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The strategies that bind:

NGO coalitions and their influence

HELEN YANACOPULOS

Abstract This article examines NGOs as strategic organizations that form coalitions in order to influence other actors, particularly international financial institutions. It has three primary aims: to examine NGOs as strategic organizations; to look at a particular type of NGO network, the coalition, which unlike a network involves more value and commitment; and to assess the factors that contribute to their strategies such as changes to the NGO environment. To do this, the resource dependency perspective is utilized to evaluate the influence of various resources (funding, legitimacy and information) on NGOs’ organizational strategy. Oxfam International, the NGO Working Group on the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods Project are three NGO coalitions examined. I conclude that there are differences between NGO networks and coalitions and that the coalitions strategically act and react to changing resources in their environments.

Change has become a defining characteristic of our time, and much of this change is described as, or as a result of, ‘globalization’. Fuelling ‘globalization’ are techno- logical advancements, the political effects of the ending of the cold war, the notion of the responsibilities and rights of the state and its inhabitants and the increasing prominence of international financial institutions (IFIs) (Edwards et al. 1999). Some have called this increase in prominence and influence of the IFIs a complex multi- lateralism (O’Brien et al. 2000). In response, non-governmental organizations increasingly redefine problems affecting the South as global or systemic, and there has been an increasing focus on their advocacy at this level. In this study I look at three development NGO coalitions and their organizational goals in response to their focus on systemic issues such as poverty. Specifically, I examine some of their ‘organizational strategies’, a broad term used to describe the plans organizations make to achieve their goals.

An organization’s goals and strategies are negotiated and frequently these are what have motivated NGOs to form collaborative arrangements such as networks and coalitions. Three such coalitions, Oxfam International (OI), the Bretton Woods Project (BWP) and the NGO Working Group on the World Bank (NGOWGWB), assert their goals and strategies in their mission statements. The similarities between these mission statements revolve around three key issues: members belonging to the coalitions are independent; members have chosen to work together in the coalition;

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and the strategy is meant to make an impact on global issues of poverty and related injustices (BWP-a; Oxfam-a; NGOWGWB-b).

The purpose of this article is to examine NGOs as strategic organizations that form networks and coalitions in order to influence other actors, particularly IFIs. While some scholars have examined NGOs and their strategies (Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Hilhorst 2003; Hudock 1999; Leipold 2000; Nelson 2000; Ramia 2003), we need to know more about how and why these strategies arise and are implemented. In this article I have three aims. The first is to look at NGOs and at NGO networks and coalitions as strategic organizations by examining their goals and the ways they set out to achieve them. While there have been numerous studies on networks, more work needs to be done on coalitions, the distinction being that one involves a higher level of commitment from members, which leads to my second aim. Finally, the third is to analyse the factors that contribute to NGOs’ organizational strategies such as the changes in the NGOs’ environment which affect their operation.

I take the work done on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as a starting point. TANs are useful for explaining the transnational level of operation and for exposing how these networks operate. To evaluate the factors that contribute to the organizational strategy of NGOs, I refer to the resource dependency perspective (RDP). This research originated from the observations of three development NGO coalitions – Oxfam International, the NGO Working Group on the World Bank, and the Bretton Woods Project. These NGO coalitions are examined in further detail in the second section, with a particular focus on their organizational strategies.

Theoretical framework

Transnational advocacy networks

NGOs are strategic organizations whose arsenal includes the formation of coalitions, tactical lobbying and multi-level campaigning. The fact that NGOs form networks received a great deal of attention during the last decade. The seminal work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) provided a framework for exploring transnational networks in many issue areas, including the environment, the women’s movement and human rights. A transnational advocacy network is a broad term used to describe an activist network that transcends national boundaries and that consists of members motivated by shared values rather than professional or material concerns. While the level of cohesion between members of transnational networks varies, as does their organiz- ational appearance, they have some similarities. They are typically comprised of non- state actors; they share information on issues and are generally focused on a specific issue area (such as abolishing landmines or increasing debt relief). Examinations of these thematic and single-issue networks have made invaluable contributions towards expanding our focus to include transnational networks as actors in international governance, and have allowed us to better understand how the international system as a whole operates. Researchers reveal how these movements have shifted and influ- enced other international actors on particular issues; generally, transnational advocacy network research has followed the issue areas of the networks themselves – they have been examined from the perspective of the issue area. Many writers have used this

The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence

framework and there is a richness of studies in this field (Burgerman 2001; Clark 2001; Clark 2004; Florini 1999; Higgott et al. 2000; Khagram et al. 2002).

Keck and Sikkink provide the starting point for looking at the three NGO coali- tions in this research. However, the TAN framework requires complementing on two points. The first is that we find that some NGOs form more than transnational net- works – they form transnational coalitions. The difference between these two organizational forms is both subtle and important, and is discussed in the following section. The second is the environment of these organizations; many factors con- tribute to the strategies that some NGOs have adopted at an organizational level and these need further exploration.

What’s in a name? Networks or coalitions?

NGO coalitions form more permanent links than single-issue thematic transnational advocacy networks. They generally have permanent staff members, a more permanent membership base, a headquarters or secretariat, and are organizations in and of them- selves. Most importantly, they have broader strategic aims than single-issue thematically focused networks. Not surprisingly, while these NGO coalitions are organizational entities in and of themselves, they and their members also frequently belong to single-issue transnational advocacy networks.

While coalitions permit information sharing, they allow stronger links to develop between coalition members. Egan (1995: 179) describes an inherent ‘value-added’, whether real or perceived, in working with others in that ‘alliances that both partners ultimately deem successful involve collaboration (creating new value together) rather than mere exchange (getting something back for what you put in)’. Here Egan describes the fundamental difference between networks and coalitions. Coalitions create a greater value and commitment together. While networking is an important part of coalition building, networks can exist without coalitions. Increased communication and information sharing are common in coalitions; however, the other areas of ‘value- added’ in coalitions come from sharing resources, decreasing costs through group specialization, and increasing legitimacy and power by speaking with one voice.

Though these coalitions are emerging among different types of NGOs, the focus in this research is specifically on development NGOs. The coalitions of development NGOs are best defined by Fowler (1997: 115) as groupings that are both short or long term and that comprise national, continental and/or global associations of NGOs. They come together to promote mutual interests, creating a distinct entity for such a purpose, which may or may not formally register as a separate legal body. They are established around specific development issues rather than the concerns of the NGO sector. The required capacity can be provided by the membership, perhaps acting as a secretariat either permanently or on a rotational basis. Mandated by members after consultation to adopt and voice positions on their behalf, coalitions serve as platforms for the articulation of members’ interests. There is also no joint liability for oper- ational performance beyond the shared risk of losing credibility. A crucial organiz- ational feature of coalitions is the members’ active control of the new organization. The cost to the members is the time, human capacity, information and investment in

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the processes needed to reach collective options on issues, and then mandating the secretariat and office bearers accordingly. One benefit of a coalition is greater strength when voicing shared positions, together with enhanced informal access to information through trusted relations.

Coalitions require a high level of commitment between member organizations; generally they are created to deal with broad goals. This organizational structure reflects the multi-level functioning of a coalition in which members have connections with the grassroots while the coalition functions at the national and international levels. The coalition structure reveals that these organizations have moved beyond information sharing, particularly as one of the coalition’s primary objectives is to influence IFIs and governments. The for-profit literature calls these ‘strategic alliances’ in that they reflect a particular mode of inter-organizational relationship in which the partners make substantial investments in developing common operations over a long-term period. Coalitions involve a commitment of resources, mutually acceptable objectives and sharing the risk from environmental pressures (Egan 1995: 147). One of the most important drivers of coalition building is strategy. Such coalitions develop meta-strategies – shared visions or desires that motivate the NGOs to work together; this allows for ‘collective strategies [which] involve reaching agreement about how to implement a shared vision’ (Gray 1996: 59).

The resource dependency perspective

The resource dependency perspective, created by Pfeffer and Salancik and rooted in organizational studies, attempts to explain how organizations respond to change in their environments. They see the organization as a part of its environment and show how the organization attempts to influence others within that same environment. Organizations are presented as strategic entities that are affected by the availability of necessary resources required for their operation. To function within a resource-scarce environ- ment, these organizations are frequently driven to work with other organizations.

Pfeffer (1997) outlines the RDP argument in five points. First is the focus on the organization as the fundamental unit of analysis (he claims that we live in a society of organizations). Second, organizations do not operate independently but are bound by a network of interdependencies with other organizations. Third, the fundamental interdependence of organizations and the doubt that accompanies the actions of other organizations lead to a situation in which survival and continued success are uncertain. Fourth, organizations take actions to manage external interdependencies (though such actions are inevitably never completely successful and produce new patterns of dependence and interdependence). And fifth, such patterns of dependence produce inter-organizational as well as intra-organizational power, where power has some effect on organizational behaviour. Organizations tend to comply with the demands of those interests in their environment that can command relatively more power.

The organization’s environment encompasses every event in the world that may potentially have an effect on the organization’s activities; problems occur not only because organizations depend on their environment but also because their environ-

The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence

ment is undependable (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 3). Resources can increase or decrease as environments change, with new organizations continuously entering and exiting. As environments are dynamic, organizations face the prospect either of not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these environmental factors. The diversification of an organization’s activities does not reduce its dependence on the environment, but merely alters the nature of the interdependence and structures organizational dependence so that it is more readily managed. However, an organ- ization is not only reactive to its environment but it is also active within it.

In RDP terms, resource refers to anything upon which the organization is dependent. It is obvious that funding for non-profit organizations is a resource; however, here we argue that legitimacy is also a resource for many non-profit organ- izations.1 In addition, information and knowledge are also controlled and possessed and can be considered important resources for an organization.2 An organization’s vulnerability, relative to its environment, is a result of its dependence on resources that are controlled by others within the environment, which gives the environment its power. Hatch (1997: 78) states that the ‘dependency the organization has on its environment is not one single, undifferentiated dependency, it is a complex set of dependencies that exist between an organization and the specific elements of its environment found in the inter-organizational network’. Thus, environmental pressures are extremely important when addressing organizational behaviour. Development NGOs are dependent on at least three forms of resources – organizational legitimacy, funding and access to information and knowledge.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 2) claim that organizations survive to the extent that they are effective, which they define as the successful management of the organiz- ation’s demands with particular reference to the demands of ‘interest groups upon which the organization depends for resources and support’. The scarcity of resources required for the operation of an organization, whatever form those resources take, are an essential element of operation. Faulkner (1995: 16) claims that the key to an organization’s survival is the ability to acquire and maintain the relevant resources, and that ‘it is not merely organizational efficiency, but organizational power and the capacity of the organization to preserve itself that determines competitive survival’. When the supply of a resource is stable and abundant, problems are unlikely. However, when an environment is changing and the resource is no longer certain and stable, the organization becomes increasingly vulnerable.

The decreasing amount of funding and the increasing number of NGOs has meant that the ‘development environment’ has been volatile and resources have been (or at least have been perceived as being) scarce.3 With respect to charitable organizations such as NGOs, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 177) state that environmental conditions may make charitable contributions scarce. In such cases, they predict that, ‘the par- ticipating agencies may willingly exchange their autonomy for the promise of some funding rather than face drastically reduced resources. No other options are available to them.’ They state that ‘power is inevitably organised around the most critical and scarce resources in the social system.’ Organizational strategies to control the environment require ‘interlocking activities with others, and such interlocking pro- duces concentrated power. Those organizations not involved in the resultant structure

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are less powerful and less able to cope with their problems of interdependence’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 1984: 158). Hatch (1997: 101) describes organizational strategy as top management’s planned efforts to influence organizational outcomes by manag- ing the organization’s relationship to its environment.

Turbulence and uncertainty in an environment necessitate changes from organiz- ations within that environment. Organizations deal with this uncertainty and instability by attempting to manage the interdependence through inter-organizational coordination: ‘by law, collusion, merger, co-option, and other strategies, organizations seek to avoid uncertainty arising from their need to acquire and maintain resources’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 1984: 156). Uncertainty results in greater efforts at coordination. Thus, if there is uncertainty within an organization’s environment, there is then a tendency towards organizational centralization. Likewise, centralization by the creation of alliances is a similar response of separate but related organizations. Therefore, ‘formal ties that bind the units of an organization together are replaced with a partnership among several organizations. Networks [and I would argue coalitions] seem most likely to form when organizations face rapid technological change’ (Hatch 1997: 191).

Inter-organizational linkages give four advantages to the management of environ- mental interdependence. First, they provide information about the activities of that organization that may impinge on or affect the focal organization. Second, they provide channels for communicating information to another organization on which the focal organization depends. Third, the exposure to other organizations provides an important first step in obtaining commitments of support from important actors in the environment. And fourth, inter-organizational linkages have a certain value for legitimating the focal organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 145).

Therefore, at certain critical moments many organizations face a dilemma. Future survival depends on the ability to adapt and work with other organizations. However, when joining collective structures, organizations run the risk of losing control over their own activities. Pfeffer and Salancik (1984: 134) emphasize that the ‘price for inclusion in any collective structure is the loss of discretion and control over one’s activities. Ironically, to gain some control over the activities of another organization, the focal organization must surrender some of its own autonomy.’

In the case of development NGOs, Hudock (1999: 5) asserts that there are subsequent gaps in how we analyse NGOs as strategic organizations. She states that ‘the political nature of NGOs is fully revealed through analysis of the way they manoeuvre and manipulate their external environments in order to extract resources from them.’ Thus, complementing existing frameworks with RDP provides us with the advantage of seeing how NGOs react and adapt to the resource constraints of their environment, and helps to explain why development NGOs form coalitions to better achieve their strategies.

NGO coalitions: case studies

The process of coalition building among development NGOs is relatively recent. It is interesting in a number of ways. First, working together involves a degree of nego- tiation and a surrender of autonomy to the collective in order to survive in a highly

The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence

competitive environment. Second, the impetus for working together is not only a defensive reaction but also a pro-active strategy for achieving shared goals. Through the three development NGO coalition case studies we will explore why these NGOs form coalitions and the strategically driven mechanics of their attempts to influence and participate in development processes at the highest level. Semi-structured inter- views were conducted and a variety of NGO documents were examined.4 Interviews were also conducted with various employees of international financial institutions, and donors who had been on the receiving end of NGO advocacy.

There were specific criteria for selecting these three development NGO coalitions. The first was that the primary focus of the coalition was on issues of development; while there has been some work on the role of networks and coalitions in the field of development, NGO networks and coalitions have generally been under-analysed (Henry et al. 2004). The second was that the primary target of organizational advo- cacy was on one or more of the IFIs, and that the coalition was consequently attempting to address not only programme issues but also systemic issues. The third criterion used to select groups was that the organizational forms these NGOs took were not loose single-issue networks but more formalized coalitions. This organiz- ational form implies a greater level of commitment from (and potential gain and loss by) all coalition members. In effect, the groups have formed (to varying degrees) new organizations, reflecting an ‘organizational reconfiguration’. The fourth criterion was that there was some connection between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’, linking the North and the South.

The first case study, Oxfam International, was established in 1995. The 12 national Oxfams that created Oxfam International did so for a number of reasons. These included improving coordination on projects between national Oxfams, improving the ‘branding’ of the Oxfam name and, most important for this research, pooling members’ strengths in national and international advocacy. OI is a separate entity from the national Oxfams, but it is also comprised of all national Oxfam members. The different Oxfams contribute towards running OI and have decided that it makes more sense to work together than apart.5 The opening of an OI advocacy office in Washington DC in 1995, which lobbies the World Bank, IMF and the United Nations on issues agreed by the members, is a reflection of an organizational move towards ‘global’ issues.

The second case study is the NGOWGWB, which was created in 1984. Its membership comprises operational and support NGOs, NGOs that engage in advocacy, and NGO networks, primarily from southern countries. The NGOWGWB is the only NGO with any official standing in the World Bank (the World Bank is required to meet representatives from the various regions of this group on an annual basis). The group is a global forum of NGOs engaged in policy dialogue and advocacy with the World Bank. A global steering committee meets high-level World Bank representatives, including regional vice-presidents, the president and the board of directors. The group was chosen for a number of reasons. The first was the unique insider/outsider relationship the group has with the Bank. The working group’s role as a global forum permits NGO members to address organization-wide Bank policy issues that might not easily be addressed in national forums. It also affords these

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members access to global-level decision-makers within both the Bank and its govern- ing bodies. They claim that their independent voice increases NGO credibility in the Bank even as it strengthens and balances international coalitions (NGOWGWB-a). Members of the coalition are national-level NGOs and NGO umbrella organizations within each region. Funding for the NGOWGWB comes from many sources, includ- ing membership fees, foundation funding and the World Bank itself.6

The third case study, the Bretton Woods Project (BWP), is based in London and was founded by a pre-existing network – the Aid and Environment Group, now renamed the Development and Environment Group. Its membership includes 27 of the largest international NGOs; it not only brings members together under the BWP umbrella but the BWP itself also belongs to a variety of other networks, making it a ‘network within networks’. The BWP was set up in 1995 to facilitate the work of UK- based international NGOs concerned with the social and environmental impacts of World Bank and IMF policies and projects.7 The BWP circulates information to NGOs across the world, identifies lobbying and campaigning opportunities, organizes meetings with UK and international organization officials, and prepares in-depth papers and a bulletin on IFI issues. The BWP has a small staff, the membership of the largest UK Development and Environmental NGOs, and a distribution database of thousands of individual and organizational members who receive their publications. BWP funding comes from a variety of sources, including members and foundations.

Coalitions, lobbying and campaigning

The resource dependency perspective proposes that organizations reconfigure in response to a changing or volatile environment – they form coalitions and advocate change. Advocacy is understood here (and is employed by the development NGOs themselves) as attempts to influence change at a political level. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 8) describe advocacy networks as ‘plead[ing] the causes of others or defend[ing] a cause or proposition. … [Advocacy groups] are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes’. In the following sections, I examine three different (but not com- prehensive) strategies taken by development NGOs: forming coalitions, lobbying and campaigning.

‘More than an issue’ – coalition building as a strategy

The explanatory purchase of the resource development perspective is in the way it focuses on both the internal and external workings of organizations. It can help us to understand why development NGOs form coalitions.

A cost–benefit analysis occurs when joining a coalition. In their attempts to address ‘global’ and ‘system’ issues, NGOs form coalitions to challenge the increas- ing power of IFIs. Here, the issue of NGO legitimacy is imperative. As the RDP outlines, in situations of large power asymmetries between actors, it is common for the less powerful ones to decide to work together in an attempt to challenge these power asymmetries – they come together to be more effective and to speak with one voice. A member NGO of the BWP states that the project’s ‘strength is that there are

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25 [sic] organizations asking the World Bank to do this, not a two-person organization’ (BWP-3). One member group of OI indicated that challenging these power asymmetries was the primary reason why the 12 national Oxfams started working together in OI:

[It was because of] changes in international policy-making and international communications. The world is slowly becoming more globalized, messages do not stop at national frontiers, and the medium operates globally. It all moves very quickly – international policy-making is far more an international affair. So you get a situation where Oxfams are conscious about the value and importance of their name. They find themselves in an international playing field and not a national playing field any more. You put the two together and it becomes blindingly obvious that you cannot work as eight [12] different Oxfams, all with the same name and then pretend to be effective in that area. That penny drops and you get a change in attitude and … therefore we have to get together.

(OXF-4)

While joining together to speak with ‘one voice’ potentially increases a coalition’s impact and legitimacy, it is also essential that these groups claim a connection to the grassroots and to their ground-level experience. One source of their legitimacy comes from transporting the voices and concerns of the poor. If development NGO coalitions did not have this connection to the grassroots, they would only be lobbying organizations, leaving themselves open to criticism and calls to defend their legit- imacy. This bridging function between the grassroots and the global level gives them legitimacy at a time when NGO credibility is being questioned. While this applies primarily to northern NGOs, southern NGOs also benefit from being in partnership with northern ones, or forming coalitions with other southern ones. Southern groups can not only utilize the reputation and standing of their northern partners, but they can also use the NGO coalition to give themselves legitimacy with their national governments – this ‘boomerang’ effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998) was employed by some NGOWGWB members. The bridging function gives legitimacy to NGOs, bridging their operation work to advocacy, bridging northern and southern NGOs and bridging the grassroots to the global. The importance of legitimacy as a resource was captured in a statement made by an employee of one of the IFIs. She stated that given the increased numbers and capacity of ‘southern’ NGOs, international or northern NGOs were becoming redundant in the field of development (IFI-8).

A development NGO’s funding has a significant impact on its organizational strategies. Aid budgets have been decreasing while the trend of allocating funds has shifted to southern groups. As one member of the NGOWGWB said, ‘What we feel in the south is that the northern NGOs, and … specifically in the past, the European NGOs, were our bridge to find resources. Now – it seems to be that they [resources] are going to the south … so we are going to compete’ (NGO-4).

An NGO member outlines concerns around funding for NGOs: ‘there is going to be a lot of competition soon for the declining pot of money outside direct service

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provision … and everyone is worried about that pot of money’ (BWP-4). One moti- vation in forming coalitions is their economies of scale. Advocacy at the global level is extremely expensive and no one NGO can afford to finance and support a global advocacy campaign. This factor has influenced the strategic reconfigurations of NGOs. For example, even one of the largest development NGOs, Oxfam Great Britain, would have to dedicate a large portion of its finances if it were conducting advocacy on a global level. Instead, Oxfam Great Britain, as part of OI, opened an office in Washington DC and hired lobbyists dedicated to lobbying the IFIs, thereby sharing the costs with other OI members. Another example is the BWP, created by some of the largest UK NGOs in order to have dedicated people consistently working on IFI issues.

Information sharing and the specialization of skills is also an essential cost saving and value-added element of forming coalitions. Information and communication technology, such as the Internet, mobile telephones and instantaneous media, has been essential in the information-sharing role of networks. However, an additional benefit of coalitions is that they harness expertise through pooling resources. It is extremely costly to employ experts, be they researchers or lobbyists, and members of Oxfam claimed that it is not only a way of ‘harnessing the resources of the affiliates in a more collaborative way’ (OXF-1), but also ‘that one of the long-term payoffs [is] that our collective overheads can be cut down. That with shared infrastructure, we can do more with all the money than … [an individual NGO member] could ever do on its own’ (OXF-4). This member continues:

You basically get very substantive research, branded as Oxfam International, and they [Oxfam Canada] can use it about Uganda in Canada. They would never have the capacity to produce their own research. Now they can go to their advocacy contacts and they appear very well informed, very substantive. They can be very authoritative – much more than they could ever be in their own capacity alone. That is the benefit of being part of an international group.

(OXF-4)

Sharing research (done by specialists working for the group) is also a resource of the coalition. In the case of the BWP, the coalition’s secretariat conducts and dissemin- ates the research. In the case of NGOWGWB individual members conduct the research and share it with the other members. For OI, the whole group takes advantage of the research capacities of the larger Oxfams.

In specializing, the quality of the research generally improves. Not only will member NGOs have access to this research to help them become more informed on an issue, but it is also a tool that they can use when they are lobbying local, national or international bodies. The quality of the research and analysis is important on two levels. The first is that high-quality research is imperative to members increasing their understanding of complex issues, outlined in the following statement: ‘we have one or two people working on it [debt relief] full time, probably more than the Bank people working on it. … My feeling is that we are going down the specialized route, and that we have therefore to get better at doing good analyses’ (BWP-3). The second reason

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why high-quality research is important is that members’ credibility is increased when they use it: ‘I know that they [BWP] are highly regarded in Washington as well, by World Bank staff, and they have forced themselves onto the agenda and they have been taken seriously. And I think their expertise is known’ (BWP-4). This level of legitimacy is powerful and arguably allows groups to be taken seriously in their advocacy ambitions.

Coming together to work on advocacy is less problematic than coming together on programme work. While the interviewees from the three coalitions were generally positive about collaboration on advocacy, only one of the coalitions, OI, came together around programme work, and this seemed to involve more tensions between members. Collaborating for the purpose of advocacy tends to be easier to manage, and one explanation for this is that work is based on negotiated shared values, which bring the members together while involving very few risks (Hajer 1995). For example, the NGOWGWB regions have meetings prior to their annual meetings with the World Bank, and there are great attempts at consensus building. Disagreements between NGOs within coalitions frequently occur and should not be underestimated. However, even if there are differences of opinion within the coalitions, the individual NGOs still have some autonomy when it comes to their own individual advocacy efforts. And given that they are strategic organizations, these NGO members would cease to belong to the coalition if they were not benefiting from the relationship.8

Tactical lobbying

Lobbying involves engaging with those one wishes to influence, while campaigning involves vilifying and mobilizing support against a target, such as a government, IFI or corporation. Lobbying and campaigning require different tools and tactics. Lobbying is a much more targeted process, requiring the art of persuasion, expert knowledge and negotiating skills. In lobbying, vilifying is ineffective. NGO lobbyists (usually in conjunction with the policy departments and programmers) provide the groundwork for campaigns and contribute to the articulation of the organization’s position.

One challenge in lobbying for both individual NGOs and NGO coalitions is a classic political problem – how closely do they work within the ‘system’? There are two aspects to this problem. First, do individual NGOs see themselves as ‘reformists’ (working within the system to change it) or ‘revolutionaries’ (wanting to get rid of the system entirely)? The second is a practical issue. What degree of working inside or outside the system is most effective to achieve the coalition’s goals (without being co- opted by the very system they are trying to change)? The degree of working within the system is an imperative aspect on which agreement must be reached within a coalition. This is a strategic decision taken by the member NGOs depending on which approach is thought more effective.

NGOs have had a long history of lobbying at the national level. The difference now is that instead of only lobbying governments, development NGO coalitions have also been targeting the IFIs (in addition to local and national governments). Because of this, it has become essential for NGO lobbyists to be better versed in the internal

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working of the IFIs. Employing professional lobbyists is costly and their required skills and knowledge of the system are highly specialized. NGO coalitions enable NGOs that would not normally be represented in Washington, New York, Brussels and Geneva to have a voice in places where decisions are being made. In addition, all three NGO coalitions have access to officials that they would not have had without the coalition, through the OI advocacy office in Washington DC, through the BWP office in London and (to senior World Bank officials) through the NGOWGWB.

The ability to coordinate lobbying is fundamental to managing a coalition. The Oxfam formula is that it is essential to have ‘one or two very effective lobbyists with the right relationships and the right information flows to coordinate them [the NGO members]. So you walk in the right doors in a coordinated manner and you push on the players who push on each other’ (OXF-5). Lobbyists must present politically viable positions if they are to be taken seriously by their targets. An official of the IMF stated: ‘to be listened to, you must provide concrete answers to concrete problems’ (IFI-2). According to various officials at the IFIs, the solutions offered by development NGOs are appealing only if they are politically viable.

An IMF employee emphasized that if NGOs focused on concrete policy options, this would help provide ‘focused expert analysis’ of problems the IMF was trying to solve (IFI-3). He continues by stating that this expertise is essential if the proposal is to be taken seriously. Development NGO coalitions have an advantage over indi- vidual development NGOs; to provide solutions it is essential to have contact with individuals within the IFIs and to know what is politically feasible within these organizations. However, here there is a tension. It is more than likely that solutions which are deemed politically viable to the IFIs would correspond to the IFI paradigmatic views of development. These views would not necessarily match those of the NGO coalition (particularly if they have goals of systemic change). Thus, a paradox arises – what might be ‘politically viable’ solutions to an IFI might not be desirable to an NGO coalition. These ‘politically viable’ solutions could very well perpetuate the systemic problems originally identified by the NGO coalitions.

It appears that having strategic allies within a target institution, or other insti- tutions that have influence over the target institution, is essential when attempting to influence the course of events of the IFIs. An employee of the World Bank stated ‘you need people identifying a need within the Bank for external influences to be effective’ (IFI-6). This also applies to relations between NGOs and government agen- cies, as an employee of the UK’s Department for International Development outlined: ‘The informal contacts are probably really important, and those tend to be built up over time ... if the NGO can get some sort of process going, whereby there is another meeting, and an action point agreed, then there’s more chance of influence’ (OTH-1).

However, there are risks in close collaboration with target institutions. As Fowler (1997: 6) states, ‘the International Financial Institutions are at an unrivalled position in setting the agenda in terms of the purpose and content of international assistance’. If this is the case, then IFI/NGO collaborations could potentially leave NGOs as mere accomplices. This is a perennial problem of organizations trying to influence without being co-opted. All three NGOs discussed this issue and said that they attempt to work inside and outside the system simultaneously. A member of OI outlines this:

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‘The only way of real change is to harness the influence in capacities of some of the insider players. There are risks with this, but I don’t care. If they launch something that we don’t like, we will then lobby around it and criticize it. The key thing is to launch something, because then it leads to a decision-making process’ (OXF-1).

This insider/outsider NGO strategy poses a challenge for NGO coalitions, particu- larly as their autonomy could potentially be jeopardized when working closely with the IFIs. The development NGO community is divided on the amount of cooperation between NGOs and their targets. Some members of the organizations studied expressed caution, measuring the risks of collaboration with IFIs and governments by selecting the times and issues of collaboration very carefully. NGO coalitions such as Oxfam emphasized the benefits of working with their targets, and harnessing the influencing capacities of some of the inside players of the IFIs in utilizing ‘influencing opportunities’. The case study organizations were unified in that they remain autonomous throughout any collaboration; however, other NGOs did not necessarily see their actions in the same light, accusing some NGOs of working too closely with the IFIs and ‘selling out’ to their demands.

Regardless of whether an NGO has been co-opted, equally important is the perception of co-option of other development actors. If other NGOs perceive that this has occurred, the NGO or NGO coalition might have problems working with other NGOs in the future. A member of the NGOWGWB describes another NGO’s reac- tions to the NGOWGWB member working with the World Bank: ‘When we, for example, first became members of the NGO working group, which was in 1995, a lot of the organizations we had been working with just refused to work with us because they felt that just by engaging in dialogue with [the World Bank], we were co-opting ourselves and we were losing our political edge’ (NGO-3).

Coordinated campaigning

Campaigning and mobilizing people around an issue moves lobbying to overt public forums, from the lunches and corridors to the TV screens and streets. Campaigning requires a clear simple message and objective, and its purpose is to mobilize sup- porters by using the media to put pressure on decision-makers, something that coalitions are particularly well placed to do. It is typically adversarial, requiring a villain or an injustice. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 27) argue that a ‘causal story’ must be established so that responsibility for an injustice is obvious and that ‘the causal chain needs to be sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing’.

Campaigns also serve other purposes: while influencing policy is a major factor, campaigns can also serve as vehicles for fundraising and raising the profile of an organization. Chapman and Fisher (in Leipold 2000: 453) identified the increase in NGO campaigning. Northern NGOs are looking for new roles. Chapman and Fisher identify a number of factors responsible for the increase in campaigning work of northern NGOs: projects have limited impact without structural changes; southern NGOs request that northern groups do more work on campaigns and policy influence; and finally the increasing desire among NGOs for a higher public profile (to increase their fundraising and standing).

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A member of Oxfam International describes the essence of campaigning:

In modern campaigning you need to have a clear proposition, the problem, solution and the villain. And you often also need what we call ‘issue campaigns’ – something very specific that illustrates the wider problem. … Landmines are a very good example. There’s a very clear villain – clear action is needed. But when you get into the kind of equity issues, health or education, or food or whatever, it’s more complex immediately about who the villain is … I mean, it’s multi-layers of villains and problems.

(OXF-1)

Single-issue networks are conducive to setting up powerful campaigns, such as debt cancellation campaigns, landmine banning campaigns and dam campaigns. The reason for this is that they focus on one issue that is easily understood while coalitions aim to deal with broader issues that are complex and have many causes. This is not to say that coalitions do not engage in campaigns – quite the opposite. What it does mean is that coalitions require a way to link a single issue to the broader aims of the coalition. Oxfam used the term ‘wedge’ to describe this linking. A member of OI talked about the education campaign as a ‘wedge’ into larger organizational goals. Education was the wedge: ‘that opens up a wider debate about equity and public expenditures, about decisions governments make about what different people get … that poverty is about injustice and it’s not just about material wealth’ (OXF-3). Another member of OI explains a further connection between the debt relief cam- paign, the education campaign and larger issues of poverty: ‘We’ll be lobbying on … changes to structural adjustment policy, particularly cost recovery, charging for basic education. … On debt as well, we’ll be trying to make a clearer link between debt and poverty and basic education’ (OXF-1).

In addition to using campaigns as a wedge to larger issues, the coalition structure allows for multi-level coordinated campaigns. The ‘multi-level’ approach, where groups work in a coordinated manner, in various countries and at various levels of politics, is one that is difficult for most individual NGOs to accomplish, because of the time required to coordinate such a campaign. One BWP member states that the group aims at ‘getting the UK officials to take things forward either in a kind of formal way by taking something to the Board [of the World Bank] or by getting the relevant paperwork through and calling in on the Bank people, or getting together other Executive Directors’ (BWP-1).

Coordination is an essential skill for managing multi-level campaigns. Probably due to its formal links, OI has been successful at conducting multi-level campaigns. One member describes the process of multi-level coordination and strategy:

You need to be able to lobby several countries and you need to be able to move to other influencing opportunities if you’re not making progress in one or two of them. You need to be able to take advantage of the media in many places to localize the pressure. All modern successful campaigns have to be international and in a way what we’re doing is gearing up more to be able to

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do more international campaigning. But that doesn’t mean that the national bits of it aren’t key. It’s just being able to do it all at once.

(OXF-1)

Finally, timing is vital in these campaigns, whether it is an approach of a lobbyist, a letter requesting information, the presentation of a position or the exertion of pressure on a particular government, it is acknowledged to be vitally important to development NGO coalitions engaging in influencing IFIs. One member of OI stated that ‘if we want to move on HIPC, we’ll go and visit the Canadian government, the Dutch government, the US government on the same day and get them talking to each other. … We will visit Blair’s government and get them to ring the Treasury’ (OXF-5). Another member of OI claimed that ‘knowing what works, what’s in the pipeline, knowing what comes up, knowing who to talk to and when to do it – doing it at the right time, gives us the opportunity of influencing’ (OXF-4).

Conclusion

Transnational network formation and the role that NGOs play in these networks is a growing area of academic investigation. Most research in this field has generally examined loosely connected networks focused on one issue. This article started with the work of Keck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks, but looked specifically at development NGO coalitions – organizational forms with broader development aims, more permanent organizational structures and greater member commitment. This organizational structure has had an impact on the strategies these coalitions have taken. Through an investigation of the coalitions – Oxfam International, the Bretton Woods Project, and the NGO Working Group on the World Bank – we examined the various organizational strategies that were taken by these coalitions, and explored how these coalitions have attempted to influence other international actors.

In using RDP, we were able to focus on these coalitions as strategic organizations that formed strong ties. Judging from some of the comments made by members of these coalitions, we might conclude that NGOs need coalitions, not only because there is a significant discourse of collaboration within the development industry (be it networks, partnerships or coalitions) but also because the level of uncertainty in the funding environment is such that (particularly) northern NGOs need to redefine their role as legitimate in the development process. The effects of the development NGO environment has been under-investigated; this study treats the organization’s environment as an important factor in the formation of organizational strategy. The importance of resources such as funding, legitimacy and information cannot be underestimated in how they affect an organization’s attempts to achieve its goals.

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Open University Milton Keynes, UK

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Acknowledgements

In writing this article I have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Jim Whitman, the three anonymous referees and the editor of this issue. This research was made possible through a Ph.D. fellowship from the Cambridge Political Economy Trust. I am also grateful for the time given by all of those interviewed for this research.

Notes

1. For example, the substance and status of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is undeniable and externally bestowed. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 194) argue that legitimacy is a bestowed status that is granted by other actors outside the organization. They continue in stating that ‘as with the existence of social norms generally, legitimacy is known more readily when it is absent than when it is present. … Legitimisation is, probably, a retrospective process, in which verbal justifications are mustered to provide approval for the organization in question.’

2. According to Hardy et al. (2000) discourse can also be mobilized as a strategic resource, although we are not addressing this here.

3. Since 1990, official aid flows have declined overall. In 1990 dollars, official grants to NGOs fell from $2.4 billion in 1988 to $1.7 billion in 1999, while private donations from individuals, foundations and corporations have doubled from $4.5 billion to $10.7 billion (Kaldor et al. 2003); thus, the reality is that funding to the NGO sector has increased over this time period. However, the number of NGOs and the work that they do has increased during this same period, which could arguably be leading to NGO perceptions of financial scarcity.

4. These interviews were conducted for Ph.D. research and are part of a set of 30 interviews, which took place in Washington DC, London, Paris, Addis Ababa, Penang and Kuala Lumpur during 1997–99. The interviewees in the case studies were selected either because of their experience in overseeing the NGO coalition, their contribution to lobbying and campaigning within the coalition, or for their capacity as researchers. The following are the selected interviews used in this article: BWP-1 (BWP employee, 24 September 1998, London); BWP-3 (BWP member, 18 August 1999, London); BWP-4 (BWP member, 23 July 1999, London); IFI-2 (IMF employee, 8 February 1999, Washington DC); IFI-3 (IMF employee, 12 February 1999, Washington, DC); IFI-4 (World Bank employee, 10 February 1999, Washington DC); IFI-6 (World Bank employee, 19 February 1999, Washington DC); IFI-8 (World Bank employee, 19 September 1999, Washington DC); NGO-1 (NGOWGWB member, 18 September 1999, Ethiopia); NGO-3 (NGOWGWB member, 13 November 1999, London); OTH-1 (DFID employee, 9 July 1999, London); OXF-1 (OI employee, 8 July 1998, Washington DC); OXF-3 (OI employee, 16 February 1999, Washington DC); OXF-4 (OI employee, 30 September 1998, Oxford); OXF-5 (OI employee, 25 June 1998, Boston).

5. While Oxfam members frequently mention the desire for closer partnerships with groups in the south, one member’s view was telling: ‘We do work with partners, and we do shape our views and what we push for based on what they decide to say, but I think it is hypocritical for us to claim they’re leading us. … I mean we choose them’ (OXF-3).

6. It is not completely clear how membership for each region of the NGOWGWB works – however, in my experience of two annual regional meetings it seemed that national umbrella networks were invited and most groups that wanted to attend were invited. The World Bank itself did not seem to have a veto power for the membership of the NGOWGWB, but there is clearly a self-selection process occurring.

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7. In assessing the relationship between the BWP and IFIs it is difficult to gauge how IFI employees see the BWP. However, BWP employees referred me to some of the high-level IMF and World Bank personnel I interviewed, and it seemed that these people were complimentary about the project (even though they frequently disagreed with the BWP’s views). Probably more telling is the role the BWP has played in the World Bank’s various consultations of civil society, for example the 2000 World Development Report, where the World Bank selected the BWP as the organizing group for comments from the civil society consultation.

8. I attended one meeting of the Africa Region of NGOWGWB at which one member strongly disagreed with the decision of the group and the actions of the facilitator. He walked out of the plenary and did not attend the joint NGO and World Bank meetings at which the united front was presented.

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