Wilson2006Atwillemploymentandracialinequality.pdf

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Review of Public Personnel Administration, Vol. 26, No. 2 June 2006 178-187 DOI: 10.1177/0734371X06287736 © 2006 Sage Publications

RESEARCH NOTE

The Rise of At-Will Employment and Racial Inequality in the Public Sector GEORGE WILSON University of Miami

This article assesses several likely consequences of moving from a traditional tenure to an at-will system of employment for patterns of racial inequality in the public sector. On the basis of these consequences, it is argued that an at-will system may negate the long-standing status of the public arena as the labor mar- ket niche for African Americans. The broad discretion of employers may increase susceptibility of African Americans to discrimination-induced job dismissals. In addition, employment at will may reduce the social-psychological benefits traditionally associated with government employment.

Keywords: public sector; employment; race; inequality

Social scientists have long recognized that the socioeconomic attainmentsof racial and ethnic minority groups vary across locations in the American labor market (Collins, 1997; Model, 1985; Waldinger, 1996). “Niches” sig- nify locations where the socioeconomic attainments of racial/ethnic group members are more favorable than other locations in the market (Burstein, 1985; Model, 1985; Waldinger, 1996). Accordingly, a niche is not necessar- ily where a numerical majority of racial/ethnic group members work. Rather, a niche is a “segment of the labor market in which a disproportionate number of racial/ethnic group members in that segment achieve socioeconomic suc- cess” (Model, 1985, p. 114) and where “minority group incumbents, partic- ularly in favorable occupational slots, achieve relative parity in economic outcomes with members from other ethnic groups” (p. 116).

This article addresses evolving patterns of racial inequality of African Americans in their labor market niche—the public sector. In particular, it addresses several likely race-specific consequences as the rules governing employment change from the long-standing system based on tenure to one predicated on principles of at-will employment (Bowman, Gertz, Gertz, &

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Williams, 2003; Green, Golden, Forbis, Nelson, & Robinson, in press; West, 2002). On the basis of these consequences, the rise of at-will employment may negate the status of the public sector as the labor market niche for African Americans. Most important, the discretion of employers may increase suscep- tibility to discrimination-induced job dismissals. In addition, the advent of an at-will system may disproportionately reduce the social-psychological benefits—job satisfaction and organizational commitment or loyalty— traditionally associated with public employment.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR—A LABOR MARKET NICHE FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS

The public sector has constituted the niche in the labor market for African Americans throughout the post-1965 civil rights era (Collins, 1997; Wilson, 1997). In particular, since the end of World War II, the government—at both the federal and state levels—has made a concerted effort to overcome negative economic consequences associated with discrimination in the pri- vate sector. It has done so by creating opportunities for African Americans to “find a haven in which to achieve a significant level of success” (Burstein, 1985, p. 113). However, it was not until the 1960s, when the welfare state expanded and issues of equality became a priority, that government assumed its most activist posture in providing meaningful employment for African Americans in jobs that span the professions and managerial ranks (Collins, 1997; Wilson, 1997).

The contemporary record regarding the socioeconomic attainments of African Americans in the public sector is mixed. First, in an absolute sense, there is inequality in the representation of African Americans across different levels of the public sector. Analyses of state- and federal-level data indicate that African Americans continue to be underrepresented in middle- and upper- middle-class positions that include managers, executives, and professionals (Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995; Greene, Selden, & Brewer, 2001; Riccucci & Seidel, 1997). Second, across levels of the public sector in privileged posi- tions, African Americans tend to be disproportionately allocated into jobs that offer lesser rewards than positions typically filled by Whites. Specifically, at both state and federal levels, African Americans are channeled into jobs that entail performing inferior-rewarded functions devoted to redistributing socioeconomic resources and serving as liaisons to community groups rather than more generously rewarded functions concerning regulating the scope and functions of government (Collins, 1997; Colvin & Riccucci, 2003).

Nevertheless, despite these indicators of racial inequality, the criteria used to designate a segment of the labor market as an economic niche are

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satisfied in the case of African Americans in the public sector. First, the Glass Ceiling Commission (1995) found that African Americans achieve greater levels of representation in privileged positions at both state and fed- eral levels of the public sector than in the private sector. Second, recent research demonstrates that for a variety of socioeconomic outcomes includ- ing income (Farley & Allen, 1989) and rates of promotion (Smith, 1997), African Americans in privileged positions achieve greater levels of relative parity with similarly situated Whites in state and federal government than in the private sector.

Evidence of the public sector as a niche is presented from the 2004 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally representative data set that tracks labor market patterns of African Americans and Whites (Hill, 1985). Table 1 presents descriptive analyses that identify the representation of African Americans and Whites in positions that offer reward-relevant decision-making responsibility in the public and private sectors. Three hierarchical levels of job authority are derived from the PSID: none if respondent did not supervise any workers on the job, low if respon- dent had supervisory authority but had no say over the pay or promotion of others, and high if respondent had both supervisory authority and say over pay or promotion.

Table 1 illustrates that African Americans are more advantaged in the public than in the private sphere in terms of their distribution across the authority hierarchy. Several findings stand out. First, the racial gap favor- ing Whites over African Americans in representation at the high level in the public sector (7.9%) is less than one half the gap in the private sector (20.3%). The second derives from the index of dissimilarity (∆), which measures the proportion of people who would have to move to other levels in the table to achieve equality in the distribution of job authority. The dissimilarity index across sectors indicates that about 2 1/2 times the amount of people would have to change authority levels in the private sector (27.8%) as the public sector (11.0%) to achieve parity.

Table 2 presents income ratios for African American and Whites rela- tive to Whites across selected levels of work experience in one working- class (clerical/operatives) and one middle-class (managers/administrators), 2000 census-based occupational category in the public and private sectors.

Inequities favoring Whites are smaller across both categories in the public sector. In both class categories in the public arena, African Americans earn between 80 and 95 cents for every dollar earned by Whites; in the private sector, the proportion earned by African Americans ranges between 68% and 75% of the amount earned by Whites.

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TRADITIONAL BENEFITS OF WORKING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

One of the most important benefits of working in the public sector derives from job security (Condrey & Maranto, 2001; Green et al., in press). Tenure serves dual purposes. At the organizational level, security facilitates state responsiveness: It helps to ensure the efficient and uninter- rupted delivery of services (Peters, 2001). For workers, security facilitates uninterrupted material benefits and career status through protection from

Table 1. Levels of Supervisory Authority Among African Americans and Whites

Public Sector Private Sector

African Whites Difference African Whites Difference Americans (%) (%) (%) Americans (%) (%) (%)

Authority level High 11.6 19.5 7.9 5.2 25.0 20.3 Low 21.4 24.5 3.1 14.5 22.5 8.0 None 67.0 56.0 80.3 52.5 Total 100.0 100.0 ∆ = 11.0 100.0 100.0 ∆ = 27.8

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2004.

Table 2. Annual Income Ratios for African Americans Relative to Whites at Selected Levels of Workforce Experience in Middle-Class and Working- Class Occupations

Private Sector

Years in Workforce

1 3 5 7 9

Managers/administrators (middle) .72 .74 .77 .75 .70 Clerical/operatives (working) .68 .71 .73 .70 .69

Public Sector

Years in Workforce

1 3 5 7 9

Managers/administrators (middle) .84 .86 .85 .83 .87 Clerical/operatives (working) .82 .80 .84 .85 .82

Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 2004.

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arbitrary job dismissals—namely, layoffs and firing—without “just cause” (Peters, 2001).

A second benefit of public employment is social psychological in nature. African Americans enjoy relatively high levels of job satisfaction and organi- zational commitment or loyalty. Satisfaction is defined as “a cluster of evalu- ative feelings related to the sense of gratification and enjoyment derived from the work one performs” (Tuch & Martin, 1991, p. 107). Organizational commitment has been defined as “an attitude related to identifying with an organization’s goals and purposes” (Scholl, 1981, p. 588).

A distillation of several studies addressing the distribution of satisfaction and organizational commitment across sectors reveals that in the early 1990s, incumbents in both middle- and working-class positions in the federal govern- ment had higher mean rates along both experiential domains than did workers in similar positions in the private sector (Knudsen, Martin, Martin, & Roman, 2003; Tuch & Martin, 1991). These sectoral differences have important reper- cussions. Levels of both job satisfaction and loyalty or commitment are related to workplace-based performance measures such as employee absenteeism and turnover (Hall, 1986), worker productivity (Hanson, Martin, & Tuch, 1987), and workplace injuries and accidents (Hanson et al., 1987). They also influence several socioemotional states that are experienced outside of the workplace, such as stress (Hall, 1986) and depression (Hanson et al. 1987).

Literature in the social sciences has analyzed the dynamics of job satis- faction and organizational commitment (for reviews, see Tuch & Martin, 1991). This research indicates there is considerable overlap in the under- lying determinants of both multidimensional constructs. In particular, “expectations for job certainty” (Tuch & Martin, 1991, p. 107) and “intrinsic nature of work” (Hall, 1986, p. 34) undergird satisfaction and commitment. The “certainty” dimension refers to “expectations for con- tinued employment” (Hall, 1986, p. 112), and the intrinsic work dimen- sion refers to degree of routinization of job tasks (Tuch & Martin, 1991). It also refers to engaging in work functions that serve the “broader public good” (Kalleberg, 1977, p. 140).

DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT POLICY BY RACE

At-Will Employment and Job Dismissals

There is a solid basis for arguing that the implementation of at-will employment in the public sector will have disproportionately negative

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consequences for African Americans (Green et al., in press; Walters, 2002; Wilson, 1997). Most critically, the loss of job security will render African Americans disproportionately vulnerable to “the most glaring negative stratification-event in the workplace” (Zwerling & Silver, 1992, p. 653): job dismissal (which includes both layoffs and firings).

The possibility that African Americans are disproportionately sus- ceptible to dismissals pursuant to the advent of at-will reforms derives from research on its discriminatory bases in the private sector, where at- will employment predominates (Wilson & McBrier, 2005). Accordingly, dynamics regarding at-will employment in business are a likely indication of their effect on the public sector. In fact, subtle, institutional dynamics associated with “modern racial prejudice” (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 336) con- stitute the underpinnings of race-specific rates of job dismissal. Specifi- cally, discrimination is manifested in its disproportionate impact on African Americans, rather than by individual ill will or malice, and tends to fall outside of the scope of legally enforceable guidelines (Wilson, 1997).

Research on private sector dynamics traces the source of racial inequal- ity in dismissals to the discretion employers exercise in evaluating employ- ees. Discretion constitutes the primary basis for assessments, which, in turn, are the typical cause of firings (Zwerling & Silver, 1992), and employ- ers use them in determining who will be subject to layoffs (Wilson & McBrier, 2005). Studies document that discretion takes the form of “par- ticularism” (Wilson, 1997, p. 41), that is, evaluations are based on a range of personal characteristics that are vaguely defined and difficult to measure directly—such as perceived loyalty, good character, sound judgment, and leadership potential (Kluegel, 1978; Wilson, 1997).

Significantly, African Americans suffer from a relative lack of opportu- nity to demonstrate the requisite personal characteristics, and this triggers discriminatory dynamics. For example, reduced access to crucial informal social networks exacerbates cognitive biases such as “statistical discrimina- tion” (Wilson, 1997, p. 41) and “attribution bias” (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 333). Consequently, African Americans tend to be assessed on selective bases that reaffirm negative stereotypes about capacity for, and levels of, productivity at work. Conversely, Whites have the opportunity to demonstrate the requisite personal characteristics on a relatively “merito- cratic and individualistic basis” (Wilson, 1997, p. 53). As such, they are more likely to be assessed on the basis of the “natural occurring distribu- tion of relevant personal characteristics” (Wilson & McBrier, 2005, p. 1184).1

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At-Will Employment and Social-Psychological Benefits

There is also a foundation for believing the rise of at-will employment may handicap African Americans more than Whites in terms of the social- psychological benefits, job satisfaction, and organizational loyalty or com- mitment, traditionally associated with working in the public sector. First, African Americans are more burdened than are Whites if the two groups experience similar levels of reduction in job satisfaction and organizational commitment pursuant to the rise of at-will reforms. African Americans suf- fer a loss where they perform best in the labor market. As such, the nega- tive impact on the most substantial concentration of the privileged among the African American population signals a significant loss for the group as a whole. Conversely, reduction in levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment pursuant to the advent of at-will employment is, arguably, not as major a setback for Whites. They continue to disproportionately enjoy the benefits of incumbency in privileged positions in segments of the private sector, their labor market niche (Waldinger, 1996).

Second, there is reason to suspect that African Americans will experi- ence greater reductions in job satisfaction and organizational commitment than Whites if an at-will system is implemented. In particular, with the advent of at-will employment, African Americans’ sentiments along cru- cial underlying determinants of both satisfaction and organizational com- mitment would be more adversely affected than Whites’. For example, levels of perceived job certainty, an underpinning of both experiential domains, would, presumably, decrease more for African Americans than for Whites if they became more susceptible to discriminatory job dis- missals. Similarly, discrimination-induced dismissals disproportionately reduce beliefs among African Americans that working in the public sector is associated with an additional advantage of job satisfaction and organi- zational commitment—“laboring for the public good.” To the extent that the “public good” is social and/or racial justice, positive levels of satisfac- tion and organizational commitment, which are predicated on justice in the workplace, are undermined by discriminatory practices.

CONCLUSION

Scholars and policy makers continue to debate the merits of moving from a tenured to an at-will system of employment. In the context of these debates, however, scant attention has been paid to the implications of this transition for racial inequality. Using the private sector—where at-will employment is

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prevalent—as a baseline, it is maintained that the adoption of an at-will system will likely increase levels of racial inequality in the public sector. Most important, the broad discretion of employers will likely increase susceptibility of African Americans to discriminatory job dismissals. In addition, the advent of an at-will system may disproportionately reduce the social-psychological benefits traditionally associated with government employment.

These consequences may negate the long-standing status of the public sector as the labor market niche for African Americans. Accordingly, the decades-long commitment to equal economic opportunity will suffer a setback if an at-will system is instituted. It is in the segment of the labor market that has for generations served as a source of relatively stable and remunerative employment for African Americans that levels of inequality will come to increasingly resemble those in the private sector. Without the public sector serving as a “socioeconomic safety-net” (Edsall & Edsall, 1991, p. 78) for African Americans, the growing class differentiation that has been a hallmark of the African American population in the civil rights era will be reversed, making race a more fundamental cleavage that deter- mines life-chance opportunities.

In sum, implementing an at-will system will likely erode decades of socioe- conomic gains made by African Americans. This possibility should merit the attention of policy makers when weighing the positive and negative conse- quences of implementing an at-will system of employment. Few concerns should be considered more fundamental in determining whether adopting at- will employment in the public sector is appropriate public policy.

NOTE

1. Under certain circumstances, discretion can benefit racial/ethnic minorities. For example, in situations in which patronage produces co-racial/ethnic minority group deci- sion makers, the dynamics of discrimination outlined here are less salient, and minorities can benefit. Nevertheless, the continuing underrepresentation of minorities at both state and federal levels in decision-making positions continues to make minorities the victims, rather than the beneficiaries, of discretion.

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GEORGE WILSON is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Miami. His research interests focus on the institutional production of racial and ethnic inequality in the American workplace and the social structural determinants and policy-related consequences of adherence to tenets of American stratification ideology.

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