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8 GLOBAL CONFLICT: WAR, TERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 7 we explored perhaps the most pressing issue of global ethics: the huge injustice of global poverty and global disparities in wealth. Th is chapter will address an equally challenging issue for global ethics: that of war, confl ict, terrorism and all forms of military intervention. A key diff erence between war and confl ict and issues of global poverty is that the suff ering and violations of human rights that arise in war and confl ict are always caused by human agency. War and confl ict is always someone’s responsibility, so if the “harm principle” (a negative duty not to harm) we discussed in Chapter 3 holds, it should be at least possible to map duties of com- pensation and redress, even if it is diffi cult to enforce these in practice. In Chapter 6 we considered arguments about who had duties to meet the needs of the poor and, in this chapter, similar arguments will be considered about duties to those who are suff ering from confl ict, particularly in the fi nal section on humanitarian interven- tion. In addition, issues that we have discussed in all the previous chapters about the scope of global duties and whether or not there are duties to distant others come to the fore when we consider the ethics of war and confl ict.

Questions about whether political violence is ever justifi ed are at the heart of global ethics. Violence and killing are unethical acts. Th e question is not whether these are “good” acts. Th ey are not. Th e question is whether they can ever be justi- fi ed. For example, is violence permissible if it prevents worse violence? Answering this question remains one of the most diffi cult ethical conundrums. For while there is general agreement that violence is wrong, there is also a general acceptance that in some instances it is permissible: for example, in self- defence, to prevent atro- city, to protect the vulnerable or as an action of last resort. But, even if one does wish to argue that violence is permissible in certain circumstances, characterizing exactly what these circumstances are is no easy matter. Moreover, as diffi cult as it is

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to characterize such situations for individuals, it is even more diffi cult to do it for larger groups and for states where violence becomes institutionalized and politically sanctioned, as it does when wars are waged.

For those who think that violence is sometimes permissible – pacifi sts believe that violence, whether individual or state, is never justifi ed – much ethical time and eff ort is given to attempting to characterize those circumstances where violence is justifi ed. It is the attempt to clarify this issue that explains the posing of familiar ethical questions: would it have been ethically acceptable to kill Hitler or Stalin (or any other “evil” leader whose actions resulted in the death of millions) as a child? In other words, is preventative violence acceptable and justifi able in instances where the “perpetrator” is still innocent? If we expand this to state violence, is it acceptable and justifi able to engage in war “pre- emptively” to prevent a bloodier later confl ict? Th is has become a key issue in contemporary debates about wars, for example, to prevent “rogue states” from acquiring nuclear weapons or other WMD, or to prevent mass starvation or ethnic confl ict; we shall return to this later issue in the last section, on humanitarian intervention.

Th is chapter will address key issues of global confl ict, particularly whether or not the use of force can ever be justifi ed. It will consider traditional “just- war” approaches that claim that force can be justifi ed for humanitarian reasons. It will consider con- temporary forms of warfare, such as terrorism, and the extent to which traditional frameworks for assessing the ethical validity of war are appropriate, and will build on the discussion of torture in Chapter 5 to continue the debate about individual and communal rights. In these ways the distinctive elements of war and confl ict as ethical issues in the contemporary global context will be assessed.

JUST- WAR THEORY

Th e traditional way ethicists have judged whether state violence is permissible is by the application of “just- war” theory. Just- war theory is a mechanism to determine the circumstances in which war is justifi ed. Moreover, it aims to control, limit and oft en even forbid war and, importantly, it attempts to respect the humanity of the enemy and to uphold morality even in times of confl ict. It is intended to be used before a confl ict to help leaders decide whether it is permissible to engage in war, but is also used aft er the event to determine whether or not the war was justifi ed. At the time of writing in 2010, for example, the debate continues over whether the US- led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which we shall use as an example throughout this chapter) was, all things considered, justifi ed or whether it was nothing of the sort and even constitutes a war crime. Both defenders and critics of the Iraq War commonly evoke arguments and concepts employed in just- war theory. For example, some critics say

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that it was a purely aggressive act of war that had nothing to do with defence (even though it was disingenuously publicized as necessary for international security) and therefore cannot be considered just. Some supporters claim that it was reasonable to suppose at the time that Saddam Hussein was developing WMD and that therefore this risk provided a good enough reason – a just cause – for invading, even though that supposition later turned out to be largely false. Others argue that the regime was so unjust that the aim of changing that regime was suffi cient to justify this confl ict.

Just- war thinking is infl uential and it is this thinking that has shaped much of the international law and codes of practice on confl ict that are accepted by the member states of the UN. Just- war theory addresses two aspects of warfare:

• Jus ad bellum: the justice of going to war. • Jus in bello: the justice of the conduct of war.

Distinguishing between these two aspects of war is important, since a war might be justifi ed in that a violent response was necessary, for example to prevent greater vio- lence or numbers of casualties. However, if the conduct of war is not all that it should be, for example, innocents are killed or unethical weapons or tactics are used, then going to war might be justifi ed but the practice of war render it unethical. Conversely, one could have a confl ict that was deemed unjust in that it should never have been begun, but the combatants could have nonetheless behaved justly, or honourably, in perpetrating the (unjust) confl ict. Depending on the questions you are trying to answer, you will focus on either jus ad bellum or jus in bello. If we consider the recent confl ict between the Western coalition and Iraq, both issues arise. For example, ad bellum questions can be asked over whether going to war was justifi ed. Were there good enough reasons to go to war? Here relevant matters might include whether or not those who declared war believed (and had suffi cient reason to believe) that there were WMDs and therefore a global threat. Th ere are also in bello questions: for example, accusations of torture at Abu Ghraib (mentioned in the case study for Chapter 5) would fall into this category.

JUS AD BELLUM

Just- war thinking has a long philosophical history and the modern framework for this thought owes much to Christian scholars, particularly Augustine, whose work on war in On the City of God (written in the fi ft h century ce) infl uenced Aquinas. Aquinas’s work on war can be found in his famous work Summa Th eologica, written around 1270. Th ere he sets out three moral criteria or principles that have become the basis of all subsequent just- war theory. Aquinas is primarily concerned with jus

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ad bellum, or what justifi es or legitimizes the resort to war and violence, rather than with how war should be conducted. For Aquinas it is possible for a war to be justi- fi ed if it meets three criteria. First, it must be waged on the authority of a legitimate prince. Aquinas was concerned that war was not waged for private interests, but in the best interests of the “common weal of the city”. In more contemporary language, a legitimate war should not serve the interests of the few but those of the majority and therefore serve the common good or public interest. Second, a “just cause” is required; in other words war should be waged only in order to right some wrong or other. Examples Aquinas uses include avenging wrongs and making amends for wrongs infl icted on subjects, or restoring that which has been unjustly seized. Th is raises issues not just of whether a war can be just, if its cause is just, but also whether there is a duty to wage war on behalf of others to redress wrongs, for example in a case where the subjects of a state are suff ering and being wronged. Th is is an issue we shall consider in a later section on humanitarian intervention. Th ird, a “right intention” is required: the intention must be to bring about better circumstances, not to infl ict harm or to attain power.

Since Aquinas, these three have been expanded and now include: legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, probability of success, last resort and propor- tionality (Box 8.1). Th ese appear in diff erent orders in diff erent lists. Yet, priority is not signifi cant in determining just war because all the principles must be met for a war to be just. Sometimes a seventh principle is also included: comparative justice. Th is principle requires that in order for the resort to the use of force to be permis- sible, the injustice suff ered by the party using the force must be signifi cantly greater than that suff ered by the party being forced. In other words, in a situation of confl ict, while someone may not be fully or perfectly justifi ed in attacking, they may be more

Box 8.1 The six criteria for a just war

1. A just war must be waged by a legitimate authority. It cannot be waged by a private body and usually this “legitimate authority” is interpreted as meaning a state.

2. A just war must have a just cause. It must be waged for a good reason; possible reasons might include self- defence or to prevent a greater injustice.

3. A just war must have a right intention. It can only be for good purposes, not for attaining goods or power.

4. A just war must have a strong probability of success. A war in a futile cause is not just.

5. A just war must be a last resort. All reasonable peaceful alternatives must have been seriously explored and exhausted.

6. A just war must be proportional. The principle of proportionality requires that a just war must have benefi ts that are proportionate to the anticipated harms.

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justifi ed than the side they attack, in which case they may be permitted to do so by this principle.

Applying just- war theory

Despite the fact that just- war thinking has been hugely infl uential in shaping inter- national law and global norms regarding when war is justifi able, employing the theory in actual cases is no easy matter. Each criterion is open to diff erent inter- pretations and in practice this leads to huge disagreements about which wars are in fact just and which forms of conduct are possible. Interpreting just- war theory has always been a diffi cult task and, arguably, this has increased in the contemporary global context, when wars are typically not between states (and certainly not between the rival princely states that Augustine and Aquinas envisaged). For instance, recent “global” wars are characterized by forms of guerrilla warfare, insurgency and so- called humanitarian interventions. None of these fi t the model of two states at war with each other, and this makes a number of just- war criteria problematic. For instance, can non- state actors (such as guerrilla groups) ever have legitimate authority? Does legitimate authority require a UN sanction in current systems of global govern- ance? Moreover, no longer is a typical war one where two armies fi ght each other at a battleground, and the war is tracked through a number of discernible battles. When wars were fought like this it was relatively simple (especially when soldiers wore uniforms of primary colours) to recognize who was a combatant and who was not. In many current global confl icts it is oft en exceptionally diffi cult to distinguish between non- combatants and combatants. Problematic as this is in many situations, it becomes even more complex in even less traditional “wars”, as we shall discuss later, concerning the “war on terror”. However, although such questions make the just- war criteria more diffi cult to apply, the complexity of current warfare arguably makes applying them even more necessary. Th e more diffi cult it is to determine the moral rightness or wrongness of a war, the more mechanisms to do this are needed. Th us, the complexities in application and interpretation do make just- war theory less simple than it might fi rst appear and it is oft en possible for those on both sides of a given confl ict to argue, using just- war principles, that it is their side that is justifi ed. Because the complexities are in the interpretation, it is important to think about the kind of issues that arise when applying just- war theory to confl icts.

1. Legitimate authority

Th e criterion of legitimate authority was originally intended to stop wars between rival families and factions and to ensure that something as important as going to

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war was in the relatively safe hands of a lawful authority (whether a sovereign or a recognized ruling body). Th e criterion is intended to ensure that war is not waged for private ends. For Augustine and Aquinas, what constituted legitimate authority was relatively unproblematic: Christian princes were those with legitimate authority to wage war, an authority that not only came from the recognition of the people but was ordained by God. Th e location of legitimate authority continued as relatively unproblematic – a power that belonged to established and recognized rulers – until relatively recently. In the postcolonial era, establishing legitimate authority by this means became problematic, because oft en the struggles against the colonial powers were viewed as legitimate (at least in hindsight). Moreover, some struggles that have involved violent elements have been supported by the international community to some extent. Th e African National Congress in South Africa during the apartheid era, for example, was seen by many across the world as the primary and most coher- ent group of legitimate resistance. And whereas the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland never received offi cial support from any state during the 1970s and 1980s, it was nevertheless not always offi cially denounced; in 1981, Prime Minister Margaret Th atcher refused to engage with any of the demands of the IRA- led prison hunger strikers and her uncompromising stance drew international condemnation.

In addition, the legitimate authority of states to wage war has been tempered by the introduction of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Th e charter continues to grant states the right to take up arms in self- defence, but action that goes beyond this needs the authorization of the Security Council. Th e eff ectiveness of the Security

Box 8.2 The UN, legitimacy and the Iraq War

The lack of a UN Resolution has been a point of much debate regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2002, the UN passed Resolution 1441, which demanded that the regime comply with its “disarmament obligations”. Iraq agreed to the Resolution and weapons inspectors were allowed into the country. No WMD were found, although the report by the inspec- tors did “not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility”. The UK, the US and Spain then proposed a second Resolution that declared that Iraq had failed to fulfi l the obligations to disarm set out in Resolution 1441, thereby making a case for the use of force. However, the second Resolution received support from only four of the Security Council (the three who proposed it plus Bulgaria), and nine affi rmative votes are required for a Resolution to be passed. In addition, France opposed the Resolution and, as one of the fi ve permanent members, could have exercised its power of veto. The Resolution was withdrawn, and the legitimacy of the subsequent invasion is thus often questioned in terms of UN procedures, with defenders of the war claiming in response that the UN’s inaction over Iraq only underlined the need for the “coalition of the willing” to use force regardless of UN approval.

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Council is a matter of debate, however; in particular the power of veto of the fi ve permanent members (China, France, Russian Federation, UK and USA) means that the council oft en fails to approve actions because of national agendas rather than for global reasons. For instance, the NATO invasion of Kosovo in 1999 was carried out without a UN Resolution. It is a matter for debate why a Resolution was not sought for what was explicitly a war that fi tted at least most of the criteria of just war in that it was done to right wrongs and to stop a threat to international peace and security. However, given the relationship between Serbia and Russia (one of ethnic and historical closeness and loyalty) getting a resolution would have been almost impossible. Although this war was generally deemed legitimate on humanitarian grounds, it did not have the necessary legitimate authority if this is now constituted by a UN Resolution.

2. Just cause

Some causes are more obviously just than others. For instance, most people would regard self- defence as an uncontroversial justifi cation for war. Th is is recognized in the UN Charter, which grants states a right to defend themselves against aggression and to assist allies who are attacked. Self- defence is perhaps the only wholly non- problematic “just cause”, at least for those who accept that it is possible for war to be justifi ed. Other possible just causes include the righting of wrongs and intervention to stop suff ering. Whether or not the prevention of suff ering constitutes a just cause is an issue we shall address later when we consider humanitarian intervention. Yet, although this justifi cation for war is controversial, there are confl icts where it has been widely accepted as suffi cient to constitute “just cause”. For example, the 1998 NATO action in Kosovo fi ts this category and was widely supported. Righting of wrongs is also controversial; but how controversial usually depends on how grave the “wrong” is seen to be. For instance, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was deemed to be so grave a wrong that the UN sanctioned the coalition response.

Diffi cult as it is to determine just cause in instances of righting wrongs and humanitarian intervention, it is perhaps even more diffi cult in instances of “pre- emption”. An understandable fi rst response to pre- emptive strikes or war would be to say that they can never be morally justifi ed or establish just cause, as in these instances aggression, however threatened, has not yet occurred and therefore might never occur. Cases where pre- emptive actions have been deemed just are instances where it has been deemed that there was enough evidence convincingly to claim that attack was inevitable and therefore a pre- emptive action did qualify as self- defence. It is this claim, that it was necessary to pre- emptively attack the Taleban in order to prevent further al- Qaeda attacks, that was used by the US to justify the 2001 action against Afghanistan and which was accepted by the UN Security Council.

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But, because of the uncertainty about actual rather than threatened aggression, pre- emptive “just cause” is diffi cult to establish.

3. Right intention

It is not hard to see why right intention is problematic when it comes to establishing whether or not a confl ict is just. It is notoriously diffi cult to establish an individual’s intention in any ethical act, let alone the intention of a state: there are questions about whether it is even intelligible to speak about a state’s intentions. In situations of confl ict there will inevitably be numerous intentions that could be attributed to a state that chose to wage war.

Right intention clearly precludes certain reasons, such as revenge or the attain- ment of goods or territory, as permissible reasons for going to war. However, rarely are reasons for going to war unitary: more oft en they are complex. According to the theory, having additional reasons for going to war that do not constitute “right inten- tion” does not invalidate the claim that the war is just. What matters is that the central purpose of the war is a good one and therefore that right intention can be claimed.

It is here that the problems arise: determining what is the primary motive is fraught with diffi culty. If it is accepted that other reasons may be in play, and what matters is simply how they are prioritized, it can be a diffi cult juggling act to ascer- tain whether the good reason really is the primary reason. For instance, if we again consider the 1990 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was much discus- sion about whether the “real” motive of the US and its partners in the coalition was to establish control of Iraq’s oil or for strategic advantage. Clearly these reasons do not qualify as a “right intention” for war. Yet, as long as they are not the primary intention, according to just- war theory, it does not undermine the claim that the war was just. In the fi rst Gulf confl ict the UN deemed the intention was correct: to right the wrong of the seizure of one UN member by another. Th e 2003 war is more controversial.

In addition, right intention requires that the aim should be a more just outcome for all, not just for your own side. Again, this is a more complex and more important criterion in current warfare and unsurprisingly the recent 2003 invasion of Iraq is a confl ict where right intention is contested. We have seen already in this chapter that, in the 2003 case, whether there was in fact a just cause for going to war is con- troversial, and it is even more controversial whether there was right intention. Many people claim that the WMD pretext was dubious: that perhaps there was at best only a suspicion, which was presented with more certainty than was warranted by evidence. Th ey thus doubt that fi nding and removing WMD really was the intention. Another reason oft en given for intervention has been that it liberated Iraq from a tyrant: critics see this as a justifi cation “aft er the event” that was underemphasized

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in the run up to the war and then stressed when the original purported intention – disarming Iraq of WMD – began to look increasingly implausible.

4. Probability of success

If a war is to be just then there must be a real chance that it will be successful. While it might be considered noble for individuals to “martyr” themselves for a cause they believe in, the just- war criteria do not permit this for a nation. According to just- war theory, if a war is not likely to result in a better outcome for the population than other options then it should not be entered into. Success does not necessarily mean outright victory; it may also mean that certain objectives are met (perhaps defend- ing core resources, cities or people might count as “just”). Or perhaps a “defeat” that leads to better terms for the population in a negotiated peace might be “better” and therefore more successful than if occupation had occurred unopposed. What is important in judging this is that what counts as success must be considered rea- sonable and in the best interest of the people of the nation. Probability of success is a contentious point in the debate over the war in Afghanistan (2001 onwards), for example. Sceptics point to the fact that the war is unlikely to be “won” against a thinly spread enemy comprising pockets of ruthless guerrilla fi ghters sheltering among rural communities in a vast mountainous landscape. Th ey cite the fact that no less a war machine than the Soviet Union’s army ultimately failed to defeat just such opposition, then in the form of Afghan “mujahideen”, when it invaded in 1980, and to the length, bloodiness and eventual defeat of the US military campaign in Vietnam.

5. Last resort

Last resort does not mean that any and all possible measures must have been exhausted for a war to be just. If this were the case war would never be justifi ed, because it would be almost impossible to claim that there were absolutely no other options. Even perhaps the worst- case scenario of occupation and even slavery con- stitutes another option. Th erefore “last resort” means a last reasonably acceptable option. Importantly, diplomatic methods and other non- violent possibilities must be explored before a war can be justifi ed. However, the balance of argument is diffi cult because there may be circumstances where waiting too long to resort to force is to do greater damage in the long run. For example, as we shall see in the fi nal section of this chapter, arguably the damage done by the reluctance of the international community to use force in situations like the Rwandan genocide in 1994 or the more recent and ongoing crisis in Darfur have resulted in much greater injustice than a swift resort to force would have done.

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6. Proportionality

A fi nal and important criterion of just war is that it must be proportional, and pro- portionality serves as a useful balance to all the other criteria. For instance, when considering “probability of success”, while it may be the case that a ruler or nation wished to count “success” as, say, preserving a holy site or some other national space, even if this could be justifi ed as a “success” it is doubtful that it could be deemed “proportional”, because as a justifying condition, proportionality demands that the benefi cial consequences of waging war outweigh the harm it causes. Th us, even if those planning war had every chance of preserving their holy site or space (thus meeting the “probability of success” requirement), the proportionality requirement would deem it impermissible, for example, to bomb schools or commit genocide in order to do so.

In current global confl icts that involve superpowers (the US being perhaps the current global example), the likelihood of the superpower being defeated is low; accordingly the duty of proportionality – the benefi cial consequences outweighing the harms of war – becomes higher. In other words, the stronger and more powerful a state is, the greater its chance of success, so the more responsibilities it will incur for the consequences of that success. Th is has led some to argue that a third group of just- war principles should be instituted that recognize post- confl ict obligations. Th ese are referred to as jus post bellum principles and they propose a duty of care to the population to ensure rebuilding and restructuring aft er confl ict as well as to protect the populations’ basic rights.

JUS IN BELLO

Whereas jus ad bellum concerns the justifi cation for going to war, jus in bello prin- ciples govern the conduct of combatants. Th ese attempt to preserve some standards of moral conduct in war, and are essentially a recognition that even though normally immoral actions are sanctioned in war, this does not mean that morality itself is sus- pended. Some actions remain prohibited, for instance killing the innocent, execut- ing prisoners of war and disproportionate damage (such as polluting land or water, or burning farms and villages in order to make tactical advances). It is principles like these that have informed codes, norms and expectations of the proper conduct of war. Th us the Geneva Convention is an attempt to establish an internationally binding account of jus in bello. Th ere are three principles of jus in bello: discrimina- tion, proportionality and military necessity (Box 8.3). Together these attempt to limit the extent of the violence of war and to ensure that there is as little harm as possible; and that where harm does occur it is unavoidable if the aims of the just

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war (as determined using the jus ad bellum criteria listed above) are to be met. For a war to be just, both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello criteria must be met. A just war is ethical in its aims and intentions and in how it is conducted in practice on the ground.

1. Discrimination

Although the jus ad bellum principles tend to be the focus of much academic and political debate when attempting to justify confl ict, in many ways the conduct of war is primary when considering the ethics of confl ict. Moreover, how the war is actually conducted can infl uence views about the original justifi cation of the war. If a war is carried out in an unjust manner, the justice of going to war will be obscured and com- promised. Th e fi rst principle of just war, that of discrimination (sometimes called distinction), is a long- standing and important principle of warfare. Historically it can be found in codes of honour that have ruled the behaviour of warriors from the ancient world, from Roman legionnaires and Samurai warriors to medieval knights’ codes of chivalry, and contemporary formulations are found in the Geneva Conventions. Obviously such codes have changed over time but all distinguish in one form or another those who are “legitimate targets” and they give guidance regarding the proper conduct of battle.

In just- war theory the vocabulary used is that of “innocence” and “legitimate targets”. Essentially, legitimate targets are those who are involved. Determining “innocent” parties is no easy task. One traditional route has been to draw a dis- tinction between non- combatants and combatants; and it is this reasoning that lies behind respect for prisoners of war in the Geneva Conventions. However, this would exclude those who incite violence or who order violence, as well as those who con- tribute to it materially (e.g. workers producing weapons), and it has been argued that this is too narrow a defi nition in contemporary warfare. We shall return to this issue later in the chapter when we discuss terrorism and contemporary forms of warfare. Here it is suffi cient to recognize that the principle of distinction is complex, and far more so in the contemporary context than in previous generations.

Box 8.3 Three principles for conducting war justly

1. Discrimination. To be just combatants must distinguish between enemy combatants and non- combatants.

2. Proportionality. To be just the harms of any action must be proportional to the gains. 3. Military necessity. To be just any action must be militarily necessary to achieve the

end with the minimum harm.

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Irrespective of how “innocence” is determined, it is important to note that the principle of discrimination does not prohibit the death of innocents; it is recognized that in war innocent people must die. What it does require is that these deaths are limited and proportional, that they are unintended and that they are justifi ed by the third principle of military necessity. Accordingly, the death of innocents must not be the purpose of the operation; it must be unintended and unavoidable.

2. Proportionality

Th e principle of proportionality is very similar to the parallel jus ad bellum prin- ciple. Acts must be appropriate and not excessive. Th e vagueness of this principle and the diffi culty of determining whether an act is proportional is one of the main points on which just- war theory is critiqued. For instance, your cause and intention profoundly infl uence what level of violence (e.g. civilian causalities) is permissible. Th us, as in Jus ad bellum, proportionality should provide a check that limits exces- sive violence.

3. Military necessity

Th e principle of military necessity requires that an act is militarily justifi ed. In other words, it must be required to bring about the military goal; it must be eff ective. Again, there are diffi culties of discrimination and proportionality here; for instance, a target might be regarded as a “military necessity” but reaching it might involve some civilian casualties (some collateral damage). An additional part of just- war theory that can be used to address this is the “doctrine of double eff ect”, which is intended to help to make distinctions between what is permissible in such contexts.

The doctrine of double effect

Th e doctrine or principle of double eff ect (meaning “side eff ect”) again has roots in Aquinas’s work (Summa Th eologica II- II, qu. 64, art.7), and is sometimes employed in just- war theory to argue that an action that is (genuinely) militarily necessary is permitted even if there are signifi cant civilian casualties. For instance, in evoking this doctrine, it may be permissible to bomb an enemy weapons factory if this will end the war quickly and if it is the only means of doing so, even if it is in a vulner- able area where there will undoubtedly be many casualties as a “side eff ect” of this action. According to the doctrine, such an action is permissible if it meets the fi ve conditions of the doctrine (Box 8.4).

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Th e doctrine of double eff ect invokes the standard principles of just- war theory, particularly proportionality. However, the means and ends condition (condition 2) and condition 3 do provide new concerns and conditions. One cannot use a bad eff ect to create a good one; therefore policies such as blanket bombings of cities are problematic within the doctrine if the intention is to kill civilians in order to end the war, rather than to attack a military target. Applying this doctrine is notoriously diffi cult, particularly when we consider the third criterion of intention. How is it possible to prove that the “intention” is to achieve the good eff ect?

PACIFISM

For some, just war is impossible and therefore theories about justifi able war are inadequate; the only ethical approach is to eschew violence altogether and to adopt pacifi sm. Just- war theory denies that the prohibition on killing is absolute: killing, violence and war are not always the worst option. Dower outlines diff erent varia- tions of non- violent theories, pacifi sm and pacifi cism, in Th e Ethics of War and Peace (2009). Essentially, pacifi st and non- violent approaches to war and peace are exten- sions of the ethical commitment not to kill (and perhaps to non- violence in general).

Th ose who adopt non- violence have an ethical commitment to non- violent responses to others (whether individuals or institutions). Th is is either based on a belief that violent acts are not an ethically justifi able response to oppression and violence or it is a tactic that, for one reason or another, is deemed to be successful in engendering social change. It is possible that those who use it as a “tactic” may not share a deeper commitment to non- violence; however, given the violence with

Box 8.4 The doctrine of double effect

1. The action must be either morally good or indifferent in itself (e.g. ending the war quickly by bombing the munitions factory).

2. The bad effect must not be the means by which one achieves the good effect (e.g. killing people is not justifi able as a means to destroying the factory).

3. The intention must be to achieve the good effect. The bad effect must be an unintended side effect, although it may be foreseen (e.g. casualties are not intended in the raid on the factory, although it is known that they will occur).

4. The good effect must make up for or outweigh the bad effect (e.g. the benefi t of ending the horrors of the war must compensate for, or be greater than, the evil of killing in the action).

5. The action must be the only way of achieving the (justifi ed) end.

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which non- violent protest is oft en met it is likely that those who regard it as a mere tactic will be provoked into violence. Famous examples of the use of non- violence to engender political, social and cultural change are the Indian independence move- ment in the mid- twentieth century and the 1960s civil rights movement in the US. Non- violence is a general position against violence; in contrast, pacifi sm centres on war and the view that waging war is morally wrong. Some pacifi sts might not be opposed to all violence, but only to war. Th ere are diff erent types of pacifi sts and Dower (2009) distinguishes between “absolute/deontological/principled pacifi sm and contingent/consequentialist pacifi sm”. Th e discussion in Chapter 3 should enable you to work out the diff erence in these two theories. In short, the absolute pacifi st believes that war is always wrong irrespective of the consequences, whereas the consequentialist pacifi st rejects war just because of its consequences: it brings about more bad things than good things. If it were shown to be otherwise then, on this view, war would no longer be deemed wrong.

In addition to general arguments against violence, there are further reasons paci- fi sts give for opposing war: in particular, that war dehumanizes both soldiers and those whom they kill in a way that undermines their own humanity and denies respect for the humanity of others. Such dehumanizing happens in a number of ways: fi rst soliders, in a real sense, have to be dehumanized in order to be able to carry out their duties; and second, they must dehumanize others. Soldiers must deny their respect for others and their rights and, as Dower says, “forget or suppress their knowledge of the essential humanity of the enemy soldiers. Soldiers have to be turned into effi cient ‘killing machines’.” Th e trauma involved in such inhumane attitudes is clear and “it is oft en recognised that such training actually hardens and maybe sometimes brutalises soldiers and certainly those actually involved in combat are oft en left with various forms of trauma and psychological problems”. A second reason is that war is necessarily indiscriminate and “innocents” are unavoidably killed, especially in modern warfare. For the pacifi st, the doctrine of double eff ect does nothing to negate the horror of civilian death. In war civilians are killed (oft en in disproportionately large numbers when compared to combatants) and this is anticipated and planned for.

For some, non- violence and pacifi sm are not regarded as the ethical options, but on the contrary as unethical and even cowardly responses. Attempting to “shame” individuals or groups is thus a fairly standard response to pacifi sm; think of the white feather used to shame conscientious objectors and their families in the First World War in the UK. Th ose who reject pacifi sm consider that there are occasions when war is justifi ed and even necessary, for example, because the evil that will be done if violence is not used is greater than the evil of the war itself. For example, they might think that some things are just so evil that all means, including war, must be used to stop them: that some wrongs are so great that it is better to die trying to prevent them than to stand by. For many this is a justifi cation for war and for other kinds

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of violence, both personal (e.g. self- defence in response to domestic violence) and political (e.g. “freedom- fi ghting”). Th e “evil” of the Nazis was certainly off ered as a justifi cation for the Second World War. If you conclude that violence is sometimes ethically required then you need to fi nd a mechanism for judging when violence is justifi ed and when it is not.

CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF CONFLICT

Th e just- war theory – despite all the diffi culties in application – is historically the method that has been adopted to do this and perhaps its longevity is itself an indica- tion of its eff ectiveness. However, there are questions about whether, even if eff ec- tive in the past, just- war theory continues to be the most appropriate theory in the contemporary global context. Armies are increasingly deployed on missions that do not neatly fi t the assumptions of just- war theory. Increasingly, states do not go to war with other states (or coalitions of states with other coalitions) but with non- state actors, and for reasons that are not neatly accommodated in the just- war framework. Two types of confl ict that are particularly diffi cult to accommodate in the just- war framework are those of terrorism and humanitarian intervention, and we shall con- sider these in the remaining sections of the chapter.

Terrorism

To say that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom- fi ghter is a cliché, and like many clichés it is also true. If a terrorist can “fi ght for freedom”, then at least some forms of terrorism (or political violence) must have some case for moral justifi ability. If this is so, then, just as a framework is necessary to judge whether war is justifi ed, so too a framework is necessary to assess other types of political violence, including ter- rorism. Some people believe that the only form of violence that is ever justifi ed is that carried out by armies of a legitimate force; in terms of just- war theory they believe that the only “legitimate authority” is a state. For those who think this, acts of “ter- rorism” can never be justifi ed, irrespective of the cause, but others argue that some acts of political violence that are not committed by state actors are indeed justifi ed and can even be heroic. To take an example, were members of the French Resistance in the Second World War justifi ed in committing acts of violence? Th ey were not part of any legitimate army and they certainly did not identify themselves as combatants, yet many would argue that their violent acts were justifi ed and morally acceptable. What about other cases, such as the acts of violence committed against the apartheid regime in South Africa? Considered in terms of just- war theory, these instances

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of terrorism were not sanctioned by a state and thus arguably lack the “legitimate authority” necessary for political violence to be justifi ed. Conversely, some argue that these acts of political violence were justifi ed, and in terms of just- war theory were supported by “right cause” and “just intention”. In standard just- war theory, failing even one criterion would be suffi cient to render the war unjust; however, some argue that either legitimate authority is a criterion that does not always need to be met, or alternatively that it does not necessarily have to be derived from the authority of the state. Some thinkers have developed such arguments in order to attempt to extend just- war theory to acts of political violence that extend beyond traditional models of war in order to incorporate contemporary warfare.

Terrorism as a just war?

To justify terrorism using just- war theory seems at fi rst glance to be a diffi cult task. Before one can even consider whether any terrorist action can meet the principles of just- war theory, one must fi rst make some judgements about the confl ict itself. Is a sequence of violent acts, such as a number of killings or bombs, or even an insurgent activity, enough to be considered a “war”? Some would argue that it is. Sometimes terrorists themselves wish to be regarded as combatants in a war. To return to an earlier example, the Provisional IRA always maintained that it was engaged in a war to free the six “occupied” counties of Northern Ireland from the British state. So strongly did these terrorists wish to be regarded as “soldiers” and, when captured, as political prisoners rather than as criminals that, in order to get the British govern- ment to accept this, a number of them went on hunger strike, Bobby Sands being the fi rst and most famous of ten prisoners who died in the cause. At other times states fi ghting terrorists use the rhetoric of war: thus the US and UK governments spoke of a “war on terror” as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon. Moreover, not only was the rhetoric of war used, but explicit references were made to “just- war” arguments by coalition leaders to justify the recent confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, speaking at the 2010 inquiry into the invasion, the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said of Iraq: “I believe we made the right decision for the right reasons”, arguably appealing to the right- intention condition; and adding that his “feeling was and still is that we cannot have an international community that works if we have either terrorists who are breaking these rules or … aggressor states that refuse to obey the laws of the international community” (Dower 2009), apparently proposing that the cause was just and that it was just for reasons of self- defence and security.

Yet, even if these prior issues can be addressed, and the confl ict can be deemed a “war” and an appropriate enemy identifi ed, there are still problems in applying just- war theory to terrorism. For instance, the legitimate- authority criterion needs to be

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rejected or substantially revised, as too would the jus ad bellum criterion. However, given that both war and terrorism are forms of political violence that have similar goals and aims – for example, liberating or protecting a particular people or group – then it is at least worth trying to fi nd a way in which they can be ethically judged in comparison with each other.

Jus ad bellum and terrorism

If terrorism – or some forms of terrorism – are to be assessed according to the just- war criteria, there has to be potential for the six just- war criteria outlined above to be met: legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, probability of success, last resort and proportionality. Of these, the one it is impossible for terrorists to meet is legitimate authority if, as noted above, legitimate authority implies that only states may engage in political violence. For some, such as the US Department of State (2006), which defi nes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence per- petrated against noncombatant targets” and its perpetrators as “subnational groups or clandestine agents”, terrorists can never have legitimate authority and so can never engage in justifi ed acts of political violence.

To suggest that all violence by non- state actors is a form of terrorism and can therefore never be justifi ed seems inconsistent with other standard practices and attitudes. For example, the justness and appropriateness of political violence by non- state actors is recognized on occasions where there is a failure of sovereignty or legitimate rule: people have a right to overthrow unjust and illegitimate rulers. Th is is an argument that has been successfully used to justify much military intervention (e.g. NATO in Kosovo 1999) as well as resistance to oppressive occupiers (e.g. the French Resistance or resisting colonial occupiers). If this is the case then perhaps the legitimate- authority criterion of just war should be revised. It could be dropped as “essential”; but the danger of this would be that individuals or extreme groups could engage in acts of political violence that were not in any way representative of a signifi cant group of persons. Another alternative is to suggest that to claim legitimate authority depends on establishing representation (e.g. of a signifi cant and identifi - able group) and perhaps even requiring evidence of some kind of participation to ensure representation.

Jus in bello and terrorism

Even if one could revise the legitimate- authority criterion so that the jus ad bellum criteria could potentially be met by an act of terrorist political violence, there are still a number of problems with the typical conduct of terrorism. Key aspects of

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the just conduct of war, like the wearing of uniforms and the need to discriminate between combatants and non- combatants, do not seem to fi t the nature of terrorist campaigns.

Th e typical form of violence employed by terrorists is that of guerrilla warfare, involving small mobile groups of armed fi ghters who are not under the auspices of a national or state army, and who characteristically employ tactics such as raids and sabotage. For this type of warfare to be eff ective, it relies precisely on the fact that it is diffi cult to distinguish combatants from civilians, and therefore it seems to be in direct confl ict with, and so contravene, the fi rst (and arguably most important) prin- ciple of jus in bello: the principle of distinction. Moreover, not only do those engaged in political violence typically fail to distinguish combatants from non- combatants, but in fact targeting civilians is a key tactic of many terrorist campaigns, and indeed part of how terrorism is sometimes defi ned. While the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism – an ongoing proposal being discussed in the UN at the time of writing – has so far not agreed on a conclusive defi nition, it seems fair to say that “terrorism” always involves specifi cally bringing about, through violence, fear and terror in certain non- military populations or communities as a means of achieving a political objective.

Th erefore, just as with the criterion of legitimate authority, the principle of dis- tinction needs to be reformed in some way if terrorist acts are ever going to be deemed justifi able on just- war criteria. Of course, you may think that discrimina- tion is so important that it could never in any circumstances be justifi ed to target non- military personnel and therefore that any act of political violence that did this should immediately be condemned as unjust. But some argue that it is not quite this simple. For instance Held (2004) suggests that it is far more diffi cult than standard just- war theory allows to distinguish between civilians and legitimate targets. In the context of the 9/11 attack she asks whether fl ying planes into the World Trade Center was signifi cantly diff erent from the attempt on the same day to fl y a plane into the Pentagon. If the principle of distinction is interpreted as clearly distinguish- ing between military and non- combatant targets, then it would seem that the attack on the Pentagon might not be terrorist, because it was a military target, whereas the attack on the World Trade Center would be. It is easy to fi nd more examples of acts that are diffi cult to defi ne, or seem to be wrongly defi ned, if we endorse a strict distinction between combatants and non- combatants. For instance, there are exam- ples of acts that are standardly not called terrorism but on this defi nition become such, such as the Second World War bombings of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden and Coventry.

Held also argues that not only is it diffi cult to separate military and civilian targets easily, but also that innocence and culpability do not neatly fi t with such distinc- tions. She uses the examples of the leaders of populations and voting populations and wonders whether those who contribute to and endorse public policy and those

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who determine it are really less legitimate targets than those who are soldiers in the army; particularly if the army is a conscripted army (Held uses the example of the Israeli army). If you agree with Held then the principle of distinction needs to be rethought and cannot be used to rule out all so- called terrorist acts as unjustifi able.

She argues that both states and terrorist groups should be judged on other aspects of the war, for instance its purpose (cause and intention) and the way it is carried out (how proportional it is). Th us she suggests that some acts, such as torture, are unjust whoever carries them out, and she speaks of the unjustifi ability of “state sanctioned torture”, which she calls “state terrorism”. She argues that both war and terrorism that kills indiscriminately are more unjust than political vio- lence, which does not.

In these ways it may be possible to extend just- war theory to include terrorism. But it would require some major revisions to both jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. Accordingly, some have rejected this project and argued that it is simply inappropriate to try to consider this type of violence using the just- war framework. Others argue that it is important to use the framework: (i) for the pragmatic reason that we need to be able to judge diff erent types of violence on the same scale; (ii) for more ideological reasons – that if just- war theory can be used by one side to attempt to justify violence, then it should at least in principle be possible for the other side to employ the same framework.

Security and civil liberties

A key issue of all aspects of the global- ethics debate is how we balance the rights and interests of individuals and groups. Th is is an issue we considered in Chapter 5 when we asked about the status of the values of human rights; for instance, are rights “trumps”, and in what circumstances can individual human rights be violated? One possible example is the “ticking- bomb” case, discussed in Chapter 5, and whether it is justifi ed to violate individual rights for the greater good. A parallel example is the violation of individual human rights in instances of pandemics or public- health crises, where rights of liberty are infringed in order to stop infection spreading and for the public good. Th is is an issue we shall revisit throughout the book: in Chapter 9 we consider the rights of groups; in Chapter 10 we consider whether individuals’ rights can be limited to address climate change; and in Chapter 11 we consider whether protecting the cultural rights of groups undermine individuals’ rights. Balancing the rights of diff erent parties is a constant challenge for the ethicist and one to which there is no obviously right or easy answer.

In terms of this debate about war and terror, there are questions not just of whether it is acceptable for the human rights of all citizens to be curtailed for the public good, but, more controversially, about the legitimacy of targeting certain groups,

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particularly the counter- terrorism method of targeting certain ethnic and religious groups, usually young Muslim men. Th ere are consequentialist arguments about the eff ectiveness of such counter- terrorism; although potentially useful in the short term, such tactics are arguably counter- productive in the long term because they alienate whole communities and result in radicalizing youth to produce more terror- ists. Th ere are also rights- based reasons for refusing to support such discrimination and the systematic violation of the human rights of certain groups. Th e Amnesty International (2004) report on racial profi ling calls for the end of ethnic profi ling, and argues that it directly aff ects “Native Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, African Americans, Arab Americans, Persian Americans, American Muslims, many immigrants and visitors, and, under certain circumstances, white Americans”. Amnesty International takes the permission to violate the human rights of some as a standard counter- terrorist practice, and fi nds it to be dangerous not only for those whom it targets, but for all of us: “When law enforcement offi cials focus on what people look like, what religion they follow, or what they wear, it puts us all at risk.”

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Humanitarian intervention is a relatively new phenomenon and one that is particu- larly interesting in global ethics. Humanitarian intervention is a military interven- tion undertaken for humanitarian reasons; for example, in order to prevent mass violation of human rights, as in a genocide situation; or in circumstances where states have collapsed into civil war and continual confl ict. Humanitarian interven- tion clashes with the principle of non- interference in the internal aff airs of sovereign states, which we discussed in Chapter 4, and the very existence of humanitarian intervention as a possibility – one that has been evoked in a number of situations – suggests movement away from a realist framework and towards some framework of global cooperation.

International law can allow force to be used for purposes of self- defence and in collective actions overseen by the UN Security Council and, as expressed in the UN Charter, this can be on the grounds of maintaining “international peace and security”, itself a move away from the principle of non- intervention. As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, while there are global standards of human rights, the protection and maintaining of such rights is the task of states. Th ere is no global form of government and, as discussed in Chapter 6, those who are essentially state- less are oft en deprived of rights. What happens then to states who do not protect the human rights of their citizens, or worse, actively violate such rights? If human rights are “inviolable” and “universal” as the language of the UDHR (discussed in

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detail in Chapter 5) asserts, should there not be a mechanism to ensure that rights are protected even in situations where the government who should be doing so fails in its duty of protection?

When one considers some of the horrors of humanitarian crises, such as the geno- cide in Rwanda (where an estimated half a million Tutsis and others were killed by Hutu militia groups), it is hard not to think that humanitarian intervention is justi- fi ed. Indeed, how can it not be if one wishes to take human rights or global duties with any degree of seriousness?

Yet, although humanitarian intervention clearly respects many of the aims of global ethics (see Box 8.5), there are also reasons why some global ethicists would not wish to endorse it, or at least treat it sceptically.

A primary question for an ethicist is whether it is ever justifi ed to use force, espe- cially in the form of contemporary military force, to prevent or address humanitarian concerns. For instance, if you are a pacifi st then it would not be acceptable to use force to stop a possible injustice, because this would simply be to add yet more evil. Likewise, many of the problems of applying just- war theory emerge also in consid- ering the possibility of justifying humanitarian intervention. Can you be relatively certain of the outcome, and of proportionate casualties? Indeed, what are propor- tionate casualties in such circumstances? Some would argue that states cannot justify losing, or injuring, any soldiers to defend non- compatriots from suff ering. Th us no military casualties are justifi ed. Th is claim might be criticized from a cosmopolitan perspective; yet it resonates strongly with public opinion, for in general the public is not very tolerant of soldiers dying in far- off places, especially if they cannot see it as necessary to defend the domestic population. Arguably, it is for this reason that the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (1999) relied on air power rather than on ground forces: the coalition knew that there would be little public tolerance for the war if soldiers started returning in body bags. However, this also meant that there were probably more civilian and non- combatant casualties in Kosovo than if ground forces had been used. In short, the diffi cult calculations necessary in just war are even more complicated when it comes to humanitarian intervention.

As well as it being hard to apply just-war reasoning to humanitarian intervention – particularly with regard to proportionality and justifying confl ict when there is no threat to the state – there are further concerns. Perhaps the two most important concerns are abuse of the system and diffi culties in consistent responses.

Box 8.5 Humanitarian intervention

• Respects the “inviolate” and “universal” nature of human rights. • Takes duties of global justice seriously. • Respects all human beings, not just citizens.

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Misuse

Th e possibility of abuse is not hard to imagine: wars being waged in the name of humanitarian intervention, but actually in order to advance the interests of certain groups or states. Arguably, one example is Hitler’s claim that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to protect the German public, where the justifi cation off ered can be seen as, in a sense, humanitarian: waging war to “save” the German people. A more recent and explicit example is the recent Iraq War, where one of the reasons expressly given for the invasion in President George W. Bush’s White House address (22 March 2003) was to “free the Iraqi people” (White House 2003). Th is is not a simple case because other, non- humanitarian reasons were given, as we have seen. In addition, and importantly, this war did not attain a UN Resolution and therefore cannot strictly be regarded as an offi cial humanitarian intervention. Th e debate about the “real” reasons for waging war will continue to be controversial. Th is example might make you wonder whether it is ethical for humanitarian reasons to be used in this discussion at all, given that they can sometimes be used to justify acts that would be otherwise regarded as ethically insupportable.

Consistency

A further problem is consistency. If humanitarian intervention is used in one situa- tion then should it also be used in other similar situations? In practice it is not. For instance, humanitarian intervention was used in Kosovo, but not in the more dev- astating situations of Rwanda and Darfur. If ever humanitarian intervention is justi- fi ed, it was justifi ed in Darfur. According to Save the Children (2007) over seventy children under the age of fi ve were dying daily; over two- thirds of the population (around four million people) were dependent on humanitarian aid; and two million people were in refugee camps in order to escape the confl ict. Yet no international response was launched, except for a limited and inadequate deployment of African Union troops, who have neither the numbers nor resources to protect civilians. As the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1999) said, we need to know “why states are willing to act in some areas of confl ict, but not in others where the daily toll of death and suff ering is as bad or worse”. Many conclude that – sadly – humanitar- ian intervention is never a primary reason for action. Th us there may be instances where the international community will engage in humanitarian intervention, and for humanitarian reasons, but only if there are also other reasons for action: if the country is strategically important or there are other gains to be made. States seem unwilling to engage in instances where there are only humanitarian reasons. In Rwanda and Darfur, the humanitarian crisis was such that if any duty to protect against human rights violations and injustice exists, action should have been taken.

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But it was not. It seems that the international community does not wish to risk its troops and spend money to protect African civilians from the violence of their own leaders or would- be leaders. Th us humanitarian intervention might be one reason among others, but it seems that it is never the only reason. Th is is problematic not just in terms of consistency – some humanitarian crises are not addressed when they should be – but it also increases the force of the “abuse” argument. If humanitarian crises only ever provide a partial reason for intervention, the previous claim that it simply provides a rhetorical justifi cation to cover other, less ethically acceptable, motives for going to war is strengthened.

The future of humanitarian intervention

From an ethical perspective there are important reasons why – despite the diffi culties – we should not dismiss humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is important for global ethics not just because it provides a globally accepted means to address some of the worst injustices and human rights violations, but also because it recognizes that there are positive global duties.

Th e failure of the international community to intervene in Rwanda and Darfur of course represents a signifi cant failure for those who do believe in some responsi- bility to protect. In these instances we might wish that humanitarian intervention had been robustly pursued. As Annan (1999) said, Rwanda “showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be in the face of mass murder” and “the inter- national community stands accused of doing too little, too late”. Th ose who agree with Annan wish to fi nd ways to ensure that humanitarian intervention to address extreme humanitarian catastrophes is undertaken in the future. In other words, ways need to be found to initiate intervention on humanitarian grounds alone and, furthermore, not to rely on states to fi nd additional reasons to provide the neces- sary motivation to go to war. Other mechanisms could be put in place to ensure that

Box 8.6 Problems with humanitarian intervention

• The “humanitarian claim” might be abused. • It is diffi cult to justify force as a preventative measure. • It is diffi cult to publicly justify military casualties to defend non- compatriots. • There are practical problems about who decides when it is justifi ed and on what

criteria. • There are practical problems about insisting that states go to war when it might not

be in their interest.

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there is legitimate authority to reduce the possibility that humanitarian intervention is abused. Th ere is still an issue of how states can be motivated – or required – to commit their forces to such confl icts where their own states are not directly involved. Some have suggested that a possible solution could be a standing UN force, to which states contribute but that they do not direct: something along the lines of NATO, but global. Given our discussion in Chapter 7 about global government and the need for solutions to be practical, realistic and achievable, perhaps (at least in the short term) we should seek solutions that use existing mechanisms and are therefore more likely to be implemented.

Responsibility to protect

Th e responsibility to protect is receiving increasing attention. It was fi rst discussed in a 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and followed up by discussion at the 2005 UN World Summit (Box 8.7).

Th e importance of the responsibility to protect is discussed in detail by James Pattison (2010) and Nicholas Wheeler (2000). Th ey report the increasing interest in the topic, and the large numbers of research and advocacy centres that have been set up to think about it. Humanitarian intervention is only part of the responsibility to protect; other duties are also important. Force therefore becomes only one aspect of the responsibility to protect, which takes the focus away from a single- confl ict framework. Moreover, humanitarian intervention is justifi ed by the responsibility to protect only if it has Security Council authorization. So the 2003 Iraq War would not count as humanitarian intervention. Th is condition reduces some of the concerns about the misuse of humanitarian intervention to provide an ethical justifi cation for an action that is really undertaken for other less admirable reasons. Moreover, such intervention must be in response to a state’s failing to address key human- rights abuses, such as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Because responsibility to protect is broader than military or humanitarian inter- vention and introduces additional elements – the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” – it might at fi rst glance seem to be more demanding and therefore less likely to receive support from states. Yet, Pattison (2010) argues, because the military aspect is less prominent in the responsibility- to- protect agenda, it may receive greater support than strong humanitarian- intervention doctrines alone. He suggests that those in the global south can be resistant to humanitarian- intervention agreements on the grounds that they fear that such interventions will be directed at them, either because they are involved in human rights abuses, or because humanitarian intervention might be used as an excuse for invasion. Others are resistant because they fear that humanitarian intervention reduces state power and sovereignty in general. However, while the military element may be downplayed

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Box 8.7 The 2005 UN World Summit

Main outcome

“Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.” (United Nations 2005)

Resolutions 138–140 under the heading “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case- by- case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and confl icts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary- General on the Prevention of Genocide. (United Nations 2005)

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in the responsibility to protect, some think that we should make sure that it does not get removed altogether. For instance, Pattison (2010) states that “if we ignore, overlook, or exclude forcible military intervention from the responsibility to protect, we will be adopting a head- in- the- sand approach about the hard choices that will sometimes need to be made about military intervention”.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have explored the ethics of contemporary wars and confl icts. In particular, we have looked at whether force can be justifi ed and by what criteria; we have asked whether in the global context traditional justifi cations of war, deriving from the just- war theory, are appropriate, and especially whether the equation of legitimate authority with states holds in terrorist confl icts or in situations of humani- tarian intervention. In considering how the global ethicist addresses confl ict and war we have also considered whether force can be used as a means to address injustice (e.g. in humanitarian intervention) and if so whether we need to reform the govern- ance structures we considered in Chapter 6.

Th ere are arguably no “right” answers to the dilemmas that global war and con- fl ict raise, but there are types of approach that the global ethicist is more likely to adopt. For instance, the global- in- scope criterion is likely to prohibit a response that considers that it is only states that have legitimate authority; it is also going to require recognition that there are duties to those in distant lands if their human rights are violated. However, recognizing that there are such duties will not tell you what these duties are: for example, it is perfectly possible for global ethicists to be pacifi sts or advocates of the use of force in instances of humanitarian intervention. Again, we have seen that the issues of global ethics are connected: war and confl ict exacerbate poverty, and poverty makes war and confl ict more likely. In Chapter 9 we shall consider bioethical issues, which are also connected with poverty. Being poor or lacking infrastructure in a confl ict or post- confl ict situation aff ects health as well as increasing one’s vulnerability and the likelihood that one will be exploited.

Box 8.8 The responsibility to protect

It includes: • the responsibility to prevent; • military/humanitarian intervention; • the responsibility to rebuild.

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