Philosophy

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Week Two Instructor’s Notes PHIL 1103 Summer

This week you will be learning in detail about the four different moral perspectives that

we will use to analyze moral questions. Notice two things right at the start. First, because normative ethics is our main focus this

term, we are not going to attempt to settle the question of whether any moral perspective at all could be correct or known to be correct—that is a task for metaethics. Our task in this second week is to learn in some detail about four different kinds of consideration or value that often seem relevant when we try to decide what is morally right or wrong in particular cases, namely:

(1) Respect for the rights and autonomy of the persons involved (2) Increasing the overall well-being of the most individuals possible (3) Asking what a person of virtue, of strong character, would do in the given situation (4) Determining what care and compassion would require in that case.

Second, notice that there are certainly other alternative perspectives that one may think are relevant in some or all cases; for example, some say that achieving the most personal pleasure is the only goal a person needs to consider when deciding what is morally right or wrong for them to do (this view is called ‘moral hedonism’). And there are others of course. We will only be concentrating on the four perspectives just listed (rights, well-being for the greatest number, virtue, and care) because they are commonly heard in discussion about what is morally right to do and because we have limited time to work this term.

Each of the four perspectives gives us a principled way to answer moral questions. We could of course answer the moral questions we face by simply flipping a coin or by force. The moral perspectives, however, provide a sort of guide or rule-book that we can use in all cases to determine what counts as right and what counts as wrong.

Each perspective is discussed in a separate chapter in Weston; respect for the rights of persons is discussed in Chapter Five, increasing the well-being for the greatest number is discussed in Chapter Six, virtue and character are discussed in Chapter Seven, and care and compassion are discussed in Chapter Eight. Because each of these perspectives have many aspects, and there is disagreement about how to best understand what each perspective entails, we are going to focus on certain elements of the discussions in those chapters. Let me now say something about the specific places we will focus in this week’s readings.

Chapter Five: Ethics of the Person In this chapter we consider what it might mean to respect the individual rights and

autonomy of the persons involved in situations in which we must decide what to do. There are many different conceptions of what a person is, and what it might mean to properly respect them as an individual with aspirations, autonomy, and rights. For example, there are different types of rights (recall the discussion of general rights, specific rights, positive rights, and negative rights in the Week One Instructor’s Notes). And there are many different lists of the general and specific and positive and negative rights that persons supposedly enjoy (for example, there is the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States and there is the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which you will read about in this chapter)).

Our primary focus in Chapter Five will be two of the different formulations that the philosopher Kant gives to what he calls “The Categorical Imperative”. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is one way of determining what we must do in particular cases to properly respect the

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autonomy and rights of the persons that may be impacted by our decisions. Another way to put the point is to say that the Categorical Imperative is supposed to give us a recipe for deciding what actions are morally required because they best respect the autonomy and rights of others. Applying the Categorical Imperative to particular moral questions, then, will reveal what rights people have and what it means to value someone as a person, as a fellow human being just as significant as myself.

So although I want you to read the entire chapter, take special care to carefully learn and reflect on Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is discussed on pages 137- 142. There are different ways that Kant formulates the idea of the Categorical Imperative, one found on page 138 and two more on the following page. We will focus on the first formulation (page 138, using the idea of a universal law) and the second (p. 139, using the idea of treating others as ends in themselves and not just a means to an end). Spend some time with each formulation and try to imagine in detail what it might mean in practice. And, both formulations are supposed to express exactly the same idea, so be sure to think about how each of these different formulations can be understood to be saying the same thing, and would both recommend exactly the same actions and policies.

Kant’s theory is what is called a “deontological” moral theory. For Kant, when we are deciding whether some act is morally right or wrong, we must only consider the nature of and motivation for the action itself, regardless of the consequences. If I intend to hurt someone, but just by chance it turns out that I unintentionally save their life as well as the lives of others, what I have done, the action itself, is still morally wrong. And for Kant, my motivation must be only to do my moral duty (the word “deontological” comes from the Greek word deon, meaning “to bind”). For my action to be morally right it must be done solely because I am bound by a moral duty to perform that action, that must be my only motivation. And there is a clear intuition here—we often think that the morally respectable person is someone who, regardless of fear or personal danger, and regardless of expectation of personal benefit, does their duty. And they do it simply because it is their duty. Notice also, then, that for Kant, I should not be motivated by emotion. Being motivated by emotions of compassion or pity or care is not to be motivated by duty alone.

But how do I know exactly which actions it is my duty to perform? Kant answers this question with his Categorical Imperative, a rule for deciding what I am morally required to do and not to do. Again, he gives several different formulations of this rule, and we are going to focus especially on the first two formulations. Those formulations are explained in Chapter 5.

The first formulation (page 138) uses the idea of what we could rationally will to be a universal law that applies to everyone under all circumstances. When working with the first formulation, pay particular attention to how the concept of rationality plays a role in deciding what to do. I must determine what would be rational if everyone were to do it, not just me. So notice that this standard immediately rules-out certain kinds of actions. Take lying for example. If I lie, but others generally tell the truth, then my lie may have the desired effect. People I lie to may be fooled because they expect that generally speaking people tell the truth. Lying is only rational if I do it but no one else does. However, if everyone lied all the time, then no one would expect anyone to tell the truth, and lying would never have the desired results. It would be irrational to lie if everyone did it. It would defeat the purpose of lying if everyone was a liar all the time. Or consider paying for a movie ticket. Suppose I have the opportunity to sneak in, undetected, and watch the movie for free. But now imagine that everyone did this (it was universally allowed). Then movie theatres would have no revenue and would have to close.

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Then no one could watch a movie at the theatre. So it would be irrational to will that everyone should sneak into the theatre without paying, that would defeat the purpose of me sneaking in since it would mean that there would be no theatre to sneak into. Also notice that Kant is here advocating a certain kind of equality—no one can put themselves above others. Whatever I think about doing, I must agree that everyone should be allowed to do it (that it should be a universal law).

The second formulation (page 139) requires that we always treat others as “ends in themselves”. When thinking about what this means, focus particularly on the concept of autonomy. I should never treat others only as tools I use to achieve my own desires. I must recognize that others are autonomous beings that have their own desires and plans and hopes and values. And be very careful when working with the second formulation to notice that it is not equivalent to the Golden Rule (“Treat others as you want to be treated”). This is also true for the first formulation—doing what would be right for everyone to do is not the same a treating others as you want to be treated. As you are grappling with understanding the Categorical Imperative, think about examples in which the Categorical Imperative would require something different from the Golden Rule. Here is one kind of case to think about. Imagine you are a judge about to impose a sentence. By the Golden Rule, you might be inclined to be lenient, even very lenient (as that is how you might want to be treated if you were being judged). However, could we rationally will that all sentences be radically lenient? Would this undermine the point of a justice system? Would we be treating the victims as ends in themselves, respecting their aspirations and values? Would we even be treating the person to be sentenced as an end in themselves, or merely as a means for insuring that if the time comes I will be treated in a certain way?

Chapter Six: Ethics of Happiness The central value we seek to protect and advance in answering moral questions from this

point of view is the happiness for the greatest number. That is, the morally right thing to do is to choose the action or policy which will best advance the happiness or well-being of the greatest number of individuals possible under the circumstances. This way of thinking is often called “Utilitarianism”—you learn why in the chapter. Focus primarily on understanding pages 181- 188 and also pages 193 (beginning with the heading “Complications”) through 198 (though do of course read the entire chapter as assigned). The Utilitarian moral perspective is common in everyday personal decision-making when concerning the impact of our actions on others as well as in formulating law and public policy.

Notice that one of the main tasks in this sort of moral perspective will be to define ‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’ or ‘good’ or ‘benefit’ (as well as their opposites, especially the complex notion of suffering). There are many different forms of each of these, for example, physical vs mental. And in the case of physical well-being or health, there are many different ways that can be defined and measured. In the case of mental or emotional well-being or happiness, again there are many different forms here. Is the happiness derived from a tasty snack the same as the happiness derived from long-lasting friendships or engagement with the arts? There is also an important distinction to be made between short-term happiness or well-being and long-term happiness or well-being (and long-term happiness may necessitate short-term suffering, as in surgery or mastering a sport).

Notice also that the Utilitarian Principle requires the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals. This is a per capita measure, not an aggregate measure. According to the Utilitarian principle, we must seek to improve things to the greatest degree for the greatest

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number of individuals, not simply increase the total amount of benefit (which might be distributed wildly unequally). And note that we said ‘individuals’ here, because the principle can be formulated so that the well-being of non-human individuals is morally relevant (individuals like dogs and families and ecosystems for example).

You will find that the Utilitarian principle is in sharp conflict in various ways with the Categorical Imperative of Kant. When thinking about possible objections to the Utilitarian way of thinking it is important to keep in mind that there are two very different types of potential difficulty for the Utilitarian principle, moral objections and practical objections. Moral objections say that in some situations the Utilitarian principle offers morally wrong advice. For example, the Utilitarian principle appears to conflict with justice and individual rights in some cases (there is a discussion of this in Weston). Other commentators have pointed out that the Utilitarian principle undermines the personality in requiring undermining of personal growth and development in the quest to advance the well-being of others. On the other hand, Practical objections pertain to the difficulties in actually attempting to apply the Utilitarian principle in real cases. For example, to apply the principle we need some sort of objective way to measure happiness or well-being, but this is perhaps an impossible task (for a variety of reasons). We also need to make reliable predictions about the long-term consequences of acts for, in some cases, thousands of people, but this is also beset with obvious difficulties. There is also the worry of whether it is realistic to expect people to continuously perform complex calculations about the far-reaching effects of their actions. Do also keep in mind, though, that these potential moral and practical objections are well-known to Utilitarians, and various response have been offered. On close examination, what might seem like a slam-dunk objection may not be as powerful and convincing as one may have thought at first.

Chapter Seven: Ethics of Virtue Chapter Seven discusses the role of virtue and character in answering moral questions. It

is often said that we ought to do the virtuous thing when faced with morally weighty decisions. But like rights and well-being, there are many different views about what virtues a person should have, and what exactly the virtuous person would do in various specific situations. In this chapter I want you to focus primarily on Aristotle’s conception of virtue as described from the middle of page 217 to page 221 (but again, do be sure to read the entire chapter as assigned). Here I will explain the main ideas of Aristotle’s ethics of virtue.

As I mentioned in the Instructor’s Notes for Week One, Aristotle’s moral theory is very different from Kant’s perspective and the Utilitarian perspective. Both Kant and the Utilitarians give an answer to the question “What are the correct moral rules that I should follow?”. Kant proposes the Categorical Imperative while Utilitarians propose the Utilitarian Principle as the correct rule to guide moral action. Aristotle’s question is different; he answers the question “What is the best or most fulfilling kind of life?”. A by-product of his answer will also give us a method for determining which actions are right and which are wrong, and how to treat others. But that method will not involve a rule; in fact, Aristotle does not think that any rule will ever do the job.

To begin answering his question “What is the best kind of life?” Aristotle first says that three common answers to this question are wrong. Many people will answer this question by saying that a life of wealth, or fame, or pleasure (or some combination) is the best kind of life. However, Aristotle says that wealth does not make the best kind of life, since money is only a tool that can be used well or badly. Money not intrinsically valuable (valuable in itself), it only

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has instrumental value. Acquiring fame cannot be the best kind of life since fame depends on others. A life of pleasure cannot be the best kind of life because pleasure is fleeting—one always has to get a new fix; in this way, Aristotle says, the pleasure-seeking life is a life of slavery. So then what is the best kind of life to lead?

Aristotle says that we can answer this question by using the three related concepts of function, flourishing (or excellence), and virtue. We start with the concept of function. Aristotle thought that all things, including human beings, have an ergon, which is usually translated as “function” or “characteristic activity”. The idea is easy to understand in the case of tools. A vegetable knife has a function, namely, to cut vegetables into various sizes. An automobile has a function, namely, to transport people and things from one place to another. Of course, any object may be used to for a variety of purposes; a vegetable knife can be used as a bookmark, a car as shelter. But, on Aristotle’s view, all things have a primary function or a characteristic activity, a particular role in the overall scheme of the universe that makes the thing the kind of thing that it is. So we can see that not just tools, but any object (even natural objects) will have an ergon, a characteristic activity that makes it unique amongst all other things.

Now, any given particular thing will perform its function well, or in a mediocre way, or poorly. When a thing performs its function well, excellently, it is said to flourish, to have achieved excellence as that kind of thing. An oak that stands tall and produces a plentiful supply of good acorns has flourished as an oak tree, is an excellent oak. A vegetable knife that efficiently cuts vegetables into all the shapes and sizes we want has flourished as a vegetable knife, is an excellent vegetable knife.

A thing that is flourishing, that is excellent at its characteristic activity, flourishes because it has certain characteristics. That is how Aristotle defines virtue—a virtue for an object is a characteristic that enables that object to perform its function well. Whatever characteristics a thing needs in order to perform its function well are called the ‘virtues’ for that thing. This is why it is said that “the virtues of a thing are determined by its function”—once we know the function of a thing, we will be able to determine which characteristics that thing needs in order to perform its function well. For example, the function of a vegetable knife is to cut vegetables. So the virtues for a vegetable knife will be attributes like being sharp, being able to hold sharpness over time, having a comfortable handle, and having an appropriate length. These are characteristics that enable a vegetable knife to cut vegetables well. Virtues for an oak would include being planted in soil with a certain chemical composition, having enough leaves exposed to enough sun, having efficient systems for moving water and nutrients up and down the trunk. When an oak has those characteristics and the other oak-virtues it will flourish, it will lead the best kind of life as an oak tree.

So to find out what the best kind of life for a person is, what human flourishing is, we must first identify the human ergon, the primary function or characteristic activity of human beings. Aristotle thought that rational self-regulation is the human ergon, is what marks humans off from all other things in the universe. What is characteristic, unique, about humans is our capacity to use our reasoning abilities to make decision about how to act and then to act on those decisions. If that is our function, then we have an immediate answer to the question of what human excellence is: Human excellence is using reason well in decision-making. To flourish as a human being is to engage in actions that are guided by excellent rational decision-making.

In order to flourish as a human being, that is, in order to perform the human function well, a person must acquire those characteristics that enable someone to do well in rational decision-making. That is, a person must acquire the human virtues. The natural question, then,

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is “What then are the virtues a person needs to acquire in order to flourish?”. Since the human function is to use reason well in decision-making, Aristotle says we can identify the human virtues, the characteristics that enable excellent rational decision making, by looking at the nature of the mind in order to identify our rational capacities. Aristotle thought that the mind is composed of two parts relevant for our question.1 There are two parts of the mind that play a role in decision-making, what he called “reason” and “the part that obeys reason”. Reason is the home of our intellectual capacities for learning, calculating, imagining, analyzing, inferring, applying information to specific cases, processing new information, comparing, generalizing, intuiting, and the like. The “part that obeys reason” is the home of emotion, ambition, drive, mood, inclination, will, appetites, and desires. Both parts play a role in decision-making, so we must learn how to control and use both parts well. The virtues are characteristics we can acquire that enable us to control and use those parts of the mind well. So there are two different kinds of virtue: Intellectual virtues are attributes that enable us to best use and control our capacities of reason, and virtues of character are attributes that enable us to best use and control the capacities we have for emotion, ambition, willpower, mood, and desire.

Since reason and emotion are very different, the intellectual virtues and the virtues of character have very different natures and must be learned in different ways. Aristotle discusses both in detail, but for the remainder of these notes I am only going to talk about the virtues of character.

In a moment I will list some of the Aristotelian virtues of character. But first let’s look at what Aristotle says about the nature of this kind of virtue and how we learn the virtues of character. The virtues of character are stable states of character, that is, they are ingrained or habitual ways of responding to the world when we are called to make decisions about how to act. The virtuous person doesn’t have to force themselves to be courageous or just, they are courageous or just as a matter of well-established habit. Being courageous or just is natural for them because of the way that they have developed their character. So we can see that to acquire the virtues is a matter of forming long-standing habitual responses, and the only way to form habits is by constant and regular practice. And the practice required must be directed by someone who is already virtuous, a “virtue coach” (what Aristotle calls a “phronimous”, from the Greek for a person with practical wisdom). After all, we must practice virtuous acts in order to form the right habits, and as learners we need to be told which actions are the virtuous ones we need to practice. Furthermore, Aristotle points out that even once we acquire the virtues we must continue to exercise them in decision-making and acting, otherwise they will atrophy. So he says that virtues of character are “preserved by action”. So, for Aristotle, a “virtuous” person who does not continually engage in virtuous acts is not actually virtuous. In some way, being virtuous, then, is a process rather than a single accomplishment (after which one can “retire”).

The most famous element of Aristotle’s conception of virtue is often given in the slogan “virtue is in finding the mean between extremes”; more fully, we would say that according to Aristotle, a virtue is always a mean state between a deficient state of character and an excessive state of character. We must be careful about what this is not saying. Aristotle is not saying that the virtuous person always does a half-way amount of anything (giving some but not too much to charity, eating some but not too much cake, being irritated but never enraged or never passive). This is not what he has in mind. Rather, here is the idea. Remember that virtues of character allow us to regulate our capacity for various emotions and desires. A virtuous person is able to 1 He thought there is also a third part, the “nutritive mind”, that is responsible for our biological functioning. However, since we do not have conscious control over that part of the mind he does not defined virtues for it.

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use the entire range of a capacity, feeling and acting with the appropriate amount for the circumstances, whatever that amount may be. Sometimes it is appropriate to have no cake at all, sometimes appropriate to have one slice but no more, and sometimes (presumably rarely) appropriate to go crazy and have three. The virtuous person is the person who has the full range of the capacity at their disposal, and can feel or desire and then act with the appropriate amount for the situation. Aristotle describes such a person as having the mean or middle state of character. However, there are people who are unable to use the entire range of their capacity. Some people have a deficient state of character, so they are never able to use their capacity or can only use it to a small extent. Others have an excessive state of character, which means that in all cases they use their capacity at maximum strength, whether that is appropriate or not.

For example, consider our capacity to feel fear. Some people have a deficient state of character with regard to that capacity. They are people who never feel fear (are unable to feel fear), or are only able to feel a twinge or fearfulness in certain situations. We say that such people are reckless or rash; they have a deficient state of character with regard to the capacity to feel fear. So they have the vice of recklessness.2 Other people have an excessive state of character with respect to the capacity to feel fear. They are people who are always fearful no matter what the circumstance. We say that such people are cowardly; they have the vice of cowardice. Other people, however, are able to feel (and then act on) the appropriate amount of fear for the situations in which they find themselves. Such people have a mean state of character with respect to the capacity to feel fear—they are able to use their capacity along its entire dimension, finding the appropriate amount given the circumstances. Those people have the virtue with respect to fear, the virtue of courage. Or take the capacity to feel angry. Some people have the vice of excess with respect to anger. These are people who are always angry at everything (they have the vice of wrathfulness, they are “angry people”). There are people who have the vice of deficiency with respect to anger, people who never feel angry no matter what the provocation or threat or situation. And there are people who have the virtue for the capacity to feel anger, the mean state. They are able to feel the appropriate amount of anger in any given situation—they have the full range of the capacity to feel anger at their disposal.

As you can imagine, there are many virtues of character (and corresponding vices of deficiency and excess), given the complexity of human capacities for emotion and appetite and willfulness and desire. Here is a partial list:

Capacity Deficiency Virtue Excess Fear Cowardice Courage Recklessness Anger Lack of Spirit Even Tempered Wrathful, Angry Pleasure indulgence Insensibility Temperance Self-indulgent Giving and taking money Miserliness Generosity Prodigality Self-regard Self humiliating Proper pride Vanity, snobbery Living well Pettiness Magnificence Vulgarity Desire for honor Laziness Aspiration Over-ambition Shame Shamelessness Modesty Bashfulness Self-disclosure Self-deprecation Truthfulness Boastfulness Indignation Spitefulness Righteous indig. Envy Judgement Unprincipled Fairness Partisanship 2 A vice is the opposite of a virtue. So for Aristotle, for each virtue there are two vices, a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess.

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Social demeanor Quarrelsome Friendliness Flattery Sense of humor Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery

Virtues of character, then, are stable states of character obtained by practice that forms habitual responses to life’s circumstances. They allow us to regulate our capacities for emotion, desire, appetite, ambition, and willfulness. They are mean states between two possible vices, a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess.

A virtuous act is one that is an habitual response that stems from a virtue of character (we don’t have to force ourselves to do it, but rather is “in character”). Aristotle also says that a virtuous act is one that results from a conscious decision to perform that act, that is, we must accept ownership of the action, it must be our choice (if someone does something unknowingly or involuntarily we don’t praise their virtue). And, Aristotle says that we must choose that action because it is virtuous (and not because we hope to gain or for some other ulterior motive).

Now we can see what the best sort of life is according to Aristotle, we can see what it means to flourish as a human being. Human flourishing (which Aristotle calls eudaimonia) is a life of activity of reason expressing virtue, that is, a life in which we use our rational and emotional capacities in the best ways (so that our actions “express virtue”) in making decisions and acting on them. We then excel at being human. This is sometimes called “self-realization” or “self-actualization”—we achieve the best of our capacities in the circumstances of our lives. We realize our best potential as human beings, actualize our potential in the best possible ways. We have then achieved human flourishing, eudaimonia. (The Greek term ‘eudaimonia’ is sometimes translated as “happiness”. This is unfortunate, because the term ‘happiness’ means many different things to different people, and because human flourishing is much more than just being happy, and is certainly not the same as pleasure as we noted above. Aristotle does think, though, that the person who flourishes turns out to be, as a by-product, the happiest person at least in the sense of contentment and fulfillment.)

In answer to the question “which actions are morally right and which are morally wrong”, Aristotle says that the morally right actions are virtuous acts (and morally wrong acts are those that stem from vices or ignorance). And Aristotle takes pains to caution us that we cannot simply state a set of rules to follow that will tell us, in every circumstance, what the right and wrong actions are. This is because life is often very complex; there are usually too many variables at play in situations in which we must decide how to act to allow for a rule that generalizes over cases—there will always be too many exceptions for any proposed rule covering more than one particular situation. So how does a virtuous person know what counts as the virtuous act in particular situations? Aristotle’s answer is that once a person acquires the virtues, that is, becomes a certain kind of person, they begin to see the world in a certain way. They become sensitive to the nuances of situations that enable them to decide, guided by their habitual responses, what the virtuous thing to do is. Aristotle tells us that “virtuous action is a matter of perception”. And this is an intuitive idea. The angry person sees the world in a certain way—even an accidental bump is perceived as an insult or attack. The even-tempered person, however, sees the world differently, and this enables them to decide on the virtuous act.

Chapter 8: Ethics of Relationship Relationships (with other people, with non-human animals, and with, our ecological

relationships) are often thought of as valuable, sometimes of paramount value. And being in various relationships helps us learn about caring and compassion, which in turn can help

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determine what we ought to do, how we ought to live, how we ought to treat others, and how we ought to structure our society.

Here we consider the fact that all people are bound to others in many different ways (even the hermit, however indirectly), and then ask what the moral significance of those relationships is. We notice immediately that care and compassion are fundamental to nurturing relationships with others, so we can ask what care and compassion for others would require when answering moral questions. After all, we often say that our treatment of others (and ourselves) should be caring and compassionate, and that failing to be caring and compassionate is a moral failing. Again, of course, there are many different conceptions of what care and compassion are and of what they require in actual decision-making in specific cases. So think about what care and compassion would look like in concrete terms in the complex situations of actual life. In your reading in Weston, focus particularly on the moral perspective of Care Ethics (pp. 245- 257). Care Ethics is perhaps the most difficult of our four perspectives to understand in concrete, practical terms. Both Kant and Utilitarianism give a rule to follow for making decisions (and Libertarianism does as well). The rules themselves may be somewhat difficult to decode and execute, but at least we have a single rule to apply to every case in which we need to know what is morally required and morally permitted. Aristotle does not give us a rule, but he does present a detailed conception of the best life as well as a clear plan for developing the virtues necessary to achieve it (along with a detailed list of virtues). Care Ethics has none of these features, neither a rule nor a fixed conception of the good life.

Rather, Care Ethics says that the lessons we learn from being in nurturing relationships with others should form our moral guidebook. So when I ask "what should I do?" we find an answer by asking "what would be the best way to care for and nurture those effected by my actions?"; another way to put it is that we must seek to express care and compassion towards others. This applies also to questions of government policy and law: what would best express care and compassion for those that would be impacted? Care ethics also asks us to recognize our interdependence with others--our lives are deeply connected and inter-twined with the lives of others, so that imposes certain responsibilities to care for others and certain limitations on our individual freedoms. What those responsibilities and limitations are must be determined in particular cases (much as in virtue ethics): By being sensitive to others, and perceptive, and having developed a sense of caring or compassion, we will be able to understand through empathy what our responsibilities to others are. So a big challenge in using Care Ethics in concrete particular cases will be to figure out what precisely the demands of care and compassion are. Another challenge is to figure out what the precise nature of our connectedness to others is in actual cases.

And Care Ethics faces two further challenges. First, Care Ethics says that we should model our moral thinking on the nature of nurturing relationships in the context of family. This raises the worry that Care Ethics is too parochial, too focused on our family group or social group, to serve as a moral theory about how we should treat others. After all, most of us would do things for friends and family that we would not do for others, for strangers. But this may have worrisome moral implications if we think that, at least in some cases, we must care for strangers as well, even at the expense of friends or family or ourselves. Consider governmental policy decisions—there we must think of the society as a whole in the long-term. Or consider the law; a judge must be impartial. Or consider our obligations to nature (if indeed we have any)—some will say we must not use nature just to further the immediate needs of our family or small social group. Second, Care Ethics puts emotion and emotional connections with others at

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the center of moral decision-making. We must rely on our emotional connections with others as a guide.3 But emotions can be capricious, inappropriate, and highly variable across situations and time. This is one reason that Kant counsels us not to rely on emotion as a moral guide; in essence, the worry is that I should not treat someone well or badly just because I happen to feel like it. So understanding Care Ethics requires us to also learn how Care Ethics might accommodate these worries.

3 This may seem similar to Aristotle’s theory at first, but remember that Aristotle thinks we must use reason to “control” the emotions. That is the function of the virtues of character. So for him, in some sense, reason “comes first” and must be used to shape and control emotion.