

ulations which are at the disposal of these bodies, and that they could embrace thousands in the organization designed by them. The intellectuals who did not join that organization did not turn against it either.

This time it was so-called Communists, another time it will be extreme nationalists or others who attempt the same thing. The urge for freedom which stirs the best among these people—inferior elements need not be considered here—is not to be checked by any contrived system of preventive or repressive measures, but perhaps the excesses to which it gives rise in these regions may be prevented by always and unreservedly granting the population a voice in administrative affairs corresponding to its own development. As the population's share in the settlement of its own interests become larger, counter-forces may be developed which will turn against any organizations which jeopardize authority. At the moment, no substantial measures can be indicated for Bantam as to a solution of this extremely difficult problem. Nevertheless it is certain that attention must, in the future, remain focused on what may be achieved in this direction. It is also certain that in Bantam's case compulsion alone can never solve the problem.

In this report the considerations and conclusions are laid down to which the three members of the Commission have come after a partially joint but chiefly individual inquiry and after mutual discussions. The Commission visited almost the whole of the area which had been in rebellion, but particularly the districts of Pandeglang, Menes, and Labuan (Tjaringin) as well as Serang. They have not only tried to obtain the views of active or retired officials but also to learn the opinions of the native inhabitants of the region. To this end they have interviewed people from the *desas* [villages] in many places.

As complete unanimity was achieved concerning the fundamental items directly connected with the assignment, there was no reason for any of the members of the Commission to submit a minority report.

Finally the Commission wishes to thank all those within and

without Bantam who have, at its request, given their very willing assistance.

The Commission of Inquiry,
E. Gobée, Sumitro, Ranneft

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In Defense of the Mission Civilisatrice in Indochina

This document consists of the introductory and concluding paragraphs from a long address surveying the state of the colony by Pierre Pasquier, Governor-General of French Indochina, on October 15, 1930. In February of that year, the Yen-Bay revolt had erupted in Tonkin, instigated by the Viet-Nam dan dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party), which the colonial government suppressed with extreme severity (see Document 48, below). Pasquier, who knew Vietnam well, having written a valuable book on old Annam, was one of the ablest spokesmen of French colonial rule before the Second World War.

Gentlemen,

Since the last session of the Great Council, Indochina has experienced grievous events. Before the highest representation of the colony I salute, with as yet unalloyed emotion, those Frenchmen and natives who have been the victims of these occurrences.

Gentlemen, it will soon be two years ago that, upon assuming my duties, I had indicated my desire to bring to conclusion the work of my predecessors, to apply myself with all my power to the realization of the loan, to the establishment of the banking organization of the colony, to endowing Indochina with a definitive

Grand Conseil des Interêts Économiques et Financiers de l'Indochine, Session ordinaire de 1930, Discours prononcé le 15 octobre 1930 par M. P. Pasquier, Gouverneur général de l'Indochine (Hanoi-Haiphong: Imprimerie d'Extrême-Orient, 1930), pp. 3-5, 117-119. English translation by Margaret W. Broekhuysen.

monetary system; at the same time I stated in detail my design to pursue a far-reaching inquiry, which had become necessary, into the very value of Indochina as well as its power and its future possibilities, without, however, interrupting the rhythm of [the colony's] life. The realization of this modest plan has not been dependent on my will alone, [and] delays have so far inhibited its completion, which, however, according to the assurances given us will be an accomplished fact in the very near future.

Despite dramatic incidents, despite the world crisis whose influence was felt here also, Indochina has nevertheless steadily progressed during these two years. No one's work has ever been slowed down. The efforts of the settler, the administrator, and the native have ensured the equilibrium of the present situation, which in no way justifies the crisis in confidence that has arisen in certain circles.

Here, where everyone is engaged in the jobs at hand, we can evaluate the difficulty of the tasks to be fulfilled, we can weigh the results obtained, here, where under the relentless criticism of our minds everyone recognizes nevertheless the grandeur of the structure erected by France in a joint and collective effort, it is easy to become inflamed against opinions which have been formulated far away from us on the progress of our evolution.

We find it difficult to understand the sudden interest in Indochina, the distant image of which appears to the metropolitan country [France] in the sudden light of striking incidents which for a moment hold the ever-changing interest of public opinion. We then see how, besides an impassioned but loyal investigation, solutions for Indochina's problems are arrived at, [including] hateful and perfidious campaigns which willfully ignore the facts, which are travesties of the realities, in order to represent the indigenous population as being bowed down under the yoke of I do not know what hard and pitiless law of haughty domination, misrepresenting the generous, just, and benevolent action which the Government has unceasingly exercised, and still exercises, in all moral and material aspects, for the development and vigor of the Indochinese Union.

These abominable indictments, this crafty or cynical publicity which interprets our most disinterested actions so as to distort them, all this is nothing but a maneuvering of the large methodically drawn-up and precisely executed program, which must necessarily lead to rebellion, to the destruction of our civilizing efforts.

Let no one misunderstand me; I am not protesting here against the noble and generous movements of opinion which derive their strength from the most unselfish and purest sentiments of the French soul. These force us at certain times to examine our conscience and thereby fortify all the more our reasons for persevering in the policies which men like Paul Bert have outlined for all times. But they also dictate to us the imperious duty to explain the attainments of this policy, to call attention to its errors, to the direction of its tendencies; to place before the French common sense the complete picture of our achievement, in order to have her [France] know it better, above all to have her understand it better. . . .

. . . I have tried to give a composite picture of our policies in Indochina, a sort of program of the goals to be attained. This program contains no ideology whatever, it is practical, social, realistic, completely stamped with that humane conception of things which is the mark of all that France does.

All of Indochina knows today the means which we have used to resolve the problems which present themselves to us.

We ask of the indigenous elite, which has always shown willingness to practice a highly successful, logical, reasonable association with us, to signify their adhesion to the policies we have just defined. We are prepared to pursue the realization of these policies with their active cooperation.

But let us be precise. If we ardently desired this cooperation—recognizing, as it has been so generously stated on the floor of the Chamber, no other imperialism than the imperialism of the heart; no other priority than the priority of the spirit—then we ask for it without reserve or reticence. This cooperation should be realized, if not on the same plane, then at least on planes on the

same level, claiming no vassalage of gratitude, but demanding definite and real support from both sides. We want to exercise firmly, as the Head of the Department has stated it, "those rights which we claim to derive from a kind of paternal power the legitimacy of which cannot be prescribed."

But we want to exercise these rights with a view to a structure for the erection of which all the natives unite so that it may become a common structure, born of our concerted efforts, of the union of our cultures, of the agreement of the virtues of our races, of the reconciliation of our mutual interests. If this concurrence should fail us, which I cannot believe, since the natives have given us ample testimony of their intelligent approval, if those who have invoked our protection should repel our favors, considering them useless for their happiness and powerless to engender duties toward us, make no mistake [in believing that] France would not pursue any the less, on her own, her noble mission in accordance with her genius. Nothing could interrupt her generously beneficent action. I speak without subterfuge, without harshness, but I do not want to leave any room in your minds for ambiguities, for foolish and dangerous fancies.

Our generosity, or simply the accomplishment of our mission, should not be accepted as promises, as bills of exchange which we draw on the natives or which the natives draw on us.

We must not allow the detractors of our work to go on weaving a fallacious web which would hide the true face of Indochina from all those living here as well as those in France.

We must work towards ends which will satisfy our own altruism and our legitimate interests and which, precisely because of these, will make possible a future of better living, of a wider liberty within the framework of our civilization, for those peoples who live under the protection of the strong ramparts of our moral and material power; in the certainty that at some time, through the development of mutual feelings of respect and reasoned affection, France shall see on this Asian soil the flowering and the expansion of one of the most beautiful branches that has sprouted from her

genius and which in the harmony and the unity of all her sons bears testimony to the enduring quality of her presence. . . .

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An Official View of Rebellion in Burma

In 1930-1931 Burma was shaken by a widespread, though short-lived, uprising centered in the Tharawaddy district. It was led by a former monk and Buddhist leader, Saya San. The rebellion was easily suppressed and its originators executed by the colonial government. Excerpted below are parts of the address given by the governor, Sir Charles Innes, to the Legislative Council on February 12, 1931. It is a typical example of the colonial government's approach to the political upheavals of the times.

I wish to say as little as may be about the rebellion. The news came as a great shock to me when I was on my way out to Burma and I am sure that it shocked equally all loyal persons in Burma. We all sympathise with Sir Joseph Maung Gyi. It was indeed bad luck that the rebellion broke out while he was acting as Governor of Burma, but I am confident that every one in this Council will agree with me when I say that we all regard it as his misfortune and not his fault, and that no one attributes the rebellion to anything he did or left undone while he was in charge of Burma. On the contrary, I am glad to have this opportunity of saying publicly that since my return to Burma, and indeed while I was still in England, I have heard many tributes from all sections of the community to Sir Joseph's popularity and to the skill with which he discharged his high office.

I hope we may say that the rebellion is at an end. Things are quiet in Pyapon and Yamethin and organised resistance to the

Yearbook of Compared Colonial Documentation, Year 1930 (Bruxelles: Institut Colonial International, 1930), Vol. III, pp. 65-67.