Week6-For Paula!

: is voluminous ans or home mot mggest intentional 1 two banks for m Association of

banks agreed to out-or.

lost two thousand 1at Blacks and Hisp:t'" ortgages as Whites Wit~ ~tural affinity betw

een Jetween white loan offi- t other words, the White

ea~h customer by only l still be less Wcely th cr~dit_w~rthiness is n: l discmmnation because

1g a profit and treating xample, has a relative- 1) ....

tion of structural dis- :, many employers lay ·er, because minorities ·esented among those . ority is an example of ity populations.

With America, the J.ation. The proposed nfants, and Children lct on poor people of

tncing versus provid- ut hurting poor peo- narines would be an,

•ry policies still hurt

thing is institution- •ortant policy impli- ·ymg to decide bow e leaders or policy- ) to purposely treat to qualified blacks, tddition, one might :h publicizing their : ity.

arguments, however, are irrelevant to eliminating structural discrimination. , it is necessary to make the argument that equality is as important as prof-

there should be a better balance between the two. For Republicans, it is neces- the negative consequences of the Contract with America along with the

gains. The issue for structural discrimination is whether the goals of the policies are worth the negative effects.

all three types of discrimination are still serious problems, it is harder to deal discrimination than with the other two. After a ll, stru ctural discrimina-

not intentional and it is not even illegal; it is carrying on business as usual. •'1T••u.••~"' structural discrimination requires the reexamination of basic cultural val-

fundamental principles of social organization. Isn't that what education is sup- to be all about?

K. {1995). "A Second Fed Bank Study Finds Disparities in Mortgage Lending." The New York Times, July 13, D1 , D18.

J. R., and H. Vera. (1995). White Racism. New York: Routledge. G. Jr. (1993). The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources,

Inc. r;abaton, S. (1994). "Denny's Restaurants to Pay $54 Million in Race Bias Suits." Tlze New York . Times, May 25, A1, A18. Lederman, D. (1996). "Supreme Court Rejects VMI's Exclusion of Women." Chronicle of Higher

Education, July 5, A21, A26-27. Mitchell, P. T. (199 6). "VMI Should Go Coed or Go Public." Chronicle of Higher Education, January

19, A48. Moberg, D. (1993). "Banking on the Inner City." In These Times, June 28, 21-23 . Pincus, F. L. (1994). "From Individual to Structural Discrimination." In F. L. Pincus and H. J.

Ehrlich, Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination and Etlmoviolence. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Watkins, S. (1993). "Racism duJour at Shoney's." The Nation, October 18, 424-28.

5

Iris Marion Young

Many people in the United States would not choose the term oppression to name injustice in our society. For contemporary emancipatory social movements, on the other hand- socialists, radical feminists, American Indian activists, black activists, gay and lesbian activists-oppression is a central category of political discourse. Entering the politi- cal discourse in which oppression is a central category involves adopting a general

36 Conceptual Frameworks

mode of analyzing and evaluating social structures and practices which is incommensu- rate with the language of liberal individualism that dominates political discourse in the United States.

A major political project for those of us who identify with at least one of these move- ments must thus be to persuade people that the discourse of oppression malces sense of much of our social experience. We are ill prepared for this task, however, because we have no clear account of the meaning of oppression.

In this chapter I offer some explanation of the concept of oppression as I understand its use by new social movements in the United States since the 1960s. My starting point is reflection on the conditions of the groups said by these movements to be oppressed: among others women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Jews, lesbians and gay men, Arabs, Asians, old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled. I aim to systematize the meaning of the concept of oppression as used by these diverse political movements, and to provide normative argument to clarify the wrongs the term names.

Obviously the above-named groups are not oppressed to the same extent or in the same ways. In the most general sense, all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their abili- ty to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts , and feel- ings. In that abstract sense all oppressed people face a common condition. Beyond that, in any more specific sense, it is not possible to define a single set of criteria that describe the condition of oppression of the above groups. Consequently, attempts by theorists and activists to discover a common description or the essential causes of the oppression of all these groups have frequently led to fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fun- damental or more grave. The contexts in which members of these groups use the term oppression to describe the injustices of their situation suggest that oppression names in fact a family of concepts and conditions, which I divide into five categories: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.

In this chapter I explicate each of these forms of oppression . .. .

t!JD.!i4&1t.leffiii1iQI!§iil6lti•JU!l§!ll One reason that many people would not use the term oppression to describe injustice in our society is that they do not understand the term in the same way as do n ew social move- ments. In its traditional usage, oppression means the exercise of tyranny by a ruling group.

Oppression also traditionally carries a strong connotation of conquest and colonial domination. The Hebrews were oppressed in Egypt, and many uses of the term oppres- sion in the West invoke this paradigm .. .. New left social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, however, shifted the meaning of the concept of oppression. In its new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-inten- tioned liberal society . . . .

Oppression refers to systemic constraints on groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant. Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people's choices or policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules. It names, as Marilyn Frye puts it, "an enclosing structure of forces and barriers which tends to the immobilization and reduction of a group or category of people" (1983, 11) . In this extended structural sense, oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often uncon- scious assumptions and reactions of well meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms-in short, the normal processes of everyday life. We cannot eliminate this

1ch is incommensu- ::al discourse in the

one of these move- ;ion makes sense of twever, because we

ion as I understand >. My starting point 1ts to be oppressed: : Spanish-speaking Asians, old people, 1 to systematize the ;al movements, and

xtent or in the same 1bition of their abili- thoughts, and feel- lition. Beyond that, riteria that describe 1pts by theorists and :he oppression of all •ression is more fun- lroups use the term ppression names in :gories: exploitation,

describe injustice in d 'al '\) o new soc1 move- J.Y by a ruling group. nquest and colonial of the term oppres- ts of the 19 60s and rr. In its new usage, mffer not because a ices of a well-inten-

tecessarily the result :~.ther than the result J.questioned norms, _es and the collective uts it, "an enclosing t and reduction of a ·al sense, oppression ence of often uncon- ' interactions, media :rarchies and market annot eliminate this

Five Faces of Oppression 37

structural oppression by getting ride of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions ....

I do not mean to suggest that within a system of oppression individual persons do not intentionally harm others in oppressed groups. The raped woman, the beaten Black youth, the locked-out worker, the gay man harassed on the street , are victims of inten- tional actions by identifiable agents. I also do not mean to deny that specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other groups, and thus have an interest in their contin- ued oppression. Indeed, for every oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group .. . .

Racism, sexism, ageism, homophobia, some social movements asserted, are distinct forms of oppression with their own dynamics apart from those of class, even though they may interact with class oppression. From often heated discussions among socialists, fem- inists, and antiracism activists in the last ten years, a consensus is emerging that many different groups must be said to be oppressed in our society, and that no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy (see Gottlieb 1987). The same dis- cussion has also led to the recognition that group differences cut across individual lines in a multiplicity of ways that can entail privilege and oppression for the same person in different respects. Only a plural explication of the concept of oppression can adequately capture these insights.

Accordingly, I offer below an explication of five faces of oppression as a useful set of categories and distinctions which I believe is comprehensive in the sense that it cover s all the groups said by new left social movements to be oppressed, and all the ways they are oppressed. I derive the five faces of oppression from reflection on the condition of these groups. Because different factors, or combinations of factors, constitute the oppres- sion of different groups, mal{ing their oppression irreducible, I believe it is not possible to give one essential definition of oppression. The five categories articulated in this chap- ter, however, are adequate to describe the oppression of any group, as well as its similar- ities with and differences from the oppression of other groups. But first we must ask what a "group" is.

.. . A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience (or way of life) , which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified with the group. Groups are an expression of social relations; a group exists only in relation to ·at least one other group. Group identification arises, that is, in the encounter and interaction b etween social collectivities that experience some differences in their way of life and forms of asso- ciation, even if they also regard themselves as belonging to the same society.

As long as they associated solely among themselves, for example, an American Indian group thought of themselves only as "the people." The encounter with other A.rilerican Indians created an awareness of difference; the others were named as a group, and the first group came to see themselves as a group. But social groups do not arise only from an encounter between different societies. Social processes also differentiate groups with- in a single society. The sexual division of labor, for example, has created social groups of women and men in all known societies. Members of each gender have a certain affini- ty with others in their group because of what they do or experience, and differentiate themselves from the other gender, even when members of each gender consider that they have much in common with members of the other, and consider that they belong to the same society. ...

38 Conceptual Frameworks

A social group is defined not primarily by a set of shared attributes, but by a sense of identity. What defines Black Americans as a social group is not primarily their sldn color; some persons whose sldn color is fairly light, for example, identify themselves as black. Though sometimes objective attributes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or others as belonging to a certain social group, it is identification with a certain social status, the common history that social status produces, and self-identification that define the group as a group ....

Groups constitute individuals. A per son's particular sense of history, affin ity, and separateness--even the person's mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling- are constituted partly by her or his group affinities. This does not mean that persons have no individual styles, or are unable to transcend or reject a group identity. Nor does it preclude persons from having many aspects that are independent of t hese group identities .. ..

A person joins an association, and even if membership in it fundamentally affects one's life, one does not talce that membership to define one's very identity, in the way, for example, being Navaho might. Group affinity, on the other hand, has the character of what Martin Heidegger (1962) calls "throwness": one finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as always already having been. For ou r identities are defined in relation to bow others identify us, and they do so in terms of groups which are always already associated with specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms.

From the thrownness of group affinity it does not follow that one cannot leave groups and enter new ones. Many women become lesbian a fter first identifying as heterosexual. Anyone who lives long enough becomes old. These cases exemplify thrown ess precisely because such changes in group affinity are experienced as transformations in one's iden- tity. Nor does it fo llow from the throwness of group affinity that one cannot define the meaning of group identity for oneself; those who identify with a group can redefine the meaning and n orms of group identity . . . . While groups may come into being, they ar e never founded.

Groups, I have said, exist only in relation to other groups. A group may be identified by outsiders withou t those so identified having any specific consciousness of themselves as a group. Sometimes a group comes to exist only because one group excludes and labels a category of per sons, and those labeled come to understand themselves as group members only slowly, on the basis of their shared oppression. In Vichy France, for example, Jews who had been so assimilated that they h ad no specifically Jewish identity were marked as Jews by others and given a specific social status by them. These people "discovered" them- selves as Jews, and then formed a group identity and affinity with one another (see Sartre 1 948). A person's group identities may be for the most part only a background or hori- zon to his or her life, becoming salient only in specific interactive contexts.

Some people think that social groups are invidious fictions, essentializing arbitrary attributes . From this point of view problems of prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and exclusion exist because some people mistakenly believe that group identification malces a difference to the capacities, temperament, or virtu es of group members. This individualist conception of persons and their relation to one another tends to identify oppression with group identification. Oppression, on this view, is something t h at hap- pens to people when they are classified in groups. Because others identify them as a group, they are excluded and despised. Eliminating oppression thus r equires eliminating groups. People should be treated as individuals, n ot as members of groups, and allowed to form their lives freely with stereotypes or group norms.

This chapter talces issue with that position. While I agr ee that individuals should be free to pursue life plans in their own ways, it is foolish to deny the reality of groups. Despite the modern myth of a decline of parochial attachments and ascribed identities,

:es, but by a sense of trily their skin color; .hemselves as black. •r classifying oneself vith a certain social tification that define

tistory, affinity, and expressing feeling- mean that persons

group identity. Nor dent of these group

1damentally affects ntity, in the way, for 1as the character of f as a member of a r our identities are Jf groups which are >rms. ;annot leave groups ing as heterosexual. throwness precisely 3.tions in one's iden- e cannot define the up can redefine the into being, they are

may be identified by s of themselves as a ~eludes and labels a ~ as group members;,. :, for example, Jews tity were marked as "discovered" them- another (see Sartre ackground or hori- exts. J.tializing arbitrary ng, discrimination, roup identification Jup members. This er tends to identify 1mething that hap- ify them as a group, ~liminating groups. nd allowed to form

Uviduals should be · reality of groups. ascribed identities,

Five Faces of Oppression 39

odern society group differentiation remains endemic. As both markets and social ~istration increase the web of social interdependency on a world scale, and as more

a pie encounter one another as strangers in cities and states, people retain and renew ~:We, locale, age, sex, and occupational group identifications, and form new ones in the

ocesses of encounter (cf. Ross 1980, 19; Rothschild 1981, 130). Even when they ~:long to oppressed groups, people's group identifications are often important to them, ·and they often feel a special affinity for others in their group. I believe that group differ- entiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes. Social ·ustice requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote repro- ~uction of and respect for group differences without oppression.

Through some groups have come to be formed out of oppression, and relations of priv- ilege and oppression structure the interactions between many groups, group differentia- tion is not in itself oppressive. Not all groups are oppressed. In the United States Roman Catholics are a specific social group, with distinct practices and affinities with one another, - but they are no longer an oppressed group. Whether a group is oppressed depends on whether it is subject to one or more of the five conditions I shall discuss below . ...

The central insight expressed in the concept of exploitation is that this oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to benefit another. The injustice of class division does not consist only in the dis- tributive fact that some people have great wealth while most people have little (cf. Buchanan 1982, 44-49; Holmstrom 1977). Exploitation enacts a structural relation between social groups. Social rules about what work is, who does what for whom, how work is compensated, and the social processes by which the results of work are appropri- ated operate to enact relations of power and inequality. These relations are produced and reproduced through a systematic process in which the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves ....

Feminists have had little difficulty showing that women's oppression consistl! partly in a systematic and unreciprocated transfer of powers from women to men. Women's oppression consists not merely in an inequality of status, power, and wealth resulting from men's excluding them from privileged activities. The freedom, power, status, and self-realization of men is possible precisely because women work for them. Gender exploitation has two aspects: transfer of the fruits of material labor to men, and the trans- fer of nurturing and sexual energies to men.

Christine Delphy (1984), for example, describes marriage as a class relation in which women's labor benefits men without comparable remuneration. She makes it clear that the exploitation consists not in the sort of work that women do in the home, for this might include various kinds of tasks, but in the fact that they perform tasks for someone on whom they are dependent. Thus, for example, in most systems of agriculture production in the world, men take to market the goods women have produced, and more often than not men receive the status and often the entire income from this labor.

With the concept of sex-affective production, Ann Ferguson (1984; 1989, chap. 4) identifies another form of the transference of women's energies to men. Women provide men and children with emotional care and provide men with sexual satisfac- tion, and as a group receive relatively little of either from men (cf. Brittan and Maynard 1984, 142-48). The gender socialization of women malces us tend to be more attentive

40 Conceptual Frameworks

to interactive dynamics than men, and makes women good at providing empathy and support for people's feelings and at smoothing over interactive tensions. Both men and women look to women as nurturers of their personal lives, and women frequently com- plain that when they look to men for emotional support they do not receive it (Easton, 1978). The norms of heterosexuality, moreover, are oriented around male pleasure, and consequently, many women receive little satisfaction from their sexual interactions with men (Gottlieb, 1984).

Most feminist theories of gender exploitation have concentrated on the institutional structure of the patriarchal family. Recently, however, feminists have begun to explore relations of gender exploitation enacted in the contemporary workplace and through the state. Carol Brown argues that as men have removed themselves from responsibil- ity for children, many women have become dependent on the state for subsistence as they continue to bear nearly total responsibility of child rearing (Brown 19 81; cf. Boris and Bardaglio 1983; and A. Ferguson 1984). This creates a new system of the exploi- tation of women's domestic labor mediated by state institutions, which Brown calls public patriarchy.

In twentieth-century c~pitalist economies the workplaces that women have been enter- ing in increasing numbers serve as another important site of gender exploitation. David Alexander (1987) argues that typically feminine jobs involve gender-based tasks requir- ing sexual labor, nurturing, caring for others' bodies, or smoothing over workplace ten- sions. In these ways women's energies are expended in jobs that enhance the status of, please, or comfort others, usually men; and these gender-based labors of waitresses, cleri- cal workers, nurses, and other caretakers often go unnoticed and undercompensated.

To summarize, women are exploited in the Marxist sense to the degree that they are wage workers. Some have argued that women's domestjc labor also represents a form of capitalist class exploitation insofar as it is labor covered by the wages a family receives. As a group, however, women undergo specific forms of gender exploitation in which their energies and power are expended, often unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to ben- efit men by releasing them for more important and creative work, enhancing their status or the environment around them, or providing them with sexual or emotional service ....

Is it possible to conceptualize a form of exploitation that is racially specific on analogy with the gender-specific forms just discussed? I suggest that the category of menial labor might supply a means for such conceptualization. In its derivation, "menial" designates the labor of servants. Wherever there is racism, there is the assumption, more or less enforced, that members of the oppressed racial groups are or ought to be servants of those, or some of those, in the privileged group. In most white racist societies this means that many white people have dark- or yellow-skinned domestic servants, and in the United States today there remains significant racial structuring of private household service. But in the United States today much service labor has gone public: anyone who goes to a good hotel or a good restaurant can have servants. Servants often attend the daily-and nightly-activities of business executives, government officials, and other high-status professionals. In our society there remains strong cultural pressure to fill servant jobs- bellhop, porter, chambermaid, busboy, and so on-with Black and Latino workers. These jobs entail a transfer of energies whereby the servers enhance the status of the served.

Menial labor usually refers not only to service, however, but also to any servile, unskilled, low-paying work lacking in autonomy, in which a person is subject to taking orders from many people. Menial work tends to be auxiliary work, instrumental to the work of others, where those others receive primary recognition for doing the job. Laborers on a construction site, for example, are at the beck and call of welders, electricians, car- penters, and other skilled workers, who receive recognition for the job done. In the United States explicit racial discrimination once reserved menial work for Blacks, Chicanos,

iing empathy and 10s. Both men and m frequently com- receive it (Easton, nale pleasure, and l interactions with

n the institutional ~ begun to explore >lace and through ; from responsibil- for subsistence as wn 1981; cf. Boris :tern of the exploi- vhich Brown calls

:n have been enter- ~xploitation. David Jased tasks requir- ver workplace terr- ance the status of, )f waitresses, cleri- rcompensated. :gree that they are :presents a form of ; a family receives. tion in which their :ed, usually to ben- ancing their status otional service . .. . ;pecific on analogy xy of menial labor nenial" designates '- >tion, more or less t to be servants of :>cieties this means ;, and in the United wusehold service. yrone who goes to a md the daily-and other high-status

1 fill servant jobs- ino workers. These us of the served. lso to any servile, s subject to taking tstrumental to the tg the job. Laborers ;, electricians, ear- lone. In the United Blacks, Chicanos,

Five Faces of Oppression 41

American Indians, and Chinese, and menial work still tends to be linked to Black and Latino workers (Symanski 1985). I offer this category of menial labor as a form of racial- ly specific exploitation, as a provisional category in need of exploration ....

The injustice of exploitation consists in social processes that bring about a transfer of energies from one group to another to produce unequal distributions, and in the way in which social institutions enable a few to accumulate while they constrain many more. The injustices of exploitation cannot be eliminated by the redistribution of goods, for as Jong as institutionalized practices and structural relations remain unaltered, the process of transfer will re-create an unequal distribution of benefits. Bringing about justice where there is exploitation requires reorganization of institutions and practices of decisionmak- ing, alteration of the division of labor, and similar measures of institutional, structural, and cultural change.

Marginalization

Increasingly in the United States, racial oppression occurs in the form of marginaliza- tion rather than exploitation. Marginals are people the system of labor cannot or will not use. Not only in Third World capitalist countries, but also in most Western capitalist soci- eties, there is a growing underclass of people permanently confined to lives of social mar- ginality, most of whom are racially marked-Blacks or Indians in Latin America, and Blacks, East Indians, Eastern Europeans, or North Africans in Europe.

Marginalization is by no means the fate only of racially marked groups, however. In the United States a shamefully large proportion of the population is marginal: old people, and increasingly people who are not very old but get laid off from their jobs and cannot find new work; young people, especially Black or Latino, who cannot find first or second jobs; many single mothers and their children; other people involuntarily unemployed; many mentally and physically disabled people; American Indians (especially those on reservations).

Marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression. A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination. The material deprivation margin- alization often causes is certainly unjust, especially in a society where others have plenty. Contemporary advanced capitalist societies have in principle acknowledged the injustice of material deprivation caused by marginalization, and have taken some steps to address it by providing welfare payments and services. The continuance of this welfare state is by no means assured, and in most welfare state societies, especially the United States, wel- fare redistributions do not eliminate large-scale suffering and deprivation.

Material deprivation, which can be addressed by redistributive social policies, is not, however, the extent of the harm caused by marginalization. Two categories of injustice beyond distribution are associated with marginality in advanced capitalist societies. First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustice by depriving those dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have. Second, even when material deprivation is some- what mitigated by the welfare state, marginalization is unjust because it blocks the oppor- tunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized ways. I shall explicate each of these in turn.

Liberalism has traditionally asserted the right of all rational autonomous agents to equal citizenship. Early bourgeois liberalism explicitly excluded from citizenship all those whose reason was questionable or not fully developed, and all those not independent (Pateman 1988, chap. 3 ; cf. Bowles andGintis 1986, chap. 2). Thus, poor people, women, the mad and the feebleminded, and children were explicitly excluded from citizenship, and many of these were housed in institutions modeled on the modern prison: poorhous- es, insane asylums, schools.

42 Conceptual Frameworks

Today the exclusion of dependent persons from equal citizenship rights is only barely hidden beneath the surface. Becau se they depend on bureaucratic institutions for sup- port or services, the old, the poor, and the mentally or physically disabled are subject to patronizing, punitive, demeaning, and arbitrary treatment by the policies and people asso- ciated with welfare bureaucracies. Being a "dependent" in our society implies being legit- imately subject to the often arbitrary and invasive authority of social service providers and other public and private administrators who enforce rules with which the marginal must comply, and otherwise exercise power over the conditions of their lives. In meeting the needs of the marginalized, often with the aid of social scientific disciplines, welfare agencies also construct the needs themselves. Medical and social service professionals know what is good for those they serve, and the marginals and dependents themselves do not have the right to claim to know what is good for them (Fraser 19 8 7 a; K. Ferguson 1984, chap. 4). Dependency in our society thus implies, as it has in all liberal societies, a sufficient warrant to suspend basic righ ts to privacy, respect, and individual choice.

Although dependency produces conditions of injustice in our society, dependency in itself need not be oppressive. One cannot imagine a society in which some people would not need to be dependent on others at least some of the time: children, sick people, women recovering from childbirth, old people who have become frail, depressed or otherwise emotionally needy persons have the moral right to depend on others for subsistence and support.

An important contribution of feminist moral theory has been to question the deeply held assumption that moral agency and full citizenship require that a person be autonomous and independent. Feminists have exposed this assumption as inappropriate- ly individualistic and derived from a specifically male experience of social relations, which values competition and solitary achievement (see Gilligan 1982; Friedman 1985). Female experience of social relations, arising both from women's typical domestic care responsi- bilities and from the kinds of paid work that many women do, tends to recognize depend- ence as a basic human condition (cf. Hartsock, 198 3, chap. 10). Whereas on the autonomy model a just society would, as much as possible, give people the opportunity to be independent, the feminist model envisions justice as according respect and partici_. pation in decision malting to those who are dependent as well as to those who are inde- pendent (Held 198 7b). Dependency should not be a r eason to be deprived of choice and respect, and much of the oppression many marginals experience would be lessened if a

• 1 less individualistic model of rights prevailed. Marginalization does not cease to be oppressive when one has shelter and food. Many

old people, for example, have sufficient means to live comfortably but remain oppressed in their marginal status. Even if marginals were provided a comfortable material life with- in institutions that respected their freedom and dignity, injustices of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness , boredom, and lack of self-respect . Most of our soci7 ety's productive and recognized activities take place in contexts of organized social coop- eration, and social structures and processes that close persons out of su ch social cooperation are unjust. Thus, while marginalization definitely entails serious issues of distributive justice, it also involves the deprivation of cultural, practical, and institution- alized conditions for exercising capacities in a context of recognition and interaction.

The fact of marginalization raises basic structural issues of justice, in particular con- cerning the appropriateness of a connection between participation in production activi- ties of social cooperation on the one hand, and access to the means of con sumption on the other. As marginalization is increasing with no sign of abatement, some social policy analysts have introduced the idea of social wage as a guaranteed socially provided income not tied to the age system. Restructuring of productive activity to address a right of par- ticipation, however, implies organizing some socially productive activity outside of the wage system (see Offe 1985, 95- 100), through public works of self-employed collectives.

·ights is only barely nstitutions for sup- abled are subject to ies and people asso- implies being legit-

:.~.1 service providers Nhich the marginal eir lives. In meeting disciplines, welfare :rvice professionals dents themselves do . 987a; K. Ferguson ill liberal societies, a vidual choice. :iety, dependency in some people would

. sick people, women ressed or otherwise ters for subsistence

question the deeply ~ that a person be on as inappropriate- cia! relations, which lman 1985). Female nestic care responsi- :o recognize depend- )). Whereas on the >ple the opportunity : respect and partici- those who are inde- prived of choice and auld be lessen ed if a

:!lter and food. Many ut remain oppressed Jle material life with- .f marginality would ct. Most of our soci~ rganized social coop- out of such social

.ails serious issues of ical, and institution- L and interaction. ~e. in particular con- in production activi- s of consumption on J.t, some social policy ally provided income ddress a right of par- ctivity outside of the ·employed collectives.

Five Faces of Oppression 43

Powerlessness

As I have indicated, the Marxist idea of class is important because it helps reveal the structure of exploitation: that some people have their power and wealth because they profit from the labor of others. For this reason I reject the claim some make that a tradi- tional class exploitation model fails to capture the structure of contemporary society. It remains the case that the labor of most people in the society augments the power of rela- tively few. Despite their differences from nonprofessional workers, most professional work- ers are still not members of the capitalist class. Professional labor either involves exploitative transfers to capitalists or supplies important conditions for such transfers. Professional workers are in an ambiguous class position, it is true, because they also ben- efit from the exploitation of nonprofessional workers .

While it is false to claim that a division between capitalist and working classes no longer describes our society, it is also false to say that class relations have remained unal- tered since the nineteenth century. An adequate conception of oppression cannot ignore the experience of social division reflected in the colloquial distinction between the "mid- dle class" and the "working class," a division structured by the social division of labor between professionals and nonprofessionals. Professionals are privileged in relation to nonprofessionals by virtue of their position in the division of labor and the status it carries. Nonprofessionals suffer a form of oppression in addition to exploitation, which I call powerlessness.

In the United States, as in other advanced capitalist countries, most workplaces are not organized democratically, direct participation in public policy decisions is rare, and policy implementation is for the most part hierarchical, imposing rules on bureaucrats and citizens. Thus, most people in these societies do not regularly participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions, and in this sense most peo- ple lack significant power. At the same time, domination in modern society is enacted through the widely dispersed powers of many agents mediating the decisions of others. To that extent many people h ave some power in relation to others, even though they lack the power to decide policies or results. The powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this mediated sen se, those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labor and the concomitant social position that allows persons little opportunity to develop and exer- cise skills. The powerless have little or no work autonomy; exercise little creativity or judg- ment in their work; have no technical expertise or authority; express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings; and do not command respect. Powerlessness names the oppressive situations Sennett and Cobb (19 72) describe in their famous study of working-class men.

This powerless status is perhaps best described negatively: the powerless lack the author- ity, status, and sense of self that professionals tend to have. The status privilege of profes- sionals has three aspects, the lack of which produces oppression for nonprofessionals .

First, acquiring and practicing a profession has an expansive, progressive character. Being professional usually requires a college education and the acquisition of a special- ized knowledge that entails working with symbols and concepts. Professionals experi- ence progress first in acquiring the expertise, and then in the course of professional advancement and rise in status. The life of the nonprofessional by comparison is power- less in the sense that it lacks this orientation toward the progressive development of .capacities and avenues for recognition.

Second, while many professionals have supervisors and cannot directly influence rnany decisions or the actions of many people, most nevertheless have considerable day- to-day work autonomy. Professionals usually have some authority over others, more-

I,

',,

44 Conceptual Frameworks

over-either over workers they supervise, or over auxiliaries or clients. Nonprofessionals, on the other hand, lack autonomy, and in both their working and their consumer/client lives often stand under the authority of professionals.

Though based on a division of labor between "mental" and "manual" work, the dis- tinction between "middle class" and "working class" designates a division not only in working life, but also in nearly all aspects of social life. Professionals and nonprofession- als belong to different cultures in the United States. The two groups tend to live in segre- gated neighborhoods or even different towns , a pr ocess itself mediated by planners, zoning officials, and real estate people. The groups tend to have different tastes in food , decor, clothes, music, and vacations, and often different health and educational needs. Members of each group socialize for the most part with others in the same status group. While there is some intergroup mobility between generations, for the most part the chil- dren of pr ofessionals become professionals and the children of nonprofessionals do not.

Thus, the privileges of the professional extend beyond the workplace to a whole way of life. I call this way of life respectability. To treat people with r espect is to be prepared to listen to what they have to say or to do what they request because they have some author- ity, expertise, or influence. The norms of respectability in our society are associated specif- ically with professional culture. Professional dress, speech, tastes, demeanor all connote respectability. Generally professionals expect and receive respect from others. In restau- rants, banks, hotels, real estate offices, and many other such public places, as well as in the media, professionals typically receive more respectful treatment than nonprofession- als. For this reason nonprofessionals seeking a loan or a job, or to buy a house or a car, will often try to look "professional" and "respectable" in those settings.

The privilege of this professional respectability appear s starkly in the dynamics of racism and sexism. In daily interchange, women and men of color must prove their respectability. At first they are often not treated by strangers with respectful distance or deference. Once people discover that this woman or that Puerto Rican man is a college teacher or a business executive, however, they often behave more respectfully toward her or him. Working-class white men, on the other hand, are often treated with respect until their working-class status is revealed.

I have discussed several injustices associated with powerlessness: inhibition in the development of one's capacities, lack of decisionmaking power in one's working life, and exposure to disrespectful treatment because of the status one occupies. These injustices have distributional consequences, but are more fundamentally matters of th.e division of labor. The oppression of powerlessness brings into question the division of labor basic to all industrial societies: the social division between those who plan and those who execute.

Cultural lm erialism

Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness all refer to relations of power and oppression that occur by virtue of the social division of labor-who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines one institutional position rela- tive to others. These three categories refer to structural and institutional r elations that delimit people's material lives, including but not restricted to the resources they have access to and the concrete opportunities they have or do not have to develop and exercise their capacities. These kinds of oppression are a matter of concrete power in relation to others-of who benefits from whom, and who is dispensable.

Recent theorists of movements of group liberation, notably feminist and Black libera- tion theorists, have also given prominence to a rather different form of oppression, which following Lu gones and Spelman ( 19 8 3) I shall call cultural imperialism. To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meanings of a society ren- der the particular perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereo- type one's group and mark it as the Other.

-

. Nonprofessionals, !ir consumer/client

. ual" work, the dis- livision not only in and nonprofession- end to live in segre- liated by planners, !rent tastes in food, educational needs. same status group. most part the chil-

ofessionals do not. ace to a whole way is to be prepared to , have some author- re associated specif- meanor all connote n others. In restau- places, as well as in han nonprofession- lY a house or a car, s. in the dynamics of >r must prove their spectful distance or .an man is a college ;>ectfully toward her !d with respect until

;s: inhibition in the e's working life, and ies. These injustices- ~rs of the division of ion of labor basic to I those who execute.

1tions of power and w works for whom, ttional position rela- tional relations that :esources they have develop and exercise power in relation to

.ist and Black libera- )f oppression, which Ilism . To experience ngs of a society ren- ~ time as they stereo-

Five Faces of Oppression 45

Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm .... Often without noticing they do so, dominant groups project their own experience as representative of humanity as such . cultural products also express the dominant group's perspective on and interpretation of events and elements in the society, including other groups in the society, insofar as they attain cultural status at all.

An encounter with other groups, however, can challenge the dominant group's claim to universality. The dominant group reinforces its position by bringing the other groups under the measure of its dominant norms. Consequently, the difference of women from men, American Indians or Africans from Europeans, Jews from Christians, homosexuals from heterosexuals, workers from professionals becomes reconstructed largely as deviance and inferiority. Since only the dominant group's cultural expressions receive wide dissemination, their cultural expressions become the normal, or the universal, and thereby the unremarkable. Given the normality of its own cultural expressions and iden- tity, the dominant group constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as lack and negation. These groups become marked as Other.

The culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression in that they are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible. As remarkable, deviant beings, the culturally imperialized are stamped with an essence. The stereotypes confine them to a nature which is often attached in some way to their bodies, and which thus cannot easily be denied. These stereotypes so permeate the society that they are not noticed as contestable. Just as everyone knows that the earth goes around the sun, so everyone knows that gay people are promiscuous, that American Indians are alcoholics, and that women are good with children. White males, on the other hand, insofar as they escape group marking, can be individuals.

Those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defined from the outside, posi- tioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as arising from else- where, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them. Consequently, the dominant culture's stereotyped and inferiorized images of the group must be internalized by group members at least to the extent that they are forced to react to the behavior of others influenced by those images. This creates for the culturally oppressed the experience that W. E. B. DuBois called "double consciousness"-"this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (DuBois 1969, 45). Double consciousness arises when the oppressed subject refuses to coincide with these devalued, objectified, stereotyped visions of herself or himself. While the subject desires recogni- tion as human-capable of activity, full of hope and possibility-she receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is different, marked, or inferior.

The group defined by the dominant culture as deviant, as a stereotyped Other, is cul- turally different from the dominant group, because the status of Otherness creates spe- cific experiences not shared by the dominant group, and because culturally oppressed groups also are often socially segregated and occupy specific positions in the social divi- sion of labor. Members of such groups express their specific group experiences and inter- pretations of the world to one another, developing and perpetuating their own culture. Double consciousness, then, occurs because one finds one's being defined by two cul- tures: a dominant and a subordinate culture. Because they can affirm and recognize one another as sharing similar experiences and perspectives on social life, people in cultural- ly imperialized groups can often maintain a sense of positive subjectivity.

Cultural imperialism involves the paradox of experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The invisibility comes about when domi- nant groups fail to recognize the perspective embodied in their cultural expressions as a perspective. These dominant cultural expressions often simply have little place for the

46 Conceptual Frameworks

. f other groups, at most only mentioning or referring to them in stereotyped expenen?e ~ized ways. This, then, is the injustice of cultural imperialism: that the or m.argm · d · t t t' f 'al 1'c f' d !'ttl ·

ed group's own expenence an m erpre a 10n o soc1 we m s 1 e expresswn 0ppress that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life ....

Finally, many groups suffer the oppression of systematic violence. Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the per- son. In American society women, Blacks, Asians, Arabs, gay men, and lesbians live under such threats of violence, and in at least some regions Jews, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and other Spanish-spealdng Americans must fear such violence as well. Physical violence against these groups is shockingly frequent. Rape crisis center networks estimate that more than one-third of all American women experience an attempted or successful sexu- al assault in their lifetimes. Manning Marable (1984, 238-41) catalogs a large number of incidents of racist violence and terror against blacks in the United States between 19 80 and 1982. He cites dozens of incidents of the severe beating, ldlling, or rape of Blacks by police officers on duty, in which the police involved were acquitted of any wrongdoing. In 1981, moreover, there were at least five hundred documented cases of random white teenage violence against Blacks. Violence against gay men and lesbians is not only com- mon, but has been increasing in the last five years. While the frequency of physical attack on members of these and other racially or sexually marked groups is very disturbing, I also include in this category less severe incidents of harassment, intimidation, or ridicule simply for the purpose of degrading, humiliating, or stigmatizing group members.

Given the frequency of such violence in our society, why are theories of justice usual- ly silent about it? I thinlc the reason is that theorists do not typically talce such incidents of violence and harassment as m atters of social injustice. No moral theorist would deny that such acts are very wrong. But unless all immoralities are injustices, they might won- der, why should such acts be interpreted as symptoms of social injustice? Acts of vio- lence or petty harassment are committed by particular individuals, often extremists, deviants, or the mentally unsound. How then can they be said to involve the sorts of insti- tutional issues I have said are properly the subject of justice?

What makes violence a face of oppression is less the particular acts themselves- though these are often utterly horrible- than the social context surrounding them, which makes them possible and even acceptable. What makes violence a phenomenon of social injustice, and not merely an individual moral wrong, is its systemic character, its existence as a social practice.

Violence is systemic because it is directed at members of a group simply because they are members of that group. Any woman, for example, has a reason to fear rape. Regard- less of what a Black man has done to escape the oppressions of marginality or powerless- ness, he lives knowing he is subject to attack or harassment. The oppression of violence consists not only in direct victimization, but in the daily lmowledge shared by all mem- bers of oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on account of their group identity. Just living under such a threat of attack on oneself or family or friends deprives the oppressed of freedom and dignity, and needlessly expends their energy.

Violence is a social practice. It is a social given that everyone !mows happens and will happen again. It is always at the horizon of social imagination, even for those who do not perpetrate it. According to the prevailing social logic, some circumstances make such violence more "called for" than others. The idea of rape will occur to many men who pick up a hitch-hilctng woman; the idea of hounding or teasing a gay man on their dorm

them in stereotyped 1perialism: that the inds little expression ;es on the oppressed

.e. Members of some )ked attacks on their ::, or destroy the per- td lesbians live under leans, Chicanos, and II. Physical violence works estimate that :d or successful sexu- tlogs a large number States between 1980 or rape of Blacks by any wrongdoing. In

:es of random white ans is not only com- .cy of physical attack is very disturbing, I

midation, or ridicule up members. ries of justice usual- , talce such incidents theorist would deny :es, they might won- justice? Acts of vio- ls, often extremists, 1lve the sorts of insti-

r acts themselves- surrounding them, .ce a phenomenon of stemic character, its

simply because they to fear rape. Regard- :inality or powerless- •pression of violence : shared by all mem- count of their group ly or friends deprives wrgy. ws happens and will en for those who do m.stances make such r to many men who 1 man on their dorm

Five Faces of Oppression 47

floor will occur to many straight male college students. Often several persons inflict the violence together, especially in all-male groupings. Sometimes violators set out looking for people to beat up, rape, or taunt. This rule-bound, social, and often premeditated char- acter makes violence against groups a social practice.

Group violence approaches legitimacy, moreover, in the sense that it is tolerated. Often, third parties find it unsurprising because it happens frequently and lies as a constant pos- sibility at the horizon of the social imagination. Even when they are caught, those who perpetrate acts of group-directed violence or harassment often receive light or no pun- ishment. To that extent society renders their acts acceptable.

An important aspect of random, systemic violence is its irrationality. Xenophobic vio- lence differs from the violence of states or ruling-class repression. Repressive violence has a rational, albeit evil, motive: rulers use it as a coercive tool to maintain their power. Many accounts of racist, sexist, or homophobic violence attempt to explain its motiva- tion as a desire to maintain group privilege or domination. I do not doubt that fear of violence often functions to keep oppressed groups subordinate.

On the contrary, the violation of rape, beating, killing, and harassment of women, people of color, gays , and other marked groups is motivated by fear or hatred of those groups. Sometimes the motive may be a simple will to power, to victimize those marked as vulnerable by the very social fact that they are subject to violence. If so, this motive is secondary in the sense that it depends on a social practice of group violence. Violence- causing fear or hatred of the other at least partly involves insecurities on the part of the violators; its irrationality suggests that unconscious processes are at work.

Cultural imperialism, moreover, itself intersects with violence. The culturally imperi- alized may reject the dominant meanings and attempt to assert their own subjectivity, or the fact of the cultural difference may put the lie to the dominant culture's implicit claim to universality. The dissonance generated by such a challenge to the hegemonic cultural meanings can also be a source of irrational violence.

Violence is a form of injustice that a distributive understanding of justice seems ill equipped to capture. This may be why contemporary discussions of justice rarely men- tion it. I have argued that group-directed violence is institutionalized and systemic. To the degree that institutions and social practices encourage, tolerate, or enable the perpe- tration of violence against members of specific groups , those institutions and practices are unjust and should be reformed. Such reform may require the redistribution of resources or positions, but in large part can come only through a change in cultural images, stereotypes, and the mundane reproduction of relations of dominance and aver- sion in the gestures of everyday life.

Social theories that construct oppression as a unified phenomenon usually either leave out groups that even the theorists thinlc are oppressed, or leave out important ways in which groups are oppressed. Black liberation theorists and feminist theorists have argued persuasively, for example, that Marxism's reduction of all oppressions to class oppression leaves out much about the specific oppression of Blacks and women. By pluralizing the category of oppression in the way explained in this chapter, social theory can avoid the exclusive and oversimplifying effects of such reductionism.

I have avoided pluralizing the category in the way some others have done by constructing an account of separate systems of oppression for each oppressed group: racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ageism, and so on. There is a double problem with considering each group's oppression a unified and distinct structure or system. On the one hand, this way of conceiving oppression fails to accommodate .the similarities

48 Conceptual Frameworks

and overlaps in the oppressions of different groups. On the other hand, it falsely repre- sents the situation of all group members at the same.

I have arrived at the five faces of oppression-exploitation, marginalization, power- lessness, cultural imperialism, and violence-as the best way to avoid such exclusions and reductions. They function as criteria for determining whether individuals and groups are oppressed, rather than as a full theory of oppression. I believe that these criteria are objective. They provide a means of refuting some people's beliefs that their group is oppressed when it is not, as well as a means of persuading others that a group is oppressed when they doubt it. Each criterion can be oper ationalized; each can be applied through the assessment of observable behavior, status relationships, distributions, texts, and other cultural artifacts. I have no illusions that such assessments can be value-neutral. But these criteria can nevertheless serve as means of evaluating claims that a group is oppressed, ~r adjudicating disputes about whether or how a group is oppressed.

The presence of any of these five conditions is sufficient for calling a group oppressed. But different group oppressions exhibit different combination s of these forms, as do dif- ferent individuals in the groups. Nearly all, if not all, groups said by contemporary social movements to be oppressed suffer cultural imperialism. The other oppressions they expe- rience vary. Working-class people are exploited and powerless, for example, but if emP.loyed and white do not experience marginalization and violence. Gay men, on the other hand, are not qua gay exploited or powerless, but they experience severe cultural imperialism and violence. Similarly, Jews and Arabs as groups are victims of cultural imperialism and violence, though many members of these groups also suffer exploita- tion or powerlessness. Old people are oppressed by marginalization and cultural imperi- alism, and this is also true of physically and mentally disabled people. As a group, women are subject to gender-based exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and vio- lence. Racism in the United States condemns many Blacks, and Latinos to marginaliza- tion, and puts many more at risk, even though many members of these groups escape that condition; members of these groups often suffer all five forms of oppression.

Applying these five criteria to the situation of groups makes it possible to compare the oppressions without reducing them to a common essence or claiming that one is more fundamental than another. One can compare the ways in which a particular form of oppression appears in different groups. For example, while the operations of cultural imperialism are often experienced in similar fashion by different groups, there are also important differences. One can compare the combinations of oppressions groups experi- ence, or the intensity of those oppressions. Thus, with these criteria one can plausibly claim that one group is more oppressed than another without reducing all oppressions to a single scale ....

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