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What's different in the corporate world and why_ December 2012.pdf
Martin Pergler
December 2012 © Copyright 2012 McKinsey & Company
McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, Number 40
Enterprise risk management What’s different in the corporate world and why
Contents
McKinsey Working Papers on Risk presents McKinsey’s best current thinking on risk and risk management. The papers represent a broad range of views, both sector-specific and cross-cutting, and are intended to encourage discussion internally and externally. Working papers may be republished through other internal or external channels. Please address correspondence to the managing editor, Rob McNish ([email protected]).
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why
Introduction 1
Reframing a basic misconception 1
The nature of risks in corporates versus financial institutions 3
Implications for risk-management practices 4
Overall consequences 8
Areas of greatest—and least—opportunity for sharing 10
Conclusion 11
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why
Introduction
Given the current environment of continuing economic uncertainty, plus a steady stream of unfortunate major operational-risk events striking companies around the globe, few would dispute that some attention to risk management at the enterprise level is important. Nor would many dispute that typical current practices too often fail to deliver. For companies outside the financial sector, however, it is challenging to find inspiration.
Historically, a significant part of risk-management practice at corporates has evolved from health and safety risk management in heavy industrial and natural-resources companies. It focuses on detailed cataloguing, tracking, and mitigation of a long list of what might go wrong—expanded beyond health and safety. This list is typically called the “risk register.” Yet companies that use this as their core framework for enterprise-level risk management routinely miss or woefully misestimate the risks that end up really mattering to the achievement of their overall objectives or even fundamental health.
On the other hand, given its role as an intermediator and disaggregator of risk, the financial sector has led the charge in developing risk-management practices related to financial and market risks. Of course, waves of recent systemic failure in the financial sector promote a healthy sense of skepticism about the idea of using the practices developed in that industry as a blueprint for others. In addition, current innovation in the financial sector is largely focused on responding to changes in governmental regulation and other firefighting measures. Nevertheless, as far as these “liquid” risks are concerned, the financial sector continues to provide a rich seam of frameworks and methodologies from which all sectors can potentially mine.
But where to go for broader inspiration? The overall risk-management framework, the nature of management (and board) dialogue about risk, or the integration of “risk thinking” into navigating overall business uncertainty? The reality is that while the need for thoughtful enterprise risk management (ERM) is clear, corporate decision makers, from line managers to board members, are jaded. The risk-management process is usually perceived as unclearly scoped, bureaucratic, ineffective, and even obstructionist. Participation in an enterprise-level process is viewed with about as much enthusiasm as going to the dentist—with the additional suspicion that the risk-management tooth- puller may in fact be a quack.
Perhaps that partly explains why many corporates are looking to the financial sector for the broader inspiration they seek—after all, the approaches and techniques are familiar and available and there is plenty of talent for hire. “We hired a risk manager from a US bank, but he’s still getting to know our business,” reports the CFO of an Asian conglomerate. “Our overall risk transformation is being driven by two new board members, one from a European financial institution, with deeper technical knowledge than the rest of us,” recounts another board member of a US consumer-goods company.
The enthusiasm in those statements is at best lukewarm. Comments from deeper in the organization are often scathing: “Now that there is an ex-banker on the board, we’re somehow supposed to create regular financial-risk reports allocating risk capital to risk types and business units. It makes no sense for us,” complains the treasurer of an industrial-manufacturing company.
Our belief is that thoughtful importing by corporates of talent and good practices from the financial sector can indeed be highly beneficial. But all those involved need to be continually conscious of the differences in expectations, challenges, and even the language used to frame the role of the risk-management function, in order for the cross- industry transfer of ERM approaches to work.
Reframing a basic misconception
Financial institutions, whose entire business model relies on the aggregation and disaggregation of risk, have been the cradle of modern risk management as a set of disciplines and processes developed since the late 1980s.
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However, that does not mean there is a linear evolutionary path whereby financial institutions define the leading edge and others’ risk-management practices obediently follow over some uncertain timeframe. Looking at all business sectors, it is useful to reframe the journey and to differentiate among four stages of maturity (Exhibit 1).
While some financial institutions (for instance, many smaller regional banks) find themselves in stage 1, and a handful of investment banks would consider themselves at stage 3, the average financial institution sits squarely in stage 2 of this spectrum. (Of course, regardless of stage, the topic of changing financial-sector regulation and its implications is very much top of mind.) Other industry sectors have different centers of gravity. The retail sector and telecoms, for example, on average are on the cusp of passing from stage 0 to stage 1. Companies in sectors with strong natural-resources exposure (whether as resource extractors or processors) or important technical or R&D risks (for example, pharma) are more often on the cusp of stage 1 to stage 2, or wholly in stage 2. Typical companies moving into stage 3 are energy companies using increasingly mature liquid commodity markets, or conglomerates or asset managers/investors juggling a diverse portfolio of assets, in each case seeking a source of advantage in a crowded, competitive arena.
Even within sectors there is a strong lack of homogeneity. For example, in one major market, a leading telco is developing quite sophisticated stress-testing macroscenario for its profit and loss and strategic plan, and models the value at risk (VAR) from its currency exposures (stage 2). By contrast, one of its peers, with a roughly comparable market position and performance, has formalized risk-management approaches that consist of the bare minimum required to meet regulatory requirements (stage 0). Similarly, there are mining companies with advanced cash-flow- at-risk models and optimized project financing and commodity hedging for new mines (stage 3) competing with others that merely conduct an annual review of mitigation plans for their top-30 operational risks (stage 1).
There is, so far, an absence of robust statistical evidence that “more mature risk management,” however defined, would necessarily translate into better performance. However, in our opinion, these differences in maturity are neither accidental, nor irrelevant. Rather, they reflect underlying differences in drivers of value creation, including assets and exposures, and management culture. Companies find niches not only in terms of market opportunity and value-chain position, but also in strategic capabilities; risk management can be one of these.
Just as over the past 40 years there has been a powerful shift toward more careful strategic management of the firm, we believe that there will continue to be a powerful overall shift to the right on this risk-management maturity spectrum. But it will be a gradual process, with drift happening at different speeds. Depending on one’s circumstance, moving to
Drivers
Key tools
▪ Compliance with basic standards/regulations
▪ Reduction of regular surprises
▪ ROE1 improvement requirements
▪ Competitive pressure ▪ Navigating trade-offs
▪ Top management focus on risk-adjusted performance
▪ Finding niche in mature marketplace
▪ Opportunistic approaches
▪ At-risk measures (eg, VAR,2 CFAR3)
▪ Systematic scenario analysis of profit and loss
As left, plus: ▪ Strong risk culture ▪ Unbundling risks
through contracting and markets
▪ Avoiding unexpected large loss events
▪ Stability to enable growth plan
▪ Professionalized management
▪ Risk heat map based on consensus assessments
Exhibit 1 There are four stages of maturity in risk management.
Initial transparency stage0
Systematic risk reduction
1 Risk-return management
2 Risk as competitive advantage
3
1 Return on equity. 2 Value at risk. 3 Cash flow at risk.
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why 3
the right in risk management at the right time will be a strategic investment for differentiation versus peers, or a catch- up move if one has fallen behind. In particular, individual corporates need to find their own path based on their specific opportunities for value-creating competitive differentiation, and not just seek to “learn from the one’s betters.”
In view of this landscape, with a variety of levels of maturity and philosophy, there is sometimes also the misconception that there are no transferrable good practices—that the differences among and between companies are so great that every company needs to improvise in its own way. We shall see below that while customization is important, there are emerging good practices that can be applied, mutatis mutandis.
The nature of risks in corporates versus financial institutions
The typical first surprise experienced by the financial-institution risk practitioner arriving at a corporate is the absence of a standardized risk taxonomy. In a bank, at a high level, there is a clear and ubiquitous separation into market, credit, operational, and liquidity risks. There are, of course, complications, such as how changes in the macroeconomic and regulatory environments translate into these four categories, and how they are correlated. But it is clear that a top-level standard taxonomy works well for institutions with very similar high-level business models.
Corporates that have thought systematically about their risks have usually developed a nonstandardized taxonomy of their own. The obvious reason for the difference is that the taking of financial-market positions and extending of credit is nearly always a less central part of their business model. Other risks—such as technical, supply chain, physical safety and environmental, natural-resources availability and cost, but grouped in whatever way reflects the management system of the company—are more characteristic.
A very high-level division among operational, strategic, and financial risks is usually helpful. However, a specific risk may be allocated to different categories based on how exactly it affects a particular company. For instance, developmental delays in new technologies may be operational risks for a company that needs to reconfigure its supply chain for a new project as a result, but may be crucial strategic risks (upside or downside) for someone in that supply chain. Commodity prices are a financial risk for a commodity processor that may suffer a temporary mismatch between its inventory costs and contracted selling price, but are a strategic risk for a real-estate developer with holdings in Australia, Canada, and the Middle East, whose economies are highly dependent on natural resources overall. As a result, nonstandard risk taxonomies actually work better, since they reflect the real differences in the mechanism through which these risks affect different companies, and therefore how the companies need to monitor and respond to these risks.
Less obviously, there are crucial differences in the nature of risk exposures. Fundamentally, the typical bank is leveraged, but has the ability to “dial up or down” its level of exposure to market or credit risks, and indeed to sample different flavors of each of these risks, by dialing up or down its appetite for transactions specifically exposed to these risks. This is why many banks have naturally settled at stage 2 of the risk-maturity framework: it provides exactly the right level of quantification to allow the navigation of such decisions.
In contrast, important risks faced by corporates are “chunky.” You either enter a certain business arena at scale, or you don’t. To be sure, there are certain opportunities for scaling your exposure, and sharing or mitigating risks, but fundamentally the typical corporate frames its core risk-management questions by asking “which are my main risks?” and “what risks am I willing to take on?” rather than deciding to “measure my exposure to a standard set of risks and I’ll choose where to set the dial on each one.”
The differences become more striking as one explores the nonlinearity of exposures. Financial institutions’ nonlinear exposures arise from slicing financial risks into tranches, by quality or time to maturity, for example, so that individual asset holders’ or counterparties’ exposures are magnified (or constrained) within (or outside) a certain range. In contrast, while many corporates’ risks are either discrete or linear, part of the reason some companies have moved to the right on the maturity spectrum is precisely because of the nonlinearity of certain crucial strategic risks that they face. And much of this nonlinearity is driven by the nature of the company’s response to the risk.
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Two examples help illustrate this important point. A heavy equipment manufacturer was considering building manufacturing facilities in Mexico and Thailand. It was therefore facing exposures to the evolution of labor costs in these countries, to transportation costs from these countries, as well as, of course, regional demand in different areas in the world. Up to a point, these risk exposures were linear—a small perturbation in any one of these drivers would propagate to a corresponding perturbation of financial performance, depending on the portion of total costs and/or revenues impacted. However, the company realized that past certain limits, its “country-risk” exposure was actually very different based on how quickly the company could realize—and react to—evolution in these risk factors by shifting production from one country and/or one product to another. The existence of that tipping point—the nonlinearity—is precisely the opportunity to profit from these risks.1
As a further example, oil companies involved in so-called “unconventional” development and production have a nonlinear exposure to oil prices. When prices are high, each dollar up or down propagates through to their bottom line. But if oil prices shift and stay sufficiently low, especially before their projects are sufficiently completed (sunk costs), their unconventional projects will very likely be out of the money. Their economic value will be determined at best by a real- options type of analysis to monetize the eventuality that at some point they will be in the money—a very different (and more complex) exposure. Furthermore, oil companies have realized that their break-even oil price for major projects actually depends heavily on whether they are procyclical developers (and face high costs in a tight specialized labor market) or contrarian countercyclical ones. For instance, construction costs in Alberta in 2008 were 1.6 times that of the US Gulf Coast—and then dropped 30 percent by 2010 as oil prices dropped and investment dried up.
Finally, due in part to “chunkiness,” a corporate’s list of its most important risks will more often contain so-called “data- poor” risks, where there is a dearth of historical or other readily available data on which to feed quantitative analytical approaches. This is a mixed blessing. Credit and market risks faced by financial institutions have a wealth of data available (even though recent experiences have shown the pitfalls on relying too much on these data). The simple absence of this amount of data for most operational, strategic, regulatory, and large-scale macroeconomic risks has led to them being considered less systematically by financial institutions in comparison. In contrast, for many corporates, data-poor risks have so clearly been integral to the risk profile that those companies have scaled back the overall level of quantification of their risk approaches, as compared to companies whose risk exposures are dominated by data-rich risks such as commodity prices. “We used to calculate VAR from financial risks in treasury; but we stopped once we realized it was swamped by our strategic and operational risks that we just couldn’t calculate at all,” reports one vice president of risk management.
Implications for risk-management practices
It would be tempting to conclude from the above that the differences in risk management, not only between financial institutions and corporates but also between individual corporates, are so great that there is really no alternative for the newly minted corporate-risk manager but to forget everything he or she knows and just start from scratch. Nevertheless, we believe there are important themes of good practice for corporate ERM that can be derived from financial approaches.2
Risk insight and transparency. Financial institutions emphasize quantifying (and maintaining up-to-date awareness of) their exposure to the core risks (credit, market, liquidity, and operational). The key output is an understanding of the degree of risk being taken—and therefore the amount of scarce risk capital needed—in different areas of the institution. The typical corporate invests much more time in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing a wide range of risks, unraveling relationships across the company and understanding the likely impact of the company’s own potential responses to the risk. The level of quantification is highly variable. Where partial offsets (natural hedges), correlations, and/or trade-offs between these risks are crucial, sophisticated models similar to those embraced by
1 Eric Lamarre, Martin Pergler, and Gregory Vainberg, “Reducing risk in your manufacturing footprint,” mckinsey- quarterly.com, April 2009.
2 The framework used here is the McKinsey framework for integrated risk management, revised from Kevin Buehler, Andrew Freeman, and Ron Hulme, “Owning the right risks,” Harvard Business Review, September 2008 (hbr.org).
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why 5
financial institutions are highly relevant. But where risks have poor data and exposure depends on untested and unpredictable endogenous responses by the company’s own management to the risk stimulus, such models are excessive and can actually be misleading as a basis for decision making.
In particular, the financial-risk practitioner can help a corporate become more systematic at aggregating the common risk exposures across different business units, much in the style of the banks. On the other hand, the corporate-risk practitioner will need to work much harder than his or her financial peer in helping the company’s top management develop a shared sense of the top dozen or so “mega-risks” that really drive corporate health and performance—and how to address them. This is the more complicated and situation-specific analog of the standard banking-risk taxonomy.
Risk appetite and strategy. The typical bank is highly leveraged, with risk capital a very scarce resource for which there is vigorous internal competition. In view of the standard risk taxonomy, setting risk appetite is an exercise in allocating this risk capital effectively, and defining the right risk limits to ensure overall risk taking is within appropriate bounds. Discussions about which risks to take are important at specific decision points, but tend to be focused on whether the institution understands the risks sufficiently, and whether the quantification of the risk capital needed is reasonably accurate, for example, by asking, “Do we dare commit to these products given what might happen in event of a correlation breakdown?”
The situation in corporates differs in two ways. First, corporates can have very fruitful discussions about exactly which risks they are preferentially positioned to own or want to learn to manage better, for example, by deciding “We have expertise in managing complex R&D portfolios that we can deploy here,” “Our mix of short-term versus long-term contracts versus competitor X gives us more flexibility to respond,” or “This is a good limited-downside opportunity to learn to manage a subsidiary in a developing country that we can then build on for more ambitious international growth.” And the limitations of risk quantification (together with generally being less leveraged and less regulated) mean risk limits are typically replaced by more qualitative risk policies. For instance, as a matter of policy, some corporates insist that any open foreign-exchange positions are immediately hedged once created or that any project they bid to provide must have a clause limiting liability. Or they even insist they will not sell their product to certain customers or through certain channels due to potential liability or reputational risk issues. These are all examples where such companies do not calculate a limiting amount of risk capital that is allowable against such a risk, since they don’t trust its quantification. In addition, the activity or investment in question is sufficiently non-core that it is not worth the trouble to try, even if there is the odd bit of value leakage (for example, the unnecessary cost of hedging and missing a business opportunity that could have been pursued at sufficient expected profit to cover the risk).
Second, the question of overall risk appetite is much broader in corporates. Given the macroeconomic and regulatory environment, the reality for many financial institutions is that the level of flexibility in overall risk appetite is fairly low. A typical corporate, however, manages for a whole range of financial metrics, such as earnings and cash over multiple time periods. Different stakeholders—including crucially important ratings agencies—have different expectations. All of these translate into constraints on risk appetite that many corporates are only beginning to explore systematically. In addition, corporate-financial levers such as raising debt or adjusting equity capital, and strategic levers such as joint ventures on a major project or hedging strategies, all affect, and are affected by, risk appetite. The implication is that the effective risk-appetite allocator at a financial institution is a technical (and regulatory) specialist, while the risk- appetite expert at a corporate needs to become a strategic financial thinker who brokers dialogue between the board and top management.
Risk-related decisions and processes. There are, though, crucial differences between corporates and financial institutions. The business model of a bank is to act as an intermediary (disaggregator and consolidator) of risk. Accordingly, on a fundamental level, risk is part of all bank decisions (for example, to whom to offer credit via lending or trading decisions). As a consequence, the role of risk “management” in business decisions and processes has mutated into asking, “What else is necessary beyond what business managers are already doing?” Typical
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elements are processes related to proper risk assessment (including back office and infrastructure), compliance and escalation, and—in view of the changing landscape—regulatory and stakeholder management.
In contrast to their financial-sector counterparts, frontline managers in corporates are, in general, less comfortable and confident as risk takers, and their risk-taking actions more directly influence others. For instance, the purchasing manager’s trade-offs on one versus several suppliers—lower cost versus greater supply-chain resilience—will give sales differing amounts of headroom within which to strike a deal. An environmental disaster in one asset may slow down governmental approvals for completely unrelated assets, or damage the brand. So a key focus of risk management in corporates is bringing a risk lens to inform precisely those decisions where the risk profile of the whole company actually is being changed. Exactly which decisions these are depends on the individual company, but it typically includes three categories:
� Significant operating decisions where the consequences affect others than the decision maker, such as supply- chain management (“Do we sole source at an expected saving but with less resilience?”), pricing, (“How much contingency do we need to factor into pricing our response to this RFP?”), product development and exploitation (“Public backlash against genetic modification could exceed share losses in this category”)
� Business planning and overall strategic decisions, for instance, overall choice of strategy (“Do we expand overseas?”), capital investment (“We have $300 million of growth capital to invest and $700 million of ideas, with some of those ideas more risky than others.), as well as supporting financing decisions, (“Can we afford to lever up, and what if we hedged our fuel spend?”)
� Opportunistic strategic decisions (“Do we do this M&A deal?,” “Do we pull out from this market that is doing less well than expected?”)
These are, of course, not purely risk decisions, but the key contribution of risk management is to frame the risk trade- offs and provide the insight to support informed management and board dialogue.
Risk organization and governance. There are some obvious differences in risk organization and governance between corporates and financial institutions. In particular, many fewer corporates have a C-suite level chief risk officer (CRO) and a dedicated risk committee on their boards. This is discussed further below, but it is a consequence of more fundamental differences in overall risk organization and governance. As we look at companies in all sectors, we see four different types of role for a central risk group (Exhibit 2).
These four models are not stages in a maturity spectrum; there is no “right” or “better” answer. Apart from tradition and organizational inertia, the most important drivers for the appropriate choice are as follows:
� the complexity of the company’s risks. In particular, are crucial risks generated in the same organizational unit that bears the consequences and can effectively mitigate them?
� the degree of confidence in the treatment of risk by existing management processes and culture
In this realm, financial institutions generally fall squarely in one of the two buckets on the right. While basic risk taking remains an integral part of each manager’s responsibility, events have repeatedly shown the myriad ways that careless or overly aggressive risk taking in one desk or department can reverberate across an organization. Processes are quite well developed, but it is a prisoner’s dilemma–like situation, in which it is often in the personal interest of a talented individual to surf the boundaries of the risk policies or limits that are in place. This relates directly to the internal competition for risk capital, since taking on an extra bit of actual risk should create additional return, and if the risk is misevaluated by the systems and processes in place as being lower than it actually is, the indirect result is that the individual is “credited” with a higher risk-adjusted return.
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why 7
In contrast, corporates are all over the map, sometimes even in one sector. Donald Humphreys, senior vice president and treasurer of Exxon Mobil said in 2009 that the company does not believe in maintaining a separate risk organization, rather that risk management is naturally a direct responsibility of line management. This articulates an important principle: that operational risks in particular are best managed in situ in order to avoid diluting responsibility. This does not mean Exxon Mobil does not conduct risk management; on the contrary, its processes are quite sophisticated and it has systems in place to track risks and ensure preparedness/response. However, it has chosen to limit the central organizational oversight dedicated to risk.
On the other hand, several other major petroleum companies are moving from an “aggregate-risk-insight” model more to the right, having experienced increasing complexity in managing their strategic oil price and geopolitical exposures, as well as having seen the disasters that ensue if operational risks are poorly managed and a dysfunctional overall approach to risk takes hold.
Indeed, the distinction is one of balance. A common framework for risk management, especially in the financial sector, is that of “three lines of defense,” the first being line management/front office, the second the risk- management function (and/or other control functions), and the third compliance and audit. This framework is typically brought out to emphasize that the risk-management function does not operate in isolation, and that robust risk management requires all three defensive lines to be in place. In this context, the differences among our four organizational models require choosing which lines of defense to prioritize. As one moves from left to right, the second line of defense (a central-risk-management function) takes on a more prominent role, while on the left-hand side, one is placing more reliance on culture and processes followed by the first line—and likely expanding the role of the third line of defense as a way of confirming that these processes are followed, compared to when a strong second line is present.
Indeed, the importance of risk culture—mind-sets and behaviors of all employees regarding risk-taking—is increasingly being recognized throughout all industry sectors. Earlier work on classifying and diagnosing cultural hotspots for risk via a survey-driven diagnostic3 allowed an empirical observation of the relatively low level of systematic difference between sectors. There are significant differences between companies, of course, and often between business units in the same company, but characteristic issues relating to poor transparency on risk tolerance (“What are we allowed to do?”), lack of openness and fear to challenge (“Everyone knew it was a bad idea, but no one felt they could object”), and speed of response or gaming the system (such as finding ways to arbitrage transfer pricing that allows one unit to keep the benefit from risk taking but passes on the downside elsewhere inside the company) are ubiquitous.
Exhibit 2 There are four different roles for the central risk group.
1 If there is any kind of central risk group at the organization; this model can be run with just line management. 2 Chief risk officer.
Support line risk ownership1
▪ Line management owns risks
▪ Minimal central risk function provides expert advice on demand
▪ Risk optimization effected by a strong business and risk culture
Aggregate risk insight
▪ Line management owns risks
▪ Small central risk team aggregates risk insight, integrates across enterprise
▪ Risk optimization performed by overall management, with informational support from central risk team
Provide checks and balances
▪ Line management owns risks
▪ Central risk team led by CRO2 with a seat at the table, acting as counterweight for important strategic decisions
▪ CRO acts as thought partner to business heads
Actively manage risks
▪ Risk function owns and actively monitors and manages certain key risks centrally (eg, FX hedging, trading/credit limits)
▪ Business heads get approval on other risk strategies from CRO
3 McKinsey Working Paper on Risk, Number 16, “Taking control of organizational risk culture,” (mckinsey.com).
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Overall consequences
Within the context of the various risk exposures and risk practices described above, some of the more superficial differences between banking and corporate risk management are quite natural.
Importance of different elements of risk management. What do risk leaders in a company worry about most? As Exhibit 3 (below) shows, the different areas of risk management that are perceived to require the most reinforcement vary between financial institutions and corporates. The two sides agree that insight and transparency are (relatively) under control, while risk appetite and culture need more attention. The big difference is that while corporates see huge opportunity in improved risk-related decisions and processes—a reflection of how a plethora of management decisions can manipulate chunky risks with complex endogenous influences—financial institutions apply that level of focus to risk IT and other infrastructural fundamentals. This is, of course, a crucial concern when risk exposure comes from the aggregation of individual risk-intermediation decisions that businesses make, putatively within established quantitative risk limits.
The CRO function. The banking CRO is a specific, fairly well-defined function: an independent member of the bank’s top management team, peer to the others, and with direct visibility to the board, often including an independent reporting line. This is very natural given the typical stage-2 maturity, and the desire for a checks-and-balances or even a more rigorous central-risk-management approach. The CRO is the steward of the bank’s risk capital.
In contrast, most corporates do not have a CRO, or the title is given to someone who is at the N-2 or N-3 level and reports up through the CFO (or, in some cases, through another top-management team member, such as the chief strategy officer or even chief counsel). For a company in stage 0 or stage 1 in the maturity framework, a full CRO would be excessive. Even in stage 2, given the role of the CFO as the “conscience of the organization” in terms of prudent decision making based on the company’s financial realities, a risk-management function reporting through the CFO often makes a lot of sense. It is, after all, the CFO who is already the steward of the company’s de facto risk capital—its
Exhibit 3 Financial institutions and corporates have different concerns about enterprise risk management (ERM).
Source: Small-sample polls at Risk Capital 2011 and McKinsey-organized roundtables (not statistically significant)
Corporates
Financial institutions
Risk organization and governance
Risk culture
Risk IT and data infrastructure
Something else
Risk transparency and insight
Risk appetite and strategy
Risk-related decisions and processes
20
24
2
0
0
25
8
42
25
0
24
9
17
4
Which ERM element would you most like to strengthen in your institution?
equity. The exception comes either when the CFO’s own decisions are an significant source of risk or the locus of risk- return trade-offs, which, in turn, require an effective checks-and-balances approach, or when the specific qualifications or background of the individual taking on the position makes him or her an asset to the C-suite as an empowered and independent advisor.
The most typical approach among corporates is to have the risk-management function reporting through the finance organization, but there are exceptions. For instance, US Steel appointed its first independent CRO in 2011. Lend Lease appointed its then head of legal as its CRO in 2005. And a number of technology- or R&D–heavy companies combine the risk function with strategy or corporate audit, recognizing that “basic” risk management happens in the line (first line of defense) and that the parts that are not covered reflect growth or portfolio decisions (the strategy angle) and compliance (third line of defense), not risk aggregation.
Board risk committee. Dedicated risk committees in financial institutions have evolved for several reasons, including the following:
� Specialized vocabulary and expertise needed to oversee risk taking
� Regulatory requirements
� Need for independent oversight
In many corporates, risk is discussed in the audit committee, reflecting the nature of risk management in stages 0 and 1 of the maturity cycle. Since risk management in these stages entails largely a combination of compliance, plus informal strategic decision making that takes place through the full board, this is an effective solution. However, as nonfinancial companies start thinking about risk-return trade-offs, their boards often find the usual audit committee mind-set restrictive and insufficient. They therefore take one of three approaches:
� Upgrade the mind-set and capabilities of the audit committee (by growing its mandate to become a full risk committee, regardless of name)
� Establish a separate risk committee that approaches risk more strategically
� Keep the audit committee responsible for risk-management oversight, but deliberately upgrade the board strategy committee dialogue from just strategy to risk-return trade-offs in the context of strategy setting.4
The risk profession and community. Risk management has grown tremendously as a profession in the past decade. However, the bulk of the related literature focuses on financial risk management, and the bulk of the attendees at industry events are from the financial sector. Part of this is a question of volume; given the difference in maturity, there are simply more interested practitioners. And given the standardization of risk types and methodologies, it is much easier to develop a common corpus of issues and knowledge around which to build a community.
However, a consequence of this is a different mind-set for risk professionals in corporates. As indicated above, the biggest concerns on risk in financial institutions encompass three areas—appetite, culture, and IT—where the transfer or codevelopment of emerging good practices across the industry is hugely important, as is the whole corpus of knowledge about how to deal with evolving regulation. In contrast, the biggest concerns for corporates relate to including risk in crucial business decisions and processes. The shared concerns of risk appetite and risk culture are particularly industry- and situation-specific, and so a “professional specialist” approach is more likely to lack critical scale. It is therefore hardly surprising that in many more instances, corporate-risk practitioners
4 André Brodeur and Martin Pergler, “Risk oversight practices: Insights from corporate directors,” Director Notes, The Conference Board, September 2010 (conference-board.org).
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are respected company insiders from adjacent fields who take on the mantle of risk management (sometimes on a temporary rotational basis as part of a general career progression) and develop tailored expertise and approaches, rather than external “industry professionals” looking to deploy the next generation of improved standardized approaches.
Areas of greatest—and least—opportunity for sharing
Which financial-sector tools and ideas will offer the most support to a newly arrived risk manager setting up shop in a corporation?
Rigorous risk dialogue. While the specifics of the risks being discussed and the level of information available about them can vary, the typical corporate can gain much by implementing a regular, fact-based, and timely dialogue on risk throughout the organization. A daily comprehensive risk report, with up-to-date assessments of risk levels by risk type and business unit, as in leading banks, is probably both impossible and impractical. However, expanding the paradigm beyond a risk register and/or risk heat map that is reviewed once a quarter (or once a year!) is crucial!
Careful quantification of risk and concept of risk-adjusted return. While VAR has become a bad word in many circles, thoughtful quantification of risks, recognizing that at different (approximate) probability levels they may have radically different levels of impact, can be highly beneficial. And while a black-box calculation of risk-adjusted return on capital or some other metric that, as if by magic, purports to derive “correct” returns for risk is rarely the right answer, a recognition that returns need to be compared and evaluated with a consideration for the level and nature of risks taken to achieve them is another key ingredient.
Aggregated risk across the enterprise, including stress testing, in particular. The response to the financial crisis (in part driven by external stakeholders) has sharpened the focus of financial institutions on assessing the aggregate impact of risks across the organizations. The same should be the case for corporates, if for no other reasons than to make more agile and informed decisions in the face of macro-uncertainty. The philosophy of stress testing, in particular, exploring the combined impact of a consistent multifactor set of risk assumptions on all the relevant key performance metrics of a company, and likely consequences (for example, credit-rating resilience), is a rich area of opportunity.
On the other hand, what are some of the key preconceptions from the financial sector that are most likely to trip up our corporate-risk manager and confound otherwise enthusiastic colleagues?
A “standardized” risk taxonomy. As discussed, the classification and aggregation of risks across a corporate is a valuable and never-ending exercise. But there is no “standard” risk taxonomy—even by industry sector—to structure the analysis akin to the standard financial-risk factors (market, credit, operational, liquidity, etc.). Untangling the Gordian knot of risk in a typical corporate has no easy solution.
Rigidity in approach to risk organization and governance. As discussed above, there is an established model for the role of the risk-management function—and of risk oversight—in a financial institution. The situation in a corporate depends much more on the nature of the risks and of the overall management system—and stakeholder expectations may well be poorly defined or inappropriate given the nature of the business. Finding the right solution and the right trajectory to get there can be one of the most complex tasks facing a corporate risk manager.
Insufficient focus on teaching, coaching, and listening to the business. While this may be an oversimplification, the typical credit manager or investment portfolio manager in a financial institution generally feels that he or she is knowledgeable enough to manage his or her own risks, even though they recognize the importance of coordination, aggregation, and oversight by the central risk function. In contrast, while many corporate line managers equally feel knowledgeable about risks they “own,” there is, in general, a greater need for coaching on how to deal with
Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why 11
risk and uncertainty, teaching basic risk concepts and frameworks, and listening to the business and translating any insights for others.
Finally, suppose the same risk manager later returns to the financial sector (or—like some readers—never leaves it in the first place). There are some areas where the best organically developed practices in risk management in corporates would make good role models for financial institutions:
Top management focus on big bets or so-called mega-risks. As discussed, some of the biggest corporates have increasingly made efforts to identify and discuss their top risks, aggregated across the business, and, importantly, articulated in a way that recognizes how the risks are likely to arise. Financial institutions have been too hamstrung by their risk taxonomy to cut through it for truly franchise-affecting risks—such as the deep-seated crisis in Europe, the slowdown in Chinese economic growth, or even fraud that affects the institution’s reputation or confidence in a profound way. Many a financial institution would do well to interrupt the discussion of market and credit risk and preface and frame its discussion of stress testing with a period of identification of and reflection on the handful of big bets the bank is truly taking.
Broad discussion on risk appetite and strategic choice of risks to take. This seems like an odd factor to include, since these days financial institutions are quite preoccupied with risk-appetite discussions. But by and large, these are discussions about how to articulate risk appetite to stakeholders, and how to set the overall risk tolerance— areas where many corporates are weak. Going the other way, financial institutions rarely emphasize the debate over which risks they are in an optimal position to deploy their risk capacity against in order to extract value, and the risks in which they want to “invest” for growth. They could well learn from corporates in this area. Financial institutions generally do a good job of making individual decisions, for example, with credit underwriting, or using a risk-return lens with market positions. However, they tend to be weaker with the fundamental decisions about “where do we play?”
Conclusion
There are both important similarities and differences between risk management in financial institutions and in corporates. This is the nature of the particular risks each face and the way these risks are reflected in a company’s value creation and management culture. In particular, there are interesting conceptual and good-practice-transfer opportunities to consider—provided one steps beyond overly simplistic approaches that position one sector as an overall risk-management leader, does not reject it out of hand due to the challenges of recent years, or limits consideration purely to the mechanics of assessing or reporting specific shared risk types. The way forward for both financial and nonfinancial companies is best articulated as a situation-specific integration of approaches, rather than a wholesale adoption or rejection of a rigid set of choices. Even within sectors, companies can justifiably adopt quite different approaches at the enterprise level, provided there is adequate dialogue with all stakeholders. At this stage, there are the beginnings of back-and-forth executive movement between sectors, and there will be more in the future. It follows that debate and clarity around what works and what is likely to fail will only become more essential for effective enterprise risk management across the board.
Martin Pergler is a senior risk expert in McKinsey’s Montreal office.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Andrew Freeman, Arno Gerken, Rob McNish, and Tony Santomero to the development of this paper.
Contact for distribution: Francine Martin Phone: +1 (514) 939-6940 E-mail: [email protected]
1. The risk revolution Kevin Buehler, Andrew Freeman, and Ron Hulme
2. Making risk management a value-added function in the boardroom Gunnar Pritsch and André Brodeur
3. Incorporating risk and flexibility in manufacturing footprint decisions Martin Pergler, Eric Lamarre, and Gregory Vainberg
4. Liquidity: Managing an undervalued resource in banking after the crisis of 2007–08 Alberto Alvarez, Claudio Fabiani, Andrew Freeman, Matthias Hauser, Thomas Poppensieker, and Anthony Santomero
5. Turning risk management into a true competitive advantage: Lessons from the recent crisis Gunnar Pritsch, Andrew Freeman, and Uwe Stegemann
6. Probabilistic modeling as an exploratory decision-making tool Martin Pergler and Andrew Freeman
7. Option games: Filling the hole in the valuation toolkit for strategic investment Nelson Ferreira, Jayanti Kar, and Lenos Trigeorgis
8. Shaping strategy in a highly uncertain macroeconomic environment Natalie Davis, Stephan Görner, and Ezra Greenberg
9. Upgrading your risk assessment for uncertain times Martin Pergler and Eric Lamarre
10. Responding to the variable annuity crisis Dinesh Chopra, Onur Erzan, Guillaume de Gantes, Leo Grepin, and Chad Slawner
11. Best practices for estimating credit economic capital Tobias Baer, Venkata Krishna Kishore, and Akbar N. Sheriff
12. Bad banks: Finding the right exit from the financial crisis Luca Martini, Uwe Stegemann, Eckart Windhagen, Matthias Heuser, Sebastian Schneider, Thomas Poppensieker, Martin Fest, and Gabriel Brennan
13. Developing a post-crisis funding strategy for banks Arno Gerken, Matthias Heuser, and Thomas Kuhnt
14. The National Credit Bureau: A key enabler of financial infrastructure and lending in developing economies Tobias Baer, Massimo Carassinu, Andrea Del Miglio, Claudio Fabiani, and Edoardo Ginevra
15. Capital ratios and financial distress: Lessons from the crisis Kevin Buehler, Christopher Mazingo, and Hamid Samandari
16. Taking control of organizational risk culture Eric Lamarre, Cindy Levy, and James Twining
17. After black swans and red ink: How institutional investors can rethink risk management Leo Grepin, Jonathan Tétrault, and Greg Vainberg
18. A board perspective on enterprise risk management André Brodeur, Kevin Buehler, Michael Patsalos-Fox, and Martin Pergler
19. Variable annuities in Europe after the crisis: Blockbuster or niche product? Lukas Junker and Sirus Ramezani
20. Getting to grips with counterparty risk Nils Beier, Holger Harreis, Thomas Poppensieker, Dirk Sojka, and Mario Thaten
21. Credit underwriting after the crisis Daniel Becker, Holger Harreis, Stefano E. Manzonetto, Marco Piccitto, and Michal Skalsky
McKinsey Working Papers on Risk
EDITORIAL BOARD
Rob McNish Managing Editor Director Washington, DC [email protected]
Martin Pergler Senior Expert Montréal
Andrew Sellgren Principal Washington, DC
Anthony Santomero External Adviser New York
Hans-Helmut Kotz External Adviser Frankfurt
Andrew Freeman External Adviser London
22. Top-down ERM: A pragmatic approach to manage risk from the C-suite André Brodeur and Martin Pergler
23. Getting risk ownership right Arno Gerken, Nils Hoffmann, Andreas Kremer, Uwe Stegemann, and Gabriele Vigo
24. The use of economic capital in performance management for banks: A perspective Tobias Baer, Amit Mehta, and Hamid Samandari
25. Assessing and addressing the implications of new financial regulations for the US banking industry Del Anderson, Kevin Buehler, Rob Ceske, Benjamin Ellis, Hamid Samandari, and Greg Wilson
26. Basel III and European banking: Its impact, how banks might respond, and the challenges of implementation Philipp Härle, Erik Lüders, Theo Pepanides, Sonja Pfetsch, Thomas Poppensieker, and Uwe Stegemann
27. Mastering ICAAP: Achieving excellence in the new world of scarce capital Sonja Pfetsch, Thomas Poppensieker, Sebastian Schneider, and Diana Serova
28. Strengthening risk management in the US public sector Stephan Braig, Biniam Gebre, and Andrew Sellgren
29. Day of reckoning? New regulation and its impact on capital markets businesses Markus Böhme, Daniele Chiarella, Philipp Härle, Max Neukirchen, Thomas Poppensieker, and Anke Raufuss
30. New credit-risk models for the unbanked Tobias Baer, Tony Goland, and Robert Schiff
31. Good riddance: Excellence in managing wind-down portfolios Sameer Aggarwal, Keiichi Aritomo, Gabriel Brenna, Joyce Clark, Frank Guse, and Philipp Härle
32. Managing market risk: Today and tomorrow Amit Mehta, Max Neukirchen, Sonja Pfetsch, and Thomas Poppensieker
33. Compliance and Control 2.0: Unlocking potential through compliance and quality- control activities Stephane Alberth, Bernhard Babel, Daniel Becker, Georg Kaltenbrunner, Thomas Poppensieker, Sebastian Schneider, and Uwe Stegemann
34. Driving value from postcrisis operational risk management : A new model for financial institutions Benjamin Ellis, Ida Kristensen, Alexis Krivkovich, and Himanshu P. Singh
35. So many stress tests, so little insight: How to connect the ‘engine room’ to the boardroom Miklos Dietz, Cindy Levy, Ernestos Panayiotou, Theodore Pepanides, Aleksander Petrov, Konrad Richter, and Uwe Stegemann
36. Day of reckoning for European retail banking Dina Chumakova, Miklos Dietz, Tamas Giorgadse, Daniela Gius, Philipp Härle, and Erik Lüders
37. First-mover matters: Building credit monitoring for competitive advantage Bernhard Babel, Georg Kaltenbrunner, Silja Kinnebrock, Luca Pancaldi, Konrad Richter, and Sebastian Schneider
38. Capital management: Banking’s new imperative Bernhard Babel, Daniela Gius, Alexander Gräwert, Erik Lüders, Alfonso Natale, Björn Nilsson, and Sebastian Schneider
39. Commodity trading at a strategic crossroad Jan Ascher, Paul Laszlo and Guillaume Quiviger
40. Enterprise risk management: What’s different in the corporate world and why Martin Pergler
McKinsey Working Papers on Risk
McKinsey Working Papers on Risk December 2012 Designed by Global Editorial Services design team Copyright © McKinsey & Company www.mckinsey.com
__MACOSX/._What's different in the corporate world and why_ December 2012.pdf
S&P Insurance ERM Rating Criteria May 7, 2013.pdf
Criteria | Insurance | General:
Enterprise Risk Management
Primary Credit Analysts:
Li Cheng, CFA, FRM, FSA, New York (1) 212-438-1849; [email protected]
Miroslav Petkov, London (44) 20-7176-7043; [email protected]
Secondary Contacts:
Eric E Hedman, CFA, New York 212-438-2482; [email protected]
Jackson E Griffith, London (44) 20-7176-3579; [email protected]
Andy Chang, CFA, FRM, Taipei (8862) 8722-5815; [email protected]
Criteria Officer:
Emmanuel Dubois-Pelerin, Paris (33) 1-4420-6673; [email protected]
Table Of Contents
SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
METHODOLOGY
The Subfactors Of Enterprise Risk Management Analysis
ASSUMPTIONS
Determining An Insurer's Enterprise Risk Management Score
Risk Management Culture
Risk Controls
Emerging Risk Management
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Table Of Contents (cont.)
Risk Models
Strategic Risk Management
APPENDIX I: Definitions
APPENDIX II: Risk Controls Of Major Risks
RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
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Criteria | Insurance | General:
Enterprise Risk Management (Editor's Note: We originally published this criteria article on May 7, 2013. We're republishing this article following our
periodic review completed on Fe. 26, 2015. As a result of our review, we updated the author contact information.)
1. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services is publishing this article to help market participants better understand its approach
to assessing insurance companies' enterprise risk management (ERM). Our assessment of ERM examines whether
insurers execute risk management practices in a systematic, consistent, and strategic manner across the enterprise that
effectively limits future losses within the insurers' optimal risk/reward framework.
2. These criteria supersede the articles titled:
• "Evaluating The Enterprise Risk Management Practices Of Insurance Companies," published Oct. 17, 2005; • "Refining The Focus Of Insurer Enterprise Risk Management Criteria," published June 2, 2006; • "Extending The Insurance ERM Criteria To The Health Insurance Sector," published Nov. 8, 2006; • "Nonlife Insurance Risk Control Criteria And Their Role In Enterprise Risk Management," published Oct. 31, 2007; • "Summary Of Standard & Poor's Enterprise Risk Management Evaluation Process For Insurers," published Nov. 26,
2007;
• "Methodology: Assessing Management's Commitment To And Execution Of Enterprise Risk Management Processes," published Dec. 17, 2009;
• "Expanded Definition Of Adequate Classification In Enterprise Risk Management Scores," published Jan. 28, 2010; and
• "Refined Methodology For Assessing An Insurer's Risk Appetite," published March 30, 2010.
3. This article also partially supersedes "Bond Insurance Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published Aug. 25,
2011.
SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
4. These criteria apply to all global insurance ratings, including life, health, property/casualty (P/C; known as non-life
outside of the U.S.) insurers, reinsurers, bond insurers, insurance and reinsurance brokers, and mortgage and title
insurers.
SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
5. The evaluation of insurance companies' ERM is a component of our rating analysis. ERM examines whether insurers
execute risk management practices in a systematic, consistent, and strategic manner across the enterprise that
effectively limits future losses within an optimal risk/reward framework. ERM analysis also provides a prospective
view of the insurer's risk profile and capital needs.
6. ERM analysis is tailored to each insurer's risk profile and focuses on five main areas: risk management culture, risk
controls, emerging risk management, risk models, and strategic risk management.
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7. These criteria bring enhanced transparency to our ratings by articulating how we score each of the abovementioned
five subfactors and how we derive an insurer's ERM based on these five subfactor scores.
IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
8. We do not expect any rating changes for the majority of insurance companies as a result of these criteria.
EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
9. These criteria are effective immediately, and we will review our ratings over the next six months. To the extent that
elements of these criteria apply to Lloyd's Syndicate Assessments, the effective date is Nov. 1, 2013.
METHODOLOGY
The Subfactors Of Enterprise Risk Management Analysis
10. ERM analysis is comprised of five subfactors:
• Risk management culture, • Risk controls, • Emerging risk management, • Risk models, and • Strategic risk management.
11. The criteria in this article determine how each of these five subfactors is assessed and how the assessments of these
five subfactors are combined to derive the insurer's ERM score.
ASSUMPTIONS
Determining An Insurer's Enterprise Risk Management Score
12. An insurer's ERM is scored as (from most to least credit-supportive) (1) "very strong", (2) "strong", (3) "adequate with
strong risk controls", (4) "adequate", or (5) "weak", based on the assessments of the five subfactors, which we classify
as "positive", "neutral", or "negative" (see tables 1 and 2). The criteria identify key considerations in the assessment of
the subfactors. Table 2 describes these considerations but it is not an exhaustive list of circumstances under which
corresponding scores are assigned.
13. The analysis is evidence-based. An insurer receives a neutral score for any of the five subfactors where evidence is
insufficient to assign either a positive or a negative score. However, a history of failing to disclose key enterprise risk
exposures and risk management information could lead to a negative score.
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Criteria | Insurance | General: Enterprise Risk Management
Table 1
ERM Assessment
Score Assessment Guideline What it means in our opinion
1 Very Strong Positive score for all subfactors and economic
capital model (ECM) is assessed either “good”
or “superior” under our criteria.
The insurer has very strong capabilities to consistently
identify, measure, and manage its risk exposures and losses
within its chosen risk tolerances.
The insurer’s risk control processes are leading edge, applied
consistently, and executed effectively. The insurer continues
to develop its risk control processes to integrate new
technologies and adapt to the changing environment.
There is consistent evidence of the insurer’s practice of
optimizing risk-adjusted returns, resulting in an overall
stronger financial performance than peers’.
Risk and risk management heavily influence the insurer's
decision-making.
The insurer is highly unlikely to experience unexpected losses
that are outside of its risk tolerances, in our opinion.
2 Strong The risk management culture, risk controls, and
strategic risk management subfactors are
scored positive, one or both of the other two
subfactors is scored neutral, and no subfactor is
scored negative.
The insurer has strong capabilities to consistently identify,
measure, and manage risk exposures and losses within
chosen risk tolerances.
There is clear evidence of the insurer's practice of optimizing
risk-adjusted returns. But such practice is not as well
developed as that of a very strong ERM insurer or has a
shorter track record of success.
Risk and risk management are important considerations in
the insurer's corporate decision-making.
In our opinion, the insurer is somewhat more likely to
experience unexpected losses that are outside of its risk
tolerances than an insurer with a very strong ERM score.
3 Adequate with
strong risk control
The risk controls subfactor is scored positive,
the strategic risk management subfactor is
scored neutral, and no subfactor is scored
negative.
The insurer has all the characteristics of an insurer with an
adequate score, but has also established a variety of risk
controls that we view in aggregate as positive.
4 Adequate The risk controls and risk management culture
subfactors are scored at least neutral; overall
doesn’t satisfy the requirement for adequate
with strong risk control.
The insurer has capabilities to identify, measure, and manage
most key risk exposures and losses, but the process has not
been extended to all significant risks facing the enterprise.
The insurer’s loss/risk tolerance guidelines are less
developed than those of insurers with a higher ERM score.
The insurer demonstrates sufficient execution of its existing
risk management programs, albeit less comprehensive than
that of insurers with a strong ERM score.
Risk and risk management are often important considerations
in the insurer's decision-making.
In our opinion, the insurer is more likely to incur unexpected
losses than an insurer with a strong ERM score.
5 Weak One or both of the risk controls and risk
management culture subfactors are scored
negative.
The insurer has limited capabilities to consistently identify,
measure, and manage risk exposures across the enterprise
and, thereby, limit losses.
The insurer demonstrates sporadic execution of its risk
management program; losses aren’t expected to be limited in
accordance with a set of predetermined risk tolerance
guidelines.
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Table 1
ERM Assessment (cont.)
The insurer has yet to adopt a risk management framework
and is currently satisfying regulatory minimums without
regularly applying risk management to business decisions; or
it has very recently adopted a risk management system that
has yet to be tested.
Risk and risk management are sometimes considered in the
insurer’s corporate decision-making process.
Table 2
Scoring The Five ERM Subfactors
Subfactor Positive Neutral Negative
Risk management
culture (see
paragraphs 18 to 34)
ERM is well entrenched in the organization
with a formal ERM framework, an
independent and well-staffed ERM
department, and active Board participation.
The insurer has some ERM functions at
the enterprise level that cover most
material risks.
ERM is not practiced, or is
practiced inconsistently, across
the enterprise, with limited Board
participation.
The insurer has a clear vision of enterprise
risk profile and risks are managed both at a
business unit and an enterprise level within
risk tolerances.
There is limited or infrequent Board
participation.
The insurer lacks clear
understanding of its enterprise
risk profile.
The insurer’s risk appetite framework is
clearly communicated and linked directly to
risk limits.
Risk and risk management are mainly
responsibilities of business functions
with limited enterprise view.
The insurer manages risks
predominantly in silos.
The insurer has a culture of risk
communication and information sharing,
internally and externally.
The insurer understands its enterprise
risk profile around key risk exposures
and manages them within chosen risk
tolerances.
The insurer lacks a formal risk
appetite framework supported by
clear rationale; risk limits do not
exist or are very basic.
The insurer’s incentive compensation
supports ERM goals.
The insurer’s risk appetite is less
clearly defined or communicated; risk
limits are fairly simple or do not align
with overall risk tolerances.
Risk controls (see
paragraphs 35 to 42)
The insurer has identified all material risks
from all sources and frequently monitors its
risk exposures with multiple metrics.
The insurer has identified and monitors
its main sources of material risks.
The insurer does not consistently
identify and monitor its key risk
exposures.
The insurer has a comprehensive risk limit
system and strict formal limit breach
policies.
The insurer has risk limits around its
material risks, but the limits are
relatively simply or lack linkage to risk
appetite.
The insurer has limited formal
risk limits, or its risk limits are
overly aggressive, providing no
practical value in controlling
exposures.
The insurer uses multiple risk management
strategies to effectively manage exposures
within limits.
The insurer has a formal limit
enforcement policy in place.
The insurer has no limit
enforcement policy; there is
evidence of prolonged breach of
limits.
We score risk controls of material risks
predominantly as positive, and none
negative.
The insurer generally manages its risk
exposures within the risk limits.
We score one or more risk
controls on material risks as
negative.
We score no risk controls of material
risks as negative.
Emerging risk
management (see
paragraphs 43 to 46)
The insurer has well-established processes
for identifying and monitoring emerging
risks, analyzing their significance, and
preparing for and/or potentially mitigating
them.
The insurer has some processes in
place to identify and analyze the
impact of emerging risks; but these
processes are more ad-hoc and don’t
lead to risk mitigations.
The insurer doesn’t have
processes for identifying and
evaluating emerging risks.
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Table 2
Scoring The Five ERM Subfactors (cont.)
Risk models (see
paragraphs 47 to 52)
The insurer’s risk models capture all
material risks and risk interrelations in
aggregating exposures.
The insurer’s risk models capture
major risks. However, the models are
less comprehensive or process used to
aggregate enterprise risk exposures are
less sophisticated than those at
insurers scored positive.
The insurer doesn’t use risk
models or the risk models fail to
capture major risks.
The insurer’s models have undergone
robust validation and vetting and are under
strict model governance processes.
Model results are used to support the
insurer’s decision-making process, but
are not as extensive as to pass “use
test”.
The insurer’s risk models have
undergone limited validation or
vetting.
Model limitations are understood and
compensated within the organization.
There are general concerns about
data quality, assumptions, and
governance.
These models perform both stochastic and
deterministic scenario analysis.
The insurer makes little use of, or
overly relies on, model results in
decision-making.
The insurer uses model results extensively
in the decision-making process (or “use
test” in industry parlance).
Strategic risk
management (see
paragraphs 53 to 56)
The insurer has a track record of
consistently using a risk vs. reward
decision-making framework to optimize
risk-adjusted returns at an enterprise level.
The insurer uses some risk/reward
analysis in decision-making, but the
metrics and processes applied are
inconsistent across the company.
The insurer does not optimize
risk-adjusted returns; risk and
risk/reward analysis is not
adequately reflected in the
insurer’s decision making.
Risk considerations and risk adjusted return
metrics, including economic capital model
results, significantly influence the insurer’s
decisions around pricing, risk management
strategies, capital allocation, strategic
planning, reinsurance decisions, and
strategic asset allocation.
The insurer’s capital allocation is
risk-based, but mainly reflects the
views of external constituents, e.g.
regulators.
The insurer’s capital
management process only
reflects the views of external
constituents, e.g. regulators.
14. All else being equal, an insurer with a stronger ERM score is less likely to experience losses outside its predetermined
risk tolerances under our criteria. The aggressiveness or conservativeness of its risk tolerances, although related to
ERM, is assessed in the management and governance analysis (see "Methodology: Management And Governance
Credit Factors For Corporate Entities And Insurers," published Nov. 13, 2012).
15. The importance of ERM to the rating is "high" for insurers exposed to complex risks that could cause a significant loss
of capital and earnings in a short period of time or that are highly uncertain and usually long term in nature. Typically,
high importance applies to companies with significant exposure to risks such as natural catastrophes, reserve volatility
of their long-tail casualty business, or financial market volatility. If the insurer is not significantly exposed to these
types of risk or regularly retains excess capital relative to risk, the ERM importance is "low".
16. To derive insurance groups' group credit profiles (GCPs), we generally assign a single ERM score because the scope of
our analysis is the whole enterprise, encompassing all subsidiaries. The group's ERM score is assigned to group
members that are either "core" or "highly strategic". (See "Group Rating Methodology," published May 7, 2013.) The
group's ERM score could also be assigned to "strategically important" group members that are well integrated into the
group ERM processes, such that their processes are virtually indistinguishable. For all other cases, the ERM score is
assigned from a stand-alone perspective and may deviate from the ERM score of the group. We incorporate significant
deficiencies in their ERM practices, if any, in our analysis of the group's ERM.
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17. In general, start-up companies are not assigned an ERM score higher than adequate, due to insufficient historical
evidence of effective processes; they nevertheless are scored on all five subfactors. A start-up insurer may receive a
score higher than adequate if, for example, it was part of a larger organization with a strong ERM score, and if it can
demonstrate that it has the commitment, resources, and plans in place to continue the robust ERM practices already in
place within the start-up.
Risk Management Culture
18. The analysis of the first ERM subfactor, risk management culture, focuses the importance accorded to risk and ERM in
all key aspects of the insurer's business operation and corporate decision-making. As risk management culture
encompasses all aspects of the ERM framework and all the ERM subfactors are interconnected, it is difficult to
evaluate this subfactor without reference to the others. For that reason, the analysis of the risk management culture
subfactor focuses on the insurer's philosophy towards risk, especially its risk appetite framework, risk governance and
organizational structure, risk communications and reporting, and the embedding of risk metrics in its compensation
structure. The analysis also evaluates the degree to which there is broad understanding and participation in risk
management throughout the organization.
19. Standard & Poor's analysis focuses on, in particular, indicators in the following key areas of the risk management
culture:
• Risk governance and organization structure, • Risk appetite framework, • Risk reporting and communication, and • Incentive compensation structures.
Risk governance and organization structure
20. A formal, well-defined, and independent risk governance and ERM organization structure is fundamental to an
effective ERM framework. A positive risk management culture is typically characterized by a well-defined and
independent ERM governance structure that supports effective risk management at an enterprise level. Such
governance structure typically involves guidance and oversight from the Board of Directors, a dedicated ERM function
led by a well-qualified senior executive and risk management functions at the business unit level, and a clear definition
of roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships. Additional evidence that supports a positive score can include an
ERM function that has been in place for several years, enjoys high visibility, and carries significant authority within the
organization. Insurers with a positive risk management culture score typically have an effective system of risk
committees both at the enterprise and the business unit levels, supported by significant resources committed to
day-to-day execution. The insurer also has enterprise level functions that aggregate and manage risks with an
enterprise view, taking into consideration correlation and diversification.
21. An insurer with a neutral score on the risk management culture subfactor typically has some of the characteristics of
those with a positive score, but with a risk governance and organizational structure that isn't equally comprehensive or
is still fairly new. Insurers may also receive a neutral score if the management of key exposures is mainly a function of
the insurer's business units, without enterprise-level risk view or risk supervision.
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22. An insurer's risk management culture score is negative if the Board and senior management display a lack of
understanding of the importance of ERM and have insufficient active involvement in the ERM process. Evidence that
might lead to such a score includes the absence of dedicated resources to risk management, blurry risk ownership and
reporting lines, and sporadic/ad-hoc Board level risk discussion. If an insurer has a risk management structure where
key risks are managed in complete silos, the score could also be negative.
Risk appetite framework
23. Strong ERM is consistent with a well-defined risk appetite framework that supports the effective selection of risks, so
that the insurer takes only desired risks where sufficiently rewarded. All insurers, independent of their size and
complexity, need to have some capabilities to limit their risk exposure and losses within their chosen risk tolerances.
The aggressiveness or conservatism of an insurer's risk appetite is a related issue, but separately considered under the
financial risk tolerance criteria detailed in "Methodology: Management And Governance Credit Factors For Corporate
Entities And Insurers," published Nov. 13, 2012. The ERM score reflects our view of management's ability to operate
within stated risk tolerances. In cases where we consider an insurer's risk appetite aggressive, we believe the strength
of its ERM framework is critical to the management of risks within the chosen risk tolerances.
24. The meanings of terms such as risk appetite, risk preferences, and risk tolerances vary across the industry and in
reference materials. Appendix 1 contains the definitions our criteria use. The criteria concentrate on the processes
around the establishment and use of risk appetite, rather than the precise definitions insurers use.
25. Insurers with a positive score on risk management culture typically demonstrate a thorough understanding of the
enterprise risk profile in relation to its risk appetite, a well-defined risk appetite framework, and a track record of
containing risk exposures within the chosen tolerances and limits. Such risk appetite framework typically means active
involvement from the Board, and strong buy-in from senior management and business units, while being well aligned
with the organization's strategic goals, resources, and value proposition. There are clear rationales supporting the
chosen risk tolerances and limits. The insurer typically is able to articulate the direct linkage between enterprise risk
preferences, risk tolerances, and risk limits and policies.
26. A neutral subfactor score is assigned to insurers with a risk appetite that is less clearly defined or communicated or
hasn't extended to all key risk exposures. An insurer with a neutral score generally has a system of risk limits in place
on its key exposures, although these limits might be fairly simple or not directly linked to overall risk tolerances.
27. Insurers with a negative score have failed to demonstrate a clear understanding of their risk profile. That is, their risk
appetite is either unclear or inconsistent or not supported by robust risk/reward metrics. Either the insurer has not
imposed limits on some of its key exposures or its risk limits are overly aggressive to allow for outsized risk taking.
Risk reporting and communication
28. A positive risk management culture score typically is consistent with an insurer's extensive and clear communications,
both internally and externally, around its risk exposures and ERM practice. Such insurer has a long-standing culture of
risk communicating and sharing, supported by a web of comprehensive and frequent risk reporting around all key
areas of risk exposures. Enterprise risk profile and risk management practices are typically clearly communicated
internally (to the Board, senior management, and to business level) and externally (notably to regulators, investors, and
analysts). Also supporting a positive score is an insurer's commitment to a high level of transparency during its
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discussions with Standard & Poor's. For example, the management is open to discussing with external constituents
lessons learned from past mistakes or current areas of improvement.
29. A negative score is assigned to insurers with only very limited internal risk communications to the Board or external
disclosure about its risk management practices; or if the insurer uses risk reports that are not frequently updated or not
granular enough to reflect its risk exposures; or if the insurer has a track record of failing to disclose key enterprise risk
exposures and risk management information.
30. An insurer will get a neutral score if it fits into neither the positive or negative category.
Incentive compensation structures
31. The alignment of a compensation structure with metrics that encourage long-term goals, rather than those
incentivizing excessive risk taking is an important element of a positive risk management culture subfactor. Evidence
that the insurer's incentive compensation structure rewards managers based on an analysis of risk/return tradeoffs,
and that it is consistent with the insurer's strategic goals and objectives, generally supports a positive risk management
culture score.
32. Incentive compensation structures not supported by robust risk reward metrics that reward managers predominately
using medium- to long-term profitability targets, but that do not promote short-term risk taking, are consistent with a
neutral subfactor score.
33. A negative score is generally assigned where short-term profitability or business-volume is the key influence of an
insurer's compensation design.
34. The analysis of an insurer's risk management culture subfactor involves assessing the above-mentioned components,
as well as considering the reflection of risk management culture in the other ERM subfactors.
Risk Controls
35. The second subfactor, risk controls, analyzes the processes and procedures insurers employ to manage their key risk
exposures within the general areas of credit and counterparty risk, equity risk, interest risk, insurance risk (including
reserving risk), and operational risk. The specific risks on which the analysis focuses are a function of the insurer's
business and risk profiles. For example, market risk is a focus for an insurer with a large U.S. variable annuity business
or a large U.K. life with-profits business, but not so much for a property and casualty insurer with only short-term
liabilities and limited equities and real estate in its investment portfolio. The analysis may also extend beyond these
broad risk categories, for example, to merger and acquisition (M&A) risks if the insurer has an acquisitive business
strategy.
36. To score the risk controls subfactor for an insurer, the criteria first require scoring of the risk controls of each of the
insurer's material risks as positive, neutral, or negative. The combination of these individual risk controls scores
determine the overall risk controls score using the same scale of positive, neutral, or negative. Each risk's relative
importance to the insurer's overall risk profile determines its weight in the score combination. Table 3 describes the
general guidelines used to derive an insurer's risk controls subfactor score from the individual assessments of risk
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controls on the insurer's key risks.
Table 3
Risk Controls Subfactor Assessment
Score Guideline
Positive Risk controls of materials risks are predominantly scored positive; no risk controls of an individual risk is scored negative
Neutral All other combinations
Negative One or more risk controls of material risks is scored negative
37. To arrive at one individual risk control score for each of the insurer's major risks, various aspects of the risk control
process, including risk identification, risk measurement and monitoring, risk limits and standards, the procedures to
manage risks to stay within limits, and the execution and the results or effectiveness of such risk control programs, are
analyzed. The criteria also consider risk limit enforcement processes and the insurer's practice of learning from its
own, or the industry's, experiences. The combined quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of these aspects of
an insurer's risk controls lead to the assessment of risk controls for each of the insurer's major risks.
38. A positive individual risk control score is assigned if the insurer has an effective risk control program in place to
consistently identify, measure, monitor, and manage the risk exposures and is able to demonstrate a track record of
effectively managing risk exposures within pre-determined risk tolerances, even during stressful periods. Such program
generally involves an established risk-specific risk management structure, comprehensively identifies risk exposures
from all sources, employs frequent risk monitoring and risk reporting using multiple appropriate risk metrics, has a
formal and clearly-communicated risk limit system, and uses multiple risk mitigation strategies to proactively contain
exposures to be within risk limits. The insurer follows clearly defined risk limit enforcement policies and promptly
addresses breach of risk limits. A risk control program that receives a positive score is also characterized by the
insurer's continuous efforts to review the program's effectiveness and to improve the program based on new
developments as well as lessons learned from the past.
39. A neutral assessment typically indicates that the insurer has generally effective risk control programs in place to
identify, measure, monitor, and manage the risk. However, the risk control program is less comprehensive or effective
than one in the positive category. Fairly new risk control programs are typically scored as neutral until there is a track
record of consistent effectiveness. An insurer with limited exposure to a risk and consequently a relatively simple
control program that is commensurate with the exposure would receive a neutral score.
40. Generally, a negative assessment occurs only if that particular risk is a material exposure to the insurer and there are
major deficiencies in the insurer's risk control processes. Examples of such deficiencies include, but are not limited to,
the insurer's history of incurring losses outside its risk tolerance, lack of a consistent process to identify risk exposures
from all sources, informal and infrequent risk monitoring and reporting using overly simplistic risk measures, lack of
formal and well-communicated risk limits, and observed prolonged breach of risk limits without justification or timely
action. A negative score is also assigned if the insurer deliberately takes on outsized risk positions in an attempt to
speculate on future market movements.
41. The main risk categories in the analysis of an insurer's risk controls are:
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• Credit risk, • Interest rate risk, • Market risk, • Insurance risk, and • Operational risk.
42. Appendix 2 provides examples of how we assess risk controls of each of the insurer's major risks, taking into
consideration the various aspects of risk control processes (as described in paragraph 37), including risk identification,
risk measurement and monitoring, risk standards and limits and limit enforcement, risk management, and risk learning.
Appendix 2 also provides examples to illustrate how we analyze risk controls of each one of the main risk categories,
including credit, interest rate, market, insurance, and operational risks. These examples are for illustrative purpose only
and should not be interpreted as either a constraining or exhaustive list based on which we form our assessments.
While some of these risks and the related risk control practices are common to all insurance companies, others are
more relevant to individual insurers in specific sectors. As such, the scope of our analysis is adjusted to reflect an
individual insurer's risk profile.
Emerging Risk Management
43. The emerging risk management subfactor analyzes how the insurer addresses risks that are not a current threat to
creditworthiness, but could become a threat in the future. In addition, it assesses the insurer's level of preparedness if
those emerging risks materialize. Such risks could derive from areas such as regulation, the physical environment, the
macroeconomic environment, and medical developments. Effective emerging risk management serves as an
early-warning system so that such risks do not catch the insurer by surprise.
44. The subfactor is scored positive if evidence shows that the insurer has well-established processes to consistently
identify, assess, monitor, and potentially mitigate the threat of each identified emerging risk if necessary. Typically,
insurers that receive a positive score perform scenario analysis to estimate the impact of possible adverse events on
the insurer's reputation, liquidity, and overall financials, taking into consideration existing and new risk mitigation and
contingency plans.
45. The score is neutral if the insurer has some processes in place for anticipating emerging risks and envisioning their
significance, but these processes are limited to the identification of the emerging risks with limited or no measurement
and mitigation.
46. If an insurer doesn't have any emerging risk management process, either formal or informal, or has experienced
outsized losses due to past failures to identify emerging risks and hasn't shown sufficient evidence of having learned
from such experiences, it would receive a negative score.
Risk Models
47. Risk models are an integral part of a robust ERM framework. They are used extensively to measure risk exposures, test
risk correlation and diversification, validate risk mitigation strategies, and quantify capital requirements for a given risk
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profile. The subfactor covers not only the risk models related to distinct risks (for example, credit, market, insurance,
and operational) and enterprise risk aggregation across risks, but also other models used in the insurer's day-to-day
operations, including pricing, valuation, and projections. If available, the analysis factors in the insurer's economic
capital model where the insurer measures its overall risk exposure considering correlation and diversification.
48. The analysis of risk models focuses on assessing the robustness, consistency, and completeness of the insurer's risk
models, including, where relevant, its development and use of an economic capital model, and the processes for model
governance and validation. The subfactor score reflects the comprehensiveness and quality of the risk models used,
the risk measures adopted, the methodology, data and assumptions used, the incorporation of risk-mitigation activities
in those models, the infrastructure to support the risk models, how the model results are used, and whether model
limitations are communicated and understood by the risk managers and senior management.
49. The score is positive if the insurer's risk model system captures the insurer's material risk exposures and the
interrelation between risks. The models have undergone extensive validation and are under a rigorous model
governance process. Such risk models typically employ comprehensive metrics to measure risk. They generally have
the capability to perform both comprehensive stochastic analysis and deterministic stress scenario analyses. Model
risks are fully understood by the insurer and have been compensated with thoughtful judgment whenever possible.
Also, characteristics of a positive subfactor score include evidence that the insurer uses model results extensively in
making ERM decisions. For example, risk models are used to ensure risk exposures are within the predetermined risk
tolerances to compare and validate risk mitigation strategies.
50. While an economic capital model is a substantive enhancement to any risk model system in that it provides a valuable
enterprise-wide and economic-based view of the insurer's risk profile, the existence and the use of the economic
capital model is not a pre-requisite for a positive risk models subfactor score.
51. The score is neutral if the insurer has effective models in place for its materials risks, but the risk models are less
comprehensive or robust compared to those in the positive category; or if the results of these models are not used
extensively in guiding risk management decisions.
52. The score is generally negative if:
• The risk models are not complete or granular enough to accurately reflect the insurer's major risk exposures and enterprise risk profile;
• The reasonableness of the methodologies and assumptions used, or the robustness of the model validation and the process to obtain data used in the models, is questionable;
• The insurer's use of risk models is limited to satisfying the regulatory requirements; or • The insurer performs limited sensitivity or stress testing, or has shown no or limited use of model results in
decision-making.
Strategic Risk Management
53. Strategic risk management is the process through which insurers facilitate the optimization of risk-adjusted returns,
starting with a view of the required risk capital and a well-defined process for allocating capital among different
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products, lines of business, and risk factors. The strategic risk management subfactor assesses the insurer's program to
optimize risk-adjusted returns and to evaluate and prioritize strategic options on a level playing field. The analysis is
based on evidence of situations where the insurer has made strategic decisions using economic risk/reward metrics
that are consistent with its risk appetite; and on how an insurer balances other concerns, including regulatory and
accounting considerations. The analysis focuses not only on the choice and outcome of the strategic decisions, but,
more importantly, on the risk/reward rationale underlying the insurer's chosen strategy.
54. The score is positive if the insurer executes consistent and effective risk-reward analysis in the majority of the key
areas of analysis, including the company's strategic planning, product pricing and re-pricing, strategic asset allocation,
reinsurance strategy and net retained risk profile, new risk-bearing initiatives (including M&A, entry into new markets),
capital and/or economic capital budgeting, and optimization of risk-adjusted returns. The score is positive only if the
insurer demonstrates a history of successful execution of its strategic risk management program, including for example
better-than-peer risk-adjusted returns and a track record of successful M&A that is consistently accretive on a
risk-adjusted basis.
55. The score is neutral if the insurer does execute some risk-reward analysis in some of the key areas and plans to add the
rest eventually. However, the insurer uses an approach to optimize risk-adjusted returns that is based on relatively
simplistic capital metrics compared to that used by insurers with positive scores. The score could also be neutral if an
insurer has developed an economic capital model and uses model results in the strategic risk management process, but
the economic capital model has limited history or credibility.
56. If the insurer doesn't use a risk-reward optimization approach in any of the aforementioned key areas, so that capital
management is very basic with no consideration of enterprise level risk reward optimization; or if the insurer's capital
management program is solely premised on the view of external constituents (e.g. regulatory capital requirements)
with no adjustments, a negative score is assigned.
APPENDIX I: Definitions
57. The criteria use the following definitions:
• Risk appetite as the framework that establishes the risks that the insurer wishes to acquire, avoid, retain, and/or reduce.
• Risk preferences as qualitative risk appetite statements that guide the insurer in the selection of risks. These qualitative risk appetite statements (risk preferences) may or may not be risk specific, but nevertheless, establish the
underlying principles for the selection of risks. For example, "The Group has no appetite for unrewarded risk", or
"The Group has an appetite for insurance risks as these are expected to be value additive".
• Risk tolerances as quantitative risk appetite statements that guide the insurer in the selection of risks. These statements typically specify maximum acceptable losses. They help the insurer to translate the qualitative risk
preferences into action by constraining the insurer's exposures to risks, as defined by its risk limits (see below). Risk
tolerances are often probabilistic in nature with reference to, for example, the insurer's solvency or earnings over a
specified period at a chosen confidence level. Examples of risk tolerances include "Maintaining capital adequacy
consistent with target rating following a 30% equity market decline" or "Constraining losses to within one-quarter's
planned earnings following a 1 in 250 year event over the following year".
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• Risk limits as quantitative boundaries that serve to constrain specific risk-taking activities at the operational level within the business. The risk appetite statements are usually implemented within the business through the use of
risk limits. For example, an insurer may express risk limits as maximum percentage of total investments in equities,
maximum duration mismatch, or maximum exposure by geography.
APPENDIX II: Risk Controls Of Major Risks
58. This appendix provides examples of how we analyze the risk controls subfactor. For each of the insurer's major risks,
we assign one individual risk control score by assessing the overall effectiveness of the risk control processes,
including the quality of risk identification, risk measurement and monitoring, the comprehensiveness and robustness of
risk limits and standards, the rigor of the procedures to manage risks to stay within limits, and the execution and the
results or effectiveness of such risk control programs. We also consider risk limit enforcement processes and the
insurer's practice of learning from its own, or the industry's, experiences.
59. Table 4 below provides some detailed examples of how we analyze these various aspects of the risk control process in
assigning an individual risk control score. Examples that are more favorable support a positive risk control score while
the less favorable ones may lead to a negative score. We do not assign scores to each of these risk control aspects,
such as risk identification or risk limit. But rather, the combined quality, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of all
these aspects lead to the assessment of risk controls for each of the insurer's major risks. The granularity of our
analysis is tailored based on the materiality of a particular risk in the insurer's overall risk profile.
60. The rest of Appendix 2 translates the general examples outlined in Table 4 into examples that are risk specific. These
examples are for illustrative purpose only and should not be interpreted as an exhaustive list based on which we form
our rating opinions. The risks discussed in this appendix include:
• Credit risk, • Interest rate risk, • Market risk, • Insurance risk, and • Operational risk.
Table 4
Examples Of Individual Risk Control Assessments
More Favorable Neutral Less Favorable
Risk identification The insurer has a comprehensive process of
identifying all risk exposures.
The insurer has identified all material risk
exposures.
Not all significant risk exposures
have been identified.
Risk measurement
and monitoring
The insurer monitors all significant risks on a
regular basis, using multiple measures.
The insurer monitors all significant risks,
although the process is not as
comprehensive or frequent as the leading
peers'.
The insurer’s risk monitoring is
informal, irregular, and of
questionable accuracy.
The insurer uses a combination of stochastic
analysis and deterministic sensitivity and
stress tests to ensure containment of
exposure, considering diversification and risk
correlation.
Stress testing is performed sometimes,
but the scenarios might not be stressful
enough or the results of the testing aren’t
used in decision making.
Stress testing is rarely or never
performed.
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Table 4
Examples Of Individual Risk Control Assessments (cont.)
The insurer has comprehensive risk reports
that are updated frequently to reflect risk
profile by risk, business line, and at the
enterprise level.
Risk reports are updated regularly. Risk reports are sporadic and
inconsistent, making it difficult to
have a clear understanding of
enterprise risk profile.
Risk exposures are clearly communicated to
all levels of the organization.
Risk exposures are communicated across
the organization, but the communication
is less formal or not as extensive as that
of insurers with a positive risk controls
score.
Risk standards and
limits
The insurer has clearly documented
comprehensive risk limits, risk standards,
and early warning systems for risk taking and
risk management.
The insurer has limits for all material risk
exposures, but some of them might not
be as equally comprehensive as those of
leading peers or not clearly documented
or communicated.
Risk limits don’t exist for some
material risk exposures, or are
not documented, or are overly
aggressive to constrain risk
taking.
Risk limits are directly linked to risk
tolerances and are clearly communicated
and widely understood within the company.
Risk limits are conservative in general,
although lacking strong rationale.
Risk limits and policies are not
well communicated or
understood internally.
Risk limits are expressed in multiple
measures.
Corporate risk policies are not
completely documented or well
communicated.
Corporate risk policies don’t exist
for some material risks; product
development policies don’t exist
or don’t include any risk metrics.
The insurer clearly documents and
communicates its risk policies and has formal
corporate product development policies to
ensure new products comply with clearly
defined risk standards.
Risk management The insurer has formal programs in place
and uses multiple strategies to proactively
manage the risks within tolerances.
The insurer has risk management
programs in place, but the execution
might not be consistent all the time.
The insurer’s risk management
activities are situational, ad hoc,
and driven by individual
judgment.
The insurer has a formal risk-specific risk
management structure starting with risk
committee and dedicated resources,
supported by coordination with and effective
feedback between all related business
functions.
Risk is managed mainly at business unit
level with some coordination and
feedback between related functions.
There is no or very limited
coordination and feedback
between risk managers and other
business functions.
There are clear rationales supporting the
chosen risk management strategies and
well-defined measurements of effectiveness.
Risk is an important consideration in
product pricing and development, but the
insurer lacks a consistent way to assess
risks in new products across product
lines.
Risk is not a major consideration
in product pricing and
development.
Risk and risk management are key
considerations in product pricing and
development.
The insurer has, in general, not incurred
losses outside its chosen tolerances,
maybe with only a few exceptions.
The insurer deliberately takes
outsized risk positions in an
attempt to speculate future
market movements.
The insurer has a good track record of not
incurring losses outside its risk tolerances,
even in stressful periods.
The insurer has a history of
incurring losses outside its risk
tolerances.
Risk limit
enforcement
The insurer has clear processes to correct a
breach of risk limits and to respond to early
warning limits within a prescribed time limit.
Breaches of limits are usually corrected,
but there is no formal procedure or time
requirement to address breach of limits.
The insurer’s review of
compliance of limits is irregular,
and often there are no
consequences or actions for
exceeding limits.
There is frequent monitoring of compliance
against all established risk limits and policies.
The insurer monitors compliance of risk
limits and policies, but less frequently or
rigorously than the leading peers.
Observed evidence of prolonged
breach of limits without
justification or action.
Special situations falling outside the limits
are constantly monitored until resolved.
Key risk exposures are generally
managed within limits.
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Table 4
Examples Of Individual Risk Control Assessments (cont.)
All risk exposures are managed within
chosen risk limits.
Risk learning The insurer has a defined process to analyze
and learn from past losses, near-misses, as
well as successes; enhancements to ERM
framework occur as a result of such process.
The insurer reviews loss events, but such
reviews are more ad-hoc in nature and
do not necessarily lead to actions.
The insurer quickly puts loss
situations behind without review
or with a review of limited scope.
The insurer might also perform back-testing
to ensure the effectiveness of the changes
and enhancements.
The insurer might also institute
drastic changes to the ERM
program as a result of recent
losses but without sound reasons.
Credit risk controls
61. Credit risks are the exposures an insurer faces from incurring economic losses caused by the default of another
company on that company's obligations, or losses from the perceived or actual deterioration of another company's
creditworthiness. Credit risk exposure could also come from counterparty risk, which is the risk of counterparties
failing to fulfill their obligations in full and in a timely manner. Typical counterparties for an insurer are reinsurers,
derivative counterparties, and other business partners, including banks, brokers, and dealers and third party
administrators. Credit deterioration of these entities can also create credit risk. In addition, some insurance liabilities
have a very high correlation to credit risk, such as director's and officer's coverage. In evaluating credit risk controls at
insurance companies, it is important to acknowledge that there may be a high degree of correlation between these
sources of exposures.
62. To assess an insurer's credit risk controls, we evaluate the processes and practices around risk identification, risk
measurement and monitoring, risk limits and standards, enforcement of risk limits, risk management, and risk learning.
The assessment of strength and effectiveness of all these aspects supports our view of the overall robustness of the
insurer's risk control program on credit risk controls.
63. Table 5 provides some examples of the credit risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis. These examples are
consistent with the examples in Table 4.
Table 5
Credit Risk Controls Assessment
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has identified and captured all potential credit
risk sources (for example, investment portfolios, derivative
counterparties, credit default swaps [CDS], brokers,
reinsurers, policyholders), and exposures are aggregated
across all sources.
The insurer has identified and captured all
major credit risk exposures, including the
investment portfolio and key
counterparties, and aggregates all major
credit exposure.
Insurer does not, as a practice, identify
credit risk other than within the
investment portfolio while it is
exposed to other sources.
The insurer uses multiple metrics to measure credit
exposure, incorporating both internal and external credit
assessments. It may also use other parameters such as
movements in equity prices, including advanced
frameworks such as value at risk (VaR) or the Merton
model.
Credit exposures are measured using only a
few relatively simple metrics.
Credit risk is mainly managed at
portfolio or business unit level. The
insurer doesn’t aggregate exposures
across the enterprise and all sources.
The insurer’s risk control framework takes into
consideration codependences between sources of credit
risks.
The insurer’s modeled credit loss doesn’t
incorporate the actual concentrations of
credit risks or codependences among
various credit risk sources.
Credit risk exposure information is not
made readily available to those
making credit decisions.
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Table 5
Credit Risk Controls Assessment (cont.)
The insurer performs frequent stress testing, including both
systemic and single obligor/sector credit events.
The insurer uses a system of credit limits,
but there is no clear linkage to the insurer’s
risk appetite.
The insurer uses a simple metric to
monitor credit risk.
The insurer has comprehensive credit risk limits (for
example, single obligor, credit quality, concentration by
geography and sector).
The insurer relies mainly on external credit
assessment to monitor creditworthiness.
Risk limits do not exist, are not
documented, or are overly broad to
provide any constraining effect on
credit risk-taking.
Risk limits are expressed in multiple measurements, e.g.,
limits around notional amount (e.g. market value as a
percentage of total invested assets) as well as around
exposures (e.g. value-at-risk, max dollar value change due
to spread widening).
The insurer performs stress testing, but the
testing is not as frequent or as sophisticated
as that of the leading peers.
The insurer uses simplistic credit risk
measures and management
techniques; however, decisions are
frequently made based on the
judgment of the portfolio manager.
Counterparty risk exposures are strictly managed through
a centralized counterparty approval process and the use of
a combination of minimum rating requirement, frequent
monitoring of obligor creditworthiness, and collateral
requirement.
64. An insurer's interest risk controls are the (i) processes of identifying and measuring the exposures through its portfolios
of assets and liabilities to losses resulting from movements in interest rate risk components and (ii) managing and
mitigating such risks to be consistent with the insurer's business goals and risk appetite. Our analysis therefore
considers the factors that can cause assets and liabilities, including hedge instruments, to expose insurers to potential
downside financial risks.
65. Interest rate risk can arise from a variety of sources and is typically most significant in cases where the assets and/or
liabilities are long term in nature, or product profitability is sensitive to asset performance, or assets and/or liabilities
contain implicit or explicit options that cause the cash flows to change dynamically based on interest rate movements.
Examples exclude options in the investment portfolios (e.g. call options and prepayment) as well as options granted to
policyholders in the liability portfolios (for example, flexible premiums, lapse, and withdrawal). Interest rate risk may
arise from exposures to absolute changes in interest rate rates, relative changes in interest rates (spread relationship),
and interest rate volatilities. For each of these, an insurer's exposures could be to one or more points along the term
structure and, in some cases, to interest rate movements in multiple financial markets.
66. Table 6 provides some examples of the interest rate risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis.
Table 6
Interest Risk Controls Assessment
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has identified and captured all exposures
from assets, liabilities, and hedge instruments to all
sources of interest rate risks (e.g. change in yield
curve level and shape, volatility, spread, and spread
volatility).
Insurer has identified and captured all major
interest rate exposures from assets liabilities and
hedge instruments.
Insurer has only identified some of
the interest rate risks of its assets or
liabilities.
All relevant component exposures are measured and
monitored using multiple metrics (e.g. duration, key
rate duration, spread duration convexity, value at risk
[VaR], dollar duration, capital at risk) at both the
sub-portfolio and the enterprise level.
The insurer segments asset and liability portfolio
into homogeneous sub-portfolios with clear
interest rate risk limits.
The insurer doesn’t have a formal
framework to control interest rate
risks; interest rate risk monitoring is
infrequent and primarily takes place
to meet regulatory requirements.
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Table 6
Interest Risk Controls Assessment (cont.)
Asset and liabilities are segmented into sub-portfolios;
interest rate risk limits, e.g. cash flow/key rate
duration/convexity mismatch limits, are employed for
each sub-portfolio as well as at enterprise level.
The insurer monitors multiple metrics, but the key
focus of risk monitoring and risk limits is duration
only; or captures only the impact of absolute rate
changes at one or multiple points along the term
structure.
The insurer doesn’t segment its
portfolio, even when underlying
asset and liabilities have varying
interest rate risk characteristics.
Stress testing analyzes the impact on the insurer’s
financials, liquidity, and underlying economics of
scenarios such as low interest rates, rate spikes,
systemic and idiosyncratic spread movements, taking
into consideration the interaction between asset and
liability cash flows.
Performs sensitivity and stress tests to analyze the
impact of interest rate movements; however, such
analysis might not capture the dynamic
interaction between asset and liability cash flow
(e.g. uses static lapse assumption for interest
sensitivity products regardless of rate
movements).
The insurer performs very limited
stress testing and lacks thorough
understanding of the impact of
adverse interest rate scenarios.
The insurer uses multiple interest rate risk
management strategies, including active management
of “inforce” business, strategic asset allocation, and
hedging.
The insurer uses appropriate interest rate
management strategies, including inforce
management and product pricing.
There is evidence of substantial
breach of interest rate risk limits
without remediation.
The insurer’s product development team works
closely with interest rate risk management team to
develop investment and/or hedging strategies and to
ensure new products have desirable asset liability
management (ALM) characteristics.
Although risk is an important consideration, risk
management is not an integral part of the product
development process as it is in the case of insurers
with a positive assessment.
Management deliberately takes
interest rate positions to speculate
on future rate movements.
There is no or very limited
coordination between risk
management, product pricing, and
inforce management.
Market risk controls
67. Our analysis of an insurer's market risk controls mainly focus on its process of capturing the exposure to equity, real
estate, and foreign exchange risk and its ability to manage and mitigate such risks to within the insurer's
pre-determined risk tolerances. Since foreign exchange risks are generally managed fairly tightly at insurance
companies, we typically place more emphasis on equity risks (where applicable).
68. The major sources of an insurer's exposures to equity and property risks are its investments in equities, equity linked
securities, and insurance liabilities that contain embedded options or guarantees that are linked to equity and real
estate investment performance, which include variable annuities, equity indexed annuities, and with profit funds.
Equity risk also manifests itself through the volatility of account-value-based fee revenues that fluctuate as a result of
equity market movements.
69. Given the potential volatility of equity and real estate risks relative to other risk drivers, we view the analysis of an
insurer's market risk controls as a critical part of ERM analysis in instances where the insurer provides certain of the
products listed above, or where equities and real estate related investment form a substantial portion of the insurer's
investment portfolio. During periods of economic stress, a sharp decline in equity markets or drastic increase in equity
market volatility could put significant strain on these insurers' financial condition. We also analyze risk controls related
to foreign exchange risks, especially for insurers with a substantial international business or international investments
outside their home country currency.
70. While all insurers are exposed to market risks to certain degrees, some insurers' exposures are fairly limited. Such a
limited exposure lowers the importance we place on this portion of our ERM analysis. In such cases, we focus on the
insurer's risk controls that are commensurate with the limited exposure and would not always view the use of a
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sophisticated equity hedge program necessary for a neutral risk control score here. In other instances where equity risk
is a key risk exposure of an insurer, our assessment involves an in-depth analysis of the insurer's ability to manage the
risk, including the complexity of risk metrics used, the frequency and robustness of risk reporting, the risk mitigation
strategies in place, the instruments used to hedge exposures, the choice of hedge targets, and hedge effectiveness and
characteristics of embedded options in the liability portfolio. We also assess the product pricing and development and
inforce management process in the context of equity risk controls.
71. Table 7 provides some examples of the market risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis.
Table 7
Market Risk Controls Assessment
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has identified and captured equity, real estate, and
foreign exchange exposures from all sources.
The insurer has identified and captured
equity, real estate, and foreign exchange
exposures from major sources.
The insurer has only identified
and captured equity, real estate,
and foreign exchange exposures
from its investments and lacks a
clear understanding of its
exposures through its liabilities, if
applicable.
Frequency of risk measurement and monitoring is consistent
with tolerance and hedging strategy (e.g. dynamic strategy vs.
static strategy using over the counter derivatives).
The insurer frequently monitors multiple
risk metrics and has risk limits in place, but
the metrics used and stress tests performed
are not as comprehensive as those for an
insurer with a positive score.
The insurer uses only a few
simple metrics to monitor equity
exposures through the liability
and/or hedge portfolio (if
material), e.g. account value only.
The applied metrics capture all relevant component equity
risks (e.g. Delta, Gamma, Vega, and Rho), on both gross and
net of hedges. The insurer performs supplemental stress tests
and supplemental historical VaR.
The insurer has a hedge program or other
risk mitigation strategies in place if equity
and/or foreign currency exposures are
material.
The insurer applies overly simply
risk limits, mainly on its
investments, or very broad risk
limits that provide no
constraining value.
The insurer uses comprehensive risk limits expressed in
multiple metrics (e.g. equity as a percentage of invested assets,
single name/industry limits, the Greeks, VaR).
Hedge program is generally effective, but
hedging targets are not backed by a clear
rationale. Hedging coverage is low relative
to the risk tolerances.
The insurer performs very limited
or no stress tests beyond
regulatory requirements.
The insurer effectively measures foreign exchange exposure in
all currencies it has exposure to and has stated risk limits to
movements in foreign exchange exposure because of each
relevant currency.
Hedge performance is monitored, but
limited hedge performance or attribution
analysis is performed.
The insurer doesn’t have a hedge
program at all (if it has material
exposures) or such program does
exist, but exposures are outside of
its tolerances and such program
provides no practical value.
The insurer applies hedging strategies and risk mitigation
techniques to ensure retained risk exposures are within defined
risk limits.
The hedge portfolio is rebalanced frequently
enough to reflect the market developments,
but is less responsive on risk mitigating
product strategies.
Other risk mitigation strategies
(such as bonus policies and use of
surplus capital buffers policies)
are not well defined or ineffective
in times of stress. The insurer
does not perform adequate
studies about profit distribution
and capital sustainability.
The insurer has clearly defined hedge targets (e.g. protection of
capital, reduction of earnings volatility, economics) and has
been very effective in achieving the chosen targets; unhedged
residual exposure is fairly small and within risk tolerances.
The insurer may have risk mitigation
strategies in place similar to insurers with a
positive assessment, but there is evidence
that these strategies were not fully
implemented or effective during financial
crises. These strategies are regularly
reviewed based on profit distribution and
capital sustainability under a range of
market scenarios but mainly based on
scenario testing.
The insurer deliberately takes
outsized risk positions to
speculate on future market
movements.
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Table 7
Market Risk Controls Assessment (cont.)
The insurer closely monitors hedge performance and
frequently rebalances, if hedge strategy necessitates, to reflect
trends and developments, including deviation of policyholder
behavior from expected and higher-than-expected market
volatility.
The insurer relies mainly on third party
software with some vetting, but has a
limited view of potential model limitation
and model risk.
Thorough hedge performance, basis risk, and attribution
analysis and results are used to support hedge program
enhancements or changes, model improvements, product
development, and inforce management.
Equity risks and risk controls are an
important consideration in product
development and inforce management.
The insurer has well-defined and embedded risk mitigation
strategies (such as adjusting policyholder’s profit distribution,
use of surplus capital buffers, re-pricing of guarantees, and
change in equity and real estate exposures to reflect capital
buffer). There is a track record of these strategies being
implemented in times of stress. These strategies are also
regularly reviewed based on extensive studies about profit
distribution and capital sustainability under a wide range of
market scenarios utilizing stochastic modeling and scenario
testing.
Risk managers work closely with product managers to embed
risk mitigation strategies in product development and inforce
management.
Life and health insurance risk controls--mortality, longevity, morbidity, and policyholder behavior risks
72. Most life insurers are exposed to mortality risk, longevity risk, morbidity risk, and policyholder behavior risks, while
health insurers are typically exposed to morbidity risk. These risks arise from the deviations of actual experiences from
those expected in pricing and reserving and could potentially hurt product profitability if adverse deviations exceed the
margins built into the product by the insurer. An insurer's exposure to these insurance risks depends on its product
offerings and benefit structures. Therefore, our assessment of insurance risk controls focuses on an insurer's key
exposures given its liability profile.
73. Table 8 provides some examples of the life and health insurance risk-specific indicators that inform our analysis.
Table 8
Life And Health Insurance Risk Controls Assessment--Mortality, Longevity, Morbidity, And Policyholder Behavior Risks
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has identified and captured exposures from all
sources (e.g. underwriting, mortality volatility, concentration,
pandemic) and has a clear understanding of all potential
policyholder behavior risks (e.g. lapse, flexible premium,
annuitization, withdrawal), especially the “in-the-moneyness”
of policyholder options.
The insurer has identified and
captured exposures from all major
sources and has some understanding
of potential policyholder behavior
risks.
The insurer has not clearly identified
major exposures.
The insurer performs frequent and comprehensive experience
studies to compare actual experience vs. expected (including
mortality rates, morbidity claim incidence and severity,
policyholder demographic distribution, concentrations);
experiences in recent years have generally been favorable.
The insurer performs some experience
studies, but not frequently enough
compared to the trends and
development.
Experience studies are either not
performed, or are too infrequent or
simple to provide real value. There is
very limited monitoring of new business
and inforce experiences.
The insurer has formal limits that are directly linked to its risk
appetite (e.g. retained risk, concentration).
The insurer has clear underwriting
standards that are well documented
and communicated.
Retention limits and the use of
reinsurance are ad-hoc.
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Table 8
Life And Health Insurance Risk Controls Assessment--Mortality, Longevity, Morbidity, And Policyholder Behavior Risks (cont.)
The insurer has clear underwriting standards and authorities
that are well documented and communicated; compliances
are closely monitored and rigorously audited.
Retention limits are in place, but not
necessary linked to risk tolerances.
Underwriting standards do exist, but the
enforcement lacks rigor. Limits and
standards are breached without
remediation.
The insurer has a disciplined product development process
and close monitoring of new business sales and inforce
business experiences on all key profitability drivers.
Some feedback from experience
monitoring and study to other areas
(claim management, underwriting,
product development and risk
management), but generally lag
behind experience developments.
The insurer has a history of overly
optimistic/aggressive assumption
setting that isn’t supported by any
experiences studies or research.
The insurer has an effective feedback loop from experience
monitoring and studies to claim management, underwriting,
product development, and risk management areas.
Pricing and valuation assumptions are
generally set conservatively based on
relevant experience; however, limited
sensitivity and stress testing is
performed to test the robustness of
these assumptions.
The insurer has had continued
unfavorable experiences in recent years
compared to pricing or reserving and no
action was taken.
Pricing and valuation assumptions are set prudently and are
refreshed frequently to reflect recent experiences; product
benefits are structured to discourage excessive policyholder
anti-selection. The insurer performs extensive sensitivity and
stress testing in pricing and valuation on key insurance
assumptions, especially those with less credible experiences.
Property and casualty risk controls--reserve and claim management risks
74. This section, as well as the next two sections, provide examples of how Standard & Poor's assesses risk controls
related to property and casualty insurance risks.
75. Loss reserves tend to be the largest source of uncertainty in the balance sheets of many property and casualty insurers.
Loss reserve is the estimate of funds required in order to fulfill all claims arising from prior policies. The ultimate
amount of these future payments can be highly uncertain, both in terms of the amount and the timing. Reserving risk
relates to the uncertainty surrounding (1) the level of reserves that will ultimately be needed to meet all liabilities and
(2) the timing of those liabilities. Claims risk arises when claims paid deviate significantly from the insurer's expectation
due to irregularities in the claim management processes, insufficient rigor to the claims process, or unexpected
legislative, regulatory, or court intervention in the claims process. The processes, controls, and reviews used to
manage the uncertainties around loss reserves and claim management form the foundation of our analysis of an
insurer's reserve risk controls.
76. Table 9 provides examples of an insurer's loss reserve and claim management risk control indicators that inform our
analysis.
Table 9
Property And Casualty Risk Controls Assessment--Reserve And Claim Management Risks
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has a track record of reserve release consistent
with target reserve levels and has an effective feedback
loop from actuarial to underwriting to claim management.
The insurer has no major adverse reserve
development for recent underwriting years.
The insurer has experienced chronic
adverse development.
The insurer uses a centralized reserving function
independent from the risk-taking business function, with
coordination and support from all business functions and
units.
The insurer shares information among
actuarial, underwriting, and claim
management, but the feedback loop may not
always be very effective.
The insurer exhibits lack of adequate
understanding and modeling of the
risk of adverse loss development.
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Table 9
Property And Casualty Risk Controls Assessment--Reserve And Claim Management Risks (cont.)
Assumptions (e.g. claim-cost-trend and loss-development)
are robustly set and justified, and allow for emerging
changes in the development of premium, losses, and
claims.
Reserving is predominately a province of
business units, but there may be some
coordination through the headquarters
office.
Reserving is disconnected from
claims and might be pressured from
underwriting.
The insurer uses appropriate and extensive data in setting
assumptions; performs thorough reconciliation to ensure
completeness and reliability; may supplement internal data
with external one.
Reserves are based on traditional actuarial
ultimate-loss projections calculated and
reviewed by qualified actuaries.
Reserving is fragmented in business
units without centralized coordination
or supervision.
The insurer uses stochastic reserve models to help
evaluate the risk of adverse reserve development and may
also feed that information into economic capital models.
The insurer performs sensitivity analyses
(e.g. to high claim-cost inflation) to help
assess reserve adequacy.
The insurer uses overly optimistic
assumptions.
The insurer has deep in-house expertise, supplemented by
the use of external expertise.
The insurer has well-defined claims
management authority levels.
The review process is unsatisfactory
and has failed to reveal chronic
issues.
The insurer employs a robust review process, including
both internal and third party actuarial reviews (beyond
audit).
There are no claims management
authority levels or they’re not applied
in practice.
The insurer has a well-defined and extensive claims
management framework with clear authority levels, which
are consistently applied.
Property and casualty risk controls--underwriting, pricing, and cycle management risks
77. P/C insurers typically establish multiple controls to address the risk that the premiums charged for unearned business,
together with the premiums to be charged for prospective business, may be insufficient to cover losses experienced
and expenses incurred from these exposures. Specifically, underwriting risk is the risk that the insurance coverage
offered has a different risk profile and therefore different loss distribution than is needed to achieve the targeted
profitability. Pricing risk may arise even when the coverage offered has the exact risk characteristics that were
expected in pricing, but the loss distribution differs from expectation. The differences emerge because the process that
formed the expected loss distribution was flawed in some way. For example, the process flaw could be due to bad
data, bad process, or an unanticipated change in trend. Cycle management risk is the risk that the insurer writes
business during a soft market that is later found to have claim costs significantly higher than premiums because of
higher claim frequency/severity and/or softer policy terms and conditions.
78. An insurer uses controls associated with underwriting, pricing, and cycle management to ensure that risks are
adequately priced. To achieve so, pricing needs to proactively take into account the industry cycle, and to prevent
adverse risk selection, especially in a soft cycle. In assessing the strength of these controls, we seek evidence such as
the examples in Table 10.
Table 10
Property And Casualty Risk Controls Assessment--Underwriting, Pricing, And Cycle Management Risks
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has a track record of higher-than-peer
underwriting returns with low volatility.
There may be some pockets of strength,
but the overall results (underwriting
returns and volatility) are average
among its peers.
The insurer has experienced chronic
underperformance relative to industry and
peers.
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Table 10
Property And Casualty Risk Controls Assessment--Underwriting, Pricing, And Cycle Management Risks (cont.)
The insurer uses a comprehensive system of
underwriting authorities (experience- and risk-based),
limits, peer reviews, and audits.
The insurer has formal underwriting
authorities and limits and performs
multiple reviews and audits, including
departmental self-audits and peer
reviews.
There are concerns about the insurer’s ability
to thoroughly understand and capture the
complexities of risks and their
interdependencies.
The insurer performs rigorous audits (including
underwriting audits and counterparty/client audits)
following a pre-defined risk-based cycle.
The insurer performs underwriting
audits following a pre-defined cycle for
all material exposures.
The insurer has underwriting authorities and
limits in place. However, the execution lacks
rigor, and there is observed evidence of
breaches of underwriting authority and limits
without remediation.
Underwriting platforms have pre-built quality controls
and facilitate information sharing and reporting.
The insurer performs some analyses of
pricing trends, and provides quantitative
support to pricing, although such
analysis isn’t as advanced or
comprehensive as leading peers’.
There is evidence of top-line based incentives
for underwriters that provide incentive for risk
taking.
The insurer uses a portfolio (enterprise-wide,
ECM-informed) approach to setting risk-adjusted
underwriting targets.
Instances of underpricing are rare, and
corrective actions are prescribed and
taken, although the insurer might not
have a formal remediation plan in place.
There is evidence of insurer’s excessive
exposure concentrations and lack of intent to
better diversify the portfolio.
The insurer has in place robust cycle-management
plans and has demonstrated a record of disciplined
and stable pricing and terms over the course of a
cycle.
The insurer’s compensation system
provides no incentive to chase top-line
results.
The insurer uses advanced analyses of pricing and
exposure trends using a comprehensive basket of
tools (e.g. expert opinion, trade journals, broker
survey, premium rate indices); such analysis provides
robust quantitative support to pricing.
The insurer uses cost/benefit analyses
in reinsurance purchase decisions.
The insurer uses multiple risk management strategies
with a goal to optimize the balance between risk
retention and risk transfer (e.g. reinsurance,
catastrophe bonds) for maximum cost-efficiency and
capital utilization.
Close coordination across different business lines,
geographies, as well as with areas such as actuarial,
claims, and legal.
Property and casualty insurance risk controls--catastrophe risks
79. Catastrophe risk is the risk that a single event, or series of events of major magnitude, usually over a short period,
leads to a significant deviation in actual claims from the expected claims. Such events can occur naturally, such as
tornadoes, floods, or earthquakes, or they can be man-made, such as an accidental explosion or an act of terrorism.
These events are typically infrequent but significant in loss potential. Writers of commercial lines, personal lines, and
reinsurance lines may all face catastrophe risks within their insurance portfolio.
80. Given the potential devastating effect of catastrophic events on an insurer's financial health and the substantial
challenges in quantifying exposures and losses related to catastrophic events, an insurer's risk controls of catastrophe
risks is of crucial importance to its sustained financial health, even survival in some instances. Our analysis focuses on
the insurer's risk management program around catastrophe risk if it is deemed a material exposure of the insurer. Key
areas of our assessment include:
• The insurer's risk tolerance for catastrophe risk and the analysis behind chosen tolerances; • Risk correlations: although many insurance risks often have inherent correlations, these correlations tend to be even
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more pronounced during extreme events, exacerbating the adverse impact; and
• Modeling risk: quantifying exposures and potential losses related to catastrophic events is a challenging task and even the best modeling efforts are susceptible to errors and misuse.
81. Table 11 provides some examples of the catastrophe risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis.
Table 11
Property And Casualty Risk Controls Assessment--Catastrophe Risks
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has a granular and up-to-date view of catastrophe risk
exposure.
The insurer has a granular view of
exposure in areas of high
concentration.
Catastrophe risk (if major) is not
adequately measured or monitored;
the insurer doesn’t have a clear
vision of its catastrophe risk profile.
Catastrophe risk tolerance is well defined and supported by a clear
rationale and thorough analysis.
Catastrophe risk tolerance is
defined and translated into
risk-taking limits; however, the
tolerance may not be supported by
a clear rationale.
There are no retained probable
maximum loss (PML) or
concentration limits.
The insurer has a comprehensive system of risk limits that are linked
to the chosen risk tolerances; risk-taking is strictly constrained by
limits (e.g. zonal limits).
Concentrations are monitored
across the main lines of business
relative to the limits in the most
exposed zones.
The insurer has some high zonal
accumulation of exposures that
raises concerns.
The insurer performs frequent and thorough analysis of
concentration, relative to limits; such analysis spans across all lines of
business, exposed risk classes, and geographic zone.
The insurer has some in-house
expertise, with reliance on external
(brokers, vendors, consultants)
resources.
There is insufficient data
reconciliation and checking; the
quality of data is questionable.
The insurer has deep in-house expertise, which is supplemented by
use of external resources.
The insurer has a formalized
process for vetting the service
providers, including periodic
re-evaluations.
The insurer has scarce in-house
skills and over-reliance on external
expertise (e.g. brokers); external
advice may be used without
sufficient validation.
The insurer performs regular rigorous reviews of proprietary models,
e.g. those used to capture "non-modeled" (such as severe weather)
risks, and makes continued improvements to these models; model
risks and limitations are well understood and compensated.
The insurer performs sufficient
validation of in-house models and
data.
The insurer does not conduct stress
analyses to test its ability to absorb
losses.
The insurer performs thorough validation of vendor-provided models
and data.
Stress scenarios are used to
evaluate the impact of extreme
events.
The insurer uses scenario/impact analyses (Realistic Disaster
Scenarios) to supplement stochastic models, and to help test the
effectiveness of controls (e.g. zonal limits, reinsurance, catastrophe
bonds) and ensure risk containment.
The insurer uses portfolio-based pricing, taking into account
(cross-class) exposure accumulations/concentrations.
There is a comprehensive process for ensuring accuracy of exposure data.
Health insurance risk controls--underwriting, pricing, claims management, and provider renewal risks
82. Health insurers face certain risk exposures that differ in scope from those faced by other insurers. Some of the more
significant risks are rising medical costs, changing regulations and legislation, and less-than-perfect data in the
underwriting and pricing processes. Moreover, controls to counter these risks might be effective or permissible in one
region or country, but not in another. Some health insurance risk exposures are unique in nature and require different
risk control practices. This section provides examples of how we analyze the risk controls related to these unique
health insurance risks. Examples of our analysis of health insurer's risk controls of morbidity risks are provided in table
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8.
83. Health insurance companies use underwriting to assess the health insurance risk, either on an individual or an
employer group basis, and estimate the cost of coverage. Underwriting risk arises when the health insurance coverage
offered has a different risk profile and therefore different loss distribution than is expected and assumed in pricing.
Another factor that further complicates the underwriting risks is that not all health coverage is underwritten. For
example, large group accounts typically do not include medical underwriting of the participants, or when "community
rating" is used. Pricing risk refers to the risk that the health insurance premium is not sufficient and can't be adjusted
quickly to cover the cost of providing the health insurance coverage. This risk is particularly prominent when medical
costs continue to rise at an accelerated pace. Claim management risk includes all exposures that arise from an insurer's
practices around claim processing, reserving, and payment. Claim management risk may manifest itself as failures to
identify claims filings abuse, miss-assessment of treatment necessity, and claim-cost development.
84. Provider renewal risk arises when the health insurer experiences a drastic rise or sudden changes in health service cost
of providers, but isn't able to promptly adjust provider contracts in response to the rise or the change. Particularly
susceptible to provider renewal risks are insurers with heavy provider concentration, more provider renewals around a
particular date (for many, January 1), or limited negotiation power with providers.
85. Table 12 provides some examples of health insurance risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis.
Table 12
Health Insurance Risk Controls Assessment--Underwriting, Pricing, And Claim Management Risks
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer uses a discipline underwriting process
with clearly defined limits (e.g. concentration
limits and minimum enrollment requirements) and
authorities.
The insurer has a system of underwriting
limits and authorities, but not as
comprehensive as leading peers’.
Underwriting limits and authorities are
blurry.
The insurer performs active monitoring and
analysis of claim experience (incidence rates and
severity), which provide feedback into the pricing
and projection process.
Claim experiences are monitored and shared
with other areas, although the feedback loop
might not be very effective.
The insurer readily assumes a large
concentration, in a certain group, sector, or
regions, even when limits are breached.
The insurer judiciously performs reviews and
audits of underwriting and claim management.
Pricing updates are mainly reactive, and the
techniques used to reflect medical cost and
health care trends are not very sophisticated.
There is a recurrence of
longer-than-expected claims process.
The insurer performs an ongoing review of health
care trends, medical advances, and medical costs
and assesses their impact as well as mitigation
strategies. In addition, the insurer uses multiple
medical care cost forecasting techniques.
There is some cost-benefit analysis of
reinsurance usage, but not very robust.
The pricing assumptions are updated
infrequently, and there is no system or
process to identify medical cost trends or
incorporate health care developments.
When possible, the insurer staggers rates renewals
throughout the year to facilitate prompt pricing
adjustments.
The compensation system provides no
incentive to chase top-line results.
The reviews and audits of underwriting and
claim management are infrequent and fail to
identify past issues.
The insurer maintains effective communication
with regulators and health care providers to
address existing and future issues to avoid
surprises.
The insurer uses standard policy provisions,
although some exceptions are granted.
The insurer routinely accepts inconsistent
policy terms and has very little pricing
power.
The insurer carefully selects reinsurance
coverage, balancing risk retention and risk
transfer.
The insurer uses more than a few providers,
but its provider network is not as diversified as
the leading peers’.
The insurer is highly concentrated in a few
providers.
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Table 12
Health Insurance Risk Controls Assessment--Underwriting, Pricing, And Claim Management Risks (cont.)
Incentive structure is tied to the portfolio-based
performance targets that balance risk and
rewards.
The insurer has some negotiation power, but
doesn’t have the ability to consistently
negotiate more-favorable-than-peer terms with
providers.
Products and service offerings are extremely
limited in scope.
The insurer uses standard policy provisions that
are applied to all providers and consistently
maintains pricing power and has the ability to
negotiate favorable terms with sponsors and
networks.
The insurer maintains multiple providers in the
portfolio; when possible, provider contract
renewals are staggered throughout the year.
Operational risk controls
86. Operational risk for insurers is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and
systems or from external events. Specifically, operational risks include information technology and business continuity
processes, environmental issues, regulation, compliance, fraud, terrorism as well as human resources, change
management, distribution, and outsourcing. Also included is reputation risk, which usually arises with or after some
other significant loss.
87. While insurers might be exposed to vastly different operational risks, some of the key elements are essential to all
insurers' operational risk controls. These include, firstly, procedures in places to systematically identify operational
risks and to monitor, assess, and mitigate those identified risks. Secondly, a sound business continuity plan (BCP) that
has undergone multiple drills. A business continuity plan comprises processes and procedures the insurer would follow
to limit the adverse impact of an event. Such event could be a natural disaster or terrorist attack that causes a major
interruption to the normal course of business operations. Our analysis also focuses on the risk controls around
operational risks that are of particular importance to the individual insurer. For examples, a health insurer's risk
controls around compliance risks.
88. Table 13 provides some examples of the operational risk-specific evidence that informs our analysis.
Table 13
Operational Risk Controls Assessment
Positive Neutral Negative
The insurer has thoroughly identified all major
operational risks using industry’s and insurer’s own
experience, with a focus on high priority risks.
The insurer focuses on compliance and uses a
bottom-up process for risk identification. The
process is mostly informed by internal audits.
The insurer has frequent incidences of
noncompliance, fraud, and system
failures.
For each key operational risk, risk owners are
assigned, close monitoring is in place, mitigation
actions are initiated, and progresses are monitored
The insurer’s identified operational risks are
prioritized (using more of an intuitive
assessment) according to their likelihood and
impact.
Operational risks are not systematically
identified, nor are they clearly prioritized.
The insurer has comprehensive compliance
standards that are clearly documented, well
communicated, and subject to rigorous compliance
reviews and audits.
The insurer has some mitigation actions in place,
but they’re not as proactive or comprehensive as
those of leading peers.
Remediation is sporadic and poorly
enforced (with no or limited
accountability).
The insurer has effective internal audit and
compliance functions that work in close
coordination with the ERM function, and help
assess and monitor operational risks.
There is a focus on disaster recovery rather than
business continuity.
There is no disaster-recovery testing.
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Criteria | Insurance | General: Enterprise Risk Management
Table 13
Operational Risk Controls Assessment (cont.)
Business-continuity and disaster-recovery
programs are in place and regularly tested.
The insurer hasn’t suffered major losses from
operational risk events in recent years; or has
had only minor losses and the insurer quickly
revised and enhanced the program as a result.
The insurer hasn’t translated past
operational risk losses into
enhancements to the program; losses are
quickly put behind.
Loss events and "near misses" are meticulously
recorded and (along with industry data) inform the
quantification of operational risk.
The insurer hasn’t suffered major losses from
operational risk events in recent years.
RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
• Insurers: Rating Methodology, May 7, 2013 • Group Rating Methodology, May 7, 2013 • Methodology For Linking Short-Term And Long-Term Ratings For Corporate, Insurance, And Sovereign Issuers,
May 7, 2013
• A New Level Of Enterprise Risk Management Analysis: Methodology For Assessing Insurers' Economic Capital Models, Jan. 24, 2011
These criteria represent the specific application of fundamental principles that define credit risk and ratings opinions.
Their use is determined by issuer- or issue-specific attributes as well as Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' assessment
of the credit and, if applicable, structural risks for a given issuer or issue rating. Methodology and assumptions may
change from time to time as a result of market and economic conditions, issuer- or issue-specific factors, or new
empirical evidence that would affect our credit judgment.
Additional Contact:
Sridhar Manyem, New York (1) 212-438-3128; [email protected]
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Criteria | Insurance | General: Enterprise Risk Management
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1388662 | 301135087
- Research:
- SCOPE OF THE CRITERIA
- SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA
- IMPACT ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS
- EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
- METHODOLOGY
- The Subfactors Of Enterprise Risk Management Analysis
- ASSUMPTIONS
- Determining An Insurer's Enterprise Risk Management Score
- Risk Management Culture
- Risk governance and organization structure
- Risk appetite framework
- Risk reporting and communication
- Incentive compensation structures
- Risk Controls
- Emerging Risk Management
- Risk Models
- Strategic Risk Management
- APPENDIX I: Definitions
- APPENDIX II: Risk Controls Of Major Risks
- Credit risk controls
- Market risk controls
- Life and health insurance risk controls--mortality, longevity, morbidity, and policyholder behavior risks
- Property and casualty risk controls--reserve and claim management risks
- Property and casualty risk controls--underwriting, pricing, and cycle management risks
- Property and casualty insurance risk controls--catastrophe risks
- Health insurance risk controls--underwriting, pricing, claims management, and provider renewal risks
- Operational risk controls
- RELATED CRITERIA AND RESEARCH
__MACOSX/._S&P Insurance ERM Rating Criteria May 7, 2013.pdf
Moody's Risk Management Assessments.pdf
Research Methodology
New York Herve Geny 1.212.553.4866 London James Hyde 44.20.7772 5322
Contact Phone
July 2004
Risk Management Assessments
Summary
This research methodology outlines Moody’s initiative to comment on the quality of the financial risk management and related practices of certain major debt issuers with significant market and operational risk exposures. It links this effort to Moody’s credit rating process, explains our analytic framework, presents the Risk Management Assessment (RMA) reports, and discusses the RMA approach.
Moody’s objectives in focusing on risk management are: • To inform the rating process by assessing the rigor of a firm’s risk management approach, its appropriateness to
the firm’s business, and its impact on business decisions and future financial health • To support fundamental analysts on specific risk and derivatives issues • To provide fixed income investors with relevant and value-adding risk discussions by:
– Identifying the key themes in risk management for specific industries – Highlighting areas for potential improvement in risk management, particularly related to disclosure – Explaining benchmarks against which individual companies in each segment will be evaluated and
differentiated from one another The key targets of the RMA process are large global financial institutions and large corporates with significant
economic exposures to financial, commodity or energy risk. Moody’s risk management assessments will result in three types of reports:
• Industry RMAs will investigate the overall quality of risk processes for key competitors within a global industry • Individual firm RMAs will comment on the quality of a specific company’s risk management • Special Comments will present Moody’s views on specific risk issues such as: development of economic capital
methodologies, emerging best practices in operational risk, etc. The RMA process will also provide input for our general credit reports on issuers, typically in the form of a dis-
tinct section in these publications.
The RMA and the Rating Process
The RMA is part of a broader Moody’s program called the Enhanced Analysis Initiative (EAI). EAI brings greater scrutiny to five areas of crucial importance to the creditworthiness evaluation of a company: • Quality of financial reporting (Financial Reporting Assessment, or FRA)1
• Quality of corporate governance (Corporate Governance Assessment, or CGA)2
• Vulnerability to an abrupt loss of market access (Liquidity Risk Assessment, or LRA) • Existence of material off-balance sheet risks (Off Balance Sheet Risk Assessment, or OBRA) • Quality of risk management practices (Risk Management Assessment, or RMA)
Recent events have indeed demonstrated that high-profile credit defaults or severe credit deteriorations were often preceded by instances of poor financial reporting, weak governance practices, inadequate risk or liquidity man- agement, or abusive uses of off-balance sheet structures.
As a separate analytical product, the RMA has two fundamental differences from the other EAI assessments: • RMAs are by nature much more closely aligned with the fundamental rating process, and some of the high-level
risk assessments they will present are already part of rating decisions • The universe of firms covered by the risk assessments will be much narrower than those by the CGA or FRA, as
we intend to focus on: – firms that have major capital market-type risks embedded in their core processes, and – firms with risk management practices that could have a significant impact on the overall stability of the
financial systems of their home markets. Consequently, the risk management assessment process might have less broad-based visibility than the previously
published FRAs and CGAs have had. However, for the industries and firms at the center of the RMA effort, the impact on Moody’s rating framework will be very significant.
Together with Financial Reporting Assessments, we hope that the RMA reports will help companies better under- stand how they can improve their risk management disclosures for the benefit of their creditors and thereby that they will promote transparency in the capital markets.
Background
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, there have been a significant number of well publicized events or debacles with high-severity financial impacts, highlighting a variety of failures in the risk management process. Events ranged from pure market, credit or operational losses to combinations of different types of risks such as unauthorized trading and unfavorable market moves, or market losses and liquidity issues.
The last 10 years have seen an accelerated pace of financial innovation with increasing complexity and coverage of contracts and structures. It is now possible to create or hedge an exposure to virtually any single underlying financial and economic risk factor or combination thereof (e.g. interest rates, equities, FX, commodities, credit, weather, even macro-economic events). In many cases, risk objectives can be achieved using a variety of tools such as derivatives, highly structured products, or alternative risk transfer insurance solutions.
In theory, financial innovation leads to a more efficient allocation of resources in the economic system. Non- financial firms use financial products to protect their core franchises from the impact of volatile financial factors. When using the products to manage risks, financial institutions facilitate risk transfers, reduce concentrations, enhance liquidity and facilitate capital formation through intermediation. Proprietary traders such as hedge funds use the prod- ucts to increase returns through leveraged positions or by arbitraging away market inefficiencies.
However, the rapid growth of financial products combined with the increasing linkages between financial markets has the potential to create destabilizing effects. This is particularly the case if the infrastructure of the capital mar- kets does not provide sufficient boundaries and controls.
1. “Financial Reporting Assessments”, Research Methodology, December 2003 2. “U.S. and Canadian Corporate Governance Assessment”, Rating Methodology, August 2003
2 Moody’s Research Methodology
As a response to financial innovations: • Regulators (BIS, Federal Reserve, SEC, FSA,…) have modified their regulatory capital frameworks for the over-
all stability of the financial systems and have issued new guidelines for the surveillance of newly emerging risks (i.e. interagency statement on structured transactions in the US)
• Accounting bodies such as FASB and IASB have promulgated new accounting rules intended to provide better visibility of the impact of financial products on balance sheet, earnings and cash-flows (e.g. FAS133, IAS 32, IAS 39). In the end, though, the risk management practices of firms form the first line of defense against the poten-
tially devastating impacts of these financial risks. Fixed income investors are concerned about unexpected events that could impair the value of their hold-
ings by significantly damaging core earnings capacity, increasing earnings or cash-flow volatility, reducing capital, or threatening business reputation or viability. Arguably, rigorous risk management practices enable management to choose a risk profile compatible with the firm’s overall financial objectives and the credit rating it wishes to maintain.
Risk control practices and risk measurement techniques have made major progress in recent years. Market risk has seen a tremendous amount of convergence around the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR), while portfolio credit risk measurement has come of age through the competing methodologies based on structural, reduced form, or hybrid approaches. Although in the initial stages of development, operational risk metrics are quickly gaining speed thanks to the Basel II accord. These impressive advances in measurement have helped fuel more financial innovations.
Active management and mitigation of credit risks have contributed to limit the impact of the turbulences of 2001-2003 on banks’ balance sheets and earnings. The atomization of credit exposures among numerous players, through securitization, syndication and credit risk hedging, has helped to lower the concentration risk of many finan- cial institutions.
Paradoxically, however, the advances in active management of risks have also created a new set of chal- lenges for financial and non-financial firms alike: • Beyond its benefits, the atomization of credit risk has created new issues such as increased opacity in risk retention
through residual tranches of securitizations and the transfer of risks to less sophisticated players. In addition, these risk transfers may make it more difficult to find quick work-out solutions for non-performing credit given the lack of players with major stakes in the outcome.
• Deal pricing has become aggressive in many areas, with traders pricing in the (supposed) diversification benefits of the new trade.
• There are increasingly major challenges in building information systems that can aggregate positions and expo- sures in a consistent fashion across all the businesses of a firm, in particular if risks have to be matched with P/L reporting for risk-adjusted profitability measurement.
• The complexity of some of the new structures makes it impossible to decompose the risks across the traditional neat boundaries of market, credit, liquidity and operational risks.
• This same complexity requires an ever increasing level of sophistication in the people measuring and monitoring these risks. However, given the information intensity required for these jobs, risk managers tend to become more and more specialized. This dynamic might result in a lack of competent people to take a holistic view of risks.
• Advances in quantitative techniques can create a false sense of comfort derived from the apparent rigor of the models. Examples would include an extension of an existing model to new products for which it is not suited. Alternatively, the model might be theoretically correct but the assumptions used in it are flawed. In both cases, the failure from the misuse of the model can lead to very unreliable hedging positions and even results that go against original intuition. In extreme cases, the uncertainty from the model could dwarf the risk from the market factors. In addition, progress in risk measurement and control has been far from uniform across industries and can
show significant variations from firm to firm within the same industry. Differences in risk management philosophy and execution are instrumental in determining prospects for a firm’s
long-term survival and prosperity. Moody’s current rating methodology implicitly incorporates our overall assessment of firms’ risks at a high level. The RMAs will clearly articulate the key factors and conclusions considered in our analy- sis.
Moody’s Research Methodology 3
Targets of Risk Management Assessments
The key targets of the RMA process are large global financial institutions and large corporates with significant economic exposures to financial, commodity or energy risk.
While the overall thought process for these assessments is the same for all industries, each particular analysis will address the issues specific to its industry and in a manner that uses the risk language and measures of that industry. For non-financial firms the emphasis will be on risks to earnings and cash-flows only, while for financial institutions the analysis will incorporate earnings, cash-flows, and market value of the balance sheet. Similarly, geography will also alter the weight we give some issues in our analysis.
Moody’s goal for the 2004-2005 period is to report on the four major segments of the financial industry, a pri- ority based on the perceived large exposure of these segments to financial and operational risks: • Global broker-dealers and securities firms • Large international universal banks • Specialized financial institutions, such as finance companies and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) in
the USA. • Global insurers/reinsurers
Within these segments we anticipate publishing on roughly 40 companies worldwide in 2004-2005, whether as RMA reports or as distinct sections in the annual credit reviews.
In the world of non-financial corporates we will, in time, focus on those companies with strategic risks tied to the financial markets such as a large exposure to commodities (metals, oil, gas and energy, grain and livestock) or high dependence on financial risk strategies such as FX hedging of international operations or liabilities management through interest rate swaps. Other non-financial issuers will be addressed in a later implementation.
Scope of Risk Management Assessments
At its core, the RMA will attempt to assess the relationship between the firm’s risk appetite and its risk con- trol capacity. Moody’s ratings reflect opinions on the relative creditworthiness of issuers with a degree of stability over economic cycles. In order for an issuer to maintain its rating over time, its risk appetite should be related to the maxi- mum amount of risk from all sources that it can adequately support even in severe market conditions without the live- lihood of the firm being threatened.
Our approach will emphasize a holistic review of risk philosophy and practices in the context of the everyday operations of the firm. We will not be assessing the firm solely in the traditional discrete categories such as market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. While most financial risks (and some operational risks) have readily available prices in the financial markets, providing a benchmark to how efficiently firms use their risk capacity, other types of risk (indeed most operational risks) do not and are considered part of the cost of doing business. In prac- tice, scenarios mixing different categories of risk such as a combination of market moves and operational inefficiencies have led to large unexpected losses: (e.g. traders trying to hide previous losses by putting on more bad trades. Examples include FX unauthorized trades at Allfirst – a subsidiary of Allied Irish Bank – leading to a USD 700 million loss in 2002, or, more recently, the unauthorized trades at National Australia Bank (NAB) with a loss of AUD 360 million).
The analysis will encompass both risk and uncertainty exposures and our conclusions will distinguish between the two where possible. Risk refers to those outcomes that can be linked to a well defined generating pro- cess and to which we can attach a probability distribution (based on historical frequencies, estimated through a model, or even subjectively assigned). A typical example is market risk. Once positions are known, exposures to the key market factors can be modeled. From the model of the future distribution of the market factors, one can then quantify the risk of the position using a metric such as Value-at-Risk (VaR). Uncertainty, on the other hand, results from heterogeneous events with no clearly identified ex-ante generating mechanism; hence it is difficult to classify and carries no estimable distribution of outcomes. Legal issues are an example of uncertainty. A firm does not know prior to it happening when and where the next legal event will occur. This unpredictability has been clearly highlighted over the past few years in the banking/securities industry with a string of unrelated events leading to large actual or potential losses: Enron and Worldcom litigation, the NYAG research settlement, the mutual funds scandal, and the Parmalat fraud.
Finally, we also intend to highlight the specific issues created by various hybrid classes of risk and uncertainty such as: • Risks which can arise from inappropriate use of models • Combination of risks arising from complex transactions structured for third parties • Combination of risks arising from relationships with hedge funds
4 Moody’s Research Methodology
RMA Analytical Framework
The ultimate objective of a firm’s risk management organization should be to make sure that no major surprises put the firm in peril. Based on the principle that only what is measured can be managed, we will primarily be assessing whether the organization is able to answer the following questions at all times: • Does the firm’s senior management level know how much it is prepared to lose from all sources of risk over a
given horizon (often a reporting period but over shorter horizons, too) to achieve its overall long-term financial objectives?
• Does the firm’s senior management level know where the top exposures are (both in terms of measured risks and non-measured uncertainties)?
• Is there an adequate understanding of the profile and mitigation of the potential losses from the top exposures? Moody’s aims to look at the rigor of the risk management process, the buy-in of management, the appropri-
ateness of measures given the business mix and at issues of technical competence. To understand the robustness of the firm’s answers, our analysis will be articulated around the four key domains of a risk framework. These are: • Risk governance
– Involvement of directors (including external / non-executive) in reviewing risk appetites and control effectiveness, directors’ awareness of risks, relevance of their backgrounds to assess risks
– Collective and individual responsibilities of and awareness by executive management on risk matters, integration of risk considerations in budgeting, capital allocation, and determination of capital adequacy
– Organization, staffing, resources, veto powers and enterprise-wide role of risk management function(s) • Risk management
– Risk control processes – mandates of units controlling market credit and operational risk, extent of separation of reporting lines of operating level risk, front line and support functions, trade reconciliations, practices to ensure limit discipline
– Risk appetite, limit setting, relationship of risk appetite to earnings, capital, business decisions, portfolio mix and diversification
– Risk mitigation (including hedging policies) • Risk analysis and quantification
– Quantification, measures used for limit setting and running the business, stress testing, capital determination
– Monitoring and reporting – rigor, appropriateness and usefulness of reports and alert systems • Risk infrastructure and intelligence
– Risk infrastructure - information and knowledge systems – Risk intelligence – validity of models and data used
(More details are provided in the appendix) On the quantitative side, given the uniqueness of the events putting firms in peril, we emphasize the use of a vari-
ety of measures instead of excessive reliance on standardized metrics such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) for market risk, for example. There is no one metric that is adaptable to all types of risk evaluation. For example, while VaR is a good indicator of the potential losses of traded liquid products over a short-term horizon, it is not designed to capture the stress-losses for illiquid products necessary to calculate economic capital.
Moody’s Research Methodology 5
RMA Process
The preparatory start point for the RMA process is the application of a standardized approach (see examples of topics in appendix) using a firm’s existing disclosures on the topics of risk: • Annual reports and public filings • Moody’s existing institutional knowledge
This initial stage will likely be the most important and time-consuming part of the whole process. For example, Moody’s expects to address credit risk issues using existing practices but, as explained in the previous sections, it may fold its risk management assessment into the overall rating (especially outside North America).
The aim is to complete the standardized work-plan (that is, the assessment road-map) to the extent possible before presenting issuers with Moody's' preliminary findings; our presentation will highlight the gaps in Moody’s collective knowledge. Risk management is a continuous process, and point-in-time disclosures by themselves do not provide investors with enough value-added information to achieve an in-depth understanding of the robustness of this process.
The next stage will vary by firm depending on the depth of Moody’s knowledge of the institution and the com- plexity of the firm’s activities. Typically, the Moody’s risk management specialist along with analysts for that name would seek to interview the Chief Risk Officer and/or the CFO along with the owners of the key risk processes of the firm. If necessary, other risk or business representatives would be interviewed if possible to gain a clearer picture of specific risk issues.
After the issuer comment phase, the final RMA report (or RMA input into the regular credit report) will therefore present the conclusions Moody’s has reached after taking into account both internal and public sources of information. Updates to the initial assessment should be less resource intensive unless a major event or some key changes have occurred since the initial assessment.
RMA Reports
Moody’s risk management assessments will result in three types of reports: • Industry RMA will investigate the overall quality of risk processes for the key companies within a global industry • Individual firm RMA will comment on the quality of a specific company’s risk management3
• Special Comments will present Moody’s views on specific risk issues such as: development of economic capital methodologies, emerging best practices in operational risk, etc.
The RMA process will also provide input for our general credit reports on issuers, typically in the form of a distinct sections in these publications. Publication of RMAs will require a 2-step process: Initial individual firm data will be gathered on the largest global participants in an industry, assessing the appropriate- ness of each firm’s risk management approach and controls, observations of their corporate culture, with balanced comments highlighting both strengths and weaknesses. This information will be used to publish the industry RMA. Industry RMA reports will: • Identify the key themes in risk management for this industry • Comment on specific risk management challenges common to firms in the industry • Explain benchmarks against which individual companies in that segment will be evaluated • Highlight best practice ideas for potential improvement particularly in the area of disclosure Individual firm RMAs will then be published against the industry benchmark and will aim to differentiate firms’ risk management practices according to a number of key criteria
3. Moody’s will use its standard safeguards regarding non-public information. Confidential non-public information is used only for the purpose of expressing an informed opinion on the firm’s quality of risk management. As usual, Moody’s will not, without the agreement of the issuer, disclose the information in any public communication or research report
6 Moody’s Research Methodology
Sequentially the following cycle is foreseen, which highlights the iterative and continuous nature of the dialog and analysis which we intend to have:
We plan to update industry RMA reports as needed, based on major shifts in risk management practices, while company RMAs will be updated on an annual basis. RMA reports will be accessible via Moody’s online subscription service at www.moodys.com.
The specific RMA reports will not represent an assessment of compliance with regulatory or accounting rules, rather they estimate the capacity of a firm to manage and communicate its risks in relation to its credit- worthiness. We intend to structure the individual firm RMA reports so as to provide maximum transparency benefit to investors.
Regional Variations in the Analytical Framework and Approach
The approach for European banks will more strongly emphasize measures to implement Basel II / EU CAD 3, oper- ational risk management, and the links to corporate governance. This is because of the: • Higher likelihood of widespread statutory adoption of the new capital adequacy accord in Europe and of related
regulatory guidelines for credit and operational risk management • Need for separate consideration of risk governance in Europe – for the North-American issuers this would already
be covered by Moody’s Corporate Governance Assessments. An important point here relates to the overlay or add-on role of the RMA process in evaluating the effectiveness
of credit risk control processes. After the credit deterioration problems of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the larger North-American institutions adopted broadly similar processes. These have included, for example: • Regular high level reviews of enterprise-wide portfolios of credit risk by sector, geography, rating class and con-
centration clusters • Limit setting procedures involving credit committees with veto-powers from non-customer-facing functions • The internal rating and assessment of counterparties and proposed transactions by persons with reporting lines
separate to those in customer-facing functions • Monitoring and reporting which can integrate the enterprise-wide exposures to a single counterparty or to related
groups of counterparties and identify credit risk concentrations.
Initial Individual Firm Data Gathering Non -benchmarked assessment of strengths and weaknesses, control culture
appropriateness of controls and risk management practices
Initial data Firm A
Initial data Firm B
Initial data Firm E
Initial data Firm D
Initial data Firm C
Industry RMA Identification of key themes, challenges and best practices, basis for benchmarking
Broader universe of firms: A -Z
Benchmarked Individual Firm RMAs
Moody’s Research Methodology 7
Neither the uniform adoption of such practices, nor a standardized adoption of the Basel “Principles for the Man- agement of Credit Risk” as guidelines by national regulators is yet certain in Europe. Moody’s therefore sees a role for the RMA process in systematically assessing the credit risk control and portfolio review processes. Typically this would draw heavily on the accumulated knowledge of the fundamental analysts at Moody’s.
The analysis in the Asian and emerging markets will incorporate the following market characteristics: • Emerging market financial institutions very often may not engage in the complex trading activities that we most
often think of as requiring superior risk management. However financial firms in these regions are often exposed to more risks resulting from structural or institutional peculiarities such as: – Weaker legal, accounting, audit and regulatory infrastructure – Often poor corporate governance – More volatile and illiquid security and asset markets.
• Basel II is not as close to implementation in these markets as in the European Union. However, with almost all rated banks working on some form of implementation, it provides a common base for credit risk discussions even in developing markets. As with Europe, credit risk management will be a key focus, and a large part of the analysis is already being done in the existing fundamental rating framework. However, we feel that given the high levels of market and operational risk inherent in emerging markets, RMAs for issuers in these regions will be beneficial to investors.
8 Moody’s Research Methodology
APPENDIX: Key Topics of Detailed RMA Approach
(Note: Some items in the table are only applicable to financial institutions)
RISK GOVERNANCE
1. Risk Governance at Board Level • Extent to which board (including external or independent directors) is involved in defining risk appetite, control
structure and organization • Awareness and understanding by board of risk exposures • Mandate and practical workings of board-level risk and/or audit committees in reviewing risk management and
effectiveness of controls
2. Risk Governance at Executive Management Level • Involvement in risk decisions by executive committee, risk-awareness of top management • Mandate and practical workings of executive level risk committees • Risk measures and considerations used by executive management in determining capital allocation and overall
capital adequacy decisions
3. Risk Governance – Risk Management Organization and its Influence • Reporting lines and authority of risk management functions • Mission of risk control: monitoring/ measuring / reporting vs. active management and mitigation • Independence / autonomy of risk organization • Centralized vs. decentralized risk organization, integrated vs. silo risk control, extent of adoption of enterprise-
wide risk management concepts • Existence and implementation of enterprise-wide risk management concepts • Veto power and forcefulness of risk control / management on new and existing products • New product approval procedures • Process for the dissemination of risk principles, preferences, risk-taking decision authorities, policies and proce-
dures • Steps taken to provide education and training for broader personnel in risk matters
RISK MANAGEMENT
4. Risk Control Processes • Mandates, authorities and responsibilities of market, credit and operational risk management units, extent to
which these are enterprise-wide • Extent of function separation in the running of risk-taking units, and how reporting lines of “customer facing”,
“trading” or “lending” business lines differ from risk and financial control reporting lines • Practical interaction of market, credit and operational risk management with risk-taking “front line” as well as
with other control/support units • Practical measures to ensure adherence to limits • Systematic processes in place for reconciliation with internal and counterparty books and records • Role of internal audit in process vetting and testing of effectiveness of controls
5. Risk Appetite and Limit Setting • Magnitude of risk appetite, its relationship to financial performance, budgets and capital levels • Impact of risk appetite on business decision making including portfolio positioning and diversification • Translation of risk appetite to granular limits - hierarchy of market and credit risk decision authorities
Moody’s Research Methodology 9
6. Risk Mitigation • Principles for hedging longer-dated market and credit exposures (dynamic vs. matched maturity) • Management and work-out practices for impaired/distressed positions • Contingency plans for market stress events • Operational risk mitigation (insurance, BCP) • Collateral management/margining practices
RISK ANALYSIS AND QUANTIFICATION
7. Risk Quantification • Measures for limit setting and for running the business • Use and specifications of statistical methodologies such as VaR, PD, LGD, UL, etc • Use of scenarios for market, ALM, liquidity and credit risk stress testing • Economic capital determination • Operational risk quantification
8. Risk Monitoring and Reporting • Frequency, granularity, aggregation of market and credit risk reporting, drill-down and concentration identifica-
tion abilities • Scope of capture of market and credit risk reporting (integration of tradable, derivative and market counterparty
linked exposures in credit risk reporting, non-trading books in market risk reporting) • Dissemination of risk reports to various management levels • Regulatory reporting • Enterprise-wide standards applied in identification of impaired and distressed positions • Identification of significant operational risks – reporting on realized high intensity / low frequency and low inten-
sity / high frequency events as well as potential high intensity events
RISK INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTELLIGENCE
9. Risk Infrastructure • Extent of enterprise-wide integration of systems, number of different platforms in use for market and credit risks • Capacity and suitability of systems for meeting requirements of Basel II / FAS133 / IAS 32 / IAS 39 • Platforms for operational risk, extent of integration of loss event recording with control self risk assessment, key
risk indicators • Key systems investment requirements for meeting risk management challenges
10. Risk Intelligence • Quality control, back-testing and assessment of risk control model assumptions • Quality control on models used by front offices • Role of internal and external audit in testing risk control and front office models • Organization of data processes and key improvement requirements for meeting data quality challenges for risk
10 Moody’s Research Methodology
Related Research
Research Methodologies: Financial Reporting Assessments, December 2003 (80224) U.S. and Canadian Corporate Governance Assessment, August 2003 (78666)
To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.
Moody’s Research Methodology 11
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12 Moody’s Research Methodology
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Authors Editor Production Associate
Herve Geny Robert Cox David Ainsworth James Hyde
__MACOSX/._Moody's Risk Management Assessments.pdf
AM Best ERM Rating Requirements for Insurers.pdf
Copyright © 2013 by A.M. Best Company, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this report or document may be distributed in any electronic form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the A.M. Best Company. For additional details, refer to our Terms of Use available at the A.M. Best Company website: www.ambest.com/terms.
Criteria – Universal
Risk Management and the Rating Process for Insurance Companies
I nsurance companies make money by managing various types of risk for individuals, municipalities and corporate entities—the risk of dying too young, experiencing a loss due to man-made or natural disasters, outliving your assets, losing income capac-
ity through business interruption, and so on. Where there is risk, there is uncertainty, and where there is uncertainty, there is exposure to volatility.
Risk management is the process by which companies systematically identify, measure and manage the various types of risk inherent within their operations. The fundamen- tal objectives of a sound risk management program are:
• To manage the organization’s exposure to potential earnings and capital volatility
• To maximize value to the organization’s various stakeholders.
However, it is important to note that the objective of risk management is not to elimi- nate risk and volatility, but to understand it and manage it. Risk management allows organizations to identify and quantify their risks; set risk tolerances based on their overall corporate objectives; and take the necessary actions to manage risk in light of those objectives. When done right, risk management fosters an operating environment
April 2, 2013
Additional Information Criteria Catastrophe Analysis in A.M. Best Ratings
Understanding BCAR for Property/Casualty Insurers
Understanding BCAR for Life/Health Insurers
Special Report: Variable Annuities – Changing The Industry’s Risk Dynamics
Survey Reveals Leaders, Laggards in P/C Enterprise Risk Management
Analytical Contacts
Thomas Mount +1 (908) 439-2200 Ext. 5155 [email protected]
George Hansen +1 (908) 439-2200 Ext. 5469 [email protected]
William Pargeans +1 (908) 439-2200 Ext. 5359 William.Pargeans@ ambest.com
A.M. BEST METHODOLOGY
Contents Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Back to Basics: Best’s Financial Strength Ratings and Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 “E”RM – What’s New? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ERM and the Risk Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . .12 Risk Management and the Rating Process . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Impact of Risk Management on BCAR Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 Direction of Future Model Improvements and Capital Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Appendix: Enterprise Risk Management – Key Topics & Meeting Agenda Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Exhibit 1 Insurance Industry Continues to Respond to Risk Dynamics
Time
R is
k
Dynamic Financial Analysis
Risk Sources and Complexity Have
Increased Over Time
Traditional Risk
Management
Traditional Risk
Management
Asset-Liability Management
Asset-Liability Management
Cash Flow Testing
ERM and
Economic Capital
Cash Flow Testing
Source: A.M. Best Co.
This publication updates the criteria report issued January 25, 2008 to include additional events that have contributed to the increased level of risk and uncertainty for the insurance industry (pages 5 and 6), as well as a more detailed explana- tion of how an insurer’s risk profile and risk management capability impact the rating process (pages 16 and 17).
2
Methodology Criteria – Universal
that supports both strong financial controls and risk mitigation, as well as prudent risk- taking to seize market opportunities.
Risk management tools and practices across the insurance industry have advanced significantly in recent years—and it’s a good thing they have. The industry has expe- rienced a number of events and trends since the turn of the millennium that have exposed, and will continue to expose, insurers to increased levels of risk and uncer- tainty.
Developments such as the implementation of enterprise risk management programs, including economic capital models, more sophisticated catastrophe management and dynamic hedging programs, have headlined efforts of the insurance industry to man- age its growing exposure to potential volatility in earnings and capital. These recent additions to the industry’s risk management arsenal are the latest evidence of ongoing efforts to respond to changing risk dynamics.
In this paper, A.M. Best explores the key risk management trends in the insurance industry and describes how risk management impacts the overall rating process and the development of capital requirements. Below are some of the highlights and key observations.
Enterprise Risk Management and the Risk Management Framework • A.M. Best believes that ERM – establishing a risk-aware culture, using sophisticated tools to consistently identify and manage, as well as measure risk and risk correlations – is an increasingly important component of an insurer’s risk management frame- work.
• The foundation of any risk management framework is the compilation of traditional risk management practices and controls that historically have helped companies moni- tor and manage their exposure to the five key categories of risk: credit, market, under- writing, operational and strategic.
• What’s new about ERM is the “E,” which represents the development of an enterprise- wide view of risk through which insurers consistently can identify, quantify and man- age risk on a more holistic basis.
Risk Management and Ratings • The assignment of an interactive Best’s Rating is derived from an in-depth evaluation of a company’s balance sheet strength, operating performance and business profile as compared with A.M. Best’s quantitative and qualitative standards.
• A.M. Best believes that risk management is the common thread that links balance sheet strength, operating performance and business profile. Risk management funda- mentals can be found in the strategic decision-making process used by a company to define its business profile, and in the various financial management practices and oper- ating elements of an insurer that dictate the sustainability of its operating performance and, ultimately, its exposure to volatility in its capital.
• As such, if a company is practicing sound risk management and executing its strategy effectively, it will maintain a prudent level of risk-adjusted capital and perform success- fully over the long term – common objectives of both A.M. Best ratings and risk man- agement.
3
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• A.M. Best believes that assessing an insurer’s risk management capabilities – within the context of determining an insurer’s financial strength – should be viewed in light of a company’s scope of operations and the complexity of its business.
• A.M. Best believes to remain competitive in today’s dynamic environment, build sustainable earnings and capital accumulation, and ultimately, maintain high ratings, complex organizations – such as insurers participating in the global reinsurance and retirement savings markets – must develop and constantly refine an ERM framework, including the development of internal economic capital modeling.
• For organizations with a more limited operating scope focusing on more stable, tra- ditional lines of business, the ERM process may be less comprehensive or complex – at this time. However, the development of principles-based solvency approaches such as Solvency II in Europe, the “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” reporting requirements in the United States, and the significant efforts of sophisticated insurers to raise the bar on the risk-management front, ultimately will become a competitive issue driving con- tinued improvement and integration of ERM concepts for all insurers, regardless of size.
• Whether utilizing a formalized ERM framework, integrating selected elements of ERM into an insurer’s operating practices or relying solely on a traditional risk management process, A.M. Best perceives risk management as paramount to an insurer’s long-term suc- cess. As such, within the rating process, each company – regardless of its size or complex- ity – is expected to explain how it identifies, measures, monitors and manages risk.
• An insurer that can demonstrate strong risk-management practices integrated into its core operating processes, and effectively execute its business plan, will maintain favor- able ratings in an increasingly dynamic operating environment. A.M. Best believes that risk management is embedded in an insurer’s “Corporate DNA” when risk metrics are integrated into corporate, business line and functional area objectives, and when risk- return measures are incorporated into financial planning and budgeting, strategic plan- ning, performance measurement and incentive compensation.
Risk Management and Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) • BCAR is an important quantitative tool that helps A.M. Best differentiate between companies and indicate whether a company’s capitalization is appropriate for a particu- lar rating level. However, BCAR by itself never has been the sole basis for determining any Best’s Rating.
• Other considerations include the various financial management practices and operat- ing elements of an insurer that ultimately dictate the sustainability of its operating per- formance, and its exposure to capital volatility. In other words, a company’s relative risk management capabilities are a key factor in determining the BCAR capital requirement for each rated insurer.
• Given the insurance industry’s evolving risk profile and the significant recent advancements made in risk management tools and practices, A.M. Best recognizes that a more economic, prospective view of capital can be another valuable supplement to the rating process. As a result:
• A.M. Best will consider allowing companies to maintain lower BCAR levels relative to the guideline for their ratings based on a case-by-case evaluation of an insurer’s overall risk management capabilities – relative to its risk profile.
4
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• A.M. Best is exploring ways to incorporate stochastic modeling in the development of risk factors within the BCAR model, and to more directly tie probability of default to the determination of capital required to support individual rating levels.
• A.M. Best also will consider the use of company-provided capital models in develop- ing capital requirements within the rating evaluation process.
Back to Basics: Financial Strength Ratings and Risk Management The objective of Best’s Ratings for insurance companies, both Financial Strength Ratings (FSR) and Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR), is to provide an opinion as to an insurer’s ability to meet its senior financial obligations, which are its obli- gations to policyholders. The assignment of an interactive rating is derived from an in-depth evaluation of a company’s balance sheet strength, operating perfor- mance and business profile, as compared with A.M. Best’s quantitative and qualita- tive standards.
In determining a company’s ability to meet its current and ongoing obligations, the most important area to evaluate is its balance sheet strength, since it is the foundation for policyholder security. Balance sheet strength measures the exposure of a company’s surplus to its operating and financial practices.
One of the primary tools used in the evaluation of balance sheet strength is Best’s Capi- tal Adequacy Ratio (BCAR), which provides a quantitative measure of the risks inherent in a company’s investment and insurance profile, relative to its adjusted capital. A.M. Best’s analysis of the balance sheet also encompasses a thorough review of various financial tests and ratios over a five-year period.
The assessment of balance sheet strength includes an analysis of an organization’s regu- latory filings, including the GAAP or IFRS balance sheet, at both the operating insur- ance company and consolidated level. To understand the strength and flexibility of an insurer’s balance sheet, a variety of tests and measures are reviewed, which include an assessment of the corporate capital structure, financial leverage, fixed charge coverage, liquidity, and historical sources and uses of capital.
While balance sheet strength is the foundation of the rat- ing process, the balance sheet provides only an assessment of capital adequacy at a point in time. A.M. Best views operat- ing performance and business profile as leading indicators when measuring future bal- ance sheet strength and poli- cyholder security (see Exhibit 2).
The term “future” is the key, since ratings are prospective and go well beyond a “static” balance sheet view. Profitabil- ity is the engine that ultimately
Strong Operating Performance Builds Balance Sheet Strength
Weak Operating Performance Erodes Balance Sheet Strength
Date of last
balance sheet
Present Future
Leading Indicators of the Future Balance Sheet
B al
an ce
-S he
et S
tr en
gt h
Time
BCAR Guideline
Business Profile Drives Strong and Sustainable Operating Performance
Exhibit 2 Impact of Operating Performance & Business Profile on the Balance Sheet
Source: A.M. Best Co.
5
Methodology Criteria – Universal
drives capital, and looking out into the future enables the analyst to gauge a company’s ability to preserve and/or generate new capital over time. In many respects, what deter- mines the relative strength or weakness of a company’s operating performance is a combination of its business profile and the ability of a company to effectively execute its strategy.
A strongly performing company, over time, will generate earnings sufficient to maintain a prudent level of risk-adjusted capital and optimize stakeholder value. Strong performers are those companies whose earnings are relatively consistent and deemed to be sustainable. Because of their track record and better-than-average earnings power, these companies typi- cally benefit from higher ratings and/or lower capital requirements relative to their peers.
On the other hand, companies that have demonstrated weaknesses in their earnings through either consistent losses or volatility are more likely to struggle to maintain or improve capital in the future. For these reasons, these companies typically are rated lower than their counterparts that perform well and/or usually are held to higher than minimum capital requirements to minimize the chance of being downgraded if current trends continue.
A.M. Best believes that risk management is the common thread that links balance sheet strength, operating performance and business profile. Risk management fundamentals can be found in the strategic decision-making process used by a company to define its business profile, and in the various financial management practices and operating ele- ments of an insurer that dictate the sustainability of its operating performance and, ulti- mately, its exposure to capital volatility. As such, if a company is practicing sound risk management and executing its strategy effectively, it will preserve and build its balance sheet strength and perform successfully over the long term – common objectives of both A.M. Best ratings and risk management.
“Necessity Is the Mother of Invention” Risk management tools and practices across the insurance industry have advanced significantly in recent years—and it’s a good thing they have. The industry has expe- rienced a number of events and trends since the turn of the millennium that have exposed, and will continue to expose, insurers to increased levels of risk and uncertainty:
• Economic conditions that generated sharp declines in equity and real estate markets, deterioration in credit markets and prolonged record-low interest rate environments.
• U.S. government impasse on fiscal policy and national debt that results in more pessimistic views of the credit quality of government debt and whether the debt is risk free.
• The Eurozone crisis that
Exhibit 3 Industry Risk Profile Trends
LOW HIGH Product Complexity
High Risk Profile
Low Risk Profile
LOW
HIGH
B
A
A) Exposure to Earnings and Capital Volatility increasing reflects the impact of: terrorism and cat exposures on loss ratios and reinsurance costs; additional risk and costs related to more complex products; and general economic conditions.
B) Product Complexity increasing due to market demand for more sophisticated products and additional guarantees, as well as heightened competition and regulatory scrutiny.
Source: A.M. Best Co.
Earnings and
Capital Volatility
6
Methodology Criteria – Universal
resulted in large investment losses related to sovereign debt, sovereign default, banking bailouts and a recession that had worldwide impacts.
• The continuing geopolitical unrest and the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks.
• Increased hurricane activity that produced multiple landfalls in a single season; repeated landfalls in areas assumed to have low annual probabilities of landfall; and damage farther inland than expected.
• Stronger than anticipated earthquake activity that demonstrated the correlation of losses across life, health and property/casualty sectors during extreme events.
• Record flooding impacting global supply chains and creating business interruption worldwide.
• The possible emergence of a global “bird flu” pandemic.
• Converging regulatory and economic views of capital adequacy, which are evident with the advent of EU Solvency II and principles-based regulatory reporting require- ments in the United States.
In addition to these event-related risk triggers, insurers – particularly in the retirement savings market – have been taking on more risk through their product development activities as insurers try to proactively address the ever-changing needs of an aging population.
The result is that the insurance industry overall has been trending toward a higher risk profile.
While the risks and level of uncertainty facing the industry have grown, the more prudent and capable insurers have taken steps to more effectively manage and miti- gate these risks and preserve policyholder security. Two areas where insurers have employed more advanced methods to address specific emerging risks are catastrophe risk management and dynamic hedging programs.
Common Themes – Principles-Based Solvency Requirements and Best’s Rating Approach
O ne of the key drivers of change in the insurance industry’s risk management landscape has been the convergence of regulatory and economic views of capital adequacy. Regulators across the globe, including those in Europe, the
United States and Canada, are moving away from their traditional factor- or rules- based solvency platforms to a more dynamic, principles-based regime. Furthermore, Solvency II in Europe; work being undertaken by various National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) working groups in the United States; and the most recent proposals prepared by the Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Require- ments (MCCSR) Advisory Committee (MAC) in Canada, all embrace core concepts that integrate risk management, corporate governance, internal capital modeling and increased transparency and disclosure as key components of the evolving capi- tal adequacy framework.
7
Methodology Criteria – Universal
These new regulatory regimes are attempting to tap into both insurance industry and supervisory best practices to create principles-based solvency requirements aimed at better reflecting each individual company’s risk profile and risk manage- ment practices. This is accomplished primarily by allowing insurers to use internally developed scenario or stochastic models as the basis for reporting their regulatory solvency requirement, if they meet certain minimum standards set by the regulators. In addition to the focus on more sophisticated financial requirements, the new sol- vency framework calls for an integrated set of regulatory requirements that consider risk management, corporate governance, market conduct and disclosure – as well as a dynamic and constructive internal risk assessment process by insurance company management – as key elements of a comprehensive solvency regime.
A.M. Best strongly supports the core concepts underlying these principles-based solvency regimes. A.M. Best believes these integrated platforms for the assessment of insurer capital adequacy promote greater emphasis on many of the same quan- titative and qualitative aspects of financial strength and long-term capital adequacy that are the foundation of A.M. Best’s interactive rating evaluation. Some of the com- mon themes shared by these emerging solvency requirements and A.M. Best’s rating approach are summarized below.
Focus on risk management as part of a balanced quantitative and qualitative review. The assignment of an interactive Best’s Rating is derived from an in-depth evaluation of a company’s balance sheet strength, operating performance and busi- ness profile as compared with A.M. Best’s quantitative and qualitative standards. A.M. Best believes that risk management is the common thread that links balance sheet strength, operating performance and business profile. An insurer that can demon- strate strong risk management practices that are integrated into its core operating processes, and effectively execute its strategic business plan, will maintain favorable ratings in an increasingly dynamic operating environment.
Support for the development of internal capital models. A.M. Best will con- sider the use of company-provided capital models in developing capital requirements within the rating evaluation process. A.M. Best believes that the primary benefit of a strong internal capital model is the aid it provides company management in under- standing and quantifying key risks and their correlations from a holistic point of view. The true value of any capital model is realized only when management employs it in the strategic decision-making process when assessing the impact of different business strategies, asset allocations, reinsurance structures, etc.
Risk management and capital modeling are not “one size fits all.” A.M. Best believes to remain competitive in today’s dynamic environment, build sustainable earnings and capital accumulation, and ultimately, maintain high ratings, complex organizations – such as insurers participating in the global reinsurance and retirement savings markets – must develop and constantly refine an ERM framework, including the development of internal economic capital modeling. For organizations with a more limited operating scope focusing on more stable, traditional lines of business, the ERM (and capital modeling) process may be less comprehensive or complex – at this time. However, the pending implementation of principles-based capital require- ments, and the significant efforts of sophisticated insurers to raise the bar on the risk management front, ultimately will become a competitive issue driving continued improvement and integration of ERM concepts for all insurers, regardless of size.
8
Methodology Criteria – Universal
Catastrophe Risk Management A.M. Best considers catastrophic loss, both natural and man-made, to be the No. 1 threat to the financial strength and policyholder security of property and casualty insurers because of the significant, rapid and unexpected impact that can occur. Of particular concern is the rapid escalation in insured exposures over the past decade – reflecting demographics and rising property values, combined with the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters.
Some experts in the fields of climatology and meteorology have submitted that global warming is contributing to the unprecedented number of severe events worldwide, representing a fundamental shift in the expectation for the frequency of their occur- rence in the future. In addition, the worldwide political environment and the technol- ogy of warfare have experts prognosticating that man-made events will occur with increasing frequency. Relatively benign storm seasons and the absence of a major, man- made catastrophe do not change the long-term dynamics; rather, they demonstrate the difficulty and uncertainty in predicting catastrophic events.
To manage and monitor catastrophic risk, most property and casualty insurers have uti- lized increasingly sophisticated catastrophe modeling tools, primarily those provided by specialized firms with extensive meteorological, seismological, statistical and technical resources. Hurricane seasons with multiple landfalling hurricanes serve as a reminder that while the models are extraordinarily useful in the analytical and underwriting pro- cess, they are only tools and cannot be relied upon solely for the management of catas- trophe exposures.
Strong catastrophe risk management is more than just an advanced model. Data quality, constant monitoring of aggregate and individual exposures, disciplined adherence to underwriting controls, and implementation of an integrated reinsurance program are all important elements of strong catastrophe risk management.
During the rating evaluation process, all these areas are assessed and considered along with the financial flexibility of a company to determine its ability to first, avoid a material loss to capital, and second, respond to any significant capital deterioration from such an event.
Dynamic Hedging The retirement savings segment long has been the growth engine for the domestic life insurance industry. As the baby boom generation nears retirement, the opportuni- ties for future growth in this business segment are enormous for companies that are well positioned in terms of product development, distribution and brand. However, with these potential rewards come significant risks – including risks that the insurance industry has not traditionally underwritten – that A.M. Best believes expose the indus- try’s earnings and capital base to greater volatility, both now and in the future.
The insurance industry long has been managing a host of risks inherent in offering annui- ties and other products and services within the retirement savings market. These risks include interest rate risk, asset/liability management and disintermediation risk. However, with the emergence of secondary guarantees within the variable product market and the introduction of equity-indexed products, new risks are emerging that will significantly influence the long-term financial strength of retirement savings providers.
The companies offering these benefit features are subject to two major risk categories that are, in some respects, outside the traditional risk parameters of the insurance industry:
9
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• Policyholder-based risks, which represent the exposure to adverse development based on the optionality in various product designs where the policyholder can control different elements of the product. As a result, many of the actions a policyholder can take can profoundly change the risk dynamics of the product.
• Capital-market-based risks, which are derived from the fact that the insurance com- pany is guaranteeing certain returns on the assets invested. These guarantees put some of the investment risk, which variable annuities previously had passed on to the policy- holder, back onto the insurance company’s balance sheet.
Insurers have made significant strides in limiting the impact of policyholder-based risks, through more intelligent product design that either limits the optionality within the product or ties certain policyholder decisions to the amount of protection provided by the guarantee.
The top writers of variable annuity products also have developed and implemented sophis- ticated hedging programs that help protect the company against adverse movements in the capital markets. Sophisticated risk management through hedging has become a critical fac- tor for success in the variable annuity market with the widespread consumer acceptance of new living benefits. These hedging programs use derivative instruments and are designed to mitigate the negative impact of swings in the equity markets.
However, similar to efforts made to predict and manage natural and man-made catas- trophe risk, dynamic hedging is far from an exact science. As such, as mentioned previ- ously, the rating evaluation process considers both the strength of the risk-mitigation process and the insurer’s financial flexibility when assessing financial strength.
“E”RM – What’s New? Enterprise risk management (ERM) has been one of the most significant and wide- spread additions to the insurance industry’s vocabulary in recent memory. While many may see ERM as a completely new process, A.M. Best considers ERM as a natural exten- sion of an insurer’s fundamental risk management practices, with the foundation still rooted in sound traditional controls and policies encompassing the five key categories of risk: credit, market, underwriting, operational and strategic.
What’s new about ERM is the “E,” which represents the development of an enterprisewide view of risk where insurers can identify, quantify and manage risk on a more holistic basis. ERM takes into consideration the individual risks at hand, as well as any correlations and interdependencies of risk across the entire organization. By overlaying this “enterprise” view of risk on top of the traditional silo approach to managing individual risks, insurers are cre- ating a more structured, integrated framework that – if prudently applied – can increase the value of the firm, while at the same time providing financial security to the organization.
A.M. Best believes ERM encompasses three key areas.
• Culture – the establishment of an environment throughout an organization, from the board level to senior management to business line management to the employee, that embeds risk awareness and accountability in daily operations, its corporate “DNA.”
• Identification and Management – the ability to consistently identify key risks across the entire organization, and to establish uniform controls and procedures to effectively manage and mitigate the impact of those risks to the organization.
10
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• Measurement – the use of sophisticated tools and data collection to quantify risks, includ- ing the impact of risk correlations within and among the five categories of risk, considering
STRONG CHARACTERISTICS WEAK CHARACTERISTICS
Set the Tone at the Top
Senior management establishes an environment and corporate framework that embeds risk awareness throughout the organization .
Senior management does not embrace and communicate a proactive approach to assessing risk within the organization .
Organization/governance structure recognizes the importance of an integrated risk management approach by placing responsibility for corpo- ratewide risk management with a member(s) of senior management with access to the board .
Risk management activities are fragmented throughout the organization and /or typically are viewed as individual tasks completed by lower level staff .
Board and senior management receive, and constructively critique, frequent reports on risk metrics and updates on key risk-management activities across the entire organization .
Board is not routinely apprised of ongoing risk management activities and tends to view risk management as a reactive, rather than proactive, process .
Senior management displays thorough understanding of key risks and risk mitigation practices across the entire organization .
Detailed understanding of the drivers of risk and the policies and proce- dures to mitigate risk resides at the business line or functional level .
Management objectives, and incentive compensation, are tied to risk man- agement objectives and risk/return measures approved by the board .
Management objectives and incentive compensation are tied to more tradi- tional measures of top-line growth or bottom-line results, without consider- ing the importance of risk-adjusted returns and risk management .
Establish and Clearly Communicate Risk Management Objectives
Board and senior management clearly define corporate risk profile – risk tolerance and risk management objectives – that supports overall corporate goals and expectations of key stakeholders .
Board and senior management view overall corporate goals and the estab- lishment of risk tolerances as mutually exclusive activities .
Senior management clearly communicates corporate risk profile to business unit management and requires business unit management to implement appropriate risk management practices .
Corporate risk profile and risk tolerances, or business unit management accountability, are not clearly documented or communicated .
Define Roles and Responsibilities
Appropriate segregation of duties between those responsible for monitor- ing/measuring risk and those responsible for making risk decisions .
Members of management responsible for monitoring/measuring risk also have the authority to make risk decisions .
Establish a separate, highly qualified department to take a holistic view of the company and coordinate risk management activities across the enter- prise, led by a member of senior management – chief risk officer (CRO) .
Risk management activities are embedded within various business lines and/or functional areas .
CRO is responsible for the establishment of an appropriate risk manage- ment framework, measuring and monitoring risk across the enterprise, pro- viding information to the board and senior management, and facilitating the ongoing risk management activities at the business-unit level .
No corporatewide risk management framework exists . Risk management information is not consistently provided to board or senior management .
Chief Executive Officer is responsible for executing corporate strategy based on information provided by the CRO and other inputs, and is ultimately responsible for the performance of the organization relative to its risks .
Risk management objectives and risk metrics are not fully integrated into overall corporate strategy .
Board provides active oversight and is responsible for understanding and constructively challenging management’s assessment of key risks to the enterprise and their approach to managing these risks .
Board is engaged on a case-by-case basis in reaction to loss events that already have occurred, rather than proactively encouraging ongoing risk assessment and analysis .
Business unit managers are directly responsible for managing risk within their areas of responsibility and implementing risk management practices in line with corporate directives .
Accountability for managing risk is not clearly defined .
Strategic Decision-Making Process
Business strategy and capital allocation are based upon risk-adjusted returns and other risk metrics consistent with the corporate risk profile .
Strategic and financial planning processes are not fully integrated with risk management framework .
Financial planning and budgeting process measures impact of projected financial results on corporate risk profile .
Financial planning and budget process is seen solely as a financial report- ing mechanism, not as part of an integrated strategic and risk management system .
Management can demonstrate how the risk/return decisions have improved/will improve the value of the company .
Management views risk management activities only as tools to avoid dete- riorating value, not as a vehicle to create value through prudent risk taking .
Source: A.M. Best Co.
Exhibit 4 ERM Characteristics—Culture
11
Methodology Criteria – Universal
the impact of general economic conditions, industry-specific events and extreme events, and report these risk assessments to senior management on a regular basis.
ERM Characteristics – Culture A.M. Best believes effective ERM starts at the top. In order to set the tone for sound risk management, A.M. Best believes there need to be clear directives established by senior
STRONG CHARACTERISTICS WEAK CHARACTERISTICS
Ability to identify, monitor and manage risk among (and within) the five cat- egories of risk – underwriting, market, credit, operational, and strategic .
Risk management process conducted independently throughout different departments and does not consider the potential impact of risk correlations .
Implemented an ongoing process for identifying and managing significant operational risks .
Operational risks are not captured or are discussed only after an event occurs .
Produce “exception reports” for all instances where scores/ratios are out- side maximum tolerances and list detailed plans to remedy .
Detailed analysis is only done once an issue impacts financial statements .
Decisions to enter/withdraw certain product lines, territories, coverages based upon impact on the entire corporation’s risk/return measure – dem- onstrating an organization’s ability to measure natural hedges/correlations .
Strategic decisions are made on a silo basis at the business-line level and are not viewed in light of the overall corporate risk/return objectives .
Reinsurance purchases are made based on overall corporate risk tolerances and provide protection from risk aggregation across lines or divisions .
Analysis of the impact of individual purchases on the overall corporate risk profile is not done .
Company adjusts its corporate risk profile and risk-management process based on past experience, pro forma model results and future stakeholder expectations and current market conditions .
Management does not learn from its mistakes by analyzing risk dynamics on an ongoing basis, and/or does not view the corporate risk profile as a constantly evolving concept .
Source: A.M. Best Co.
Exhibit 5 ERM Characteristics—Identification & Management
STRONG CHARACTERISTICS WEAK CHARACTERISTICS
Use of corporate scorecards to assess risk and measure against predeter- mined tolerances .
Risk management information is compiled and reviewed on an “ad hoc” basis, as opposed to being developed and analyzed routinely versus expect- ed results and predetermined risk tolerances .
“What if” scenario testing is done to quantify impact of unusual/unforeseen/ unlikely events on corporate risk profile (i .e . rating downgrade, interest rate shock, stock market crash) .
Financial planning process does not include stress testing of baseline assumptions, or any analysis of extreme events .
Management reports give information using risk/return measures that iden- tify areas where risk tolerances and objectives are not being met .
Management reports either don’t exist or are prepared using only traditional financial reporting measures and do not track performance versus risk tol- erances .
Use of well understood, proven economic capital (EC) models that capture all risks of the enterprise .
If an EC model exists, the model is not robust or is not widely utilized as a management tool .
EC model updated, tested and run frequently . EC model is run and reviewed only annually and is not viewed as a decision- making tool .
Risk/return measures and EC models can be created for short, medium and longtime horizons .
EC model and risk/return measures are viewed as annual planning tools that are not incorporated in ongoing business management .
Management reports and capital models capture correlations across the five risk categories, considering the impact on all risk categories of: - general economic conditions - industry-specific conditions - extreme events
Risk metrics and capital models do not routinely analyze effects of outside economic factors and market developments on risk correlations .
Risk-based or economic capital model can identify scenarios in which indi- vidual risks provide natural hedges to mitigate overall exposure, as well as risks that can compound overall exposure .
Models do not provide detail by scenario to quantify the impact of risk cor- relations .
Ability to determine effectiveness of company-implemented risk mitigation techniques, such as reinsurance and hedging .
Models do not provide detail to quantify value added by risk-mitigation techniques .
Source: A.M. Best Co.
Exhibit 6 ERM Characteristics—Measurement
12
Methodology Criteria – Universal
management and the board. Ultimately, it is the importance that the board of directors and senior management place on risk management that will determine the extent to which the management of risk is integrated across the entire organization.
A strong risk-aware culture also is based on a common language and understanding of risk among corporate officers and directors that enables collaboration on risk manage- ment issues across an organization, and a common set of risk-based rules governing accountability and incentive compensation.
Therefore, an essential part of assessing an insurer’s risk management capabilities is gaining an understanding of an organization’s corporate culture and the degree to which risk management is imbedded within the organization’s decision-making process. Strong and weak ERM characteristics are listed in Exhibit 4.
ERM Characteristics – Identification and Management A strong risk management culture is the starting point; however, the effectiveness of any risk management framework depends on an insurer’s ability to identify the key risks to the organization and to establish detailed controls and procedures to manage the potential impact of those risks to stakeholder value. Traditional risk management practices incorpo- rate a wide variety of risk identification and management activities across the five categories of risk. What ERM adds is a more comprehensive approach to the identification and man- agement of risk. ERM also incorporates the development of a consistent, corporatewide set of guidelines that formalize the broader risk process and allow for the sharing of informa- tion across business lines and functions. Strong and weak ERM characteristics are listed in Exhibit 5.
ERM Characteristics – Measurement In addition to identifying and managing individual risks, an extremely important compo- nent of ERM is the ability to consistently quantify those risks using sophisticated tools and data-collection procedures that ensure the data’s integrity. Another key component of measurement is the ability to assess the impact of risk correlations across the enter- prise. Certain correlations may be present that create natural hedges across business lines. Other correlations may be identified that could compound risks. A.M. Best believes that companies with more complex risks need to demonstrate that risk models appropriately
reflect such correlations. Strong and weak ERM characteristics are listed in Exhibit 6.
ERM and the Risk Management Framework A.M. Best believes that ERM – establishing a risk-aware culture; using sophisticated tools to identify and manage, as well as measure risk; and capturing risk correlations – is an increasingly important component of an insurer’s risk management framework.
The foundation of the risk management framework is the
Exhibit 7 Enterprise Risk Management Framework
Senior Management
Traditional Risk Management Practices
and Controls
Capital Management
“E”RM and EC
* Establish Risk-Aware Culture including proper alignment of management incentives * Implement Improved Risk Identification and Management * Develop Sophisticated Risk Measurement Tools
Source: A.M. Best Co.
13
Methodology Criteria – Universal
compilation of traditional risk management practices that historically have helped compa- nies monitor and manage their exposure to the five key cat- egories of risk: credit, market, underwriting, operational and strategic risk. These practices include a wide variety of pro- cesses and controls that enable an insurer to identify and moni- tor specific types of risk (see Exhibit 9).
• Credit Risk – Counterparty credit exposure from all poten- tial creditors, including agents, reinsurers, bond issuers and large, institutional clients.
• Market Risk – Exposure to liquidity events, asset/liability mismatches and risks in investment portfolios due to changes in equity prices, commodity prices, interest rates and exchange rates.
• Underwriting Risk – Financial exposures arising from various activities integral to the underwriting of insurance products, including: product development; regulatory rela- tions; establishing reserves and pricing metrics; analyzing loss experience, mortality, morbidity and lapses; and loss trends.
Insurers and the Capital Markets
T he insurance industry and the capital markets have become increasingly inter- twined in recent years, a direct result of the industry’s heightened risk profile and the economic realities of low interest rates and uncertain credit and equity markets.
For example, an increasing number of insurers effectively (and increasingly) are transfer- ring policyholder obligations to the capital markets via securitizations. Still others are utilizing various nontraditional capital-raising techniques offered by the capital markets, including hybrid securities and contingent capital arrangements, to bolster their capital positions and provide additional financial flexibility.
These various capital-markets activities are to a large extent the result of the insurance industry continuing to refine its capital-management processes, and in a broader sense, its risk-management framework. Having an ongoing relationship with the capital mar- kets also has forced many insurers to be more financially disciplined, which is a positive development.
The reality in today’s insurance marketplace is that prudent use of these capital-markets tools is becoming a core competency for the larger players. However, A.M. Best believes that the industry needs to continue to focus on the core, fundamental financial and risk management practices of sound underwriting and pricing, asset and liability manage- ment, credit analysis, and spread management as the primary tools for building financial strength.
Exhibit 8 Traditional Risk Management Framework
Capital
Management
Traditional Risk
Management Practices
and Controls
Capital Management
Senior Management
Traditional framework is still appropriate for many insurers. * Incorporating selected elements of ERM is prudent for all insurers * However, EC is beyond the scope of the traditional framework “E”RM
and EC
Traditional Risk- Management Practices
and Controls
Source: A.M. Best Co.
14
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• Operational Risk – Financial exposures arising from damage to a company’s reputa- tion or franchise value stemming from a wide variety of external and internal factors, such as: management change; business interruption; fraud; data capture; data security and integrity; claims handling; and employee retention.
• Strategic Risk – Financial exposures arising from adverse business decisions, improper implementation of decisions or a lack of response to industry changes.
Another integral part of the risk management framework is capital management. If a company’s traditional risk management practices are thought of as the processes and controls in place to monitor and manage individual risks, then capital management is the process by which a company provides a backstop to absorb losses that are not suf- ficiently mitigated by its traditional risk management practices. The primary sources of capital, and in turn financial flexibility, are retained earnings, debt markets and equity markets. Prudent capital management incorporates each of these sources in an inte- grated way to provide adequate financial resources for daily operations and expected growth, while anticipating potential needs for additional capital based on the risk pro- file of the entity.
ERM then provides senior management, the final part in the risk management frame- work, with a platform to view all the various risk management and capital management elements in a more holistic way. The bottom line is that strong, fundamental practices and processes encompassing traditional risk management, capital management and ERM provide a wealth of information and sophisticated tools. However, a company’s risk profile, and its ultimate success or failure, still are dictated by the decisions made by management.
ERM Is NOT “One Size Fits All” A.M. Best believes that assessing an insurer’s risk management capabilities – within the context of determining an insurer’s financial strength – should be viewed in light of a company’s operating scope and the complexity of its business. For those more complex organizations, such as insurers participating in the global reinsurance and retirement savings markets, or insurers with diverse operations covering a variety of products and distribution channels, ERM takes on increasing importance because of the size and complexity of the organization, and the relative risk and volatility in its various lines of business. A.M. Best believes these organizations must develop and constantly refine an ERM framework, including the development of internal economic capital modeling, to:
Credit Risk Default Downgrade Disputes Settlement lag Sovereign Concentration
Market Risk Equities Other Assets Currency Concentration Basis Reinvestment Liquidity ALM Interest Rate Sensitivity
Underwriting Risk UW Process Pricing Reserve Development Product Design Basis Frequency Severity Lapse Longevity Mortality and Morbidity Policyholder Optionality Concentration Economic Environment
Operational Risk Monetary Controls Financial Reporting Legal Controls Distribution IT Systems Regulatory Training Turnover Data Capture
Strategic Risk Competition Demographic/Social change Negative Publicity Rating Downgrade Customer Demands Regulatory/Political Capital Availability Technological
Exhibit 9 Major Categories of Risk
Source: A.M. Best Co.
15
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• remain competitive in today’s dynamic environment;
• build sustainable earnings and capital accumulation; and
• ultimately, maintain high ratings.
Meanwhile, for organizations with a more limited operating scope focusing on more stable, traditional lines of business, the ERM process may be less comprehensive or complex – at this time. However, the pending implementation of Solvency II in Europe, “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” regulatory reporting requirements in the United States, and the significant efforts of sophisticated insurers to raise the bar on the risk management front, ultimately will become a competitive issue driving continued improvement and integration of ERM concepts for all insurers, regardless of size.
For example, a small, disciplined insurer that operates as a single-state personal automo- bile writer, or a life company selling traditional protection products through a captive agency force, or a health insurer writing high-deductible products, may not benefit from the development and full implementation of a sophisticated ERM process, but incor- porating selected elements of ERM can help any company, regardless of size. A.M. Best believes every company can take steps to foster a risk-aware culture; improve its ability to consistently identify, monitor and manage risk on a quantitative basis; and consider the impact of risk correlations within its business model.
Across the insurance industry, there are many companies that produce consistently strong operating results, which support a very strong risk-adjusted capital position – each with its own approach to risk management. A.M. Best does not expect successful, well-managed companies with a limited business and risk profile to change their opera-
Correlations
A.M. Best’s Rating Components
Enterprise Risk Management Process
Decisions: Lines Segments Territories Limits Distribution Capital Structure Investments Reins. Program Growth
Business Profile: Lines Segments Territories Limits Distribution Reinsurance Management Team
Operating Performance: Level of Earnings Volatility of Earnings Sustainability of Earnings Revenue Composition and Growth Pattern
Balance Sheet Strength: Risk Adjusted Capital UW Leverage Asset Leverage Financial Leverage Capital Structure Quality of Capital Liquidity Reinsurance Program Asset Quality Reserve Adequacy Growth
Measurement and Monitoring of: Level of Earnings Volatility of Earnings Revenue Composition UW Risk Market Risk Credit Risk Operational Risk Liquidity Risk Correlations
Impact on: Risk Adjusted Capital Economic Capital Actual/Projected Capital Probability of Default Probability of Rating Downgrade
Exhibit 10 ERM Process & Rating Components
Source: A.M. Best Co.
16
Methodology Criteria – Universal
tions, hire a chief risk officer and build a sophisticated economic capital model to main- tain a high rating – as long as the company employs sound risk management practices relative to its risk profile and considering the risks inherent in the liabilities it writes, the assets it acquires and the market(s) in which it operates, and takes into consider- ation new and emerging risks.
In many cases, companies with a more limited operating scope, such as those mentioned above, can be managed effectively with traditional risk management practices, because the management teams are smaller and the risks more clearly defined and more easily understood. Consequently, the financial management and risk management tools required to effectively manage and monitor risk, and preserve policyholder security, are more basic. However, that does not mean that all small organizations are successful, or that manag- ing less complex companies is an easy task, because all organizations and business lines potentially are exposed to new and emerging risks. In some respects, managers of smaller organizations face a wider range of challenges than do their large company peers, simply because they “wear many hats” within their organizations.
Whether utilizing a formalized ERM framework, integrating selected elements of ERM into operating practices, or relying solely on a traditional risk management process, an insurer’s risk management is perceived by A.M. Best as paramount to long-term success. A.M. Best also believes companies that engage in sound risk management practices are typically less likely to fail because they’ve “considered the unexpected.” As such, within the rating process, each company – regardless of its size or complexity – is expected to explain how it mea- sures, monitors and manages risk on an ongoing basis.
An insurer that can demonstrate strong risk-management practices integrated into its core operating processes, and effectively execute its business plan, will maintain favor- able ratings in an increasingly dynamic operating environment. A.M. Best believes that risk management is embedded in an insurer’s “Corporate DNA” when risk metrics are integrated into corporate, business line and functional area objectives; and risk-return measures are incorporated into financial planning and budgeting, strategic planning, performance measurement and incentive compensation.
Risk Management and the Rating Process In the rating evaluation process, A.M. Best always has considered risk management and capital management to be core areas of assessment in determining a rating. As such, many of A.M. Best’s existing rating criteria speak to risk management and capital man- agement issues.
With the insurance industry overall trending toward a higher risk profile, and the introduction and ongoing development of ERM platforms, the ties that bind risk man- agement and ratings are becoming even stronger. Exhibit 10 shows the interaction between the risk management framework and the rating components.
While risk management is core to the rating evaluation process, A.M. Best has not estab- lished a separate rating category for risk management because the various components of the risk management framework are intertwined among the three key rating areas: balance sheet strength, operating performance and business profile.
However, because of the importance of risk management in the rating process, A.M. Best has added a separate section in its insurance reports that discusses an insurer’s risk management process.
17
Methodology Criteria – Universal
The impact of risk manage- ment on an insurer’s rating is based on the insurer’s risk profile and the insurer’s risk management capability rela- tive to that risk profile. An insurer’s risk profile is made up of both quantitative and qualitative risks. Exhibit 11 shows a number of quantita- tive and qualitative risks that A.M. Best contemplates when reviewing an insurer’s risk profile. An insurer’s risk man- agement capability is made up of both its traditional risk management processes and its enterprise risk manage- ment process. Exhibit 12 shows a number of risk man- agement areas that A.M. Best considers when reviewing an insurer’s risk management capabilities.
Insurers are expected to demonstrate that their risk management processes are appropriate for their risk pro- files. An insurer with a very high risk profile would need to demonstrate that it has a corresponding high level of risk management capability. For insurers with a low risk profile, traditional risk management practices alone may suffice. Whenever the insurer’s risk management capabilities are considered insufficient for its risk profile, this could have a negative impact in determining the insurer’s financial strength rating, resulting in a lower rating or requiring additional capital to maintain a certain rating. Conversely, when the insurer’s risk management capabilities exceed its risk profile, this is consid- ered a positive rating factor and could have a favorable impact on the insurer’s financial strength rating, resulting in a higher rating or lower capital requirements for a specified rating.
Volatility Is NOT A “Four-Letter” Word Insurance companies make money by managing various types of risk for individuals and other corporate entities—the risk of dying too young, experiencing a loss due to man-made or natural disasters, outliving your assets, and so on. Where there is risk, there is uncertainty, and where there is uncertainty, there is exposure to volatility.
From a ratings perspective, it is crucial to understand the historical and potential volatility the insurer’s balance sheet is exposed to, as well as the drivers of volatility. A.M. Best’s ratings are prospective, and understanding an insurer’s exposure to vola- tility in earnings and capital is at the heart of A.M. Best’s assessment of operating performance and business profile – the leading indicators of future balance sheet strength.
Exhibit 11 Quantitative & Qualitative Risks in A.M. Best’s Risk Profile Evaluation Market Risk Judicial Environment Credit Risk Economic Environment Underwriting Risk Growth Off-Balance-Sheet Risk Investments (quality, type, etc .) Operational Risk Liquidity Strategic Risk Financial Flexibility Capital Management Volatility of Results or Capital Line of Business Concentrations Correlation Among Lines or Risk Categories Data Quality Policy Limits Credit Quality of Reinsurers Product/Coverage Changes Ceded Leverage/Potential Disputes Competitive Environment Impact of Reinsurance Program Legislative/Regulatory Environment Management Philosophy Source: A.M. Best Co.
Exhibit 12 Capabilities Considered in A.M. Best’s Risk Management Review Market Risk – Bonds Off-Balance-Sheet Risk Market Risk – Stocks Operational Risk Market Risk – Other Strategic Risk Credit Risk – Bonds Capital Management Credit Risk – Reinsurance Risk Culture Credit Risk – Other Risk Identification Underwriting Risk – Pricing Risk Measurement Underwriting Risk – Reserving Risk Appetite/Tolerance Underwriting Risk – Event Risk Source: A.M. Best Co.
18
Methodology Criteria – Universal
However, it is important to note that the objective of A.M. Best’s rating evaluation pro- cess – similar to the fundamental goal of any sound risk management system – is not to encourage companies to eliminate risk and volatility, but to understand and evaluate each insurer’s risk profile and the reward received for that risk.
Risk management, especially robust ERM programs, allows an organization to identify and quantify its risks, set risk tolerances based on its overall corporate objectives and take the necessary actions to manage risk in light of those objectives. When done right, ERM allows companies to find the risk/reward balance that best meets their stakeholders’ expectations.
For some insurers, the right balance is to reduce volatility through measures such as the pur- chase of reinsurance, changes in business mix or the refinement of liability characteristics.
For others, the right balance is to accept their current level of volatility and focus on boosting returns through price actions, expense reductions, changes to reinsurance programs or business mix, etc.
In either case, A.M. Best believes that by developing a better understanding of risk and risk correlations through ERM, insurers can take advan- tage of inefficiencies in the market and improve stake- holder value.
Typically, management is try- ing simultaneously to strike a delicate balance among the interests of various stakehold- ers – including shareholders, policyholders, regulators and rating agencies. A.M. Best recognizes this dynamic and understands that higher rat- ings are not always an objec- tive of insurers. As such, for some companies, the right balance may be found by tak- ing actions that could be detri- mental to their ratings.
Impact of Risk Management on BCAR Requirements
A.M. Best’s Traditional Approach Clearly, BCAR is an impor- tant quantitative tool that helps A.M. Best differentiate between companies and indi- cate whether a company’s
Exhibit 13 ERM—Balancing Risk & Reward: Reduce Volatility
Today Future
Time
B CA
R
Average Returns
Baseline Strategy
BCAR Guideline
Stable Strategy Supports Higher
Rating
Source: A.M. Best Co.
Exhibit 14 ERM—Balancing Risk & Reward: Accept Volatility...Improve Returns
Today Future
Time
B CA
R
Average Returns
Baseline Strategy
BCAR Guideline
Return Strategy Supports Higher Rating (Despite
Volatility)
Source: A.M. Best Co.
19
Methodology Criteria – Universal
capitalization is appropriate for a particular rating level. How- ever, BCAR by itself never has been the sole basis for deter- mining any A.M. Best rating.
In many cases, companies with similar capital posi- tions – BCAR scores – might be assigned different ratings based on the integration of other important considerations unique to each insurance company. These other consid- erations include the various financial management prac- tices and operating elements of an insurer that ultimately dictate the sustainability of its operating performance and its exposure to capital volatility. In other words, a com- pany’s relative risk management capabilities are a key factor in determining the BCAR capital requirement for each rated insurer.
Exhibit 15 is a simple depiction of the relationship between an insurer’s relative risk management capabilities and the BCAR capital requirements. In the chart, the rela- tive risk management capabilities of an insurer are depicted as either Strong or Weak. In reality, the assessment is not nearly as “black and white;” rather, there is a range of relative results. The vertical axis represents the BCAR Requirement or score. The hor- izontal axis represents the relative Exposure to Earnings and Capital Volatility, which considers both the inherent volatility in a company’s business mix and the volatility in reported results. In assessing a company’s Exposure to Earnings and Capital Volatil- ity, A.M. Best considers a number of factors.
• Review of the relative risk inherent within the insurer’s business profile – including the political and regulatory environment – and other elements of strategic and oper- ating risk.
• Earnings and capital trends, including an analysis of the drivers behind the trends so that the long-term sustainability of earnings as a source of capital accumulation can be assessed.
• Comparison of current and prior projections (provided by company management) to actual results, and review of the assumptions used to develop those projections, to assess the insurer’s ability to anticipate changes in its operating environment and recog- nize the potential impact of such changes.
The key points to take away from this chart are:
1. Only companies with STRONG risk management capabilities and LOW relative expo- sure to volatility are allowed to maintain BCAR levels at or near the guideline for their rat- ings. STRONG risk management capabilities are defined as strong, traditional risk manage- ment fundamentals, relative to the insurer’s risk profile, in each of the five key risk types, AND sound financial flexibility.
Exhibit 15 Risk Management & BCAR — A.M. Best’s Traditional Approach
LOW HIGH
Exposure to Earnings and Capital Volatility BC
AR
Weak Risk Management
Strong Risk Management
BCAR Guidelines
Source: A.M. Best Co.
20
Methodology Criteria – Universal
2. Companies with WEAK risk management capabilities need to maintain a higher level of required capital – BCAR score – even if there is LOW relative exposure to volatility. WEAK risk management capabilities are evident when traditional risk management practices are insufficient in one or more of the five key risk areas, AND financial flexibility is limited.
3. As the exposure to volatility increases, the BCAR requirement increases at a more rapid rate, i.e. the slope of the line is steeper, for companies with WEAK risk management capabilities.
The chart is intentionally not drawn to scale, because there are an infinite number of combinations and permutations of the various factors evident across the population of rated companies. However, the fundamental approach of determining BCAR capital requirements in light of a company’s exposure to volatility, and its ability to measure, monitor and manage that volatility through risk management practices, has been (and always will be) core to the rating process.
A .M . Best’s Approach Evolves Recognizing the development of robust ERM frameworks, as well as the advances in some of the traditional risk management practices employed by the industry, such as the use of more sophisticated catastrophe modeling and dynamic hedging programs, A.M. Best is modifying its approach to determining BCAR capital requirements (see Exhibit 16). The fundamental difference in the revised approach is that for companies with STRONG risk management capabilities, A.M. Best will consider allowing compa- nies to maintain lower BCAR levels relative to the guideline for their ratings based on a case-by-case evaluation of an insurer’s overall risk management capabilities – relative to its risk profile. However, the bar has been raised to incorporate more advanced tools and metrics employed by sophisticated insurers. To qualify for this treatment, compa- nies typically will have ALL of the following:
1. Superior traditional risk management fundamentals, relative to the insurer’s risk pro- file, in each of the five key risk types.
2. Superior capital management and financial flexibility, providing the organization with cost-efficient access to capital even in distressed scenarios.
3. Strong ERM characteristics (as described earlier).
4. Strong Economic Capital modeling capabilities (as described below).
All companies that demonstrate these characteristics will potentially be held to lower capital requirements at their current rating level. In addition, for companies with a com-
Exposure to Earnings and Capital Volatility
BCAR Guidelines
Exhibit 16 Risk Management & BCAR — A.M. Best’s Revised Approach
LOW HIGH
BC AR
Weak Risk Management
Strong Risk Management …
What’s New… A.M. Best will consider allowing companies with STRONG risk management to maintain lower BCAR levels relative to the guideline for its rating
Source: A.M. Best Co.
21
Methodology Criteria – Universal
bination of STRONG risk management capabilities (as described above) and relatively low exposure to earnings and capital volatility, A.M. Best will consider allowing compa- nies to maintain BCAR levels below the guideline for their ratings.
ERM and Economic Capital Models As mentioned earlier, A.M. Best believes that ERM encompasses a wide range of activi- ties, including the use of sophisticated tools to identify and quantify risks. One of the tools often used to quantify risks, and measure the volatility and correlation of risks, is an economic capital (EC) model. A.M. Best believes that a strong EC model can be a valuable tool to an insurer, but it is just one of many tools and processes utilized within the overall risk management framework, i.e. ERM is more than just an EC model.
A strong EC model provides a sound basis for analyzing the risk-adjusted returns (i.e. EC is the denominator) of an insurer; however, an EC model is not simply a financial-report- ing system. The benefit of a strong EC model is the aid it provides in understanding the insurer’s risks and their correlations from a holistic point of view. The true value of an EC model is realized only when management employs it in the strategic decision-mak- ing process when assessing the impact of different business strategies, asset allocations, reinsurance structures, etc.
At the present time, BCAR is the starting point for A.M. Best’s assessment of bal- ance sheet strength. Over time, as A.M. Best becomes comfortable with an insurer’s EC model, consideration could be given to the output from a strong EC model in the rating evaluation. A strong EC model must be able to capture the material risks associated with each of the major categories of risk listed in Exhibit 9. A.M. Best recognizes that certain elements of operational and strategic risk are not easily quan- tified. However, A.M. Best believes these risks are real and that companies must over time develop methods to estimate the impact of these risks. In the interim, A.M. Best expects companies to allocate some portion of capital within their internal EC mod- els as a placeholder.
Characteristics of Strong EC Models: • Address correlations within and across the five risk categories above, incorporating reasonably conservative assumptions on positive correlations.
• Contemplate increased correlations with larger events.
• Show the volatility in results.
• Reflect the benefits of diversification.
• Reflect the dangers of concentrations.
• Reflect the macro economy.
• Reflect the stages of the underwriting cycle.
• Can reflect changing reinsurance environment.
• Can accept deterministic scenarios for testing.
• Provide sufficient data to explain extreme events.
22
Methodology Criteria – Universal
• Parameters fit company data well.
• Parameters updated/reviewed regularly.
• Staff dedicated to the EC model.
• Quality of input data reviewed/audited/tested.
• Model output easy to read/understand.
• Results can be tied to objectives.
• Results can be tied to probability of default.
• Produce cash-flow projections for each scenario.
• Model has tested well against historical adverse events.
• Can produce volatilities over different time frames.
Through the development of an integrated framework, combining the key elements of risk, companies have better tools at their disposal to optimize stakeholder value by allo- cating capital to the risks that provide the best risk/reward opportunities, and/or to prod- ucts that provide the most optimal diversification benefit, which can be used as a hedge against existing product offerings. In doing so, an insurer is better prepared to determine the levels of economic capital allocated to certain product lines, ultimately resulting in optimal capital utilization and maximizing risk-adjusted returns within each product line.
A.M. Best may give more consideration to EC models as confidence in those models increases. Obviously, this will take time, as A.M. Best will need to see that company management is relying on the model to make business decisions, and that these deci- sions are validated over time. As part of this process, A.M. Best expects insurers to dis- close their corporate risk tolerance or appetite in relation to earnings and/or capital, as well as their risk tolerance and key risk metrics by major line of business, which may include aggregate and single-event risk metrics used to manage certain exposures.
Management also must demonstrate that it can explain the model and its output. Members of management should be ready to show how the model helps them to understand the vol- atility of their risks, the underlying correlations of those risks and the drivers of the volatility. A.M. Best expects companies to discuss actual results compared with the risk tolerance and key metrics. This should highlight any variances from expected results and any correspond- ing steps taken to bolster the overall ERM process. Eventually, as actual results are compared with expected results, the model will develop a track record as a dynamic management tool that either will prove or disprove its value to the company. This information and analysis will be reviewed and discussed at the annual company rating meeting and incorporated into the determination of capital requirements and the overall rating analysis.
Direction of Future Model Improvements and Capital Requirements As mentioned earlier, BCAR is one of the primary tools used in the evaluation of bal- ance sheet strength. The BCAR model provides a quantitative measure of the risks inherent in a company’s investment and insurance profile, relative to its capital. A.M. Best reviews the BCAR model on an ongoing basis and makes modifications to enhance
23
Methodology Criteria – Universal
the model in response to industry dynamics—including changes in financial reporting requirements, significant regulatory and product developments, and industry trends.
However, BCAR provides only one view of capitalization, using public financial statements as a base. To develop a more comprehensive view of an insurer’s pro- spective financial strength and flexibility, A.M. Best’s assessment of balance sheet strength also includes an analysis of an organization’s regulatory filings, including the GAAP or IFRS balance sheet, corporate capital structure, financial leverage, operating leverage, fixed-charge coverage, liquidity, and historical sources and uses of capital.
Given the insurance industry’s evolving risk profile and the significant recent advance- ments made in risk management tools and practices, A.M. Best recognizes that a more economic, prospective view of capital can be another valuable supplement to the rat- ing process. As a result, A.M. Best also is exploring ways to incorporate stochastic mod- eling in the development of risk factors within the BCAR model, and to more directly tie probability of default to the determination of capital required to support individual rating levels. The probability of default factors will be based on insurance company insolvency and impairment statistics compiled by A.M. Best.
In addition, A.M. Best will consider the use of company-provided capital models in devel- oping capital requirements within the rating evaluation process. A.M. Best will consider using the output of company-provided capital models (that incorporate all the character- istics of strong EC models described above) for analytical purposes; however, the BCAR still will be published as a common, industrywide baseline for capital adequacy.
Appendix: Enterprise Risk Management* – Key Topics & Meeting Agenda Items
ERM Framework and Culture Board and Senior Management Involvement
Establishment and Communication of Risk Management Objectives Risk Tolerance and Key Risk Metrics Roles, Responsibilities and Oversight Strategic Decision Making
Risk Identification and Management Traditional Risk Management (Underwriting, Credit and Market/Liquidity are covered throughout annual rating meeting) Exception Reporting – Performance vs . Key Risk Metrics (by functional area and/or risk type) Action Plans for Exception Items Operational Risk and Strategic Risk Emerging Risk Issues
Risk Measurement and Capital Modeling Management Reporting – Performance vs . Risk Tolerance (corporate-wide, by line of business, by risk type) Risk Correlation Tools (Economic Capital or Other) Used to Determine Required Capital and Capital Allocation Disclosure of EC Results – Internal, Rating Agency, External Data Integrity – Completeness and Accuracy of EC Inputs Independent Review of Modeling Process
Management's Perspective on Key Risks Top 5 Risk Exposures and Critical Success Factors to Managing these Exposures Lessons Learned through ERM Development Process Next Steps in ERM Development
* A.M. Best's evaluation of a company's ERM capabilities will vary depending on an insurer's scope of operations, size and complexity of risk. During the annual rating review, the discussion of risk management practices and ERM may be interspersed throughout the meeting, or it may be included in a separate, comprehensive ERM discussion. In either case, the topics listed above will be incorporated into the final rating evaluation
Published by A.M. Best Company
Methodology CHAIRMAN & PRESIDENT Arthur Snyder III
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT Larry G. Mayewski
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT Paul C. Tinnirello
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENTS Manfred Nowacki, Matthew Mosher, Rita L. Tedesco, Karen B. Heine
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