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CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 123

studies presented to participants in the research we summarize were fabricated.

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What We Know Now About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century

Susan T. Fiske

Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Abstract

A f t e r n e a r l y a c e n t u r y ’ s study, what do psychologists now know about intergroup bias and conflict? Most people reveal unconscious, subtle bi- ases, which are relatively auto- matic, cool, indirect, ambiguous, and ambivalent. Subtle biases underlie ordinary discrimina- tion: comfort with one’s own in-group, plus exclusion and avoidance of out-groups. Such biases result from internal con- flict between cultural ideals and cultural biases. A small minor- ity of people, extremists, do harbor blatant biases that are more conscious, hot, direct, and unambiguous. Blatant bi- ases underlie aggression, in- c l u d i n g h a t e c r i m e s . S u c h biases result from perceived in- tergroup conflict over econom- i c s a n d v a l u e s , i n a w o r l d perceived to be hierarchical

and dangerous. Reduction of both subtle and blatant bias re- sults from education, economic opportunity, and constructive intergroup contact.

Keywords

bias; stereotyping; prejudice; d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; i n t e r g r o u p conflict

People typically seek other peo- ple who are similar to themselves, being comfortable with others they perceive as members of their own in-group. From comfort follows, at best, neglect of people from out- groups and, at worst, murderous hostility toward out-groups per- ceived as threatening the in-group. Biases do vary by degree, and the psychologies of moderate and ex- treme biases differ considerably. Well-intentioned moderates reveal bias more subtle than the rants and

rampages of extremists. By some c o u n t s , 8 0 % o f W e s t e r n d e m o - cratic populations intend benign intergroup relations but display subtle biases. In contrast, blatantly biased extremists are completely out-front. Although estimated to be a minority (perhaps 10%), they are salient, vocal, and dangerous.

After nearly a century’s study, s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y k n o w s a l o t about both forms of bias. Stereo- typing, prejudice, and discrimina- tion reflect, respectively, people’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to people from other groups (Fiske, 1998). All constitute

bias

, reacting to a person on the ba- sis of perceived membership in a single human category, ignoring other category memberships and other personal attributes. Bias is thus a narrow, potentially errone- ous reaction, compared with indi- viduated impressions formed from personal details.

SUBTLE BIAS AMONG WELL- INTENTIONED MODERATES

Automatic, Unconscious, and Unintentional

The big news from two recent de- cades of research: Bias is most often

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underground (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). First data showed that even among relatively unprejudiced peo- ple, racial category labels automati- cally prime (increase the accessibil- ity of) stereotypes; scores of studies now support the essential automa- ticity of stereotypes (Fiske, 1998, 2 0 0 0 ; M a c r a e & B o d e n h a u s e n , 2000). For example, even when out- group category labels are sublimi- nally presented (i.e., presented too q u i c k l y t o b e c o n s c i o u s l y p e r - ceived), they activate stereotypic as- sociations. In a more affective vein, out-group cues (such as faces or names) easily activate negative evaluative terms. Relatedly, brain imaging shows activation of the amygdala in response to out-group faces; because the amygdala is the center of fear and anxiety in the brain, its activation in response to out-groups is consistent with primi- tive emotional prejudices. Further- more, automatic activation of out- group categories leads to behavior stereotypically associated with that group. For example, young people primed with the category “elderly” (vs. a neutral one) walk and re- spond more slowly; Whites primed with Black faces (vs. White ones) re- spond in a more hostile way than they normally do. Such responses create self-fulfilling prophecies in in- tergroup biases. Brain imaging and automatic behavior form the cutting edges of work on automatic biases.

A u t o m a t i c r e a c t i o n s t o o u t - group members matter in every- day behavior. Awkward social in- teractions, embarrassing slips of the tongue, unchecked assump- tions, stereotypic judgments, and spontaneous neglect all exemplify the mundane automaticity of bias, which creates a subtly hostile envi- ronment for out-group members. The apparent automaticity of rou- tine biases corroborates Allport’s (1954) provocative early insights about the inevitability of categori- zation. Automaticity also shocks well-intentioned people who as-

sume that both their own and other people’s prejudice must be con- scious and controllable.

All is not lost for the well-inten- tioned. Category activation is not

u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y

a u t o m a t i c . A l - though people can instantly iden- t i f y a n o t h e r p e r s o n ’ s c a t e g o r y membership (especially gender, race, and age), they may not al- ways activate associated stereo- types. For example, sufficient men- t a l o v e r l o a d b l o c k s a c t i v a t i o n . People’s long-term attitudes also h a v e a m o d e r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e : Chronically low levels of prejudice can attenuate the activation of ste- reotypes. Temporary goals matter, too: Category activation depends on short-term motivations, includ- ing immediate threats to self-esteem and focused efforts toward accurate understanding.

Promising as they are, findings indicating that biases are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional re- main controversial. For example, the ease of category activation dif- fers depending on the nature of the stimuli: Activation is easy when people encounter verbal labels, harder when they encounter photo- graphs, and hardest when they en- counter real people. Some research- ers believe that social categories inevitably activate associated bi- ases, whereas others believe activa- tion depends entirely on short-term goals and long-term individual dif- ferences (Devine, 2001).

Whether bias is conditionally or unconditionally automatic, less prej- udiced perceivers still can compen- sate for their automatic associations with subsequent conscious effort. If category activation is conditionally automatic, then people may be able to inhibit it in the first place. In ei- ther case, motivation matters.

Moreover, even if people do acti- vate biases associated with a cate- gory, they may not apply (or use) those biases. For example, once the category is activated, other informa- tion may be consistent or inconsis-

tent with it, and perceivers have to decide what to do about the conflict- ing information. Inconsistency reso- lution and subsequent individua- tion of the other person require mental resources, which are allo- cated according to the perceiver’s motivation and capacity. Overriding category use depends on metacogni- tive decisions (thinking about one’s thinking) and higher-level execu- tive functions (controlling one’s thinking), not just brute attentional c a p a c i t y . O t h e r i n f l u e n c e s o n whether activated categories are used go beyond the perceiver’s mo- tivation and capacity: For example, category use depends on the stimuli (general group-level abstractions en- courage assimilation toward the ste- reotype, whereas individual exem- plars encourage contrast away from it). Category use increases when the perceiver’s personal theory holds that people’s dispositions are fixed entities, rather than flexible states. Psychologists continue to debate the boundaries of automaticity.

Inhibition of both category acti- vation and category application challenges even the most deter- mined moderate. Direct suppres- sion sometimes causes only a re- bound of the forbidden biases. Depending on cognitive capacity, practice, age, and motivation, peo- ple can inhibit many effects of social categories on their thinking, feeling, and behaving. Indeed, when people adopt goals encouraging them to treat others as unique individuals or not at all as social objects, they no longer show even amygdala activa- tion in response to faces from races other than their own (Wheeler & Fiske, 2001). The take-home mes- sage: Bias is more automatic than people think, but less automatic than psychologists thought.

Cool, Indirect, and Ambiguous

T h e b i a s e s o f t h e m o d e r a t e , well-intentioned majority not only live underground, they also wear

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 125

camouflage. Consistent with peo- ple’s biases reflecting in-group comfort at least as much as out- group discomfort, bias often con- sists of withholding positive emo- tions from out-groups. Moderates rarely express open hostility to- ward out-groups, but they may withhold basic liking and respect; hence, their responses represent cool neglect. People more rapidly assign positive attributes to the in- group than the out-group, but of- ten show at best weak differences in assigning negative attributes. People withhold rewards from out- groups, relative to the in-group, re- f l e c t i n g f a v o r i t i s m ( B r e w e r & Brown, 1998). But they rarely pun- ish or derogate the out-group. The typical damage is relative.

Moderate biases are indirect, re- lying on norms for appropriate re- sponses. If norms allow biases, they flourish. That is, biases most often appear when people have un- prejudiced excuses. When contact or helping is discretionary, for ex- ample, if some people neglect out- group members, then most people do. If the out-group member be- haves poorly, providing an excuse for prejudice, the resulting exclu- sion is more swift and sure than for a comparable in-group member. Biases also appear in political pol- i c y p r e f e r e n c e s f o r w h i c h o n e might have principled reasons (ex- cuses), but regarding which one also just happens to have a series of opinions that all disadvantage the out-group relative to the in-group. Excuses for bias fulfill the social norm requiring rational, fair judg- ments, but empirically controlled comparisons reveal greater bias to- ward out-group members than to- ward comparable in-group mem- b e r s . R e s e a r c h e r s c o n t i n u e t o debate the meaning of these biases.

People also engage in attribu- tional tricks that discourage sym- pathy by blaming the out-group for their own unfortunate out- comes: Members of the out-group

should try harder, but at the same time they should not push them- selves where they are not wanted (Catch 22). The blame goes further. Although the in-group might be excused for its failures (extenuat- ing circumstances), the out-group brought it on themselves (unfortu- nate dispositions). People often at- tribute the out-group’s perceived failings to their essence: Innate, in- herent, enduring attributes, per- haps biological, especially genetic, define category distinctiveness.

In making sense of out-group members, people exaggerate cul- tural differences (in ability, lan- guage, religious beliefs, and sexual practices). The mere fact of catego- rizing into in-group “us” and out- group “them” exaggerates intercat- egory differences and diminishes intracategory differences: “Out- group members all are alike and d i f f e r e n t f r o m u s , b e s i d e s . ” I n short, moderates’ bias is cool, indi- rect, and ambiguous.

Ambivalent and Mixed

Besides being underground and camouflaged, moderate biases are complex. Ambivalent racism entails, for moderate Whites, mixed “pro- Black” pity and anti-Black resent- ment, which tips over to a predomi- nantly positive or negative response, depending on circumstances. Am- bivalent sexism is another example, demonstrating two correlated di- mensions that differentiate hostile s e x i s m ( t o w a r d n o n t r a d i t i o n a l women) and subjectively benevolent sexism (toward traditional women). In both cases, ambivalence indicates mixed forms of prejudice more sub- tle than unmitigated hostility.

Mixed biases turn out to be the rule, rather than the exception. Al- though various out-groups all are classified as “them,” they form clusters (see Fig. 1). Some elicit less respect than others, and some elicit less liking than others. Not only is the bias of well-intentioned moder-

ates of the cool variety (withhold- ing the positive, rather than assign- ing the negative), but it is not even u n i f o r m l y l a c k i n g i n p o s i t i v e v i e w s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , s o m e o u t - g r o u p s ( A s i a n s , J e w s , c a r e e r women, Black professionals, rich people) are envied and respected for their perceived competence and high status, but they are resented and disliked as lacking in warmth because they compete with the in- group. Other out-groups (older people, disabled people, house- wives) are pitied and disrespected for their perceived incompetence and low status, but they are nur- tured and liked as warm because they do not threaten the in-group. Only a few out-groups (primarily homeless and poor people of any race) receive contempt, both dislike and disrespect, because they are seen as simultaneously low status and exploiting the in-group.

Ambivalent, mixed biases justify the status quo. Subordinated, pit- ied groups have an incentive to co- operate because they receive care, in return for not challenging the hi- erarchy. Conversely, dominant groups use subordinated groups to maintain their own relative advan- tage. Envied, competitive groups have an incentive to support the system because they are perceived to be succeeding, even if they are socially excluded by the culturally dominant group. For dominant groups, respecting envied groups acknowledges the ground rules for competition (which favor them also), but disliking those groups justifies social exclusion.

Moderate Biases Lead to Exclusion

Subtle biases motivate personal interactions that reek of discomfort and anxiety. Nonverbal indicators (distance, posture, voice tone) and people’s own reports of their feel- ings all reveal intergroup interac- tions that are anything but smooth,

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mostly because of inexperience with the out-group.

Moreover, people mentally and behaviorally confirm their biased expectations, leading both groups to maintain their distance.

Self-ful- filling prophecy

expectancy effects

, and

behavioral confirmation

all name related phenomena whereby biased perceivers bring about the very be- havior they anticipate, usually neg- ative. These interpersonal processes result in subsequent avoidance, whenever people can choose the company they keep. Discretionary intergroup contact is minimized.

F u r t h e r m o r e , e x c l u s i o n a n d avoidance extend to employment, housing, education, and justice that tend to favor the in-group and dis- advantage the out-group. Ample evidence indicates that relatively automatic, cool, indirect, ambigu-

ous, and ambivalent biases permit allocation of resources to maintain the in-group’s advantage.

How Do Moderate Biases Originate?

Subtle prejudice comes from people’s internal conflict between ideals and biases, both acquired from the culture. Direct, personal experience with out-group mem- bers may be limited. Given sub- stantial de facto residential and oc- cupational segregation, people lack experience in constructive inter- group interactions. Cultural media, then, supply most information about out-groups, so people easily develop unconscious associations and feelings that reinforce bias.

Simultaneously, contemporary Western ideals encourage tolerance

of most out-groups. Complying with modern antiprejudice ideals requires conscious endorsement of egalitarian norms against preju- dice. And moderates do endorse antiprejudice values. The upshot is a conflict between relatively im- plicit, unconscious biases and ex- plicit, conscious ideals to be unprej- udiced. The resulting prejudices are subtle, modern, and aversive to the people holding them.

BLATANT BIAS AMONG ILL- INTENTIONED EXTREMISTS

Hot, Direct, Unambiguous, and Conscious

In contrast to well-intentioned moderates, extremists openly resent

Fig. 1. Five-cluster solution showing the perceived distribution of American social groups, according to perceived competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002, Study 2). Copyright by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 127

out-groups and reject any possibil- ity of intimacy with them (Petti- grew, 1998b). They resent out- groups—whether racial, cultural, gender, or sexual—as holding jobs that in-group members should have and (paradoxically) living on welfare unnecessarily. They be- lieve that out-groups and the in- group can never be comfortable to- gether. Extremists are particularly upset by intergroup intimacy. They report that they would be bothered by having a mixed grandchild, that they are unwilling to have sexual relations with out-group mem- bers, and that they are unwilling to have an out-group boss.

Extreme biases run in packs; people biased against one out- group tend to be biased against others. People’s differing levels of ethnocentrism are reliably mea- sured by old-fashioned prejudice scales that assess self-reported atti- tudes toward racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual out-groups.

Extreme Biases Underlie Aggression

The result is as simple as it is horrible. Because of hot, direct, un- ambiguous prejudices, extremists advocate segregation, containment, a n d e v e n e l i m i n a t i o n o f o u t - groups. Strong forms of bias corre- late with approval of racist move- ments. Hate-crime perpetrators and participants in ethnic violence, not surprisingly, endorse attitudes (prejudices and stereotypes) that fit extreme forms of discrimination.

Aggression has two main goals: preserving hierarchies and pre- serving values perceived to be tra- ditional. People with blatant preju- dices often approve aggression to maintain the status quo, viewing current group hierarchies as inevi- table and desirable. Highly preju- diced people gravitate toward jobs that enhance group hierarchy and defend the status quo (e.g., they tend

to be police officers rather than social workers and businesspeople rather than educators). Blatant prejudice may also lead to self-righteous ag- gression against nonconformers and other people who threaten core val- ues. I f o u t - g r o u p s d e v i a t e a n d threaten traditional values, they be- come legitimate targets of aggres- sion.

How Do Extreme Biases Originate?

Whether extremists are domes- tic or international, they endanger those they hate. People become bi- ased extremists because they per- ceive threats to their in-group. Thus, extreme bias parallels the in- group favoritism of biased moder- ates, who also protect the in-group. Differences lie in the perceived na- ture and degree of threat.

Threat to economic standing has long been implicated in intergroup bias. Although still controversial, the most convincing but counterin- tuitive lesson here is that personal economic deprivation is not in fact the culprit. The state of people’s own wallets does not motivate their degree of prejudice. Instead, the most reliable indicator is per- ceived threat to one’s in-group. Group threat (e.g., high local un- employment) correlates with ex- treme biases against out-groups perceived to be responsible. The causal sequence seems to run from subjective social class to perceived group deprivation to prejudice.

Perceived threat to in-group economic status correlates with worldviews that reinforce a zero- s u m , d o g - e a t - d o g p e r s p e c t i v e . Tough-minded competition is per- ceived to reflect the state of inter- group relations. Economic conser- vatism results. Overall, blatant prejudice correlates with high so- cial dominance orientation (Sida- nius & Pratto, 1999), that is, en- dorsing views that superior groups

should dominate inferior groups, that force may be necessary to maintain this dominance, and that group equality is neither desirable nor realistic.

Perceived threat to traditional values is the other prong of blatant bias. Extremists view the world as dangerous, with established au- thority and conventions in col- lapse. Social conservatism corre- lates with perceived threats to traditional values, and also with extreme bias (Altemeyer, 1996). Ex- tremists move in tight ethnic circles and endorse right-wing authoritar- ian views: old-fashioned values, censorship, mighty leaders who fight evil, and suppression of trou- blemakers, freethinkers, women, and homosexuals.

The background of people who become extremists features limited intergroup contact—few out-group n e i g h b o r s , a c q u a i n t a n c e s , a n d friends. Nor do extremists value such contact. They also tend to be less educated than moderates, for reasons not fully clear, although one might speculate that a liberal education broadens people’s ap- preciation of different values.

WHAT REDUCES BIAS?

Given subtle biases that are un- conscious and indirect, change is a challenge, resisting frontal assault. S i m i l a r l y , g i v e n b l a t a n t b i a s e s rooted in perceived threat to group interests and core values, direct confrontation will likely fail again. Instead, more nuanced means do work.

Education does help. Economic opportunity does help. Moreover, for decades, social psychologists have studied the positive effects of constructive intergroup contact that increases mutual appreciation (Pettigrew, 1998a): When contact features (a) equal status within the i m m e d i a t e s e t t i n g , ( b ) s h a r e d

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goals, (c) cooperation in pursuit of those goals, and (d) authorities’ support, it provides a basis for in- tergroup friendship. Genuine in- tergroup friendships demonstrably do reduce stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination of whatever sort.

WHERE NOW?

Much is known, but much re- mains to be learned. Promising lines of research range from imag- i n g b r a i n a c t i v i t y b e y o n d t h e amygdala, to specifying intergroup emotions beyond mere antipathy, to explaining stereotype content b e y o n d m e r e l i s t s o f n e g a t i v e traits, to predicting discrimination in all its guises, to assessing peo- ple’s control over their own seem- ingly automatic reactions (Fiske, 2000). Bias researchers will not be unemployed any time soon.