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Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Active shooter response: defensive tactics
and tactical decision-making for elementary
school teachers and staff
Whitney, John A., IV
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56841
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF
by
John A. Whitney IV
December 2017
Thesis Co-Advisors: Carolyn Halladay Kathleen Kiernan Second Reader: Lauren Wollman
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF
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6. AUTHOR(S) John A. Whitney IV
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and tactical-based decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making tools that could be taught to teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research sources include government operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem intimidating to the non-military or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The tactics provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental preparation and situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques), and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification). Additionally, the findings support the following recommendations: provide training to teachers and school staff on options-based responses (including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students by any means necessary, and establish reconnection procedures in the event of an incident.
14. SUBJECT TERMS active shooter, education, school, defense, tactics, elementary
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139
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF
John A. Whitney IV Division Chief, Scottsdale Fire Department, Scottsdale, Arizona
B.A., Arizona State University, 2002 M.S., Arizona State University, 2007
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2017
Approved by: Carolyn Halladay Thesis Co-Advisor
Kathleen Kiernan Thesis Co-Advisor Lauren Wollman Second Reader Erik Dahl Associate Chair for Instruction Department of National Security Affairs
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PREFACE
I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who
was scared to death that his son would not be adequately protected in the event of an
active shooter. I asked the questions, surveyed the layout of the school, and spoke with
my son about his school’s lockdown practices. None of them made me feel any better.
Run, Hide, Fight provides a great foundation to build on, but I felt it needed more. I felt
people needed to know when to run. They needed to know where to hide. Moreover, they
needed to know how to fight. The fear I felt inspired me to conduct research on how to
prepare elementary school teachers better to respond to active-shooter events. Based on
this research, I feel that I have uncovered many simple practices that can be learned for
free and practiced on a daily basis.
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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and
tactical-based decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth
and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and
military tactics and tactical decision-making tools that could be taught to teachers and
school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research sources include government
operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive tactics and
tactical decision-making.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem
intimidating to the non-military or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The
tactics provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that
have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff
alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental preparation and
situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques),
and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification).
Additionally, the findings support the following recommendations: provide training to
teachers and school staff on options-based responses (including defensive tactics and
tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students by any means necessary,
and establish reconnection procedures in the event of an incident.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................1 B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................7
1. After-Action Reports .....................................................................9 2. Psychological Impact of Training ...............................................10 3. Mitigation Strategies ....................................................................12
D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................14
II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT ............................................................................................17 A. HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS ...............................................17 B. NEED FOR CHANGE ............................................................................20 C. RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY ....................................................23
1. Positives of Run ............................................................................24 2. Negatives of Run ..........................................................................25 3. Best Practices of Run ...................................................................28 4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy ..................................30
D. HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY ..................................................31 1. Positives of Hide ...........................................................................33 2. Negatives of Hide..........................................................................34 3. Best Practices of Hide ..................................................................36 4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy .................................39
E. FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY................................................40 1. Positives of Fight ..........................................................................43 2. Negatives of Fight .........................................................................45 3. Best Practices of Fight .................................................................47 4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy ................................48
III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ..............................................................51 A. WARRIOR MINDSET ............................................................................52 B. WILL TO SURVIVE ...............................................................................58 C. SENSORY INTEGRATION ...................................................................60 D. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP ...............................................................65 E. DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE ..........................................71 F. STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE ...............72 G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS .............................................................73
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IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ...............77 A. COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT ...................................................78 B. ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT ................................................................79 C. I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN ...................................................80 D. KILL ZONES ...........................................................................................81 E. NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES .............................................................83 F. DANGER AREAS ....................................................................................85 G. BARRICADING ......................................................................................89
V. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ....................................................................91 A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................92 B. PRE-ACTION ..........................................................................................93
1. School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find Success by any Means Necessary ................................................93
2. Situational and Area Awareness ................................................94 3. Commit to Mission Success .........................................................94
C. ACTION....................................................................................................95 1. Do Not Delay .................................................................................95 2. Be Decisive ....................................................................................95 3. Move with a Purpose ...................................................................96 4. Put Distance between Self and Threat .......................................96 5. Cover over Concealment .............................................................96 6. Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment
and Provide a Tactical Advantage ..............................................97 D. RE-ACTION .............................................................................................97
1. Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least Expected Action ...........................................................................97
2. Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome ...........................................98 E. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................98 F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY ............................99 G. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................100
APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST ...............................101
APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE ..........................................103
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................113
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed.) ..........................................................................................................6
Figure 2. Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories .........................................19
Figure 3. Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually ...........................................19
Figure 4. Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech .................................21
Figure 5. Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000– 2010) ..........................................................................................................42
Figure 6. The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events ...........................................................................................63
Figure 7. Boyd’s OODA Loop ..................................................................................66
Figure 8. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop .............................................66
Figure 9. Cover versus Concealment ........................................................................79
Figure 10. Kill Zones...................................................................................................82
Figure 11. High Crawl versus Low Crawl ..................................................................84
Figure 12. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’” ......................................................................86
Figure 13. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching from the Base of the ‘T’” ...........................................................................87
Figure 14. Stairwell Clearing ......................................................................................88
Figure 15. The Active Shooter Dirt Dive ..................................................................104
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience Scores .........................................................................................................12
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAR after-action report
ALICE alert lockdown inform counter evacuate
COA courses of action
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
EMS emergency medical services
EOP emergency operations plan
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GLOCK get out, lock out, knock out
IMT individual movement techniques
ISC Interagency Security Committee
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NYPD New York Police Department
OODA observe, orient, decide, act
SET stress exposure training
SPD Scottsdale Police Department
SSIC Safe School Initiative Committee
SWAT special weapons and tactics
TADMUS tactical decision making under stress
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.1 They remain
a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.2 Since the 1999
Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in
the public’s awareness as a potential threat.3 Response strategies need to evolve beyond
the basics of lockdowns.4 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion
of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.
The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate
students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any
visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior
of the school grounds.5 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside
threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the
interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area
perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate
responses and change their actions.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for
responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.6 The adaptive strategy,
1 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression
and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.
2 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study- 2000-2013-1.pdf.
3 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes- revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
4 Ibid.
5 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.
6 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2 D0.
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funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.7 The public rollout of the
strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.8 The
DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as
those in schools in response to active shooter events.9
The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response
strategies to active shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was
to analyze what characteristics of current active shooter mitigation strategies are
beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical-
based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance
the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law
enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to
teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.
Research found that commitment to a winning mindset could be a critical
component in the potential survival of a threatening event. A lot of research addresses
handling stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and
school staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must engage actively
in practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments. It does not cost
money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation, and a
willingness to succeed. It is critical that school systems emphasize the importance of
preparedness and a desire to support readiness processes. With the appropriate mindset
practices in place, teachers and school staff can work to familiarize themselves with task-
level tactical practices.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem
intimidating to the non-military or non–law-enforcement professional, they are not. The
7 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive- mass-shooting.html.
8 Ibid.
9 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016, https:// www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.
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tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement
and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of
survival. Once committed to the “will to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for
teachers and school professionals to feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a
multitude of threatening environments.10
Findings from the research fall into three general categories: Pre-action, action,
and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the
necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over
into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. The tactical
movements and techniques that potential victims implement increase survival. Action
also carries into re-action, and vice-versa, as a feedback loop. Re-action means the
reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or
worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a
looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the
research are the following.
A. PRE-ACTION
School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any means
necessary
Situational and area awareness
Commit to mission success
B. ACTION
Do not delay
Be decisive
Move with a purpose
10 “Active Shooter Resources”; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3.pdf.
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Put distance between self and threat
Cover over concealment
Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide a
tactical advantage
C. RE-ACTION
Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action
Stay flexible, adapt and overcome
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on
options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response
including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.
This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to
school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity
to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.
Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to
protect the children in their care by any means necessary.
Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.
Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If
teachers make a tactical real-time decision to take their students out the window and into
a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know that
their ability to decide is supported.
Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of
an incident.
With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.
In the previous example when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a
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process needs to be established for them to reconnect to the school administration to
provide a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.
By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school
systems have the potential of dramatically increasing the likelihood of survival.
Lockdown should be an option, not THE solution. This nation, as a society, entrusts
teachers with the daily protection of the children. Why not empower them with the tools
and opportunity to evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?
References
Air Land Sea Application Center. Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery. Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ fm3-50-3.pdf.
Blair, J. Pete, and Katherine W. Schweit. A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000– 2013. Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014. https://www.fbi. gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf.
Buerger, Michael E., and Geoffrey E. Buerger. “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. September 2010. https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/ those-terrible-first-few-minutes-revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
Epstein, Emily Anne. “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.” Mail Online. July 27, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight- Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shoot ing.html.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Active Shooter Resources.” Accessed September 23, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/ active-shooter-resources.
Hendry Jr., Joseph A. The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from. Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploa ds/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.
Ready Houston. “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English.” YouTube video. 5:55. Posted by the City of Houston. July 23, 2012. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0.
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United States Air Force. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS). Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012. http://static. epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_ active_shooter_(20121114).pdf.
Wike, Traci L., and Mark W. Fraser. “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 162–69. doi: 10.1016/j. avb.2009.01.005.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to begin with a special thanks to my outstanding thesis committee.
The amount of energy the “Tres Amigas” put into this project is beyond appreciated!
Thanks to Dr. Carolyn Halladay for her precision and professionalism, to Dr.
Kathleen Kiernan for her support, encouragement, and vast subject matter expertise,
and, especially, to Dr. Lauren Wollman for the support, guidance, and “motivation” to
continue.
I would like to recognize and thank Dr. Anders Strindberg and Dr. David
Brannan. As faculty members in this program, they truly inspired me to change the way I
think and approach problems completely. Challenging my own biases, assumptions, and
recognizing different ways to approach problems, gave me a path to take on a project that
brought together vastly different disciplines. Thank you both!
I would also like to thank the City of Scottsdale for its support, and specifically,
Fire Chief Tom Shannon, Center for Homeland Defense and Security alumni, for the
motivation and inspiration to enter and complete the program. The entire Scottsdale Fire
Department family has been completely supportive and patient as I complete this
program. Thank you, Sir, and thank you all!
My extended family has been incredibly patient throughout this process, which I
greatly appreciate. I want to thank my parents, Rosanne and Jerry, who instilled my work
ethic and desire to always try to better myself and my surroundings, for their
love, support, and childcare! I greatly appreciate my dad, John, for his pride and
interest in my project. A special thanks to Grandma Barbara who always checked to
make sure I was home safe from the in-residence portions and told me how proud of
me she was every time. Thank you all!
I am especially thankful for my son, John, who inspired the subject matter of
this project and remains a constant motivator to apply my heart and soul into
something in which I truly believe. Thank you, buddy!
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me every step of the way and gave me the energy and inspiration to succeed. I truly could
not have done it without her. This accomplishment is just as much hers as it is mine.
Thank you, babe. I love you!
Most importantly, this thesis would have not been possible without the love,
support, and INCREDIBLE patience that my wife, Desi, has provided me. She was with
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
Which defensive tactics and tactical decision-making processes can be provided
to teachers and school staff to enhance preparedness for active shooter events?
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical
Educator,” author Jason Winkle recognized the critical value that faculty play in dealing
with the situation immediately following acts of school violence.1 Beyond current
strategies, opportunities exist to train teachers and school administrators in basic
defensive tactical decision-making strategies. The goal of the training is to become more
comfortable in reacting to a potentially chaotic situation. Teachers and school
administrators are then able to make defensive tactical decisions that consider all
available information. With an options-based decision-making matrix, teachers can make
defensive tactical decisions regardless of the scenario they encounter. If they are not in
their classroom, not with their entire class, or any other myriad of possible circumstances,
they can make sound decisions based on the best information available. By educating
teachers to be familiar with defensive tactical decision-making, they have the potential to
be better equipped to react to active shooter events and better protect the students in their
care.
Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.2 They remain
a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.3 Since the 1999
1 George Matthew Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College
Students’ Perceptions of Personal Safety” (PhD diss., Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, 2014), 44; Jason Winkle, “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical Educator,” Illinois Journal for Health, Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 63 (April 2009).
2 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.
3 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study- 2000-2013-1.pdf.
2
Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in
the public’s awareness as a potential threat.4 Response strategies need to evolve beyond
the basics of lockdowns.5 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion
of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.
The occurrence of school shootings, while a significant percentage of all active
shooter events, is still very unlikely.6 Schools struggle with balancing cost and time
commitments with the potential risks associated with various threats potentially
impacting school-aged children.7 While balance is always necessary, the detrimental
impact of a school-based active shooter cannot be understated. Beyond the given risk of
injury and death, a potential psychological impact exists to all associated with the event.8
The fear of such events can spread far beyond the intended target. As a vulnerable
population, school-aged children require additional protection from external threats.
Options-based active shooter defensive tactical training for teachers and school
administrators may provide the help they need to remain safe.
Government organizations have worked to advance strategies for school shootings
since the Columbine High School shootings in 1999. The term active shooter came into
the public vernacular in the wake of this tragedy.9 Government-developed active shooter
strategies have historically focused on lockdowns as the primary defense for school
4 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes- revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
5 Ibid.
6 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills (Bethesda, MD and Hoover, AL: National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, 2014), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Best-Practice-Active-Shooter- Drills.pdf.
7 Ibid.
8 Cathy Kennedy-Paine and Franci Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” National Association of School Psychologists, Communique 43, no. 1 (2015): 22–23, http:// search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1785215596/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/31.
9 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
3
shootings.10 Aided by after-action reports (AARs) following the 2012 mass shooting at
the Sandy Hook Elementary School, which left 20 elementary students ages six and seven
dead, adaptive active shooter strategies have now become more prevalent in schools.11
The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate
students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any
visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior
of the school grounds.12 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside
threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the
interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area
perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate
response and change their actions.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for
responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.13 The adaptive strategy,
funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.14 The public rollout of the
strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.15 The
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Training First Responders and School Officials on Active
Shooter Situations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), accessed November 15, 2016, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-training-first-responders_0.pdf.
11 Steve Vogel, Sori Horwitz, and David A. Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say,” Washington Post, December 14, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ sandy-hook-elementary-school-shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/2012/12/14/24334570-461e-11e2- 8e70-e19935 28222d_story.html.
12 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.
13 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0.
14 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public- service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shooting.html.
15 Ibid.
4
DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as
those in schools in response to active shooter events.16
The first fundamental principle of the DHS active shooter policy is to evacuate
the affected area. If the first option becomes unavailable, hiding from sight is the next
step. The last option—fight—guides the threatened individuals to confront the shooter in
self-defense.17 Running, hiding and fighting are already natural instincts (akin to “fight or
flight”).18 For this reason, the adaptable and actionable characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight
make it a potential strategy for implementation across a broad spectrum of situations.19
The components of Run, Hide, Fight have had successes and failures both before
and after the official rollout of the strategy. In the AARs of Columbine and Sandy Hook,
numerous examples illustrated these achievements and failures.20 Some who attempted to
escape were shot in the process, while others made it to safety. Of those who hid, some
avoided the shooter entirely while others were executed under their desks.21 Civilians
who directly confronted shooters also had varied outcomes. The 2014 Berrendo Middle
School (New Mexico) shooting concluded when a teacher ordered the shooter to put
16 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016,
https://www. fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.
17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 4, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.
18 Holt Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active Shooting Incidents,” McKenzie Institute, July 5, 2014, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/run-hide-fight- effective-public-policy-individual-safety-response-active-shooting-incidents/.
19 Ibid.
20 William H. Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission (Littleton, CO: Columbine Review Commission, 2001), https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-%20Gover nor’s%20Commission%20Report.pdf; Stephen J. Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012 (Danbury, CT: Office of the State’s Attorney, Judicial District of Danbury: State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report. pdf; Scott D. Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_Report_3-6-2015.pdf.
21 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29–32.
5
down his weapon.22 On the other hand, one of the victims killed in the 2013 Sparks
Middle School (Nevada) shooting was a teacher who attempted to confront the shooter.23
Run, Hide, Fight has definite benefits that should remain in the creation of a new
model. It is easily remembered, adaptable, and in sync with natural instincts.
Unfortunately, it is so non-specific that someone not typically trained in high-stress
tactical scenarios—teachers and school staff, for example—might have difficulty
implementing the model when faced with multiple and changing variables. For example,
a panicked teacher unfamiliar with movement under fire may inadvertently stray or lead
students into a firing lane. No one-size-fits-all approach addresses the evolving
environment of an active shooter event.24 Additionally, no mechanism is available during
an event to assess the mental state of a shooter rapidly to decide the best course of action.
A mitigation strategy, bolstered by tactical decision-making tools, can provide an element
of structure to an unpredictable situation.
Sophisticated tactical decision-making models and principles can be adapted to
the educational environment to provide better depth and breadth of understanding by
teachers. For example, reciting “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is a tool used by the
U.S. military to limit exposure time for personnel confronted with a shooting threat.25
The mnemonic can easily be attached to a lesson plan under the Run element to enhance
the capabilities of a civilian population further. “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is
22 Katherine W. Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 2016), 6, https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active shooterincidentsus_2014-2015.pdf.
23 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 42.
24 Laura Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense” in ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 53, https://kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20 Active_Shooter_Open%20%282015%29.pdf.
25 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, 2011), http:// www.usnavy.vt.edu/Marines/PLC_Junior/Fall_Semester/TACT3019_Intro_to_Fire&Movement_Student_Out line.pdf.
6
just one example of the numerous tactical training methods that can be adapted to equip
teachers and school staff better.26
The research identified many similarities between military and law enforcement
personnel and teachers. Both serve with a level of pride and dedication unique to their
professions. Both commit to the service of others. Moreover, both find themselves
directly responsible for the safety of themselves and those they protect. Adapted from the
United States Department of the ’Army’s “Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed,” the following
Teacher-Warrior Creed illustrates the dedication and commitment that teachers and
school staff take responsibility for every day with the students in their charge.
I am a Teacher.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the community and my students.
I will always place my students first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I am disciplined, mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to defend my students against any threat.
I am a guardian of my students.
I am a teacher.
Figure 1. Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed.)27
26 Ibid.
27 Adapted from United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 1–10, http://armyrotc.msu.edu/resources/FM3- 21InfantryRifleSQPL.pdf.
7
With strong dedication, commitment to the safety of their students, and a
willingness to succeed, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to respond
to threatening events. The Teacher-Warrior Creed solidifies that commitment to success
and survival. Combined with other elements in the research, the Teacher-Warrior Creed
serves to celebrate the selfless service that teachers have provided throughout their entire
existence.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review focuses on how school personnel train and react during
active shooter events. Specifically, it concentrates on the psychological impact of
training, as well as the many versions of Run, Hide, Fight that have evolved from various
sources both governmental and private. It does not address law-enforcement response to
active shooter incidents or the psychology of the shooters. A review of the literature
represents three overarching categories: AARs, the psychological impact of training, and
mitigation strategies.
Immediately following the Sandy Hook report in November 2013, an increased
focus was placed upon school-shooter mitigation strategies.28 The New York Police
Department (NYPD) active shooter study was released shortly after the actual event but
only included events up to December 2012.29 The Blair and Schweit report does include
the Sandy Hook incident in their study.30 Although the Sandy Hook shooting appears in
recent studies, limited literature remains regarding an options-based approach to active
shooter responses and mitigation.
The second main area of consensus in the literature is the need to develop or
expand schools’ emergency operations plans (EOPs) to address active shooter
28 Sedensky, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at
Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.
29 Raymond W. Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation (New York: New York City Police Department, 2012), iii, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter.pdf.
30 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 7, 12, 15–17.
8
preparedness adequately.31 Experts agree that school response strategies need to be
expanded to include other options besides lockdown. In the 2010 Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) publication, Those Terrible First Few Minutes: Revisiting Active-
Shooter Protocols for Schools, authors Michael Buerger and Geoffrey Buerger discussed
the foundational benefits of lockdown but also described the many variables where
lockdown is not sufficient.32 The authors described one such variable as, “the most
glaring gap involves non-classroom locations and activities.”33 They went further to
discuss such problematic scenarios as students at recess, in transition from class to class,
and students getting off the bus who they stated may be better served by fleeing the scene
and reconvening at an alternate location versus attempting to lock themselves down.34
One of the takeaways of Sandy Hook is that lockdowns should not be the sole response to
shootings. Experts also agree that an options-based approach needs to be recognized and
applied based on the variables that differentiate one school from another.35 Again,
Buerger and Buerger stated, “An effective response requires school-specific planning and
coordination grounded in local conditions.”36
Ample literature and information provides a sound basis for the proposed topic. A
significant gap in the literature is the lack of specificity when it comes to the needed
types of changes to active shooter preparedness. The majority of the literature reviewed
seems to stop just short of providing that kind of guidance. Specifically, tactical planning
or training is hardly mentioned if at all. The next step of the research is to review what
guidance, if any, was provided to teachers and school administrators immediately
31 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (Washington, DC: United States Department of Education, 2013), 57, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1922-25045- 3850/rems_k_12_guide.pdf.
32 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
33 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
34 Ibid.
35 Tracy L. Frazzano and G. Matthew Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional ‘Active Shooter’ Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs X, 2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ docview/1728289935/abstract/1CC4943198E144AEPQ/10.
36 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
9
following past events. Value and a need for furthering research into the specifics of
advancing defensive tactical decision-making training for teachers still exists.
1. After-Action Reports
The majority of the literature associated with past active-shooter events analyzes
the situations from a law-enforcement response perspective. However, studies show that
in the majority of cases, the shooter is no longer a threat before the arrival of law
enforcement. In a 2014 study on active shooter events in the United States from 2000 to
2013, Blair and Schweit reported that 66.9 percent of the cases they analyzed ended
before the arrival of law enforcement.37 This statistic is valuable in illustrating that the
expectation of law enforcement mitigating the shooter may not be reasonable.
Although few statistical studies regarding historical active shooter events exist,
the few studies that do show consistent statistics across time.38 Researchers from the
NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring over 279 locations
between 1966 and 2012.39 Of the locations analyzed, 68 happened in schools, which
accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.40 The 2014 Blair and Schweit study
also showed that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in educational facilities.41
The total number of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of 160 events.42 Blair and
Schweit report that of 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at K-12 institutions.43 Blair
and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school shootings are consistent with
37 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
9.
38 Joel A. Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 6 (2015): 397, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2015.1008341.
39 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.
40 Ibid., 8.
41 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 13.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
10
those of a 2012 NYPD report.44 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an
overall increase in active shooter events from 2000 to 2013.45 In the first seven years of
the Blair and Schweit study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.46 In the last
seven years of the study, that number increased to 16.4 events per year.47 Given the
statistics, it can be inferred that an increase in school-based shootings is very likely.
2. Psychological Impact of Training
Many school agencies have made changes to how they train their staff and
students to respond to active shooter events. These changes in programming have raised
numerous questions regarding the potential psychological impact of proposed training
styles. The FBI has focused on the role of school psychologists in both pre-event
mitigation and assistance in dealing with the impacts of training.48 The majority of the
literature on the topic agrees that both running and hiding are potentially beneficial
responses to active shooters and those facilities must approach implementation of these
steps strategically.
The research shows two distinct schools of thought regarding training to confront
the shooter physically. Critics of the practice contend it is an unrealistic expectation to
have school-age children confront active shooters.49 Also, they feel the training itself can
have a detrimental impact on the psyches of both teachers and students participating in
44 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.
45 Ibid., 9.
46 Ibid., 6.
47 Ibid.
48 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” 22–23.
49 Steve Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate,” Psychology Today, August 25, 2014, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-act-violence/201408/the-truth-behind-the-run-hide-fight- debate.
11
the training.50 The U.S. Department of Education offers that confronting the shooter may
be the only option remaining when all other possibilities have been exhausted.51
Carole Rider’s 2015 doctoral dissertation is a significant empirical study that
analyzes the relationship between training and perceived ability to react to an event.52
The study analyzes teachers in Mississippi and how prepared they felt for responding to
an active shooter based on which training they or policies their district had
implemented.53 The study shows that teachers who have a regular amount of active
shooter training feel far more prepared to respond to an event.54 Although isolated to a
particular region, Rider’s study correlates a positive perception of preparedness with
increased active shooter training.55
Matthew Snyder found results similar to Rider’s in “The Effects of Active
Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’ Perceptions of Personal
Safety.” Snyder found, “the research suggest that active shooter awareness training
programs do positively influence students in a way that better prepares them to identify,
report, react to, and recover from an active shooter incident (see Table 1).”56
Snyder’s research (illustrated in Table 1) again shows an overall increase in the
perception of safety and resilience from active shooter training. While focused on college
students, a correlation can be made based on Snyder’s and Rider’s findings that adult
learners experience a greater sense of preparedness from training.
50 Romeo Vitelli, “Should Students Be Trained to Respond to School Shootings?” Psychology Today,
January 13, 2016, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/media-spotlight/201601/should-students-be- trained-respond-school-shootings.
51 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.
52 Carole Frances Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident” (PhD diss., University of Southern Mississippi, 2015), 1, http://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067& context=dissertations.
53 Ibid., 9, 108.
54 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 142.
55 Ibid., 125.
56 Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’ Perceptions of Personal Safety,” 73.
12
Table 1. Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience Scores57
3. Mitigation Strategies
In 2012, the DHS sponsored a policy for responding to active shooter events
called Run, Hide, Fight. The adaptive strategy, developed with DHS funding by the City
of Houston, came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.58
The DHS’s Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as those in
schools in response to active shooter events.59 The most prevalent iterations of Run,
Hide, Fight are alert lockdown inform counter evacuate (ALICE), which was developed
by Greg Crane with the ALICE Training Institute, and get out, lockout, knockout
(GLOCK), which was prepared by Basim Abu-Hamid.60 Limited literature exists
regarding the evolution of these various mitigation strategies.
57 Source: Ibid.
58 Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.”
59 “Active Shooter Resources.”
60 National School Safety and Security Services, “ALICE & Run-Hide-Fight Training: Teaching Students to Attack Gunmen,” School Security, accessed September 23, 2016, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/alice-training/; “Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Polk County Itemizer-Observer, April 16, 2013, http://www.polkio. com/news/2013/apr/16/get-out-lock-out-knock-out/; Cody Vance, “Active Shooter Training,” Alice Training Institute, accessed December 8, 2016, https://www.alicetraining.com/about-us/; Brad Bakke, “Surviving an Active Shooter Incident is a Matter of Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Chemeketa Community College, January 30, 2013, http://blogs.chemeketa.edu/courier/2013/02/15/surviving-an-active- shooter-incident-is-a-matter-of-get-out-lock-out-knock-out/.
Variable
DHS (N=29)
CPPS (N=38)
DHS & CPPS (N=39)
Control Group (N=30)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Safety 4.793 .4913 4.579 .5987 4.846 .3655 3.467 1.306
Fear 2.207 2.6643 3.026 2.4104 2.128 2.2616 2.0736 .3786
Resilience .6652 .14035 .7218 .11955 .7592 .13364 .6470 .1676
13
The scientific backing behind the development of the Run, Hide, Fight strategy
remains unclear. Despite the lack of available scientific evidence, it is apparent from the
literature review that proposed mitigation strategies are relatively consistent. Most, if not
all of the strategies researched were some form of Run, Hide, Fight. For example, the
United States Air Force (USAF) produced an active shooter guideline in 2012 that
highlighted its mitigation strategy as escape, barricade, or fight.61
ASIS, an international network of security professionals, published a white paper
in 2016 through its School Safety and Security Council. In the article, Laura Spadanuta
interviewed numerous subject matter experts in the field of school security. Of those
interviewed, not all agree on the details of best practices but do agree with the
overarching messages. Kenneth Trump, president of National School Safety and Security
Services, felt that trends in school active shooter strategy changes were too quick to
abandon proven techniques, such as lockdown.62 Amy Klinger, an educational
administration professor at Ashland University (Ohio), viewed the expansion of
mitigation strategies as an enhancement to current techniques.63 A point of continued
contention is the subject of whether to teach K-12 students to fight. Again, Trump
disagrees with the approach.64 Conversely, Linda Watson, a security consultant for
Whirlaway group LLC, supports the notion of when all else fails, it is essential to do
whatever it takes to survive.65
Literature that outlines specific changes for active shooter response in schools is
limited. In 2010, Buerger and Buerger called for further development of flexible
strategies related to school-based active shooter events.66 They contend that active
shooter strategies in schools do not consider the flexibility needed to avoid becoming a
61 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS) (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012), 6–1, http://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/ publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_active_shooter_(20121114).pdf.
62 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 55.
65 Ibid.
66 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
14
victim.67 Many experts have called for the need to advance active shooter strategies for
schools in the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting, but have failed to provide specific
details as to what those changes need to be. The majority of recommendations focus more
on the need for schools to develop thorough emergency-operation plans rather than
specifically detailing how active shooter responses should adjust.68
Literature exists regarding different sources of tactical decision-making tools and
strategies. Department of Defense (DOD) related standard operating procedures and
guidelines are available in an open-source format. For example, the United States Marine
Corps has information regarding tactical movement while under fire.69 Additionally, the
USAF discusses the “warrior mindset” to provide mental clarity in the face of stressful
situations.70 Documents of this type have many components of tactical decision-making.
D. RESEARCH DESIGN
The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response
strategies to active-shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was
to analyze what characteristics of current active-shooter mitigation strategies are
beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical
based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance
the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law
enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to
teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.
While all aspects surrounding elementary school response to active-shooter events
have significant value, it was important to limit the focus of research to maintain a
manageable scope that could be comprehensively evaluated. Public safety (law
enforcement/fire/emergency medical services (ems)) response was not evaluated, as those
67 Ibid.
68 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 56–58, 63–66.
69 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement.
70 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–1.
15
are separate from the actions taken by teachers and school staff. Additionally, these
factors were avoided to not create an inappropriate dependence on the thought that
someone else will solve the issue. Another limitation was the analysis of after-event
mitigation/recovery. The research did not study the reunification process or long-term
implications of an event. Based on the highly complex aspects of the psychology of
shooter/warning signs/indicators of potential threats, this area was excluded from the
research.
With the research being focused on elementary schools, additional limitations of
the research presented themselves. First, the research focused on the training and
preparation of teachers, school administrators, and staff. Training of the students was not
researched. Training elementary students in Run, Hide, Fight is a debated topic and
beyond the scope of the research. Higher education settings were not researched in depth,
based on student age and capability differences, other than to draw similarities and
takeaways that could be applied to lower grade levels. Also, what practices were in place
in individual schools was not researched, as that would create too large of a scope. Based
on the overall research it was assumed that elementary schools fall somewhere into the
broad categories of Run, Hide, Fight and lockdown.
The main information source for Run, Hide, Fight were the Department of
Homeland Security active-shooter documents. The Department of Education provided
Lockdown information. DOD training manuals, as well as law enforcement procedural
documents, provided tactics and tactical decision-making procedures. Literature-based
sources were AARs, such as the Sandy Hook Commission final report, and scholarly
research providing historical data and analysis. Specifically, this research included Blair
and Schweit’s studies of active-shooter events, as well as the 2012 NYPD review.
The type and mode of analysis followed for the research was “policy analysis”
based on Bardach and Patashnik’s Practical Guide to Policy Analysis.71 The specific
steps of the analysis were the following:
71 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to
More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2015).
16
Determine the common characteristics of success or failure for current
mitigation strategies.
Research what defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools exist in
other disciplines with a focus on military and law enforcement.
Analyze what implementation would look like.
Analyze what barriers exist to implementation and what potential
problems it creates and then attempt to mitigate those issues in advance.
Create an output tool and recommended implementation plan.
The research output is a tangible training tool providing recommendations for
teachers and school staff to aid them in tactical-based decision-making, preparation, and
response to active-shooter events. Recommendations from the research provide for the
development of a self-guided online module that provides a continuing education style
mode of delivery for ease of access at minimal cost. The foundational education provides
a firm base from which conversations and interactions can occur with local public safety
agencies, such as police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency
management.
Based on the preliminary work conducted on the topic, it was determined that the
project was possible. Enough credible information was available on the topic to draw the
various conclusions and connections to relate the different disciplines (elementary school
teachers and the military). Many research projects have been conducted that analyzed the
myriad variable aspects of active shooter events. None of the studies located described, in
depth, the defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools to be applied specifically
to these situations by elementary school teachers and staff. The research summarizes the
benefits of Run, Hide, Fight, discusses the complications of the protocol, describes the
defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools available to assist in minimizing
potential risk, and applies these tools and tactics to the elementary school setting.
17
II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT
Development of new self-protection strategies was necessary to adapt to the
increasing and changing environment of active shooter events.72 By providing a
memorable and adaptable approach to self-protection, the DHS has provided a potential
solution applicable to a variety of scenarios. Also, the policy provides a starting point
from which to build further programs and plans.73 Run, Hide, Fight is adaptable to a
multitude of situations and functions as a cost-effective foundation from which to
customize individual response and mitigation strategies. This chapter explores the need
for change, researches the three aspects of the protocol, discusses the benefits and
challenges of each practice, and summarizes their efficacy.
A. HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS
School shootings in the United States have occurred as far back as the Pontiac’s
Rebellion on July 26, 1764.74 Since then, the number and severity of events have varied
but remained a consistent threat. In 1999, school based active shooter events hit the main
stage of public awareness with the Columbine High School shootings.75 Since that time,
the mitigation and response strategies for such events have had a different focus and
discussion. Although few statistical studies are available regarding historical active
shooter events, those that do exist show consistent statistics from various eras in time.76
Researchers from the NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring
over 279 locations between 1966 and 2012.77 Of the locations analyzed, 68 took place in
72 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
73 “Developing Emergency Operations Plans for Schools,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 56–58, 63–66, June 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/rems-k-12-guide-508.pdf/view.
74 “History of School Shootings in the United States,” K12 Academics, accessed November 23, 2016, http:// www.k12academics.com/school-shootings/history-school-shootings-united-states#.WDXak3eZP-Y.
75 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
76 Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” 397.
77 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.
18
schools, which accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.78 The 2014 Blair
and Schweit study also shows that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in
educational facilities.79 The total amount of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of
160 events.80 Blair and Schweit report that of the 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at
K-12 institutions.81 Blair and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school
shootings are consistent with those of the 2012 NYPD report. The studies cited show a
consistent proportion of active shooter events occurring in educational settings (Figure
2).82 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an overall increase in active shooter
events from 2000 to 2013 (Figure 3).83 In the first seven years of the Blair and Schweit
study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.84 In the last seven years of the study,
that number increased to 16.4 events per year.85 Given the statistics, it can be inferred
that a continuing increase in school-based shootings is very likely.
78 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 8.
79 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 13.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 9.
84 Ibid., 6.
85 Ibid.
19
Figure 2. Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories86
Figure 3. Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually87
86 Source: Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000
and 2013, 6.
87 Source: Ibid., 8.
20
While all school-based shootings are significant, a few have had a direct impact
on the evolution of mitigation strategies. The 1999 Columbine High School shooting
brought the term “active shooter” to the forefront of society’s vocabulary.88 Various
government agencies began discussions regarding what changes needed to be made in the
overall reaction strategy to school-based shootings after Columbine. The majority of
these reviews appeared to be centered on law enforcement’s actions as they relate to
overall response tactics.
B. NEED FOR CHANGE
The shooting at Virginia Tech is a dynamic example of the many elements of
active-shooter events the research evaluated. In April 2007, Seung Hui Cho killed 32
teachers and students.89 Students and staff, to lessen the impact of the situation,
implemented a variety of tactics. In room 211, the teacher saw the shooter in the hallway,
moved back to the classroom, and began to barricade the door with lightweight desks.90
Cho then entered the room, pushing past the desks and killing an Air Force cadet who
had attempted to rush him, and opened fire on the rest of the classroom.91 After leaving
the room and returning, Cho shot everyone in the classroom; those already dead, and
those attempting to play dead, and killed approximately two-thirds of the students in the
class.92
In room 205, students attempted to barricade the door with a large teacher’s
desk.93 Cho fired through the door and hit no one.94 In the end, Cho never gained access
to classroom 205, and no students were shot or killed.95 Abandoning his attempts at room
88 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
89 “Massacre at Virginia Tech Leaves 32 Dead,” History, April 16, 2007, http://www.history.com/this- day-in-history/massacre-at-virginia-tech-leaves-32-dead.
90 John P. Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 195.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 196.
93 Ibid., 195.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
21
205, Cho moved to room 204.96 In room 204, the teacher had placed himself against the
door in an attempt to barricade it and advised his students to exit through a window.97
When Cho attacked room 204, he shot through the door, hitting the teacher, then pushed
his way through the door and killed him.98 After gaining entry, Cho shot everyone who
had not escaped through the window.99 Blair et al. summarize the actions taken and
resulting impacts in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech100
The conditions are as follows:
“In room 206 where the potential victims took no defensive actions
other than freezing, 92 percent of the people were shot and more
than three-quarters of them died.
96 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis
Group, 2013), 195.
97 Ibid., 195–196.
98 Ibid., 196.
99 Ibid.
100 Source: Ibid.
22
In room 211, where the potential victims attempted unsuccessfully
to barricade the door and Cadet LaPorte attempted to attack the
shooter, everyone was shot and about two-thirds were killed.
In room 207, no initial defensive action was taken, but the
potential victims successfully barricaded the door to prevent the
shooter from reentering. Here, 85 percent of the people were shot
and 38 percent of those in the classroom died.
Room 204 performed a denial and then attempted to avoid the
shooter. While the denial was ultimately unsuccessful, it provided
most of the students with time to escape. In this room, 36 percent
of the occupants were shot and 14 percent of those in the
classroom were killed.
Room 205 successfully denied the shooter access to the room. The
shooter fired through the door, but no one was hit or killed.”101
Blair, a leading researcher in the field of active shooter events, deduced along
with his co-authors from the Virginia Tech research, “The data show a clear pattern that
those who took some form of defensive action at Virginia Tech fared much better than
those who did not. Freezing or playing dead were not good options.”102
Combining these findings with Blair and Martaindale’s previous research on
active shooter events from 2000–2010, the authors of Active Shooter Events and
Response found that “you are not helpless during these events” and “what you do
matters.”103 Blair et al. continued to find other valuable takeaways from the events
studied. Consistent with other professionals in the field, Blair et al. found that “people
need options other than lockdown.”104 Additionally, they found that many active shooter
101 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 196–197.
102 Ibid., 197.
103 Ibid., 198.
104 Ibid.
23
policies were too lengthy and inappropriately attempted to be all encompassing.105 Based
on the extreme variability of these events, long and wordy policies and procedures are
ineffective at addressing every situation. Blair et al. note, “it is simply not possible to
write a policy that will address every possibility.”106 Again, Blair et al. reinforce the idea
that it is necessary to engage in options and be adaptable versus trying to define every
potential variable of every possible situation.
C. RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
Escaping danger is one of the most primal actions of the human brain. Fight or
flight is an automated neurologic response either to confront danger directly or flee the
area. The Run, Hide, Fight practice echoes this primal instinct. Many variations of run are
studied, discussed, and practiced: evacuate, evade, and avoid among them. The U.S.
Department of Education provides guidelines for evacuation in the Guide for Developing
High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans. Specifically, the annex speaks to:
“How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly
areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school
locations.
How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff
member.
How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service
animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with
access and functional needs, including language, transportation,
and medical needs.”107
105 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 198.
106 Ibid.
107 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 28–29.
24
Specifically, the 2013 guide prioritizes evacuation as the number one priority, as
safely available, to respond to an active shooter in schools. This direction was a departure
from the previously held stance that lockdowns were the preferred default reaction.108
1. Positives of Run
The research provides numerous examples of successful outcomes of Run
implementation. The tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary demonstrated the potential
success of evacuating. Of the survivors, nine of the children had escaped the attacked
rooms.109 AARs from Sandy Hook established that the nine students were able to take
advantage of an opportunity when the shooter stopped firing, while either reloading or
correcting a weapon malfunction, to make an options-based decision to escape.110 Many
of the other survivors were able to escape the school, find safe shelter, and notify
police.111
The 1999 Columbine massacre demonstrated the positive outcomes of running.
The Columbine AAR describes many surviving students who fled the school once the
shooting started. Specifically, many students, teachers, and staff were able to escape
through the cafeteria or upstairs to the second level of the school.112 When the students
witnessed the actions occurring outside, they began to hide under cafeteria tables.113
According to the AAR, teacher Dave Sanders advised students in the cafeteria to flee the
area, potentially saving many lives.114 As the shooting continued at Columbine, students
108 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 64.
109 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 10.
110 Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 12.
111 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.
112 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.
113 Ibid., 27.
114 Ibid., 27–28.
25
were able to escape as the shooters moved through different areas.115 Again, this example
demonstrated the natural inclination to options-based, nonlinear response strategies.
Another successful case example of evacuation is the 2009 Hampton University
shooting in Hampton, Virginia.116 The Harkness Hall shooting ended due to the quick
thinking of a dormitory manager, who activated the hall’s fire alarm, which in turn,
evacuated the building.117
Despite having limited direct examples of the positives of Run, it could be
concluded that anyone who escaped an active shooter situation was a success. While not
always documented or recorded, the sheer survivability reveals the value of this strategy.
The clear benefit and survivability support the value of evacuation being the number one
response plan.
2. Negatives of Run
Negative examples or characteristics of Run also appear in the research. The
USAF states that all employees should be trained in evacuation procedures and have the
routes pre-identified.118 Unfortunately, pre-existing evacuation plans, whether fire related
or not, can prove to be problematic under active shooter conditions. While training in
advance on these routes has great value for specific scenarios, escapees can find
themselves in a high-risk position if a shooter cuts off routes. In the 2015 document,
Planning and Response to an Active Shooter, the Interagency Security Committee
discusses how pre-established evacuation routes may be inaccessible in an active shooter
115 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 33.
116 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 31.
117 Ibid.
118 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 5–1.
26
scenario or put people in a higher risk position.119 By recognizing evacuation routes
having specific applicability, (i.e., fire, natural disaster event, etc.), teachers must focus
on the elements of the routes to be navigated versus the routes themselves. When faced
with an active shooter event, teachers and school staff should not lock themselves into a
specific route. They need to stay adaptable and take the route that provides the safest and
timeliest escape.
The AARs of Columbine discuss concern over the contradictions of the practice
of evacuating. Specifically, they discuss the possibility that the students shot while hiding
under tables might equally have met their fate while escaping in the hallway.120 After
directing students to evacuate the cafeteria, potentially saving many lives, Dave Sanders
was shot moving through the hallways attempting to warn others.121 The Columbine
AARs also describe scenarios where students were shot at and wounded as they
attempted to flee.122 Unfortunately, the what-if scenarios confirm the idea that no one
single answer exists to the question.
The Columbine AARs also discuss the plans originally set forth by the shooters,
Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. In their initial plan, an explosion was intended to kill
those in the immediate vicinity, as well as trigger an evacuation.123 The shooters then
planned to shoot school staff and students as they escaped from the area of the
119 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (Washington, DC: Interagency Security Committee, 2015), 20, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov- 2015-508. pdf.
120 Lawrence Fennelly, “Lessons Learned,” in ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 20, https:// kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20Active _Shooter_Open%20%282015%29.pdf.
121 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29.
122 Ibid., 27.
123 Ibid., 25.
27
explosion.124 Klebold and Harris also staged their vehicles to ensnare escapees in their
crossfire.125
In a white paper compiled by ASIS International, various subject-matter experts
discussed the positives and negatives of different active shooter response strategies.
Specifically, they examine the difficulties of keeping children controlled and quiet along
an evacuation route.126 Moving children becomes increasingly more complicated with the
potential of an active shooter being on the path of an escape route.127 Paul Timm,
president of RETA Security, contends that ample opportunities are available to lockdown
school children in secure locations and minimize the risk exposure of attempting
escape.128 Additionally, a 2014 report provided by the National Association of School
Psychologists, in conjunction with the National Association of School Resource Officers,
titled Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed
Assailant Drills describes other negative potentials of escaping an area. Again, it includes
running into a path of danger, but adds exposure to victims, and potentially trampling
each other in an attempt to evacuate.129
Described in Kelly’s 2012 NYPD report, two additional case studies demonstrate
potentially negative characteristics of escape. In August 2010, Thomas Cowan reportedly
asked for the location of the fire alarm at Sullivan Central High School in Blountville,
Tennessee.130 Cowan’s reported intent was to activate the fire alarm to lure students into
hallways as they evacuated to provide targets for him in the firing lanes.131 The second
case in Kelly’s report occurred at Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas.132 In
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 26.
126 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
127 Ibid.
128 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
129 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 5.
130 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 97.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 123.
28
March 1998, two students shot at classmates and teachers after luring them out of the
building by activating the fire alarm.133 These examples enumerate the risks associated
with moving from secure locations into potentially more vulnerable areas. While fire
alarms should not be assumed as false, the examples provided emphasize the value in
teachers and staff not making assumptions about situations. Although teachers will
implement standard evacuation procedures and take pre-determined routes in case of fire
alarm activation, they must maintain heightened situational awareness to avoid being
drawn into a shooting lane.
3. Best Practices of Run
Consistent characteristics in the research relate to the best practices of Run. ASIS
International, a recognized authority in the field of security, provides various collections
of best practices from experts in the active shooter field. The 2016 ASIS School Safety
and Security Council active shooter white paper describes the most recent best practice
compilations. Specifically, they list Run features as:
“Find a path and attempt to evacuate
Evacuate whether others agree or not
Leave your belongings
Help others Evacuate
Prevent others from entering
Call 911”134
The document continues to discuss the untethered approach that evacuation
should take. ASIS advises the need to escape in “any way possible” should the situation
133 Ibid.
134 Jason T. Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” in Active Shooter (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 1.
29
allow it, preferably by running.135 The document’s subject matter experts discuss the
value of taking any means necessary, including breaking windows, to create student
escape routes.136 They also recognize the potential that a previously secured area can
become less safe and require the potential victim to escape.137 The Final Report of the
Sandy Hook Advisory Commission also described the potential use of windows for
escape.138 That report goes as far to recommend construction standards for new builds
and remodels.139
The 2012 NYPD report discusses recommendations for evacuating as well. While
the majority of the information is consistent with other sources, one area is contradictory
to the overall consensus of research. Presumably adapted from the 2008 version of DHS
Active Shooter: How to Respond, the NYPD report advises evacuees to “visualize their
entire escape route” before beginning to move.140 As seen in other areas of the research,
this approach becomes problematic if the route previously committed to or visualized
becomes inaccessible or puts the evacuee at a higher risk.
Again, the U.S. Department of Education guide provides thorough
recommendations for escape. Specifically, they list:
“Leave personal belongings behind;
Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible
routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons
with access and functional needs;
Avoid escalators and elevators;
135 Ibid., 5.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 54.
139 Ibid.
140 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 4.
30
Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will
not go;
Call 911 when safe to do so; and
Let a responsible adult know where they are.”141
Although the directions regarding visualizing routes may seem consistent between
the NYPD report and the Department of Education’s guide, slight variances are evident.
As opposed to the visualization of an entire path (NYPD), the Department of Education
prompts teachers and students to visualize possible escape routes, and emphasize the
importance of options. Additionally, they extend the direction to accommodate the
consideration of what routes are even physically possible based on the capabilities or
restrictions of the population attempting evacuation.142 This direction provides a perfect
balance between planning and reaction. By visualizing different routes, the escapees are
building a system of possibilities should they encounter any inputs requiring them to alter
their plans. The planning aspect also prevents evacuees from running off with no
direction or guidance. Additionally, the flexibility avoids the risk of delaying response
and the potential decrease of adaptive thinking.
4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy
Statistically, Run is a challenging response strategy to assess. The data suggest
that people putting as much distance as possible between themselves and their attacker
when safely feasible has obvious benefits. From an after-action standpoint, examples of
both positive and negative outcomes resulted when Run was applied. The positives
appear to outweigh the negatives. Based on the information, the position that the U.S.
Department of Education took making evacuate the number one priority in active shooter
141 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
142 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
31
response makes sense.143 The key, as discussed in subsequent chapters, is to assess the
scenario strategically to determine the appropriate time and details of escaping.
The status quo direction of Run oversimplifies a complex situation. As seen in the
examples, evacuating can have both positive and negative outcomes. As discussed in
greater depth in the following chapters, different tactics and tactical decision-making
tools can be applied to running. It is critical to maintain situational awareness at all times
as teachers move through their school day. For example, teachers and school staff should
be constantly analyzing where the nearest two exits are. They should identify a primary
and secondary option. Additionally, teachers and school staff should work to familiarize
themselves on cover and concealment and should work to make noticing it second nature.
Purposeful, short burst movements, when faced with a nearby threat, can dramatically
decrease casualty rates. Additionally, when a threat is further away, a well-executed
escape can provide distance from the shooter that will likely increase potential survival.
Regardless of distance, if escape is an option, it should always be prioritized.
D. HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
Schools have historically implemented lockdowns as the primary response to
threatening situations.144 Many schools are now implementing more adaptive strategies,
such as Run, Hide, Fight.145 The Hide portion of the Run, Hide, Fight active shooter
response strategy is the most discussed and implemented. Packaged under terms, such as
lockdown, secure in place, and isolate, hiding is standard amongst many school systems
based on its simplicity, relative advantages, and a level of comfort associated with
familiar surroundings. Lockdown is the most commonly used terminology utilized in
schools related to the practice.146
143 Ibid., 64.
144 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 4.
145 Ibid., 1.
146 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.
32
Terminology makes a significant difference in defining expectations of action.
Hiding is the practice of using concealment to avoid detection by a threat. Lockdown, on
the other hand, describes a system in which physical barriers, locked doors, for example,
are utilized to prevent access from a threat. Secure-in-place, a commonly misused term,
represents a strategy of safely maintaining an area to avoid exposures from outside
threats, usually natural. Although they appear similar on the surface, secure-in-place is a
much more passive strategy intended to last for an extended period. Lockdown, on the
other hand, is a shorter-term strategy, and ideally both active and defensive. Hiding is
similar to lockdown with or without the aid of physical barrier mechanisms.
Lockdown is the most commonly seen active shooter response strategy for
elementary schools. The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency
Operations Plans, a collaborative government guidance document, describes the purpose
of lockdown as, “to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in
the rooms away from immediate danger.”147 Despite offering lockdown as an option, the
guide recommends evacuation as the primary mitigation strategy.148
The origin of lockdown is unclear. Some experts trace it to the Los Angeles
Unified School District’s response to riots in the 1960s.149 Lockdown continued as an
appropriate strategy for that same area, which saw an increase in drive-by shootings and
violent threats outside school perimeters.150 It is apparent from the literature that
lockdowns were designed and developed to address threats from the exterior of the
school grounds.151 In active shooter events, it becomes extremely problematic, as the
shooter may have already accessed the interior of the school.
147 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.
148 Ibid., 64: Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 7.
149 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 6.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., 7.
33
Modern mitigation strategies challenge the wisdom of lockdown as the primary
strategy in active shooter events.152 However, Kenneth Trump, president of National
School Safety and Security Services, argues that the emotional response following the
Sandy Hook shooting has caused those in the industry to want to move away from a
practice that has proven successful in past scenarios.153 While acknowledging the
benefits of evacuation, the potential safety of lockdown and recognizing that it may be
the only option, critics also demonstrate concern in leaving students defenseless while
simply hiding without the protection of security barriers.154
1. Positives of Hide
The Safe School Initiative Committee (SSIC) report following the Sandy Hook
shooting stated, “The testimony and other evidence presented to the Commission reveals
that there has never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked
classroom door.”155 This statement demonstrates the significant value of lockdown when
done correctly and with the appropriate factors in place. Implementation of hiding and
lockdown has a litany of success stories. Numerous case studies and AARs describe the
achievements associated with implementing the strategy. For example, in one AAR from
Sandy Hook, staff hid under their desks in the front office of the school, near where the
shooter Adam Lanza first made entry.156 The shooter reportedly entered the office area,
apparently did not see anyone, and moved back into the hallway.157 Throughout the
school, many students successfully hid from the shooter. Students hid in school
restrooms, as well as other areas throughout the school.158
152 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32.
156 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 2, 10, 12.
157 Ibid., 2.
158 Ibid., 10, 11.
34
Another positive result occurred in the 1999 shooting at Notus Junior-Senior High
School in Idaho.159 The AAR describes students barricading themselves in classrooms
when they heard shots.160 These actions attributed to the zero casualty count of this
incident.161
2. Negatives of Hide
Unfortunately, examples of hiding have also led to harmful outcomes. Both in
Sandy Hook and Columbine, two of the most significant active shooter events provide
examples of the disadvantages of hiding. In Sandy Hook, the shooter gained access to the
interior of the school.162 In two classrooms, 20 students were murdered (15 and five,
respectively).163 The majority of the victims were all located, hiding, in their
classroom.164 Of the nine students who ran from classroom, 10 survived the event while
the five students and two teachers who remained in the classroom died.165
In 1985, in the Portland, Connecticut shooting at the Portland Junior High School,
the perpetrator walked the halls looking for victims.166 After killing a custodian and
wounding two other staff members, Floyd Warmsley took a student hostage.167
Warmsley then reportedly wandered the halls with the student hostage for 30 minutes.168
159 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 122.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.
163 Ibid.; Vogel, Horwitz, and Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say.”
164 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.
165 Ibid.
166 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 138.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
35
The now-infamous Columbine library was an additional example of problems
associated with hiding. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris entered the school library
approximately 15 minutes into their shooting spree.169 Students in the library had been
directed by staff to hide under the tables when the shooting started.170 In seven and a half
minutes, the two shooters worked through the library, killing 10 students out of the 60
total students and staff, and injuring many others.171 Witnesses reported that the two
shooters seemed to have no exact method as to whom they shot, which they left alone,
and what prompted them to discontinue the slaughter.172 In this case, it is unclear whether
having hidden in the library was overall a successful strategy. However, had students and
staff taken advantage of the 15-minute gap between the start of the shooting and when the
two shooters entered the library, many more might have survived. By applying an
options-based approach, students and staff could have either fled the area to safety or
confront the shooters in an attempt to overwhelm them. Professor Amy Klinger from
Ashland University in Ohio poses this (rhetorical) question: if you know that an event is
taking place at one end of a school, and you are at the other end of the school, why would
you wait to see if the threat reaches you rather than evacuating?173 To address this
scenario, Klinger advocates for options-based approaches to active shooter events in
schools. In the trainings she provides, the emphasis is placed on showing teachers that
multiple options exist to address these threats. The focus of the training is to illustrate that
no single “right way” of doing things exists. Instead, the value is placed on teachers
recognizing the different options available to them.
Structural design challenges to implementing lockdowns in schools do occur.
Experts in the field of school security discuss the issues associated with attempting to
lockdown a classroom that has glass in or around doors or locks if they are not easy to
169 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.
170 Ibid., 29.
171 Ibid., iii.
172 Ibid., 30.
173 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
36
use in an emergency.174 Depending on the configuration, glass can be broken to allow
access to the locking mechanism; teachers may have difficulty in engaging the lock
during stressful times.175 Another significant drawback to lockdown or other similar
linear response strategies is the familiarity of the practice to the shooter. Many times, the
shooter is familiar with the facility and can anticipate the practices associated with threat
response.176
Lockdowns have obvious strategic limitations. Once committed to an area
perceived as secure, opportunities may be limited to reevaluate a response strategy or
make new decisions. To put it bluntly, once a commitment to hiding is made, victims
become “sitting ducks,” at the mercy of chance. Structural integrity and design of the
building and classrooms become significant in their ability to protect occupants from
shooters.177
3. Best Practices of Hide
The SSIC report following Sandy Hook made two critical recommendations to
assist in the implementation of lockdown in K-12 schools. The recommendations are as
follows:
Recommendation No. 1: “The SSIC Report includes a standard
requiring classroom and other safe-haven areas to have doors that
can be locked from the inside. The Commission cannot emphasize
enough the importance of this recommendation. The testimony and
other evidence presented to the Commission reveals that there has
never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked
classroom door. Accordingly, the Commission reiterates its
174 Jim McLain, “Buying Time—Realistic Hardening of the Target at the Classroom Door,” in ASIS
International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 30.
175 Ibid.
176 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 4.
177 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 6.
37
recommendation that all classrooms in K-12 schools should be
equipped with locked doors that can be locked from the inside by
the classroom teacher or substitute.
Recommendation No. 2: The Commission also reiterates its
recommendation that all exterior doors in K-12 schools be
equipped with hardware capable of implementing a full perimeter
lockdown.”178
These recommendations provide relatively straightforward changes that
institutions can make to provide for better success in potential lockdown scenarios.
The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans also
provides a best practices list for implementing both lockdown and shelter-in-place. As
part of the planning process, the guide stipulates that the assessment team should
consider:
“How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be
safe to do so.
How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e.,
windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action
(COA).
What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.
When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when
outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are
closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as
normal).”179
178 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32–33.
179 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.
38
Unique to the practice of hiding, the guide provides the following list of best
practices: “Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls
might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:
“Lock the doors;
Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;
Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;
Turn off lights;
Silence all electronic devices;
Remain silent;
Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the
hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible
escape if the shooter enters the room);
Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if
possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs
to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency
responders to indicate the status of the room’s occupants; and
Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law
enforcement officers.”180
Other best practice considerations are to establish plans specifically designed for
those who cannot Hide or evacuate.181 Special populations require special planning
180 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
181 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).
39
considerations. Additionally, plans should include variables, such as teachers not being in
their classroom when a lockdown order is given.182
4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy
It is unrealistic to assume or make the correlation that more victims could have
survived if they had approached the situation differently. The outcomes are highly
influenced based on many variables involved. A few of the many variables that impact a
potential victim’s response options and the likelihood of survival include time, distance
from the shooter, exits, and escape routes.
Again, the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations
Plans provides that evacuation should be the number one priority in response to an active
shooter threat when safely feasible.183 However, the guide also provides best practices
that can significantly increase the likelihood of survival if faced with hiding or locking
down. Takeaways from the research demonstrate that locking down can be successful
when done correctly and with the right supporting factors (door construction, locking
mechanisms, and classroom layouts for example). The key is to delineate the difference
between hiding, lockdown, and sheltering-in-place. Again, no one-size-fits-all approach
exists.
If Hide or Lockdown is determined to be the best option given the scenario, it is
critical that teachers and staff actively pursue self-protection. Practicing passive
lockdown procedures can lull teachers and school staff into a false sense of security.
Asking teachers to put themselves in the high-risk, high-stress mindset, and commit to
aggressive defensive tactics, will change the way staff approach hiding and locking
down. Subsequent chapters go into more depth regarding the tactics and tactical decision-
making tools that can be applied to the situation. Having students sit on the floor and
remain quiet is simply not enough when faced with a real threat. Doors need to be locked
and barricaded. Children need to be hidden. All access paths need to be made as
182 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 7.
183 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans.
40
complicated as possible for the shooter to navigate. In addition, makeshift weapons
should be identified early for deployment as a last resort.
E. FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
The Fight portion of Run, Hide, Fight is the most highly debated element of
mitigation strategy for schools. When dealing with elementary age children, many feel
that it is an unreasonable expectation to ask kids to Fight attackers. Some psychologists
and school administrators challenge the Fight aspect of Run, Hide, Fight,184 arguing that
it is unrealistic and inefficient to confront the shooter physically. Many reasons for this
critique have been stated, such as age, knowledge base, and physical capabilities of the
threatened party. Since all situations reveal themselves differently, and are full of
variables, these factors must be discussed when considering the last phase of the protocol.
Having school-aged children confront the shooter, for example, becomes more
problematic the lower the grade level.185 Additionally, access to weapons or objects
potentially used as weapons remains a factor for consideration. Critics also contend that
even the training can be traumatic to participants.186 Proponents of Fight believe, to the
contrary, that when no other option exists, kids may simply have to Fight.187
When discussing Fight, it is important to recognize that the term has many
variables. Fight is recognized as a primary component of the Fight or Flight response.
This natural instinct prompts the threatened to attack the attacker physically. Another
version is to confront an attacker; approach and attempt to mitigate the situation without
physical engagement. Approaching an attacker has distinct risk factors associated with it
but has proved a successful strategy in some cases, as described in the positive examples
184 Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate.”
185 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” 22–23.
186 Dan Frosch, “‘Active Shooter’ Drills Spark Raft of Legal Complaints; Critics Say Simulation Exercises Can Traumatize Those Taking Part,” Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps. edu/docview/=1559961268/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/28.
187 Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active Shooting Incidents.”
41
of Fight in this chapter. The ability to adapt to the given situation to determine the
appropriate outcome lends itself to supporting the idea of options-based approaches.
According to a 2014 study reviewing active shooter events from 2000 to 2013,
66.9 percent of events end before police intervention.188 The shooters either were stopped
by a citizen, or otherwise discontinued their attack (fled, committed suicide, or killed by
someone on-scene).189 Breaking it down by school type, the report identified seven of 10
high school shooters being detained by school staff, three held by educators in middle
schools, and three apprehended at elementary schools. The decision to confront
an attacker, either verbally or physically, is extremely situational. Split-second
decisions need to be made that include only available facts at that time. For example,
could the shooter be easily overpowered, do they seem unsure of themselves, are they
reloading, or is a school staff member at a tactically advantageous position to
incapacitate the attacker? Statistically, the following case studies demonstrate that potential victims can directly impact the outcome of the event (Figure 5).190 As Blair et al. stated:
In 39% of the attacks that were stopped before the police arrived, the victims took action to stop the shooter themselves either by physically subduing the attacker (81%) or by shooting him with their own personal weapons (19%). These data clearly show that it is possible to defend yourself successfully in these events even if you are unarmed.191
188 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 9.
189 Ibid.
190 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.
191 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.
42
Figure 5. Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000– 2010)192
More recently, a 2016 study by Schweit reviewing active shooter events in 2014
and 2015 identified six scenarios out of 40 in which citizen intervention ended the
situation.193 Of the six incidents Schweit describes as ending with citizen involvement,
two involved people restraining the shooters after citizens with permitted firearms fired
upon them.194 Two more incidents involved physically restraining shooters until the
arrival of law enforcement.195 The remaining two events were non-physical
confrontations where one shooter complied with an order from a teacher to put the gun
down.196 The other student shooter committed suicide after being confronted by a
teacher.197 The U.S. Department of Education’s Guide for Developing High-Quality
School Emergency Operations Plans describes 16 events, out of 41, in which victims
192 Source: Ibid., 62.
193 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 2.
194 Ibid., 3.
195 Ibid.
196 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 3.
197 Ibid.
43
physically halted an attack before law enforcement’s arrival.198 Of the 16 events
described, in 13 cases, the potential victims physically “subdued” the attacker.199 Blair
and Schweit’s 2014 report described 65 out of 160 incidents in which events ended due to
citizen involvement or suicide, and 21 concluded due to the intervention of unarmed
citizens.200 Specifically, 11 of the 21 events included the engagement of unarmed school
staff, teachers, and students.201
These statistics demonstrate the likelihood that events will end before the arrival
of law enforcement. The examples also point to the reality that many times,
confrontations (both physical and verbal) lead to the end of the threat. The U.S.
Department of Education’s guide admits that although the idea of confronting a shooter
may be difficult to explain and understand, early mitigation of an event may save many
lives.202 Although potentially beneficial, the research again demonstrates both positive
and negative examples of the implementation of Fight (or confrontation).
1. Positives of Fight
The 2004 Columbia High School (New York) shooting ended when school staff
restrained the shooter after he wounded one person.203 After killing one staff member and
wounding two others in 2005, Campbell County Comprehensive High School
(Tennessee) students and administrators subdued the shooter.204 A teacher restrained a
14-year-old shooter at Pine Middle School in Nevada after he wounded two people.205 In
198 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.
199 Ibid., 66.
200 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 11.
201 Ibid.
202 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 66.
203 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 24.
204 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 26.
205 Ibid.
44
2006, at Weston High School (Wisconsin), staff restrained the shooter after he killed one
person.206 Another shooting in 2006 occurred at Memorial Middle School (Missouri)
where staff escorted the shooter out of the building after his rifle jammed.207 School staff
tackled and restrained an adult shooter in 2010 after he opened fire, wounding two, at
Deer Creek Middle School (Colorado).208 Showing high situational awareness,
construction workers near Kelly Elementary School (California) tackled a shooter when
he stopped to reload after he had wounded two in 2010.209 School staff restrained a 2012
Perry High School (Maryland) shooter after he wounded one classmate.210 In 2013, a 16-
year-old student began firing at Taft Union High School in California.211 He stopped
shooting, after wounding two people, when a staff member persuaded him to halt.212 A
non-physical confrontation concluded the 2014 Berrendo Middle School (New Mexico)
after the shooter was ordered to drop his gun by a school staff member.213 The shooter
had already wounded three people but complied with the order. In 1999, Fort Gibson
Middle School (Oklahoma) staff restrained a gunman after wounding four in 1999.214
Also in 1999, Heritage High School (Georgia) staff disarmed a high school shooter.215
Two Heath High School (Kentucky) students persuaded a shooter in 1997 to put down his
gun after he had killed three and wounded five others.216 After a student killed three,
wounded one, and held his class hostage for 10 minutes, a school staff member restrained
a Frontier Middle School (Washington) shooter.217
206 Ibid., 27.
207 Ibid.
208 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 95.
209 Ibid., 99.
210 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 39.
211 Ibid., 41.
212 Ibid.
213 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 6.
214 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 120.
215 Ibid.
216 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 124.
217 Ibid., 127.
45
2. Negatives of Fight
Negative examples of situations when shooters were confronted or fought are not
numerous. In 2013, Sparks Middle School (Nevada) was the scene of an active
shooter.218 According to the 2014 Blair and Schweit report, the 12-year-old student shot a
teacher when the teacher confronted the shooter.219 An international example occurred in
2003 at a school in Bavaria.220 The student shot a teacher who had tried to “wrestle” the
gun away.221 An example previously described as positive had negative outcomes as
well. In 2006 at Weston High School in Wisconsin, a 15-year-old student opened fire; the
gun was “wrestled” away from him by a custodial worker.222 The shooter then pulled out
a second gun and killed the school’s principal with it.223 The Blair and Schweit report
describe that school staff then detained the shooter while they awaited the police
department.224 This example demonstrates the fluidity of these events showing how
difficult they are to mitigate or control.
Critics maintain that teaching elementary age students to Fight is dangerous and
unnecessary both because of physical disadvantage (by age and size), and the potential
trauma of the training outweighing the likelihood of an attack.225 Most of the examples
indeed show teachers and school staff who confronted shooters; no known examples of
elementary school-age students facing down shooters are available. Kenneth Trump,
President of National School Safety and Security Services, thinks the inclusion of counter
or Fight in elementary school student training is a response to the fear induced by the
Sandy Hook Elementary student.226 Trump does not feel it is the “best way” to prepare
218 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 42.
219 Ibid.
220 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 88.
221 Ibid.
222 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 107.
223 Ibid.
224 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,” 27.
225 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.
226 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53, 55.
46
students for an active shooter event.227 Paul Timm, RETA Security President, agrees that
teaching fighting or confrontation to elementary students “might not be the best
approach” especially if they have other options to them, such as secure classrooms they
can Hide in and lockdown.228 Amy Klinger from Ashland University (Ohio) takes a
different view of the potential setbacks of teaching elementary students to Fight.229 She
points out the enormous potential for pushback and negativity by parents, administrators,
and the community.230 Pushback was the case in Burleson, Texas when students were
trained to Fight would-be shooters.231 After the negative public reaction, the school board
reversed its position and removed that portion from its procedures.232 Klinger also
contends that when teaching Fight, the focus seems to center on that portion and other
options are overlooked.233
The complexities described in teaching elementary age children to Fight
emphasize the value in properly preparing teachers and school staff on defensive tactics
and tactical decision-making. Without the ability to count on the physical swarming of
students attempting to subdue an attacker, elementary school teachers must rely more on
avoidance and evasion. They will have to outsmart and outmaneuver an attacker
whenever possible. Again, when faced with no other option, they will simply have to
employ any tactics available. While physically fighting an attacker may not be a preferred
option, impeding progress by confronting an attacker from a distance may prove
valuable. By maintaining composure in a stressful environment, teachers can outfit and
direct their students to throw objects at attackers if they get through the door of a
227 Ibid., 55.
228 Ibid., 54–55.
229 Ibid., 55.
230 Ibid.
231 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Mike Von Fremd, “Texas School District Learning to Fight Back against School Gunmen,” ABC News, October 8, 2003, http://abcnews. go.com/GMA/story?id=2580664&page=1.
232 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Associated Press, “Burleson Changes Stance on Student Attack Training,” Dallas Morning News, October 25, 2006, http://www.dallasnews. com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/102606dnmetburleson.736f1085.html.
233 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
47
classroom. Klinger supports this practice in stating that she does limited training on Fight
that mainly focuses on simple tactics, such as “throwing things and creating
diversions.”234 At that point of an event, anything helps.
3. Best Practices of Fight
The best practices seen through the literature are insufficient when it comes to
fighting. Based on the variables of the situation, combined with the unforeseen actions or
intent of the assailant, instructions are brief. Due to unknown abilities of potential
victims, the instructions also appear to be designed in a “do the best you can” approach.
Experts in the ASIS white paper provide general instructions when faced with an
active shooter. The literature states, “If you do not have the ability to hide, then the last
option is to:
Fight
Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
Act with physical aggression
Improvise weapons
Commit to your actions”235
As found in the Kelly NYPD report, the 2008 version of the DHS’s Active
Shooter: How to Respond guidance document directs that potential victims “should
attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter.”236 This guidance, however, is
provided only when escape or shelter is not available.237 Specifically, the guide mentions
“throwing objects, using aggressive force and yelling.”238
234 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
235 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 2.
236 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.
237 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.
238 Ibid.
48
The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans
provides similar guidance. The U.S. Department of Education document states:
If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs.239
4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy
As previously stated, many disagree with teaching students the Fight portion of
Run, Hide, Fight. Others contend that when all else fails, it may be all they have left.
Most experts do agree that Fight is a potential necessity for teachers to know how to
defend themselves and their students appropriately. The benefit of the training leads to
the promotion of options-based approaches while still adhering to past proven practices.
Linda Watson, a Whirlaway Group LLC security consultant, states, “If you’re in a dire
situation, you need to go into survival mode and do whatever you have to do to have a
chance to live.”240 This message rings true in almost all the guiding documents on the
subject.
Despite Fight typically being labeled as the last option of mitigating an active
shooter event, it may end up being the first option depending on the variables of the
encounter. For example, if a teacher is at the front office when a shooter enters and
begins firing, physical confrontation may be the only option. As demonstrated in the
research, these events are non-linear, and do not yield to linear response strategies.
Situations have resulted in successful outcomes by someone simply attacking the shooter
at the onset of an event, but no formula really exists for the exact situations were attack is
warranted and prioritized. Typically, in these scenarios, instincts simply take over. It may
end well or poorly, but doing nothing never ends well.
As shown through the research, fighting or confronting an active shooter can have
mixed results. No doubt exists that the immediate mitigation of active shooter events by
239 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
240 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
49
school administrators and others have saved many lives. Other scenarios have shown that
the people attempting to confront the shooter became a victim themselves. It is hard to
assess what would have happened had they not tried to intervene. The mixed responses
when faced with a direct threat indeed speak to the fight or flight mentality that almost
seems to come naturally to the potential victims. Despite concern about teachers and
staff’s willingness to confront a shooter, the research shows that they are willing to face
an active shooter to protect their students. The desire to defend provides excellent support
for enhancing the tactical decision-making capabilities of those entrusted to protect the
youth.
As provided in the Run, Hide, Fight research findings, all three of the elements,
plus lockdown, have definite advantages. Unfortunately, numerous examples of the
protocol elements failing were also provided. Active shooter events are highly complex.
Based on the variability of the events, no one size fits all solution exists. Run, Hide, Fight
provides a solid foundation from which to build off of. The following chapters provide
specific tactics and tactical decision-making tools that can be applied to the foundation of
Run, Hide, Fight by elementary school teachers and staff. The goal of these findings is to
provide specificity to the different elements of Run, Hide, Fight. By linking the practices,
providing details about potential applicability, and training teachers and school staff on
implementation, the goal is to increase the likelihood of survival in these incredibly
challenging events.
50
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51
III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING
Run, Hide, Fight has definite advantages and disadvantages. It is evident from the
research that Run, Hide, Fight, and similar mechanisms, are not linear approaches.241 It is
necessary to be prepared to adapt on the fly and change strategies as different variables
present themselves. By modifying thought processes and overall preparedness, potential
victims have a potentially higher likelihood of survival. Mental preparation, both before
and during an event, is critical in establishing the mindset necessary for survival.
Statistically, the majority of active shooter events end before the arrival of law
enforcement.242 The importance of this statistic is the recognition that regular citizens
will have to make “life and death” decisions and be willing to adapt to all the possibilities
presented.243 In 11 out of 21 incidents described by Blair and Schweit in 2014, “unarmed
principals, teachers, other school staff, and students confronted the shooters to end the
threat.”244 In 2016, in a study of active-shooter incidents in 2014 and 2015, Katherine
Schweit reiterated:
The “active” aspect of the definition inherently implies that both law enforcement personnel and citizens have the potential to affect the outcome of the event based on their responses to the situation. The consistency of these incidents supports the paramount need for training and exercises for law enforcement, other first responders, and citizens alike.245
This chapter analyzes tactical mental preparation techniques to assist teachers and
school staff on how to react when faced with an active shooter threat. Run, Hide, Fight is
considered a best practice for response to active shooter events. Unfortunately, it fails to
241 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53–56; Interagency Security Committee, Planning
and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide.
242 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013.
243 Ibid., 8.
244 Ibid., 21.
245 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 1.
52
recognize the mental preparedness and steps taken in advance of an event that may assist
in increasing the likelihood of survival. By leveraging the advantages available to
teachers and school staff, the goal is to win the challenge and survive. Having the
appropriate mental attitude before and during an event is critical. By reviewing best
practices of mental preparation used by law enforcement and the military, teachers and
school staff can work to create the appropriate mindset and internal defense mechanisms
to increase survival. Teachers and school staff must not prepare for or accept being a
victim. They must prepare themselves for success, survival and accept nothing else.
A. WARRIOR MINDSET
With military personnel, self-defense and protection of their fellow soldiers is
critical. Countless examples are available of heroic efforts made by soldiers to save their
fellow soldiers. Similarly, teachers have proven their willingness to go to extreme
measures to protect their students time and time again. History has shown that the
willingness to protect exists. By providing defensive tactical decision-making skills, the
intent of the research is to outfit teachers with mechanisms to make decisions to support
their willingness to protect. While a warrior mindset may seem foreign in an educational
environment, it is reflected in numerous cases in which teachers have paid the ultimate
sacrifice in attempting to protect their students.
One of the most thorough guidance documents is the USAF Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures manual on active-shooter response and preparedness. Described in the
introduction, the manual “is applicable to all theaters of operation.”246 Not only is it
designed to assist soldiers in war zones, it also works for domestic Air Force personnel
working in offices stateside. Based on this flexibility, it provides excellent guidance that
can be applied to teachers and school staff as well.
One of the first recommendations in the manual is the emphasis to develop a
“warrior mindset.”247 The warrior mindset is a mental state of mind that emphasizes
246 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), iii.
247 Ibid., 1–1.
53
survivability over a flawless procedure. By implementing this mentality, the goal is to
empower and inspire potential victims with the mindset that they WILL survive and will
not let anything get in their way. The Air Force manual describes the warrior mindset as:
1.2.1 Warrior Mindset. The warrior mindset is more important than polished technique.
When faced with an attack, act immediately and escape. Do not let anything get in your way of survival or mission accomplishment.
1.2.1.1 Toughness. The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.
1.2.1.2 Immediate Response. Respond immediately with the appropriate level of force. Stop the attack and escape or press forward with the mission. A warrior does not wait, as the advantage is the surprise of instant and direct offense.
1.2.1.3 Focus. Stay focused on your goal of survival and mission accomplishment. Be persistent and continue to respond if the first response is not effective. Commit to your goal of survival and let nothing get in your way.248
By training on, promoting, and implementing a warrior mindset, teachers and
school staff have the ability to develop an enhanced level of confidence and comfort in
the situation at hand.
The Air Force manual goes further to provide a multitude of recommendations.
The document describes the necessity that those threatened need to be immediately
focused and conscientious of not hesitating. The value of reacting and not waiting is
stated numerous times throughout the document, and suggests that it can lead to increased
survivability. One of the techniques described to assist in avoiding hesitation is to
overcome the thought that “this could never happen to me.”249 Teachers and school staff
should recognize that it is a possibility at any school in the world. While relative
consistencies in shooter profiles are prevalent to a degree, the factors concerning the
location of the event are extremely variable. These events occur in a broad-spectrum of
248 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–1.
249 Ibid., 1–2.
54
location, type, time and socio-economic status. Additionally, as an extension to avoid
hesitation, the manual describes the inappropriate belief potentially shared by airmen and
school staff that someone will respond and mitigate the situation on their behalf.250
Statistically, this belief is shown not to be the reality. Emergency response will occur, but
66.9 percent of events end before the arrival of law enforcement.251
A major component in being prepared to react appropriately in a stressful
situation is to understand what happens physiologically to the body when faced with a
threat. While every individual is different, basic known factors occur to the human body
when confronted with an immediate danger. Controlled by the autonomic nervous
system, the parasympathetic nervous system drives the human body’s “fight or flight”
response.252 This response is an internal self-defense mechanism to enhance survival.253
When the parasympathetic nervous system takes over, the body can take on many
recognizable changes. The Air Force describes these potential physical changes as:
“Pounding heart
Muscle tension
Trembling
Rapid, shallow breathing
Dizziness
Nausea
Gut wrenching knot
Sweating
250 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–2.
251 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 9.
252 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–3.
253 Ibid.
55
Dry mouth
Goose bumps
Tingling sensation in limbs or face
Insensitive to pain” 254
In addition to physical changes in response to fear, individuals may potentially
experience changes in perception, as well as cognitive or behavioral changes.255 The Air
Force describes “perceptual changes” as, “tunnel vision, heightened visual clarity,
hearing distortion, and time distortion.”256 When faced with an event, teachers may
experience these changes. It is important to recognize their likelihood and work to
embrace their benefits. When faced with stressful events, teachers may find themselves
hyper-aware and attuned to the situation. To the contrary, while these changes can be
utilized in a beneficial fashion, they can also cause detrimental impacts if not recognized
or addressed.
The Air Force lists cognitive or behavioral changes as “automatic behavior.”257
The Air Force describes these changes as instincts taking over during traumatic events.
When applied to elementary school teachers, this change becomes critical. When faced
with traumatic or stressful events, those involved will many times instinctively resort to
whatever they have been thoroughly trained to do. Since teachers are not soldiers,
firefighters, or law enforcement, in training constantly to handle stressful situations, they
must take the initiative to do mental walkthroughs of these types of events. Repetition is
critical in establishing patterns to implement when automaticity takes over.
Resilience is a critical component to responding successfully to an active shooter
threat. The Air Force defines resilience as:
254 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–3—1–4.
255 Ibid., 1–4.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
56
The ability to respond, withstand, recover, and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. Resilience does not mean an absence of stress or fear. Resilience during an active shooter incident is about a process of performing under stress, resisting the effects it may have, and then recovering and restoring as needed.258
Resilience recognizes that a potential victim will be scared when faced with a
threat of this type. It acknowledges that individuals’ bodies will react without their
complete control. More importantly, resilience recognizes that despite fear and
physiological changes, potential victims can overcome all these and be successful in their
response.
The Air Force continues to build upon the mental preparation aspect of active
shooter response and reaction. Tactical mental toughness skills are “designed to optimize
performance and enhance resilience.”259 Specifically, the Air Force divides tactical
mental toughness skills into two primary categories, composure and concentration.260
The importance of tactical breathing is emphasized to enhance composure and
concentration.261 Tactical breathing is “a technique employed to consciously control
breathing to overcome or prevent the physical effects of stress.”262 Tactical breathing is
accomplished by “Inhale(ing) through your nose to the count of four seconds, hold your
breath for four seconds, exhale(ing) through your mouth slowly for four seconds, and
hold your breath for four seconds.”263
The tactical breathing technique is also known as “box breathing,” and is common
in both military situations and anxiety mitigation practices.264 Tactical Breathing, the
Warrior Mindset, and Attention Management are the Air Force’s steps described as
258 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–1.
259 Ibid., 2–5.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Mark Divine, Unbeatable Mind: Forge Resiliency and Mental Toughness to Succeed at an Elite Level, 3rd ed. (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishing, 2015), 50–51.
57
necessary to develop tactical mental toughness skills.265 Attention management is a skill
designed to enhance “internal and external awareness.”266 Attention management is
accomplished by recognizing physiological stress responses and managing the body’s
physical mechanisms to help keep those factors in check, which can be done through
heart rate control, fear or rage response, and thought control.267 Tactical breathing can
assist in overall calming and heart rate reduction. Fear and anger are natural reactions
when threatened. The Air Force does not recommend focusing on eliminating fear or rage
but rather managing those responses to optimize survivability.268 Thought control is an
attempt in clearing “mental static” by pushing out negative thoughts of what could
potentially happen, the feeling of being unprepared, or the lack of recognition of the
situation.269 Instead, the focus should be on recognizing the situation for what it is, not
being in denial, focusing thoughts on what is necessary to survive, and engaging the
warrior mindset to set up for positive outcomes.
Many active shooter advisory documents refer to overall situational awareness to
aid individuals better in surviving an active shooter event. In Active Shooter: How to
Respond, the DHS advises to be cognizant of the surrounding environment and to stay
vigilant to any potential dangers.270 Additionally, the guiding document references the
value in predetermining exit routes in any building entered.271 Ready Marine, a United
States Marine Corps (USMC) website dedicated to personal emergency preparedness for
soldiers and their families, also advises individuals to be aware of their environment and
265 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.
266 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.
267 Ibid., 2–6.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 41.
271 Ibid.
58
pre-establish potential escape routes.272 Despite the inherent value of pre-determining
potential escape routes, potential victims must not lock themselves into any one specific
plan and should remain flexible in adapting to situations.
When the tactical mental toughness skills are combined, they work by recognizing
stressors and being attentive to keep those stressors in check. Utilizing techniques, such
as refocusing and tactical breathing, overall survivability is enhanced by focusing on
resilience and implementing the warrior mindset to let nothing stand in the way of
accomplishing the ultimate goal of survival.273 Teachers preparing themselves in
establishing a warrior mindset, and practicing those behaviors regularly, can greatly assist
in responding to active shooter events. By recognizing the physical indicators of stress,
teachers and school staff can focus on minimizing the impact of those physiological
changes. Once physical changes are controlled, clarity in attention can be applied to the
situation at hand. The more this approach is practiced, the better prepared the staff will be
when called to task.
B. WILL TO SURVIVE
Similar to the “warrior mindset,” the “will to survive” expands on the foundation
established. Teachers with the warrior mindset can implement the will to survive when
faced with threats. By combining these two mental approaches, teachers and school staff
can establish mental toughness and focus on doing whatever it takes to be successful in
protecting themselves and their students. In Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, the DOD
describes the components of “the will to survive” as:
“Know your capabilities and limitations.
Keep a positive attitude.
Develop a realistic plan.
272 United States Marine Corps, Ready Marine Corps: Active Shooter (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, n.d.), accessed March 15, 2017, http://www.ready.marines.mil/Portals/208/Docs/Factsheets/Terrorism/Active %20Shooter_08272015.pdf.
273 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.
59
Anticipate fears.
Combat psychological stress.
Recognize and anticipate existing stressors (injury, death, fatigue, illness,
environment, hunger, and isolation).
Attribute normal reactions to existing stressors (fear, anxiety, guilt,
boredom, depression, and anger).
Identify signals of distress created by stressors (indecision, withdrawal,
forgetfulness, carelessness, and propensity to make mistakes).”274
In a group setting, similar to those common in school shootings, the DOD
recommends that those involved consistently “reassure and encourage each other”
throughout the event to help promote the “will to survive.”275
The U.S. Department of the Army, in The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,
describes a similar approach known as “mental stamina.”276 The manual discusses mental
stamina by recognizing that an “individual’s awareness during combat is never complete”
and that “there is no such thing as perfect awareness or understanding of the situation.”277
Furthermore, the Department of the Army states:
Mental stamina is the quality Soldiers must have to combat this uncertainty. Mental stamina provides the ability to assess the situation based on whatever facts are at hand, to intuitively make reasonable assumptions about what is not known, and to make logical decisions based on that information.278
274 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007), A–1, https://fas.org/ irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3.pdf.
275 Ibid., A–2.
276 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–6.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
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Teachers equipped with “mental stamina” will demonstrate the “will to survive”
through the warrior mindset,” especially well when coupled with the three things the
Department of the Army states that a leader needs:
“Purpose: the reason to accomplish the mission.
Direction: the means to accomplish the mission.
Motivation: the will to accomplish the mission.”279
C. SENSORY INTEGRATION
In Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. identify that “the number one
sign of an active shooter event is gun fire.”280 Based on “normalcy bias,” the “brain will
try to describe unusual events as normal first,” which in many scenarios, is classifying the
sound like firecrackers.281 Blair et al. ask, “how many times have you heard firecrackers
at your place of employment or school?”282 For most, they found the answer is zero.283
Based on the infrequency of actual firecrackers on a school campus, Blair et al. challenge
that it is better to assume the worse, that it is gunfire, and accept potential embarrassment
if it is firecrackers but that lives can potentially be saves by reacting in a timely
fashion.284
In The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events,
author Mark Landahl provides recommendations regarding potentially advantageous
sensory response mechanisms. He concludes:
279 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–1; United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–24; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, A–1.
280 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 187.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
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Finding 1. The survivor response to campus active shooter events is social rather than asocial and includes helping behavior between survivors consistent with research findings in other disaster event types.
Finding 2: Survivors of active shooter events will process environmental cues, social cues, and engage in social interaction to define the situation, gather information and implement and reassess protective behavior choices within a framework that maintains and extends social and organizational roles.
Finding 3: Survivors gather additional information and process environmental cues, social observations, and social interactions to determine protective action behaviors that include taking cover on the floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, using available resources to barricade themselves, locking door, turning off lights, and barricading doors.
Finding 4. Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of environmental cues and processing of additional incident cues that lead to implementation and reassessment of protective actions many times with a division of tasks amongst the group. (Emergent Social Structure).”285
A key takeaway from the Landahl findings is the recognition of two senses that
need to be activated before personal action occurs. The value of the result becomes
critical in the time sensitivity of an active shooter event. If potential victims can
recognize, or assume the worst based on an initial sensory input, they have a much more
rapid recognition time and have a potentially higher likelihood of survival based on the
timesaving factor of not needing secondary sensory confirmation. The finding is
consistent with the Air Force’s emphasis on accepting the situation and not delaying
response.286
285 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 21–31; Mark R. Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral
Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events” (PhD diss., Oklahoma State University, 2015), v, 154–157.
286 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).
62
Figure 6 illustrates Landahl’s research findings. Based on the illustration, the time
delay to seek secondary sensory confirmation is evident.287 As opposed to moving
directly to “protective actions,” potential victims move to “information gathering
activities.”288 By emphasizing immediate action and assumption of worst-case scenarios,
event mitigation activities can begin immediately with one sensory cue and be
advantageous to potential victims.
287 Mark Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events” (presentation, The 9th Annual Homeland Security and Defense Education Summit, Evolving Homeland Security to meet Future Threats/Hazards, September 26, 2015), 17, https://www.chds.us/ed/resources/uploads/2015/12/Summit-2015-Landahl-Socio-Behavioral-Response-of- Survivors-of-Active-Shootings.pdf.
288 Ibid.
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Figure 6. The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events289
Actual attacks bear out this fact. One Sandy Hook shooting report described two
school administrators who were killed when they went to investigate the sound of shots
fired, and a staff member who ran towards a “loud crashing noise.”290 After seeing bullet
holes and smelling gunpowder, the employee recognized the situation and retreated to an
area of safety to notify authorities.291 A Columbine review also describes a scenario in
289 Source: Ibid.; Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter
Events,” PhD diss., 155.
290 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.
291 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.
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which a teacher responded to the sounds of a “commotion” outside the building.292 After
looking out an exterior opening, the staff member and student were injured by debris
resulting from a shot fired at the doors they were looking out.293
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) also recommends not hesitating when
faced with potential danger. The ISC recognizes, “During an active shooter incident,
those present will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully-informed
decision about applying the Run, Hide, Fight options.”294
The ISC describes a 2005 report from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) that found that those individuals located closest to the floors
impacted by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks “waited longer” to respond to the
threat by evacuating than those further away from the immediate impact.295 It is unclear
exactly what factors drove the evacuation differences. The ISC also discusses the
differing levels of severity of the response of potential victims during the Virginia Tech
shooting.296 These examples once again demonstrate the consequences of a delayed
response to an immediate threat. To mitigate this threat, the ISC recommends that entities
“Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately. For example, train staff to
recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and
necessary action (e.g., ‘Gun! Get out!’).”297
The Active Shooter White Paper compiled by ASIS provides some basic
information outlining the necessity and feasibility of options-based approaches to active
shooter events in schools. One of the first messages is that no one-size-fits-all approach
292 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 28.
293 Ibid.
294 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.
295 Ibid.; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2005), http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf. cfm?pub_id=909017159.
296 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.
297 Ibid., 19.
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exists and that all of the current programs have value since their intent is to help save
lives.298 This approach is consistent with the something is better than nothing philosophy.
Additionally, the paper describes the nonlinear nature of Run, Hide, Fight.299 Based on
the incredible variability of active-shooter events, it is not possible to know which option
will be the best at a given time. The white paper also goes on to describe the benefits
teachers’ gain from being highly familiar with their surroundings.300 Since teachers have
the potential to spend more time in the buildings than a shooter may have, they have a
distinct advantage provided they pay attention to their surroundings before an incident.301
D. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP
In the late 1970s, John Boyd, a fighter jet pilot, invented a tactical decision-
making tool that would come to be known as Boyd’s OODA Loop.302 In Boyd: The
Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, author Robert Coram describes the Boyd
OODA cycle in detail. OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, act.303 In its original
form, Boyd’s OODA Loop is a highly complex feedback-based decision-making tool.
(Figure 7) The most recent version illustrated as a simplified feedback loop is directly
applicable to active-shooter responses. (Figure 8) In its simplified form, Coram describes
the loop as “seen as a simple one-dimensional cycle, where one observes what the enemy
is doing, becomes oriented to the enemy action, makes a decision and then takes an
action.”304
298 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 1.
299 Ibid., 2.
300 Ibid., 7.
301 Ibid.
302 Joe Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning,” All Life Is Problem Solving, June 16, 2008, http://kmci.org/alllifeisproblemsolving/archives/the-ooda-loop-and-double-loop-learning/.
303 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002).
304 Ibid., 334.
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Figure 7. Boyd’s OODA Loop305
Figure 8. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop306
305 Source: Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning.”
306 Source: United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2003), 2–1, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp2-1.pdf.
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Boyd’s intent was to emphasize that fighter pilots must stay ahead of their enemy
and “must operate inside his adversary’s time scale.”307 Coram describes the value of the
Boyd OODA Loop as:
Generating a rapidly changing environment—that is, engaging in activity that is so quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy—inhibits the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact.308
Applying this type of approach to an active shooter event in a school provides a
tactical advantage to teachers and school staff. Although teachers and school staff have
an inherent advantage of working in the threat environment regularly, they must assume
that potential attackers will have intimate knowledge of the school layout and active
shooter procedures. Attackers familiar with the school design and expected actions give
them a distinct advantage over their intended victims. If the staff can operate within their
attackers’ timeline and alter any expected actions, they sway the advantage their
direction.
The adversaries’ timescale can be described as the internal mental process
conducted by the enemy. For example, “I am going to shoot out the front door so I can
get past the locking devices. Then I am going to search the offices to find any staff or
students there. After that I will work my way down the main hallway checking all of the
doors, shooting anyone that I come across until someone stops me, but they won’t take
me alive.”
The event or attacker’s timeline, on the other hand, can be described as the
external viewpoint of the timing of the events. For example, the shooter entered the main
entry by shooting through the glass door. After that, the shooter shot everyone in the
entrance area. The shooter then moved to the administration offices. After that, the
shooter started into the hallways.
Combining timescale and timeline opportunities to establish tactical advantage
exist. Using the example previously described, a teacher can find areas to advance in the
307 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 327.
308 Ibid., 328.
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timeline while operating in the adversaries’ timescale. In this case, teacher x hears what
sounds like gunshots. Teacher x stops teaching and peaks out of door to see what is
happening. Teacher x is now behind in the timeline, as the shooter has already killed
everyone in the main entry and is working toward the offices. Even worse, if teacher x
walks toward the main entry or chats with other teachers trying to determine what is
going on, they have now fallen further behind. Now, the shooter is moving into the main
hallway where the teacher is located and has implemented no defensive tactics. The
teacher never became immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and found opportunities to
get ahead in the attack timeline. Therefore, no tactical advantage was made.
Teacher y, on the other hand, became familiar with defensive tactics and tactical
decision-making tools. Teacher y has already identified the two nearest exits (one
primary, one secondary). Teacher y is already tied at the frontend of the timeline before
the attack occurs. (The only reason teacher y is not ahead is that the attackers know they
are about to attack). Teacher y now hears the same gunshots as teacher x.
Teacher y immediately isolates the direction of the shots as being toward
the main entry. (Gaining advantage).
Primary exit is now out of play, secondary needs to be implemented.
(Losing advantage).
Without hesitating, teacher y orders the students to leave everything, go to
the window, and start going outside. (Gaining advantage).
Teacher y locks the door then follows the students out. (Gaining
advantage).
Teacher y has already become immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and is
assuming that if attackers are shooting in the front office, it is only a matter of time
before they come down the hallways. Thus, instead of delaying, teacher y works to
advance a timeline advantage. If teacher y is wrong, the students can always be brought
back in and breathe a sigh of relief, but they are alive. Teacher x is not. Nor are any of
those students.
69
In the military, applicability of the loop speed is the main takeaway from the
lesson.309 Coram emphasizes this point, and writes that having a full understanding of the
complexities of Boyd’s original matrix is not as valuable as recognizing, “the need to
execute the cycle in such a fashion as to get inside the mind and the decision cycle of an
adversary. The unpredictability is crucial to the success of the OODA Loop.”310
When teachers and staff encounter an active shooter event, it is critical that they
do not slow the OODA Loop once begun but rather accelerate it to keep the advantage
over their adversary.311 Boyd advises that to stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo potential,
victims must take the “least-expected action” versus the known or “most-effective
action.”312 A USMC intelligence manual describes tempo as “keep(ing) the enemy off
balance, thereby increasing his friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility generate and
maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match.”313
As previously discussed, if a perpetrator has knowledge of layouts or procedures,
they can predict the “most effective action” that teachers and staff may be inclined to
take.314 By implementing the “least expected action,” the decision maker can impact the
effectiveness of the attacker. Coram states:
To take the least-expected action disorients the enemy. It causes him to pause, to wonder, to question. This means that as a commander compresses his own time, he causes time to be stretched out for his opponent. The enemy falls farther and farther behind in making relevant decisions. It hastens the unraveling process.315
A relevant example of the expected is the recommendation of many active shooter
guidance documents to post emergency evacuation routes in all classrooms. While
applicable to fire scenarios, it may provide a higher-risk situation for those threatened by
309 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 334.
310 Ibid., 335.
311 Ibid., 338.
312 Ibid., 336.
313 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–2.
314 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.
315 Ibid.
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an active shooter. If the attacker is familiar with the evacuation routes, this person is then
knowledgeable of the expected action. By following the posted evacuation route, teachers
and students may walk directly into the shooters’ firing lanes. According to the USMC
manual on intelligence operations, “The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict,
whether combatants are individuals or large military formations. When engaged in
conflict, participants—
Observe. Take in information about the environment, the friendly
status, and the threat.
Orient. Make estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments
about the situation to create a cohesive mental image.
Decide. Determine what needs to be done, whether it is an
immediate reaction or a deliberate plan.
Act. Put the decision into action.”316
In the previous example, numerous “expected” actions are possible. The most
likely action of the enemy is that of the shooter working through the entry and killing
while proceeding. People are placed at greater risk when left behind while the shooter
advances. The teacher’s “expected” actions would be to delay reaction. Peer into the
hallway or even walk toward the shooting to determine what is happening. If shooting is
determined, the next expected action is for the teacher to lock the classroom door, turn
off the lights, and have the students remain quiet. In this example, the shooter has time to
move forward and attempt to access the classrooms. Teacher y’s actions can be described
as least expected.
There was no delay (unexpected).
The door was locked (expected) but a rapidly deployed impediment for
shooter advancement.
316 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 2–1.
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Then teacher y took the students out the window and away from the
school to a nearby neighborhood (unexpected).
If a teacher has the acumen to recognize the pattern of development of the
event at hand, through observation and orientation, it is then possible to stay ahead
of the attacker’s decisions and actions by implementing an action that is “least-
expected” versus “most-effective.”317 Additionally, teachers and staff can rapidly
estimate an “enemy most likely course of action.”318 By quickly determining what the
enemy most likely will do next, potential victims can stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo.
E. DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE
The USAF embraces an active shooter response philosophy known as “Defend
Your Sector.”319 The phrase “simply implies the actions taken during the fight to protect
yourself and others in the area where you have barricaded.”320 If teacher and school staff
opt to fortify themselves and their students in a location, “Defend Your Sector” implies
that they use multiple mechanisms to protect themselves and others actively.
Actively attempting to barricade and impede the shooter’s advantage has the
potential of increasing survivability. Fortifying describes the action of securing the room
from entry to include such things as locking the door and pushing a large desk in front of
it. Impeding shooter advancement, on the other hand, may not prevent entry or
movement, but will slow or disorient the attacker. Examples of impediments include a
stack of chairs at the door or multiple small desks. If the decision is made to remain in the
classroom, teachers and students should Hide “in a place that reduces observation from
the shooter, but allows you to react if you must defend your sector.”321 If these efforts to
317 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.
318 United States Marine Corps, Rifle Squad Tactics B2F2837 Student Handout (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2015), 13, http://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2F2837%20Rifle%20 Squad%20Tactics.pdf?ver=2015-05-27-100939-710.
319 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).
320 Ibid., 6–3.
321 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 6–3.
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fortify fail, the items put in the attacker’s way, combined with a strategic hiding location,
will provide the tactical advantage needed if fighting is a necessity.
F. STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE
In 1998, Cannon-Bowers and Salas discovered the value of recognizing expected
stressors to prepare better to respond in times of stress. The resulting book reported the
findings of a research project conducted by the Office of Naval Research. The intent of
the TADMUS (tactical decision making under stress) project “was to develop training,
simulation, decision support, and display principles that would help to mitigate the
impact of stress on decision-making.”322 In Making Decisions under Stress: Implications
for Individual and Team Training, the authors found, “the following characteristics,
which can be defined as stressors, all appear to be present in the operational environment:
Multiple information sources
Incomplete, conflicting information
Rapidly changing, evolving scenarios
Requirement for team coordination
Adverse physical conditions
Performance pressure
Time pressure
High work/information load
Auditory overload/interference
322 Janis A. Cannon-Bowers and Eduardo Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998), http://www.apa.org/pubs/books/ 4318761.aspx.
73
Threat” 323
Describing SET (Stress Exposure Training), Cannon-Bowers and Salas stated:
It rests on the notion that that when people have accurate expectations regarding what to expect in the stress environment, have confidence in their ability to cope with such stressors, and have an opportunity to practice dealing with the stress so that appropriate skills can be developed, maximal performance can be expected.324
While reality-based training has been both celebrated and criticized by subject
matter experts, stress-based training is possible without the implementation of an actual
drill. Although potentially not as effective, teachers and school staff can perform mental
exercises to prepare themselves for stress exposure better. By doing “dry run” mental
walkthroughs of “if-then” scenarios, teachers and staff can prepare themselves for the
multitude of variables that may be present during an active-shooter event. The Navy
Seals refer to this practice as a “dirt dive.”325 It is rehearsing a detailed mental “walk
through” of an intended mission. Former Navy Seal and author Mark Divine points out,
“When you visualize the mission your body and subconscious mind gain valuable, yet
subtle, physiological and psychological cues. These insights prove to be invaluable keys
for success when you act on your plan to accomplish the mission.”326
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
The U.S. Coast Guard defines situational awareness as, “the ability to identify,
process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening to
the team with regards to the mission. More simply, it’s knowing what is going on around
you.”327
323 Cannon-Bowers and Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training, 19.
324 Ibid., 30.
325 Mark Divine, “SEALFIT—4 Tactics for Success,” Navy SEALs, January 24, 2014, https://navyseals.com/ 3837/sealfit-4-tactics-success/.
326 Ibid.
327 United States Coast Guard, Team Coordination Training Student Guide (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 1998), 5–1, https://www.uscg.mil/auxiliary/training/tct/chap5.pdf.
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Situational awareness is one of the essential elements of human intelligence.
Intelligence has a direct and immediate relationship to operations or defensive decision-
making. The U.S. Marine Corps states, “Intelligence drives operations by shaping the
planning and execution of operations. It provides a menu of factors that the commander
considers when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence
Identifies potential advantages offered by the environment.
Describes limitations imposed by the environment.
Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be avoided.
Uncovers enemy critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
Recommends COAs based on factors of the battle space and threat.
Enables rapid decision-making and generating and maintaining tempo.”328
Situational awareness is a continuous process. It begins the moment teachers
wake up and are aware of personal well-being. As they pull into the school parking lot,
they are aware of things that look out of place. As they approach the school, and
subsequently, their classroom, they recognize areas of potential concern, areas of refuge,
and routes of safety. In class, they identify the nearest exits. They identify different items
for barricading the door of their classroom. They know how the doors lock. They know
the quickest way out of the building and multiple backup routes. They recognize tools for
diversions, decoys, and weapons. They also know their students. They know their
capabilities and know they will do everything in their power to protect them.
Former Navy Seal and SEAL Survival Guide author Cade Courtley states:
When you’re going to a mall or market, or even during your first days of class at a new school, make a mental note of exits. Have at least three options, preferably in three different directions. This could be as obvious as a double-door entry or as desperate as a second-floor window with a ten-foot drop onto pavement. Second, observe the whereabouts of any large items or objects that seem sturdy enough to provide cover, if needed,
328 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–5.
75
and file this information. In some malls, for example, there may be a lounge area with furniture, or sculptures, or columns that are placed at regular intervals. In a school, are the desks bolted to the floor? Do the windows open? Filled bookshelves in a library or the cooking and dishwashing equipment in a cafeteria will provide very good cover.329
Cade’s soft target Situational Awareness Checklist states:
“Find your exits.
Locate places or objects that could serve as your nearest cover.
Observe individuals who are dressed strangely, acting abnormally,
or carrying something suspicious.
Trust your gut.”330
Put more succinctly, “situational awareness: exits, cover, people.”331 Teachers
and school staff have a constantly evaluative situational awareness cycle. As they move
throughout the school, and throughout their day, they should constantly be evaluating the
what if scenarios and determining potential “exits, cover, and people.”332
Commitment to a winning mindset can be a critical component in the potential
survival of a threatening event. A lot of research has been conducted on handling
stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and school
staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must actively engage in
practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments at regular intervals. It
does not cost money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation,
and a willingness to succeed.
329 Cade Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook) (New York: Gallery Books, 2012), Kindle edition, loc. 141–142, https://www.amazon.com/SEAL- Survival-Guide-Shooter-Med icine-ebook/dp/B01H0IOZKA/ref=sr_1_9?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1500398420&sr=1- 9&keywords=seal+ survival+active+shooter.
330 Ibid., loc. 154–157.
331 Ibid., loc. 141.
332 Ibid.
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IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING
In the 2013 Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. quantified the
casualty rate of active-shooter events as “Casualties = f(rate of suitable target
location*response time)”333 The research identified the casualty rate of the events as a
function of two things:
(1) the amount of time that the shooter has to perform the attack
(2) the rate at which the offender can find suitable targets to shoot334
More importantly, the research concluded, “that many times the attack stopped
because the potential victims took action to stop the shooter directly or made it difficult
for the shooter to find targets.”335 These findings are conducive to the research in
emphasizing that potential victims attempt to make themselves “hard targets” versus “soft
targets.” As simple as it may seem, being harder to hurt has dramatic increases in
survivability. Becoming a hard target begins with ongoing situational awareness and a
willingness to succeed as previously discussed. The following tactical techniques help to
maintain the protection as the situation develops.
Regardless of having the appropriate tactical mindset, if a teacher does not know
how to navigate a threatening environment physically, the likelihood of survival falls. By
combining the tactical mindset with task level tactical skills, teachers and school staff
give themselves a distinct tactical advantage when faced with threats. The following
chapter provides detailed tactical practices utilized by military and law enforcement
personnel. These practices are intended to decrease risk in a high-risk environment,
increase the likelihood of survivability, and provide a tactical advantage to those
threatened.
333 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 174.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
78
A. COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT
A major military delineation describes the difference between cover and
concealment. When hiding from or attempting to escape from an active shooter threat, it
is important for those threatened to recognize the difference as well. According to the
USAF, “cover is an object that can protect against weapons fire.”336 Concealment, on
the other hand, is an object that “only provides [protection] against visual detection
from the enemy.”337 When teachers or school staff attempt to Hide or lead themselves
and students to a safe area, it is important to recognize the difference between cover
and concealment. As they move through a zone, concealment locations may need to
be a temporary solution if shooting is occurring. According to the ISC, ballistic
protection “cover” includes such things as:
“thick walls made of steel,
cinder block, or brick and mortar;
solid doors with locks;
and areas with minimal glass and interior windows”338
If cover is an option, it is preferred, as it provides both concealment and ballistic
protection.339 Granted, an option may not exist to choose between the two; if so, cover
should be prioritized (Figure 9). Courtley states, “Whatever you choose as cover or
concealment, avoid bunching up with too many people. In these circumstances, people
huddled together will create a larger and more attractive target; a single bullet can
penetrate several people.”340
336 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 5–2, 6–3.
337 Ibid.
338 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 7.
339 Ibid.
340 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 201.
79
Figure 9. Cover versus Concealment341
B. ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT
Following the July 7, 2016 sniper attack that killed five police officers in Dallas,
Texas, the Scottsdale Police Department (SPD) in Arizona provided anti-sniper
awareness to city staff.342 During the presentation, the SPD snipers provided lessons
learned from a variety of sniper attacks. A valuable takeaway from the training was the
value of individual movement. While most school-based active-shooter scenarios are not
sniper events, the lessons still provide value to anyone attacked. Personnel were advised
to move perpendicularly to the shooter; doing so increases the amount of ground covered
from left to right or right to left. Increasing the amount of distance covered in a shorter
amount of time decreases the shooter’s ability to acquire targets quickly. By running
straight away from a shooter (without concealment or cover) the shooter has straight line
target acquisition ability.343 Moving at an angle away from the shooter narrows the
amount of lateral distance covered and makes target acquisition easier.344 While value is
341 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook),
loc. 206.
342 Faith Karimi, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Ralph Ellis, “Dallas Shooting: 5 Officers Die, Suspect ID’d,” CNN, July 9, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling- protests/index.html.
343 Dan Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness (Scottsdale, AZ: Scottsdale Police Department, n.d.).
344 Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness.
80
obvious in providing the most distance possible between the potential victim and the
threat, it is important to provide as much tactical advantage to the threatened as possible.
Distance should be established as soon as possible when cover or concealment are
available. The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group provides direction for
combatants under enemy fire. Many of the suggestions can apply to any scenario when
gunfire is a threat. Regarding movement while under fire, the guide emphasizes the value
of not setting patterns. Similar to the OODA philosophy of doing the unexpected,
movement is trackable once patterns occur. The guide also highlights the use of shadows,
cover, and concealment.345 When unable to utilize cover and concealment to mask
movement, the guide recommends “keeping in constant motion,” and “moving in ‘S’ or
‘W’ paths.”346
In Survival, Evasion and Recovery, the DOD states the following when moving
through urban environments:
“Look for and move to ‘friendly’ controlled location or stronghold
point.
Head to concealment to break visual contact.
If seen, change direction radically.
Use caution when passing windows and doors; try to avoid.”347
C. I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN
The mnemonic “I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down” is the preferred USMC
schema for movement under fire.348 The time required to recite this mnemonic when
moving from cover or concealment to other cover or concealment matches the time
345 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips (Fort George
G. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2007), 1.
346 Ibid.
347 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, I–5.
348 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
81
needed for target acquisition by a sniper. The tactic starts upon deciding to move from
one area to another, in an active shooting lane. Upon moving, the next step is to recite,
“I’m up, they see me, I’m down” in a regular speech cadence.349 By the time the end of
“I’m down” is reached, people should be under new cover or concealment. Not only is a
tactical advantage provided by decreasing target acquisition time, but it also assists in
pre-planning movements by comparing the amount of time needed to move from one area
to another. While this detail can vary based on the type of weapon used (single shot
versus semi-automatic or automatic), the saying provides basic guidance again by
increasing the tactical advantage of those threatened.
D. KILL ZONES
According to author Cade Courtley, surviving the first 10 seconds of an attack can
greatly increase overall chances for survival.350 According to Courtley, the three typical
reactions to an immediate threat are to “fight, flight or freeze.”351 He suggests a
technique called “get off the X.”352 Courtley emphasizes that potential victims must not
freeze or “burrow in.”353 The “X” or “kill zone” refers to the shooter’s immediate
vicinity where most damage occurs (Figure 10).354 By immediately providing as much
distance as possible from the “kill zone” in the first few seconds of an attack, and angling
away from the shooter’s primary focus, the chances of survival increase dramatically.355
Courtley points out that a typical response from people to an immediate threat is to hit the
ground and cover their heads; while this action may be automatic for some, it places
potential victims at a higher risk if they do not continue to move.356 This advice is
consistent with the U.S. Army’s emphasis that potential victims “keep moving” since
349 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
350 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 173.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid., loc. 171.
353 Ibid., loc. 173.
354 Ibid., loc. 171.
355 Ibid., loc. 171–173.
356 Ibid., loc. 186.
82
attackers tend to fixate on the easiest targets.357 Courtley recommends seeking the
immediate cover possibly identified earlier, or if hitting the ground immediately to start
moving to suitable cover.358 Courtley’s guidance is consistent with the USMC guidance
to be a “hard target;” thus, making it harder to be attacked.359
Figure 10. Kill Zones360
357 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips, 1.
358 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 186.
359 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
360 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 171.
83
Once those threatened have gotten off the “X,” continued, purposeful movement
is key. It is important that as much distance as possible be put between the potential
victims and the shooter. Moving from cover to cover, when available, in small bursts (3–
5 seconds: I’m Up-They See Me, I’m Down) provides a safer escape and small mental
victories, which reinforced the warrior mindset and will to survive.361 After small
covered escapes have occurred, it is then possible to begin to make larger escape bursts
when a safe distance has been established. According to Courtley, “as you gain distance
from the shooter, you can increase the distance you travel between covers.”362 Courtley
also adds, “that the farther away from the shooter you are, the faster you can move, until
even sprinting if the situation warrants it.”363 Courtley reminds, “that if you can hear
gunfire, you can be shot” and to “continue to act with maximum purpose and calculated
caution.”364
E. NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES
The DOD emphasizes the fundamental importance of proper individual
movement techniques (IMT) in battle scenarios.365 The DOD defines the elements of
IMT as “high crawl, low crawl, and 3–5 second rush.”366 Courtley also references the
high and low crawl as potential movement techniques when faced with a potential threat
(Figure 11).367 In discussing techniques to navigate obstacles, the USMC describes high
crawl use conditions as “when you have some cover or concealment, but not enough to
stand.”368 High crawl is executed by “lifting your belly only inches from the floor and
361 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS); Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery; United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement; Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook).
362 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 208.
363 Ibid.
364 Ibid., loc. 208–213.
365 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–7.
366 Ibid.
367 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.
368 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
84
moving on your knees and elbows.”369 The USMC describes the high crawl as the
preferred method when speed is of the essence, running is not an option, and keeping a
low profile is still necessary.370 The USMC describes low crawl use conditions as “when
there is no cover or you are going through a low lying obstacle.”371 Low crawl is
executed by “pushing with your toes and pulling with your fingers, inch by inch if
necessary, keeping you flat to the floor and out of range.”372 This crawl is mostly utilized
when cover is needed over speed.373
Figure 11. High Crawl versus Low Crawl374
369 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194–
198.
370 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
371 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
372 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.
373 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
374 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 198.
85
F. DANGER AREAS
When moving between cover and concealment, those threatened may be faced
with a variety of open areas, hallway junctions, or otherwise compromised situations,
which are known as “danger crossings” or “danger areas.”375 In SWAT Leadership and
Tactical Planning author Tony Jones advises that movement should “circumvent” or
avoid crossing open areas whenever possible.376 If avoidance is not a possibility,
Courtley advises to:
Take a moment to discern a pattern in the shooting and try to move when there is a pause in the gunfire. This will generally happen when the weapon is being reloaded, and it will give you a few seconds to move without taking fire. While preparing your body to make this move, use the combat breathing technique we discussed earlier.377
Commonly found danger crossings in educational environments are doorways and
hallway intersections. These intersections are typically in a “T” fashion. Teachers
navigating a danger crossing can find themselves at the intersection of a “T” hallway
junction moving in both the direction of the long and short side of the “T.” Combined
with Courtley’s recommendation to recognize patterns in the firing, moving in a tactical
order across the danger crossings can increase potential survivability. Tactical order is
implemented by a teacher (Figures 12 and 13, position number 3) going to the corner of
the hallway, checking if it is clear and ordering students to cross. The teacher is
strategically navigating the danger crossing and increasing the likelihood of survival. The
following figures demonstrate tactical movement across both styles of “T” hallway
intersections. While these figures demonstrate a military building clearing technique
375 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 232;
United States Marine Corps, Marine Rifle Squad (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2002), 8– 25, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%203- 11.2%20Marine%20Rifle%20Squad.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-1640 48-590.
376 Tony L. Jones, SWAT Leadership and Tactical Planning: The SWAT Operator’s Guide to Combat Law Enforcement (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1996), 48, 83, https://gooddebate.org/sin/mirror/library/security/Swat_ Leadership_And_Tactical_Planning_-_T_-_Tony_L._Jones.pdf.
377 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 233.
86
(Figures 12 and 13) they can also be applied when a teacher, possibly with the aid of a
teacher’s assistant, is guiding children through the hallways of their school.
Figure 12. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’”378
378 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–43–44.
87
Figure 13. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching from the Base of the ‘T’”379
Another danger crossing commonly found in schools is stairwells. Navigating
stairwells can be complicated. Figure 14 demonstrates a stairwell clearing technique that
379 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–45–46.
88
can again be implemented by teachers and school staff when trying to escape potentially
hazardous areas.
Figure 14. Stairwell Clearing380
By taking the point position, teachers can move their students across the danger
crossings at intervals conducive with the situation and pause them when at excessive risk.
Although crossing danger areas should be avoided, sometimes they are unavoidable. By
moving with purpose, teachers are strategically navigating their environment and are
avoiding unsafe movement. When faced with danger crossings, teachers should navigate
their students through them as quickly as possible. Unless absolutely necessary, low or
high crawls or “S”/”W” patterned movement should be avoided for the sake of speed.
In conclusion to tactical movements, Courtley offers the following list to reiterate
the valuable steps in providing a safe distance when avoiding the active shooter threat:
“1. Get off the X. Remove yourself from immediate danger.
2. Regroup and regain focus.
3. Perform a self-assessment for injuries and resources.
4. Form your game plan. Make a decision, keep the group
cohesive, and assign individuals responsibility.
380 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–47.
89
5. Live or die. Pull the trigger! This is your mission!
6. Make sure you safely encounter law enforcement.”381
G. BARRICADING
Terminology regarding hiding varies across the research. Hiding can be different
from lockdown and is definitely different from “shelter-in-place,” which typically refers
to longer periods of time and usually from natural disaster events. As lockdown can be
passive or active, hiding implies an active approach to self-protection. The USAF takes a
step further and emphasizes the value of “barricading.”382 “Barricading is not merely
hiding. It is the active effort to hinder the shooter’s ability to enter the room or
facility.”383
The USAF recognizes barricading as: “A viable option if: (1) it is likely you are
not directly confronted with the shooter(s); or (2) it is likely your egress route is
obstructed and/or under the observation of the shooter(s).”384
Closing and locking the doors, finding an “improvised weapon,” preparing to
Fight, and using “heavy objects to barricade the door,” begin the barricading process.385
The USAF states:
If barricading the door with objects in the room is not possible, use objects in the room as obstacles to slow down, fix, turn, or obscure the vision of the shooter. Even though an obstacle will not prevent a shooter from entering your area (i.e., sector), it will help you achieve a tactical advantage to ‘Defend Your Sector.’”386
According to the USAF, once barricade is decided, the following assists in
attempting to gain a tactical advantage.
381 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 362– 364.
382 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 6–2.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid., 6–3.
90
“Turn off the lights.
Remain quiet and observe noise discipline (e.g., limit movement, talking,
whispering, and yelling).
Silence your cell phone and/or pager.
Turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions).
Develop a strategy to “Defend Your Sector” using fight in case you cannot
prevent the threat from entering the room.”387
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described in this chapter may
seem intimidating to the non-military or law enforcement professional, they are not. The
tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement
and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of
survival. As described in the chapter on mental preparation, once committed to the “will
to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for teachers and school professionals to
feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a multitude of threatening environments.388
With preparations combined, mental and tactical, teachers and school staff will have
more opportunity to implement Run, Hide, Fight practices efficiently.
387 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 6–3.
388 Ibid.; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
91
V. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Training teachers and school staff on defensive tactical decision-making will
prepare them better to react to active shooter events. An options-based approach to active
shooter protection strategies creates an opportunity to advance the safety of school
children in the United States. By providing tactical decision-making processes, simplified
for civilian populations, active shooter protection strategies can evolve to become more
efficient. Despite regular iterations of advanced mitigation strategies dealing with the
handling of school shootings, elementary schools need to advance their active shooter
response strategy beyond the simple implementation of lockdowns.
Expecting teachers to protect in place is the simplest of all strategies and is
riddled with potential concerns. Not all faculty and students will be in their classrooms
when an event occurs. If trained in classroom lockdown drills alone, they will be
potentially more vulnerable. Government agencies agree that teachers need more options
beyond simple lockdowns. In The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One
Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came From, author Joe Hendry discussed a
recommendation based on an Ohio task force assembled by the State Attorney General to
look into school safety.389 The recommendation “encouraged a proactive, rather than
passive response to active shooter.”390 Taken even further, Hendry emphasizes, “Not
training everyone to respond as if their life depended on it is shortsighted, high-risk and
does not align with the realities of an active shooter event.”391
Many currently available opportunities can be provided to school staff to increase
their active shooter preparedness. Unfortunately, no clear-cut one-size fits all approaches.
During an active shooter event, lockdown may be the only option. However, any
advanced training provides more opportunities to school staff.
389 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 8.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
92
This research has found many defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools
for elementary school settings. While found in military and law enforcement settings, the
findings demonstrate basic principles of self-defense and decision-making in stressful
environments. By training on and practicing the various components of the results,
teachers and school staff have the potential of increasing possible survivability of active
shooter events in elementary schools.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Findings from the research fall into three general categories: pre-action, action,
and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the
necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over
into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. It is the tactical
movements and techniques that potential victims implement to increase survival. Action
also carries into re-action, and vice-versa as a feedback loop. Re-action means the
reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or
worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a
looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the
research are the following:
Pre-action
School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any means necessary
Situational and area awareness
Commit to mission success
Action
Do not delay
Be decisive
Move with a purpose
Put distance between self and threat
Cover over concealment
93
Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide a tactical advantage
Re-action
Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action
Stay flexible, adapt and overcome
B. PRE-ACTION
A major shortcoming of Run, Hide, Fight is the lack of mental preparation prior to
an event. While it is necessary to not overly plan an escape, based on changing factors,
mentally preparing for stressful situations has incredible advantages. Additionally,
familiarizing oneself with surroundings and ongoing situational changes can have a
dramatic impact on the likelihood of survival should an event occur.
1. School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find Success by any Means Necessary
One who lacks strategic planning and underestimates the enemy will be captured.
~ Sun Tzu392
For many years, experts in the field of active shooters and school shootings have
called for more options-based approaches to active shooter events in schools.
Unfortunately, while advances have taken place, the full acceptance of varied approaches
has not occurred in school settings. Possibly due to budgetary restrictions, liability
concerns or the distraction of teaching young children to Fight, the necessary discussions
and actions have not occurred. Moving forward, school administrators need to recognize
the real threat of violence and empower their teachers to make good, situational-based
decisions. Due to the changing threat environment, schools must adapt to stay ahead of
the threat without causing a constant state of fear. Are parents more concerned that their
child survived, or that the teacher followed the policy?
392 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War—Original, Accurate, and Complete Translation of All 13 Chapters—
Translated by the Sonshi Group,” 12, Sonshi ☮, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.sonshi.com/original- the-art-of-war-trans lation-not-giles.html.
94
2. Situational and Area Awareness
One who is prepared and waits for the unprepared will be victorious.
~ Sun Tzu393
Situational awareness is a skill that once practiced and refined is ongoing. Many
teachers do so without even recognizing it. What is intuition saying? Why does
something not seem right? Teachers following their instinct and paying attention to what
is going can pay huge dividends. By identifying options available to them, the teacher
and school staff can mentally log and build a playbook for if-then scenarios. For example,
by recognizing the location of their classroom, their current position in the school, nearest
exits, cover and concealment escape routes, safety zones, etc., teachers can maintain a
running dialogue that is actionable in the face of a potential identified threat.
3. Commit to Mission Success
The important thing in doing battle is victory, not protracted warfare.
~ Sun Tzu394
Teachers and school administrators must commit to mission success.
Commitment is a formal mental process and state of mind. The research demonstrates the
incredible importance of this step in surviving stressful and threatening environments.
Teachers must not accept failure as an option and must have the utmost confidence in
their ability to survive and protect their children safe in the process. By adhering to the
Situational Awareness Checklist (Appendix A), and The Active Shooter Dirt Dive
(Appendix B) practices, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to have
the confidence in approaching these scenarios.
393 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 5.
394 Ibid., 4.
95
C. ACTION
Run, Hide, Fight is the recognized best practice when responding to the threat of
an active shooter. Unfortunately, the guidance lacks specificity. While it is important to
remember to Run, Hide, Fight, it is critical to recognize how to accomplish each one of
those responses. Implementing the steps inappropriately can actually lead those
threatened into a higher risk situation. By implementing the steps accurately, and with
supporting mental preparation and tactics, the chances of survival can be increased
significantly.
1. Do Not Delay
When doing battle, seek a quick victory. A long battle will blunt weapons and diminish ferocity.
~ Sun Tzu395
Hesitation is the enemy of success. The research is consistent that teachers and
school staff must not delay taking action to mitigate or evade an active shooter event. Do
not assume that it is something other than the worst-case scenario. Do not delay action. Is
it better to feel foolish or be dead? Hear what seems like a gunshot, implement immediate
evasive action.
2. Be Decisive
The essential factor in warfare is speed.
~ Sun Tzu396
When analyzing, moving, or reacting to a scenario do not freeze. The research has
shown that hesitating or simply doing nothing is deadly. When faced with a threatening
environment, it is critical that teachers and school staff take action. Right or wrong,
research shows inaction is not successful.
395 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 3.
396 Ibid., 14.
96
3. Move with a Purpose
Move when advantageous, stop when not advantageous.
~ Sun Tzu397
In such an environment, all movement is critical. If a particular move does not
immediately improve or lead to increasing the teachers’ overall tactical advantage, it
should not occur unless absolutely no other option is available. While not hesitating, see
the move, analyze the advantage, make the move, and reanalyze.
4. Put Distance between Self and Threat
To march over a thousand kilometers without becoming distressed, march over where the enemy is not present.
~ Sun Tzu398
Distance equals success. As found in the research, active shooter events in schools
are typically short in duration. By immediately providing distance from the threat,
potential victims dramatically increase their chances of survival. Every second counts.
5. Cover over Concealment
To be certain of safety when defending, defend where the enemy cannot attack.
~ Sun Tzu399
The difference between cover and concealment is critical. Cover has to be the
priority over concealment. As implied by the term active shooter, the threat is bullets. If
potential victims are vulnerable to the penetration of gunfire, they are simply not safe.
Concealment is temporary. Cover may also be temporary depending on the situation, but
it is always better than concealment.
397 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.
398 Ibid., 7.
399 Ibid.
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6. Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment and Provide a Tactical Advantage
Calculate the situation, and then move. Those who know the principles of the circuitous and direct will be victorious.
~ Sun Tzu400
Overall, actions in threatening environments need to be fast and result in an
improved tactical advantage. As opposed to envisioning an entire route, potential victims
should move from cover to cover quickly and concisely. These events come down to
seconds, which can impact potential survival. If those threatened can continue to move,
remain in cover, and provide distance from the threat, chances of survival increase.
D. RE-ACTION
With mental preparation engaged and tactically advantageous actions
implemented, it is critical to reevaluate the situation regularly. As a highly dynamic
event, active shooter environments are constantly changing. To maintain tactical
advantage, which increases the likelihood of survival, actions must be reevaluated
relative to the current and forecasted threat environment. By accomplishing this, those
threatened have the tactical advantage of staying ahead of their attacker.
1. Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least Expected Action
Attack where your enemies are not prepared; go to where they do not expect.
~ Sun Tzu401
These events are competitions of who will win. Winning is survival. The attackers
have the advantage of knowing what their plans are. Knowledge of intent puts those
threatened at an immediate disadvantage. To compensate for this disadvantage, in
addition to not delaying, being decisive and moving with a purpose, potential victims
must gain any tactical advantage available. Pre-established evacuation routes and
400 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 9.
401 Ibid., 2.
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lockdown are the most likely action found in school systems. If the threat is familiar with
school policies and procedures, then all the proposed actions and the specific details of
each one may already be known to that threat. With an options-based approach, teachers
and school staff have the flexibility to get ahead of the threat’s operational tempo and
gain tactical advantage.
2. Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome
When moving troops and calculating plans, be formless.
~ Sun Tzu402
Active shooter events are constantly evolving and highly variable. The research
confirms that no one-size fits all approach exists in these situations. Initial plans may
change with routes or conditions. It is critical that teachers and school staff not lock into
any one solution. Instead, they should focus on remaining flexible, adapting to whatever
the situation provides, and overcoming any current, new, or unknown challenges. This
principle is the reason behind the recommendation by experts to establish options-based
approaches and not try to provide a procedural approach to an event. Instead, the
emphasis is to provide the tools for those involved to be successful and then give them
the ability to use the tools as needed.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has shown that options-based approaches to active shooter events
are necessary for elementary school events. Active shooter events are not linear.
Preparation and response activities should not be linear either. Teachers and school staff
need to be prepared and supported to make changes to standard practice. Additionally,
teachers and school staff should be celebrated for their willingness to protect the students
in their charge. While the research demonstrates detailed actions and ideas, the resulting
recommendations summarize the steps necessary for schools to advance their
preparedness.
402 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.
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Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on
options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response
including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.
This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to
school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity
to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.
Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to
protect the children in their care by any means necessary.
Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.
Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If
teachers make a tactical real time decision that taking their students out the window and
into a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know
that their ability to decide is supported.
Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of
an incident.
With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.
In the previous example of when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a
process needs to be in place for them to reconnect to the school administration to provide
a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Opportunities exist for further research regarding active shooter events. Most
likely, the most complicated, and most significant, would be the psychological analysis as
to why an individual would commit such an act. Additionally, research regarding target
selection has inherent value. While school and workplace attacks are commonly
understood targets, random active shooter targets are not. Depending on the willingness
and reality of implementing the steps outlined in this document, research could evaluate
the hurdles keeping school systems from evolving their protection measures. Research on
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that topic could potentially assess cultural obstacles, political influences, and social
ramifications. Regardless of the area of research, school-based active shooter events are a
valuable topic, as the protection of youth is a globally accepted social priority.
G. CONCLUSION
I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who
is still scared, as I am sure all parents are, but whom now sees options to
increase success—survival—in active shooter events. Through the research, I found
many great resources that could easily be applied to a multitude of varied
environments to increase survivability. Unfortunately, bureaucratic hurdles always
seem to precede change. I feel confident that changes can and will be made based on
the ever-evolving threat environment that this nation’s schools face. The threat of
active shooters in schools has not waned and is statistically increasing. The impact of
these events in elementary schools is significant.
Many school systems have failed to adapt to the changing environment or have
adapted portions of the needed steps. Emergency operations plans have significant value
in overall school planning. Unfortunately, these plans often provide a false sense of
security. Focus on preventing these events and having an overall school threat
vulnerability analysis is critical. Identifying potential risks and intervening in advance is
a daily process and significant step to prevention. Unfortunately, not all events stop at
this stage. Individual schools not wanting to face the reality that it can happen and not
preparing for it is unacceptable. School systems need to recognize the possibility of the
threat, not dismiss the likelihood, be honest with their vulnerability, accept strengths and
weaknesses, and find a way to improve.
By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school
systems have the potential dramatically increase the likelihood of survival. Lockdown
should be an option, not THE solution. As a society, this country entrusts teachers with
the daily protection of children. Why not empower them with the tools and opportunity to
evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?
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APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST
o Am I in the proper “warrior mindset” today?403 o Do I have the “will to survive” and the will to protect my students?404 o Can I commit to mission success and refuse to accept defeat? o Can I not delay, assume the worst and act decisively?
o Has anyone given me cause for concern recently?
o Students? o Co-workers? o Parents? o Other adults?
o Did anything strike me as odd this morning while driving in or arriving on
campus? o Unusual cars? o Unusual people?
o What are the “weak points” of my school?
o Blind spots? o Glass entrances? o Fences?
Anything I can fix or recommend changing?
o How close am I typically to those “weak points?”
o What are the nearest exits to my classroom (or where I spend most of my day)? o Primary o Secondary (separate direction from primary) o Tertiary (hopefully separate direction than both primary and secondary)
o What do my escape path options look like?
o Are they identified but not committed to? o Do I have multiples? o Can I adapt and overcome if paths become unsafe or inaccessible?
403 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
404 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
102
o What type of cover or concealment is available while escaping or when hiding?405
o What would hinder my and my student’s escape to safety? o Physical abilities of self or others? o Locked doors? o Location in school? (i.e., second or third floor)
o How fortifiable is my classroom if I could not escape?
o Windows? o Lockable doors? o Large objects that could be moved to impede access? o Smaller objects that could be placed to slow attacker movement? o Areas large enough to accommodate hiding entire class?
o What in my class can be used as a weapon or distraction?
o Extinguisher? o Staplers? o Vases? o Stacks of papers? o Pencils? o Erasers? o Anything!!
o If moving between classes, or moving to another area of the school have I
reevaluated my surroundings? o Newly available, or better, exits? o Different escape paths? o Different concern areas? o Different fortification options?
o Am I willing to stay ahead of an attacker and do the least expected action
whenever necessary to gain the tactical advantage?406
405 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
406 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.
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APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE
Adapted from the following and shown in Figure 15: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook)
“Get off the X” “Low crawl/high crawl”
United States Marine Corp, Fire and Movement.
“I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down” United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS)
“Avoid danger areas” Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness; U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.
“Cover & concealment” “Defend your sector” “Anti-sniper lateral & angled movement”
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Figure 15. The Active Shooter Dirt Dive407
407Adapted from Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook); United States Marine Corps, Fire and
Movement; United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS); Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness; U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.
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