Global Ethics

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10 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE ETHICS

INTRODUCTION

Environmental ethics is a key branch of contemporary global ethics and one that is increasingly important. Environmental ethics has expanded dramatically in recent years and, like global ethics, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is a response to emerging problems and crises. For some, the environmental crisis is the overarch- ing global- ethics issue that needs to be addressed because human survival itself is threatened. In attempting to respond to the environmental crisis we can see very clearly the logic of global ethics at work. It makes little sense to construct a less- than- global ethical community when considering how to address global threats such as climate change. No nation or region can address climate change alone. Only a shared response, where everyone takes the actions necessary, will be suffi cient to deal with this problem. Climate change is no respecter of national borders and the behaviour of one nation or region aff ects others. Hence responses to climate change are always “global in scope”; even those who endorse regional protections (such as the strengthening of national borders to protect national resources) cannot but think of the global causes and eff ects. Th e second two criteria of global ethics are also clearly met: responses to climate change are necessarily multidisciplinary – sci- entifi c knowledge is crucial to legal, moral and political responses; and theory and practice are linked as ethicists struggle to propose just and eff ective practical solu- tions (something evident in the work of Caney and Moellendorf, discussed towards the end of this chapter).

In addition to being of obvious global- ethics concern, environmental issues are interrelated with the other global- ethics issues we have considered. In particular, climate change compounds other injustices. For instance, those who are already living a subsistence existence have no spare resources with which to cushion them- selves from the eff ects of severe weather events caused by climate change, such as

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drought or fl ood. Nor do they have the means to attain scarce natural resources, such as water and productive land. Moreover, as weather patterns change and land that was once fertile becomes uninhabitable, the total resources available diminish. As well as exacerbating economic injustice, other forms of injustice also increase in an environmentally unstable context and accessing basic health and security becomes more diffi cult. As natural resources – of fertile land, energy, water and food – become increasingly scarce, the likelihood that there will be confl ict to secure them increases. Again, those who are most vulnerable will suff er most: they might suff er from inse- curity during periods of confl ict; be on the losing side and suff er retribution; their land and lives might be threatened; or they might become refugees and suff er loss of status, property and even citizenship.

Environmental issues are clearly fundamental to resolving global- ethics issues; they are not separate but intimately connected. Again, as in Chapter 9, we are reminded that if we wish to address injustice then we must not consider issues in isolation but adopt holistic models that recognize the interconnections of these issues.

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND CLIMATE ETHICS

Environmental ethics covers a large area and one that has expanded dramatically over the past few decades. It represents developments in ethical thinking that are not just responses to the current environmental crisis, but are responses to increas- ing ethical concerns and uneasiness about human duties to the non- human world. For instance, environmental ethics includes questions about the scope of duties and asks what duties, if any, humans have to non- human species and to the environment more broadly.

In fact, a primary issue of environmental ethics is whether rights should be extended beyond human agents. Th e moral theories we discussed in Chapter 3 were human- centric or anthropocentric; moral duties were limited to how human beings should treat other human beings. Likewise, the political theories of Chapter 4 were concerned with human governance, and Chapter 5 was overtly about human rights. In Chapter 9 we saw how ethical frameworks are beginning to be developed that respect groups and common goods and that allot some rights to groups as groups, rather than just to individuals. Parallel arguments are made in environmental ethics about the rights of animals; here there is considerable overlap with bioethics, because much of the focus of this debate has been on whether or not research on animals is justifi ed to produce medicine and other products for humans.

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Animal rights

Th e most prominent thinker in this debate is Peter Singer (1975), whose arguments about the duties of justice we discussed in Chapter 7. Singer argues that the principle of equality applies not just to humans, but also to animals. Th erefore, according to Singer, if you accept that equality and impartiality are sound moral principles for governing human relations then you should accept that they are also sound when it comes to governing relations between humans and animals. Not to see this is unjustly to discriminate, without reason to do so: a prejudice Singer terms “speciesism”. Singer argues that just as being a member of a diff erent race does not justify exploitation, being a member of a diff erent species does not justify exploitation. Likewise, he argues, the fact that animals may be less intelligent than we are does not justify disre- garding their interests any more than we would be justifi ed in disregarding interests of less- intelligent human beings.

For Singer, animals have interests that deserve to be protected because they can suff er, and this suff ering should be taken into moral consideration. Beings capable of suff ering, happiness or enjoyment have interests that entitle them to moral status and enable us to distinguish moral beings from things. Singer does not propose that the interests of all animals are the same and accepts that there are diff erences in levels of suff ering. He also recognizes that there are diffi culties in making comparisons between human and animal suff ering. However, he argues that precision is not nec- essary to make judgements and, in cases where human suff ering is less than animal suff ering, animal interests should be respected over and above human interests. Singer applies this reasoning to all aspects of human relationships with animals, from eating animals to animal experimentation. Ascribing respect for animals’ interests has implications for many aspects of contemporary living. For instance, is it accept- able to eat animals at all, and, if so, in what circumstances? How much does human need count compared to animal suff ering? Likewise, is experimentation on animals justifi ed when the need is great?

Environmental value

In addition to the rights of animals, there are also questions about how nature itself should be treated in general. Are there duties to preserve and protect our environ- ment that extend beyond the need to preserve what is necessary for human survival? For instance, is the extinction of species intrinsically bad or is it just instrumentally bad in that in losing a species humans might be losing useful resources (such as medical or food sources)? Likewise, should biodiversity be protected, and, if so, why?

Th e traditional model of ethics excludes the non- human sphere and regards it as having value only as far as it is of use to humans. Th us any duties to nature are

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instrumental: nature should be protected because it is useful to humanity. Over the past few decades other models of the relation between human beings and the planet have emerged and are gaining prominence as “green approaches” become central to public and policy debates.

Stewardship model

One possible model, which has its basis in Judaeo- Christian thinking, is the “stew- ardship model”. Th is model – which is now promoted as a secular as well as religious model, for instance by Robin Attfi eld (2006) – suggests that humans are the stewards or trustees of nature. Th us the ways in which human beings can act towards nature is limited; they cannot do whatever they wish and do not have dominion over nature. Th is model off ers a conception of the duties that human beings have not only to animals to prevent suff ering, but also to nature more broadly: for instance, to prevent species extinction and to preserve biodiversity. In the current environmental crisis it suggests that there are not just duties to protect humans but additional duties to protect animals, species and habitats as well as biological and ecological systems.

Deep ecology

Another model that moves beyond instrumental models is that of deep ecology. Th e principles of deep ecology were set out by Arne Naess and George Sessions (Naess & Sessions 1984; Sessions 1995). Th ey assert the intrinsic value – value in and of itself – of non- human life. Th e fl ourishing of eco- systems and natural objects is regarded as important independently of being instrumentally valuable to human beings. Th e deep ecology model argues that diversity is valuable in itself and that humans, as one form of life among all the others, have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of the natural world except to support vital needs. Hence, deep ecology roundly rejects any anthropocentric perspective: any view that puts humans at the centre of our concerns.

Beyond instrumental value

Th is brief look into the developing movements in environmental thinking shows that models are emerging that go beyond ascribing instrumental value to the envi- ronment. How you view these models and the status you ascribe to animals and the non- human world in general will change your ethical framework, and you will need to revise the frameworks of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 to incorporate such concerns.

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Th is is easier to do when you adopt some theories rather than others: for instance, if you are a utilitarian how can the environment (if you exclude animals) be valued intrinsically in a calculation about happiness? Similarly, can a human- rights- based model be extended to animals and the environment more broadly?

In addition to these questions about the scope of rights and duties beyond the human sphere, environmental ethics is increasingly dominated by climate change and how this should be responded to. For the most part this is an anthropocentric debate and one that is concerned only instrumentally with the environment; it is the threat to human survival and fl ourishing that is driving the concern with climate ethics rather than concerns about whether we should be respecting the environment as valuable in itself. However, these wider debates about environmental ethics are not irrelevant to climate ethics. For instance, more holistic and sustainable approaches to nature, such as those promoted by deep ecology and the stewardship model, off er motivation to make some of the diffi cult changes that are required if the environ- mental crisis is to be addressed.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

Given the dominance of climate ethics in current environmental ethics, the rest of the chapter will focus on this issue of ethical response to the environmental crisis and the suggestions that are being put forward to address current challenges of climate change. Climate change is generally agreed to be something brought about by human actions: anthropocentric climate change. It is primarily caused by the emis- sion of greenhouse gases (GHG) through the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, aerosol gases, CFCs in refrigeration systems and from animals, manure processing and paddy- fi eld farming. Although the science remains disputed by some, by far the majority of the scientifi c community agree that climate change is happening and that its eff ect on the environment and human beings’ ability to sustain current standards of living – and even to survive – will be catastrophic.

So for example, the latest report from the IPCC (2007a) predicts that “very large sea- level rises that would result from widespread deglaciation of Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets imply major changes in coastlines and ecosystems, and inunda- tion of low- lying areas, with the greatest eff ects in river deltas”. And the IPCC has produced a statement on the melting of Himalayan glaciers, which notes:

[W]idespread mass losses from glaciers and reductions in snow cover over recent decades are projected to accelerate throughout the 21st century, reduc- ing water availability, hydropower potential, and changing seasonality of fl ows in regions supplied by meltwater from major mountain ranges (e.g.

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Hindu- Kush, Himalaya, Andes), where more than one- sixth of the world population currently lives. (2010)

Th ese are just two of the predictions of climate change. More information can be found from the IPCC. Th e task of this chapter is not to lay out the science – which is easily available – but to focus on the ethical responses to the predictions.

Th ese eff ects of climate change are already being felt; and, importantly, these eff ects will increase no matter what actions are taken. Th e eff ects of the emissions that have already been produced will continue to be felt for a long time into the future. In addition to the already dangerous changes listed in Box 10.1, there are a number of possible events that, if they occurred, would result in even more catastrophic climate changes. For instance, it is also possible that climate change could result in the failure of the Gulf Stream, which would in turn result in the cooling of northern Europe, making another region of the world potentially uninhabitable.

Th e eff ects of climate change will fall disproportionately on the poor, as with so many other issues in global ethics. Th e already vulnerable – through poverty or ill health – will be more vulnerable to environmental catastrophes and less able to miti- gate their eff ects. For instance, sea- level rises will aff ect low- lying and low- income states – such as Bangladesh, small island states and the Nile Delta – harder and more immediately than other countries. In part this is purely a geographical accident. However, it is also because they are not able to aff ord the adaptations that richer, similarly low- lying states – such as the Netherlands – employ. (It is worth noting that even in the Netherlands, according to a report from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2006), it is unlikely that current approaches will suffi ce: “Th e second half of the century may see serious problems arising from climate change, in particular in the low- lying areas of the country. A sea level rise of several to many metres is expected in the very long term [a few hundred years]. It is questionable

Box 10.1 Effects of climate change

• Temperature rise. • Sea- level rise. • Extreme weather events, e.g. heatwaves. • Increased fl oods, hurricanes, droughts. • Large regions of the world becoming uninhabitable. • Large- scale displacement of human communities. • Species extinction. • Ocean acidifi cation. • Destruction of land and sea infrastructures.

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whether conventional techniques can be used to maintain the current level of safety.”) Likewise, rises in temperature are more easily managed by countries with agriculture infrastructure that can deal with droughts; earthquakes and tidal waves are more easily managed by those who live in appropriate housing rather than shanty towns; fl oods are more easily managed by rich countries that can bear the cost of immediate aid and that have health- care systems that can quickly address the threats of emergency dis- eases; and so the list goes on. Th us one form of injustice compounds other injustices and the result is further disadvantage and injustice for those already at the bottom of the heap.

Such compounding of injustices is, without doubt, a serious ethical issue. Yet because the injustice is so clear and the need to address it so striking, in a strange way climate change is a less controversial issue – when it comes to ethics – than some of the other issues we have addressed. For instance, if we think back to Chapter 9, there are strong disagreements between ethicists; they profoundly disagree on issues such as whether individuals should be able to sell their organs if they choose or whether sex selection should be permitted. When it comes to climate change there is little ethical disagreement. In short, climate change is an extreme threat to human survival and fl ourishing and therefore it is imperative that it is addressed. Th is is true whatever moral theories one adopts from Chapter 3: for utilitarians the greatest good requires that climate change is addressed because the consequences for not doing so will be a vast increase in human suff ering; for deontologists human dignity and rights require that climate change be addressed; and for virtue ethicists, if human beings are to fl ourish and be able to exercise the virtues, climate change must be addressed. Th e political diff erences of Chapter 4 are also less pronounced; even realists, who seek only national advantage, have to engage in global negotiation to produce treat- ies and agreements that will lead to the necessary practical solutions. As discussed above, this is an issue that no nation can hope to infl uence alone.

Addressing climate change

However, simply because all agree about the ends does not mean that there is agree- ment about the means. Th us the ethical debate in climate ethics is primarily about what measures can be put in place and whether they can be justifi ed. Is the situation so severe that draconian measures are needed? Would it be permissible to coerce individuals and communities to reduce their emissions, even if it required a dra- matic reduction in standards of living for the wealthy and denied the poor rights of development? Are enforced population- control measures permissible, for instance negative measures such as penalties for reproduction or positive measures such as payment for sterilization? And who should bear the cost of managing the eff ects of the climate change already in progress?

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A further question that merits some attention is: who is responsible for address- ing climate change? Nations clearly have roles in global negotiations, regulation and enforcement of agreed measures. Much current focus is on international responses based on consensus between nations. Th e most prominent example of nations making international agreements and taking action is the Kyoto Protocol, which, as of November 2009, 187 countries had signed up to; this was followed by the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, which endorses the continuation of the protocol and its targets, but is not itself legally binding.

Th e Kyoto Protocol is a protocol of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, and is a global attempt to address the problems of global warming and GHG emissions. Th e key objective set out in the protocol was for countries to meet targets for emissions in 2012 relative to their 1990 levels. On average this target is a 5.2 per cent reduction, which means that diff erent nations may have diff erent targets: the UK has a target of 8 per cent reduction, whereas Australia is permitted a slight increase. Progress towards this goal has been a partial success (or partial failure), although it is generally agreed that the 2012 target is likely to be met overall. As of 2005, many of the “economies in transition” (EIT), such as Poland and former Soviet Republics, had made signifi cant reductions that exceed their 1990- related targets (up to 35 per cent reductions), possibly owing to the downscaling of the ineffi cient industries of the communist era. By contrast, during the same period, the other non- EIT devel- oped nations that have ratifi ed the protocol together increased their emissions on average by 5 per cent. Clearly, then, nations have a role in implementing and regulat- ing practical solutions (see Box 10.2) and in managing any kind of carbon quotas or trading policies such as those set out in the Kyoto Protocol.

However, there are problems with relying on nations alone; for instance the Kyoto Protocol is widely criticized for doing too little to address the severity of climate change, and key nations, such as the US and Turkey, have neither signed nor rati- fi ed the protocol (although they are named as “parties” to it and their emissions are

Box 10.2 Possible practical measures to address climate change

• Carbon quotas. • Carbon trading policies. • Carbon taxes. • Clean development initiatives. • Adaption programmes. • Gas extraction from landfi ll programmes. • Renewable energy programmes. • Waste reduction and re- use.

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included in the targets and calculations). Likewise, there are issues about how such agreements can be enforced and monitored. In 2009, the then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown looked into the viability of monitoring individual nations with a view to policing their emissions. Th is proposal received interest and support from French President Nicolas Sarkozy and was followed by a suggestion by US President Barack Obama that spy satellites could be employed to do this. Yet global enforce- ment mechanisms have yet to be put into place.

So we need to ask what other actors there are who might make a diff erence. For instance, even though the US has not signed the Kyoto Protocol, some US states have taken measures to address climate change: California is committed to reducing GHG to 1990 levels by 2020 and other states, including most New England states, have pledged to reduce GHG emission to 10 per cent lower than 1990 levels by 2020. Likewise, regions can make a diff erence: for example, in 2005 the EU introduced a limited emissions and trading scheme that “keeps track of the ownership of allow- ances in the same way as a banking system keeps track of the ownership of money”, in the words of the European Commission (2010).

Institutions and fi rms can also have roles in infl uencing both nations and the individuals who work for them. Likewise, individuals have duties; arguably, those in the West, who have largely been the creators and benefi ciaries of climate change, have the greatest duties. Some individuals act to compensate for their use of scarce resources by using carbon off setting schemes, which allow individuals to off set their own carbon footprints by funding “green projects”, such as alternative energy sources or tree planting. Suggestions have been made for institutionalizing such duties and ensuring that individuals take responsibility for their own carbon footprints. For instance, the UK government has explored the possibility of implementing a “per- sonal carbon trading system”, in which individuals would be given a quota of carbon emissions and, if they wished to use more (e.g. in energy or travel), they would have to purchase additional permits from those who had not used their full quota. Th is

Box 10.3 Responses to climate change

Mitigations: • Reducing emissions. • Reducing fossil fuel use. • Reducing animal emissions.

Adaptions: • Renewable fuel. • Sea defences. • Technological defences, such as genetically modifi ed crops.

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scheme was not, in fact, taken forward, but the fact that such possibilities are being explored suggests that this is an issue policy- makers are acting on.

Th us the ethical debate is not about whether or not we should address climate change, but rather about how we should do it justly. Given the overwhelming evi- dence, there is little disagreement about the ethical importance of addressing climate change: the debate is about how to motivate change and how to set about it in prac- tice. For the most part – as we shall see in the fi nal section of the chapter – the ethics debate focuses on mitigation and adaption policies with particular focus on how to reduce GHG emissions in just ways. A primary focus, especially for the global ethicist, is how to ensure that those who are already on the receiving end of much injustice and who lack economic, social and cultural goods are not further damaged by climate change: that those already vulnerable are protected against the eff ects of climate change and that the right of the poor to develop is not undermined by policies that reduce emissions. However, there are those who propose more radical solutions to climate change; for instance, forced reductions in emissions and forced population control to reduce the scale of the crisis.

Duties to human survival

In a famous paper, “Living on a Lifeboat” (1974), Garrett Hardin argues that if the environmental crisis is to be resolved, then we have duties explicitly to protect the planet so that human beings survive, and that this entails a radical rethinking of what our ethical duties to the poor are. Hardin argues that we should not think of the environmental crisis as a global problem that requires a global solution, in the way set out above: he calls this the “we’re all in this together”, “spaceship model”. He suggests that this model – which assumes that because we all share the planet we should share resources – leads to the destruction of resources and allows “misguided idealists to justify suicidal policies for sharing our resources through uncontrolled immigration and foreign aid”. Hardin argues that for resources to be protected – which they must be for human survival and in order to respect the rights of future generations – they must be owned by somebody and access to them must be limited. Th is is an argu- ment he put forward in an almost equally famous earlier paper, “Th e Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). Th e “tragedy” of common property is that because it belongs to all (rather than particular individuals and groups) no one takes responsibility for pre- serving it into the future. Hardin believes that the tragedy of the commons is evident in the pollution of global commons such as air, water and land and fi sh stocks.

Rather than a “spaceship” with shared resources to which all have an entitlement, Hardin proposes that it is more realistic to think of the globe as an ocean that is scat- tered with lifeboats. Th ese lifeboats are the rich countries (which hold about a third of the world’s population) and the poor swim in the ocean towards the lifeboats,

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desperately trying to clamber aboard. Th e lifeboats are nearly at capacity and at best can take a few more people; but, to do this would be to reduce the “safety factor”: the capacity to respond to crisis, such as drought or fl ood (arguably more important in the current climate situation where emergencies are increasingly likely).

What are the options for those in the lifeboats? Hardin (1974) argues that if we take the usual justice approach, we will attempt to bring all those in the sea into the lifeboats. Th e result of this is that “the boat swamps, everyone drowns”. In Hardin’s words “complete justice, complete catastrophe”. He argues that we should refuse to allow any additions to the lifeboats and set guards at their perimeters. If people feel guilt about this for reasons of justice, his reply is “get out and yield your place to others”. He regards any other approach as unrealistic, and in fact unethical, because it will result in further environmental degradation and the destruction of all human life.

Hardin’s lifeboat ethics has implications not only for immigration and aid policies, but also for health programmes, international law and all forms of global govern- ance. In particular, he worries about population increase – especially of the poor whose populations grow twice as fast as the rich – and advocates coercive popula- tion control as a means of lessening environmental degradation. Hardin points out that every human being uses environmental resources and thus, as population rises, there are fewer resources to be shared. He argues that populations should be naturally checked by drought and famine but that these natural means of population reduction have been artifi cially reduced by food and development aid. Such aid, he believes, is misguided and irresponsible and should be refused: “however humanitarian our intent, every Indian life saved though medical or nutritional assistance from abroad diminishes the quality of life for those who remain, and for subsequent generations”. According to Hardin, our duties to future generations require that we reject the usual claims of justice and recognize the claim of these alternative duties: “prosperity will be satisfi ed with nothing less”.

Not surprisingly, the lifeboat model has received little support from ethicists – especially global ethicists – as it contravenes key principles of moral theories, such as universalism and impartiality, discussed in Chapter 3, and most political theories, from cosmopolitanism to rights theories, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Not only is Hardin’s theory of justice criticized as failing ethical and moral premises, but his empirical claims about the eff ect of population growth are questionable. For instance, while all humans do use resources, the quantity of those resources is vastly diff erent; as we saw in Chapter 9, if we were concerned with resource depletion it should be the US population we control and not poor populations. So, to use Hardin’s logic, to protect the world’s resources for future generations our duty might well be to sink the lifeboats, and insist that all live using sustainable measures. Alternatively, population increase may be addressed as development occurs; however, along with development comes increased resource use and environmental impact. Population reduction alone is not a solution to the environmental crisis.

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A rights- based approach

Th ere are strong pragmatic reasons for us to address climate change; it is arguably the biggest threat to human survival and therefore should be at the top of the list if we wish human beings to continue to survive, let alone fl ourish. Th is pragmatic and consequentialist approach is most prevalent – particularly in public and policy debates – and most debate is about how to reduce environmental degradation and pollution (few thinkers adopt non- global approaches such as Hardin’s). But conse- quential reasoning is not the only form of moral reasoning that suggests we have collective and individual duties to address climate change. For instance, deonto- logical arguments can be made and a number of prominent global ethicists have adopted rights- based approaches. Foremost among these is Simon Caney. He adopts a human- rights approach to argue that climate change needs addressing with the utmost haste and also to guide thinking about how solutions should be formulated and implemented in practice. Caney’s concept of human rights is a standard one, as discussed in Chapter 5. For him, all individuals possess human rights irrespective of their social or cultural circumstances, and these rights take priority over other values. Rights, for Caney, are “moral thresholds”; they delineate an acceptable standard beneath which no one should be allowed to fall. (Th ink back to the discussion about Shue and “basic rights”.) He defends instrumental rather than intrinsic conceptions of human rights but argues that this makes little diff erence to the ethical arguments or the duties that rights impose when we consider climate change.

In his paper “Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Th resholds” (2009b), Caney notes the increasing attention to climate change in human- rights documents. To this end he cites the “Male’ Declaration on Human Dimension of Global Climate Change” (CIEL 2007) and the 2008 resolution of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations (OHCHR 2008), which recognize the threat climate change poses to human rights. Caney identifi es three rights that climate change threatens: rights to life, health and subsistence. Because climate change is brought about by human action, he is able to base his argument on a negative- rights claim that there is a right not to be harmed by the action of others.

Caney presents these three rights as basic, minimal requirements in order to gain as much consensus as possible from across the theoretical and political spec- trum. Elsewhere he also argues that “the right to property” and “the right not to be subject to enforced relocation” are also jeopardized; but because these are perhaps more contentious he omits them from “Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Th resholds” in order to strengthen the force of his argument. Th us he considers the “right to life”, for instance, in its negative formulation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OHCHR 1976) as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. Th is is a little diff erent from Shue’s basic conception of rights as set out in Chapter 5, which suggested that such basic rights require not only being “left alone”,

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but also some basic protection from threats, something that Shue argued removed the distance between negative and positive rights. However, Caney adopts a minimal, negative account of the right to life and argues that inviolability must entail that no one acts so as to deprive people arbitrarily of their lives. Anthropogenic climate change does just this: by human action people are arbitrarily killed. Th is happens in the severe weather events that are a result of climate change, such as hurricanes and fl oods, and in extreme weather conditions such as heatwaves. Caney thus argues that it is unquestionable that a human right to life is violated by climate change and by actions that contribute to climate change.

Caney continues with similar arguments for the right to health and the right to subsistence. Again he frames these as negative rights not to be harmed: the right that others do not act so as to create serious health threats; and the right not to be deprived of the means of subsistence by others’ actions. Again he states that it is clear that climate change violates these rights. Th e severe weather events of climate change bring in their wake epidemic diseases that constitute severe threats to health. Th e right to subsistence is violated as drought increases and food security is under- mined; sea levels rise and agricultural land is lost; fl oods increase and crops fail; and severe weather events destroy harvests. By way of illustration, in his paper “Human Rights, Climate Change and Discounting” on a similar topic, Caney (2008) notes that “a temperature increase of 2.5°C will [it has been estimated] result in an extra 45–55 million people suff ering from hunger by the 2080s; a temperature increase of 3°C will result in an increase of 65–75 million people of those who are threatened by hunger; and a temperature increase of 3–4°C will result in an increase of 80–125 million in that category”. Th us, for Caney, one does not even need to think about positive duties; on the basis of negative human rights alone, climate change requires immediate action.

Rights of, and obligations to, future generations

Th e rights of future generations is becoming an increasingly important global- ethics concern, and perhaps nowhere more so than in issues of environmental justice. As

Box 10.4 Basic human rights threatened by climate change

• The right to life. • The right to health. • The right to subsistence.

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we saw in Chapter 9, increasingly the decisions we are making about the sort of people who can be created and the global infrastructure we put in place to distribute health resources have a fundamental impact on future generations; to an important extent the decisions we make today will curtail and limit the choices of future genera- tions. Th is is even more the case in climate ethics, where our actions already have – if scientifi c evidence is to be believed, and the weight of opinion is that it is – curtailed and limited life options for future generations. Th ere is a danger that, if changes are not made very quickly, such limitations will make life for our descendants diffi cult in unimaginable ways. Indeed, some argue that human survival itself is threatened.

For some, our duties to future generations are less important than our current duties of justice. Th ese arguments are similar in structure to the non- cosmopolitan arguments we discussed in Chapter 4. Just as, as we saw in Chapter 4, non- cosmopolitans argued that our duties to distant others were less than our duties to those in close proximity, so some argue that our duties to tempor- ally (rather than geographically) distant others are fewer or less important than our duties to those who are temporally nearer. Th is is a view famously champi- oned by Bjørn Lomborg (2001), who argues that money could be better spent on addressing current injustices rather than on climate change. Indeed, he questions the whole “downward trajectory” of the current depressing rhetoric of climate change and cites increasing prosperity in support of his claims. However, given the increasing and overwhelming evidence regarding the dangers of climate change and the impact of climate change on other forms of injustice, this view is not con- vincing. In addition, the rhetoric of increasing prosperity is problematic given the recent world recession and economic crisis as well as the predicted problems of funding an ageing population. Th is said, it is important to remember that environ- mental issues are not the only global- ethics issues to address, and thought needs to go into how to balance the competing claims of justice (to both current and future generations).

Th ose who defend the rights of future generations do so using the type of rea- soning employed by cosmopolitans that we saw in Chapter 4, or by those defending impartiality or universalism that we saw in Chapter 3. Th ey deny that accidents of birth, such as race, gender or class, are morally relevant and therefore they should not feature in moral decision- making. Location in time, no less than geographical location, is arbitrary and irrelevant to moral calculations.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Given the wide political and ethical agreement that something must be done to address climate change – both in terms of mitigating its eff ects and funding adaptive

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technologies and defences – the key ethical question is who should bear the burden of these costs. Who should be required to cut back emissions and on what grounds? How can a fair model be developed that recognizes historical and current benefi ci- aries and that does not unreasonably prevent the development of those who, as yet, have benefi ted very little? When it comes to deciding who should be responsible, we should also remember that the costs of adapting to climate change are already signifi cant. Even if GHG emissions ceased wholly and immediately (something that is impossible), the eff ects of emissions to date will continue to be felt for a signifi cant time to come. For instance, as we have mentioned already in this chapter, tempera- tures will continue to rise, as will sea levels, and with these there is likely to be an increase in extreme weather events, such as more rain and, with it, fl ooding, high temperatures and hurricanes.

When considering the possible solutions below it is important to remember that there is no status quo option with regard to climate change. To leave things as they are does not mean that things will stay the same, with the poor and vulnerable continuing to enjoy (or suff er) the same standard of life. To do nothing means that those who are already poor and vulnerable will become more so because the eff ects of climate change – such as severe weather events – aff ect them disproportionately because they are unable to adapt as well as the rich.

In the literature, and in public debate, possible principles to govern the develop- ment of policies under current discussion are the principles of “equality”, “polluter pays”, “benefi ciary pays” and the “ability to pay”. Most of the practical solutions sug- gested – such as carbon taxes and trading policies – broadly attribute responsibility to those currently polluting. However, a focus on current emissions rather than on past polluters (and benefi ciaries) of carbon emissions can lead to injustice. For instance, one might support “clean development initiatives” that are expensive in developed countries, but argue that there is a case for developing countries to be exempt from such requirements (or subsidized by already developed countries) at least until the point where a reasonable standard of living is reached. It would seem unjust if all countries were treated alike, as the developed world has already produced emissions and experienced economic development, whereas the developing world has yet to reap the benefi ts of development and experiences only the burdens of climate change caused by the developed world.

Box 10.5 Possible principles for addressing climate change

• Equality of burdens. • Benefi ciary pays. • Equality of quotas. • Ability to pay. • Polluter pays.

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Equal burdens

It is for these reasons that claims to equality – so central to many global- justice claims – are somewhat problematic in the ethics of climate change, because it may be that to treat actors equally is to treat them unjustly. Th e problem of treating all global actors equally is discussed by Moellendorf (2009a). He addresses the approach of the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which takes a historical baseline of 1990 and then requires diff erential reductions in accordance with this. Th us the burdens are intended to be equal for all. Moellendorf argues that this does not suffi ciently take into account the background of injustice, but rather requires all to share the burden, including underdeveloped countries. He suggests that this does not respect the right to development because it requires underdeveloped countries to pay costs that may stall development in order to maintain higher standards of living in developed countries. In addition, reduced emissions fall on diff erent parts of the world in diff erent measures. For instance, the reductions of the rich may seem signifi cant, but they may be reductions of luxuries, whereas the reductions of the poor may be losses of essentials: again this threat- ens development rights. Moellendorf (2009a) argues that “a principle that does not permit emissions increases in many of the poorest countries … is incompatible with the right to development”.

Equal shares

Another equality- based approach is one of “equal shares”. Like equal burdens, the idea of equal shares has been discussed with regard to future policy and is the assumption of models that assign per capita quotas. Again, equality has intuitive justice appeal because it allots the same share of emissions to all, and the same reduction.

Th e advantage of this over the equal- burden model is that it does allow some space for growth for the poorest – who are yet to use their whole quota of emissions – while requiring large reductions for the richest. Moellendorf reports that on one model, using fi gures from the US Census and IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (2007b), if years 2000 and 2050 were taken as end points then Bangladesh would be allowed emissions 4.5 times those of 2000. Th us there is some accommodation of the right to development. In addition, it also allows emissions permits and trading for those states that emit less than their target. Th is allows richer states to buy additional emissions targets, which is arguably more effi cient and less diffi cult than cutting emissions. In addition, it benefi ts poor states by making their lack of emissions a source of revenue.

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Polluter pays

Another model is “polluter pays”, which argues that those who created climate change are responsible for addressing its ill eff ects. It is a backward- looking model that seeks to lay the responsibility on those who caused the calamity. Th is is an intui- tively strong view that meets concerns for justice; it seems fair and puts fi nancial responsibility in the same place as moral responsibility. Again, part of this principle is built into the Kyoto Protocol in that a 1990 baseline is set: however, as Moellendorf has argued, this is not suffi cient to respect the rights of the poor.

As well as fi tting with assumptions about justice, the polluter pays model seems also to fi t our real- world intuitions about who should pay. If we consider countries to be the agents responsible, then it is likely that the wealthier countries would be responsible for the cost of fi nancing mitigations and adaption to climate change. Given that, for the most part, it is wealthy countries that have been the pollut- ers (and also largely the benefi ciaries) at the expense of low- and middle- income countries, this model again seems to be broadly fair. Certainly a number of low- and middle- income countries, such as Brazil, have thought so and endorsed such principles.

But, although the polluter pays principle seems to be just and fair, there are a number of diffi culties. First (true, to some extent, of all responses to climate change) there is the problem of uncertainty. Estimating the ill eff ects of climate change is notoriously diffi cult, as shown by the scientifi c and political controversies with regard to the extent and danger of climate change. Given the diffi culties in estimat- ing ill eff ects, it is not surprising that it is even harder to estimate who caused which harm with enough accuracy to insist on reparations. Second, are polluters respon- sible for the ill eff ects before it was known that such actions contributed to climate change, or only for pollution since around the 1990s, when it began to be known that carbon emissions contributed to climate change? To make polluters responsible for eff ects that they can reasonably be said not to have known about seems unjust, and this reduces the intuitive appeal to fairness that is, at fi rst sight, such a strength of this principle.

Benefi ciary pays

Whereas the polluter pays principle places the responsibility for the eff ects of pol- lution squarely on those who directly cause or have caused the pollution, the “ben- efi ciary pays” principle holds those who have benefi ted from the development that has led to climate change responsible for meeting its costs: “responsible”, that is, for paying the costs – it does not say that those who benefi t from pollution must have had something to do with causing pollution. Again, the principle is essentially quite

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simple. Th ose who benefi t from projects that increase global warming and despoil the environment are liable to pay for putting things right, or for reparations to those harmed by those projects. In “Historical Emissions and Free Riding” (2004), Axel Gosseries defends a version of this view, arguing that by virtue of a society’s benefi t- ing from, for example, large- scale industrialization, it can incur a moral obligation to compensate those who have been harmed by its eff ects. Th is may be the case even if those who benefi t could not reasonably have been held responsible – causally or morally – for the event. So, if we in a developed nation now benefi t from huge power plants built by our ancestors who knew nothing of global warming and its disastrous consequences, we may still owe reparations to people adversely aff ected by the smoke that bellows out of their chimneys. Th is is not because we are responsible for it hap- pening or for not stopping it, but simply because we gain the benefi ts while others do not. Furthermore, such a system could be “progressive”, meaning that people pay proportionately according to their means, so that the richer pay more than the poorer because they can aff ord to do so without hardship. So, for example, to use a proportion of income tax, a percentage of people’s earnings, to fund the restoration and maintenance of national parks is consistent with a progressive version of the benefi ciary pays principle.

Caney has resisted this view in “Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Signifi cance of History” (2006). He raises several problems with both the polluter pays and benefi ciary pays principles. Suppose, says Caney, that we combine the two principles and then suppose that one party – a country, government or corporation, A – causes an environmental injustice that benefi ts A and also benefi ts another B. On the combined view, both A and B are liable to pay for the injustice; but how liable? How do we apportion blame in this case? We might think that A should bear more of the cost, because it caused the event as well as benefi ting from it. Yet it could surely be the case that B benefi ted from A’s act of injustice far more than A did. In fact, we could also imagine a scenario in which A causes but does not benefi t from the act whereas B does not cause it but does rather nicely out of it. What then? Caney argues that the benefi ciary pays principle is less attractive because:

it is a deeply entrenched view that those who cause a harm have some moral obligation to address that pollution. If I release some toxic waste in a river then surely, ceteris paribus [all else being equal], I should pay. To deny the Causal Account [the polluter pays view] any role would be highly counter- intuitive. (2006: 472)

However, despite Caney’s criticisms, the benefi ciary pays principle continues to have appeal, not least because the polluters and benefi ciaries are broadly similar groups. So this principle may be useful as a partial solution.

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Ability to pay

Th e “ability to pay” principle has gained popularity, partly because of the pressing need to address climate change and the awareness that if suffi cient action is not taken soon then it may be too late. Accordingly, those who endorse this model argue that there is no point arguing about historical injustices and attributing blame if those identifi ed are either unable or unwilling to pay. So rather than attempt to track diffi cult networks of causal injustices, we should instead be pragmatic and consider just who can aff ord to fi nance the changes that are so necessary. Th ey suggest we adopt an ability to pay model. Th e model is forward- looking rather than backward- looking, focusing on what can be done now and who has the most resources to do it. It suggests that the burdens of climate change should be carried by the wealthy and in proportion to their wealth.

Th e main problem with this approach is that it does not seem fair. Why should having the resources to pay for mitigations and adaption of climate change make it your responsibility? Th is seems unjust, and not a principle that is operated in other areas of justice. Th e ability to pay principle thus lacks the intuitive appeal to fairness that both the polluter pays and the benefi ciary pays principles have. However, if the wealthy do not pay then who will? Furthermore, would such a system be less fair than familiar “progressive” income taxation, where the wealthier give a higher proportion of their income than the less well off ? Doing nothing has consequences and it is the poor and vulnerable who will bear the greatest burden if there is no action. If it is a choice between the already disadvantaged suff ering (and oft en to the extent that they fall below a minimally acceptable standard of living) or the advantaged suff ering (and in a way that does not aff ect their survival ability or cause them to fall below a minimal standard), it would be unjust for the already disadvantaged to suff er. In addition, when one considers that, if the actors we are discussing are countries, it is the wealthy countries that are the overall polluters – benefi ciaries as well as those with the ability to pay – then this concern is somewhat reduced. However, as Caney has argued, we should beware of equating these groups too quickly. For instance, China and India are current polluters, but they have not been polluters historically, nor are they primary benefi ciaries over time and certainly they are not the coun- tries with the greatest ability to pay. Nonetheless, a major advantage of the ability to pay approach is that it avoids much of the uncertainty of establishing causal links between the causes and eff ects of climate change, which so bedevils the polluter pays principle and, although less so, the benefi ciary pays principle.

Hybrid principles

Like so many solutions in global ethics – including all those we have discussed, from development measures to research ethics in bioethics – the option adopted does not

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have to be either one approach or another. Th ere are many instances where mixed approaches can be chosen. Oft en these are practical choices that allow the benefi ts of the diff erent approaches to be used.

One such hybrid model is proposed by Caney (2010); another similar approach is put forward by Moellendorf (2002), which supplements the polluter pays principle with the ability to pay principle. By so doing they attempt to produce a solution that has the strengths of both principles: a principle with the strong appeal to justice and fairness of the polluter pays principles and with the practicality of the ability to pay principle.

Caney (2010) regards the justice appeal of the polluter pays principle as import- ant and thus adopts this as a fi rst principle by which to fund the mitigations and adaptions necessary to meet the challenges of climate change. However, he does not think this is enough, in part because of the criticisms above regarding uncer- tainty and the diffi culty in addressing pollution caused by previous generations. He argues that these diffi culties mean that the polluter pays principle can be used only to address a portion of the eff ects of climate change. Th ere will always be some causes that cannot be traced or are not appropriate to chase. For instance, he argues, some contemporary polluters, such as India and China, are not able to pay repara- tions for their emissions. He argues that such countries should be partly exempted from the polluter pays principle because to insist on payment would perpetuate and increase poverty. Th erefore, he argues, duties to address climate change should not cause people to fall beneath a certain standard of living. His claim, then, is that the polluter pays principle should be the fi rst principle of climate change, but one that is qualifi ed in order that people are not forced to pay for emissions that are necessary for survival or if such payment will cause people to fall below a minimum standard of living: the “Poverty- sensitive polluter pays principle”.

To supplement this poverty- sensitive polluter pays principle and address the remainder of the ill eff ects of climate change he adopts an ability to pay principle. To show why there is a duty for those who have the ability to pay to do so, even when they have not contributed to the harm, Caney (2010) draws on arguments about duty of aid (similar to those of Singer, discussed in Chapter 7) to suggest that there are not only negative duties not to harm, but positive duties on those with the ability to pay. He argues that one should “pay” to the point where the duties are not “too demanding”. He also distinguishes between those who attained their wealth unjustly (e.g. by benefi ting from slavery) and those who attained it justly. He argues that both groups have duties to pay but that those who attained their wealth unjustly have a greater responsibly: the “historically- sensitive ability to pay principle”. Including some element of historical considerations introduces a backward- looking element to this essentially forward- looking principle. Th is allows him to retain some of the sense of justice of the polluter pays principle, even in the ability to pay principle, and so to satisfy concerns about fairness.

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CONCLUSION

Th is chapter has brought together many of the issues of global ethics. What is the scope of justice? As well as being global does it also extend to non- human species? And are there duties to the natural world in itself, for instance to biodiversity and habitats? And what about future generations? How do we factor in to our calculations the rights of those yet to be born and who might never be born as against those who are already living and in need? Moreover, what is justifi ed in limiting the rights of individuals for the greater good of reducing climate change? Can human rights be trumped in order to address the crisis? Some argue that the crisis is so dangerous that it is justifi ed to deny some human rights (e.g. the right to reproduce or to develop) and to curtail civil liberties (e.g. to enforce reduced travel and energy conservation).

How you decide these issues will again depend on the decisions you made with regard to your ethical toolbox. Which of the moral, political and rights theories of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 do you endorse? If, like Caney, you regard human rights as inviol- able, this will infl uence what responses to climate change you favour. If you are an egalitarian cosmopolitan like Moellendorf, you will defend the global poorest’s rights to development as justice rights while proposing means that reduce climate change. Perhaps the extreme nature of climate change will change the views you hold and make you rethink your previous moral and political commitments. However, what- ever else, the complex way in which environmental injustice aff ects other areas of injustice has shown the necessity for the interconnected and broad approach advo- cated in global ethics.