IUU fishing or fishing activities.1299 The thesis
contends that there is a gap between these two regimes that is exploited by illegal actors.
The research reviews the national legal frameworks of the seven study states and shows that the
1297 See ch 5.
1298 See sec 5.2.2 in ch 5.
1299 Ibid.
nexus between IUU fishing and maritime security is given minimal attention in fisheries and
maritime security laws.1300 Only three case study states examined (Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia)
have national fisheries laws which explicitly recognise the link between IUU fishing and
organised crimes. Criminal laws also fail to address IUU fishing activities. The research suggests,
that when the laws were drafted, the possibility that IUU fishing could be linked with other
maritime crimes was not considered or factored into the legislation.
Additionally, the research indicates that the legal and policy measures of Gulf of Guinea states
do not characterise IUU fishing as a maritime security issue, and investments towards combatting
IUU fishing do not focus on its criminal dimensions.1301 A review of several policies and practices
to combat IUU fishing show that Gulf of Guinea states classify IUU fishing as a fisheries
management problem, focusing on fisheries law enforcement, such as enhancing Monitoring,
Control, and Surveillance (MCS) and imposing administrative sanctions. Many states are hesitant
to impose criminal sanctions for IUU fishing despite the criminalisation of IUU fishing in
English-speaking states (Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra).1302 Weak implementation of
criminal sanctions does not sufficiently curtail or disincentivise activities by illegal actors.
Furthermore, an assessment of the national institutional regulatory framework of the study states
reveals that effective interagency cooperation between fisheries and maritime security law
enforcement agencies is hampered by factors such as inadequate information and data sharing,
inadequate personnel, lack of financial capacity, and insufficient knowledge of fisheries and
criminal laws.1303 In addition, the lack of transparency concerning vessel ownership severely
impacts interagency cooperation. The lack of identification of beneficial owners further makes
investigation and prosecution by fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies
extremely challenging.
Given all the above, the thesis argues that states need to further broaden their perception of IUU
fishing and recognise that IUU fishing is a maritime security issue in their regulatory
instruments. The current fisheries management approach that addresses IUU fishing has had
limited success in combatting IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. States are encouraged to
improve their legal, institutional and policy framework with a view to combatting IUU fishing
as a fisheries management issue and a broader facilitator of maritime crimes. States must also be
responsible for their current inadequacies in policy implementation if more enhanced inter-
sectoral approaches are to be developed.
1300 Sec sec 5.3 in ch 5.
1301 See sec 5.4.2.8.2 in ch 5.
1302 See sec 5.3.1.8 in ch 5.
1303 See sec 5.3.2.8 in ch 5.
1305 See sec 6.3 in ch 6.
5) What are the impacts of the gaps in Gulf of Guinea states’ measures in combatting IUU
fishing on maritime security?
The analysis of Chapter Six finds that ineffective adoption and implementation of best practices
obligations in national regulations have a consequential impact on maritime security. For
example, criminal operators take advantage of gaps in adopting fisheries' best practices to engage
in illicit and criminal activities.1304 The current flexibility in registration and licensing processes
enables the concealment of beneficial owners and creates favourable conditions for criminal
operators to continue their activities without fear of sanction. The gap in implementing coastal
states’ obligations and compromised MCS capacity creates an avenue for criminal activities to go
unnoticed. Furthermore, the non-designation of ports for landing by foreign-flagged vessels
creates a gap where non-fishery illicit goods can be landed in port. Therefore, closing these gaps
will ensure that criminal operators in the fisheries sector are not allowed to continue their illicit
activities, thereby protecting the maritime security of states and the region.
6) What is the way forward?
The analysis of Chapter Six finds that closing gaps in adopting and implementing
internationally recognised fisheries best practices will enhance the Gulf of Guinea’s regional
and national maritime security.1305 Flag states should ensure that existing deficiencies in the
registration and authorisation of vessels that allow for the concealment of the identity of
beneficial owners and criminal operators are improved. They should ensure that all vessels
adhere to strict registration and authorisation processes before a vessel can be granted their flag
or is given an ‘authorisation to fish’ in national waters and Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
(ABNJ). The history of the vessel and the information on the identity of its beneficial owners
should be required and investigated before registration and licensing. Coastal states’ ineffective
implementation of regulatory monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that enable criminal
operators to continue their activities without fear of being caught should be addressed. Coastal
states should ensure that they effectively monitor and enforce their regulations in waters within
their jurisdiction through regional maritime security cooperation and collaboration.
Furthermore, gaps in the adoption of international port states' obligations, such as the non-
designation of ports for entry that impedes effective inspection of vessels, should be addressed.
Port states should ensure that they designate ports with trained and qualified fisheries and
1304 See sec 6.3 in ch 6.
1306 See sec 6.4 in ch 6.
maritime security law enforcement agents, where foreign-flagged vessels can be thoroughly
inspected to ensure that illicit cargoes do not enter international and regional markets.
This thesis also finds that addressing IUU fishing through a fisheries-maritime security
approach offers a better approach to combat IUU fishing.1306 From a legal perspective, the thesis
recommends specific measures for combatting IUU fishing and enhancing maritime security.
First, the research indicates that all states should ratify and implement relevant international
instruments to combat IUU fishing. Adequate ratification and implementation could help Gulf
of Guinea states address IUU fishing and crimes onboard fishing vessels. Second, states like
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal that do not view IUU fishing as a criminal activity should
characterise IUU fishing as a crime and a maritime security threat in their fisheries and criminal
legislation. States could adopt a similar law to the US Lacey Act to assist in criminalising IUU
fishing. A law such as the Lacey Act will also enable cross-border cooperation. Third, Gulf of
Guinea states like Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone that have already criminalised IUU
fishing in their national legislation, should consider incorporating provisions in their relevant
legislation that require criminal sanctions to be imposed and published. Criminal prosecutions
of IUU fishing activities have the potential to deter IUU fishing and associated maritime crimes.
Fourth, all states should adopt a similar law to the Australian Maritime Powers Act to act as the
primary legislation for fisheries and criminal law enforcement at sea and deal with current
administrative and legal weaknesses.
From a policy perspective, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and Gulf of
Guinea states are encouraged to recognise IUU fishing as a criminal activity associated with
other crimes and conduct comprehensive research on IUU fishing and maritime security.
Research outcomes will enable adequate investigations into crimes in the fisheries sector.
Second, states should enhance the political will to prioritise combating IUU fishing and
transnational organised crime in the fisheries sector. Politicians and policymakers should be
informed and recognise that the fisheries sector is significant for revenue generation, food
security, and its sustainability can only be secured by enhancing both fisheries management and
maritime security. Third, Gulf of Guinea states should enhance transparency in the fisheries
sector through improved processes. Increased transparency should involve improved registration
and authorisation requirements, conditions for granting Fisheries Partnership Agreements
(FPAs), and enforcement proceedings. Fourth, states should combat judicial corruption and
ensure effective criminal prosecutions. The limited number of completed fishing prosecutions
may indicate poor implementation and possible political interference in due process. Fifth, states
should develop a more effective compliance strategy rather than focusing on extensive law
enforcement. An effective compliance strategy will ensure that fisheries and maritime security
laws are more integrated and have a greater chance of being complied with, even when law
enforcement is low or non-existent. Sixth, states should foster interagency cooperation and
collaboration between fisheries and maritime security law enforcement agencies. These
different agencies need a cultural transformation and change in vision to work together for
national benefit. Lastly, Gulf of Guinea states should regulate and monitor fishing activities and
vessels involved in fish-related activities, including trans-shipment and bunkering vessels that
may have a logistical connection to criminal operations.
7.2 Limitations of Study
The main limitations of this thesis are that:
1) As an English speaker, the thesis author experienced issues analysing data derived from
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. These are states with two official languages that
are not English: Guinea (French), Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese), and Senegal (French).
There were challenges in the translation of these states' national laws and regulations,
particularly in capturing the nuances as intended in the original language, which may
not have been translated precisely in English language through the translation software
applications used.1307
2) This thesis does not cover every potential crime associated with IUU fishing, only those
identified as significant threats in the existing scholarly literature.
3) The study was limited by Covid-19 restrictions on travel and resource limits which
hindered the potential to engage directly in West African fieldwork during the thesis
candidature.
7.4 Further Study
There are three overarching issues where further research is needed. These include:
1) Legal Framework: This thesis examined fisheries and criminal legislation of seven case
study states to determine whether they reflect the nexus between IUU fishing and
maritime security and to understand where legislative improvement is most needed.
However, the research reviewed only fisheries legislation related to fishing activities.
For criminal legislation, only Acts and Decrees were reviewed and excluded
regulations. An examination of more criminal regulations may identify better
1307 Google translate was used to translate Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal’s legislation.
connections between IUU fishing and maritime security and produce more exhaustive
recommendations.
2) Implementing best practices: Further research should be undertaken to gain in-depth
knowledge on implementing internationally recognised best practices to combat IUU
fishing by Gulf of Guinea states. This thesis limits its analysis primarily to adopting
best practices in national legislation and policy.
3) Examination of more Gulf of Guinea states: This thesis has limited its assessment to
only seven states in the region (Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Sierra Leone). Further in-depth research should be conducted on other
Gulf of Guinea states to understand better the complexities of IUU fishing and maritime
security in the region. Examining more states should inform future legislative reforms
and policymaking and ensure that more detailed and specific recommendations are
given.
7.5 Conclusion
This thesis concludes that IUU fishing threatens maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and
current approaches are inadequate in combatting IUU fishing and its maritime security
dimensions. This thesis reveals that the fisheries management approach that focuses on
enforcement and control has not successfully combatted the problem of IUU fishing. As such,
this thesis provides a more comprehensive approach by arguing that an integrated fisheries-
maritime security approach is a superior solution to effectively addressing IUU fishing, having
the potential to successfully combat IUU fishing while enhancing regional and national
maritime security. All Gulf of Guinea states should follow the recommendations proposed in
this thesis to reap the benefits of a healthier and more secure maritime environment.
