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WhatCanBeDoneAboutADisruptivePhysician.pdf

126

What Can Be Done About A Disruptive Physician?

A Legal Analysis

Samuel D. Hodge, Jr.*

House, a medical drama about an infectious disease

specialist, entertained television audiences for years as the

irascible and pill-popping physician solved medical mysteries

with the zeal of a modern-day Sherlock Holmes while playing

mind games with his coworkers. Uncanny intuition and

eccentric thinking earned the physician great respect but his

bullish behavior and antisocial tendencies were a distraction at

the hospital.1 Not only did Dr. House clash with his fellow

physicians but he also insulted patients, flouted hospital rules

and caused great conflict with the hospital administrators.2 In

fact, his actions often crossed the line into obnoxiousness and

rage causing the hospital staff to tiptoe around his dysfunctional

behavior.3

In the real world, Dr. House would be labeled a “disruptive

physician” and would be subjected to disciplinary action

including the loss of his hospital privileges. This article will

explore the problems caused by being labeled a disruptive

physician in a legal context with a focus on the peer review

process and the relevant court cases.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction...................................................................... 127

* The author is a professor at Temple University, where he teaches both law and anatomy. He also serves as a mediator and neutral arbitrator for the Dispute Resolution Institute in Philadelphia and is considered one of the most popular CLE speakers in the country. Professor Hodge has authored more than 175 articles on the intersection between law and medicine, has published ten books and has been named a top lawyer in Pennsylvania on multiple occasions.

1. House (TV Series), Wɪᴋɪᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_ (TV_series), (last visited Sept. 14, 2019).

2. Id.

3. Bob Wachter, Gregory House, MD, RIP, HOSPITAL LEADER BLOG (May 21, 2012), https://thehospitalleader.org/gregory-house-md-rip/.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 127

II. What is a Disruptive Physician? .................................. 128

III. The Problem .................................................................. 129

A. Statistics .................................................................... 129

B. Conduct That Is Disruptive ....................................... 130

IV. Remedial Measures ....................................................... 131

A. The American Medical Association ........................... 132

B. The Joint Commission ............................................... 133

C. Federation of State Medical Boards .......................... 134

D. Response by the States .............................................. 135

V. Peer Review Immunity ................................................. 136

VI. Court Action .................................................................. 139

A. Immunity under the Healthcare Quality Improvement

Act (HCQIA) ........................................................................ 141

B. Reliance upon Bylaws and Procedures ..................... 147

C. Disruptive Conduct as Justification for Suspension . 150

VII. Conclusion ..................................................................... 152

I. Introduction

The practice of medicine is filled with stress from being

involved in life and death decisions, to declining revenues while

practicing in a heavily regulated environment.4 These facts have

triggered the quick response by some physicians to use

regulatory schemes to advance their own personal agendas and

to protect personal interests.5 Unfortunately, these rules and

regulations, which are not well understood by most medical

professionals, have caused a great deal of animosity and

frustration, leading some doctors to become “disruptive

physicians.”6

The troublesome physician causes untold medical, legal,

and psychological problems in the workforce,7 and most health

care managers are ill prepared to deal with these doctors.8 For

4. Michael J. Grogan & Paul Knechtges, The Disruptive Physician: A Legal Perspective, 20 Aᴄᴀᴅ. Rᴀᴅɪᴏʟᴏɢʏ 9, 1069–73 (2013).

5. Zachary L. Erwin, Analyzing the Disruptive Physician: How State and Federal Courts Should Handle Whistleblower Cases Brought by Disruptive Physicians, 44 Dᴜǫ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 275, 275 (2006).

6. Id. at 276.

7. Id.

8. Eugene Fibuch & Jennifer J. Robertson, Bringing Value: Dealing Fairly With Disruptive Physicians, AM. ASS’N PHYSICIAN LEADERSHIP (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.physicianleaders.org/news/bringing-value-dealing-fairly-

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128 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

example, disruptive physicians can lead to a hostile work

environment, cause morale problems, increased litigation,

compromised patient care, communication issues, and

obstruction in the regular running of the organization.9 As noted

by Alexander Vaccaro M.D., the President of the Rothman

Institute, “There is no place in medicine for disruptive

physicians and every study that has examined the issue has

concluded that a disruptive doctor increases the chance of an

adverse event. In fact, these physicians have a higher

complication rate and receive negative feedback in patient

satisfaction surveys.”10 Addressing this conduct head-on is

critical, but recognizing the proper course of remedial action can

be a daunting task.11

II. What is a Disruptive Physician?

No single definition exits to describe a disruptive physician

but a number of organizations and court decisions have

addressed the issue. Some medical professionals claim that they

have an “instinctive understanding” of what represents

disruptive behavior and do not need guidance.12 On the other

hand, the Court in Gordon v. Lewistown defines a disruptive

physician as one who is unruly, “contentious, threatening,

unreachable, insulting and frequently litigious. He will not, or

cannot, play by the rules, nor is he able to relate to or work well

with others.”13 It is important to note, however, that a sole

occurrence of troublesome behavior is inadequate to be labeled a

disruptive physician and anticipating complete harmony in the

workplace is unrealistic. The tag should also not be used to

disruptive-physicians.

9. Erwin, supra note 5, at 275–76.

10. Alexander Vaccaro, M.D., Ph.D, MBA, is an orthopedic surgeon and the President of Rothman Institute, one of the largest orthopedic practices in the country. He is also the Richard H. Rothman Professor and Chair in the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, and a Professor of Neurosurgery at Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His comments were obtained in a telephone interview conducted by the author on September 20, 2019.

11. Alicia Gallegos, Disruptive Physicians: Is This an HR or MEC Issue?, MDEDGE (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.mdedge.com/internalmedicine/article /174921/businessmedicine/disruptive-physicians-hr-or-mec-issue.

12. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at 2.

13. Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 714 A.2d 539, 544 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 129

describe a doctor who has had a bad day or demonstrates an

occasional outburst that is out of character. Nor should the label

apply to a physician who has quirks, tends to be disagreeable, or

annoys others on the medical staff.14 Rather, the

characterization should be reserved for those who show a

pattern of seriously inappropriate conduct that is “deep-seated

and habitual.”15 A single incident that is improper must still be

addressed but the label “disruptive physician” is reserved for

more sustained and inappropriate behaviors over a period of

time.16

III. The Problem

As the sophistication and intricacies of medicine and

managed health care increase, the need to work in a conducive

atmosphere of cooperation intensifies. Contemporaneously, the

pressures, burdens, and distractions involving physicians

correspondingly escalate. Because doctors occupy an esteemed

position in society, inappropriate actions by these individuals

become magnified and have a greater probability for

disruption.17

Acknowledged in the medical literature for more than a

century,18 there is little evidence to demonstrate that the

number of episodes of disruptive physicians has increased in

recent years, but the problem has moved to the forefront of

healthcare management. Likewise, doctors who demonstrate

inappropriate behavior are being sanctioned with greater

frequency.19

A. Statistics

14. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at 3; See also Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr., 404 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1991).

15. Norman T. Reynolds, Disruptive Physician Behavior: Use and Misuse of the Label, 98 J. MED. REG. 1, 10 (2012).

16. Id. at 9–10.

17. Brian J. Santin & Krista L. Kaups, The Disruptive Physician: Addressing the Issues, BULL. AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Feb. 1, 2015), http://bulletin.facs.org/2015/02/the-disruptive-physician-addressing-the- issues/.

18. Llewellyn E. Piper, Addressing the Phenomenon of Disruptive Physician Behavior, 22 HEALTH CARE MANAGER 335, 335–39 (2003).

19. Santin & Kaups, supra note 17.

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130 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

Most physicians and other health care workers have seen

their contemporaries engage in disruptive conduct with co-

employees, patients, and other individuals.20 In fact, more than

seventy percent of doctors surveyed indicate that disruptive

conduct happens at least once a month at their workplace, and

more than ten percent admit that such episodes occur on a daily

basis.21 This disruptive behavior runs the gamut from cursing to

the refusal to follow established procedures.22 Most responders

expressed concern about the consequences of this inappropriate

conduct on their practices, and nearly all are of the opinion that

the disruptive physician affects patient care. Surprisingly,

twenty-six percent of doctors acknowledged that they have

engaged in disruptive conduct at some point during their careers

and the most proffered reasons for these inappropriate actions

are “workload and learned behaviors.”23

Demographically, nurses are the main victims of this

unseemly conduct,24 and a number have left their jobs as a

result.25 The greatest offenders are those with the highest stress

level jobs, with surgeons being labeled the greatest culprits,

followed by obstetricians/gynecologists, orthopedic doctors, and

primary care physicians.26 Other specialists with less frequent

episodes include cardiologists, anesthesiologists,

ophthalmologists, cardiac/vascular surgeons, kidney specialists,

radiologists, oncologists, and psychiatrists.27

B. Conduct That Is Disruptive

20. Id.

21. Owen MacDonald, Disruptive Physician Behavior, QUANTIAMD 1, 2 (May 15, 2011), http://www.quantiamd.com/q-qcp/Disruptive_Physician_ Behavior.pdf.

22. Id. at 2.

23. Id.

24. Stephen Lazoritz, Don’t Tolerate Disruptive Physician Behavior, AM. NURSE TODAY (Apr. 11, 2011), https://www.americannursetoday.com/dont- tolerate-disruptive-physician-behavior-2/.

25. Charles P. Samenow et. al., ACME Course Aimed at Addressing Disruptive Physician Behavior, PHYSICIAN EXEC. 32 (Jan.–Feb. 2008), https://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/root/pdfs/cph/Samenow.pdf.

26. Alan H. Rosenstein et. al., Legal Entanglements in Dealing with Disruptive Behavior, PHYSICIAN LEADERSHIP J., May–June 2016, at 46, 48 fig. 2.

27. Id.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 131

Inappropriate conduct takes many forms, with the highest

level of encounters being degrading comments, insults, and

yelling. Other types of disruptive behavior are less obvious but

no less concerning. These include a physician’s refusal to

cooperate with others and the inability to adhere to established

protocols. Conduct which occurs less frequently includes

physician assaults, discriminatory behavior, incompetence,

retaliation, spreading malicious rumors, throwing objects, and

substance abuse.28 Female physicians are slightly less likely to

engage in disruptive conduct as compared to their male

counterparts.29

It is believed that disruptive physicians direct their actions

against those who are perceived as having a status below the

doctor. It is theorized that the hierarchical character of the

medical profession has produced alphas who feel compelled to

flaunt their status. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that

one study ascertained that fifty percent of the conflicts dealing

with disruptive doctors involve coworkers with less professional

clout.30

Critics of this label maintain that being designated a

disruptive physician has been applied improperly by hospital

management to jettison unwanted competition and anti-

administration practices. It is also asserted that the phrase

“disruptive physician” is buried in the bylaws and left

intentionally broad, subjective, and undefined so that health

care executives can construe it anyway they wish.31 Therefore,

it is critical that hospitals implement rules and regulations that

will assist them in the handling of disruptive doctors while

shielding physicians from bogus claims of disruptive conduct.32

IV. Remedial Measures

28. MacDonald, supra note 21, at 4–5.

29. Id. at 5.

30. Brian M. Peters, Disruptive or Targeted Physician?: Compliance Strategies, HOSP. & HEALTH SYS. INST., February 9, 2006, Am. Health Law. Ass’n, AHLA-Papers P0209-608 (citing David O. Weber, Poll Results: Doctors’ Disruptive Behavior Disturbs Physician Leaders, PHYSICIAN EXEC., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 6).

31. Lawrence R. Huntoon, Abuse of the “Disruptive Physician” Clause, 9 J. AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 68, 68 (2004).

32. Peters, supra note 30, at 4.

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132 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

A. The American Medical Association

The first remedial attempt by the medical profession

occurred at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the AMA House of

Delegates who adopted Resolution 9 (A-99) dealing with the

disruptive physician. The pronouncement requested the AMA

to “identify and study behavior by physicians that is disruptive

to high quality patient care.”33 The end result was the

enactment of AMA Policy E-9.045 titled Physicians with

Disruptive Behavior. This rule of ethics labels disruptive

behavior as personal conduct, whether verbal or physical, that

negatively affects or that potentially may adversely impact

patient care. This inappropriate conduct is not limited to those

actions that interfere with one’s ability to work with others on

the health care team. Physician criticism, however, that is

provided in good faith with the intent of improving patient care

should not be classified as disruptive behavior.34

The AMA also published a Model Medical Code of Conduct

that can be used by health care facilities in drafting their

bylaws.35 This Code defines disruptive behavior as “any abusive

conduct including sexual or other forms of harassment, or other

forms of verbal or nonverbal conduct that harms or intimidates

others to the extent that the quality of care or patient safety

likely would be compromised.”36 Inappropriate behavior is

discouraged, but if such conduct persists, it will be transformed

into disruptive behavior. Examples include:

belittling or berating patients or members of their

care team, use of profanity or disrespectful

33. Dudley M. Stewart, Jr., Physicians with Disruptive Behavior, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CEJA Report 3-1-09, AMERICAN

MEDICAL ASS’N 1, 1 (2009), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/ files /corp/media-browser/public/about-ama/councils/Council%20Reports/council- on-ethics-and-judicial-affairs/i09-ceja-physicians-disruptive-behavior.pdf.

34. Id. at 2 (citing AMA Opinion 9.045 – Physicians with Disruptive Behavior).

35. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, Model Medical Staff Code of Conduct (2012), https://www.slideshare.net/BarneyCohen/amamedicalstaffcodeofconduct (last visited Oct.4, 2019).

36. Id. at 1.

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language, inappropriate comments written in a

patient’s chart, blatant failure to respond to a

patient’s needs, deliberate lack of cooperation

with members of the medical staff, the deliberate

refusal to return calls, and use of intentionally

demeaning language that negatively impacts

patient care.37

The Code goes on to note that complaints about a physician

should be in writing and directed to the president of the medical

staff. A copy of the complaint, Code of Conduct, and bylaws

should be given to the accused within thirty days. In turn, the

offending member shall have the opportunity to respond in

writing.38

B. The Joint Commission

The Joint Commission, which is the accrediting agency for

more than 22,000 health care organizations in the United

States,39 published Standard LD.03.01.01. This provision

acknowledges that a disruptive physician engages in “behavior

that intimidates others and affects morale or staff turnover[,]

undermines a culture of safety and can be harmful to patient

care.”40 As a result, the Joint Commission requires health care

organizations to establish a code of conduct that defines

behaviors that are “acceptable,” “disruptive,” and

“inappropriate.”41

This problem is so significant that the Joint Commission

subsequently issued a Sentinel Event Alert which notes that

intimidating and disruptive behaviors can lead to medical

errors, poor patient satisfaction, increased cost of care, and

37. Id. at 2–3.

38. Id. at 5.

39. About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https:// www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).

40. LD.03.01.01: Leaders Create and Maintain a Culture of Safety and Quality Throughout the Hospital, JOINT COMMISSION 1, 1 https:// medschool.ucla.edu/workfiles/Site-AcademicAffairs/Events/17.Joint- Commission.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).

41. Stewart, Jr., supra note 33, at 1–2.

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134 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

avoidable adverse outcomes.42 In response to criticism that the

term “disruptive behavior” is both ambiguous and inaccurate,

the definition was changed to “behavior or behaviors that

undermine a culture of safety.”43

C. Federation of State Medical Boards

The Federation of State Medical Boards recognized the need

to issue guidance on the disruptive physician when it issued the

2000 Report of the Special Committee on Professional Conduct

and Ethics, as well as in the 2011 Policy on Physician

Impairment.44 The Special Committee’s Report defines

disruptive behavior as “personal interaction with physicians,

hospital personnel, patients, family members, or others that

interferes with patient care.”45 Furthermore, disruptive

behavior is not a diagnosis but a descriptive label that impairs

the ability of the healthcare team to operate effectively, thereby

placing patients at risk. More specifically, it identified several

ways in which disruptive conduct interferes with the

doctor/patient relationship:

1. The physician’s inappropriate behaviors or emotional

outbursts shift the physician’s focus from the patient,

which can result in errors in clinical judgment and

performance.

2. Physician’s emotional outbursts or other inappropriate

behavior can increase apprehension and anxiety of the

physician’s patients as well as other patients who may

witness such outbursts and inappropriate behavior.

42. JOINT COMMISSION, Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety (July 9, 2008), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_40.pdf.

43. Joint Commission Changes Term “Disruptive Behavior” in the Standards, HCPRO (Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.hcpro.com/ACC-273165- 851/Joint-Commission-changes-term-disruptive-behavior-in-the- standards.html.

44. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 8.

45. Federation of State Medical Boards, Report of the Special Committee on Professional Conduct and Ethics 1, 5, (Apr. 2000), http://www.fsmb.org /siteassets/advocacy/policies/report-of-the-special-committee-on-professional- conduct-and-ethics.pdf.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 135

3. Decreased effectiveness of the entire health team.

Peers, nurses, allied health professionals, and other

members of the health care team may be intimidated and

anxious, causing a loss of their clinical focus and

productivity and thereby increasing the propensity for

medical errors.

4. Decrease in effective communications among the

health care team.46

The Report went on to note that disruptive behavior in

doctors is frequently the result of underlying pathology such as:

“(1) addiction (2) stress (3) psychiatric disorders (e.g., bipolar

disorder) or (4) personality disorders (e.g., narcissism).”47

Personality disorders seem to be the cause of most referrals for

disruptive behavior which may be treated, without or concurrent

with punitive action.48

D. Response by the States

States have also taken steps to curb unprofessional medical

conduct. For instance, New York lists a number of ways that

individuals can engage in professional misconduct under its

public health law including “willfully harassing, abusing, or

intimidating a patient either physically or verbally.”49 The

Texas Medical Association deems a health care professional who

engages in conduct that leads to a breakdown in safety measures

or acts in an intimidating manner towards a member of the

medical staff to be engaged in disruptive behavior.50

Pennsylvania enacted the Peer Review Protection Act which

provides that one offering information to any review

organization shall be granted immunity unless the information

is not related to the functions of the review entity or if the

46. Id. at 5–6.

47. Id. at 6.

48. Id.

49. N.Y. Educ. § 6530(31) (McKinney 2008).

50. Crystal Conde, Joint Commission Tries to Regulate Physicians’ Behavior, TEX. MED. (Dec. 2009), https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id =8189.

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136 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

materials provided are false and the individual knew or had

reason to think the material was false.51

Failure of the facility to implement remedial measure to

deal with disruptive physicians can result in expensive

litigation. This is evidenced by a number of costly

discrimination/harassment lawsuits against health care

facilities as the result of the disruptive physician.52 For

instance, Chopourian v. Mercy General Hospital involved a

federal matter in which the jury awarded $168 million to a forty-

five-year-old physician’s assistant who claimed that she was

tormented and harassed by the surgeons and medical staff.53

The plaintiff testified that one harasser informed her, “you’ll

give in to me” and a surgeon told her that “I’m horny” and

slapped her buttocks.54 A “bullying surgeon” stuck her with a

needle and another called her a “stupid chick” in the operating

room.55

V. Peer Review Immunity

Interacting with disruptive physicians can be a time-

consuming and emotionally exhausting endeavor for both

management and the organization. Nevertheless, health care

leaders have a duty to investigate and stop unprofessional

conduct in the workplace.56 This requires the implementation of

an organized approach such as educating the staff as to what

constitutes improper behavior and to clearly identify the

penalties for engaging in such conduct.57 For example, a code of

conduct or bylaws should be created which applies to all

members of the health care team. These directives should define

what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behavior in

51. 63 PA. STAT. and CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3(a) (West 2019).

52. Alice Gosfield, 2013 Health Law Handbook, Section 11:2. Scope of the Problem, at *4.

53. Eugene Lee, Largest Sexual Harassment Verdict in History - $168 Million, CAL. LAB. & EMP. L., https://calaborlaw.com/largest-sexual- harassment-verdict-in-history-168-million/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). See also Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. CIV S–09–2972, 2012 WL 1551728 (E.D. Cal. 2012).

54. Lee, supra note 53.

55. Gosfield, supra note 52, at *4.

56. Fibuch & Robertson, supra note 8.

57. Id.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 137

clear and precise language and contain a well-defined due

process clause with an appeal process. In turn, each physician

should be asked to read and sign the document indicating an

understanding of the rules.58

A number of hospitals publish these rules under the

category of “professionalism,” and mandate that physicians

exhibit a minimum level of acceptable behavior towards co-

workers and patients. Any violation of the rules may act as

support for starting disciplinary action to address the conduct.59

While differences in language and procedures among health care

facilities is expected, common elements, include: Clearly

explained behaviors that are expected; The repercussions for

deviation from these behaviors should be explained in detail;

Penalties should be staggered according to the severity of the

incident; Those who commit repeat violations will be treated

more harshly; and Every incident must be reported and

documented.60

This plan of action helps foster a positive atmosphere within

the organization and members of the team are put on notice as

to what is expected of them in the workplace.61

Discipline against a disruptive physician, however, can

result in retaliation by the offender, especially if the doctor’s

hospital privileges are suspended.62 A key event in this regard

occurred in 1988 when the United States Supreme Court decided

Patrick v. Burget.63 This matter involved whether Oregon law

protected physicians against federal antitrust liability as the

result of their serving on a peer-review committee.64 The facts

reveal that the plaintiff declined an invitation by the defendants

to join their surgical practice.65 Instead, the plaintiff opened his

own clinic but experienced problems in his dealings with the

defendants.66 The dispute escalated into a peer-review

proceeding to terminate the plaintiff’s hospital privileges at the

58. Id.

59. Santin & Kaups, supra note 17, at 3.

60. Id.

61. Fibuch & Robertson, supra note 8.

62. See Hein-Muniz v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 2d 729 (D.S.C. 2012).

63. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).

64. Id. at 95–96.

65. Id. at 96.

66. Id.

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138 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

city’s only hospital on the ground that his care of patients was

below the hospital’s standards.67

The plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of the

Sherman Act by the defendant’s charges and by their

participating in the peer-review proceeding in order to reduce

competition from the plaintiff rather than to improve patient

care.68 The Supreme Court ruled that the state’s law failed to

shield the defendants from liability for their activities on the

hospital peer-review committee.69 This ruling prompted

Congress to enact the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of

1986.70 The legislature found that the threat of money damages

under Federal law unreasonably dissuaded doctors from serving

on professional peer review committees. Therefore, there is a

national overriding interest to protect physicians who serve in

this capacity.71

This statute offers immunity under Federal and State laws

to those on a peer review body who act in the reasonable belief

that their action was in the furtherance of quality health care,

and they act after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts even

though their actions adversely impact the clinical privileges or

professional society membership of a physician.72 This statute

sets forth the specific requirements and standards for immunity

and applies to disruptive physician cases.73 Only a good faith

review qualifies for immunity, so whether the standards are

followed by the peer review committee is very important to the

final disposition of most disruptive physician cases and is the

subject of much litigation.74

It must be noted, however, that the Act only grants

immunity to “professional review actions.”75 This is defined as

an action or recommendation by the professional review body

which is done during a review activity, that is premised on the

competence or professional actions of a doctor, and which may

67. Id. at 97.

68. Id. at 97–98.

69. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.

70. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2019).

71. Id.

72. Id.

73. Erwin, supra note 5, at 281–80.

74. Id. at 280.

75. Gosfield, supra note 52, at *1.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 139

adversely affect the clinical privileges of the physician.76

VI. Court Action

Being labeled a disruptive physician, especially if sanctions

are imposed, can have serious professional implications

including the loss of one’s hospital privileges. In fact, it can have

career ending repercussions. State and federal agencies can also

discipline a physician who is labeled disruptive if the offending

conduct is determined to influence the quality of patient care or

if it implies moral, ethical, or unprofessional deficiencies.77

Unhappy patients can register a complaint with the health plan

or managed health care firm triggering an investigation that can

cause the loss of a physician’s affiliation with the plan or

hospital. Intimating and unprofessional conduct can also be

reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank, thereby

resulting in other investigations and charges against the

physician who seeks a hospital affiliation or credentialing.78

This data bank79 maintains a listing of actions taken by

authorized organizations regarding health care practitioners,

entities, providers, and suppliers who do not meet professional

standards. These adverse reports are permanently kept unless

modified or removed by the entity that submitted them.80 In

turn, the information can be used in rendering decisions dealing

with licensure, employment, contracting, membership or clinical

privileges, or when conducting investigations. Under the

appropriate circumstances, the information may even be

obtained by plaintiff’s counsel.81 Therefore, it is not surprising

that litigation involving being labeled a disruptive physician is

76. Standards for Professional Review Actions, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2019).

77. Wᴇɪꜱꜱ, Zᴀʀᴇᴛᴛᴛ, Bʀᴏꜰᴍᴀɴ, Sᴏɴɴɪᴇɴᴋʟᴀʀ, & Lᴇᴠʏ, P.C., How the Title of Disruptive Physician Can Ruin Your Career and How to Avoid It, Firm News & Legal Alerts (Aug. 1, 2010), https://weisszarett.com/lawyer/2010/08/01 /Healthcare-Law/How-the-Title-of-%E2%80%9CDisruptive-Physician %E2%80%9D-Can-Ruin-Your-Career-and-How-to-Avoid-It_bl31980.htm.

78. Id.

79. What You Must Report to the NPDB, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴᴇʀ Dᴀᴛᴀ Bᴀꜱᴇ, https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/hcorg/whatYouMustReportToTheDataBank.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).

80. Id.

81. Id.

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140 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

common.82

A Westlaw search of the phrase “disruptive physician”

references 1,566 federal and state cases.83 Not all of the cases,

however, are relevant. For instances, some deal with whether a

physician’s disruptive conduct constitutes a mental condition,84

or whether a fee shifting provision of a hospital contract is in

violation of public policy. Relevant cases deal with such issues

as the removal of sanctions or the recovery of money for lost

income, restraint of trade, or emotional harm.85 Overall, the

applicable cases involve the failure of the health care provider to

follow process, discrimination claims, retaliation, or intent to

harm cases.86

An analysis shows that the courts do not care about actual

quality issues, and they will usually not question the opinion of

the hospital’s management team or the peer review committee.87

In fact, the courts tend to favor the medical organization88 on the

basis of the granting of immunity under the Health Care Quality

Improvement Act, affording deference when hospitals adhere to

their bylaws or rules, or finding that disruptive behavior by itself

is a proper justification to sanction a physician.89 This bias in

82. Most disruptive physician cases are resolved without court intervention. Rosenstein, supra note 26, at 46.

83. This Westlaw search was conducted on Oct. 9, 2019.

84. See Neravetla v. Dep’t of Health, 394 P.3d 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).

85. See Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212 (Del. 2013).

86. Rosenstein, supra note 26, at 49.

87. See Ross Zbar et. al., The Disruptive Physician: Righteous Maverick or Dangerous Pariah?, 124 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 409 (2009).

88. Id.

89. Erwin, supra note 5, at 281. See Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971). As noted:

No court should substitute its evaluation of such matters for that of the Hospital Board. It is the Board, not the court, which is charged with the responsibility of providing a competent staff of doctors. The Board has chosen to rely on the advice of its Medical Staff, and the court cannot surrogate for the Staff in executing this responsibility. Human lives are at stake, and the governing board must be given discretion in its selection so that it can have confidence in the competence and moral commitment of its staff. The evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance. The court is charged with the narrow

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 141

favor of a hospital is partially based upon the court’s reluctance

to interfere with a hospital’s decision to revoke, suspend,

restrict, or to refuse to renew the clinical privileges of a medical

staff member. Court review is usually limited to making sure

that there is substantial adherence with the facility’s bylaws

concerning such a decision, and to ensuring that the bylaws

provide rudimentary notice, a fair procedure, and an impartial

tribunal.90 This analysis is buttressed by the AMA, which notes

that most lawsuits attacking a peer review proceeding should be

dismissed at the summary motion phase. The litigation should

only proceed when the physician has rebutted the presumption

that the peer review process was reasonable and fair.91

The following is a representation of some of the cases under

various categories.

A. Immunity under the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act

(HCQIA)

Courts started finding health care facilities responsible for

the inappropriate conduct of their medical staff under a

corporate negligence theory for hiring and supervision in the

mid-1960’s. The basis for this liability is that patients depend

upon the hospital to guarantee the quality of care afforded at its

responsibility of assuring that the qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably related to the operation of the hospital and fairly administered. In short, so long as staff selections are administered with fairness, geared by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court should not interfere.

Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177.

90. Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 755 (W. Va. 1991). See also Shulman v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.D.C. 1963); Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 175 (Alaska 1982); Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dir., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1254–56 (Conn. 1989); Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 544 N.E.2d 733, 737–41 (Ill. 1989); Pepple v. Parkview Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., 536 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind. 1989); Porter Mem‘l Hosp. v. Malak, 484 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. Willman v. St. Joseph Hosp., 684 S.W.2d 408, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gotsis v. Lorain Cmty. Hosp., 345 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193–94, 1196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), appeal denied (Pa. Oct. 1, 1980).

91. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at *3.

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facility.92 To succeed on such a claim, however, the plaintiff

must prove that the hospital knew or should have known of the

doctor’s negligent conduct.93

This potential liability has motivated a number of state

legislatures to enact peer review laws.94 A peer review is the

way by which healthcare management examines the quality of

medical treatment provided by physicians under their charge.

This undertaking has been approved by different states who

have enacted statutes to protect the privacy of the materials

created during the peer review process.95 Likewise, Congress

appreciated the need for effective peer review, as well as a

procedure to encourage doctors to participate.96 This lead to the

enactment of the Immunity under the Healthcare Quality

Improvement Act of 1986 (IHQIA) in which Congress bestowed

qualified immunity from liability for peer review participation to

doctors and dentists as well as establishing a national

practitioner data bank to keep track of inept, incompetent, or

unprofessional physicians. The legislation also established

procedural rules for due process, privilege restrictions, and

reporting requirements.97

HCQIA has generated much litigation by disgruntled

physicians who wish to sue the peer review committee that

disciplined them as well as the whistleblowers who reported the

disruptive physician. The seminal case is Meyers v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation,98 and this opinion is

frequently referenced in many subsequent decisions.99 The facts

reveal that Dr. Meyers filed a lawsuit because he was denied

92. Peters, supra note 30, at 8.

93. Id.

94. Id.

95. David Freedman, The Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, RELIAS MEDIA (May 1, 1999), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/41639-the- health-care-quality-improvement-act-of-1986.

96. Id.

97. Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, AM. J. L. & MED. 453, 455 (1990).

98. Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2003).

99. Mark W. Leach, Dealing With Disruptive Physicians: The Myers Cases and Their Progeny, 9 AM. HEALTH. L. ASS’N. 1, 1 (Oct. 2010), (http:// www.postschell.com/site/files/medstaffnews_oct10.pdf). According to Westlaw, the Myers decision has been referenced in 419 other decisions.

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2019 DISRUPTIVE PHYSICIAN? 143

reappointment to the hospital’s medical staff over concerns

about his disruptive conduct.100 A hospital committee

determined that the physician displayed repeated temper

tantrums, he refused to limit elective cases to the time period

assigned, he attempted to interfere with the right of an

attending physician to refer a patient to the surgeon of his

choice, he was condescending towards women, he refused to

speak to members of the surgical team during a procedure, and

he demonstrated several instances of throwing a scalpel during

an operation.101 The committee believed that this conduct could

adversely affect the quality of patient care and so informed the

doctor. Dr. Meyers requested a hearing and the board appointed

a peer review committee consisting of a retired appeals judge, an

attorney, a bank president, an industrialist, and dentist even

though the bylaws noted that three people from the medical staff

should be on the committee when “feasible.”102 The committee

met on eleven occasions and voted not to appoint Dr. Meyers to

the staff.

This prompted the physician to file a lawsuit in state court

seeking an injunction forcing the hospital to reappoint him. The

court refused to reinstate his privileges so the doctor filed a

different lawsuit in federal court for violating the federal

antitrust laws and breach of the covenant of good faith.103 In

ruling in favor of the hospital, the court noted that HCQIA was

enacted to allow for effective peer review, motoring of

incompetent physicians, and to offer qualified immunity from

damages for those who participate in peer review duties.104 This

immunity will be granted as long as the review is performed in

the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of

quality health care; after a reasonable effort to learn the facts is

undertaken; the physician is given adequate notice and hearing

procedures; and in the reasonable belief that the action was

needed after a reasonable investigation.105 Compliance with

these requirements provides a rebuttable presumption of

immunity, thereby forcing the physician to prove that the

100. Meyers, 341 F.3d at 463.

101. Id. at 464–65.

102. Id. at 465.

103. Id. at 466.

104. Id. at 467.

105. Id.

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hospital did not comply with the standards.106 In this matter,

the court determined that the doctor received adequate notice of

the hearing, and the committee only had to consist of hospital

staff when “feasible.” It was not possible to appoint staff

members to the committee in this case because they were

working too many hours and could not devote the time to a

hearing.107

Isaiah v. WHMS Braddock Hospital Corp. involved a

determination by the hospital to suspend the plaintiff’s hospital

privileges.108 The surgeon was granted conditional privileges

upon his completion of a proctoring program. This remedial

action was recommended in view of several “red flags” that the

Chair of the Department of Surgery saw in the records dealing

with the plaintiff’s length of operations, surgical judgment,

decision making, ability to identify anatomy, and case

selection.109 Following an investigation, the plaintiff’s hospital

privileges were summarily suspended based upon the hospital’s

bylaws that allowed precautionary suspensions when “the

activities or professional conduct of any Medical Staff Appointee

are considered to be a departure from the standard of the

Medical Staff or the Hospital.”110

The Medical Events Subcommittee then convened, met with

the plaintiff, and discussed the precautionary suspension. The

end result was that the Subcommittee reached the conclusion

“that [Dr. Isaiah’s] surgical competence and clinical decision-

making is below the standards of the hospital.”111 The Medical

Executive Committee and Board of Trustees also concluded that

all privileges should be revoked. The surgeon was then afforded

a full hearing at which time the original decision was upheld and

the National Practitioner’s Data Bank was notified of the

action.112

The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit on a number of grounds

including defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious inference

106. Meyers, 341 F.3d at 467–68.

107. Id. at 470.

108. Isaiah v. WHMS Braddock Hosp. Corp., No. JFM 07-2197, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57850 at *1 (D. Md. July 25, 2008).

109. Id.

110. Id. at *8.

111. Id. at *12.

112. Id. at *19.

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with prospective advantage.113 The defense filed a motion for

summary judgment claiming immunity under the Health Care

Quality Improvement Act. The physician countered that the

defendants were not immune because he had offered adequate

evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendants failed to act

appropriately with respect to the prongs of the immunity

analysis.114

In dismissing the claim, the court noted that the immunity

inquiry does not mandate that the court find that the surgeon

actually made a mistake, breached a standard of care, or put a

patient in danger. Rather, all that is mandated is a

determination that the hospital possessed a reasonable

belief that the action taken would advance the objective of

quality health care. Thus, an incorrect but reasonable

determination would still be afforded immunity.115

Sherr v. Healtheast Care System offers another example of

how far the courts will go to protect peer review committees.116

Sherr was a neurosurgeon who had hospital privileges at two

related institutions. He filed a lawsuit against the hospitals

claiming that their in-house neurosurgeons sought his ouster as

a competitor by defaming his medical skills and arranging a

sham peer review process that caused his summary

suspension.117 The facts show that the defendants have a Spine

Council that reviews spinal care matters, and they hold monthly

meetings to talk about problem cases. One of the hospital’s

physicians referred patients to neurosurgeons who were not part

of the in-house team, including the plaintiff. This practice

resulted in the referring physician being berated especially

when he referred matters to the plaintiff who they labeled “a

hack,” “not a good surgeon,” and an “asshole.”118

Contemporaneously, one of the hospital’s operating room

staff, an infection prevention specialist, expressed concern about

the plaintiff’s increased infection rates, blood loss, and redo

procedures. A red flag was also raised by a Spine Quality Report

discussing Dr. Sherr’s increased rate of infection following fusion

113. Id. at *20.

114. Isaiah, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57850, at *20–21.

115. Id. at *49–50.

116. Sherr v. Health East Care Sys., 262 F. Supp.3d 869 (D. Minn. 2017).

117. Id. at *1–2.

118. Id. at *8.

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surgery.119 This caused one of the in-house neurosurgeons to

contact the head of surgery about the issue. The plaintiff was

then notified that a peer review would be undertaken at which

time the in-house neurosurgeon provided the committee with a

summary of the data from the Spine Quality Report which

showed that Dr. Sherr’s infection rate was more than double

that of the other surgeons.120 The Committee immediately

issued a summary suspension of Dr. Sherr’s privileges out of

concern for patient safety. The Medical Executive Committee

then meet to discuss the suspension, and Dr. Sherr objected to

the inclusion of the in-house neurosurgeon’s presence on the

Executive Committee based upon her status as a competitor.

After deliberating, the Committee upheld the suspension. A

hearing was subsequently held at the request of the plaintiff

before the Judicial Review Committee and the suspension was

overturned.121 Nevertheless, Dr. Sherr did not seek

reinstatement and moved to Florida where he entered into an

employment agreement with another practice.122

Dr. Sherr filed a lawsuit, and the defendants argued that

their peer review activities were immune under state and

federal law.123 The court noted that immunity applies unless the

peer review process is motivated by malice towards the subject

of the review. Dr. Sherr argued that the peer review process was

started by the in-house neurosurgeon who was a competitor and

had a direct economic stake in the outcome.124 The court

dismissed this argument and stated that both state and federal

peer review statutes “contain no provision barring competitors

from participating in professional review activities.”125 Because

the plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable

juror could determine that the peer review process was

motivated by malice, the committee was immune from a

lawsuit.126 Interestingly, the court noted that a reviewer’s

119. Id. at *9.

120. Id. at *9–10.

121. Id. at *20–21.

122. Sherr, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 878.

123. Id. at *23.

124. Id. at *24.

125. Id. at *27–28.

126. Id. at *32.

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subjective bias or bad faith is not relevant.127

The opposite result was reached in Islami v. Covenant

Medical Center, Inc., where the court ruled against a hospital

because it did not believe the defendant was entitled to summary

judgment on the basis of HCQIA immunity.128 The defendant

failed to provide the physician with notice and hearing

procedures as outlined in the bylaws and under the terms of the

statute.129

B. Reliance upon Bylaws and Procedures

The majority of courts hold that medical staff bylaws are

enforceable contracts between the hospital and physician.130

These rules generally explain who can trigger an investigation

or request remedial action. If such an investigation uncovers

a doctor with shortcomings, restrictive measures may be levied

to bring about improvement in the offending conduct, including

the suspension of a physician’s hospital privileges.131

The courts are disposed to rule in favor of hospitals against

lawsuits by disruptive physicians if the peer review committee

adheres to the process set forth in the bylaws or the rules and

127. Id. at *33.

128. Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 822 F. Supp. 1361 (N. D. Iowa 1992).

129. Id. at 1377. In Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital 2010 ONCA 13 (2007), aff’g O.J. 44856; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, S.C.C.A. No. 89 (2010), a court in Ontario, Canada awarded an alleged disruptive physician whose hospital privileges had been revoked in bad faith over $3 million. The court found that the hospital had revoked his privileges because the doctor did not “fit in.” Shantona Chaudhury, Disruptive Physician Behavior and Hospital Liability in Tort: Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital, PAPE CHAUDHURY (March 2011), https://papechaudhury.com/ disruptive-physician-behaviour-and-hospital-liability-in-tort-rosenhek-v- windsor-regional-hospital/.

130. See Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. 1991); Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1987); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D.Pa.1986); Terre Haute Regional Hosp. v. El–Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371 (Ind. App. 1984); Anne Arundel General Hosp. v. O’Brien, 432 A.2d 483 (1981); St. John’s Hosp. Med. Staff v. St. John Regional Med. Center, N.W.2d 472, 474– 75 (1976); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass’n, A.2d 18 (1958). For examples of courts who have found that bylaws do not constitute a contract, see Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360 (1985); Todd v. Physicians & Surgeons Comm. Hosp., S.E.2d 378 (1983); Stein v. Tri–City Hosp. Authority, 384 S.E.2d 430 (1989); see also 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 16 (1991).

131. See Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., 346 P.3d 1136 (N.M. 2015).

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148 PACE LAW REVIEW 40.1

procedures.132 In fact, the immunity granted by the Health Care

Quality Improvement Act is not dependent upon strict

compliance with a hospital’s bylaws, although the statute does

include a “safe harbor” provision.133 If the procedure used by a

hospital to handle a dispute varies from the letter of its bylaws,

the facility will still satisfy the immunity requirements if it is

“fair to the physician under the circumstances.”134

Leach v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2135 involved

a physician who was summarily suspended after continued

disruptive behavior.136 In turn, the plaintiff asked the Medical

Executive Committee to lift his summary suspension. The chief

of staff replied that the bylaws failed to contain a review process

once a suspension had been upheld by the Board of Directors.

Dr. Leach, however, was informed that the hospital had a long-

standing policy that mandated a one-year moratorium before a

physician could reapply for staff membership.137 While the

bylaws did not mandate such a moratorium, the hospital’s

handbook recommended reapplication after a minimum of one

year. This prompted the suspended physician to file the instant

lawsuit claiming that his due process rights were violated.138

The Court determined that the hospital reasonably adhered

to its rules, so the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. While the

hospital’s bylaws offered no guidance for reapplication after a

summary suspension, the Committee Handbook recommended a

one-year moratorium. It was noted that the hospital has an

obligation to protect patients and to guarantee their competent

treatment.139 Therefore, the measures used by the hospital were

reasonable. As for the argument that the hospital’s rules and

regulations were inadequate to protect the doctor’s

constitutional rights, Dr. Leach’s interest in his medical

privileges were protected because he could have practiced at

another hospital. There was also no evidence that the Executive

132. Erwin, supra note 5.

133. Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F. App’x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003).

134. Id. at 46.

135. Leach v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 870 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989).

136. Id. at 301.

137. Id. at 302.

138. Id.

139. Id.

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Committee failed to provide him with the necessary safeguards

to protect his interests at the hearing.140 Lastly, the hospital has

an obligation to offer quality medical care to its patients. If a

doctor is disruptive or has personal issues, the heath care facility

has an obligation to step in. The suspension was necessary in

this case, so the procedural safeguards to guarantee that the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights were protected were adequate.141

On the other hand, the need to follow the bylaws is not

always required. In Taylor v. Kennestone Hospital, Inc.,142 an

anesthesiologist was accused of sexually harassing a nurse.

During an investigation, it was learned that the physician

demonstrated harassing conduct toward others, such as

inappropriate gestures and remarks, offensive touching, and

lewd suggestions. Several staff members even said that they

were afraid to work when the doctor was on duty.143 The plaintiff

was confronted with these allegations, and he admitted to a

sexual harassment problem. Faced with possible disciplinary

action, the doctor gave up his staff privileges, and sought

treatment with a psychiatrist.144 The hospital continued its

investigation and uncovered even more instances of

inappropriate conduct. An accommodation was worked out

where the doctor could see patients at the hospital so long as he

adhered to the guidelines created by his psychiatrist. The doctor

was warned, however, that any other inappropriate conduct, or

his failure to adhere with his psychiatrist’s treatment plan,

could result in “suspension, termination or restriction of his

clinical privileges.”145 Subsequently, the physician applied for

reinstatement, but it was determined that he had not complied

with the plan established by the psychiatrist. His application

was denied, and the plaintiff requested a hearing. The hearing

panel recommended that the physician be reappointed to the

medical staff for three months upon proof from the psychiatrist

certifying compliance with the plan.146 The Board of Trustees,

however, rejected this recommendation and denied Taylor’s

140. Id. at 303.

141. Leach, 870 F.2d at 303.

142. Taylor v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 596 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).

143. Id. at 181.

144. Id. at 182.

145. Id.

146. Id.

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application for reappointment.

A lawsuit was filed, and the doctor maintained that he did

not receive proper notice of the various proceedings which

violated the defendant’s bylaws. The Court granted the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon the

immunity provided by HCQIA. It noted that the statute did not

require that hearing procedures satisfy a hospital’s bylaws in

order for immunity to apply. Rather, the statute merely requires

that the procedures of the hearing be adequate and fair under

the circumstances.147

C. Disruptive Conduct as Justification for Suspension

A medical facility has the obligation to make sure that

physicians appointed to its staff satisfy particular requirements

of professional competence and conduct, so long as there is a

sufficient connection between those standards and

the hospital’s duty of offering quality patient care.148 This

standard of care has led a number of courts to determine that

disruptive conduct by itself is proper justification for a health

care facility’s determination to suspend or terminate a

physician’s staff privileges.149 As noted in Mahmoodian v.

United Hospital Center, Inc., disruptive behavior is a legitimate

concern to a hospital in formulating medical staffing decisions.

Nearly all courts examining the problem have, therefore,

concluded that a hospital may adopt and enforce bylaws

providing for the suspension or revocation of clinical privileges

of the offending doctor, solely when such conduct may have an

adverse impact upon the patient’s quality of care.150 This

determination will be based upon an objective test which focuses

on the totality of the circumstances,151 but the test does not

mandate that the peer review decision be correct or that the

determination actually improves the quality of care.152

147. Id. at 185.

148. Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 759 (W. Va. 1991).

149. Erwin, supra note 5, at 277–78.

150. Mahmoodian, 404 S.E. 2d at 760.

151. Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1994).

152. Id.

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The caveat that the imposition of sanctions must relate to

the patient’s quality of care is important to keep in mind. This

is demonstrated by Clark v. Columbia/HCA Information

Services where the court refused to grant immunity to a hospital

who had revoked the privileges of a psychiatrist because their

determination was not in furtherance of quality health care.153

Clark, a child psychiatrist, enjoyed hospital privileges at West

Will Hospital. This facility alleged that the plaintiff was

engaging in “activities or professional conduct which are

disruptive to Hospital operations” so they conducted a peer

review.154 The board determined that Clark had engaged in

disruptive conduct that harmed the quality of health care so he

was suspended. The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the

hospital claiming that the hospital “conspired to commit illegal

conduct, divert patients away from him, and improperly

terminated his staff privilege.”155 He also asserted that his

privileges were ended because he reported violations of medical

standards, an action that is protected as a matter of public

policy.156

The Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed because the

plaintiff had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

revocation of his hospital privileges was not premised upon a

reasonable belief that it was in furtherance of quality health

care. The Court determined that his suspension related

exclusively to the plaintiff’s reports and letters to outside doctors

and regulatory agencies, complaining about the care and

procedures the defendant used in its child psychiatric practice,

the scheduling of doctors, and in-patient insurance policies.157

The doctor’s actions constituted protected whistleblowing

conduct which cannot be reasonably classified as limiting

incompetent actions or protecting patients.158

Another challenge facing the alleged disruptive physician

who fights disciplinary action is the awarding of attorney’s fees

to the hospital; Sternberg v. Naticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc.

153. Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Servs. Inc., 25 P.3d 215 (Nev. 2001).

154. Id. at 218.

155. Id. at 219.

156. Id. at 220–21.

157. Id. at 222–23.

158. Id. at 223.

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provides an example.159 The plaintiff sued the hospital due to

the precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges. The facts

demonstrated that the physician was critical of the hospital’s

practices and was often vocal about quality of care issues. The

way that he articulated his opinions and dealing with the staff,

however, was disruptive and put patients at risk.160 The

plaintiff did not succeed on his challenge to overturn the

suspension and he was presented with a $412,928 bill for legal

services incurred by the hospital in defense of the lawsuit. The

hospital’s bylaws provided that if “an individual institutes legal

action and does not prevail, he or she will reimburse the Hospital

and any member of the Medical Staff named in the action for all

costs incurred in defending such legal action, including

reasonable attorney’s fees.”161 Sternberg asserted that the

legislature found that an award of attorney’s fees should be

restricted in HCQIA immunity cases to those that are frivolous,

unreasonable, without foundation, or instituted in bad faith.162

The court disagreed and found that the counsel fee provision

contained in the bylaws applied and was not against public

policy.163

VII. Conclusion

A disruptive physician can cause havoc in the work place

and compromise patient safety. While the issue was once swept

under the rug, this is no longer the case. Troublesome conduct

is now an area of primary concern among health care providers,

and it is often discussed in the hospital’s bylaws or rules and

regulations. Offending physicians can face prompt suspension

or revocation of their hospital privileges, a decision that has

lasting implications.

State and federal legislatures have recognized the need to

protect peer review committees so they have been granted

qualified immunity for their actions. In turn, court review of

physician discipline is very limited and the judiciary tends to

favor the medical organization as long as the basic tenants of

159. Sternberg v. Naticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d. 1212 (Del. 2013).

160. Id.

161. Id. at 1216.

162. Id.

163. Id. at 1221.

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due process have been followed.

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