****For C. Owens Only****

Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: Is Adaptive

Management What ’ s Missing?

Th is article analyzes performance and organizational

issues revealed by the governmental response to Hurricane

Katrina. It reviews and analyzes the organizational

changes made in the federal government to address home-

land security and presents several proposals for reorgani-

zation suggested by policy makers in the aftermath of

Katrina. A management approach rooted in adaptive

management is presented for use in the ongoing process of

organizing for homeland security.

H urricane Katrina was more than a challenge

to the capabilities of federal, state, and local

governments to respond to hurricane or

natural disaster emergencies. It was, in fact, as Secre-

tary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff ob-

served, the fi rst large-scale test of the new National

Response Plan that the U.S. Department of Home-

land Security (DHS) developed. Th is partnership with

other federal departments and state and local govern-

ment agencies was to provide for an “ all-discipline, all-

hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive

framework for management of domestic incidents ”

(DHS 2004a, iii). But, as President Bush declared,

“ Th e results are not acceptable, ” and he maintained

that it is important that both the administration and

Congress take a good look at what went on “ to make

sure this country is knitted up as well as it can be, in

order to deal with signifi cant problems and disasters ”

(quoted in Jackson 2005, 2 ). Only four years after

9/11 and three years after the establishment of the

DHS, the nation is confronted with the question of

whether government organization for homeland secu-

rity is suffi cient to ensure security with respect to

catastrophic incidents, whether they are the result of

natural hazards or terrorism.

Th ere is little doubt that the suboptimal governmental

performance during Katrina was the result of many

factors: organizational, management, policy, person-

nel, and political. Both the House and the Senate, as

well as the executive branch, have convened special

committees to attempt to determine what went

wrong. Th e purpose of this article is not to analyze all

the performance gaps revealed by Katrina or to at-

tempt a comprehensive analysis of all the factors con-

tributing to homeland security. Rather, it seeks to

analyze what Katrina means for the question of how

the federal government should reorganize itself to

better perform the homeland security function.

Th e events of 9/11 kicked off one of the most active

periods of reorganization in the history of the federal

government. Th e enactment of the law creating the

DHS was itself one of the largest reorganizations ever

undertaken, but the department ’ s creation is but one

milestone in an ongoing process of organizing for

homeland security — a process that Hurricane Katrina

intersected. Numerous proposals are now being put

forward in Congress and by the executive branch to

reorganize federal agencies and intergovernmental

relationships for homeland security; some are a direct

result of Katrina, including everything from separat-

ing the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) from the DHS to giving the Department of

Defense (DoD) a stronger role in emergency response.

Th e questions are, fi rst, how will the reorganization

proposals intersect the ongoing process of organizing

homeland security functions and programs in the

federal government? Second, are any of them likely to

cause signifi cant changes in the behavior of the mul-

tiple organizations that perform the homeland secu-

rity function in the United States?

Th is analysis will fi rst discuss events leading up to

Katrina that signaled organizational problems in the

response system. An analysis of performance and

organizational issues revealed by the governmental

response to Katrina will then be presented. Th e article

will then review and analyze the organizational

changes that have been made in the federal govern-

ment to address homeland security and the stage of

development of the organizing process at the time

Katrina hit, followed by a presentation of several

proposals for reorganization suggested by policy mak-

ers in the aftermath of Katrina. Th is will be followed

by an analysis of two organizational models that could

Charles R. Wise is a professor of public

affairs in the School of Public and

Environmental Affairs at Indiana University.

He is a three-time recipient of the William

E. Mosher and Frederick C. Mosher

Award for the best academic article

published in PAR. E-mail : [email protected] .

Academic– Practitioner Exchange

302 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

Charles R . Wise Indiana University

provide a framework for the next round of reorganiza-

tion. Finally, a management approach rooted in adap-

tive management will be presented for use in the

ongoing process of organizing for homeland security.

Harbingers of Potential Problems before Katrina Following the federal response to Hurricanes Andrew

and Iniki in 1992, a Government Accountability

Offi ce (GAO) report issued fi ndings that forecast the

experience during Katrina: “ Th e problems we found

with the federal strategy for catastrophic disasters —

such as inadequate damage and needs assessments,

miscommunication, unclear legislative authority, and

unprepared, untrained state and local responders — are

more systematic than agency specifi c. Th us, they

require solutions that cut across agencies and levels of

government ” (GAO 1993, 11).

About one year before Katrina, in July 2004, a tabletop

exercise that simulated a category 3 hurricane hitting

New Orleans, dubbed Hurricane Pam, was conducted

in Louisiana. About 250 emergency-preparedness

offi cials from more than 50 federal, state, local, and

volunteer agencies participated. It involved issues such

as developing an eff ective search-and-rescue plan,

identifying short-term shelters, devising housing

options, and removing fl oodwater from New Orleans.

Th e exercise assumed that in advance of the storm,

pleas for evacuation would only be half-successful.

Th at was partly a recognition that as many as 100,000

people lived in households in which no one owned a

car. A University of New Orleans survey released in

July 2005, the month before Katrina, which found

that although 60 percent of those asked at fi rst said

they would leave if public offi cials recommended an

evacuation, on further questioning, only 34 percent of

the residents of 12 coastal parishes would “ defi nitely ”

leave. Th e message to the numerous New Orleans

residents without a car provided on the City of New

Orleans ’ Web site under “ General Evacuation Guide-

lines ” was, “ If you need a ride, try to go with a neigh-

bor, friend, or relative ” ( City of New Orleans 2005 ).

Th e assumption presumably was that cars were equally

distributed throughout the city, which was actually

not the case. Th e House Katrina Investigation Com-

mittee found that the implementation of lessons

learned from Hurricane Pam was incomplete prior to

Katrina (U.S. House, 2006, 83).

Another pre-Katrina exercise forecast potential man-

agement and organizational issues. Both the National

Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident

Management System (NIMS) of the DHS were used

for the fi rst time in a real catastrophe during Hurri-

cane Katrina. However, just fi ve months before

Katrina, the DHS had conducted the third in a series

of exercises to test disaster preparedness, simulating a

mock biological attack in New Jersey and a chemical

attack and high-yield explosion in Connecticut.

Twenty-seven federal departments and agencies were

represented in the exercise, and 30 state, 44 local, and

156 private-sector organizations participated. Th e

DHS ’ s inspector general evaluated the organizations ’

performance during the exercise and found that over-

all objectives were addressed and met. However, the

inspector general reported several fi ndings concerning

problems that forecast the problems experienced

during Katrina: (1) Guidance and procedures to de-

fi ne how each function interrelates within the NRP

appeared to be absent (DHS 2005, 15); (2) there was

a fundamental lack of understanding of the principles

and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS (DHS

2005, 2); and (3) there was a need for participating

responders as well as coordinating departments and

agencies to have a common operational picture, which

is essential to an effi cient and eff ective command-and-

control structure (DHS 2005, 19).

Th e picture that emerged is one in which the offi cials

of federal, state, and local governments and the pri-

vate sector did not have any specifi cation of how their

functions were supposed to interrelate, and they did

not understand the principles and protocols in the

NRP and NIMS framework that were supposed to

guide their decision making. Furthermore, without a

common operational picture or an adequate informa-

tion system to track and share information, the offi -

cials had diffi culty achieving unifi ed command and

control of the total shared response.

Katrina: A Real Test of U.S. Homeland Security Organization Katrina was the fi rst-large scale test of the NRP and

the NIMS. Although many individuals performed

skillfully under the worst conditions, as President

Bush (2005) stated, “ the system, at every level of

government was not well-coordinated, and was over-

whelmed in the fi rst few days. ” Organizational prob-

lems related to planning, incident management, and

the management of intergovernmental relations were

experienced during the response to Katrina.

Planning Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff (2005a)

indicated that there was insuffi cient planning for the

roles of various organizations: “ I think 80 percent or

more of the problem lies with planning. And that goes

to the evacuation issue. It goes to how well we work

with the military when the military has large numbers

of assets they can bring to bear on the problem, [and]

how fl uid we are with them. ” Th e House Katrina In-

vestigation Committee found that critical elements of

the National Response Plan were executed late, ineff ec-

tively, or not at all (U.S. House, 2006, 132). Confu-

sion over organizational procedures and defi ned roles

did seem to contribute to the gaps in coordination

Organizing for Homeland Security 303

among participating organizations. Th e White House

Report on the Federal Response concluded, “At the

most fundamental level, part of the explanation for

why the response to Katrina did not go as planned is

that key decision-makers at all levels simply were not

familiar with the plans” (White House, 2006). Fur-

ther, the report observed that the NRP itself provides

only a “base plan” and the supporting operational

plans that Federal departments and agencies were

required to develop to integrate their activities into

the national response were either nonexistent or under

development when Katrina hit (White House, 2006).

Th e General Accountability Offi ce observed, “Al-

though the NRP framework envisions a proactive

national response in the event of a catastrophe, the

nation does not yet have the types of detailed plans

needed to better delineate capabilities that might be

required and how such assistance will be provided and

coordinated” (GAO, 2006, 5). Paul McHale (2005) ,

assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense, he

testifi ed that one of the ways to improve the federal

government ’ s response lay in “ examining the role of

DoD in responding to a catastrophic event. ” William

Carwille (2005) , the federal coordinating offi cer for

Katrina response operations for Mississippi, testifi ed,

“ Th ere has been no operational planning developed by

FEMA in over four years. In my view, there is no clear

understanding of the responsibilities of each level

(Washington, the regions, deployed emergency re-

sponse teams) and how they are to interact. ” In par-

ticular, he emphasized, “ Katrina exposed a weakness in

the National Response Plan — there is no specifi c dis-

cussion of multi-state disaster-management options. ”

Th e basic model underlying the planned role of fed-

eral agencies seemed to be at issue. Th at model as-

sumes that state and local governments have the lead

in disaster response, with federal forces responding to

calls for assistance and thus arriving later. Th is model

is now under scrutiny. Scott Wells (2005) , the federal

coordinating offi cer for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

in Louisiana, testifi ed about the bottom-up emer-

gency-response system: “ Th is system works for small

to medium disasters. It does not work so well for large

disasters, and it falls apart for a catastrophic disaster. I

think that is a fundamental problem with the response

to Katrina. ” Th e House Katrina Investigation Com-

mittee concluded that catastrophic disasters require

the federal response to be more proactive and not

dependent on state requests for assistance (U.S.

House, 2006, 136).

Managing Homeland Security Incidents Th e House Katrina Investigation Committee found

that during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina

made landfall, there were lapses in command and

control within each level of government, and be-

tween the three levels of government (U.S. House,

2006, 183). Th e White House Report found, “In

terms of the Federal Response, our architecture of

command and control mechanisms as well as our

existing structure of plans did not serve us well.

Command centers in the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS0 and elsewhere in the Federal govern-

ment had unclear, and often overlapping roles and

responsibilities that were exposed as fl awed during

this disaster”(White House, 2006). Th e General

Accountability Offi ce found, “… there were multiple

chains of command, a myriad of approaches and

processes for requesting and providing assistance, and

confusion about who should be advised of requests

and what resources would be provided within specifi c

time frames (GAO, 2006a, 4).

Having a picture of conditions on the ground in

various areas and communicating about conditions

was also a big problem. Secretary Chertoff (2005b)

testifi ed, “ During the Katrina response, our eff orts

were signifi cantly hampered by a lack of information

from the ground. With communication systems dam-

aged and state and local assets compromised by the

subsequent fl ooding, our ability to obtain precise

reporting was signifi cantly impaired. ” Th e House

Katrina Investigation Committee found that lack of

communications and situational awareness paralyzed

command and control (U.S. House, 2006, 191).

Major General Richard J. Rowe, director of opera-

tions for the Northern Command, testifi ed, “ We need

immediate, reliable communications that are surviv-

able and fl exible. Th ese communications must be

mobile, secure, and both voice and data capable ”

(2005, 4). Th e White House Report found, “Federal,

state, and local governments have not yet completed a

comprehensive strategy to improve operability and

interoperability to meet the needs of emergency re-

sponders. Th is inability to connect multiple commu-

nications plans and architectures clearly impeded

coordination and communication at the Federal, state,

and local levels” (White House, 2006). It must be

recalled that the responses to 9/11 were severely af-

fected by similar kinds of information tracking and

communication problems.

In addition, the unity of eff ort among the various

agencies was signifi cantly impaired during the re-

sponse to Katrina. Th e House Katrina Investigation

Committee concluded, “ In responding to Hurricane

Katrina, elements of federal, state, and local govern-

ment lacked command, lacked control, and certainly

lacked unity” (U.S. House, 2006, 195). Secretary

Chertoff was asked when he had learned that FEMA

chairman Michael Brown had not been able to estab-

lish a unifi ed command. He testifi ed,

I think on Wednesday he was — on Wednesday

General Honore, I think, appeared. And I said

to Brown, “ You need to get together with the

state, and you need to get together with General

304 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

Honore in the same place. You guys need to be

connected together. ” Th at means unifi ed com-

mand. What that means is everybody who has

command responsibility has to be in one place.

( Chertoff 2005a )

Members of Congress raised signifi cant questions

about who was really in charge of the total response

eff ort, and why federal authorities did not take over

the total eff ort when it became apparent that the

capabilities of the state of Louisiana and local govern-

ments were failing. Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that

under the Homeland Security Presidential Directives,

he had a responsibility as the secretary of homeland

security to manage incidents of national signifi cance,

but he had delegated this responsibility to the head of

FEMA, Michael Brown. Th ough Brown was not

named as principal federal offi cer by Secretary Chert-

off until Tuesday, when the response was fully under

way, Chertoff (2005b) testifi ed that this was only a

formal recognition of the delegation that he had made

to Brown earlier.

Th e House Katrina Investigation Committee found

considerable confusion existed over the authority of

the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the Federal

Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) over who was autho-

rized to direct federal operations and that FEMA

offi cials acknowledged that the Department of De-

fense frequently operated on its own outside the estab-

lished unifi ed command (U.S. House, 2006, 190).

Th e White House Report recommended that the

confusion over Federal Offi cials authority be remedied

by designating the PFO as the FCO (White House,

2006, 90).

Managing Intergovernmental Relations for Homeland Security One point of controversy concerned why the city of

New Orleans and the state of Louisiana did not

order a mandatory evacuation earlier than they did.

Federal offi cials testifi ed that they had urged state

offi cials to issue a mandatory evacuation order on

the Saturday before the storm, but it was not issued

until Sunday ( Brown 2005 ). State offi cials argued

that they were executing a phased evacuation and

that it was successful ( Blanco 2005 ). Th e House

Katrina Investigation Committee found:

Despite adequate warning 56 hours before

landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin

delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in

New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall. Th e

failure to order timely mandatory evacuations,

Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evac-

uate the remaining population, and decisions of

individuals led to an incomplete evacuation.

Th e incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to

deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and

horrible conditions for those who remained.

(U.S. House, 2006, 2)

Th ere is a diff erence of opinion on whether the federal

government had the means to supersede state author-

ity to do such things as order an earlier evacuation.

Th e Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRP gives

the federal government special powers, including the

ability to bypass state governments. Th ey were not

used during Katrina. Th e more detailed Catastrophic

Incident Supplement had not been approved by the

DHS when Katrina hit. Secretary Chertoff testifi ed

that the annex provides that, upon recognition of a

catastrophic incident, the designation in advance of a

presidential disaster declaration permits the deploy-

ment of certain kinds of federal assets. However,

Chertoff (2005b) asserted, because President Bush had

issued the disaster declaration on the Saturday before

the storm, use of the annex was not necessary. Th e

House Katrina Investigation Committee concluded,

“Th e Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic

Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) to direct the federal re-

sponse posture to fully switch from a reactive to pro-

active mode of operations” (U.S. House, 2006, 137).

Th e Committee observed that the NRP-CIA has never

been appropriately exercised and as a result, federal

personnel have little experience or comfort with insti-

tuting a proactive response (U.S. House, 2006, 137).

Regardless of the interpretation of the Catastrophic

Incident Annex during Katrina, the issue of under

what circumstances federal authority should super-

sede state authority has been placed on the agenda for

homeland security reorganization, as has the question

of what processes should exist to designate who is in

charge during emergencies. Concern about the poten-

tial preemption of state authority by federal offi cials

was heightened by questions surrounding the author-

ity to order evacuations. R. David Paulison (2005),

acting director of FEMA, testifi ed that evacuation is a

state and local issue and that FEMA does not make

evacuation decisions. In fact, the NRP lists directing

evacuations as a responsibility of local chief executive

offi cers (DHS 2004a, 8). Federal offi cials can help

facilitate evacuation procedures when the NRP is

invoked, support search-and-rescue eff orts, and pro-

vide technical assistance. In the event of catastrophic

incidents, the federal government is to provide public

health, medical, and mental health support at evacua-

tion points and refugee shelters ( Bea 2005, 2 – 3 ).

Scott Wells (2005) , federal coordinating offi cer for

Louisiana, testifi ed that FEMA had received no pre-

landfall requests for evacuation assistance.

Th e larger question concerns under what circum-

stances the Federal government should not wait for

requests for assistance from a state but should move

ahead on its own. Th e White House report asserts,

“Ultimately, when a catastrophic incident occurs,

Organizing for Homeland Security 305

regardless of whether the catastrophe has been warned

or is a surprise event, the Federal government should

not rely on the traditional layered approach and in-

stead proactively provide or ‘push’ its capabilities and

assistance directly to those in need” (White House

2006). Th e General Accountability Offi ce has recom-

mended that the NRP’s provisions regarding proactive

response of the federal government to emerging cata-

strophic events be clarifi ed and that Congress give

federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to

prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is warn-

ing (GA), 2006b, 12–13).

Post – 9/11 Changes in Organization for Homeland Security: A Work in Progress Th e major organizational issue is that given the cre-

ation of the DHS, why were such signifi cant organiza-

tional problems evident in the response to Katrina?

Congressional policy makers in both parties and the

president explicitly addressed the organizational issues

in the course of enacting one of the largest federal

reorganizations in history, and more organizational

changes have followed the establishment of the DHS.

A major issue addressed in the creation of DHS was

to specify who is in charge . Proponents of the depart-

ment argued that it would fi x accountability for

homeland security in the federal government: Th e

secretary of the department would have the power to

act and not just coordinate, and various agency activi-

ties would be integrated by means of hierarchical

organization (Wise 2002a, 137). Opponents argued

that the non-terrorism-related functions of the agen-

cies that were to be merged into the department, such

as those of the Coast Guard and FEMA, would be

neglected or subordinated to the terrorism mission

(Wise 2002b, 3). Another question raised at the time

about the coordinating capacity of the proposed de-

partment was whether its own operational responsi-

bilities would be compatible with a government-wide

coordinating role (Wise 2002a, 137). Many of the

federal agencies with major homeland security respon-

sibilities were not included in the merged department,

such as the DoD, the Department of Justice, and the

Central Intelligence Agency, among others. Th e issue

was how Congress could write a law giving the head

of a department of homeland security what amounts

to presidential authority to direct the activities or

realign the resources of other cabinet departments

( Donley and Pollard 2002, 142 ). In the end, Congress

did not do that. It did not give the DHS the power to

direct the activities of other cabinet departments, but

instead a mandate to call on other departments for

their assistance in homeland security tasks. Th e de-

partment, in fact, was given little new legal authority

to undertake its coordinating role.

However, trying to establish a departmental super-

structure and begin some degree of integration of

what had been 22 separate agencies became the major

preoccupation of the department, with interdepart-

mental coordination taking a lower priority. As was

pointed out prior to the passage of the legislation

establishing the DHS, digesting transferred units is a

longer and more arduous process than reorganizers

often plan for (Wise 2002a, 139).

Th e GAO designated the department ’ s transformation

in 2003 as “ high risk ” because it faced enormous

challenges in implementing an eff ective transforma-

tion process and building management capacity and

because it faced a broad array of operational and man-

agement challenges that it inherited from its compo-

nent legacy agencies (GAO 2003). In a review update

in 2005, the GAO reported that implementation and

transformation of the DHS remained high risk (GAO

2005c). Just integrating the management systems of

the department, including fi nancial, human resources,

information, and procurement systems, has been an

enormous task occupying top leadership, and though

the DHS has made some progress, it does not have a

comprehensive strategy, with overall goals and a time-

line, to guide management integration across func-

tions and departments (GAO 2005b, 4).

The National Framework for Homeland Security Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and

8 require the DHS to establish a single, comprehen-

sive, “ all hazards ” approach to and plans for the

management of emergency events, whether they are

the result of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or

accidental disasters (GAO 2005b, 2). Th e overall

structure that is supposed to guide federal homeland

security activities and provide for their coordination

is not the sole province of the DHS. To address the

overall homeland security challenge, the National

Strategy for Homeland Security — which sets out a

plan to improve homeland security through the

cooperation and partnering of federal, state, local,

and private-sector organizations on an array of

functions — and 12 Homeland Security Presidential

Directives, which provide additional guidance

related to the mission areas in the strategy, have been

issued. Th e strategy sets out 43 initiatives to fulfi ll

the federal responsibility. A GAO review found

that in fi scal year 2004, although the DHS was

identifi ed as the lead for 37 of the initiatives, there

were multiple leads for 12. Th e GAO review identi-

fi ed homeland security challenges in fulfi lling the

strategy that cut across mission areas and levels

of government:

● Clarifying roles and responsibilities within and

between levels of government and the private

sector through the development and implementa-

tion of an overarching framework and criteria to

guide the process

306 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

● Developing a national blueprint — called an

enterprise architecture — to help integrate diff erent

organizations ’ eff orts to improve homeland security

(GAO 2005e, 24)

Th us, when Katrina hit, it is clear that both the lead-

ership and action roles and the responsibilities of

major federal organizations, in fact, needed to be

clarifi ed. Nonetheless, the Homeland Security Presi-

dential Directives assigned the DHS the lead role in

setting out the structure for coordination of homeland

security activities. Among the major components of

this coordination responsibility were planning,

incident management, and managing intergovern-

mental relations.

Planning for Homeland Security Katrina revealed signifi cant problems with regard to

planning the defi ned roles of various departments and

offi cials and their interactions. Th e primary planning

document to guide all federal activities is the NRP,

which was issued on January 6, 2005, and forms the

basis for how the federal government coordinates with

state, local, and tribal governments and the private

sector during incidents.

Federal departments and agencies signed letters of

agreement, pledging cooperation and support for the

DHS “ as appropriate and consistent with their own

authorities and responsibilities ” (DHS 2004a, iii; em-

phasis added). As Tom Ridge, then secretary of home-

land security, made clear in his introduction, the plan

created “ no new authorities ” (DHS 2004a, i). Th us, in

many situations, federal departments and agencies

must decide for themselves what types of cooperation,

resources, and support are not only consistent with

their own authority but also “ appropriate. ” Th e secre-

tary of homeland security has little legal leverage to

use if he or she disagrees. Th e one situation covered in

legislation that does provide more leverage is the

Staff ord Act, which authorizes the secretary of home-

land security and the director of FEMA to “ task ”

supporting departments and agencies after an inci -

dent is declared an emergency or a disaster by

the president.

Managing Homeland Security Incidents A key concept in the Incident Command System of

the NIMS is that most incidents are to be managed

locally (DHS 2004b, 7). For disaster response and

recovery from natural disasters such as hurricanes, the

federal government, in fact, is not the lead organiza-

tion. State and local governments take the lead, but

when their resources are overwhelmed, governors may

request assistance from the federal government. In

response to such a gubernatorial request, a presidential

declaration pursuant to the Staff ord Disaster Relief

and Emergency Assistance Act designates an incident

as a major emergency. Such a declaration permits

FEMA and other federal agencies to provide

assistance to state and local governments, businesses,

and individuals.

However, FEMA is not an operating agency that can

mount resources to respond to disasters on its own;

rather, it is a coordinating agency that tasks other

federal agencies to use their resources to assist state

and local governments. It is, in fact, a rather small

agency with a little more than 2,400 employees. It

possesses nothing equivalent to the U.S. Army ’ s 82nd

Airborne Battalion, which can send in its own people,

equipment, and supplies to address the eff ects of a

natural disaster. In responding to disasters, FEMA

and state emergency managers are embedded in a

network of thousands of nonprofi t organizations,

private fi rms, ad hoc groups, individual fi rms, and

public safety agencies that are all responding to the

disaster. “ Th e disaster network is loosely structured,

organizationally diverse, motivated by a broad range

of interests, and in part ad hoc ” ( Waugh and Sylves

2002, 148 ). Together, FEMA and state emergency

managers coordinate using a variety of means, includ-

ing some direct authority, fi nancial incentives, techni-

cal assistance, and expressions of personal support

( Waugh 2002 ). With little in the way of direct opera-

tions under its control, FEMA ’ s task is primarily one

of interagency, intergovernmental, and intersectoral

relations. Even when supplemented by the authority

of the secretary of homeland security, who can direct

FEMA ’ s sister agencies within the DHS to provide

resources, the coordination task is complicated by

multiple constitutional, legal, organizational, and

historical strictures.

Th e incident management framework that has been

developed to provide some structure to an otherwise

decentralized scheme is the NIMS. It is supposed to

help emergency managers and responders from diff er-

ent jurisdictions and disciplines work together more

eff ectively to handle emergencies, and it is intended

to be a comprehensive response system for use in

directing government response to emergencies. It is

modeled on the incident management system used by

the agencies that fi ght forest fi res, which was de-

ployed during 9/11 and also for the Challenger crash.

It is intended to provide a common and consistent

framework for the management of incidents, so that

any agency or combination of agencies — federal,

state, or local — can readily combine their eff orts in

responding to an emergency. Although it recognizes

that incidents are going to be managed locally, the

NIMS is intended to ensure that fi eld management

complies with a standard set of organizational defi ni-

tions, doctrines, and procedures: “ Th e goal is to take

advantage of this commonality to build fl exible,

modular, [and] scalable response organizations, sup-

ported by interoperable technology ” ( Rubin and

Harrald 2006, 684 ).

Organizing for Homeland Security 307

Managing Intergovernmental Relations One component of the homeland security intergovern-

mental relations framework is that beginning in fi scal

year 2005, federal agencies and departments are re-

quired to make adoption of the NIMS by state, local,

and tribal governments a requirement for federal pre-

paredness assistance grants, contracts, and other activi-

ties. In addition, the DHS is directed to issue a

National Preparedness Goal that defi nes national per-

formance standards for assessing domestic preparedness

capabilities and identifying gaps in those capabilities

and refl ects national homeland security priorities for

prevention, response, and recovery from major events,

with an emphasis on terrorism. Th e department is also

tasked with establishing mechanisms for the delivery of

federal preparedness assistance to state and local gov-

ernments, as well as outlining actions to strengthen the

preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local

entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8

also requires the preparation and approval of compre-

hensive and statewide all-hazards preparedness strate-

gies in order to receive federal preparedness assistance

at all levels of government, including grants, after fi scal

year 2005. Th e DHS issued an Interim National Pre-

paredness Goal on April 1, 2005, and had planned to

issue the fi nal National Preparedness Goal and Target

Capabilities List on October 1, 2005, following com-

ment from state and local homeland security offi cials.

Katrina obviously sent the drafters back to the drawing

board to engage in further refi nement of the prepared-

ness goal. In developing the goal, the DHS used a

capabilities-based planning approach — one that defi nes

the capabilities required by states and local jurisdic-

tions to respond eff ectively to likely threats. Th e speci-

fi ed capability requirements are to establish the

minimum levels of capability necessary for reasonable

assurance of success against a standardized set of 15

scenarios for threats and hazards of national signifi -

cance (GAO 2005a, 20).

Especially after the defi ciencies exhibited by some

state and local governments during Katrina, it should

be expected that the standards eventually promulgated

under the National Preparedness Goal will be the

subject of considerable scrutiny and debate. Not only

will millions of dollars of federal aid hinge on the

assessments of states ’ preparedness ratings, but also

information about how states measure up to the stan-

dards is sure to spark political debate. Th e release of

school performance scores under the No Child Left

Behind Act is perhaps a harbinger of what is to come

in homeland security.

Historically, the national system for responding to

emergency incidents has been very diverse and com-

plex, and the NRP and the NIMS constitute attempts

to impose standards and structure on it. One risk is

that these initiatives will lead to the overstructuring of

a system that some see as historically eff ective and the

diminishing of critical innovative capabilities ( Rubin

and Harrald 2006, 686 ). In attempting to increase

accountability, standards can also portend further

centralization of the federal role in defi ning appropri-

ate and acceptable policies for preparedness and re-

sponse ( Posner 2003, 42 ).

On the other hand, another risk is that these initia-

tives will provide the illusion of an integrated system

without suffi cient buy-in on specifi c actions by all

stakeholders at various levels of government to ensure

coordinated action. Th at is, they may fail to cause

integration at the operating level. In fact, when

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed before the House Com-

mittee investigating Katrina, he seemed to conclude

that just such a risk had become manifest: “ In particu-

lar, we did not have the kind of integrated planning

capabilities that you need to deal with the kind of

catastrophe we faced in Katrina. And when I say

integrated, that means not only our own planning but

our ability to plan with others, including state and

local government and including the military ”

( Chertoff 2005a ).

To summarize, the response to Katrina revealed

signifi cant organizational issues in planning,

management of incidents, and management of inter-

governmental relations. Th is analysis will now turn to

current proposals for organizational change to deter-

mine the extent to which they address these issues.

Proposals for Organizational Change Like other major events, such as 9/11, which brought

major formal organizational changes in government,

Katrina has brought forth proposals to further change

organization for homeland security. Among the pro-

posals put forward are plans to modify federal law to

give the president greater ability to order federal ac-

tion, even in the absence of requests from state gover-

nors; to assign a greater role to the DoD and other

Federal Departments for domestic emergency re-

sponse; and to remove FEMA from the DHS and

have its director report directly to the president.

In a televised address to the nation, President Bush

said that Hurricane Katrina showed the need for

“ greater federal authority and a broader role for the

armed forces ” ( Bush 2005 ). In part, the interest in

greater federal authority stemmed from the decisions

of the City of New Orleans regarding evacuation.

Fran Townsend, who is in charge of the White House

examination of the federal response to Katrina, re-

portedly said that she is considering whether there is

a narrow band of circumstances in which the presi-

dent should seize control when a disaster strikes

( Davis 2005 ).

In fact, the White House report states, “Th e Federal

gov ernment should develop plans to build and

308 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

temporarily command the Incident Command Sys-

tem (ICS) until the State and local authorities are able

to recover from the initial impact of the catastrophic

incident and perform their roles under the ICS.” Th e

White House report also assigns a new lead Federal

role for evacuations to the Department of Transporta-

tion; “Th e Department of Transportation, in coordi-

nation with other appropriate departments of the

Executive Branch, must also be prepared to conduct

mass evacuation operations when disasters overwhelm

or incapacitate State and local governments” (White

House 2006).

Richard Falkenrath, former deputy assistant to the

president for homeland security, has suggested a fed-

eral evacuation statute that would allow the president

to order an evacuation when state and local agencies

fail to act with appropriate swiftness (Brookings 2005,

15). However, the National Governors Association

issued a statement opposing federalization: “ Th e

possibility of the federal government pre-empting the

authority of the states or governors in emergencies,

however, is opposed by the nation ’ s governors. Gover-

nors are responsible for the safety and welfare of their

citizens, and are in the best position to coordinate all

resources to prepare for, respond to, and recover from

disasters ” (NGA 2005). In addition, the National

Emergency Management Association has recom-

mended that state and local governments remain in

control of their own disaster response with federal

support and unifi ed command structures: “ Even in

extreme circumstances, we need to continue to use

and follow the plans and systems that are in place.

State and local governments must have buy-in for

the response and recovery of their communities ”

( Ashwood 2005, 4 ).

Several issues are related to a federal evacuation stat-

ute: (1) What criteria would it include that would

justify triggering presidential action? (2) What incen-

tives or disincentives exist for a president to use it? For

example, in considering whether to overrule a gover-

nor in ordering a mandatory evacuation, would the

risk of ordering an unnecessary evacuation discourage

presidential use? (3) If the president orders an evacua-

tion, would federal forces, including the military, be

required to implement it?

Some have suggested that laws and plans be changed

to designate a greater role for the military in natural

disaster response. Th e U.S. Conference of Mayors is

one organization that has advocated a greater role for

the military (2005, 3).

Currently, according to the NRP, the DoD ’ s role is

contingent on a request for assistance from another

federal agency and approval of the secretary of de-

fense. During Katrina, more than 90 requests for

assistance were acted on by the secretary of defense

or the acting deputy secretary of defense ( McHale

2005, 3 ). “From the time a request is initiated until

the military force or capability is delivered to the

disaster site requires a 21-step process” (White House

2006). Th e DoD uses a diff erent process from other

departments.

In addition, as the White House report found, “Fur-

ther, active duty military and National Guard opera-

tions were not coordinated and served two diff erent

bosses, one the President and the other the Governor”

(White House 2006).

Federal Coordinating Offi cer Philip Parr testifi ed that

during Katrina, a plan he had worked out with the

National Guard to evacuate people from the Super-

dome was put on hold because General Honore had

taken charge of the evacuation ( Parr 2005 ). Increased

military involvement clearly raises issues of command

and coordination with other federal agencies.

Th e White House report envisions a lead role for the

Department of Defense in catastrophic incidents that

would displace the Department of Homeland

Security:

DOD and DHS should develop recommenda-

tions for revision of the NRP to delineate the

circumstances, objectives, and limitations when

DOD might temporarily assume the lead for

the Federal response to a catastrophic incident.

Katrina demonstrated the importance of prior

planning for rapid and complex response ef-

forts. DOD should develop plans to lead the

Federal response for events of extraordinary

scope and nature (e.g., nuclear incident or

multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks causing a

breakdown of civil society). (White House

2006)

Similarly, in addition to the Departments of Transpor-

tation and Defense already discussed, the White

House report envisions assigning lead roles to Federal

Departments other than the Department of Home-

land security including:

● Department of Justice — primary agency responsible for ESF-13 Public Safety and Security

function

● Department of Health and Human Services — lead a public health and medical command and

responsibility for coordinating the provision of

human services during disasters.

● Department of Housing and Urban Development — lead Federal agency for the

provision of temporary housing.

In short, the White House report envisions multiple

hierarchies for diff erent functional areas.

Organizing for Homeland Security 309

Some members of Congress have proposed that

FEMA be removed from the DHS and given the

status of an independent agency whose director re-

ports directly to the president. Such a move is predi-

cated on the notion that placing the director higher in

the federal hierarchy will give him or her greater com-

mand authority in the federal government. It also

presumes that FEMA ’ s functions are so fundamentally

diff erent from those of the other units within the

DHS that its operations are hampered by a common

departmental location and administration. Th e com-

plaint is that FEMA ’ s historical natural disaster func-

tions have been subordinated to the DHS ’ s new

emphasis on terrorism. Albert Ashwood, vice presi-

dent of the National Emergency Management Asso-

ciation, argues, “ Th e FEMA director serves in a

bureaucratic chain of command which reports

through the structures of the DHS, which delays

response and recovery functions ” (2005, 2).

One issue is how much synergy to integrate opera-

tions for more eff ective emergency response has been

achieved since FEMA was absorbed into the DHS.

Secretary Chertoff asserted that since FEMA has

joined DHS, things have worked better in terms of

FEMA ’ s ability to work with the Coast Guard and in

terms of the DHS ’ s ability to coalign all of the depart-

ment ’ s other assets to supplement FEMA (Chertoff

2005b). Th e National Emergency Management Asso-

ciation charged, however, that since the merger,

FEMA ’ s state and local coordination unit was severed

to stand up the DHS ’ s Offi ce of State and Local

Coordination, other FEMA functions were consoli-

dated into the DHS, and FEMA funds were trans-

ferred to the Transportation Security Administration

( Ashwood 2005, 2 ).

Another issue is how diff erent natural disaster – related

functions are from other homeland security-related

functions, such as terrorism. Th e GAO completed a

study of the target capabilities established by the DHS

showing that most of the DHS ’ s targeted capabili-

ties — 30 of 36 — are common to both terrorist attacks

and natural or accidental disasters. Such capabilities as

on-site emergency management and search and rescue

were found to be common to all hazards. Th e study

revealed that the preparedness capabilities required for

terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters are

more similar for protection, response, and recovery

and diff er most for prevention (GAO 2005f, 5).

Nonetheless, the National Emergency Management

Association protested Secretary Chertoff ’ s move to

sever FEMA ’ s preparedness function and assign it to a

newly created Preparedness Directorate that arose

from Chertoff ’ s Second Stage Review. Th e association

highlighted what it said was the department ’ s lack of

focus on natural hazards preparedness and the inabil-

ity to connect response-and-recovery operations to

preparedness functions ( Ashwood 2005, 5 – 6 ).

The Way Forward for Homeland Security Reorganization: Two Models What many of the suggested reorganization proposals

have in common is a desire for greater centralization of

authority, whether that means turning over more

power to the president, elevating FEMA ’ s director to a

position directly under the president, or increasing the

authority of DoD and other Federal departments.

Granted, the desire to use military assets involves more

than a wish to centralize authority, but even there, the

desire for a unitary command structure is implicated.

Following the same dynamic that was set in motion

after 9/11, there is a renewed desire to strengthen hier-

archy and fi x accountability. Th e cry who is in charge? is

raised once again, this time in the context of response

and recovery from natural disasters. Apparently, the

idea of creating the Department of Homeland Security

as the one Federal agency to be in charge has given way

to a search for a new organizational solution.

Hierarchical Model Th e common tendency just identifi ed rests on the

well-known hierarchical model of organization.

“ Hierarchy uses authority (legitimate power) to create

and coordinate a horizontal and vertical division of

labor. Under hierarchy, knowledge is treated as a

scarce resource and is therefore concentrated, along

with the corresponding decision rights, in specialized

functional units and at higher levels in the organiza-

tion ” ( Adler 2001, 216 ). Among the advantages of

this mode of organization are that it provides a form

for employing large numbers of people and preserves

unambiguous accountability for the work that they do

( Jaques 1990 ). Also, it has been pointed out that a key

dimension of hierarchy is the “ formal authority to

compel ” (O ’ Toole and Meier 1999, 507). “ Hierarchy

can provide institutional support for the current bun-

dle of routines, information systems, values, and other

key elements that infl uence production — off ering a

crystallization of stable, cooperative eff ort, the opera-

tional status quo ” (O ’ Toole and Meier 1999, 507).

Th us, the hierarchical model speaks particularly to the

recurrent desire of federal policy makers to achieve

stability in homeland security operations and to fi x

accountability. However, the idea of top-down

(i.e., hierarchical) coordination to achieve cooperative

eff ort that provides stability in a multiorganizational

environment “ rests on the notions that the organiza-

tions to be coordinated have been identifi ed or can

readily be identifi ed by the headquarters coordinators;

that the relationships of these organizations to each

other are well understood; that agreement has been

reached about what objectives will be accomplished by

altering certain of these inter-organizational relation-

ships; and that the authority and means to eff ectuate

desired goals exist to alter the relationships in the

desired direction. It assumes hierarchy will facilitate

the implementation ” (Wise 2002a, 141). Many of

these assumptions are questionable at present.

310 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

Although research has shown that hierarchically struc-

tured institutions may be effi cient mechanisms for the

performance of routine partitioned tasks, they encoun-

ter diffi culties in the performance of innovative tasks

and those requiring the generation of new knowledge

( Bennis and Slater 1964; Daft 1998; Mintzberg 1980 ).

When specialized units are told to cooperate in tasks

that typically encounter unanticipated problems re-

quiring novel solutions, the hierarchical form gives

higher-level managers few levers with which to ensure

that the participating units will collaborate. “ By their

non-routine nature, such tasks cannot be programmed,

and the creative collaboration they require cannot be

simply commanded ” ( Adler 2001, 216 ).

Network Model Th e network model starts with the presumption that

public functional fi elds are populated by a variety of

organizations, government agencies, nonprofi ts, and

for-profi ts ( Agranoff and McGuire 2003 ; Keast et al.

2004; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997 ; Milward

and Provan 2000; O ’ Toole 1997; Wise 1990 ). “ Net-

works are structures of interdependence involving

multiple organizations as parts thereof, where one unit

is not merely the formal subordinate of the other in

some larger hierarchical arrangement” ( O ’ Toole 1997,

45 ). Although networks may take many forms, the

type of interest here are public management networks,

which are “ those led or managed by government rep-

resentatives as they employ multi-organizational ar-

rangements for solving problems that cannot be

achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations”

( Agranoff and McGuire 2001 ). Th e activities of public

management networks are purposeful eff orts to bring

parts of organizations together to access knowledge

and technology and to guide, steer, control, or

manage (Agranoff , forthcoming, 12).

Purposeful eff orts to bring parts of organizations

together place an emphasis on facilitating interorgani-

zational arrangements in which negotiation and ad-

justment occur, as opposed to restructuring formal

organizations in an attempt to control all future con-

tingencies. Accomplishing this does not mean that the

design or structuring of governmental organizations

is immaterial. From the network perspective, the

emphasis is placed on structuring organizations and

organizational arrangements in government, so that

government organizations can play positive roles in

setting the stage for other organizations in the interor-

ganizational fi eld to interact to accomplish common

goals ( Wise 1990, 151 ).

One of the weaknesses of the network model is that

accountability is diff used, and assessing performance

means that not only must the performance of indi-

vidual agencies be measured but also the joint action

of multiple agencies ( Wise and Nader 2006 ). Th us, in

an area such as homeland security, when performance

gaps are experienced, it is diffi cult for policy makers to

isolate and pinpoint fault.

Major works of modern organization theory stress

that there is no one structural model that is suitable

for all situations. Th e work of major organization

researchers stresses that key determinants of eff ective

organizational structuring and functioning include the

nature of the tasks the organizations are to perform

and the nature of the environment in which they are

embedded ( Mintzberg 1980 , 1993; Th ompson 1967;

Williamson 1975, 1990 ).

Th ompson (1967) stresses that internal and external

dimensions of organizations cannot be separated from

each other and that interdependence among organiza-

tions has a major impact on internal organizational

structuring. Mintzberg posits that stable versus dy-

namic and simple versus complex dimensions of orga-

nizational environments determine the suitability of

diff erent organizational forms. A simply structured

organization that relies on direct supervision for its

coordination mechanism exists in a simple dynamic

environment, whereas mutual adjustment is the coor-

dination mechanism used in the organizational form

characterized as “ adhocracy, ” the structure most ap-

propriate for a complex dynamic environment. As

noted earlier, the homeland security system is most

like Mintzberg ’ s adhocracy.

Williamson fi nds that whether hierarchy should be

used and what form it should take depends on the

characteristics of the transaction. He argues that hier-

archies should be matched with transactions in a

discriminating manner (Williamson 1990). Th e trans-

action approach applied to the multiorganizational

homeland security setting leads organizational policy

makers to determine the nature of the functions that

need to be performed in homeland security and the

types of interactions that need to occur among mul-

tiple federal, state, and local agencies, as well as those

in the nonprofi t sector. Th e broad categories of

functions include preparedness, response, recovery,

and mitigation. For the performance of most of these

functions, authority is diff use because of the nature of

our system of federalism and private property rights.

One area that is less diff use is response during

emergencies in which issues of sovereignty and

independent action give way more to considerations

of security.

Th e fi rst phase of reorganization for homeland

security in the federal government emphasized the

hierarchical model. It may be recalled that following

9/11, the DHS was created with a cabinet-level direc-

tor to answer the question “ who is in charge? ” and to

better address the threats of terrorism, and particularly

to increase the preparedness for terrorism. An initial

set of priorities based on the federal government ’ s

Organizing for Homeland Security 311

experience after 9/11 were set in motion by the secre-

tary for homeland security. Some of the choices made

by the department ’ s secretary, in an eff ort to gear up

for the terrorism priority, may have placed a lesser

priority on natural disaster response and recovery.

Following Katrina, a risk is that in reaction to perfor-

mance gaps in natural disaster response, Congress and

the president will change formal hierarchical structures

to emphasize natural hazards response, which could

deemphasize other goals such as terrorism prepared-

ness. Th e next event may then be a large-scale chemi-

cal or biological attack, which the latest structural

adjustments to the new hierarchy may not address.

Choosing an Organizational Framework for Homeland Security Th e choice of which organizational model should form

the basic framework for the next phase of homeland

security reorganization needs to take into consideration

the nature of the homeland security environ ment. By

any standard, the expectation must be that homeland

security organizations will continue to exist in a com-

plex environment. Herbert Kaufman points to several

potential sources of continuing complexity in organi-

zational environments that are applicable here. It may

arise from changes in technology, from changes in

people ’ s expectations and demands for more sophisti-

cated protection and services, or from the greater

variety of skills, knowledge, and resources required for

even small operations to get started and sustain them-

selves. As the setting changes, organizations of greater

sophistication, encompassing specialized tasks and

units that have to be kept in balance with one an-

other, will make their appearance. As a result, coordi-

nation and the conduct of relations with other highly

specialized organizations, necessitated by a fi ner and

fi ner division of labor and rising interdependence in

the system, will become separate functions ( Kaufman

1985, 107 – 8 ).

An important characteristic of the homeland security

environment that bears on the eff ectiveness of the

organizational model chosen is that it is neither

simple nor static. New threats and new expectations

for dealing with them are emerging as the govern-

ment organizations themselves change. For example,

to address the changing scene of the intelligence

function, Congress has created, along with the DHS,

the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist

Th reat Integration Center, and the Terrorist Screen-

ing Center. All of these now inhabit the immediate

environment of the DHS. Th e department, which

once was thought to be the designated coordinator

for intelligence, has now witnessed the creation of a

separate Offi ce of the Director of National Intelli-

gence. Th e coordination of intelligence has become a

separate function, as Kaufman might have predicted,

and now the secretary of homeland security has

designated an assistant secretary for information

analysis as its chief intelligence offi cer to provide the

primary connection between the DHS and others

within the intelligence community, including pre-

sumably the Offi ce of the Director of National

Intelligence (Chertoff 2005b, 12). In eff ect,

Secretary Chertoff has ceded the overall intelli gence

coordination function to the new national

director of intelligence.

Th e planned interaction of a new or changed organiza-

tion inevitably comes to terms with the complex and

changing environment into which it is inserted, and the

assumptions of what is required for coordinated organi-

zational performance are often not met and things are

left out. Th us, the plan for the DHS to be the main

coordinator of intelligence faced a much more complex

intelligence environment and had to be altered. Reorga-

nizations are not undertaken for their own sake but to

facilitate change in the operation and behavior of orga-

nizations and people engaged in common enterprises.

In the case of response to natural disasters, the issue is

how to cause change in the operations of a signifi cant

number of federal, state, local, and private-sector

organizations so that their eff orts mesh eff ectively.

As indicated previously, the choice of organizational

structure needs to take into account both the nature

of the tasks to be performed and the nature of the

environment. Although there is not room here to

engage in a comprehensive task analysis, it is clear that

various categories of homeland security tasks diff er

suffi ciently, and these diff erences have implications for

organizational design. For response, the nature of the

task — saving lives in a defi ned geographic area —

demands fast action and unity of eff ort. Th ere is more

or less widespread agreement that the normal preroga-

tives of jurisdiction and processes of governance in a

federal system of shared powers with separate bureau-

cracies must be minimized and give way to decisive

and unifi ed action.

Recovery shares some similarities with response in that

the activity focuses on a defi ned geographic location.

Many more activities are involved, however, and

jurisdictional prerogatives and processes of governance

must be allowed to play a part in recovery decisions.

Th e rebuilding of New Orleans is an example in

which the various branches of government have both

shared and independent responsibilities and key roles

in decision making and involving citizens in forums

to express their preferences.

For preparedness and mitigation, the activities are

even more diverse, programs are innumerable, time

frames are elongated, and decision making and

implementation are spread over the entire country.

More emphasis is placed on diff erentiated needs

and circumstances and the need to gain acceptance

from multiple stakeholders acting through multiple

312 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

governance and decision-making processes. Th ese are

not pure types, of course. For example, in order for

response to be eff ective, planning and groundwork

must be done to set an agreed-upon framework that

will be employed in actual response eff orts. Such a

response framework cannot be imposed by any one

agency, offi cial, or jurisdiction but must involve the

actions of multiple interacting networks.

For a basic framework of organization that embraces

most of the characteristics of the task, the network

model most closely represents what is required.

However, as most organization designers have long

acknowledged, combination models are most often

appropriate. Th us, even though the network model

lends itself most appropriately to the overall frame-

work for organization of homeland security, the

hierarchical model still has a valuable role to play,

especially in response. In fact, the NIMS explicitly

incorporates recognition of this proposition. Th e

Incident Command System within the NIMS explic-

itly specifi es that in incidents involving multiple

jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with multiagency

involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multi-

agency involvement, there must be a unifi ed chain

of command with an orderly line of authority, and

incident managers at all levels must be able to control

the actions of the personnel under their supervision.

Th e incident command organizational structure devel-

ops in a top-down, modular fashion based on the size

and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifi cs

of the hazard environment (DHS 2004b, 10 – 11). Th e

response during Katrina experienced problems with

unity of command and the NIMS. Actions are needed

to modify or supplement the NIMS to remedy the

observed defi ciencies. Having two military chains of

command that in turn are separate from the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security chain of command

clearly needs fi xing, for example.

Taking all the functions together, using the network

model for the base framework best accommodates the

conditions surrounding homeland security — the

complexity of the homeland security environment and

the rate of change in it; the multijurisdictional and

multiorganizational makeup of the homeland security

space; and the nature of the functions to be

performed. Within that framework, the adoption of

other models for certain functions, such as the hierar-

chical model as the framework for incident command,

is feasible and advisable. What is not appropriate is to

set the framework for all of homeland security accord-

ing to the hierarchical model. “ Finally, this means that

the homeland security challenge is primarily a chal-

lenge of interagency and intergovernmental aff airs. In

this instance, the concept of putting a single offi cial in

charge of homeland security and holding him or her

accountable is a management and organizational pipe

dream ” ( Donley and Pollard 2002, 138 ).

At the time that the DHS was created, there was little

consideration given in the legislative process to the

continuing unstable environment of homeland secu-

rity and the network model, and therefore little plan-

ning for the continuing organizational adaptation that

would be needed for the evolving nature of the home-

land security functions and the multiorganizational

and multijurisdictional arrangements that would be

required to fulfi ll the numerous functions. Instead,

the deliberations quickly focused on the hierarchical

approach. Applying a strict federal hierarchical ap-

proach at this juncture to try to encompass all the

risks, functions, and geographical locations involved

in homeland security is unlikely to cause signifi cant

systemic behavioral change. As discussed earlier, this is

not to say that for certain subfunctions, such as inci-

dent command, there should be no changes. Clarify-

ing the incident command structure is certainly in

order. But for the overall organizational framework of

homeland security, insisting on more hierarchy insuf-

fi ciently recognizes (1) the homeland security system

is not the province of one federal department, even

the DHS, but many, each with its own authorities and

responsibilities fi xed in separate federal laws; (2) the

plural nature of our federal system, which creates

shared authority among the federal government and

the states ( Khademian 2006, 1106 ); and (3) the need

to change organization as the homeland security

situation changes.

Th e multifunctional and multiorganizational world of

homeland security in the United States is populated

by multiple networks, and managerial craftsmanship

is required to develop the capacity for these various

networks and the organizations that populate them to

work collaboratively toward the evolving goals of

homeland security (Wise 2002a, 141 – 42). “ An eff ec-

tive, homeland security functional system will be

composed of thousands of matrixed networks that are

dynamically interacting to share information and

foster imagination, adaptability, and eff ective opera-

tional management ” ( Clayton and Haverty 2005, 5 ).

Eff ective emergency networks cannot just include

government agencies or even agencies and nonprofi ts.

Large corporations have their own emergency

management systems, separate from and parallel to

those of government. For example, during Katrina,

Wal-Mart handed over 25 of its facilities to the relief

eff ort for use as supply depots, shelters, and even a

dialysis clinic. In Kenner, Louisiana, just north of the

New Orleans airport, in the fi rst critical days, more

than 90 percent of the city ’ s supplies were coming

from Wal-Mart. Kenner ’ s fi re chief stated, “ If we had

waited on the state and federal government, we

would ’ ve starved to death, no joking ” ( Freedberg

2005 ). However, John Engler, the president of the

National Association of Manufacturers, observed that

one of the problems for businesses in Louisiana was

Organizing for Homeland Security 313

not knowing the right point of contact. Engler said,

“ You had trucks in staging areas, full of supplies,

stuck. I don ’ t think that there ’ s one right way to do it,

but what ’ s clearly wrong is not having a plan, not

contemplating the potential for outside help, and not

having a way to manage that ” ( Freedberg 2005 ).

Many off ers of help from businesses came into FEMA

headquarters, and FEMA set up a toll-free hotline to

handle them — but only after Katrina had made

landfall.

An Adaptive Management Model for Homeland Security Th e pertinent question for “ knitting together, ” to

borrow President Bush ’ s term, all the organizations

that make up the homeland security networks is, what

is required for eff ective network management? As

Agranoff has found, organizational participants in

action networks come together as representatives of

diff erent governmental, quasi-governmental, and

nongovernmental organizations, with all of their

attendant aims, rules, and procedures. “ Th ey must

decide, but they do not have hierarchical authority.

Instead, the kind of action they take is based on nego-

tiated adjustment while applying extant knowledge

and simultaneously going through a learning process ”

(Agranoff , forthcoming, 391). In the homeland secu-

rity context, agencies and managers must respond to

uncertain events, which creates inherent problems for

designing policies and procedures. When uncertainty

is the rule and the magnitude, scope, and timing of

the response required by the emergency are complex

and unknown, ordinary instruments of planning are

inadequate ( Comfort 1988; Johnson 1999 ). To over-

come uncertain environments, managers must de-

velop organizational learning capacity by employing

three rational processes: risk assessment, information

feedback to decision makers, and adjustment of per-

formance based on current information ( Chen et al.

2003; Comfort 1988 , 2002; Holling 1978 ).

Given the turbulent environment of homeland secu-

rity and the ongoing reorganization process aff ecting

homeland security organizations, the most suitable

approach seems to be adaptive management. Adaptive

management techniques provide managers the ability

to ensure that decisions are used as an opportunity for

organizational learning (Graham and Kruger 2002;

Holling 1978 ). Adaptive management is an iterative

process, calling for the integration of science and

management, treating policies as experiments from

which managers can learn (Graham and Kruger 2002;

Holling 1978; Johnson 1999; Lee 1993 ). Th e adaptive

method requires managers to change their approach as

new information arrives ( Alexander 2002 ). Th is mode

of management diff ers from traditional forms of man-

agement by emphasizing the importance of feedback

in shaping policy, followed by further systematic

experimentation and evaluation (Graham and Kruger

2002; McLain and Lee 1996 ). Adaptive management

is premised on the notion that the knowledge avail-

able to a manager is always incomplete and that sur-

prise is an inevitable component of implementation

( Holling 1978; Saveland 1989 ). Th e process of adap-

tive management diff ers from a number of other more

traditional approaches to making management deci-

sions ( Johnson 1999 ).

Adaptive management begins by bringing together

interested stakeholders to discuss the problem and any

available data, then moving on to develop models of

the problem ( Johnson 1999 ). Once stakeholders are

brought together for discussion and modeling, adap-

tive managers develop plans to meet goals and gener-

ate information to reduce data gaps and uncertainties

( Johnson 1999 ). Management plans are then imple-

mented along with monitoring plans designed to

analyze data and update managers ’ understanding of

how the adopted approach worked in practice

( Johnson 1999 ). At the end of the process, results are

monitored to evaluate the progress achieved by the

management approach taken (Shindler, Cheek, and

Stankey 1999). Adaptive management thus entails

an ongoing collaborative relationship among

separate organizations that come together to achieve

common goals.

Adaptive management is suggested for use in framing

the overall management approach to assist in the

management of homeland security networks. It is not

meant as a substitute for functional management

protocols and systems such as the Incident Command

System, which is based on the hierarchical model.

Nonetheless, facilitative frameworks to permit the

practice of adaptive management are needed.

Conclusion: Implementing Adaptive Management For this phase of organizing, policy makers have the

opportunity to include a focus on establishing frame-

works that can facilitate an adaptive management

approach. Th e establishment of such facilitating orga-

nizational frameworks is not without precedent in the

federal government. Th e GAO recently completed a

study of three collaborative eff orts in which federal

agencies worked across agency lines to achieve com-

mon objectives. Th e eff orts involved nonfederal part-

ners as well. Although the collaborative eff orts studied

did not each encompass the entire adaptive manage-

ment model, they are nonetheless instructive. Th e

study identifi ed the following key practices to sustain

collaboration among federal agencies:

● Defi ning and articulating a common outcome

● Establishing mutually reinforcing or joint

strategies to achieve the outcome

● Identifying and addressing needs by leveraging

resources

314 Public Administration Review • May | June 2006

● Agreeing on agency roles and responsibilities

● Establishing compatible policies, procedures,

and other means to operate across agency

boundaries

● Developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,

and report the results of collaborative eff orts ● Reinforcing agency accountability for

collaborative eff orts through agency plans and

reports ● Reinforcing individual accountability for

collaborative eff orts through agency performance-

management systems ● Involving nonfederal partners, key clients, and

stakeholders in decision making

Th e study also found that agencies could strengthen

their commitment to work collaboratively by articu-

lating their agreements in formal documents, such as

memoranda of understanding, interagency guidance,

or interagency planning documents, signed by senior

offi cials in their respective agencies (GAO 2005g,

10 – 11). Th us, there are precedents for collaborative

frameworks that provide a platform for adaptive man-

agement that could potentially be utilized in home-

land security and do not necessarily require wholesale

formal reorganization. Strengthening collaboration is

not the only organizational step required; strengthen-

ing the capacity of individual organizations, such as

FEMA, is also necessary.

Adaptive management is not a panacea for solving all

the problems experienced during Katrina or all the

problems in homeland security more generally. It is not

a substitute for suffi cient professional personnel who are

well trained or for astute leadership and decision mak-

ing. Establishing collaborative relationships also does

not mean there is no room for formal organization. On

the contrary, it means putting into place a formal frame-

work that facilitates the interpersonal interaction across

agency, intergovernmental, and intersectoral boundaries

and at multiple levels. What is required for homeland

security is for professionals at various levels to work

across boundaries, plan and negotiate future activities,

and communicate during operations to resolve unantici-

pated problems. From this perspective, the goal of any

adjustments in formal structure is to facilitate collabora-

tive decision making at multiple levels rather than fi x

decision making in one person or organization at each

level, which is then expected to resolve the myriad issues

that arise on an unpredictable basis.

Acknowledgments Th e author gratefully acknowledges the helpful com-

ments of professors Trevor Brown and Lois Wise on

earlier drafts of this article.

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