Graduate Level Essay and Journal

MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 1

Course Learning Outcomes for Unit II Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:

3. Discuss the threat posed by radiological, chemical, and biological devices. 3.1 Explain types of chemical agents that could be used in a chemical attack. 3.2 Summarize the impacts of a nuclear weapon in a community feeling its effects. 3.3 Define the characteristics of nuclear terrorist weapons.

Course/Unit Learning Outcomes

Learning Activity

3 Lesson

3.1 Lesson, Chapter 2.1, Essay

3.2 Lesson, Chapter 2.2, Essay

3.3 Lesson, Chapter 2.2, Essay

Reading Assignment Unit II: Introduction, pp. 85-89 Chapter 2.1: Chemical Weapons, pp. 90-109 Chapter 2.4: Nuclear Weapons, pp. 200-219, 223-235

Unit Lesson A chemical attack is the spreading of toxic chemicals with the direct intent to harm those who are in its path. Harmful chemicals that could be considered dangerous to life and health during an attack would include the following:

 chemical warfare agents used for military purposes,

 toxic industrial and commercial chemicals that are standard use and transported, and

 chemical toxins of biological origin. Chemical weapons were first used during World War I and were drawn from chemicals such as chlorine and phosgene. Moving forward to 1997, chemical weapons were considered to be eliminated in the sense of production, storage, and use. One of the issues surrounding the use of chemical weapons took place in the Sarin Gas Attacks in Tokyo during 1995. Over 5,000 people were injured, and the death count totaled 12. Some of the dangers of exposure to such dangerous chemicals included anything ranging from minor injuries to imminent death depending on the degree of toxicity, concentration, means of exposure, or the duration of the exposure (Howard & Forest, 2013). The food supply is as vulnerable to contamination as the water supply. An example of water contamination would be if the Great Lakes were to experience some form of chemical exposure that traveled throughout the waterways into other bodies of water through tributaries and rivers. One needs only to look at the major disruption caused by contaminated public water in Flint, Michigan, after Flint changed its water source from treated Detroit Water and Sewerage Department water to the Flint River in 2014, which had an effect on drinking water for years. Imagine what a terrorist chemical attack to a vulnerable water system might cause.

UNIT II STUDY GUIDE

Weapons and Motivations

MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 2

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Some of the practical steps regarding protection from a chemical attack would be to locate clean air quickly, remove outer clothing that may be contaminated, wash affected areas with soap and water, clean clothing, and seek medical attention. Some late health effects from chemical agent exposure may include eye damage, chemical burns, cancer, and other health–related issues depending on the type of chemical. One alarming factor regarding a terrorist attack is how determined they are to inflict mass causalities on target rich environments. The attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened the nation’s concerns regarding the potential use of radioactive materials in a terrorist act. The possibility of such an attack has been of particular concern because of the widespread use and availability of radioactive materials in the United States and abroad by industries, hospitals, and academic institutions. Loss or theft of such materials, in risk-significant quantities, could lead to their diversion for malicious use in a device that is intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives, a radiological dispersal device (RDD). An RDD detonation would likely result in a few deaths (mainly from the explosion), but significant social and economic impacts could result from public panic, decontamination costs, and denial of access to the area for extended periods of time (Howard & Forest, 2013). Nuclear weapons, or terrorist nuclear devices that produce a nuclear explosion, are a concern for all parties involved in the United Nations as well as those nations who are seeking peace throughout the globe. A nuclear device that produces a nuclear explosive blast, direct nuclear radiation, thermal radiation, and an intensely hot flash can cause huge areas to catch on fire and the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. The ground blasts pull the materials off the ground to the plume, or characteristic mushroom cloud, where they eventually disperse into the air, creating fallout. This fallout is far ranging, impacts the immediate and surrounding areas, and travels great distances in the wind-related direction. A nuclear terrorist attack could cause substantial fatalities, injuries, and infrastructure damage from the heat of the blast generated from the explosion. Depending on the size of the nuclear device, the initial impact of destruction could be devastating. Radioactive fallout from the blast has an irregular pattern in the direction it will be dispersed. Wind direction plays a key role in determining what areas will be impacted by the fallout of the radiation. Some of the secondary hazards associated with the bomb could include the heat intensity, the numerous fires that would be created by the blast, broken gas and water lines, damaged roads and bridges, the release of hazardous chemicals into the air from the damaged refineries, gas wells, and other chemical agents that could be present in the atmosphere. If there is impending danger from a nuclear attack, people in the community should listen to local authorities and warnings that would be communicated. There are several impacts that occur after a nuclear blast such as limited medical treatments, clean–up of the affected area, control of the contaminated food supplies, and additional economic and psychological impacts. Severe damage to the communications network can cause increased fear and anxiety due to the lack of communication from authorities. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is met with mixed responses. There are those within government agencies that feel such an attack is imminent and could have a catastrophic impact in the years to come. On the other hand, there are others who feel that terrorists’ abilities to acquire such a device are limited. A homemade nuclear device is considered to be cruder and less efficient than those acquired from state governments in terrorist-prone countries, but the impact from such devices could meet the needs for terrorist groups. Quantities of nuclear materials that fall into the kilogram range can still make an impact and increase the likelihood of using such a device. The primary obstacles that terrorist groups face when gathering nuclear materials are acquisition and transport. It would be challenging, if not impossible, to have such a device transported to another location. There are several myths associated with nuclear terrorism. Some do not accept that terrorist extremist groups are acquiring a nuclear device that could cause destruction and hundreds of thousands of deaths. One area that policy-makers do agree upon is that terrorists are trying to acquire a nuclear device and the materials to construct such a device. On the other hand, there are many political leaders who seem to feel that terrorists will not use the nuclear devices to cause massive destruction.

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A second myth is that political leaders seem to feel acquisition of nuclear materials will not occur. Many leaders seem to feel the materials required to construct such a device will be out of reach or that nuclear materials are impossible to obtain. On the other hand, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has raised several questions regarding the whereabouts of their nuclear devices that have been lost or never located (Howard & Forest, 2013). A third myth regarding terrorists and nuclear devices is that nobody is searching for them, and it is too difficult to build a nuclear device. Iran is currently exploring many scientific methods to develop a nuclear weapon. They have trained scientists to enrich uranium to obtain sufficient fissile material and have the funding required to continue such research if they desire. It remains to be seen whether or not Iran will adhere to the nuclear weapons treaty they signed in 2016 (Howard & Forest, 2013). The fourth myth is that the terrorists’ only plausible method of obtaining a nuclear device would be through the use of political influence through other states. However, current terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS possess the funds and technical know-how to develop a nuclear bomb themselves without state assistance— provided they can obtain the needed fissile material (Howard & Forest, 2013). A fifth myth that many confuse with the truth is that the United States and its border-sharing neighbors can build a safe area or cordoned-off area to defend themselves and defeat those who are pre-empting an attack (Howard & Forest, 2013). The sixth myth of nuclear terrorism states that, because the United States has a strong offense, terrorists will be deterred from researching and developing nuclear devices. Being aware of dangerous groups is only part of the overall picture; the United States must also be prepared to destroy the machine shops, chemical warehouses, and other secret locations in an effort to mitigate the deadly work taking place (Howard & Forest, 2013). Finally, the seventh myth dispelled is that nuclear weaponry is generated by the states supporting terrorist ideology and not the terrorist groups themselves. This is the furthest myth from the truth. Terrorist groups are willing to work alongside states in an effort to develop a bomb and create havoc in one part of the world. States cannot operate alone due to the fact that there is so much at stake regarding funding, development, and sanctions from other nations for seeking a nuclear weapon (Howard & Forest, 2013). The terrorists have made it clear that they have intentions of obtaining a nuclear device and using it against the United States and other nations. In the days of the Cold War, only nation states had the technical knowledge, precision manufacturing capabilities, fissile material, and sufficient funds to manufacture a nuclear device. That is no longer the case, and nuclear weapons, perhaps just crude ones, can be made by well-funded terrorist groups with the technical knowledge, with or without the collusion of rogue nations like Iran or North Korea. The key ingredient they lack, however, is fissile material. It is in denying this material that the majority of the world’s nonproliferation efforts have focused. The question remains, however: Can nations remain focused and make the expenditures necessary to continue to prevent terrorist use of these devastating weapons? The U.S. government believes that it is not a question of if a nuclear terrorist attack will occur, but when. In order to prevent such an attack, a significant, joint effort between U.S. government agencies—including the State Department, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have been engaged since 9/11. A multilayered defense regime, coordinated with many other nations, has been set up that aims to prevent the fissile materials necessary to build a nuclear weapon from being obtained by terrorist groups. The strategy is to deny terrorist groups access to fissile material as close as possible to the source of the material and as far from the United States as possible. Combating this threat through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is one of the highest priorities.

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Along with the State Department’s Office of Export Control Cooperation and Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, our intelligence agencies, and the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Agency directs the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program, formerly called the Second Line of Defense. The NSDD energetically pursues a two-program effort to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials (National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], n.d.). Further information about the NSDD can be found at https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/gms/nsdd. The NSDD program was also designed to confront the threat of nuclear terrorism as close to the source of the threat as possible. Given the vast amount of nuclear material spread across Russia’s nuclear complex, cooperative work with the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation to secure Russian points of entry and exit remains a high priority. However, the NSDD has expanded deployments to countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and established the Megaports program in recognition that significant quantities of nuclear materials are generated and stored outside of Russia and that redundant layers of detection are necessary to address such a grave threat. The NSDD provides partner countries with the tools and training necessary to counter nuclear smuggling, thus making an essential contribution to the global nuclear detection architecture. It does this by installing radiation detection systems at high-priority locations around the world and by building a community of states that possess an indigenous capacity to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear and radioactive materials. The NSDD program consists of two main components: the Core Program and the Megaports Initiative. The Core Program deploys radiation detection systems at land border crossings, airports, and feeder ports in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet States, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region, and other key countries. The Megaports Initiative works with foreign customs, port authorities, port operators, and/or other relevant entities in partner countries to systematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transiting the global maritime shipping network. In support of this mission, the Megaports Initiative helps partner countries equip major international seaports with radiation detection equipment and alarm communication systems. In addition, the Megaports Initiative provides comprehensive training for foreign personnel, short-term maintenance coverage, and technical support to ensure the long-term sustainment and viability of installed radiation detection systems (NNSA, 2010). These two important programs form synergistic layers in the larger, multi-tiered defense against nuclear terrorism and work in partnership with the DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Finally, as an additional layer of protection against an attempt to detonate a nuclear device in the United States, the NNSA is responsible for nuclear emergency response teams that can search for clandestine transport of nuclear materials or weapons and disarm a terrorist nuclear device if necessary. These teams work in close partnership with the FBI and the Department of Defense (DoD), which have the lead on managing our national response requiring nuclear search or render-safe activities. In the event of any sort of terrorist event involving nuclear or radioactive materials, these teams would support other federal agencies in managing the aftermath, saving lives, and seeking to identify those responsible.

References Howard, R. D., & Forest, J. (2013). Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (2nd ed.). New York, NY:

McGraw-Hill. National Nuclear Security Administration. (n.d.). Nuclear smuggling detection and deterrence. Retrieved from

https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/gms/nsdd National Nuclear Security Administration. (2010, September). Megaports initiative. Retrieved from

https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/singlepages_9-15-2010.pdf

MHS 5201, Weapons of Mass Destruction 5

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Suggested Reading In order to access the following resources, click the links below:

Click here to read more about the Megaports Initiative that was discussed in the lesson. Paul Errico of the Homeland Security Executive Advisory Board in the United States cites bombings as the most common type of terrorist attack in the country. You are encouraged to read the below article. Blades, H. B. (2003). Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and improvised explosive devices: An

interview with Paul Errico. Forensic Examiner, 12(7/8), 12-16. Retrieved from https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?auth=CAS&url=https://libraryresources.columbia southern.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=58454534& site=ehost-live&scope=site

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, collectively described as "unconventional," presents the most formidable security challenge of the immediate post-Cold War Era. You are encouraged to read the below article. Parachini, J. (2001). Planning the unthinkable: How new powers will use nuclear, biological and chemical

weapons. Armed Forces & Society, 28(1), 168-171. Retrieved from https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?auth=CAS&url=https://libraryresources.columbia southern.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=5785289&sit e=ehost-live&scope=site

Learning Activities (Nongraded) Nongraded Learning Activities are provided to aid students in their course of study. You do not have to submit them. If you have questions, contact your instructor for further guidance and information. The following video presents information on how terrorists could easily hijack a truck and use it to transport chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. After viewing this video, write a one-page summary on what law enforcement agencies can do to make it difficult for terrorists to perform this action. In the Line of Duty (Producer). (2009). Easy terrorism. In Cops and hazardous materials—What every officer

should know: In the line of duty, Volume 12 [Video file]. Retrieved from https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?auth=CAS&url=http://fod.infobase.com/PortalPla ylists.aspx?wID=273866&xtid=52643&loid=190297

Click here for video transcript.