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Andrew Hoffman

WeWork: Oil Money and the Challenge of Achieving Carbon Neutrality

Published by WDI Publishing, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.

© 2019 Daniel Partin, Maggie Steele, Cameron Stitt and Arlene Tjoarman. This case was written by University of Michigan graduate students Daniel Partin, Maggie Steele, Cameron Stitt and Arlene Tjoarman, under the supervision of Andrew Hoffman, Holcim (US) Professor of Sustainable Enterprise, a position that holds joint appointments at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business and School of Environment and Sustainability. The case was prepared as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a situation. The case should not be considered criticism or endorsement and should not be used as a source of primary data. The opening situation of this case is a dramatization created for the purpose of class discussion and engagement.

Linda Cook,i WeWork’s newly-appointed chief communications offcer, read through her draft response again as she had seemingly done a dozen times in the last hour. It was mid-October 2018 and Cook had been on the job for only a little over a year, but already she was facing a major challenge that would test her ability as a public relations professional and challenge her expertise as a businesswoman. It was Cook’s responsibility to respond to a request for comment on a New York Times article highlighting WeWork’s fnancial ties to Saudi Arabia.

The timing of the article was no accident. Senior leaders within Saudi Arabia had just been implicated in the brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey.1 That gruesome killing and its connection to the Saudi government brought considerable attention to virtually any company doing business in or with Saudi Arabia, and WeWork was no exception. How Cook chose to respond posed many potential pitfalls. How could a company that prided itself on being progressive and sustainability-minded, publicly committed to carbon neutrality by 2023, and banned serving meat to its employees,2,3 justify its considerable funding from Saudi Arabia, a country with a history of human rights violations and continued proliferation of fossil fuels? The funding that WeWork received from Saudi Arabia was indirect, through the Japan-based SoftBank Vision Fund, but it was easy enough for anyone interested to connect the dots.

Cook glanced out her New York offce window and wondered if and how she could justify her company’s willingness to receive such funding. Should a company be held responsible for the actions of its investors or did a duty to shareholders trump such ethical questions? In January 2018, BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink announced that the $6.3 trillion investment frm would begin considering a company’s impact on the environment and society when making its investments,4 but realistically, could companies reject investors that they perceived as misaligned with their values? Cook refocused on her response to the New York Times. How she responded could make WeWork look hypocritical or worse. It could also seriously strain her

i Linda Cook is a fctional character.

case W60C89 April 10, 2019

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company’s relationship with SoftBank, which was considering another $15-20 billion investment that would expand its 20% stake to a majority share of WeWork.5 Cook knew she had to be careful in her response, but in this situation what did “careful” mean?

Background on WeWork

WeWork was founded in 2010 in New York’s SoHo district by Adam Neumann and Miguel McKelvey to provide workspaces for small businesses and entrepreneurs. Unlike other commercial leasing companies, WeWork would take an entire foor or two of an offce building, divide the foor into smaller spaces and charge a monthly membership to those who didn’t mind sharing the space. By providing assets such as on-site staff, stocked kitchens, cleaning services, printers, and other offce amenities, WeWork effectively offered offce space as a service.6,7,8 WeWork also prided itself on creating and maintaining a culture that fostered “community.” WeWork’s strategy proved effective and by 2018 it had 268,000 members occupying 287 locations in 96 cities and 32 countries.9 With the company’s intense focus on growth, those numbers were only increasing.

By mid-2018, WeWork had started to diversify into other businesses. WeLive followed a similar structure to WeWork, but for temporary apartment space.10 WeGrow was a private elementary school that encouraged entrepreneurship at a young age. Business lessons were provided by WeWork employees and clients. Rise by We was WeWork’s wellness club and superspa that offered unlimited access to boutique ftness classes to encourage social wellness. In 2017, WeWork acquired Meetup, a service to organize groups of people with similar interests to meet in person. Also in 2017, WeWork acquired Flatiron School, a coding academy that offered online and offine coding courses. WeMRKT was launched in 2018 and offered shelf space to WeWork member companies to sell their products in brick-and-mortar locations for a low fee.11 Such expansion beyond corporate real estate refected WeWork’s desire to be as much a lifestyle as an offce space company.

Company Values

Going Meatless

In July 2018, co-founder and chief culture offcer McKelvey announced a new company policy: WeWork would no longer serve or reimburse for meat at company functions.12 The executive decision was driven predominantly by environmental concerns, but also with an eye for animal welfare. In a memo to employees, McKelvey wrote: “New research indicates that avoiding meat is one of the biggest things an individual can do to reduce their personal environmental impact— even more than switching to a hybrid car.” This move toward vegetarianism was not far from the co-founders’ mission for people to create more awareness and a mindfulness perspective. As a private company, WeWork had the right to impose such a rule, especially since free meals at work were a company perk and not required by law.

While this was considered a bold move, WeWork was not the frst company to encourage going meatless. Google tried to have “Meatless Mondays,” but employees rebelled. Even so, more and more companies were joining a broader trend of imposing corporate values on the lives of their employees. Some argued that WeWork’s policy went beyond encouraging awareness and essentially forced its nearly 6,000 employees to become vegetarians, at least at work. The company’s policy also attracted considerable media attention, both positive and negative, regarding environmental efforts and restrictions on personal choice.

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WeWork Commits to Carbon Neutrality

WeWork’s meat-free initiative was part of a larger, more ambitious effort by the company to achieve carbon neutrality by 2023. On September 13, 2018, at the same time WeWork was negotiating a possible third round of funding that would give SoftBank a majority share,13 the company announced its commitment to carbon neutrality at the Global Climate Action Summit in San Francisco. WeWork’s approach to sustainability focused on its impact in the cities and communities in which it operated, as well as on its members, through what it described as three key pillars: energy, materials, and health. In summing up its commitment, WeWork stated: “At WeWork, we believe culture is an output of action and intent. Whether through our commitment to being a meat-free organization, phasing out our use of disposable plastics and leather furniture, or pledging to be carbon-neutral by 2023, being responsible global citizens is a critical pillar of our culture as a company and a community.”14

Company Financing

The quick expansion of WeWork was the result of 14 rounds of funding, totaling $12.1 billion through November 2018.15 At least $8.4 billion came from SoftBank’s Vision Fund, with $4.4 billion in August 201716

and another $3 billion in November 2018. This latter round of funding valued WeWork at $45 billion.17 Other early investors in WeWork included Goldman Sachs, T. Rowe Price, Wellington Management, Glade Brook Capital Partners, Hony Capital, and Legend Holdings, but with their combined investment at less than $1.5 billion, their stake was dwarfed by SoftBank’s dominating 20%.18 At the time of Cook’s decision in mid- October 2018, SoftBank was reportedly considering an additional $15-$20 billion investment that would give the Japan-based investment frm a majority share in WeWork.19

An immensely capital-intensive company, WeWork used the funding primarily to rapidly expand its real estate footprint. Because of its focus on growth and asset acquisition, WeWork was bleeding capital, making it extremely reliant on cash investments. In fact, as of October 2018, WeWork had yet to turn a proft. In Q3 of 2018, WeWork made $482 million in revenue, up from $241 million the year prior, but lost $497 million the same quarter, meaning WeWork was losing money at a pace greater than 100% of its revenue.20 In total, WeWork’s net losses were more than $730 million in the frst half of 2018, up 369.5% from the same period in 2017.21 In August 2018, analysts at investment website Crunchbase put it this way: “WeWork’s 2017 net loss came to $934 million. It lost $732 million in the frst half of 2018. Which is worse? ... In 2017, WeWork’s full-year loss was 105.4% of its revenue of $886 million. In the frst half of 2018, the company’s revenue result of $763.6 million was 105.6% of its net loss.”22

The History of SoftBank and the Vision Fund

SoftBank began as a Japanese multinational telecom and internet frm. Founded in 1981 by Masayoshi Son as a small computer parts store with two employees, SoftBank grew into a multibillion-dollar holding company spanning a multitude of industries and segments.23,24 For the 2017 fscal year, SoftBank made $11.7 billion in net income on $86.2 billion in revenue across all its lines of business.25

In October 2016, Son announced the formation of Vision Fund, a venture capital investment fund targeting technology companies. SoftBank and Son contributed $28 billion in equity to the new fund. In a concerted effort to diversify Saudi Arabia’s economy away from oil, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman contributed another $45 billion through Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), thereby forming a unique alliance between bin Salman and Son. Investors, including Abu Dhabi and Apple, contributed another $27 billion in equity, giving Vision Fund $100 billion in capital and making it the largest private equity fund in the world and one of the world’s most infuential investors, especially in the technology

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industry. In comparison, in the same year Vision Fund was founded (2016), the entirety of other venture capital funds raised globally was $64 billion.26 Despite Vision Fund already dwarfng all other sources of venture capital, Bloomberg reported in October 2018 that Saudi Arabia’s PIF was preparing to invest another $45 billion in Vision Fund.27

Vision Fund and the Technology Industry

The scale of Vision Fund gave it considerable infuence in the emerging technology space. Within two years of its founding, Vision Fund had taken stakes of $9.3 billion in Uber, $5.0 billion in NVIDIA, $4.4 billion in WeWork, $2.5 billion in Flipkart, and $2.3 billion in GM Cruise, to name a few.28 Exhibit 1 shows Vision Fund’s top investments as of June 2018.

The pervasiveness of Vision Fund in the technology industry raised concerns about Saudi Arabian infuence and money. On October 12, 2018, a New York Times opinion piece titled “Silicon Valley’s Saudi Arabia Problem” highlighted the concerns about and hypocrisy of numerous United States-based startups taking considerable funding from Saudi Arabia. According to the author, Anand Giridharadas,ii many of these technology startups, WeWork included, “love to talk about ‘making the world a better place’” but take considerable funding from a leading fossil fuel producer with a dubious history of human rights abuses.29

Concern and outrage over Saudi Arabian money in the technology industry grew following the murder of the journalist Khashoggi, allegedly at the order of bin Salman himself. Despite the controversy, Son, the leader of the Vision Fund, did not comment publicly on the journalist’s slaying or Saudi Arabia’s reported involvement until November 5, 2018.30

Mr. Giridharadas is the author of Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World. ii

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Exhibit 1 Vision Fund’s Top Investments as of June 2018

Source: Molla, Rani. “Where SoftBank has invested its $100 billion Vision Fund.” Recode. 6 June 2018.https://www.recode.net/2018/2/5/16974032/this-is-where-chart- softbank-vision-fund-masayoshi-son-venture-capital. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a country in Western Asia that makes up the majority of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by the countries of Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen. The population is just below 34 million people and essentially 100% are Muslim.31 The only offcial language recognized is Arabic. The country had been ruled by an absolute monarchy under the Āl Saʿūd family since the modern-day kingdom was declared in 1932, and Islamic law, the Sharīʿah, was the primary source of legislation.32 At the time of Khashoggi’s death, Saudi Arabia’s ruler was King Salman

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bin Abdulaziz, but much of the power in the government had been consolidated by his son Mohammed bin Salman, who held the titles of deputy prime minister, chairman for the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chairman of the Council of Political and Security Affairs, minister of defense, and crown prince.33

Bin Salman had a strong relationship with the United States and was considered progressive in his country, but Saudi Arabia still differed from the Western world on many civil rights issues and was still working to diversify its economy away from oil.

Saudi Arabia’s Economy

Enormous revenues from oil exports fueled the Saudi Arabian economy. The country possessed the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, 260 billion barrels, estimated to be about 20% of the world’s total. As a result, no other country had the same ability to infuence the world oil market, and the level of production by Saudi Arabia infuenced crude oil prices around the globe.34

The economy grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s due to crude oil exports and the country quickly transitioned from an underdeveloped country to a modern state.35 Following this rapid growth, the country found itself subject to the rise and fall of oil prices, despite also having some control over them. In response, Saudi Arabia made several plans to move away from dependency on oil exports to generate GDP and jobs. Those continuing efforts manifested themselves in developments such as investing in SoftBank’s Vision Fund.

Even so, the petroleum sector accounted for 87% of budget revenues, 42% of the country’s GDP, and 90% of its export earnings. Crown Prince bin Salman announced that the country intended to publicly list shares of its state-owned oil company, Aramco, in another attempt to increase revenue and outside investment.36 However, this attempt was indefnitely called off in August 2018 due to conficts over valuations of the company and other logistical diffculties.37 In April 2016, the country announced the Saudi Vision 2030, an offcial plan to reduce the country’s dependency on oil, diversify its economy, and develop public service sectors including health, education, infrastructure, recreation, and tourism. The plan outlined projects including construction of resorts, sports stadiums, theme parks, and urban development projects. In addition, several new government entities and vision realization programs (VRPs) were established to help achieve the strategic objectives of Vision 2030. (A table of the new government entities and VRPs is shown in Appendix A.38) The government continued to make efforts to reduce oil dependency and develop other aspects of the economy for a prosperous future.

Saudi Arabia and Human Rights

Saudi Arabia’s civil policies differed widely from those of the United States. In recent years, the country had reportedly been indirectly involved in funding Islamic terrorist groups, refused to allow any independent media coverage, arrested peaceful human-rights activists and their family members, and continued to permit crucifxion, beheading, stoning, and fring squad capital punishment (in some cases for nonviolent drug crimes and pro-democracy protests), as well as carry out corporal punishments such as caning, fogging, and body mutilation.39 During Crown Prince bin Salman’s rise within the royal court, around 200 of the country’s top offcials, businesspeople, and royal family members were detained under a “corruption crackdown,” eventually leading to settlements producing more than $100 billion for the government.40

Saudi Arabia was heavily involved in a civil war in neighboring Yemen. The war began in 2015 when the Houthi rebel movement seized control of signifcant portions of the country, forcing the internationally recognized president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, to fee to neighboring Saudi Arabia. In response, Saudi Arabia, along with eight other Arab states and with backing from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, began air strikes and other actions aimed at restoring Hadi’s government. This coalition feared that

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the Houthis would give Iran a foothold in Yemen. With both sides of the Yemen confict beset by infghting, the continuous warfare produced a humanitarian crisis in the country. By 2018, 8.4 million people were at risk of starvation, and malnutrition threatened the lives of more than 400,000 children under the age of fve.41 Saudi Arabian airstrikes hit civilians and a Saudi Arabian blockade prevented shipping from reaching Yemen, thereby taking away opportunities for delivery of food and other aid. As a result, the United States began to reconsider its support for the Saudi coalition in late 2018.

Backlash Against Saudi Arabia: Khashoggi Affair

Jamal Khashoggi was a Saudi Arabian journalist, dissident, and editor-in-chief of Al-Arab News Channel. He was critical of Crown Prince bin Salman, King Salman, and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen. In June 2017, Khashoggi fed Saudi Arabia and went into self-imposed exile in the United States, as he feared retaliation from the Saudi regime for his views. In October 2018, Khashoggi entered the Saudi Arabian consulate in Turkey to get personal documentation after being unable to obtain it at the consulate in the United States. Khashoggi never left the consulate in Turkey and was murdered there by Saudi agents.42

Accounts of what happened inside the Turkish consulate differ. According to leaks from senior Turkish offcials, Khashoggi was killed and dismembered shortly after entering the consulate. The team of Saudi operatives fed the consulate quickly. Saudi Arabian offcials initially denied that Khashoggi had been killed and stated that he had left the consulate within an hour of arriving. They later changed their story and acknowledged that he had been killed within the consulate. Saudi offcials then claimed that they were merely trying to bring Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia, and that he resisted, fghting broke out, and he died after being placed in a chokehold. Since admitting its involvement, Saudi Arabia reportedly arrested 18 people involved with the case and dismissed fve senior offcials.43

A subsequent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment concluded that Crown Prince bin Salman personally ordered the murder. As of December 2018, the United States and other countries were determining what actions to take to penalize Saudi Arabia, through sanctions or other means. There was a strong international backlash, with calls for a more detailed investigation. However, many countries, including the United States, Russia, and Spain, were hesitant to push economic consequences onto Saudi Arabia due to lucrative business deals in technology and arms sales. Saudi Arabians had avoided serious economic ramifcations for their controversial stances in the past due to their wealth, but it was unclear if the Khashoggi murder would change that.44

Companies Abandon “Davos in the Desert”

Davos in the Desert was an annual investment conference hosted by Saudi Arabia that drew business executives, investors, and offcials from around the world. The 2018 conference was held on October 23 amid the controversy over Khashoggi’s death. Dozens of leaders decided not to attend, but many others went. Individuals who dropped out included the CEOs of Uber, SoftBank, Mastercard, Siemens, and Google Cloud, the chairman of Ford, and the U.S. Treasury Secretary. Individuals who attended included the PepsiCo vice chairman, SoftBank investment advisors, McKinsey and Co. senior partners, and the Pakistani prime minister.45

Even as companies were trying to distance themselves publicly from Saudi Arabia, many were hesitant to take steps toward decreasing their fnancial dependence. Many waited to see how the situation would play out before making their next move. For instance, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi stated that “Once we get the facts and understand exactly what happened, we’ll do our best to react as a company.” When asked

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why he pulled out of the conference if he didn’t have the full picture he stated: “We didn’t know the facts, but we thought it was inappropriate to go at that point.”46

WeWork’s Response

Cook knew the clock was ticking. Providing no response could be just as damaging to the company’s efforts and reputation as a poorly-phrased response. Cook believed in the community focus and sustainability efforts WeWork had undertaken since its formation. She was especially proud of the company’s ambitious commitment to carbon neutrality. But she also knew that it could all be dismissed as greenwashing if she could not justify her company’s investments from SoftBank and, by extension, Saudi Arabia. Was WeWork responsible for the actions and reputation of its investors? Without that investment, would WeWork have been able to take a leadership role in sustainability? Would WeWork even exist? Cook turned back to her computer. Time was up. It was time to respond.

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Appendix

Appendix A New Government Entities and VRPs from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030

Source: “KSA Vision 2030.” The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/download/fle/fd/1319. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

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Endnotes

1 McKelvey, Miguel. “WeWork Commits to Being Carbon Neutral by 2023.” WeWork blog. 13 Sept. 2018. https://www.wework.com/ blog/posts/wework-commits-to-being-carbon-neutral-by-2023. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

2 McKelvey, Miguel. “WeWork Commits to Being Carbon Neutral by 2023.” WeWork blog. 13 Sept. 2018. https://www.wework.com/ blog/posts/wework-commits-to-being-carbon-neutral-by-2023. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

3 Lomas, Natasha. “WeWork takes meat off the menu as part of environmental policy.” TechCrunch. Aug. 2018. https://techcrunch. com/2018/07/16/wework-takes-meat-off-the-menu-as-part-of-environmental-policy-drive/. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.

4 McGregor, Jenna. “BlackRock CEO tells peers, you must do good for society.” Boston Globe. 16 Jan. 2018. https://www. bostonglobe.com/business/2018/01/16/blackrock-ceo-tells-peers-you-must-good-for-society/umdimGhbDD0o5KwkyYwYQI/story. html. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

5 McGregor, Jenna. “BlackRock CEO tells peers, you must do good for society.” Boston Globe. 16 Jan. 2018. https://www. bostonglobe.com/business/2018/01/16/blackrock-ceo-tells-peers-you-must-good-for-society/umdimGhbDD0o5KwkyYwYQI/story. html. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

6 “Business services and then some.” WeWork. https://www.wework.com/benefts. Accessed 18 Feb. 2019.

7 Konrad, Alex. “Inside the Phenomenal Rise of WeWork.” Forbes. 24 Nov. 2014. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ alexkonrad/2014/11/05/the-rise-of-wework/#190289e06f8b. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.

8 Hempel, Jessi. “Why WeWork Thinks It’s Worth $20 Billion.” Wired. 6 Sept. 2017. https://www.wired.com/story/this-is-why- wework-thinks-its-worth-20-billion/. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.

9 Winfrey, Graham. “How WeWork Plans to be the Ecosytem for Your Entire Life.” Inc. 21 Nov. 2018. https://www.inc.com/graham- winfrey/wework-2018-company-of-the-year-nominee.html. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.

10 “Space That Works for You.” WeWork. https://www.wework.com. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.

11 Wang, Jenna. “WeWork Dives into Retail with WeMRKT.” Forbes. 6 July 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ jennawang/2018/07/06/wework-dives-into-retail-with-wemrkt/#93344d2451a5. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

12 Gelles, David. “Memo From the Boss: You’re Vegetarian Now.” The New York Times. 20 July 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/07/20/business/wework-vegetarian.html?module=inline. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

13 Brown, Eliot. “SoftBank Finalizes $4.4 Billion WeWork Investment.” The Wall Street Journal. 25 Aug. 2017. www.wsj.com/articles/ softbank-invests-additional-3-billion-in-wework-1503597860?mod=article_inline. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

14 McKelvey, Miguel. “WeWork Commits to Being Carbon Neutral by 2023.” WeWork blog. 13 Sept. 2018. https://www.wework.com/ blog/posts/wework-commits-to-being-carbon-neutral-by-2023. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

15 Wilhelm, Alex. “WeWork Raises $3B More, Continues to Lose Money.” Crunchbase.com. 13 Nov. 2018. https://news.crunchbase. com/news/wework-raises-3b-more-continues-to-lose-money/. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

16 Brown, Eliot. “SoftBank Finalizes $4.4 Billion WeWork Investment.” The Wall Street Journal. 25 Aug. 2017. www.wsj.com/articles/ softbank-invests-additional-3-billion-in-wework-1503597860?mod=article_inline. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

17 Brown, Eliot. “SoftBank Finalizes $4.4 Billion WeWork Investment.” The Wall Street Journal. 25 Aug. 2017. www.wsj.com/articles/ softbank-invests-additional-3-billion-in-wework-1503597860?mod=article_inline. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

18 “The We Company/Funding Rounds.” Crunchbase. https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/wework/funding_rounds/funding_ rounds_list#section-funding-rounds. Accessed 18 Feb. 2019.

19 Brown, Eliot, et al. “SoftBank Explores Taking Majority Stake in WeWork.” The Wall Street Journal. 10 Oct. 2018. www.wsj.com/ articles/softbank-discusses-taking-majority-stake-in-wework-1539127641. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

20 Wilhelm, Alex. “WeWork Raises $3B More, Continues to Lose Money.” Crunchbase.com. 13 Nov. 2018. https://news.crunchbase. com/news/wework-raises-3b-more-continues-to-lose-money/. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

21 “WeWork Raises $1 Billion from SoftBank as Revenue - and Losses - Surge.” CNBC, 10 Aug. 2018. www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/ wework-earnings-q2-2018.html. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

22 Wilhelm, Alex. “The New WeWork Numbers.” Crunchbase. 10 Aug. 2018. news.crunchbase.com/news/the-new-wework-numbers/. Accessed 18 Feb. 2018.

23 Webber, Alan. “Japanese-Style Entrepreneurship: An Interview with SoftBank’S CEO, Masayoshi Son.” Harvard Business Review. Jan. 1992. https://hbr.org/1992/01/japanese-style-entrepreneurship-an-interview-with-softbanks-ceo-masayoshi-son. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

24 “SoftBank Group Corp.” CNN Business. 12 Dec. 2018. https://money.cnn.com/quote/profle/profle.html?symb=SFTBF. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

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25 “SoftBank Group Annual Report 2018.” Softbank. https://cdn.group.softbank/en/corp/set/data/irinfo/fnancials/annual_reports/ pdf/2018/softbank_annual_report_2018_001.pdf. Accessed 18 Feb. 2018.

26 “The Meaning of the Vision Fund.” The Economist. 12 May 2018. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/05/12/the-meaning- of-the-vision-fund. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

27 Hamade, Riad, et al. “Saudi Arabia Doubles Down on SoftBank Bet with Extra $45 Billion.” Bloomberg. 5 Oct. 2018. https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-05/saudi-arabia-doubles-down-on-softbank-bet-with-extra-45-billion. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

28 Molla, Rani. “Where SoftBank has invested its $100 billion Vision Fund.” Recode. 6 June 2018. https://www.recode. net/2018/2/5/16974032/this-is-where-chart-softbank-vision-fund-masayoshi-son-venture-capital. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

29 Giridharadas, Anand. “Silicon Valley’s Saudi Arabia Problem.” The New York Times. 12 Oct. 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/10/12/opinion/silicon-valley-saudi-arabia.html. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

30 Truong, Alice. “SoftBank fnally condemned Khashoggi’s murder—but it won’t stop taking Saudi money.” Quartz. 5 Nov. 2018. https://qz.com/1450476/softbanks-masayoshi-son-fnally-condemns-khashoggi-murder/. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

31 “Saudi Arabia: Government and Society.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/Government- and-society. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

32 “Saudi Arabia: Government and Society.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/Government- and-society. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

33 “Mohammad bin Salman named new Saudi Crown Prince.” Tass. 21 June 2017. http://tass.com/world/952543. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

34 Saudi Arabia.” Fanack.com. 23 Sept. 2009. https://fanack.com/saudi-arabia/economy/. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

35 “Saudi Arabia: Economy.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/Economy. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

36 “Best Countries for Business: Saudi Arabia.” Forbes. 2018. https://www.forbes.com/places/saudi-arabia/. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

37 Denina, Claire, et al. “Exclusive: Aramco IPO halted, oil giant disbands advisers -- sources.” Reuters. 22 Aug. 2018. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-ipo-exclusive/exclusive-aramco-ipo-halted-oil-giant-disbands-advisers-sources- idUSKCN1L71TZ. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

38 “KSA Vision 2030.” The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/download/fle/fd/1319. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

39 Perper, Rosie. “All the atrocities Saudi Arabia committed before outrage over Jamal Khashoggi’s death reached a fever pitch.” Business Insider. 22 Oct. 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-human-rights-violations-atrocities-before-jamal- khashoggi-2018-10#an-unprecedented-crackdown-on-corruption-6. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

40 Perper, Rosie. “All the atrocities Saudi Arabia committed before outrage over Jamal Khashoggi’s death reached a fever pitch.” Business Insider. 22 Oct. 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-human-rights-violations-atrocities-before-jamal- khashoggi-2018-10#an-unprecedented-crackdown-on-corruption-6. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

41 “Yemen Confict Explained in 400 Words.” British Broadcasting Company. 13 June 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-44466574. Accessed 14 Dec. 2018.

42 Hubbard, Ben. “One Killing, Two Accounts: What We Know About Jamal Khashoggi’s Death.” The New York Times. 20 Oct. 2018. www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/world/middleeast/khashoggi-turkey-saudi-narratives.html. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

43 Sullivan, Kevin, et al. “Saudi Arabia Fires 5 Top Offcials, Arrests 18 Saudis, Saying Khashoggi Was Killed in Fight at Consulate.” The Washington Post. 19 Oct. 2018. www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/10/19/saudi-government-acknowledges- journalist-jamal-khashaoggi-died-while-in-that-countrys-consulate-in-istanbul/?utm_term=.9ca72c5b863d. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

44 Kelly, Makena. “Tech reckons with Saudi cash after journalist’s brutal murder.” The Verge. 18 Oct. 2018. https://www.theverge. com/2018/10/18/17995284/silicon-valley-saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi-investment-slack-uber. Accessed 8 Dec. 2018.

45 Alkhalisi Zahara, et al. “Who’s at Saudi Arabia’s ‘Davos in the Desert’ and who’s staying away.” CNN. 23 Oct. 2018. https://www. cnn.com/2018/10/23/business/saudi-davos-in-the-desert-speakers/index.html. Accessed 9 Dec. 2018.

46 Tibken, Shara. “Uber stuck between a rock and a hard place with Saudi investment.” CNET. 13 Nov. 2018. https://www.cnet.com/ news/uber-ceo-says-stuck-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-with-saudi-investment/. Accessed 9 Dec. 2018.

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